Holding

Boats of all descriptions, including mechanically propelled barges, can be taxed by the State Legislature under Entry 58 of List II, rendering the Barge Tax Act constitutionally valid.

Summary

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Act, 1973, arguing that a 'barge' is not a 'boat' within the meaning of Entry 58, List II of the Seventh Schedule, which permits states to tax 'animals and boats'. They contended that the term 'boat' should be limited to vessels propelled solely by oars and that mechanically propelled barges fell under other entries concerning shipping and navigation. The State defended the Act, asserting that barges are boats of all descriptions and that the entry must be given a wide construction. The Court examined dictionary definitions, the General Clauses Act definitions of 'ship' and 'vessel', and the principle that legislative entries are to be interpreted broadly unless language demands otherwise. It held that a barge is a flat‑bottomed boat used on inland waterways, may be mechanically propelled, and therefore falls within the ambit of 'boat' under Entry 58. Consequently, the State Legislature was competent to levy the tax, and the Act was upheld as constitutional.

Issues considered

The meaning of 'boat' in Entry 58, List II of the Seventh Schedule – whether it includes mechanically propelled vessels such as barges.
Whether the Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Act, 1973, falls within the legislative competence of the State under that entry.
Whether entries in List I and List III concerning shipping and navigation restrict the scope of Entry 58.
The effect of the definitions of 'ship' and 'vessel' in the General Clauses Act on the interpretation of 'boat'.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Schedule VII, List II, Entry 58
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 3(55), s. 3(63)
Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Act, 1973s. Section 2(1), s. Section 3
Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Rules, 1975s. Rule 10, s. Rule 11, s. Rule 6, s. Rule 7, s. Rule 8, s. Rule 9

Subjects

constitutional lawstate taxation powerinterpretation of legislative entriesdefinition of boatbargesSchedule VIIGeneral Clauses ActGoa Daman Diu

Judgment

•

A PANDURONGA TIMBLO INDUSTRIES ETC. ETC:
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

MARCH 13, 1992

B , [A.M. AHMADI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.)

Constitution of I. ulia, 1950:

Schedule VII, List II, Entry 58-Tax on;'Barge'-COmpetency of State
C Legislature to enact Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Ac4 1973. __... ~

Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Ac4 1973/Goa, Daman and Diu ·
· Barge Tax Rules,· 1975: ~

Sections 2(1) and 3/Rules 6 and 7-Levy of tax on 'Barge'-Constitu-·
D tional validity ot-iJarg~eaning of-Constitution of India, 1950:'Schedule
VII, Listi!, Entry 58-General Clauses Ac4 1897: Section 3(55) and 3(63).

Word\" and PhraseMVord 'Baige'-Meaning of.

The constitntional validity of the tax levied on barges, used or kept
E for use in the Uniou Territory of Gcia, Daman and Diu, under Section .3 of
the Goa, Daman and Din Barges Tax Act, 1973 was challenged by the
_.,>.:
appellants, contending that the word 'boat' could not include a mechani-
cally propelled vessel, and since the definition or a 0barge' in section 2(1)
of the Act meant a mechanically propelled water craft used or capable of
F being used as a means or transport or minerals, it coiitd not be termed as
a boat to attract the legislative power conferred by Entry 58 in' List II of
the VIIth Schedule and the legislation was clearly incompetent; that from
, the definitions of'ship' and 'vessel' in Section 3(55) and 3(63) respectively
of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it was clear that a 'boat' was not a 'ship'
bot a vessel exclusively propelled by oars, and thus a _boat was a small
G vessel not mechanically propelled, but propelled exclusively by oars and
Entry 58 in Llst II of the VII Schedule conld be invoked for levying a tax
on such a vessel, and not on a 'baige• which was a mechanically propeiled
water craft; that the entire field in regard to mechanically propelled vessels
was covered by Entries 24, 25 and 27 of Llst I and Entries 31 and 32 of
H Llst Ill of the VII th Schedule and, therefore, the scope of_ Entry 58 in List
210
PANDURONGA TIMBLO INDS. v. U.0.1. 211

II of the Vllth Schedule was clearly confined to vessels other than mechani- A ·
cally propelled vessels, like small boats, and, therefore, the word 'boat' in
Entry 58 in List II must receive a narrow meaning and must be limited to
a vessel exclusively propelled by oars.

On behalf of the State, it was contended that the Legislature was
competent to enact the Act by virtue of the power conferred by Entry 58 in B
List II of the Vllth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which permitted
levy of 'taxes on anbnals and boats', and since barges were boats, the
Legislature was competent to levy and collect the tax on barges.

- .... Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD 1.1 Boats of all descriptions can be taxed by the State Legis-
c
lature by reason of the power conferred by Entry 58 in List II of the Vllth
:... Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950. [219H]

1.2 A 'barge' is a large flat-bottomed boat used for transporting D
heavy burdens on canals and rivers, but is not generally a ocean-going
vessel. It may or may not be fitted with an engine depending on its
calibration. It is essentially a freight-boat chiefly meant for canal and
river-navigation. Barges can be of different sizes and may be propelled by
. oars, sails or engines. They, however, belong to the family of boats and
not ships. Section 2(1) of the Act also defines it .as a water craft mecbani- E
cally propelled and used or capable of being used as a means of transport
of minerals. Thus, the legislature has carved out only mechanically
propelled barges for tax purposes. Therefore, the State Legislature was
competent to tax it under Entry 58 of List II. [217G-H, 218A-C]
F
1.3 According to the General Clauses Act a 'ship' includes a vessel
of every description used in navigation and not exclusively propelled by
>-- oars. A 'vessel', on the other hand, is a ship or a boat or any other
.l.. description of vessel used for navigation. Therefore, a vessel which is
exclusively propelled by oars would not fall within the definition of a ship
but would be covered by the wider definition of a vessel. From these two G
definitions it cannot be inferred that a mechanically propelled vessel is not
a boat for the simple reason that the definition of vessel is wide enough to
include a ship which is mechanically propelled. Both the definitions are
inclusive definitions and the definition of vessel is wide enough to include
boats of every description, both mechanically propelled and those H
,
2U SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 2 S.C.R.

A propelled exclusively by oars. Further no distinction can be drawn on the
basis or the size or the vessel Merely because the Act and the Rules cover.
barges ranging from less than 100 tonnes to 350 tonnes and above, it
cannot be said that such large sized vessels which are mechanically
propelled cannot be called boats. Since barges are used for transporting
B hea'i)' burdens on canals and rivers • inland waters • and for loading and
unloading ships which are anchored away as they can not enter shallow
waters, they are bound to be hea'iY vessels which can take the load. For ·
that reason they do not cease to be Oat-bottomed boats and in ordinary
parlance they cannot be described as ships. [218D·E, G-H, 219A)

C 1.4 It is well-settled that the legislative entries must be interpreted
widely unless the language or the entry or the.context requires that it be
given a narrow meaning. Neither the language or Entry_58 in List II nor
the context in which the word 'boats' is used therein calls for confining
its scope to boats exclusively propelled by oars. The language of Entries
~~~nin~I~~~31~~in~m~~~~a
D narrow meaning to be given to the word 'boats' in Entry 58 orList II. These
entries have nothing to do with the subject orle'i)' of tax ou boats. [219D·E)

· CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1511 of
1980.
E On appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated
29.4.1980 of the Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu in Special .
Civil Application No.26 of 1976.

WITH
F
Civil Appeal No. 1973 &.2851of1980.

S.K. Mehta, Aman Vachher, Dhruv Mehta {NP), R.F. Nariman and
Mrs. A. Verma for the Appellants.

G Bed Brat Barua, Ms. A. Subhashini {NP) and Ashok Bhan for the
Respondents.
'
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

• AHMADI, J. Is a barge a boat? The answer to this question will ~
H · determine the challenge to the constitutional va!idity of the tax levied

--
PANDURONGA TIMBLO INDS. v. U.0.1. [AHMADI; J.) 213

on a barge under the Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Act, 1973 A
(hereinafter called 'the Act'). It is contended that the State Legislature was
competent to enact the Act by virtue of the power conferred by Entry 58
in List II of the Vllth Schedule to the Constitution of India which permits
levy of 'taxes on animals and boats'. If barges are not boats, the Act will
lose the cover provided by the said entry and will be rendered unconstitu- B
tional.

The Act, as the Preamble shows, was enacted to impose a tax on
barges in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and for matters
connected therewith and was brought into force with effect from 1st March,
1971. 'Barge' according to section 2(1) means every description of water C
craft mechanically propelled and which is used or is capable of being used
as means of transport of minerals. Section 3 which is the charging section
provides that there shall be levied and collected on all barges used or kept
for use in the Union Territory, a tax at the rates fixed by the Government,
by notification in the Official Gazette, but not exceeding the maximum D
rates specified in the Schedule to the Act. The Schedule to the Act reads
as under:

SCHEDULE
(Section 3)
E
Capacity of Barge Maximum annual
rate per tonne
Less than 100 tonnes Rs. 3.50
100- tones and less than 200 tonnes Rs. 5.00
F
200 tonnes and less than 350 tonnes Rs. 6.00
350 tonnes and above Rs. 7.50

Note : When tax is not paid for the whole year at a time, but
is paid for one or more quarters at a time, the tax so payable G
for each quarter shall be an amount equal to one-fourth of
the annual tax plus ten per cent of that amount."

Section 19 empowers the Government to make rules to carry out the
purposes of the Act. In exercise of the said power the Government by a
notification framed rules called the Goa, Daman and Diu Barge Tax Rules, H
214 SUPREME CbURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

·A 1975. Rule 6 lays down that every owner or the person having posession or
control of a barge in the Union Territory shall pay to the Government a
tax at the rates specified in the table below :

TABLE

B Capacity of Barge Rate of tax payable per
. annum per tonne
Less than 100 tonnes Rs. 3.50 p.
100 tonnes and less than 200 tonnes Rs. 5.00 p.
200 tonnes and less than 350 tonnes Rs. 6.00 p
c 350 tonnes and above Rs. 7.50 p.

The rates which have been specified are the same as specified in the
Schedule to the Act. For the purpose of levy of tax under rule 7, the
Taxation Authority may require the barge to be calibrated i.e. identify the
D carrying capacity with reference to its structual strength, reserve buoyancy
and safe working height above water level. Rule 8 lays down the mode of
payment. Rule 9 provides for the issue of tax licence and Tax Token and
rule 10 provides for levy of penalty for failure to pay the tax. Rule 11
empowers the seizure and detention of any barge with respect to which the
E tax is due under the Act, until the tax due in respect of the barge is paid.
Provision is also made for refund of tax in certain circumstances. It will
thus be seen from the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules that
the State Government has levied a tax on all barges used or kept for use
in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. The Government contends

F
that since barges are boats, the State Legislature was compe!ent to levy
and collect a tax on barges under entry 58 in List II of the Vlltb Schedule
to the Constitution.
-
Counsel for the appellants contended that the word 'boat' cannot
include a mechanically propelled vessel and since the definition of a 'barge'
G in section 2(1) of the Act means a mechanically propelled water craft used
·or capable of being used as a means of transport of minerals, it cannot be
termed as a boat to attract the legislative power conferred by Entry 58 in
List II of the Vllth Schedule and hence the impugned legislation is clearly
incompetent. Reference was also made to the definitions of 'ship' and
'vessel' in sections 3(55) and 3(63) of the General Clauses Act to butteress
H the submission that a boat cannot include a mechanically propelled vessel.
PANDURONGA TIMBLO INDS. v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.] 215

We may reproduce the said two definitions at this state: A
"3(55) - 'Ship' shall include every description of vessel used in
navigation not exclusively propelled by oars"

"3(63) - 'Vessel' shall include any ship or boat or any other
description of vessel used in navigation." B
- --.(
It was submitted that the position of the word 'boat' immediately next
to the word 'vessel' in the definition in section 3(63) is clearly indicative of
the fact that 'ship' and 'boat' convey two different meanings since the
definition of 'ship' does not include vesssel exclusively propelled by oars.
~
From these two definitions_ it was contended that a 'boat' is not a 'ship' but
c
is a vessel exclusively propelled by oars. Thus according to the learned
counsel for the appellants a boat is a small vessel not mechanically
,L propelled but propelled exclusively by oars and Entry 58 in List II of the
Vllth Schedule can be invoked for levying a tax on such a vessel and not
on a 'barge' which, as the definition in sectiol) 2(1) of the Act conveys, is D
a mechanically propelled water craft. This was the first limb of counsel's
submission. The second limb of his submission was based on the scope and
ambit of Entries 24, 25, and 27 of List I and Entries 31 and 32 of List III
of the Vllth Schedule. Counsel submitted that the entire field in regard to
mechanically propelled vessels was covered by these entries and, therefore, E
the scope of Entry 58 in List II of the Vllth Schedule was clearly confined
to vessels other than mechanically propelled vessels like small boats. There-
fore, counsel submitted that the word 'boat' in Entry 58 in List II must
receive a narrow meaning and must be limited to a vessel exclusively
propelled by oars. In order to appreciate this contention based on the
various entries in List I and List III above, it may be appropriate to read F
those entries at this stage:
>---
Jo._
"List I

Entry 24 - Shipping and navigation on inland waterways,
G
declared by Parliament by law to be national waterways, as
regards mechanically propelled vessels; the rule of the road ori
such waterways.

Entry 25 - Maritime, shipping and navigation, including shiQ-
ping and navigation on tidal waters; provision of education and H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 2 S.C.R.

A training for the mercantile marine and regulation of
such education and training provided by States and other
agencies.

Entry 27 - Ports declared by or under law made by Parliament
or existing law to be major ports, including their delimitation,
B and the constitution and powers of port authorities therein.

List III

Entry 31 - Ports other than those declared by or under law
made by Parliament or existing law to be major ports.
c
Entry 32 - Shipping and navigation on inland waterways as
regards mechanically propelled vessels, and the rule of the road
on such waterways, and the carriage of passengers and goods
on inland waterways subject to the provisions of List I with
D ,respect to national waterways."

Now before we proceed to answer the contentions urged by the
learned counsel for the appellants. It may be advantageous to notice the
dictionary meanings of the words 'barge', 'boat', 'ship' and 'vessel' used in
the aforementioned legal provisions.
E
"ODHAM'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY

Barge : a large flat-bottomed boat for transporting heavy burdens
on canals or rivers; a large flat-bottomed boat used in
loading and unloading ships; a boat for the use of the chief
F officers of a man-of-war; a large richly decorated boat of
state propelled by oars and used on ceremonial occasions:
a college house-boat.

Boat : a long symmetrically shaped hollow vessel or receptacle that
G floats upon water, is propelled either by oars, the action of
wind on sails, or by mechanical means, and which is used
as a ·means of transport.

Ship : a large ocean-going vessel.
\

H Vessel : a ship
PANDURONGA TIMBLO INDS. v. U.O.I."[AHMADI, J.] 217

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY A
Barge : a flat-bottomed freight-boat chiefly for canal and river-
navigation, either with or without sails; a rowing boat; esp.
a ferry-boat.

Boat : a small open vessel in which to traverse the surface of water, B
usually propelled by oars, though sometimes by a sail.

Ship : a large sea-going vessel {opposed to a boat);

Vessel : any structure designed to float upon and traverse the water
for the carriage of persons or goods; a craft or ship or any
kind, now usually one larger than a rowing-boat and often C
restricted to sea-going craft or those plying upon the larger
rivers or lakes.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Barge : name originally applied to a small sailing vessel but after- D
wards came into general use for a flat-bottomed boat used
for carrying goods on inland waterways. Barges are usually
towed or fitted with some kind of engine.
Boat : a small open vessel, or water craft, usually moved by oars
or rowing.
E
Ship : a vessel of any kind employed in navigation. In a more
restricted and more technical sense, a three-masted vessel
navigated with sails.
Vessel : a ship, brig, sloop or other craft used in navigation. The
word in its broadest sense is more comprehensive than F
'ship'. Any structure which is made t1) float upon the water,.
for purposes of commerce or war, whether impelled by
wind; steam, or oars."

It is clear from aforementioned meanings that a 'barge' is a large G
flat-bottomed boat used for transporting heavy burdens on canals and
rivers but is not generally a ocean-going vessel. It may or may not be fitted
with an engine depending on its calibration. All the three aforequoted
dictionaries have described it as a flat-bottomed boat used for carrying
goods or minerals on inland waterways. It is essentially a freight-boat
chiefly meant for canal and river-navigation. Barges can be of different H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 2 S.C.R.
A sizes and may be propelled by oars, sails or engines. They, however, belong
to the family of boats and not ships. The learned Judicial Commissioner •"'f'
. has rightly concluded that a 'barger' is a flat-bottomed freight boat used
on rivers and canals and propelled by oars, sails or engines. Section 2(1)
of the Act also defines it as a water craft mechanically propelled and used
or capable of being used as a means of transport of minerals. Thus the
B legislature has carved out only mechanically propelled barges for tax
purposes. It would, therefore, seem that the State Legislature was com-
petent to tax it under entry·58 of List II.

True it is that the dictionaries have described a 'boat' as a small open
vessel usually propelled by oars, though sometimes by sail also. According
C to the General Clauses Act a 'ship' shall include a vessel of every descrip-
tion used in navigation and not exclusively propelled by oars. A vessel on
the other hand is a ship or a boat or any other description of vessel used
for navigation. Therefore, a vessel which is exclusively propelled by oars
would· not fall within the definition of a ship but would be covered by the
D wider definition of a vessel. From these two definitions it cannot be
inferred that a mechanically propelled vessel is not a boat for the simple
reason that the definition of vessel is wide enough to include a ship which
is mechanically propelled. Both the definitions are inclusive definitions and
the definition of vessels is wide enough to include boats of every descrip-
tion, both mechanically propelled and those propelled exclusively by oars.
E There is no warrant for the argument that because the word 'ship' and the
word 'boat' are placed side by side, the latter refers to only boats exclusive-
ly propelled by oars and not boats fitted with engines. To place such an
interpretation would lead to the absurd situation of a small boat propelled
by sail being called a ship. It would mean that a boat exclusively propelled
F by oars would cease to be a boat the moment it is fitted with a sail. The
definition of vessel, in our view, is wide enough to cover both boats
propelled exclusively by oars as well as boats fitted with engines. Nor can
any distinction be drawn on the basis of the size of the vessel. Merely
because the Act and the Rules cover barges ranging from less than 100
G tonnes to 350 tonnes and above, it cannot be said that such large sized
vessels which are mechanically propelled cannot .be called boats. The
definition of a 'barge' in the dictionaries aforementioned clearly show that
barges are flat-bottomed boats meant for carrying goods on inland waters
and are usually fitted with engines. Since they are used for transporting
heavy burdens on canals and rivers - inland waters - and for loading and
H unloading ships which are anchored away as they cannot enter shallow
PANDURONGA TIMBLO INDS. v. U.0.I. [AHMADI, J.] 219

waters, they (barges) are bound to be heavy vessels which can take the load. A
For that reason they do not cease to be flat- bottomed boats and in
ordinary parlance they cannot be described as ships. We are, therefore not
impressed by the submission that Entry 58 in List II must be confined to
boats which are exclusively propelled by oars. We think the learned Judicial
Commissioner was perfectly justified in rejecting: the submission and we
respectfully agree with his line of. reasoning.
B

This very submission was sought to be supported with reference to
the entries in List I and List III set out hereinabove. Now it must be
remembered at the out set that Entry 58 in List II deals with taxes on boats
and we see no warrant to lin}it the same to boats propelled exclusively be C
oars. It is settled law that legislative entries must be interpreted widely
unless the language of the entry or the context requires that it be given a
narow meaning. Neither the language of Entry 58 in List II nor the context
in which the word 'boats' is used therein calls for confining its scope to
boats exclusively propelled by oars. We also do not think that the language D
of Entries 24, 25, and 27 in List I and Entries 31 and 32 in List III would
justify a narrow meaning to be given to the word 'boats' in the Entry 58 of
List II. The entries relied upon have nothing to do with the subject of levy
of tax on boats. Entry 24 in List I deals with the subject of shipping and
navigation on iuland waterways declared to be national waterways, the rule
of the road as such waterways and Entry 25 in List I deals with maritime E
shipping and navigation. The use of the expression 'mechanically propelled
vessels' in Entry 24 cannot restrict the ambit of Entry 58 in List II to vessels
exclusively propelled by oars. On the contrary it restricts the scope of Entry
24 itself and confines its application to mechanically propelled vessels.
Both the Entries 24 and 25 of List I and Entry 32 in List III concern F
shipping and. navigation and have nothing to do with the question of levy
of tax on boats. Entry 27 in List I deals with Ports and so does Entry 31
in List III and it is difficult to appreciate how it can legitimately be
.i..
contended that these entries cut down the scope of Entry 58 in List II. The
entrits from List I and III relied upon operate in their own fields and do
not entrench upon the subject covered by Entry 58 in List II. The learned G
Judicial Commissioner was, therefore, right in concluding that boats of all
description can be taxed by the State Legislature by reason of the power
conferred by Entry 58 in List II of the Vllth Schedule.

For the above reasons we are satisfied that the view taken by the H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A learned Judicial Commissioner is correct and does not call for interference.
Therefore, these appeals on certificate issued under Article 133(1) of the
Constitution must fail. We, therefore, dismiss them but having regard to
the facts and circumstances of the case of each matter we think it would
be advisable to direct each party to bear its own costs.

N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.