PATASI DEVIversusSTATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

                     [2012] 7 S.C.R. 387


                        PATASI DEVI                              A
                              V.
                STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 6183 of 2012)

                     AUGUST 29, 2012
                                                                 B
          [G.S. SINGHVI AND SUDHANSU JYOTI
                  MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]

      Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4 and 6 - Acquisition of
land - Award passed on 9.12.2009 - Acquired land included C
land of the appellant - Writ petition by appellant challenging
the acquisition of her land on the ground that in the garb of
acquiring land for a public purpose, the State Government
misused its power u/ss.4 and 6 for benefit of a private
colonizer (respondent no. 6) who was constructing a residential o
colony; that her land should have been exempted/released
in terms of the policy framed by the State Government since
she had constructed a house on the land prior to issuance of
s.4 notification; and that she was discriminated inasmuch as
land belonging to one firm Mis 'SFH' was released while her E
land was not released and that acquisition proceedings were
vitiated due to non-application of mind by functionaries of
State Government and violation of rules of natural justice -
High Court dismissed the writ petition - On appeal, held: The
High Court was not right in holding that the writ petition of the F
appellant was not maintainable because the same was filed
after passing of the award - Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 failed to
discharge the onus to prove that after passing of the award,
possession of the acquired land had been taken and delivered
to the Estate Officer, HUDA ·- No evidence was produced by
the official respondents before the High Court to show that G
possession of the appellant's land and the house constructed
over it had been taken by the competent authority between
9. 12. 2009, i.e., the ctate on which the award was passed and
                             387                                 H
    388      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 7 S.C.R.


A 20.1.2010, i.e., the date on which the writ petition was filed
    before the High Court - Acquisition of the appellant's land was
    vitiated due to co/ourable exercise of power by the State
    Government - The State Government misused the provisions
    of ss.4 and 6 of the Act - The real object of the acquisition
B   was to benefit a private colonizer i.e. respondent No.6 - The
    official respondents are guilty of practising discrimination in
    the matter of release of land - Before Supreme Court it was
    pleaded that on the date of issuance of preliminary
    notification the appellant's land was vacant, but, this statement
c   cannot be relied upon for denying relief to her because no
    such averment was made in the counter affidavit filed before
    the High Court - The policy framed by the Government of
    Haryana clearly stipulates release of land on which
    construction had been raised prior to s.4 notification - The
    appellant's case is covered by that policy - Therefore, her land
0
    ought to have been released as was done in the case of Mis.
    SFH - Acquisition of appellant's land is declared illegal and
    is quashed - Haryana Urban Development Authority, 1977.

         Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial
E   Development and Investment Company (P) Limited (1996)
    11 SCC 501: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551; Municipal Council,
    Ahmednagar, v. Shah Hyder Beig (2002) 2 SCC 48; C.
    Padma v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu
    (1997) 2 SCC 627: 1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 158; Star Wire
F   (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698: 1996 (7)
    Suppl. SCR 6; Mis. Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
    Rajasthan JT 2008 (2) SC 280; Banda Development
    Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394: 20~ 1
    (7) SCR 435; Ba/want Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat
G   (1976) 1 SCC 700: 1975 Suppl. SCR 250; Balmokand Khatri
    Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab (1996) 4
    SCC 212: 1996 (2) SCR 643; P.K. Kalburqi v. State of
    Karnataka (2005) 12 SCC 489; NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta
    (2009) 8 SCC 339: 2009 (10) SCR 1084; Sita Ram Bhandar
H   Society v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2009) 10 SCC 501: 2009
      PATASI DEVI v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                   389


(14) SCR 507; Brij Pal Bhargava v. State of UP. (2011 )5 SCC         A
413; Prahlad Singh v. Union of India (2011) 5 SCC 386: 2011
(5) SCR 1002 and Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of
Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792: 2011 (14) SCR 1113 - referred
to.
                                                                     B
                       Case Law Reference:
  1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551          referred to       Paras 5, 13
  (-2002) 2 sec 48                  referred to      Paras 5, 13
  1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 158           referred to      Paras 5, 13     c
                 ~



  1996 (7) Suppl. SCR. 6            referred to      Paras 5, 13
  JT 2008 (2) SC 280               referred to       Paras 5, 13
  2011 (7) SCR 435                  referred to      Para 9          D
  1975 Suppl. SCR 250               referred to      Para 9
  1996 ( 2) SCR 643                 referred to      Para 9
  (2005) 12 sec 489                 referred to      Para 9
                                                                     E
  2009 (10) SCR 1084                referred to      Para 9
  2009 (14) SCR 507                 referred to      Para 9
  (2011) 5 sec 413                 referred to       Para 9
  2011 (5) SCR 1002                referred to       Para 10         F

  2011 (14) SCR 1113               referred to       Para 12

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6183 of 2012.
                                                                     G
    From the Judgment and Order dated 05.04.2010 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.
2494 of 2010.

      Satinder S. Gulati, Anubha Agarwal, Tarjit Singh, Sushil Kr.   H
    390      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A   Jain, Puneet Jain, D.K. Gupta, Anurag Gohil, Sachar Anand for
    the appearing parties.

          The Order of the Court was delivered

                                ORDER
B
          1. Leave granted.

        2. By notification dated 15.12.2006 issued under Section
   4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act'), the
C Government of Haryana proposed the acquisition of land
   measuring 231.04 acres (48.23 acres of village Bahayapur,
   139.2!) acres of village Para and 43.56 acres of village Bohar,
   Tehsil and District Rohtak) for the development of Residential
   Sector 36, Rohtak under the Haryana Urban Development
   Authority Act, 1977 by the Haryana Urban Development
D Authority (HUDA). After considering the report of the Land
   Acquisition Collector, who is supposed to have heard the
  ·objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons
   under Section 5A(1), the State Government issued declaration
   dated 14.12.2007 under Section 6 of the Act. The award was
E passed by the Land Acquisition Collector on 9.12.2009.

        3. The appellant, who owned 14 kanals 8 marlas land
  situated in the revenue estate of Mouza Para, challenged the
  acquisition of her land in Writ Petition No. 2494/2010. She
F pleaded that in the garb of acquiring land for a public purpose,
  the State Government misused its power under Sections 4 and
  6 of the Act for the benefit of respondent No.6 Mis. Ujjawal
  Coloniser Pvt. Ltd. of Delhi, who was constructing residential
  colony known as 'Sun City'; that her land should have been
G exempted/released in terms of the policy framed by the State
  Government because she had constructed a house prior to the
  issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act; that she
  has been discriminated inasmuch as land belonging to M/s.
  Sharad Farm and Holdings Pvt. Ltd. had been released vide
H letter dated 4.9.2008, but her land was not released and that
    PATASI DEVI v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                   391


the acquisition proceedings are vitiated due to non-application      A
of mind by the functionaries of the State Government and
violation of the rules of natural justice.

      4. In the counter affidavit filed by respondent Nos. 1 and
3, an objection was raised to the maintainability of the writ        8
petition on the ground that the same was filed after passing of
the award. On merits, respondent Nos.1 and 3 did not dispute
that the appellant's land was surrounded by the land of
respondent No.6, who was developing residential colony but
pleaded that the acquisition was for a public purpose i.e.
development of Sector 36, Rohtak. The plea of discrimination         C
raised by the appellant was contested by respondent Nos. 1
and 3 by asserting that the appellant had not filed objections
under Section 5A(1).

     5. The High Court did not decide the appellant's challenge      D
to the acquisition of her land and dismissed the writ petition
solely on the ground that it was filed after passing of the award.
For arriving at this conclusion, the High Court relied upon the
judgments of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Industrial Development and Investment Company              E
(P) Limited (1996) 11 SCC 501, Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar, v. Shah Hyder Beig (2002) 2 SCC 48,
C.Padma v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil
Nadu (1997) 2 SCC 627, Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of
Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698 and Mis. Swaika Properties Pvt.            F
Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan JT 2008 (2) SC 280.

     6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
scanned the record. We shall first consider the question
whether the High Court was right in non-suiting the appellant
without examining the merits of her challenge to the acquisition     G
proceedings. For this purpose, it will be apposite to note that
in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and
3 before the High Court it was nowhere pleaded that
possession of the appellant's land and house was taken by the
particular official I officer on a particular date and was handed    H
    392       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 7 S.C.R.

A   over to the Estate Officer, HUDA, Rohtak. Not only this, no
    document was produced evidencing dispossession of the
    appellant. This is the reason why the High Court did not record
    a finding that possession of the appellant's land had been taken
    after passing of the award.
B
        7. In the counter affidavit filed before this Court, respondent
  Nos. 1 and 3 have, for the first time, averred that possession
  of the acquired land was handed over to Estate Officer, HUDA,
  Rohtak on the date of award and as per official assessment
  report the construction had been raised after the issue of
C notification under Section 4. This statement is contained in para
  6 of the counter affidavit, which is reproduced below:

          "6. That the award related to the abovesaid notification was
          announced on 9.12.2009 and the possession was handed
D         over to Estate Officer, HUDA, Rohtak on the same day. It
          is relevant to mention here that as per the official
          assessment report of the constructed area regarding the
          above said notification the land of the petitioner was
          vacant at the time of u/s-4 and the construction has been
E         raised after the survey and issuance of the notification u/
          s-4. However since it is also subsequent to declaration of
          the area as controlled area and the same is without
          permission and unauthorized one."

F      8. In the separate counter affidavit filed by Estate Officer,
  HUDA, Rohatak (respondent No.2) before this Court, a similar
  averment has been made albeit without disclosing the name
  of the person who is said to have delivered possession of the
  acquired land to him on the date of the award. Not only this,
  while making that averment in para 5(v) of the counter affidavit,
G the officer has used white fluid to score out something recorded
  after the words "handed over to the answering respondent". By
  doing so the concerned officer has tried to hide the truth from
  this Court. That apart, what is most surprising is that neither
  before the High Court nor before this Court the official
H respondents have produced any document to show that actual
    PATASI DEVI v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                   393


or even symbolic possession of the acquired land was taken           A
by the particular officer/official and the same was handed over
to the particular officer of HUDA. Therefore, there is no escape
from the conclusion that respondent Nos.1 to 3 have failed to
discharge the onus to prove that after passing of the award,
possession of the acquired land had been taken and delivered         B
to the Estate Officer, HUDA.

    9. In Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal
Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394, this Court considered as to what
should be the mode of taking possession of the land acquired
under the Act, referred to the judgments in Ba/want Narayan          C
Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC 700, Balmokand
Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab
(1996) 4 SCC 212, P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka (2005)
12 sec 489, NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta (2009) a sec 339,
Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2009)             D
10 SCC 501, Brij Pal Bhargava v. State of UP (2011 )5 SCC
413 and culled out the following principles:

    "i) No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what act
    would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land.      E
    ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the concerned
    State authority to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama
    will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking
    of possession.
                                                                     F
    iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/
    structure exists, mere going on the spot by the concerned
    authority will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking
    possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the concerned
    authority will have to give notice to the occupier of the        G
    building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land
    and take possession in the presence of independent
    witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of
    course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure
                                                                     H
    394       SUPREME COURT REP8RTS                   [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A         may not lead to an inference that the possession of the
          acquired land has not been taken.

          iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not
          be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take
          physical possession of each and every parcel of the land
B         and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken
          by preparing appropriate document in the presence of
          independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such
          document.

c         v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/
          instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total
          compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3A) and
          substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised
          in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the
D         Court may reasonably presume that possession of the
          acquired land has been taken."

       10. In Prahlad Singh v. Union of India (2011) 5 SCC 386,
  the Court considered as to when the acquired land can be
  treated to have vested in the State, referred to various
E judgments on the issue of taking of possession including the
  judgment in Banda Development Authority, Banda (supra) and
  observed:

          "If the present case is examined in the light of the facts
F         which have been brought on record and the principles laid
          down in the judgment in Banda Development Authority
          case it is not possible to sustain the finding and conclusion
          recorded by the High Court that the acquired land had
          vested in the State Government because the actual and
G         physical possession of the acquired land always remained
          with the appellants and no evidence has been produced
          by the respondents to show that possession was taken by
          preparing a panchnama in the presence of independent
          witnesses and their signatures were obtained on the
H         panchnama."
    PATASI DEVI v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                  395


     11. At the cost of repetition, we consider it necessary to     A
observe that in the present case no evidence was produced
by the official respondents before the High Court to show that
possession of the appellant's land and the house constructed
over it had been taken by the competent authority between
9,12.2009, i.e., the date on which the award was passed and         B
20.1.2010, i.e., the date on which the writ petition was filed
before the High Court. Indeed, it was not even the pleaded case
of the official respondents that the house constructed by the
appellant was lying vacant on the date of award and some
official had put lock over it evidencing the taking over of         c
possession.

      12. A somewhat similar question was considered by this
Court in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012)
1 sec 792. In that case also, the High Court had non-suited
the writ petitioner on the ground that possession of the acquired   D
land had been taken by the concerned officers arid the same
will be deemed to have vested in the State Government free
from all encumbrances. This Court took cognizance of the
entries recorded in khasra girdawari revealed existence of
crops on the acquired land and observed:                            E

    "The respondents have not produced any other evidence
    to show that actual possession of the land, on which crop
    was standing, had been taken after giving notice to the
    appellant or that he was present at the site when               F
    possession of the acquired land was delivered to the
    Senior Manager of HSllDC. Indeed, it is not even the case
    of the respondents that any independent witness was
    present at the time of taking possession of the acquired
    land.
                                                                    G
    The Land Acquisition Collector and his subordinates may
    claim credit of having acted swiftly inasmuch as
    immediately after the pronouncement of the award,
    possession of the acquired land of Village Jatheri is said
    to have been taken from the landowners and handed over          H
    396       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A         to the officer of HSllDC but keeping in view the fact that
          crop was standing on the land, the exercise undertaken by
          the respondents showing delivery of possession cannot but
          be treated as farce and inconsequential. We have no doubt
          that if the High Court had summoned the relevant records
B         and scrutinised the same, it would not have summarily
          dismissed the writ petition on the premise that possession
          of the acquired land had been taken and the same vested
          in the State Government."

C      13. The Court then referred to the judgments in Municipal
  Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
  and Investment Company (P) Limited (supra), Star Wire
  (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (supra), C.Padma v. Deputy
  Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (supra),
  Municipal Council, Ahmednagar, v. Shah Hyder Beig (supra)
D and Mis Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan
  (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the High Court
  and observed:

          "In all the cases, challenge to the acquisition proceedings
E         was negatived primarily on the ground of delay. An
          additional factor which influenced this Court was that
          physical possession of the acquired land had been taken
          by the authorities concerned. In none of these cases, the
          landowners appear to have questioned the legality of the
F         mode adopted by the authorities concerned for taking
          possession of the acquired land. Therefore, these
          judgments cannot be relied upon for sustaining the High
          Court's negation of the appellant's challenge to the
          acquisition of his land."

G        14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High
    Court was not right in holding that the writ petition of the
    appellant was not maintainable because the same was filed
    after passing of the award.

H         15. As a sequel to the aforementioned conclusion, we may
    PATASI DEVI v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                  397


have set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter to A
the High Court for disposal of the writ petition on merits but
having carefully gone through the pleadings of the parties and
the material produced before this Court, we are satisfied that
the acquisition of the appellant's land is vitiated due to
colourable exercise of power by the State Government. No B
doubt, the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the
Act recite that the land was acquired for a public purpose,
namely, development of Sector 36, Rohtak, but the real object
of the acquisition was to benefit a colonizer i.e. respondent
No.6, who had undertaken to develop the area into a residential     c
colony. In para 5 and 6(iv) of the writ petition, the appellant had
made the following averments:

    "5. That it would be worthwhile to point out here that the
    land which has been sought to be acquired vide the
    impugned notification is surrounded by the land of Ujjawal D
    Coloniser - respondent No. 6 from all sides and the
    residential colony named Sun City is being developed by
    the respondent No. 6 and land situated in the Sun City was
    also acquired by the State Government and then it was
    handed over to respondent No. 6 who is a well known E
    colonizer and the respondent No. 6 also approached the
    petitioner for selling her land to him and the petitioner
    refused to accept the said proposal of the respondent No.
    6 and now the land which the respondent No. 6 failed to
    purchased from its owners has been got acquired for F
    extension of Section 36, Rohtak with clear understanding
    that same would be further handed over to respondent No.
    6 after completion of its acquisition and there is a secret
    agreement between the State authorities and respondent
    No.6.                                                       G

    6(iv) That the acquisition of land for public purpose is just
    an eyewash. In fact, the land is being acquired for semi-
    public, commercial purpose etc. It is also so reflected from
    the lay out plan of Section 36 and marked in red. The semi      H
    398      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A         public purpose is for giving the land to the private
          developers cannot be termed as a public purpose in the
          real sense and earlier also the land was acquired for
          development of Sector 36 in a similar fashion and after
          acquisition the same was handed over to the respondent
B         No. 6 and the land of the petitioner is surrounded by the
          land of Sun City by three sides and cannot be choose for
          any purpose except to acquire the same and hand over it
          to the respondent No. 6 and the acquisition proceedings
          are not meant for public purpose in true sense and the
C         authorities are bent upon to help the respondent No. 6 in
          an illegal and arbitrary manner."

          16. In the counter affidavit filed by Land Acquisition
    Collector, Urban Estates, Haryana, Rohtak on behalf of
    respondent Nos.1 and 3, it was claimed that the procedural
D   requirement contained in Sections 4 and 6 of the Act had been
    fully satisfied and reference to Section 17(1) in the declaration
    issued under Section 6 was a mistake and further that no
    discrimination had been practised in acquiring the land.
    However, it was not denied that the appellant's land is
E   surrounded by the land of respondent No.6, who was
    developing residential colony under the name and style 'Sun
    City' and earlier also the land acquired for the development of
    Sector 36, Rohtak was transferred to respondent No.6. This
    shows that in the guise of acquiring land for a public purpose,
F   the State Government had acquired the land for being handed
    over to the private coloniser. In other words, the State
    Government had misused the provisions of Sections 4 and 6
    of the Act for making land available to a private developer. We
    may hasten to add that if the land was to be acquired for a
G   company, then the official respondents were bound to comply
    with the provisions contained in Chapter 7 of the Act, which was
    admittedly not done in the instant case.

        17. We also find merit in the appellant's plea that the official
    respondents are guilty of practising discrimination in the matter
H
    PATASI DEVI v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                      399


of release of land. In paragraphs 6(v) and 6(vi) of the writ petition   A
the appellant had made the following averments:

     "6(v) That the petitioner who is having only small piece of
     land/ residential house would be deprived of th.: roof and
     the construction made by the petitioner is of A Class and B
     has been raised prior to the issuance of Notification u/s 4
     of the Act i.e. 15.12.2006. Photographs showing
     construction of the House of A Class, is annexed herewith
     as Annexure P/5. As per the policy of the State
     Government dated 30.9.2007, copy of which is annexed C
     as Annexure P/6, the structure which have been
     constructed prior to the issuance of the notification u/s 4
     and is inhabited could be released u/s 48(1) of the Act ibid
     but the respondents have ignored its own instructions and
     for releasing the land the pick and choose policy has been
     adopted by the authorities and the land of Mis Sharad D
     Farm and Holdings Pvt. Ltd. has also been released
     arbitrarily after notification u/s 6 of the Act as is reflected
     from letter dated 4.9.2008, copy of which is annexed as
     Annexure P/7 and furthermore the constructed house of the
     petitioner has been acquired but the vacant land of some E
     influential person have been left out and the State
     Government is not justified in acquiring the land in question
     for further handing over the same to the private developers
     for commercial gains at the cost of the life/livelihood of the
     petitioner and the impugned notification has not been F
     issued for a bonafide purpose and is a result of connivance
     of the authorities with the respondent No. 4 to 6 and it is
     not permissible under l~w. The release of land of the
     petitioner would not create any hurdle in the scheme of the
     respondents.                                                    G

     6(vi) That the construction of the house of the petitioner is
     prior to the notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.
     The Land Acquisition Collector in similar circumstances
     also recommended the release of the land and the same
                                                                        H
    400       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A         was not included while issuing the notification u/s 6 of the
          Land Acquisition Act and it has been incorporated while
          issuing notices u/s 9 of the Act ibid, copy of
          recommendations of the L.A.C is attached herewith as
          Annexure P/8. There is, thus, a total non-application of
B         mind. According to the notification u/s 6 ibid Killa No. 23(7-
          12) is stated to have been acquired but while in the notice
          under Section 9 of the Act ibid whole of the area has been
          shown to have been acquired. Even the recommendations
          of the L.A.C. for release of the constructed area has also
c         been ignored without any basis."

        18. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent
    Nos.1 and 3, the above reproduced averments were not
    denied. This is evinced from paragraphs 6(v) and 6(vi) of the
    counter affidavit, which are extracted below:
D
          "6(v). That the contents of Para no. 6(v) of the civil writ
          Petition are wrong and denied. However, the state Govt,
          has absolute right to acquire the land for public purpose
          and the disputed land is also being acquired for serving
E         public purpose i.e. Sector-36 Rohtak. However petitioner
          has never filed the objection regarding his house.

          6(vi). That the contents of para no. 6(vi) of the civil writ
          petition are wrong and denied. However, it is submitted
          that there exists a public purpose for which the land has
F         been acquired and there is no illegality or infirmity in the
          decision of the state. No discrimination has been done with
          any of the land owners."

          19. Before this Court it has been pleaded that on the date
G   of issuance of preliminary notification the appellant's land was
    vacant, but, this staten:ient cannot be relied upon for denying
    relief to her because no such averment was made in the counter
    affidavit filed before the High Court. The policy framed by the
    Government of Haryana clearly stipulates release of land on
H   which construction had been raised prior to Section 4
    PATASI DEVI v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                    401


notification. The appellant's case is covered by that policy.         A
Therefore, her land ought to have been released as was done
in the case of M/s. Sharad Farm and Holdings Pvt. Ltd.

    20. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned
order is set aside. The acquisition of the appellant's land is
                                                                      8
declared illegal and is quashed. The parties are left to bear their
own costs.

B.B.B.                                          Appeal allowed.