Holding

Section 438 Cr.P.C. may be exercised only in exceptional cases and cannot be used to issue blanket bail orders or to restrain arrest, but a conditional order directing non‑arrest subject to cooperation is valid.

Summary

The appellants, employees of Citibank/CWA, were implicated in an FIR alleging fraud under Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC. They sought quashing of the FIR and anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C., arguing that the allegations were civil in nature and that they would cooperate with the investigation. The High Court denied anticipatory bail, prompting the appeal. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Sections 438 and 439, holding that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary and must not be used to issue blanket orders or to restrain arrest, as such interference hampers investigation. It upheld the earlier order directing the appellants not to be arrested provided they cooperate with the investigating agency and issued directions for the investigation to be completed within two months. The appeals were dismissed and the order of the High Court was affirmed.

Issues considered

The proper scope and limits of Section 438 Cr.P.C. in granting anticipatory bail
Whether a blanket order releasing the applicant for any offence is permissible
Whether an interim order restraining arrest can be issued under Section 438
The validity of the High Court's order directing non‑arrest subject to cooperation

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 438, s. 439, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 406, s. 420

Subjects

anticipatory bailSection 438Section 439criminal procedurearrestinvestigationblanket orderinterim ordernon‑bailable offence

Judgment

[2008] 15 S.C.R. 155
1"

PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. A
II.
STATE (U.T. CHANDIGARH) AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1716 of 2008)
NOVEMBER 3, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

s. 438 - Exercise of power under - Scope - Held: c
Normally a direction should not be issued to the effect that
applicant shall be released on bail 'wherever affested for which
ever offence whatsoever' - Such order should not be passed
as it would serve as blanke.t to cover or protect any and every
~ kind of unlawful activity. D
ss.438 and 439 - Scope of - Distinction between.

s. 439 - Interim order not to arrest the applicant- Pending
anticipatory bail - Held: Cannot be passed, as it would
amount to interference with the investigation. E

The appellants filed application under s.482 Cr.P.C.
praying for quashing the proceedings in FIR registered
"""' in respect of offences punishable under ss.406, 420 and
1208 IPC. In essence, the prayer was for grant of F
protection under s.438 Cr.P.C. The High Court noted that
this was not a case where any protection in terms of s.
438 Cr.P.C. was to be extended. Hence the instant
appeals.
G
Disposing of the appeals with certain directions, the
Court

HELD: 1.1. The facility which s.438 Cr.P.C. gives is
155 H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 15 S.C.R.
.f)

A generally referred to as 'anticipatory bail'. This expression ;-
>

whic~ was used by the Law Commission in. its 41st
Report is neither used in the section nor in .its marginal
note. But the expression 'anticipatory bail' is a convenient
mode of indication that it is possible to apply for bail in
8 anticipation of arrest. Any order of bail can be effective
only from the time of arrest of the accused. The bail is ~·

basically release from restraint, more particululy the
custody of Police. The distinction between an ordinary
order of bail and an order under s.438 Cr.P .C. is that
c whereas the former is granted after arrest, and therefore
. means release from custody of the Police, the latter is
. granted in anticipation· of arrest and is therefore effective
at the very momen't of arrest. It is well-known that bail is
ordinary manifestation of arrest, that the Court thinks first
D to make an order is that in the event of arrest a person ~

shallJ't?~ [el~ased on bail. Manifestly there is no question
of release ·d.n bail unless the accused is arrested, and
ther~fore, i~is only on an arrest being effected the order
I -
becomes operative. The power exercisable under s.438
'
E is sorrewhat extraordinary in character and it is only in
exceptional cases where it appears that the person may
be falsely implicated or where there are reasonable
grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence
is not likely to otherwise misuse his liberty then power
r
.F is to be exercised under s.438. The power being of
important natur~ it is entrusted only to the higher .
echelons of judicial forums, i.e. the Court of Session or ..
the High Court. It is the power exercisable in case of an
anticipated accusation of non-bailable offence. The
G object which is sought to be achieved by s.438 Cr.P.C. is
that the moment a person is arrested, if he has already
obtained an order from the Court of Session or High
Court, he shall be released immediately· on bail without
being sent to jail. [Para 6] [162-C-H; 163-A-D]
H
PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE (U.T. 157
CHANDIGARH) AND ANR.

Gur Baksh Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 SCC 565, A
relied on.

Balachand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1977)
SC 366, referred to.
8
1.2. S.438 is a procedural provision which is
concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who
is entitled to plead innocence, since he is not on the date
of application for exercise of power under s.438 Cr.P.C.
convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks C
bail. The applicant must show that he has 'reason to
believe' that he may be arrested in a non~bailable offence.
Use of the expression 'reason to believe' shows that the
applicant may be arrested must be founded on
reasonable grounds. Mere "fear" is not 'belief' for which . 0
reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he
has some sort of vague apprehension that some one is
going to make an accusation against him in pursuance '
of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief
of the applicant is based that he may be arrested in non- E
bailable offence must be capable of being examined. If an
application is made to the High Court or the Court of
Session, it is for the Court concerned to decide whether
a case has been made out of for granting the relief
sought. The provisions cannot be invoked after arrest of F
the accused. [Para 15] [166-G-H; 167-A-D]

1.3. Normally a direction should not be issued to the
effect that the applicant shall be released on bail
"whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever". G
Such 'blanket order' should not be passed as it would
serve as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind
of allegedly unlawful activity. An order under s.438 is a
device to secure the individual's liberty' it is neither a
passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield
H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

,...-:')
A against any and all kinds of accusations likely or unlikely.
[Para 15] [167-E-G]

Niranjan Singh and Anr. v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote
and Ors., AIR (1980) SC 785, relied on.
B
Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR (1996) SC 1042; K.L. Verma v. State and Anr., (1996) 7
SCALE 20; Nirma/Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. and Anr., [2004] "'"'
7 SCC 558 and Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Anr., JT
(2004) 10 SC 491, referred to.
c
2. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of
investigation intended to secure several purposes. The
accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding
various facets of motive, preparation, commission and
D aftermath of the crime and the connection of other
_,;>
persons, if any, in the crime. There may be circumstances
in which the accused may provide information leading to
discovery of material facts. It may be necessary to curtail
his freedom in order to enable the investigation to
E proceed without hindrance and to protect witnesses and
persons connected with the victim of the crime, to
prevent his dis-appearance to maintain law and order in
the locality. For. these or other reasons, arrest may
become inevitable part of the process of investigation. r
F
The legality of the proposed arrest cannot be gone into
in an application under s.438 Cr.P.C .. The role of the
investigator is well-defined and the jurisdictional scope
of interference by the Court in the process of
investigation is limited. The Court ordinarily will not
G
interfere with the investigation of a crime or with the
arrest of accused in a cognizable offence. An interim
r
order restraining arrest, if passed while dealing with an
application under s.438 Cr.P.C. will amount to interference
in the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done
H
PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE (U.T. 159
CHANDIGARH) AND ANR.
~

under s.438 Cr.P.C. [Para 17] (168-A-E] A
Adri Dharan Das v. State of. West Bengal, [2005) 4 SCC
303, relied on.

3. In the instant case this Court had in fact by order
dated 30.5.2008 directed that the appellants shall not be B
~ arrested subject to the condition that they will join
investigation. The order is in operation and it is not
appropriate in the present case to make any variation.
[Para 18] (168-G]
c
Case Law Reference :
(1980J 2 sec 565 relied on Para 6
AIR (1977) SC 366 referred to Para 6
D
AIR (1996) SC 1042 referred to Para 9 ·
(1996) 7 SCALE 20 referred to Para 10
c20041 1 sec 558 referred to Para 11
E
JT (2004) 10 SC 491 referred to Para 11
AIR (1980) SC 785 relied on Para 12

-.(, c20051 4 sec 303 relied on Para 17

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal F
No. 1716 of 2008.

From the final Order dated 19.5.2008 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Misc No. 12094-M/
2008. G
-,
WITH
Criminal Appeal No. 1717 of 2008.

Arun Jaitley, R.S. Sodhi, Anjan Chakraborty, Mohd. Wassay
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 15 S.C.R.

__,,...,./
A Khan, Rahul Malhotra, Kripa Shankar Prasad and R.S. Suri for
the Appellants.

Manohar Lal Sharma, Jitendra Kumar and Kamini Jaiswal
for the Respondents.
B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJ!T PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in these appeals is to the order of learned
c Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Though
the appellants had filed application under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') praying
for quashing the proceedings in FIR No. 73 dated 15.4.2008
registered in respect of offences punishable under Sections
o 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
./'
the 'IPC') in Police Station, Sector 3, Chandigarh, in essence
the prayer was for grant of protection under Section 438 of the
Code.

E 3. Background facts, highlighted by the appellants, are as
follows:

Citibank and Citigroup Wealth Advisors (in. short 'CWA')
are two separate legal entities. Citibank carries on banking
activities and is incorporated under the Banking Re~ulations >--
F Act; 1956 and is guided by the directions and guidelines of the
Reserve Bank of India; whereas CWA is a wealth advisory
body incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and is
regulated by the directions and guidelines as set out by SEBI
and the Stock Exchanges.
G
Appellants' (who are employees of Citi Bank) prayer for
anticipatory bail are based on the premises that the allegations
in the complaint are purely of civil nature since arbitration
proceedings have been initiated at the behest of both the
H
PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE (U.T. 161
CHANDIGARH) AND ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
,.. \~

complainant and CWA much prior to the institution of the A
criminal case.

The prayer was opposed by the State and the complainant.
The High Court noted that the allegation in the FIR was to the
following effect: B
y- "A perusal of the FIR shows that an amount of Rs.1.10
crores has been fraudulently withdrawn from the saving
account of_the complainant and shares worth Rs.1.60
crores have been fraudulently withdrawn/embezzled from
his demat account maintained in the City Bank with whom
c
the petitioners were employed at the relevant time. The act
of embezzlement is attributed to the petitioners and two
other persons, who are employees of City Group \/Vealth
Advisors India Private Limited. On these allegations, a
•---,....__ 0
case under sections 406/420 and 1208 of the Indian Penal
Code in Police Station, Sector 3, Chandigarh was
registered against the petitioners. "

The High Court noted that this was not a case where any
protection in terms of Section 438 of Code was to be extended. E

4. In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the FIR was nothing but a sheer
---<. abuse of the process of the law. The entire case hinges on
documentary evidence which cannot be tampered since the F
records are duly co-related with NSE/BSE and CWA and there
cannot be apprehension of either the appellants tampering with
the evidence or absconding since they are responsible officers
and are willing to assist the investigation. It is further submitted
that the complaint made by the complainant is not bona fide G
-r- and has been file,d-with ulterior motive.

5. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand
submitted that in spite of the directions of this Court the
appellants are not cooperating with the investigation. This H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A statement is strongly denied by learned counsel for the
appellants. They have submitted that they have on more than
twenty occasions appeared before the investigating officer.
Strangely, the investigating officer is asking for certain
documents which have either no relevance and, therefore, the
B investigating officer is not acting fairly.

6. The facility which Section 438 of the Code gives is
generally referred to as 'anticipatory bail'. This expression which
was used by the Law Commission in its 41 st Report is neither
c used in the section nor in its marginal note. But the expression
'anticipatory bail' is a convenient mode of indication that it is
possible to apply for bail in anticipation of arrest. Any order of
bail can be effective only from the time of arrest of the accused.
Wharton's Law Lexicon explains 'bail' as 'to set at liberty a
o person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his
appearance.' Thus bail is basically release from restraint, more
particularly the custody of Police. The distinction between an
ordinary order of bail and an order under Section 438 of the
Code is that whereas the former is granted after arrest, and
E therefore means release from custody of the Police, the latter
is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at
the very moment of arrest. (See: Gur Baksh Singh v. State of
Punjab, [1980] 2 SCC 565). Section 46(1) of the Code, which
deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making >--t
F an arrest the Police officer or other person making the same
"shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be
arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word
or action". The order under Section 438 of the Code is
intended to confer conditional immunity from the touch as
G envisaged by Section 46(1) of the Code or any confinement.
The apex Court in Balachand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
AIR (1977) SC 366 has described the expression 'anticipatory
bail' as misnomer. It is well-known that bail is ordinary
manifestation of arrest, that the Court thinks first to make an
H order is that in the event of arrest a person shall be released
PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE (U.T. 163
I-.._
CHANDIGARH) AND ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
on bail. Manifestly there is no question of release on bail unless A
the accused is arrested, and therefore, it is only on an arrest
being effected the order becomes operative. The power
exercisable under Section 438 is somewhat extraordinary in
character and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears
that the person may be falsely implicated or where there are '8
reasonable grounds for holding that a person accu'sed of an
offence is not likely to otherwise misuse his liberty then power
is to be exercised under Section 438. The power being of
important nature it is entrusted only to the higher echelons of
judicial forums, i.e. the Court of Session or the High Court. It is c
the power exercisable in case of an anticipated accusation of
non-bailable offence. The object which is sought to be achieved
by Section 438 of the Code is that the moment a person is
arrested, if he has already obtained an order from the Court of
'7--- Session or High Court, he shall be released ·immediately on D
bail without being sent to jail.

7. Sections 438 and 439 operate in different fields.
Section 439 of the Code reads as follows:
E
"439. (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct -

(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody
be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature
specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose
F
any condition which it considers necessary for the
purposes mentioned in that sub-section;

(b) that any condition imposed by the Magistrate when
releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified."
G
-r- (underlined for emphasis)

8. It is clear from a bare reading of the provisions that for
making an application in terms of Section 439 of the Code a
person has to be in custody. Section 438 of the Code deals
H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.
,..,,-(

A with "Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest".

9. In Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR (1996) SC 1042 it was observed as follows:

"Anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest in
B
non-bailable cases, but that does not mean that the
regular court, which is to try the offender, is sought to be
bypassed and that is the reason why the High Court very
rightly fixed the outer date for the continuance of the bail
and on the date of its expiry directed the petitioner to move
c the regular court for bail. That is the correct procedure to
follow because it must be realised that when the Court of
Sessions or the High Court is granting anticipatory bail, it
is granted at a stage when the investigation is incomplete
and, therefore, it is not informed about the nature of
D _,;('
evidence against the alleged offender. It is, therefore,
necessary that such anticipatory bail orders should be of
a limited duration only and ordinarily on the expiry of that
duration or extended duration the court granting
E anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular court to
deal with the matter on an appreciation of evidence placed
before it after the investigation has made progress or the
charge-sheet is submitted".
(Emphasis supplied) y-(
F 10. In KL Verma v. State and Anr., (1996) 7 SCALE 20 \
this Court observed as follows:

"This Court further observed that anticipatory bail is
granted in anticipation of arrest in non-bailable cases, but
G that does not mean that the regular court, which is to try
the offender, is sought to be bypassed. It was, therefore,
pointed out that it was necessary that such anticipatory bail
orders should be of a limited duration only and ordinarily
on the expiry of that duration or extended duration the court
H
PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE (U.T. 165
CHANDIGARH) AND ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

- ~

granting anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular court
to deal with the matter on an appreciation of evidence
A

placed before it after the investigation has made progress
or the charge-sheet is submitted. By this, what the Court
desired to convey was that an order of anticipatory bail
does not enure till the end of trial but it must be of limited B
~--
duration as the regular court cannot be bypassed. The
limited duration must be determined having regard to the
facts of the case and the need to give the accused
sufficient time to move the regular court for bail and to give
the regular court sufficient time to determine the bail c
application. In other words, till the bail application is
disposed of one way or the other the court may allow the
accused to remain on anticipatory bail. To put it
differently, anticipatory bail may be granted for a duration
~ which may extend to the date on which the bail D
application is disposed of or even a few days thereafter
to enable the accused persons to move the higher court,
if they so desire."
(Emphasis supplied)
E
11. In Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. and Anr., [2004]
7 SCC 558 and Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Anr. Criminal
Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4601 of 2003 disposed
--.....: of on 6.12.2004 certain grey areas in the case of K.L. Verma's
case (supra) were noticed. The same related to the observation F

..
'

'
"or even a few days thereafter to enable the accused persons
to move the Higher Court, if they so desire". It was held that
the requirement of Section 439 of the Code is not wiped out
by the above observations. Section 439 comes into operation
only when a person is "in custody". In K.L. Verma's case (supra) G
-or- reference was made to Salauddin's case (supra). In the said
case there was no such indication as given in KL Verma's
case (supra), that a few days can be granted to the accused
to move the higher Court if they so desire. The statutory
requirement of Section 439 of the Code cannot be said to have H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S:C.R.

A been rendered totally inoperative by the said observation.

12. In view of the clear language of Section 439 and in view
of the decision of this Court in Niranjan Singh and Anr. v.
Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Ors., AIR (1980) SC 785,
B there cannot be any doubt that unless a person· is in custody,
an appiication for bail under Section 439 of the Code would
not be maintainable. The question when a person· can be said
to be in custody within the meaning of Section 439 of the Code
came up for consideration before this Court in. the aforesaid
·c decision.
13. After analyzing ~he crucial question is when a person
is in custody, within the mea.ning of Section 439 of the Code, it
was held in Nirmal Jeet Kaur's case (supra) and Sunita Devi's
case (supra) that for making an application under Section 439
0
the fundamental requirement is that the accused should be in -~
cust9dy. As observed in Salauddin's case (supra) the
protection in terms of Section 438 is for a limited duration
during which the regular Court has to be moved for bail.
E Obviously, such bail is bail in terms of Section 439 of the Code,
mandating the applicant to be in custody. Otherwise, the
distinction between orders under Sections 438 and 439 shall
be rendered meaningless and redundant.

14. If the protective umbrella of Section 438 is extended
F beyond what was laid down in Salauddin's case (supra) the
result would be clear bypassing of what is mandated in Section
439 regarding custody. In other words, till the applicant avails
remedies upto higher Courts, the requirements of Section 439
G become dead letter. No part of a statute can be rendered
redundant in that manner.

15. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is
concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is
entitled to plead, innocence, since he is not on the date of
H application for exercise of power under Section 438 of the
PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE (U.T. 167
CHANDIGARH) AND ANR. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
,,. -.......__
Code convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks A
bail. The applicant must show that he has 'reason to believe'
that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the
expression' reason to believe' that he may be arrested in a non-
bailable offence. Use of the expression 'reason to believe'
shows that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on B
reasonable grounds. Mere "fear" is not 'belief for which reason
'...- it is not enough for the applicant to show that h has some sort
of vague apprehension that some one is going to make an.
accusation against him in pursuance of which he may be
arrested. Grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based c
that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be
capable of being examined. If an application is made to the
High Court or the Court of Session, it is for the Court concerned
to decide whether a case has been made out of for granting
'--,.___
the relief sought. The provisions cannot be invoked after arrest D
of the accused. A blanket order should not be generally passed.
It flows from the very language of the section which requires the
applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may
be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable
grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis E
of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that
he may be arrested is genuine. Normally a direction should not
issue to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail
......... "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever". Such
'blanket order' should not be passed as it would serve as a F
blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly
unlawful activity. An order under Section 438 is a device to
secure the individual's liberty' it is neither a passport to the
commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of
accusations likely or unlikely. G

16. The next question is whether a Court can pass an
interim order not to arrest the applicant, where an application
under Section 438 of the Code is pending disposal.
H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 15 S.C.R.

A 17. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of
investigation intended to secure several purposes. The
accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various
facets of motive, preparation, commission and aftermath of the
crime and the connection of other persons, if any, in the crime.
B There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide
information leading to discovery of material facts. It may be
necessary to curtail his freedom in order to enable the
investigation to proceed without hindrance and to protect
witnesses and persons connected with the victim of the crime, . ·
C to prevent his dis-appearance to maintain law .and order in the
locality. For these or other reasons, arrest may become
inevitable part of the process of investigation. The legality of
the proposed arrest cannot be gone into in an application under
Section 438 of the Code. The role of the investigator is well- ·
D defined and the jurisdictional scope of interference by the Court
in the process of investigation is limited. The Court ordinarily
will not interfere with the investigation of a crime or with the
arrest of accused in a cognizable offence.· An interim order
restraining arrest, if passed while dealing with an application
E under Section 438 of the Code will amount to interference in
the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done under
Section 438 of the Code. The above position was highlighted
in Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal, [2005] 4 SCC
303.
F
18. We find that in the instant case this Court had in fact
by· ord~r dated 30.5.2008 directed that the appellants shall not
be arrested subject to the condition that they will joint
investigation. Strictly speaking the order does not fit in with the
G parameters indicated in Adri Dharan Das's case (supra). Be·
that as it may, the order is in operation and we do not think it ,
appropriate in the present case to make any variation.

19. We dispose of the appeals with the following directions:
H
PARVINDERJIT SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE (U.T. 169
CHANDIGARH) AND ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

(1) The investigation shall be completed within two A
months unless there is some practical difficulty in
completing the same within that period.

(2) The appellants shall, as and when required by the
investigating agency, appear before the B
investigating officer and shall cooperate in the
investigation.

(3) If any document is asked for the same shall be
supplied unless the appellants are not in C
possession of the documents.

(4) In case the investigating officer feels that the non-
production of documents as called for has any
relevance, that can certainly be taken note of while
submitting the final form or the charge sheet as the D
case may be. Needless to say that this order shall
be operative till the charge sheet or the final form
as the case may be is filed before the concerned
court.
E
20. The appeals are disposed of.

D.G. Appeals disposed of.