Holding

An eviction decree based on a landlord’s personal requirement remains enforceable and may be executed by the landlord’s legal representatives, and subsequent events cannot be taken into account once the decree has become final.

Summary

The landlord obtained a decree of possession against the tenant under Section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, on the ground of bona‑fide personal requirement to start a business. The landlord died before the tenant vacated, and his heirs sought to execute the decree. The tenant argued that the decree became unenforceable on the landlord’s death and could not be inherited. The Supreme Court held that a decree based on personal requirement remains enforceable until it becomes final, and once final it cannot be reopened on the basis of subsequent events; the decree becomes part of the landlord’s estate and may be executed by his legal representatives. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, restoring the executing court’s order.

Issues considered

Whether an eviction decree granted on the ground of the landlord's personal requirement becomes inexecutable upon the landlord's death.
Whether the legal representatives of a deceased landlord can execute such a decree.
Whether events occurring after the decree becomes final can be considered to reopen or modify the decree.

Legislation cited

Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961s. 21(1)

Subjects

evictionpersonal requirementdecree finalityKarnataka Rent Control Actlegal representativesexecution of decreesubsequent eventslandlord death

Judgment

A P.V. PAPANNA AND ORS. .L..

v.
K. PADMANABHAIAH

FEBRUARY 4, 1994

B [S. MOHAN AND M.K MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961: Section 21(1)--Landlord-Eviction
decree against tenant on the ground of bona fide personal requirement-Death
of landlord-Eviction decree-Whether becomes ittexecutable-Events sub-
•
c sequent to the filing of petition-When can be taken into account-Subseqent
events whether could be taken note of during execution stage.

The appellants' predecessor-in-interest, landlord, obtained a decree
of possession against the respondent-tenant on the ground that the suit
premises were bona fide required for his personal requirement to start a
D business. The respo~dent-tenant preferred a revision before the High
~
Court which dismissed the same but granted him 4 years time to vacate
the prem~seS,. The special leave petition filed by the tenant challenging the
order of the High Court was dismissed. However, before the expiry of 4
years granted by the High Court the landord died leaving a will bequeath-
E ing the suit premises to his brother, wife and his son, i.e., the appellants.

On failure of the respondent- tenant to vacate the premises within
4 years the appellants filed an execution application which was resisted by
the tenant contending that (1) the order of eviction having been made ,;_
solely on the ground of bona fide use and occupation of premises by the
F deceased landlord to carry on a business, it became inexecutable on his
death; (ii) the order of eviction being personal it could not be inherited by
or assigned in favour of the legal representatives.

The Executing Court passed an order directing issuance of a delivery
warrant holding that (i) once th, decree for eviction had become final it
G could not be agitated that the decree had become infructuous as the
personal requirement of landlord for his own use and occupation had ,.
come to an end with his death; (ii) on the death of the landlord the rights
created by the decree stood transfered in favour of the legal representatives
and the same could not be defeated on the ground that the decree holder
H had died. On revision, the High Court set aside the order of the Executing
642
PAPANNA v. PADMANABHAIAH 643

Court and dismissed the eviction petition on the grounds that (i) the cause A
of action did not survive on the death of the landlord and that (ii) the·
legatees, claiming as legal representatives of the deceased landlord, could
not execute the decree for eviction which was purely personal. Against the
decision of the High Court appeal was preferred in this Court.

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High B
Court, this Court

HELD: 1. In a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide require-
ment of premises by landlord the subsequent events ought to be taken into
account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still required C
. the premises in possession of the tenant. However, such an enquiry can be
made so long as the decree for eviction does not become final. In other
words, once the matter has become final in the sense that the order of
eviction bas been upheld by the highest Court in which it was sought to be
challenged, it would not be open to further challenge, which necessa~ily
can be in the execution stage. This conclusion inevitably follows from the D
well settled principle that a Court executing the decree cannot go behind
the decree for it is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit.
Therefore, the Executing Court is required to execute the decree as it finds;
save in exceptional cases where the decree on the face of it may be found
to be without jurisdiction. [647-H, 648-A-B] E
2. Events which take place subsequent to the filing of an eviction
petition under any Rent Act can be taken into consideration for the
purpose of adjudication until a decree is made by the final Court deter-
mining the rights of the parties but any event that takes place after the
decree becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopening the decree. F
The finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot be reopened
by the executing Court for re-adjudication on the ground that some event
or the other has altered the situation. [649-E]

2.1. Once the decree became final it became a part of the estate of
the landlord and therefore the appellants as legal representatives of the G
deceased landlord are entitled to execute the same. [649-F]

Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 1711; P.
Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, A.1.R. (1975) S.C.1409; Syed
Asadullah Kazmi v. Addi. Distt. Judge Allahabad, A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 1724 H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 1 S.C.R.

A and M/s. Variety Emporium v. R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim, A.I.R. (1985) S.C. 207,
relied on.

D.K Soni v. P.K Mukherjee, [1988) 1S.C.C.29 and Yasimsah Fak-
ruddinsab Dori v. Basappa A/F Basappa Hanaraki (Dead) by L.rs., [1991) 2
K.LJ. 219, distinguished.
B
Dr. Mohd. Ibrahim v. Rahim Khan, (1947) II M.LJ. 419, disappr'-'ved.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 622 of
1994.

C From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.1991 of the Karnataka
High Court in C.R.P. No. 4138 of 1990.

S.S. Javali, M. Shivappa and P.R. Ramasesh for the Appellants.

D C. Seetharamaiah, M.R. Janardhana and P. Mahale for the Respon-
dent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. Special leave granted.
E 1. This appeal stems from the judgment and order dated October 31,
1991 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Civil Revision Petition No.
4138 of 1990. Facts and circumstances leading to this appeal are as under:

On March 22, 1973 one P.V. Jayashankar filed an application in the
F first Court of the Munsiff at Bangalore under Section 21(1) of the Kar-
nataka Rent Control Act, 1961 seeking recovery of possession of his
non-residential premises from his tenant, the respondent herein. Though
recovery of possession was sought for on various grounds the.trial Court,
by its judgment and order dated October 24, 1980, allowed the application
solely on the ground that t:::,e suit premises were bona fide required by the
G landlord for his personal use and occupation and directed the tenant to
hand over vacant possession of the same to Shri J ayashank:ar. The trial .,.
Court granted two years' time to the tenant to comply with its direction.
Against the order of eviction the tenant preferred a revision petition in the
High Court of Karnataka which was dismissed on December 19, 1993. The
H High Court, however, granted four years' time to the tenant to vacate the
PAPANNA v. PADMANABHAIAH [MUKHERJEE, J.] 645

premises. Assailing the order of dismissal of his revision petition, the tenant A
filed a Special Leave petition in this Court which was also dismissed.

2. Before the period of four years granted by the High Court to the
tenant to vacate the premises expired, Jayashankar died - on October 26,
1986, to be precise. He left behind a will dated June 11, 1986 under which
the suit premises were bequeathed to his brother, his wife and their son, B
the three appellants herein.

3. On the failure of the tenant to vacate the premises within the
period of four years, which expired on December 31, 1987, the appellants,
as legatees under the will and legal representatives of the deceased C
Jayashankar, filed an application for execution of the order for eviction in
the Court of the Small Causes, Bangalore on March 7, 1988. In resisting
the execution, the tenant first contended that the order for eviction having
been made solely on the gound of bona fide use and occupation of the
premises by J ayashankar to carry on a business, it had become ineffective,
unenforceable and inexecutable on his death. The tenant next contended D
that the order of eviction being personal, it could not be inherited by or
assigned in favour of the legal representatives. The tenant also assailed the
genuiness of the will.

4. Overruling the objections raised by the tenant, the Executing Court
passed an order on July 20, 1990 directing issuance of a delivery warrant. E
The Executing Court took the view that, sitting in execution, it could nc»
go behind decree. According to the Court, once the decree for eviction
had become final it could not be agitated that the decree had become
infructuous as the personal requirement of landlord for his own use and
occupation had come to an end with his death. The Court lastly held that F
on the death of the landlord the rights created by the decree stood
transferred in favour of the legal representatives and the same could not
be defeated on the ground that the decree holder had died.

5. Aggrieved by the order of the Executing Court, the tenant
preferred a revision petition before the High Court. By its judgment and G
order dated October 31, 1991, the High Court allowed the petition, set
.... aside the order of the ExeC11ting Court and dismissed the eviction petition
on the grounds that the cause of action did not survive on the death of the
landlord and that the legatees, claiming as legal representatives of the
deceased landlord, could not execute the decree for eviction which was H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A purely personal.

6. In the context of the admitted facts that Jayashankar sought
recovery of possession of the suit premises for his personal requirement to
·start a business of his own and that he died after the Special Leave petition
filed by the tenant in this Court against the order of eviction was dismiSsed,
B the only question which requires an answer in this appeal is whether the
order thereby became inexecutable.

7. This Court has consi<>tently held that when eviction of a tenant is
sought for on the ground of personal need of the landlord, such need mu:;t
C not only exist on the date of the suit but must also exist when higher courts
deal with the order of eviction in appeal or in revision. Reference in this
connection may first be made to Hasmat Rai v. Reghunath Prasad, A.l.R.
(1981) S.C. 1711, where relying upon its earlier decision in the case of P.
Venkateswarlu v. The Motor& General Traders, A.I.R. (1975) S.C. 1409, this
D Court held that it was incontrovertible that where prossession was sought
for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement
pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but
must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction was made. This
Court emphasised that if during the progress and passage of the proceed-
ing from Court to Court subsequent events had occurred which, if noticed,
E would non-suit the landlord, the Court had to examine and evalute the
same and mould the decree accordingly. This Court observed that the
tenant was entitled to demonstrate that the need or requirement of the
landlord no more existed by pointing out such subsequent events to the
Court, including the appellate Court. In such a situation, it would be
incorrect to say that as the decree or order for eviction was passed against
F
the tenant he could not invite the Court to take into consideration sub- .
sequent events. The Court lastly observed:

"He (the tenant) can be precluded from so contending
when the decree or order for eviction has become final".
G
(emphasis supplied)
.,..
.

8. In concurring with the above observations made by Justice D.A.
Desai for himself and Justice E.S. Venkataramiah (as His Lordship then
H was), Justice R.S. Pathak (as His Lordship then was) said:
PAPANNA v. PADMANABHAIAH[MUKHERJEE,J.] 647

"......it is well settled now that in a proceeding for the A
ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal require-
ment under a statute controlling the eviction c~ tenants,
unless the statute prescribes to the C(llltrary, the require-
ment must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding
is disposed of either in appeal or revision, by the relevant
B
authority".

(emphasis supplied)
• 9. In Syed Asadullah Kazmi v. Addi. Distt. Judge, Allahabad, A.LR.
(1981) S.C. 1724, it was held by this Court that the order of the appellate C
authority releasing a portion of the premises in favour of the third respon-
dent therein and leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the
appellant acquired finality when the proceedings taken against it by the
appellant had failed. The Court observed that as the order which had been
taken to the Highest Court had become final the Prescribed Authority was
bound to give effect to the same and in so doing it was not acting outside D
his jurisdiction or contrary to law. This Court then observed: -

"It is true that subsequent events must be taken into
account by a statutory authority or Court when consider-
ing proceedings arising out of a landlord's petition for E
ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's
personal need. But in the present case, the order for release
of a portion of the accommodation acquired finality before
the death of Raj Kumar Sinha and the controversy con-
cluded by it could not be reopened".
F
(emphasis supplied)

The observations made in Hasmat Rai (supra) were quoted with
approval in Mis Variety Emporium v. RM. Mohd. Ibrahim, A.l.R. (1985)
s.c. 207. G
10. From the various observations made in the cases referred to
above it is patently clear that this Court, while laying down that in irsuit
for eviction on the gound of bona fide requirement of premises by landlord
the subsequent events ought to c'! taken into account for the purpose of
finding out whether the landlord still required the premises in possession H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A of the tenant, has also laid down that such an enquiry can be made so long
as the decree for eviction does not become final. In other words, once the :j,.-
matter has become final in the sense that the order of eviction has been
upheld by the Highest Co~ in which it was sought to be challenged, it
would not be open to further challenge, which necessarily can be in the
B execution stage. This conclusion inevitably follows from the well settled
principle that a Court executing the decree cannot go behind the decree
for it is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit. Therefore,
the Executing Court is required to execute the decree as it finds: save in ·
exceptional cases where the decree on the face of it may be fouLd to be
without jurisdiction. To put it differently, the Executing Court cannot
C enquire as to why the decree was passed but for the purpose of finding out
whether the decree is a valid one or a nullity it can go into the question as
to whether the Court which passed the decree was competent to do so.
Besides, the Executing Court may if need be, look into the pleadings of the
parties and the proceedings of the trial, for the limited purpose of constru-
D ing the decree or the meaning of the words used therein.

11. The learned counsel for the tenant, however, strongly relied upon
the following observation iu D.K Soni v. P.K Mukherjee, [1988) 1 S.C.C.29.

"......We recognise that unless the statute expressly
E prohibits as it did in the instant case, by the aforesaid
clause, cautious recognition of subsequent events to mould
the relief should be taken note of''.

to contend that subsequent events could be taken note of even at the
p execution stage as there was no statutory inhibition to such recognition.
Read in isolation, the above quoted observation may seem to support the
above contention of the tenant .but when the judgment is read as a whole
it completely negatives the contention. ·

G ·12. In D.K Soni (supra} the Court reiterated the ratio of Hasmat Rai
(supra) and Syed Asadullah Kazmi (supra) as quoted earlier and held that
finality of judicial decision was one of the essential ingredients upon which
admiinistration of justice must rest. Therefore, the above quoted observa- -.,.
tion has to be read in the context of the facts and circumstances of that
case and understood in the light of the provisions of the U.P. Rent Act
H . which came up for consideration there.
PAPANNA v. PADMANABHAIAH [MUKHERJEE, J.] 649

13. The learned counsel for the tenant then relied upon a Division A
Bench Judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Yasimasah Fakruddinsab
Dori v. Basappa A/F Basappa Hangaraki (Dead) by L.rs., [1991) 2 K.LJ.
219 wherein it has been held that as the landlord sought recovery of
possession of the suit premises for running a business of his own and he
subsequently died, the cause of action perished with his death. The facts B
of that case are clearly distinguishable as, unlike ours, there the landlord
died during the pendency of the revision petition filed by the tenant against
the trial court's order for eviction.

14. The learned counsel lastly relied upon a judgment of the Madras
High Court in Dr. Mohd. Ibrahim v. Rahim Khan, (1947) II M.L.J. 419. C
Undoubtedly that case supports him as it upheld the contention of a tenant
that on the death of the landlady the order for recovery of possession had
become unenforceable, but then we regret our inability to rely upon the
same; firstly, because in the judgment there is no rationale for accepting
the above contention and secondly, because of the judgments of this Court
referred to earlier. D
15. For the foregoing discussion, we must hold that events which
take place subsequent to the filing of an eviction petition under any Rent
Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until
a decree is made by the final Court determining the rights of the parties E
but any event that takes place after the decree becomes final cannot be
made a ground for reopening the decree. The finality to the dispute
culminating in the decree cannot be reopened by the executing Court for
readjudication on the ground that some event or the other has altered the
situation. As a corollary thereto it must also be held that once the decree
became final it became a part of the estate of the landord and therefore F
the appellants as legal representatives of the deceased landlord are entitled
to execute the same.

16. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the
High Court and restore that of the Executing Court. However, there will G
be no order as to costs.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed.