Holding

A dying declaration can form the basis of conviction only if it inspires confidence in its reliability; the present declaration did not, so the conviction cannot stand.

Summary

On 20 December 1980 a bomb attack injured Sriram Singh, who later died. His dying declaration, recorded by a magistrate in the presence of a doctor, implicated Panchdeo Singh as being present at the scene. The magistrate asserted the deceased was in a fit state of mind, but no medical certification or doctor's signature was obtained, and the magistrate could not recall whether the deceased had signed the statement. The trial court and the High Court convicted Panchdeo Singh under IPC sections 302, 148, 149 and 324 solely on this declaration. The Supreme Court examined whether a dying declaration lacking medical certification and clear signature can alone constitute reliable evidence. It held that a dying declaration is admissible as substantive evidence only if it engenders confidence in the court, which was absent here; consequently the conviction was set aside and the appellant released.

Issues considered

Whether a dying declaration recorded without a doctor's certification of fitness and with uncertainty about the declarant's signature can be the sole basis for conviction under Section 302 IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 324

Subjects

dying declarationreliabilityevidenceconvictionIPC 302medical certificationcorroborationIndian Evidence Actconfidence of court

Judgment

PANCHDEO SINGH A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR

DECEMBER 7, 2001

[UMESH C. BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] B

Evidence Act, 1872 : Section 32.

Dying declaration-Reliability of-Accused-Conviction based on dying
declaration-Statement in declaration as to presence of accused at the scene of C
crime-Declaration recorded by Magistrate in the presence of Doctor-Satis-
faction of Magistrate that injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making
declaration-No medical certification that injured was in a fit state of mind-
Held, not safe to rely upon such a declaration.

Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 302, 148 and 149. D

Murder-Accused-Conviction based on dying declaration-Validity of

The appellant was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149
oflndian Penal Code, 1860. He was also convicted under Section 324 of the
1
I.P.C. read with Sections 148 and 149. The conviction and sentence of life
E
imprisonment imposed on the appellant by the Trial Court was affirmed
by the High Court. Both the Trial Court as well as the High Court relied on
a statement of the deceased in the dying declaration with regard to pres·
ence of the appellant accused at the site of the occurrence. The declaration
was recorded by a Magistrate in the presence of a Doctor. Though the F
Magistrate opined that injured was in a fit state of mind of making a
declaration yet no certification to that effect or signature of the Doctor was
taken on the declaration. In his evidence, the Magistrate also deposed that
he did not recollect as to whether the deceased put up his signature on the
declaration. The question in this appeal is as to whether snch a declaration G
by itself would tantamount to substantial evidence against the appellant
warranting the conviction and sentence as affirmed by the High Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

H
503
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A HELD : 1. A dying declaration itself can be treated as a substantive
piece of evidence and can be the basis of an order of conviction and
sentence without there being any corroboration, provided, however, the
same brings forth a sense of confidence and trustworthiness in the mind of
the Court. lle declaration most be such so as to evoke confidence in the
factual context. [510-B; DJ
B
2. In the instant case Court is unable to record its confidence on the
declaration so as to lend support and concurrence to the judgment under
appeal. It is only the Judicial Magistrate, who has staled from the witness
box that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement and he
c was otherwise satisfied in regard thereto. The Doctor was available but
unfortunately there is neither any certification as regards the state of the
condition of the declarant nor even a signature of the Doctor in the decla-
ration. Why did not the Doctor certify the fitness of the person making the
statement or even append his signature, there i.; no answer to the same.
lle magistrate also did not recollect as to whether the deceased did put his
D signature or not but since there Is no mention of "L. T.I!' before the name
of deceased obviously left thumb Impression Is not there on the dying
declaration. This ls the declaration which happened to be the only material
piece of evidence on the basis of which the Trial Court came to a conclusion
that the appellant herein ought to be found guilty under Section 302 IPC
E warranllna sentence of life Imprisonment. It Is not a very safe piece of
evidence to rely upon for conviction under Section 302 IPC.
[!09-H; 510·A; B·E]
Ramnath Madhoprasad and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
(1953) SC 420, referred to.
F
Tarachand Damu Sutar v. The Statt of Maharashtra, AIR (1962) SC
130; Munnu Raja and A11r. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1976) SC
2199; Arvi11d Singh v. State of Bihar, JT (2001) 5 SC 127 and Paperambaka

G
Rosamma and Ors. v. State of A.P., [1999] 7 SCC 695, relied on.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No, 497
.
of 2000.
I
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.9.99 of the Patna High Court in
Cr!. A. No. 64 of I989(R).
H Jaspal Singh H.M. Singh and Anil Hooda for the Appellant.
PANCHDEO SINGH v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 505
Ashok Mathur for the Respondent. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. Admissibility of a dying declaration has had judicial
scrutiny for over five decades. Whereas the earlier view in Ramnath 's case
(Ramnath Madhoprasad and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) B
S.C. 420) to the effect that it is not safe to convict an accused person merely
on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration without further corroboration,
a larger Bench judgment of this Court in Tarachand (Tarachand Damu Sutar
v.The State of Maharashtra, AIR (1962) SC 130) categorically observed that
conviction based on dying declaration, against the correctness of which no
cogent reasons have been given or suggested, is sustainable in law.
c
This Court, a decade later in Munnu Raja and Anr. v. The State qf
Madhya Pmdesh, AIR (1976) SC 2199 stated the law to the effect that though
the dying declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the
maker of the statement cannot be subjected to cross-examination, there is D
neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of
law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. This
Court went up to observe that the court must not look out for corroboration
unless it comes to the conclusion that a dying declaration suffered from any
infirmity.
E
One of the latest pronouncement of this Court pertaining to the subject
find place in the decision of Arviml Singh v. Swte of Bihw; J.T. (2001) S SC
127) wherein. this court observed that apart from tho care and caution factors
ns noticed earlier the dying declaration ought otherwise to be treated as trust-
worthy. The issue thus becomes as to whether the dying declaration has been F
able to bring about a confidence thereon or not is it trustworthy or it is a mere
attempt to cover up the !aches of investigation: it must allure to the satisfaction
of the court that reliance ought to be placed thereon rather than a distrust: The
confidence of the court is the summum-bonum and in the event of there being
.... any affirmation thereto in the judicial mind, question of any disbelieve or
distrust would not arise. In the event however of there being some infirmity, G
howsoever, negligible it be, the Court unless otherwise satisfied about the
credibility thereof, ought to look for some corroboration, if however it is
otherwise, question of requirement of a corroboration would not arise: dying
declaration alluring confidence of the court would be a sufficient piece of
evidence to sustain conviction. There is no format as such of dying declaration H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001J SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A neither the declaration need be of any longish nature and neatly structured. As
a matter of fact, perfect wording and neatly structured dying declaration may
bring about an adverse impression and create a suspicion in the mind of the
court since dying declarations need not be drawn with mathematical precision
- the declarant should be able to recollect the situation resulting in the available
state of affairs.
B
Having dealt with the basic issue involved in the matter and adverting
to the factual score, be it noted that\against the judgment and order of convic-
tion and sentence dated 23rd December, 1988 passed by the additional Sessions
Judge, Dhanbad, two separate appeals being Crl.A.No.64/1989 (Panchdeo
c Singh v. State of Bihar) and the other, Crl.A.No.65/1989 (Dun Bahadur Singh
v. State qf Bihar), the High Court by a common judgment affirmed the order
of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the court below. The
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhanbad convicted the appellant herein
under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code for com-
mitting murder of one Sriram Singh and Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code
D
and sentenced rigorous imprisonment for life. The accused was further con-
victed under Section 324 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to rigorous impris-
onment for 3 years on each count though, however, sentence were directed to
run concurrent. The High Court dealt with both the appeals by common
E judgment as noticed above, affirmed the judgment of the learned Sessions
Judge and it is against this order of affirmation that the present appellant
Panchdeo Singh moved this Court for special leave to appeal under Article 136
of the Constitution and this Court granted such leave by its order dated 12th
May, 2000.
F
At this juncture it will be convenient to advert to the prosecution case
briefly: on 20.12.1980, around 8 a.m., the informant Rarnsumer Singh (PW-
8), in the company of Srirnm Singh (the deceased) was going to Modidih

G
Colliery Office on some election work and when on way they arrived on the
road, at a distance of about 50 yards from the Modidih Director's Technical
Bungalow, the informant spotted the appellants, co-accused Sakaldeo Singh,
Vinod Kumar Singh (since deceased) and Nagendra Singh (who died during
the trial) standing with their Car No.BHW 98 stationed on the west of the road,
-
and Sakaldeo Singh hurled a bomb on Sriram Singh (the deceased), which hit
in his abdomen, and thereafter Nagender Singh and Dun Bahadur Singh threw
H bombs, causing injuries lo the deceased and the informant too sustained wounds.
PANCHDEO SINGH v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 507
On ·alarm, the witnesses arrived and the culprits fled away in the parked car A
to.wards Loyalabad. The informant, Bhagwan Singh and other witnesses carried
Sriram Singh to Loyalabad Central Hospital, where the fard-beyan of Rarnsumer
Singh (PW-8) was recorded by the police officer, attached to Jogta Police
Station, on 20.12.1980 at 10.30 a.m. The motive behind the occurrence is
alleged to be the previous enmity. On its basis, the formal First Information
B
Report (Exhibit 2) was. drawn up and the investigation commenced. During
investigation, the injured (Sriram Singh) succumbed to the wounds on the next
day of the occurrence, around I 0.30 a.m., at Sadar Hospital, Dhanbad, and after
completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was laid in court against the
appellants and other accused in the case.
c
In their statements, recorded under section 313 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code, the appellants denied their involvement in the occurrence and stated
false implication.

At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Out of
it three arc formal witnesses. Even one of the formal witnesses were declared D
hostile along with other eight. But admittedly the conviction under Section 302
!PC and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life both by the Ad-
ditional Sessions Judge, Dhanbad and that of the High Court has been on the
basis of the dying declaration of the deceased, which admittedly does not
involve the appellant herein with the crime. There is, however, a positive E
statement against the appellant herein in regard to his presence at the site of
occurrence and it is on the basis of this statement in a dying declaration that
the High Court sustained the conviction and sentence as passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge. The dying declaration thus needs to be considered
with some detail. For convenience sake, the dying declaration is set out herein
below: F

"Dying declaration of Shri Ram Singh son of Chandwar Singh of
Village: Akbarpur, Police Station (Illegible), Distt. Azamgarh, at present
Modidih, PS: Jogta, Distl. Dhanbad, being recorded at Sadar Hospital,
Dhanbad on 20.12 .. 1980 at l l.20 AM. According to the injured the G
occurrence took place at 3.00 AM today.

Question : When, how, and where did you sustain injury?

Answer: Sakaldeo Singh son of Mukhrarn Singh threw bomb on me
from the front side on my belly on Modidih Road which H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A leads to Tetanwari Station Road.

Question : Do you want to say anything more?

Answer: Nagender Singh son of Mukhram Singh also threw and hit
bomb from behind. Dun Bahadur Singh and Vinod Singh
B son of Mukh Ram Singh also ran with the bomb. Pachdeo
Singh was also with them. When the bomb hit me, I ran
away but fell down on the ground due to hit of another
bomb on the back side. I was wearing vest, shirt and woolen
jacket.I was going from Modidih to the Union Office,
Modidih."
c
The filed copy of the above noted declaration does not contain any
signature but a perusal of the original depicts that the deceased signed the
declaration but the signature appears at the bottom of the page with some space
in between the last writing and the signature.In this context, the evidence of
D the Magistrate, being PW-12. seems to be of some relevance :

" .. On that day I received an order of the Chief Judicial Ma~istrate,
Dhanbad to record the dying declaration of injured Shri Ram Singh son
. of Shri Chander Singh Rio Aklipur, PS: Mch Nagar, Distt. Aw:.1garh,
at present Modidih, Police Station : Jogta, Distt. Dhanbad. After
E receipt of this order I went to Sadar Hospital, Dhanbad on the same
day and recorded dying declaration of the said injured at 11.20. I
recorded it, in the presence of Dr.Raman Shanker Prasad. I recorded
his statement as stated by the injured and the same was read over to
him. He marked his signature after being found the statement
correct.That statement is scribed and signed by me. Dying declaration
F
is marked as Ex.5."

In cross-examination, the witness stated :

G 3. Before recording dying declaration I asked to the injured about
his nan1e etc. He was in a fit condition to make the statement or not,
I did not put up any other question to know about it. He voluntarily
stated his name and full address, therefore, I got satisfied myself that
he was in fit condition to make the statement. The statement was read
H over to the injured and he marked his signature after being found it
PANCHDEO SINGH v. STATE [BANERJEE, I.] 509
correct which is not on my record. Below the statement "Ram Singh" A
has been mentioned, therefore, I state that the injured marked ~is
signature. I do not recollect as to whether he put his signature or not.
There is no mention of L.T.I. before "Ram Singh". L.T.I. of Ram Singh
is not on the Dying Declaration.

4. The injured was not previously known to me. The injured was B
introduced by the doctor.This fact has not been noted down by me on
the dying declaration."

The issue thus arises for consideration as to whether a declaration,
as above, by itself would tantamount to substantial evidence against
the appellant herein warranting the conviction and sentence as af-
c
firmed by the High Court.

Before so doing, a look at the decision of this Court in Rosamma
(Paparambaka Rosamma and Or>·. v. State of A.P., [1999] 7 SCC 695 would
be of some relevance wherein this Court observed that where conviction is D
solely based on the dying declaration there is an obligation on the part of the
Court to consider with extreme care and caution both the dying declaration as
also the evidence of the witnesses supporting it. In Rosamma (supra) the doctor
was also examined and the doctor appended a certificate at the end of the
declaration that the patient is "conscious while recording the statement". It is
on this, this Court observed that the question that needs to be considered is as E
to whether the Magistrate could have come to a definite conclusion that the
injured was in a fit state of mind to make a declaration in the absence of a
certificate by the doctor certifying the state of the mind that existed before
recording the dying declaration and this Court opined that in the absence of a
medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of F
making that declaration, it would be very risky to accept the subjective satis-
faction of the Magistrate, who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind
at the time of making a declaration. In Rosamma (supra) noting of the state of
mind of the declarant before making the statement by the doctor has been stated
to be an essential requirement for the prosecution to prove-incidentally-mere
certification by even a doctor at the end of the declaration that the patient is
G
conscious while recording the statement was stated to be not sufficient -this is
so by reason of the factum of the dying declaration being only the circumstance
for conviction and sentence of the accused. Presently, however, there is not
even a doctor's certification as regards the state of the condition of the declar-
ant. It is only the Judicial Magistrate, who has stated from the witness box that H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 l] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement and he was otherwise
satisfied in regard thereto. The doctor was available since the Magistrate named
him as Dr.Raman Shanker Prasad but unfortunately there is neither any certi-
fication nor even a signature of the doctor in the declaration.

As noticed above, declaration itself can be treated as a substantive piece
B of evidence and can be the basis of an Order of conviction and sentence without
there being any corroboration, provided, however, the same brings forth a sense
of confidence and trustworthiness in the mind of the Court-why did not the
doctor certify the fitness of the person making the statement or even append
his signature, there is no answer to the same. The Magistrate also did not
c recollect as to whether the deceased did put his signature or not but since there
is no mention of"L.T.I." before "Ram Singh" obviously left thumb impression
is not there on the dying declaration. This is the declaration which happened
to be the only material piece of evidence on the basis of which the trial Court
came to a conclusion that the appellant herein ought lo be found guilty under
Section 302 !PC warranting sentence of life imprisonment. The decision of this
D Court in Rosa11u11a (supra) directly runs counter to the Judgment under appeal.
In our view it is not otherwise a very safe piece of evidence to rely upon for
conviction under Section 302 !PC. The declaration must be such so as t0 evoke
confidence in the factual context. However, we are unable to record our
confidence on such a declaration so as to lend support and concurrence to the
E Judgment under appeal. As noticed 11bove, Rosanmw (supra) decides counter
and we do record our respectful agreement, apart from being a larger Bench
Judgment which should act as a binding precedent, with the observations and
findings and on the wake of the aforesaid we are of the view that the High Court
fell into a manifest error. The Judgment under appeal lhus cannot be sustained.
The appeal is thus allowed. The appellant be released forthwith, if not wanted
F
in any other case.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed.