Supreme Court of India
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMAversusSTATE OF UTTARAKHAND
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 647
- Decided
- 27 September 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The conviction under Sections 302 and 307 IPC was upheld as the prosecution evidence, including hostile witness statements and forensic material, satisfied the burden of proof and no material prejudice arose from the alleged procedural lapses.
Summary
Paramjeet Singh (Pamma) was convicted for murdering his brother and two nephews and injuring three other family members in a property dispute. The trial court and the Uttarakhand High Court upheld the conviction based on the FIR, statements under Section 161 CrPC, medical reports, forensic evidence and the testimony of the investigating officer, despite seven of eight prosecution witnesses turning hostile. The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds that the prosecution relied on hostile witnesses, failed to put certain incriminating material before him under Section 313 CrPC, and that his abscondence, the Panchayat pardon and lack of motive should preclude conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had satisfied the stringent standard of proof, that hostile witness statements can be relied upon if corroborated, and that any omissions under Section 313 did not cause material prejudice. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the life sentence and ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of circumstantial evidence and hostile witness testimony to sustain convictions under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.
- Whether the trial court erred by not putting certain incriminating material before the accused under Section 313 CrPC.
- Whether the appellant's abscondence, Panchayat pardon, and alleged lack of motive constitute material grounds for acquittal.
- Whether the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt was met despite the turning hostile of key witnesses.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 313
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307
Subjects
murderproperty disputecircumstantial evidencehostile witnessSection 313 CrPCabscondencePanchayat pardonstandard of proofconviction upheld
Judgment
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.
A PARAMJEET SINGH@ PAMMA
v.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
(Criminal Appeal No. 1699 of 2007)
SEPTEMBER 27, 2010
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 307 - Conviction under
- Property dispute - Firing by accused resulting in death of
C three and injuries to three - Conviction u/ss. 302 and 307 by
courts below - Interference with - Held: Not called for - FIR
was lodged promptly and accused was named as the person
who committed the offence - All eye-witnesses including
injured witnesses attributed commission of the offence only
o to the accused in their statements uls. 161 Cr.P.C., though
they turned hostile later - Unwarranted attitude bn the part of
witnesses disentitles any benefit to accused who committed
a heinous crime - The case otherwise is proved by
circumstantial evidence - Prosecution case duly supported
E by medical evidence as well as other material collected by
Investigating Officer during investigation - Thus, no cogent
reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts by
courts below - Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - ss.
161 and 313 - Evidence - Circumstantial evidence -
F Witnesses - Hostile witness.
It is alleged that the appellant was denied his share
in the immovable property by his father 'HS'. On the
fateful day in the morning, the appellant threatened his
father 'HS' and brother 'IS' at the office of the Sub-
G Registrar at place 'K'. In the evening, the appellant killed
his brother 'IS' and his two nephews, and injured his
father 'HS'and nephews PW 1 and PW 2. The incident
was witnessed i:>y PW 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. PW 1 lodged the
FIR. The investigations were carried out. The trial court
H 1064
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAM MA v. STATE OF 1065
UTTARAKHAND
convicted the appellant of the offences punishable under A
sections 302 and 307 IPC and sentenced him to
imprisonment for life and_ 10 years rigorous rmprisonment.
The High Court upheld the order passed by the trial court.
Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeal.
B
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In a criminal trial involving a serious offence
of a brutal nature, the court should be wary of the fact
that it is human instinct to react adversely to the
commission of the offence and make an effort to see that C
such an instinctive reaction does not prejudice the
accused in any way. In a case where the offence alleged
to have been committed is a serious one, the
prosecution must provide greater assurance to the court
that its case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. D
[Para 13) [1079-0]
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952
SC 159; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh and Anr.
AIR 1973 SC 2407; Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of E
Maharashtra AIR 1981 SC 765; Mousam Singha Roy and
Ors. v. State of West Bengal (2003) 12 SCC 377; Aloke Nath
Dutta and Ors. v. State of West Bengal (2007) 12 SCC 230 -
relied on.
Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 F
SC 37 - referred to.
2. Though a conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence, this is something that the court
must bear in mind while deciding a case involving the G
commission of a serious offence in a gruesome manner.
The prosecution's case must stand or fall on its.own legs
and cannot derive any strength from the weakness-of the-.
defence put up by the accused. [Para 14] [1079-F-G]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra· AIR H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.
A 1984 SC 1622; State of Uttar Pradesh v.- Satish (2005) 3 SCC
114; Krishnan v. fate represented by Inspector of Police
(2008) 15 SCC 430; Ramesh Bhai and Anr. v. State of
Rajasthan (2009) 12 SCC 603; Subramaniam v. State of
Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 415; Babu v. State of
B Kera/a JT 2010 (8) SC '560 - relied on.
3. The fact that the witness was declared hostile at
the instance of the public prosecutor and he was allowed
to cross examine the witness furnishes no justification
C for rejecting en bloc the evidence of the witness.
However, the court has to be very careful, as prima facie,
a witness who makes different statements at different
times, has no regard for the truth. His evidence has to be
read and considered as a whole with a view to find out
whether any weight should be attached to it. The court
D should be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness;
normally, it should look for corroboration to his
testimony. The evidence of a person does not become
effaced from the record merely because he has turned
ho.stile and his deposition must be examined more
E cautiously to find out as to what extent he supported the
case of the prosecution. [Paras 17 and 22] [1081-E-F;
1082-H; 1083-A]
State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani and Anr. (2003) 7 SCC
F 291 - relied on.
State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing (1997) 6 SCC 514;
Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb and Ors. v. State of UP.
(2006) 2 SCC 450; Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra (2008)
13 SCC 271; Rajendra and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
G (2009) 13 SCC 480; Govindappa and Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (2010) 6 SCC 533 - referred to.
4.1 An accused can be questioned under Section 313
Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally
· H to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1067
UTTARAKHAND
against him. No matter how weak or scanty the A
prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating
material, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused
and seek his explanation on incriminating material which
has surfaced against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based
on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of B
the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory
pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an
explanation if he chooses to do so. Therefore, the court
is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating
circumstances before the accused and solicit his c
response. This provision is mandatory in nature and
casts an imperative duty on the court and confers a
corresponding right on the accused to have an
opportunity to offer an explanation for such incriminatory
material appearing against him. Circumstances which
0
were not put to the accused in his examination under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him and have
to be excluded from consideration. [Para 23] [1083-B-E]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR
1984 SC 1622; State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh and E
Anr. AIR 1992 SC 2100; Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 400; Bhoor Singh and Anr. v. State of
Punjab AIR 1974 SC 1256; Labhchand Dhanpat Singh Jain
v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1975 SC 182; State of Punjab
v. Naib Din AIR 2001 SC 3955; Parsuram Pandey and Ors. F
v. State of Bihar (2004) 13 sec 189 - relied on.
S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1976 SC
2140; Asraf Ali v. State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328; Shivaji
Sahebrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973
SC 2622; Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam (2009) 7 SCC G
404; Basavaraj R.Patil and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2000)
8 SCC 740; Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra (2009)
6 SCC 583; Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC
595; Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar AIR 1994 SC
2420 - referred to. H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.
A 4.2 The provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C make it
obligatory for the court to question the accused on the
evidence and circumstances against him so as to offer
the accused an opportunity to explain the same. But, it
would not be enough for the accused to show that he has
B not been questioned or examined on a particular
circumstance, instead he must show that such non-
examination has actually and materially prejudiced him
and has resulted in the failure of justice. In other words,
in the event of an inadvertent omission on the part of the
C court to question the accused on any incriminating
circumstance, cannot ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it
is shown that some material prejudice was caused to the
accused by the omission of the court. [Para 31) [1086-0-
FJ
D 5. Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has
been lodged, having an apprehension of being
apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be
unnatural. Absconding by itself is not conclusive proof
of either of guilt or of a guilty conscience. [Para 34) [1087-
E F, G]
Matru@ Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P. AIR 1971
SC 1050; Rahman v. State of U.P. AIR 1972 SC 110; State
of M.P. v. Pa/tan Mal/ah and Ors. AIR 2005 SC 733; Bipin
F Kumar Monda/ v. State of West Bengal JT 2010 (7) SC 379
- referred to.
6. If motive is proved, that would supply a link in the
chain of circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof
cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. [Para
G 45) [1095-G]
Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar AIR 1994 SC
2420; State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing (1997) 6 SCC 514 -
referred to.
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1069
UTTARAKHAND
7.1 In the instant case, the FIR was lodged promptly. A
PW.1-complainant in his deposition admitted that FIR was
lodged by him and the same was in his handwriting; and
in the document he had stated that the appellant had
committed the offence. [Para 35] (1088-D]
B
7.2 The witnesses PW.1 and PW.2 in their respective
depositions admitted their presence at the place of
incident and admitted to suffering the injuries. The
medical report corroborated the case of the prosecution.
In their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. they also C
admitted that they suffered the said injuries at the hands
of the appellant. It was at a later stage that they denied
any role of the appellant. Their statements to that effect
are not trustworthy for the simple reason that they failed
to offer any explanation for why they assigned the said
role to the appellant in their statements under Section 161 D
Cr.P.C. and why the appellant was named by PW.1 while
lodging the FIR. PW.1 and PW.2 also deposed that after
the incident, a Panchayat was convened and it pardoned
the. appellant. The version of convening the Panchayat
and grant of pardon to the appellant was duly supported E
by PW.3 and PW.4. Injured 'HS'. could not be examined
as he died of cancer during the trial. (Paras 41 and 36]
(1093-F-H; 1094-A]
7.3 The witnesses PW.3, PW.4, PW.5, PW.6 and PW.7 F
denied their presence on the spot. PW.6 deposed that he
reached the place of occurrence after the commission of
the offence. None of the said eye-witnesses supported
the case of the prosecution in spite of the fact that all of
them had named the appellant as an assailant in their G
respective statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
[Para 37] (1089-D-E]
7 .4 PW.8-lnvestigating Officer proved the statements
of all the witnesses recorded by him under Section 161
Cr.P.C. and deposed that it was PW.1 who stated that the H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A appellant caused three deaths and injuries to three other
family members. He admitted his signatures on the said
statements. He stated that PW.1 had pointed towards the
place of occurrence and on the basis of the same he
prepared the site plan. The said witness admitted that he
B had recovered empty cartridges and other materials from
the place of occurrence including the piece of cloth, blood
soiled earth-' and ordinary soil. He supported the
postmortem report that postmortems of the dead bodies
were conducted which was recorded in the case diary.
c He further deposed that at the instance of a secret
informer, the appellant was arrested and the appellant
confessed his crime. At the behest of the appellant the
gun was recovered. In spite of the extensive cross-
examination of PW.8, the defence could not make out
anything which may discredit his deposition. [Para 38]
0
(1089-F-H; 1090-A-D]
7.5 It is evident from the postmortem reports of three
persons and the injury reports that the appellant had
caused a very large number of injuries. (Paras 39 and 40]
E (1090-E; 1093-E]
7.6 The trial court had put a question to the appellant
regarding the recovery of gun from the arms dealer at
place 'R' and he had answered the same. [Para 44] (1095-
F B]
7.7 The view taken by the courts below that the eye-
witnesses turned hostile because of the decision taken
in the Panchayat, pardoning the appellant, does not
require any interference. The said eye-witnesses had no
G regard for the truth and concealed the material facts from
the court only in order to protect the appellant, for the
reasons best known to them. Such an unwarranted
attitude on the part of the witnesses disentitles any
benefit to the appellant, who committed a heinous crime.
H The crime was committed against the society/State and
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAM MA v. STATE OF 1071
UTTARAKHAND
not only against the family and, therefore, the pardon A
accorded by the family and Panchayat has no
significance in such a heinous crime. [Para 42) [1094-E-
G]
7 .8 The compromise in Panchayat and the pardoning
B
of the appellant cannot be labelled as a circumstance
charging the appellant with a crime. It cannot be held that
the said circumstance involved any accusation towards
the appellant. In fact, in cannot be termed as incriminating
material, proving the offence against the appellant, rather C
it was a· circumstance due to which all the seven eye-
witnesses turned hostile. Not putting questions
regarding any of the said circumstances cannot be held
to be a serious irregularity inasmuch as the same may
Vitiate the conviction. More so, in the instant case, it did
not materially prejudice the appellant nor it resulted in a D
miscarriage of justice. [Para 47) [1096-0-F]
7.9 The abscondance of the appellant after
commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for
a period of six days itself cannot be a circumstance E
against the appellant. Thus, not putting a question on the
particular circumstance to the appellant remained
inconsequential. The courts below considered that the
appellant could not furnish any explanation for his
absence for about six days. The appellant failed to raise F
any positive defence and answered all the questions put
to him in an evasive manner. [Para 46] [1096-A-B)
Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar (2007) 10
SCC 433; Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 15 SCC 455 - relied on. G
7 .10 The case is considered in the totality of the
circumstances, also taking into consideration the gravity
of the charges that the appellant killed his real brother,
'IS' and his nephews and injured his father 'HS' and H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.
A nephews PW.1 and PW.2 in broad day light. The FIR was
lodged promptly, naming the appellant as the person
who committed the offence. All the eye-witnesses,
including the injured witnesses, attributed the
commission of the offence only to the appellant in their
B statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is difficult to
imagine that the complainant and the eye-witnesses
falsely named the appellant as being the person
responsible for the offence at the initial stage itself. Thus,
there is no cogent reasons to interfere with the concurrent
c findings of facts by the courts below. [Paras 48 ~nd 49}
(1096-G-H; 1097-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1952 SC 159 Relied on. Para 11
D AIR 1973 SC 2407 Relied on. Para 11
AIR 1981 SC 765 Relied on. Para 11
(2003) 12 sec 377 Relied on . Para 11
.(2007) 12 sec 230 Relied on. Para 11
E
AIR 1957 SC 637 Referred to. Para 12
AIR 1984 SC 1622 Relied on. Paras 14, 23
(2005) 3 sec 114 Relied on. Para 15
F (2008) 15 sec 430 Relied on. Para 15
(2009) 12 sec 603 Relied on. Para 15
(2009) 14 sec 415 Relied on. Para 15
JT 2010 (8) SC 560 Relied on. Para 15
G
(1997) 6 sec 514 Referred to. Paras 16, 45
(2'003) 1 sec 291 Relied on. Para 17
(2006) 2 sec 450 Referred to. Para 18
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1073
UTTARAKHAND
(2008) 13 sec 211 Referred to. Para 19 A
(2009) 13 sec 480 Referred to. Para 20
(201 O) s sec 533 Referred to. Para 21
AIR 1992 SC 2100 Relied on. Para 23
B
AIR 1976 SC 2140 Relied on. Para 24
AIR 1956 SC 400 Relied on. Para 25
AIR 1974 SC 1256 Relied on. Para 25
AIR 1975 SC 182 Relied on. Para 25 c
AIR 2001 SC 3955 Relied on. Para 25
(2004) 13 sec 189 Relied on. Para 25
(2008) 16 sec 328 Referred to. Para 26 D
AIR 1973 SC 2622 Referred to. Para 27
(2009) 1 sec 404 Referred to. Para 28
(2000) 8 sec 140 Referred to. Para 28
E
(2009) 6 sec 583 Referred to. Para 29
(2009) 6 sec 595 Referred to. Para 29
AIR 1994 SC 2420 Referred to. Paras 30, 45
AIR 1971 SC 1050 Referred to. Para 32 F
AIR 1972 SC 110 Referred to. Para 33
AIR 2005 SC 733 Referred to. Para 33
JT 2010 (7) SC 379 Referred to. Para 33
G
(2007) 1o sec 433 Relied on. Para 46
(2001) 15 sec 455 Relied on. Para 46
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1699 of 2007.
H·
107 4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 11 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment & Order dated 30.04.2004 of the
High Court of Uttaranchal at Nanital in Criminal Appeal No.
1767 of 2004.
Pradeep Aggarwal, L.P. Singh, Ram Niwas, Deepam
B Borah, Brijesh Singh, Vivya Nagpal for the Appellant.
Sunil Kumar Singh, Mukti Singh, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed
against the judgment and order dated 30.4.2004, passed by
the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, dismissing the
Criminal Appeal No.1767 of 2001 against the judgment and
order of the Sessions Court dated 9.8.2001 in Sessions Case
o No.254 of 2000 convicting the appellant under Sections 302
and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called
'IPC') and sentencing him to life imprisonment and 10 years
rigorous imprisonment respectively. The Sessions Court had
also imposed a fine of Rs.10,000/-, failing which the appellant
E has to undergo another 3 years rigorous imprisonment.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case
are that an FIR was lodged on 27.4.2000 at 6.40 P.M. with
Police Station, Rudrapur, by complainant Ajit Singh (PW.1)
alleging that his grand father Hardayal Singh had given certain
F shares in his immovable properties to his three sons, namely,
Gopal Singh, Joginder Singh and Mahender Singh and denied
a share to his father lnderjit Singh and uncle Paramjit Singh,
the appellant. The appellant had fraudulently sold a plot at
Rudrapur and to prevent him from repeating such act,
G appellant's father Hardayal Singh executed a General Power
of Attorney, as well as a Will, dated 27.04.2000 in respect of
one of his properties in favour of the complainant's father,
lnderjit Singh and thus, the appellant became annoyed. The
appellant misbehaved with his father Hardayal Singh and
H brother lnderjit Singh and threatened them with dire
PARAMJEET Si'NGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1075
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
consequences, at the office of the Sub-Registrar at Kichcha. A
3. On the same day in the evening at 5.45 P.M., the
complainant Ajit Singh (PW.1), his father lnderjit Singh and
brothers Surender Singh, Saranjit Singh alongwith Satwant
Singh and Gurmit Singh went to drop Hardayal Singh at his
B
residence in Matkawali Gali. When they were alighting from
the car, the appellant Paramjit Singh and two or three of his
associates were sitting there. The appellant, with an intention
to kill them, started firing. Thus, complainant's father lnderjit
Singh, his brothers Surender Singh and Saranjit Singh, died
on the spot and complainant Ajit Singh (PW.1 ), his brother C
Baljit Singh (PW.2) and his grand-father Hardayal Singh got
injured. The incident was witnessed by Gurmit Singh (PW.3),
Satwant Singh (PW.4) and cousins of complainant Ajit Singh
(PW.1), Rajinder Kumar (PW.5), Harpal Singh (PW.6) and
Hira Lal (PW.7). D
4. The Investigating Officer recovered and prepared the
Seizure Memos of plain soil, blood soaked soil, three empty
cartridges and a turban. The dead bodies of the aforesaid
three persons were recovered vide Panchnama and E
postmortems were conducted on the bodies of all the three
deceased on 28.4.2000 in the B8se Hospital, Haldwani. The
other injured persons, namely, k;1t Singh (PW.1 ), Baljit Singh
(PW.2) and Hardayal Singh were examined medically.
5. During the investigation on 4.5.2000, the Investigating F
Officer recovered the licensed Gun of the appellant, on the
disclosure made by appellant himself, from an Arms Dealer at
Rampur and the recovery memo and site plan of the place of
recovery was prepared. The empty cartridges and recovered
Gun were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Agra and G
other materials e.g., blood soaked soil and the clothes etc. of
the deceased were also sent to FSL, Agra for chemical
analysis.
6. The Investigating Officer completed the investigation H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A and submitted the charge-sheet against the appellant. He
denied the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution
examined 8 witnesses to substantiate its case before the trial
Court. Out of 8 witnesses, 7 turned hostile. After conclusion of
the trial, the learned Sessions Court vide its judgment and
8 order dated 9.8.2001 found the appellant guilty of the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 307 IPC and awarded the
sentences mentioned hereinabove.
7. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal
Appeal No.1767 of 2001 before the High Court of Uttarakhand
C at Nainital which has been dismissed vide impugned judgment
and order dated 30.4.2004. Hence, this appeal.
8. Shri S.R. Bajwa, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant, has submitted that out of 8 witnesses examined
o by the prosecution, 7 turned hostile and none of them deposed
that the appellant had committed any offence. The Investigating
Officer remained the only witness in the trial who had not turned
hostile. The gun was allegedly recovered at the disclosure of
the appellant as required but it was not in consonance with
E Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, on the basis of
which the recovery of the Gun could be proved. The trial Court
as well as the High Court erred in convicting the appellant as
none of the alleged pieces of circumstantial evidence could
be proved by the prosecution. The courts below committed an
F error in accepting the inadmissible evidence e.g., confession
before Police official; contents of statement recorded under
Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
called 'Cr.P.C.'); using the FIR as a substantial piece of
evidence; and recovery of 12 Bore Gun from an Arms Dealer
at Rampur on the disclosure of the appellant and held the .
G appellant guilty. No witness was examined to prove that the
material collected by the Investigating Officer had been placed
in safe custody in the Malkhana; the Register maintained by
the arms dealer at RampLir had not been produced before the
court nor had the arms dealer been examined. None of the
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1077
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
relevant incriminating pieces of circumstantial evidence had A
been put to the appellant by the court while examining him
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The circumstances of the
absconding of the appellant for 6 days had been taken to
show him as guilty person. In spite of the fact that a compromise
by Panchayat was not proved before the trial Court, it had B
been used against the appellant. More so, no motive or
genesis of occurrence could be established on the record of
the case. The conviction is totally based on conjectures and
surmises, thus, liable to be set aside.
9. Per contra, Shri Sunil Kumar Singh, learned counsel C
appearing for the State of Uttarakhand has vehemently opposed
the appeal contending that appellant had been found guilty of
committing murder of 3 members of his own family and injuring
3 other family members. The informant Ajit Singh (PW.1) and
Baljit Singh (PW.2) have admitted that they were present at D
the place of occurrence. They suffered injuries but denied the
involvement of the appell~nt in the crime altogether. The other
eye-witnesses even denied their presence at the place of
occurrence itself. In such a fact-situation, where all the witnesses
had been won over by the appellant, as the family had pardoned E
the appellant, the case otherwise stood proved by circumstantial
evidence. The courts below have rightly convicted the appellant.
All relevant questions had been put to the appellant under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., and the appellant could not explain his
whereabouts at the time of occurrence of the incident. The F
case of the prosecution has duly been supported by the
medical evidence as well as the other material collected by
the Investigating Officer during the investigation. The appeal
lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
G
10. We have considered the rival submissions made by
the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The case is to be decided keeping in mind that as all the
seven eye-witnesses turned hostile and none of them involved
H
•
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 $.C.R.
A the appellant in the crime, it remained a case of circumstantial
evidence.
Legal Issues
Standard of Proof:
B
11. A criminal trial is not a fairy tale wherein one is free
to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. Crime is an
event in real life and is the product of an interplay between
different human emotions. In arriving at a conclusion about the
c guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime,
the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of
probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses.
Every case, in the final analysis, would have to depend upon
its own facts. The court must bear in mind that "human nature
0 is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out
of strong suspicions." Though an offence may be gruesome
and revolt the human conscience, an accused can be convicted
only on legal evidence and not on surmises and conjecture.
The law does not permit the court to punish the accused on
E the basis of a moral conviction or suspicion alone. "The burden
of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the
burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence." In fact, it is a
settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious
the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a
F higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.
The fact that the offence was committed in a very cruel and ·
revolting manner may in itself be a reason for scrutinizing the
evidence more closely, lest the shocking nature of the crime
induce an instinctive reaction against dispassionate judicial
G scrutiny of the facts and law. (Vide: Kashmira Singh v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159; State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh Baljit Singh & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 2407; Shankarfal
Gyarasi/al Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765;
Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2003)
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1079
UTTARAKHAND [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
I 12 sec 377; and Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West A
Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230)~
12. In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab,
AIR 1957 SC 637, this Court observed:
"Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true; B
but between 'may be true' and 'must be true' there is
inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this
distance must be covered by legal, reliable and
unimpeachable evidence (before an accused can be
convicted]." c
13. Thus, the law on the point may be summarised to the
effect that in a criminal trial involving a serious offence of a
brutal nature, the court should be wary of the fact that it is
human instinct to react adversely to the commission of the 0
offence and make an effort to see that such an instinctive
reaction does not prejudice the accused in any way. In a case
where the offence alleged to have been committed is a serious
one, the prosecution must provide greater assurance to the
court that its case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
E
Circumstantial Evidence:
14. Though a conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence, this is something that the court must
bear in mind while deciding a case involving the commission F
of a serious offence in a gruesome manner. In Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC
1622, this Court observed that it is well settled that the
prosecution's case must stand or fall on its own legs and
cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence G
put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be
called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various
links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are in themselves
complete. This Court also discussed the nature, character and
essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on
H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A circumstantial evidence alone and held as under:
(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established;
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with
B the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty;
(3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
c and tendency;
(4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved; and
(5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
D to leave any reasonable ground for tile conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.
E 15. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Krishnan
v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC
430; Ramesh Bhai & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12
SCC 603; Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu &Anr., (2009)
F 14 SCC 415; and Babu v. State of Kera/a, JT 2010 (8) SC
560, observing that the evidence produced by the prosecution
should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the
accused sustainable.
Hostile Witness:
G
16. In State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing, (1997) 6 SCC
514, this Court observed as under :
"Every criminal trial is a voyage in quest of truth for public.
justice to punish the guilty and restore peace, stability
H
PARAMJEET SINGH@ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1081
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
and order in the society. Every citizen who has knowledge A
of the commission of cognizable offence has a duty to
lay information before the police and cooperate with the
investigating officer who is enjoined to collect the
evidence and if necessary summon the witnesses to give
evidence. He is further enjoined to adopt scientific and B
all fair means to unearth the real offender, lay the charge-
sheet before the court competent to take cognizance of
the offence. The charge-sheet needs to contain the facts
constituting the offence/s charged. The accused is
entitled to a fair trial. Every citizen who assists the c
investigation is further duty-bound to appear before the
Court of Session or competent criminal court, tender his
ocular evidence as a dutiful and truthful citizen to unfold
the prosecution case as given in his statement. Any
betrayal in that behalf is a step to destabilise social peace, 0
order and progress."
17. The fact that the witness was declared hostile at the
instance of the public prosecutor and he was allowed to cross
examine the witness furnishes no justification for rejecting en
bloc the evidence of the witness. However, the court has to be E
very q:ireful, as prima facie, a witness who makes different
statements at different times, has no regard for the truth. His
evidence has to be read and considered as a whole with a
view to find out whether any weight should be attached to it.
The court should be slow to act on the testimony of such a F
witness; normally, it should look for corroboration to his
testimony. (Vide : State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani &Anr., (2003)
7 sec 291)
18. This Court while deciding with the issue in Radha G
Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U. P., (2006) 2
sec 450, observed as under:
" ..... It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution
witness cannot be rejected in toto merely bec.ause the
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-
examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be
treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but
the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found
to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof ... "
8
19. In Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC
271, this Court considered the value of the deposition of a
hostile witness and held as under:
"..... If PW 1, the maker of the complaint has chosen not to
c corroborate his earlier statement made in the complaint
and recorded during investigation, the conduct of such a
witness for no plausible and tenable reasons pointed out
on record, will give rise to doubt the testimony of the
in.vestigating officer who had sincerely and honestly
D conducted the entire investigation of the case. In these
circumstances, we are of the view that PW .1 has tried to
conceal the material truth from the Court with the sole
purpose of shielding and protecting the appellant for
reasons best known to the witness and therefore, no
E benefit could be given to the appellant for unfavourable
conduct of this witness to the prosecution".
20. In Rajendra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009)
13 sec 480, this Court observed that merely because a
witness deviates from his statement made in the FIR, his
F evidence cannot be held to be totally unreliable.
21. This Court reiterated a similar view in Govindappa &
Ors. v. State of Kamataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533, observing that
the deposition of a hostile witness can be relied upon at least
G upto the extent he supported the case of the prosecution.
22. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence of
a person does not become effaced from the record merely
because he has turned hostile and his deposition must be
H examined more cautiously to find out as to what extent he has
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1083
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
supported the case of the prosecution. A
Section 313 Cr.P.C.:
23. An accused can be questioned under Section 313
Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally to
explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against B
him. No matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence
is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of
the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation
on incriminating material which has surfaced against him.
Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the fundamental principle of
fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be -·--C
brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an
opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so.
Therefore, the court is under a legal obligation to put the
incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit D
his response. This provision is mandatory in nature and casts
an imperative duty on the court and confers a corresponding
right on the accused to have an opportunity to offer an
explanation for such incriminatory material appearing against
him. Circumstances which were not put to the accused in his E
examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used
against him and have to be excluded from consideration. (Vide
Sharad Birdhichand (Supra); and State of Maharashtra v.
Sukhdev Singh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2100).
24. In S. Hamam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1976 F
SC 2140, this Court held that non-indication of inculpatory
material and its relevant facts by the trial court to the accused
adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. The
recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise. G
25. If any appellate Court or revisional court comes across
the fact that the trial Court had not put any question to an
accused, even if it is of a vital nature, such an omission alone
should not result in the setting aside of the conviction and H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.
A sentence as an inevitable consequence. An inadequate
examination cannot be presumed to have caused prejudice.
Every error or omission in compliance of the provisions of
Section 313 Cr.P.C., does not necessarily vitiate trial. Such
errors fall within category of curable irregularities and the
B question as to whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends
upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice has been
or is likely to have been caused to accused. Efforts should be
made to undo or correct the lapse. (Vide: Wasim Khan v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 400; Bhoor Singh &
c Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1256; Labhchand
Dhanpat Singh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC
182; State of Punjab v. Naib Din, AIR 2001 SC 3955; and
Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC
189).
D 26. In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328,
this Court observed:
"Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put
in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the
E purpose of enabling him to explain any of the
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It
follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each
material circumstance appearing in the evidence against
the accused is required to be put to him specifically,
F distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to
a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the
accused was prejudiced. "
27. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, this Court observed as under
G
"It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the
prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory
material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic
H fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1085
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if A
consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However,
where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso
facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned
by such defect must be established by the accused. In
the event of evidentiary material not being put to the B
accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material
from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court
to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what
explanation the accused has as regards the
circumstances established against him but not put to him c
and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court
any plausible or reasonable explanation of such
circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable
answer exists and that even if the accused had been
questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would 0
not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out
of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied
for its conviction." (Emphasis added).
28. In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam, (2009) 7 SCC
404, this Court relying upon its earlier decision in Basavaraj E
R. Patil & Ors. v. State of Kamataka, (2000) 8 SCC 740, held
that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not meant to
nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his
benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of
natural justice and the maxim "audi alteram partem" has been F
enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under Section
313 Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.
29. In Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra, (2009)
6 SCC 583; and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 G
SCC 595, this Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to
indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313
Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/
inadequate questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C. amounts
to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground
H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A for interference with the conviction.
30. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994
SC 2420, this Court rejected the submission that as no question
had been put to the accused on motive, no motive for the
commission of the crime could be attributed to the accused,
8
nor the same could be reckoned as circumstance against him
observing that it could not be pointed out as to what in fact
was the real prejudice caused to the accused by omission to
question the accused on the motive for the crime. No material
was placed before the court to show as to what and in what
C manner the prejudice, if any, was caused to the accused. More
. so, the accused/appellant was aware of accusation and charge
against him.
31. Thus, it is evident from the above that the provisions
D of Section 313 Cr. P. C make it obligatory for the court to
question the accused on the evidence and circumstances
against him so as to offer the accused an opportunity to explain
the same. But, it would not be enough for the accused to show
that he has not been questioned or examined on a particular
E circumstance, instead he must show that such non-examination
has actually and materially prejudiced him and has resulted in
the failure of justice. In other words, in the event of an inadvertent
omission on the part of the court to question the accused on
any incriminating circumstance cannot ipso facto vitiate the
F trial unless it is shown that some material prejudice was caused
to the accused by the omission of the court.
Abscondance of Accused :
32. In Matru@ Girish Chandra v. The State of UP., AIR
G 1971 SC 1050, this Court repelled the submissions made by
the State that as after commission of the offence the accused
had been absconding, therefore, the inference can be drawn
that he was a guilty person, observing as under:
"The appellant's conduct in absconding was also relied
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. _STATE OF 1087
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily A
lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent
man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly
suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self-
preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant
piece of evidence to be considered along with other B
evidence but its value would always depend on the
circumstances of each case. Normally the courts are.
disinclined to attach much importance to the act of
absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence
for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a c
determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial
evidence which must admit of no other reasonable
hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the
present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the
FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being
D
wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we
do not think this circumstance can be considered to be
necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade
justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence."
33. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in E
Rahman v. State of U. P., Al R 1972 SC 11 O; State of M. P. v.
Pa/tan Mal/ah & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 733; and Bipin Kumar
Monda/ v. State of West Bengal, JT 2010 (7) SC 379.
34. Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has F
been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended
by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, mere
abscondance by the appellant after commission of the crime
and remaining untraceable for a period of six days itself cannot
establish his guilt. Absconding by itself is not conclusive proof G
of either of guilt or of a guilty conscience.
Present case:
35. The present case requires to be examined in light of
the aforesaid certain legal propositions. H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A The offence as alleged, has been committed by the
appellant, killing three persons and injuring three other persons
who were members of his own family. The alleged motive had
been annoyance because of the denial of his share in the
immovable property by his father, Hardayal Singh. An earlier
B incident had occurred in the morning in the office of the Sub-
Registrar at Kichcha and the offence was allegedly committed
by the appellant on the same day in the evening at about 5.45
P.M. An FIR had been lodged promptly at 6.40 P.M. at Police
Station: Rudrapur, which is located at 14 kms. away from the
C place of occurrence. Complainant Ajit Singh (PW.1) in his
deposition, admitted his presence at the place of occurrence
and also that he had suffered injuries in the same incident,
however, he had denied the participation of the appellant in
the crime. He had also admitted that FIR (Ex. K-1) was lodged
by him and the same had been in his handwriting. He also
0
admitted that in the document Ex. K-1, he had stated that the
appellant had committed the offence. On being cross-examined
by the public prosecutor, he furnished the explanation for
changing his stand, stating that he had named the appellant
for the killing of lnderjit Singh, Surender Singh and Saranjit
E Singh and causing injuries to three others including the
complainant at the behest of the members of the crowd present
there, whereas he had not seen the appellant firing at the spot.
He denied the suggestion that there was a compromise in the
family and because of that he had been falsely deposing to
F save the appellant. However, he had admitted that he was
medically examined. His version in the FIR stands corroborated
by the medical evidence. The statement recorded by the
Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has been in
consonance with his version made in the FIR.
G
36. Baljit Singh (PW.2) was also an injured witness, and
was also medically examined. The medical report corroborated
the case of the prosecution. He named the appellant
responsible for the crime while making a statement under
H Section 161 Cr.P.C., which was recorded by the Investigating
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAM MA v. STATE OF 1089
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Officer, Rajan Tyagi(PW.8). However, he did not support the A
case of the prosecution when he was examined in the court.
He admitted his presence on the spot and admitted that he
had suffered injuries. He also admitted that he was medically
examined. He admitted that there was a dispute in the family
on the issue· of sharing the immovable property, but he B
deposed that the appellant did not cause three deaths or
injuries to three others. In his cross-examination, he was
confronted with his statement recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C., wherein he had named the appellant as the person
who had committed the crime. He had also denied the c
suggestion. that he was deposing falsely because of the
compromise in the family.
37. The other witnesses Gurmit Singh (PW.3), Satwant
Singh (PW.4), Rajinder Kumar (PW.5}, Harpal Singh (PW.6)
and Hira Lal (PW. 7) had even denied their presence on the D
spot. Harpal Singh (PW.6) deposed that he had reached the
place of occurrence after the commission of the offence. None
of the said eye-witnesses supported the case of the prosecution
in spite of the fact that all of them had named the appellant as
an assailant in their respective statements made under Section E
161 Cr.P.C.
38. Shri Rajan Tyagi, Investigating Officer (PW.8}, had
proved the statements of all the witnesses recorded by him
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and deposed that it was the F
complainant, Ajit Singh (PW.1 }, who had stated that the
appellant had caused three deaths and injuries to 3 other family
members. He had admitted his signatures on the said
statements. He had further stated that Ajit Singh (PW.1) had
pointed towards the place of occurrence and on the basis of G
the same he prepared the site plan, Ex. K-36. The said witness
admitted that he had recovered empty cartridges and other
materials from the place of occurrence including the piece of
cloth, blood soiled earth and ordinary soil. He had supported
the postmortem report, that postmortems of the dead bodies
H
were conducted on 27th April, 2000, which was recorded in
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.
A the case diary. He has further deposed that at 1.30 P.M. on
4th May, 2000 at the instance of a secret informer, the appellant,
Paramjeet Singh, was arrested and the appellant had
confessed his crime and had told him that the appellant had
deposited his licensed gun with M/s J.B. Sales Arms &
B Ammunition Dealer, Railway Station, Rampur. The Investigating
Officer (PW.8) went alongwith the appellant and other police
personnel to Rampur railway station for the recovery of the
gun used in the offence. The appellant, Paramjeet Singh, had
pointed out, from the distance of about 90 paces, the agency
c of the arms dealer. They alighted from the jeep and the
appellant walked towards it and got recovered the gun which
was lying in an almirah of the said shop and identified the
same. So, it was the, appellant at whose behest the gun was
recovered. In spite of the extensive cross examination of Shri
Rajan Tyagi, Investigating Officer (PW.8), the defence could
0
not make out anything which may discredit his deposition.
39. The case should be examined from another angle
also. The postmortem reports of 3 persons, who died in the
incident, are part of the record and speak for themselves.
E
Postmortem Reports :
I. The postmortem report of Sharanjeet Singh
(Ex.Ka.27) reads as under:
F (1) Lacerated wound 1 cm x 1 cm circular,
Margins inverted over forehead in between
eyebrows.
(2) Lacerated wound 1 cm x 1 cm right side
G chest, 6 cm above right nipple.
(3) Lacerated wound 1 cm x 1 cm right side of
lower abdomen 6 cm lateral to umbilicus,
circular, margins inverted.
H (4) Lacerated wound 1 cm x 1 cm over right
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. ·STAT_E OF 1091
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN; J.]
shoulder, margins inverted, circular. A
(5) Multiple firearm injuries measuring 1 cm x 1
cm in an area of 12 cm x 16 cm over middle
of back, margins inverted, cavity deep,
pellets and plastic cork recovered (wound of
B
entering).
II. The postmortem report of Surender Singh (Ex. Ka.
28) reads as under:
(1) Lacerated would 12 cm x 14 cm right side c
abdomen 6 cm ~bove and lateral to
umbilicus and 10 cm below right nipple,
margins crushed and multiple firearm injuries·
measuring 1 cm x 1 cm around the lacerated
wound, margins inverted, mus-c;le deep. D
\
(2) Multiple lacerated wounds measuring 1 cm
x, 1 cm over left chest around nipple some
are cavity deep and some skin deep.
(3) Lacerated wound 10 cm x 6 cm left abdomen E
lateral side.
Ill. The postmortem report of lnderjeet Singh (Ex.Ka.
29) reads as under:
(1) Lacerated wound 1 cm x 1,5 cm left side F
chest oval in shape, margins inverted 6 cm
above left nipple, cavity deep.
(2) Two circular lacerated wound right side chest
6 cm below right nipple, skin deep, margins G
inverted.
(3) Three lacerated wound in an area of 8 cm x
6 cm over right shoulder joint, skin deep,
margins inverted.
H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A (4) Three lacerated wound 1 cm x 1 cm circular
in shape over right lower abdomen 6 cm
lateral to umbilicus.
(5) Lacerated wound 3 cm x 3.5 cm oval in
shape margins averted and irregular over
8
back of chest, left side, track corresponding
to injury No. 1, injury No. 5 is wound of exit.
R.M. present both upper and lower limbs.
40. Injury Reports :
c
I. Ajit Singh (PW.1) was medically examined and his·
injuries' report (Ex.Ka.37) reads as under:
(i) Lacerated wound of .3cm x .3cm on the back side
of right hand, "skin deep. Oozing of blood present.
D
(ii) Multiple firearm wound of entry size .3 x .3cm in the
area of 18cm x 9 cm on middle part of the left thigh on the
outer side. Black coloured. Jean pant is also torn on the
same places. Margins are charred and indication is
E ·present around them. Advised X-ray of left thigh.
(iii) Multiple firearm wound of entry on the medial and
anterior aspect of right thigh, some part of the Jeans is also
torn on the same places over the injuries. Margins are
charred and indication is present around them. Oozing of
F
blood also present size 13cm x .3cm. Advised X-ray of the
right thigh.
II. The injuries' report of Baljit Singh, (PW.2) (Ex.Ka.38)
reads as under:
G
(i) Lacerated wound over the right side of face
and neck involving the lower jaw and right
angle of lip and tongue.
(ii) Excessive bleeding through the wound.
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1093
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
(iii) Irregular margin defect in the chin cut being A
received on mandible.
(iv) Right lower palpable throughout the wound.
Opinion : The above injuries were caused by fire
arm. Fresh. B
Ill. The medical examination report of Shri Hardayal
Singh (Ex.Ka.36) is as under:
(i) Punctured wound 4 mn x 4 round in the left C
side of temporal area 3 cm above the left
extended ear. Bleeding. X-ray advised.
(ii) Punctured wound % cm x % cm round with
level of 1st thoracic vertebra. Bleeding. X-ray
advised. D
(iii) Punctured wound % cm x % cm on left
scapula. Bleeding. X-ray advised.
It is evident from the above that the appellant had E
caused a very large number of injuries.
41. The witnesses i.e. Ajit Singh (PW.1) and Baljit Singh
(PW.2) in their respective depositions have admitted their
presence at the place of incident and admitted to suffering
those injuries. In their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. F
they have also admitted that they suffered the aforesaid injuries
at the hands of the appellant. It was at a later stage that they
have denied any role of the appellant. Their statements to that
effect are not trustworthy for the simple reason that they failed
to offer any explanation for why they assigned the said role to F
the appellant in their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
and why the appellant had been named by Ajit Singh (PW .1)
while lodging the FIR. It is relevant to note that the witnesses,
namely, Ajit Singh (PW.1) and Baljit Singh (PW.2) have also
deposed that after the incident, a Panchayat was convened H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1,1 S.C.R.
A and it pardoned the appellant. The version of convening the
Panchayat and grant of pardon to the appellant has duly been
supported by Gurmit Singh (PW.3) and Satwant Singh (PW.4).
Gurmit Singh (PW.3) deposed:
B " ..... it is correct that accused is my cousin. The
matter had been compromised in the Panchayat".
Satwant Singh (PW.4) deposed:
" .... matter had been compromised in the
c Panchayat. Panchayat had pardoned Pamma
accused".
It is pertinent to mention here that injured Hardayal
Singh could not be examined as he died of cancer during
D the trial.
42. It is evident from the above that the view taken by the
courts below, that the eye-witnesses turned hostile because of
the decision taken in the Panchayat, pardoning the appellant,
E does not require any interference.
It is also evident from the above that the said eye-
witnesses have no regard for the truth and concealed the
material facts from the court only in order to protect the
appellant, for the reasons best known to them. Such an
F unwarranted attitude on the part of the witnesses disentitles
any benefit to the appellant, who has committed a heinous
crime. The crime had been committed against the society/
State and not only against the family and therefore, the pardon
accorded by the family and Panchayat has no significance in
G such ,a,heinous crime.
'43_ It has been canvassed on behalf of the appellant that
the trial Court committed an error relying upon various factors/
incriminating materials which were not pointed out to the
H appellant while recording his statement under Section 313
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1095
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Cr.P.C. Such material had been in respect of (i) recovery of A
gun from arms dealer at Rampur; (ii) motive; (iii) abscondance
of the appellant; and (iv) compromise in Panchayat which
pardoned the appellant.
44. So far as the circumstance of recovery of gun from
B
the arms dealer at Rampur is concerned, the trial court had
put a question to the appellant and he has answered the same.
The question and answer read as under:
"Q. It has come in evidence that the Investigating Officer
prepared a site plan of the place of occurrence which is C
Exh.K-26. Your licenced gun 17466/96 was recovered at
your instance from Rampur and the Recovery Memo was
prepared which is K-39, the site plan of the place of
recovery is Exh.K-45. The forensic science laboratory
report in respect of the case property is Exh. K-44, what D
have you to say?
Ans. The gun was not recovered at my instance. This
number 17466/96 is the number of my licenced gun. I had
deposited this gun with a dealer at Rampur. The police has
E
concocted the story of recovery."
It appears that the number of one of the exhibits had wrongly
been pointed out as K-44, though it was Exh. K-46. But it is
not a case where no question was put to the accused on the
said circumstance. F
45. So far as the issue of motive is concerned, the case
is squarely covered by the judgment of this court in Suresh
Chandra Bahri (supra). Therefore, it does not require any further
elaborate discussion. More so, if motive is proved that would G
supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence but the
absence thereof cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution
case. (Vide: State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing [supra])
46. The third circumstance i.e. the abscondance of the
H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 11 S.C.R.
A appellant has also been taken into consideration by the courts
below. We have clarified that it cannot be a circumstance
against the appellant. Thus, not putting a question on this
particular circ~~mstance to the appellant remained
inconsequential. The courts below had considered that the
B appellant could notJurnish any explanation for his absence for
about six days. Appellant failed to raise any positive defence
and answered all the questi6nS- p'tli_'to. him in an evasive
manner. Such a view is permissible being in consonance with
the law laid down by this Court in Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar
c v. State of Bihar, (2007) 10 SCC 433; and Amarsingh
Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2007)
15 sec 455.
47. So far as the fourth circumstance i.e. the compromise
in Panchayat and the pardoning of the appellant is concerned,
D it cannot be labelled as a circumstance charging the appellant
with a crime. By no stretch of the imagination can it be held
that the said circumstance involved any accusation towards
the appellant. In fact, in cannot be termed as incriminating
material, proving the offence against the appellant, rather it
E had been a circumstance due to which all the seven eye-
witnesses turned hostile.
Be that as it may, we are of the considered opinion that
not putting questions regarding anyone of the aforesaid
F circumstances can not be held to be a serious irregularity
inasmuch as the same may vitiate the conviction. More so, in
the present case, it has not materially prejudiced the appellant
nor has it resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
48. If the case is considered in the totality of the
G circumstances, also taking into consideration the gravity of the
charges, the appellant had killed his real brother, lnderjit Singh
and his nephews, Surender Singh and Saranjit Singh and
injured his father Hardayal Singh and nephews Ajit Singh
(PW.1) and Baljit Singh (PW.2) in broad day light. The FIR
H had been lodged promptly, naming the appellant as the person
PARAMJEET SINGH@ PAMMA v. STATE OF 1097
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
who committed the offence. All the eye-witnesses, including A
the injured witnesses, attributed the commission of the offence
only t© the appellant in their statements under Section 161
Cr.P.C. It is difficult to imagine that the complainant and the
eye-witnesses had all falsely named the appellant as being
the person responsible for the offence at the initial stage itself. B
Thus, we do not see any cogent reasons to interfere with
the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below. The appeal
lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
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