Holding

Under sections 5 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 a court may, in exceptional circumstances, rescind an arbitration agreement, and the Limitation Act applies to arbitrations, rendering the petitioner's claim barred due to a ten‑year delay.

Summary

Panchu Gopal Bose entered into an arbitration agreement on 27 May 1978 to complete work within nine months. He claimed he sent bills on 12 July 1979 but received no payment, and only on 28 November 1989 did he issue a notice invoking arbitration. The respondent filed an arbitration suit under sections 5, 12 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Calcutta High Court held the claim was barred by limitation, cancelled the arbitration agreement and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court considered (i) whether the High Court could rescind an arbitration agreement under sections 5 and 12, and (ii) whether delay could justify such rescission. It held that the court has power, exercised sparingly, to revoke an arbitration agreement in exceptional cases, and that section 37 incorporates the Limitation Act into arbitration, making the cause of arbitration accrue when a notice could have been served. Because the petitioner delayed over ten years, the claim was hopelessly barred and the High Court’s rescission was justified. The special leave petitions were dismissed without costs.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court could, under sections 5 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, rescind an arbitration agreement.
Whether a delay of more than ten years in invoking arbitration can constitute a ground for rescission of the arbitration agreement.
Whether the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to arbitrations under section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and from when the limitation period commences.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 12, s. 33, s. 37, s. 5
Limitation Act, 1908

Subjects

arbitrationlimitationrescission of arbitration agreementdelaySection 5Section 12Section 37Supreme Court of Indiacontractual obligations

Judgment

PANCHU GOPAL BOSE A

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR PORT OF CALCUTT A

[K. RAMASWAMY ANDS. MOHAN,JJ.]
B

- Arbitration Act, 1940:
APRIL 23, 1993

Ss.5, 12, 33 and 37:

Limitation Act. 190811963:
c
Delay of JO years in seeking reference to arbitration-Held, limitation
applies to arbitration-Claim barred by delay-Courts below justified in rescind-
ing arbitration agreement.

On May 27, 1978, the petitioner entered into an arbitration agreement
under which he had to execute a certain work within 9 months. He averred D
that he had sent his bills on July 12, 1979, but payment was not made. On
November 28, 1989, for the first time he sent a notice to the respondent for
reference to arbitration. The respondent approached the High Court under
Ss. 5, 12 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. A learned Single Judge held that

- the claim was hopelessly barred by limitation, and cancelled the arbitration
agreement. A Division Bench dismissed the Appeal.

On appeal, this Court addressed itself to 2questions: Whether the High
Court could permit a party to rescind an arbitration agreement; and whether
delay can be a ground for rescinding such agreement.
E

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
F
HELD: 1. The Court has the power and jurisdiction under Ss. 5 and 12
to grant leave to the applicant in exceptional circumstances to revoke the
contract of arbitration. The Court should exercise the power sparingly,
cautiously and with circumspection in permitting a party to rescind an
arbitration agreement he had entered into voluntarily. (365-B)
G
2. By virtue of s. 37 of the Arbitration Act, the provisions of the
Limitation Act would apply to arbitrations, notwithstanding any term in the
contract to the contrary. (366·8)

3. The period oflimitation for the commencement of an arbitration runs
from the date on which, had there been no arbitration clause, the cause of H
361
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 3 S.C.R.

A action would have accrued, just as in the case of actions the claim is not to be
brought after the expiration of a specified number of years from the date on
which the cause of action accrued, so in the case of arbitrations, the claim is
not to be put forward after the expiration of the specified number of years
from the date when the claim accrued. (368-D-E)

B Ram Dutt Ramkissendassv.Sassoon (E.D.) & Co. (1929) (56) IA 128 (PC);
Naamlooze V~nnootschap Handels-En-Transport Maatschappij 'Vulcatf v'.Vs.J.
Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi [1938) 2 AU ER 152; Pegler v. Railway Eucutive
[1948) AC 332 at 338 and; West Riding of Yorkshirtr Country Council v.
Huddersfield. Corporation [1957) 1 All ER 66'{and Russell on Arbitration;-t
C Justice Bachawat, law ofArbitration, applied.

4. Delay defeats justice: Defaulting party should hear the hardship and
should not transmit the hardship to the other party, after the claim in the
cause of arbitration was allowed to be barred. (369-F )

D Mustiu and Boyd's Commercial Arbitration (1982 edn.), referred to.

5. The claim in the case on hand is undoubtedly hope-lessly barred by
limitation as the petitioner by his conduct slept over his right for more than
10 years. The High Court justifiably exercised the discretionary power and
E jurisdiction under Ss. 5 and 12 (2) (b) in permitting the respondent to rescind
the agreement. (370-E)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.
4304-06 of 1993.

F From the Judgment and Order dated 18.12.1992 of the Calcutta High Court
in Appeal from Original Order Nos. 105. 104. and 106 of 1991.

Panchugopal Bose-in-person for the Petitioner.

G D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General, A.K Sil and G. Joshi for the Respondent.

The Judgment of Court was delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY. J.: These three Special Leave Petitions arise out of
Arbitration Agreement said to be executed by the petitioner on May 27, 1978
H which provided that the petitioner had to execute the work within 9 months. It is
P.G. BOSS v. BOARD OFTRUSlEES [RAMASWAMY, J.) 363

his claim that while executing the work be sent the bills on July 12, 1979 but A
payment was not made. For the first time he sent noticeoii Nov. 28,l989 to the
respondent for reference to the arbitration. On receipt thereof, the respondent filed
an arbitration suits in the Calcutta High Court under ss. 5, 12 and 33 of the
·Arbitration Act. 1940 for short 'the Ac(. The le"'11ed Single Judge held. that the
claim was hopelessly barred by limitition. There was no proof that the petitioner
had sent any claim in July, 1979. Since the Claim was made long after 10 years the B
arbitration cannot be proceeded with. Accordingly finding that it to be an
exceptional case for interference, the learned Single Judge cancelled the arbitra-
tion clause.6S 'or the contract in matter Nos. 1326, 1364 and 1365/90 dated
".:'°'" • - -
November 23. 1990. Oo further appeals the division bench by its order dated
December lB, 1992in Appeal Nos 104/90 etc .. dismissed the appeals:Thus these
special leave petitions. c

The contention of the petitioner appearing in person is that Clause 68 of the
Contract provides for appoinunent of an arbitrator and when the petitioner bas
-.- legally invoked clause 68 and issued notice to tho!iespondent. the respondent is
duty bound to appoint an arbitrator and on its fOHure it is open to him to approach o
the Court for appropriate remedy under s. 8 of the Act for appointlllent of an
arbitrator. The High Court scuttled this procedure in exercising the power under
S. S of the ACt which is illegal and ultra vires. He further contented that Section
S bas no application to the facts of this case. We have heard also Shri D.P. Gupta.
the learned Solicitor General for the respondent
E
The question for consideration is whether the High Court was justified in
permitting the respondent to rescind the contract of Arbitration provided in Clause
68 of the Contract Undoubtedly, Clause 68 provides reference to arbitration of all
or any of the disputes or differences enumerated therein that have arisen between
the parties, at the instance of either party to the contract. It empowers either party
F
to issue notice calling upon the Engineer to refer the_ dispute or difference for
arbitration. In this case, as found by the High Court that though the petitioner was
said to have made theclaimforpaymentforthe first time in July 12, 1979. Though
there is no proof in that behalf, and the respondent claimed that the petitioner had
abandoned !he contract, even assuming that any claim was as a fact made in July.
1979 and payment was not made, the petitioner had not taken foll.ow up action G
thereafter for well over 10 years. It was open to him to avail Clause 68 of the
contract seeking reference to the arbitration. No such action was taken till
November 28, 1989 Immediately on receipt of the notice, the respondent invoked
the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court under ss. 5 and 12 at 330 of the Act.

Section 5 provides thus: H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1993] 3 S.C.R.

A "The authority of an appointed arbitrator or umpire shall not be
revocable except with the leave of the Court, unless •a contrary
intention is expressed in the arbitration agreement".

Therefore, Section 5 postulates that there must be an order of appointing an
arbitrator or umpire and thereafter the same cannot be revoked except with the
B leave of the Court, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the agreement. Ex-
facie it would appear that appointment of an arbitrator is a condition to avail the
remedy under s.5. Section 12 accords consequential power which postulates that
the power of the Court where Arbitrator is removed or his authority revoked. Sub-
section (2) says that:
c
"Where the authority of an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire is
revoked by leave of the Court, or where the Court removes an
umpire who has entered on the reference ora sole arbitratoror all the
arbitrators, the Court may, on the application of any party to the
arbitration agreemel)t, either
D
(b) order that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect
with respect to the difference referred."

Therefore, by a conjoint reading of ss. 5and12 (2) (b) it is clear thatthecourt
E has been given power in given circumstances to grant leave to a contracting party
to have the arbitrator oru mp ire removed and the.arbitration agreement entered into
with other contracting part revoked. Where the Court grants such authority
consequentially arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with respect to the
difference or dispute. It flows therefrom that there exist implied power vested in
the court permitting a party to avail the remedy under ss. 5 & 12 to rescind the
F
arbitration agreement. In all cases it is not a condition precedent that there should
in the first instance be an order appointing an ;b.ltrator or he should enter upon_
ref~rence for adjudication. In·given circumstances and the factual background the
court may be justified to exercise the power under ss.5 and 12. The question then
is under what circumstances sµch power would be exercised. This Court in Mis
G Amarclzand Lalit Kumarv. Shree Ambicalute Mills Ltd. [1963) 2 SCR 953 at 969
held thus: "In exercising its discretion cautiousJy and sparingly the Court has no
doubt (kept) these circumstances in view, and consider that the parties should not
be relieved from a tribunal they have chosen because they fear that the arbitrator's
decision may go against them. The grounds on which leave to revoke may be given
have been put under five heads:
H
P.G. BOSS v. BOARD OF TRUSlEES [RAMASWAMY, J.] 365

- l. Excess or refusal of jurisdiction by arbitrator; 2. Misconduct of arbitrator;
3. Disqualification of arbitrator; 4. Charges of Fraud; and 5. Exception~ cases~
Thus it could be seen that the Court has the power and jurisdiction under ss.
A

5 and 12 to grant leave to the applicant in exceptional circumstances to revoke the
contract of arbitration. The court should exercise the power sparingly, cautiously
and with circumspection to permit a party to the contract ofa arbitration voluntarily
entered into to relieve the party from dispute or difference and to order that the B
arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect in respect of the dispute or
difference.

In this case we have seen that even assuming that the petitioner had put-
forward his claim in July, 1979 and the respondent had not acted thereon till C
November 28, 1989 for long 10 years he did not move his little fing~r t6 approach
the Engineer and later the Court. For the first time on November 2$; ·1989 he issued
notice to the respondent to refer the case for arbitration. Clause 68 of the Contract
provides that when any disputes or differences has arisen h.e should approach the
Engineer in the first instance seeking reference of it to an arbitration and if the
Engineer refuses to act upon or omits to refer the dispute to the arbitration within D
15 days from the date of the receipt of notice, then it is open to him to approach
a Civil Court for reference to the arbitration. On his own showing cause of
arbitration has arisen in July, 1979, the petitioner did not take any action from then.
On the other hand when notice was issued in Noveinber, 1989 the respondent
immediately approached the Court and sought its leave to rescind the agreement
E
explaining the circumstances. The Court exercised the jurisdiction in permitting
the respondent to revoke the arbitration agreement. The question then is whether-
it is justified?

Section 37 (l) of the Act provides that all the provisions of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908 (since amended Act came into force in 1963) shall apply to F
arbitrations as they apply to the proceedings in court. Sub-section (2), employing
non-obstemi clause, says that notwithstanding any tenn in an arbitration agree-
ment to the effect that no cause of actio~ shall accrue in respect of any matter
required by the agreement to be referred until an award is--made under the
agreement, a cause of action shall; forthe purpose oflimitation, be deemed to have
G
accrued in respect of any such matter at the time when it would have accrued but
for that term in the agreement. Sub-sectio.n (3) thereof states that for the purp6ses
of this section and of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 an arbitration shall' oe B
..
.'. ·\_:~;~---;-/~~,_->;_ \\ -,~

3M ! i .\ - . " ~: '. Slw~\IE COURT REPORTS . / [t993)3 S.C.R. ·
·-,_-:\..: ' \ . -~/" •,
~ ·- .
', A< deemed .to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on
. - \ -. ' - '

. me Other Party thei;to a notice requiring the appointment Of an arbitrator. Or where
th~ aroitration agreement provides that the reference shall be to a person named or
<iesignat~d in the agreement, requiring that the difference be submitted to the
person so named or designated. Sub-sections (4) and (5) are omitted as being not
material. It would, therefore, be clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act
B would apply to arbitrations and notwithstanding any term in the contract to the .
contrary, cause of arbitration for the purpose oflimitation shall be deemed to have
accrued io.the party in respect of any such matter at the time when it should have
accrued bn! 'for the contracL Cause of arbitration shall be deemed to have
commenced - '
when one party serves the notice on the other party requiring the
C appointment of an arnitrator. The question is when the cause Of arbitration arises
in the absence of issuance of a notice or omits to isS:ue for long time or contract to -
the contrary?

It is stated in Robertson's History that honest men__dread arbitration more
than they dread law suits. The arbitrations differ from legal proceedings proper
D only in the choice of tribunal and all ordinary defences legally permissible are
available to the Parties. Parties to an arbitration may voluntarily determine among
themselves '\he procedure-to be followed including the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal to adjudicate the dispute or differences arising from the contract including
the power of the arbitrator. They could also contract restricting the limitation for
adjudication. Subject to the aboves. 37 of the Act regulates the limitation for the
E arbitration proceedings. In Ram Dull Ramkissendass v. Sassoon (E.D) & Co. 1929
(56) Indian Appeals 128, the Privy Council held that although, it is indisputable
that, in a niodem arbitration, the principles of equity must be applied just as they
would now be applied in a court oflaw, since upon a special case for the opinion
of the court under Sec. 7 if the Arbitration Act or the Judicature Act, 1925, s.94
(replacing sec. 19 of the Arbitration Act), the court is, andhas long been, bound
F
to apply equitable rules and relief. It is difficult to see how the equitable view of
the applicability of Limitation Act, 1908, to a case of debt can be excluded in a legal
arbitration. Although the Limitation Act does not in terms apply to arbitrations,
they (their Lordships of the Judicial Committee) think that in mercantile reference
of the kind in question it is an implied term of the contract that the arbitrator must
G decide the dispute according to the existing law of contract, and that every defence
which would have been open in a court of law can be equally proponed for the
·arbitrator's decision unless the parties have agreed-which is not suggested here: __ -·
. to exclude -tliat defence. Were it otherwise, a claim for breach of contraci--_-·-
containing ii reference cause could be brought at any time, it might be 20 or 30
years after the cause of action bad arisen, although the legislature bas rrescribed
H a limit of three years . . for the enforcement of such a claim in .any application that
'
-
P.G. BOSS v. BOARD OF TRUSlEES [RAMASWAMY, J.] 367

might be made to the law cou!'.(S. This ratio was approved by House of Lords in A
Naamlooze Vennootschap Handels-En-Transport.. Maatschappij "Vulcaan' v.
A/SJ. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi [19~8] 2AH1t'.R. 152, Lord Maugham. L.C.
speaking.for the unanimous Cou.rt held that in considering whether the Limitation
Act would apply to arbitration {pre-statutory arbitrations), it was held that this
seems to be a good reason for holdi_ng that there may wen be cases where the object
of both parties to the arbitration might be to determine whether a sum was due, B
though possible or certainly not recoverable by legal proceedings. We are,
however, here concerned....... with an arbi9"ation in which legal rights are being
advanced or denied.... .lf the defence of the· statute is to be deemed inadmissible,
it would seem that the claims of one party or the other might be put forward long
after the persons who could give useful evidence had died and the most relevant C
documents had been destroyed ........ If the legal defence were to be excluded, it was
in this agreement that one would expect to find such a provision .........The matter
does not rest th~ecause we have to consider how far the suggested elimination
.,.:.·-~

of defences available at law or in equity .must logically be held to extent in other
arbitrations. If the party defending may not rely on the Statute of Limitations, can
he rely on the Statute of Frauds, or the Act partially replacing it? Could he rely in D
a commercial arbitration on the Gaming Act? A number of like questions might
be asked ........ .It is indisputable that. in a modem arbitration, the principles of
equity must be applied just as they would now be applied in a court oflaw. In the
concluding findings it is :;aid thus:

"In the circu_mstances of this case as above-stated. it is, I think, E
impossibl<(to come to the conclusion that there was an implied
agreement between the parties to exclude any defence under any
Statute of Limitations. In the absence of soch·an-'t~plied agreement.
the Limitation Act was open to tlfe.respondents, and the conse-
quence must follow that the arbitrator was acting rightly in admit-
F
ting the-defence under the statute".

_In Pegler v. Railway Executive 1948 Appeal Cases -332 at 338, House of
Lords held that just as in the case of actions the claim is not to be brought after the
expiration of a specified number of years from the date on which the cause of action
accrued, so in the cr.se·of'arohrations, the claim is nouo be put forward after the G
expiration of the specified number of years fromtli'e'ctate when the claim accrued.
While accepting the interpretation put up by Atkinson, J. as he then was in the
judgment under appeal, learned Law Lords accepted the conclusion of Atkinson,
in the LaDguage 'thus: "the cause of arbitration" corresponding to "the cause of
a
action" in litigation "treating cause of arbitration in the same way as a cause of
action would be treated if the proceeding were in a court of law. B
368
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.

A In West Riding of Yorkshirs Country Council v. Huddersfield
Corporation [1957] 1 All E.R. 669, the Queens Bench Division, Lord
Goddard, C}. (as he then was) held that the Limitation Act applies to
arbitrations'lts it applies to actions in the High Court and the making,
after a claim has become statute barred, of a submission of it to
arbitration, does not prevent the statute of limitation being pleaded.
B
Russell on Arbitration, 19th Edition, reiterates the above proposition.
At page 4 it was further stated that the parties to an arbitration
agreement may provide therein, if they wish, that an arbitra~on mci~t
be commenced within a shorter period than that allowed by statute; but
the court then has power to enlarge the time so agreed. The period of
c limitation for commencing an arbitration runs from the date on which
the cause of arbitration accrued, that is to say, from the date when the
claimant first acquired either a right of action or a right to require that
an arbitration takes place upon the dispute concerned. ·

D Therefore, the period of limitation for the commencement of an arbitration
runs from the date on which, had there been no arbitration clause, the cause of
· action would have accrued. Just as in the case of civil actions the claim is not to
be broµght after the expiration of a specified number of years from the date on
wtfich the cause of action accrued, so in the case of arbitrations, the claim is not
to be put forward after the expiration of the specified number of years from the date
E when the claim accrued.

In Russell on Arbitration, at pages 72 and 73 it is stated thus:

F
"Disputes under a>contract may aJso be removed, in effect, from the
jurisdiction of the court, by including an arbitration clause in the
•
contract, providing that any arbitration under it must be commenced
within a certain time or not at aJl, and going on to provide that if an
arbitration is not so commenced the claim concerned shall be barred.
Such provisions are not necessarily found together. Thus the contract may
limit the time for arbitration with out barring the claim depriving a
G party who is out of time of his right to claim ar.bitration but
leaving open a right .of action in the courts. Or it may make
compliance with .a time limit a condition of any Claim without
limiting the operation of the arbitration clause, leaving a party who is
outoftimewith the right to claim arbitration but so that it is a defence
in the arbitration that the claim is out of time and barr.ed.
H
(
)
P.G. BOSS v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES [RAMASWAMY, J.] 369

Nor, since the provisions concerned. are essentially separate, is there A
anything to prevent the party relying on the limitation clause waiving his
objection to arbitration whilst still relying on the clause as barring the
claim."

At page 80 it is stated thus:
B

"An extension of time is not automatic and it is only granted if "undue
hardship" would otherwise be caused. Not all hardship, however, is
"undue hardship,"; it may be proper thathardst)ip caused to a party by his
own default should be borne by him, and not transferred to the other party
by allowing a claim to be reopened after it has become barred. The mere C
fact that a claim was barred could not be held to be "undue hardship."

The Law of Arbitration by Justice Bachawat in Chapter XXXVII at p.549 it
is stated that just as in the case of actions the claim is not to be brought after the
expiration of a specified number of years from the date when the claim accrues,
as also in the case of arbitrations, the claim is not to be put forward after the D
expiration of a specified number of years from the date when the claim accrues:
For the purpose of s. 37 (1) 'action' and' cause of action' in the Limitation Act
should be construed as arbitration and cause of arbitration. The cause of arbitra-
tion, therefore, arises when the claimant becomes entitled to raise the question, i.e.
when the claimant acquires the right to require arbitration. The limitation would
E
run from the date when cause of arbitration would have accrued, but for the
agreement.

Arbitration implies to charter out timous commencement of arbitration
availing the arbitral agreement, as soon as difference or dispute has arisen. Delay
defeats justice and equity aid the promptitude and resultant consequences. F
Defaulting party should bear the hardship and should not transmit the hardship to
the other party, after the claim in the cause of arbitration was allowed to be barred.
The question, therefore, as posed earlier is whether the coun would be justified to
permit a contracting party to rescind the contract or the coun can revoke, the
authority to refer the disputes or differences to arbitration. Justice Bachawat in his
Law of Arbitration, at p. 552 stated that "in an appropriate case leave should be G
given to revoke.the authority ::if the arbitrator". It was also stated that an ordinary
submission without special stipulation limiting or conditioning the functions of the
arbitrator carried with it the implication that the arbitrator should give effect to all
legal defences such as that of limitation. Accordingly the arbitrator was entitled . H
(
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 3 S.C.R.

A and bound to apply the law of limitation. Section 3 of the Liinitation Act applied
by way of analogy to arbitration proceedings, and like interpretation was given to
s. 14 of the Limitation Act, The Proceedings before the arbitration are like civil
proceedings before the court within the meaning of s.14 of the Limitation Act, By
consent the parties have substituted the arbitrator for a court of law to arbiter their
disputes or differences. It is, therefore, open to the parties to plead in the
B proceedings before him of limitation as a defence.

In Mustiu and Boyd's Commercial Arbitration (1982 Edition) under the )
1

heading "Hopeless Claim" in Chapter 31 at page 436 it is stated thus: /

'I
c "There is no undoubtedly jurisdiction to interfere by way of injunc-
-tion to prevent the respondent from being harassed by claim which
can never lead to valid award for example in cases where claim is
brought in respect of the alleged Arbitration agreement which does
not really exist or which has ceased to exist. So also where the
dispute lies outside the scope of Arbitration agreement".

The c~e on hand is clearly and undoutnedly hopelessly barred claim as the
petitioner by his conduct slept over his right for more than 10 years. Statutory
arbitrations stand apart. In these circumstances it is an exceptional case and the
courts below have justifiably exercised their discretionary power.and jurisdiction
.E under ss. 5 and 12(2) (b) to permit the respondent to rescind the arbitration
agreement and declared that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect
·with respect to the difference or dispute referred to in the notice of the petitioner
and relieved the parties from the arbitration agreement. The Special Leave
P~titions are accordingly dis!Ilissed without costs.

U.R Appeal dismissed.

I
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