Holding

The Supreme Court held that the respondents wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the Court's interim orders, thereby committing civil contempt, and sentenced them to two weeks' simple imprisonment.

Summary

The petitioners alleged that the respondents, who were parties to a family property dispute, sold and transferred portions of the disputed land and allowed construction despite two interim orders of this Court dated 26‑April‑2004 and 10‑January‑2005 that prohibited any creation of third‑party interest without notice to the petitioners. The respondents contended that no prior notice was required and that their actions were undertaken in good faith, also offering an unconditional apology. The Court examined whether the respondents' conduct amounted to wilful disobedience of the Supreme Court's orders, thereby constituting civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and whether the apology could be accepted to discharge the contempt. It held that the orders were clear, unambiguous and that the respondents deliberately violated them, creating third‑party interests without notice, which is contemptuous. Consequently, the Court rejected the apology as a tactical move and sentenced the respondents to two weeks of simple imprisonment, disposing of the contempt petitions.

Issues considered

Whether the respondents' sale of property and creation of third‑party interest violated the Supreme Court's interim orders of 26‑April‑2004 and 10‑January‑2005.
Whether such violation amounts to civil contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether an unconditional apology tendered by the contemners can be accepted to discharge the contempt.
What punishment is appropriate for the contempt committed.

Legislation cited

Subjects

civil contemptcontempt of courtSupreme Court interim ordersproperty transferjoint family propertywilful disobedienceapology in contempt proceedingspunishment

Judgment

[2008] 10 S.C.R. 1169

PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. A
v.
PATEL CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS
(CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 12-13 OF 2006. IN
SLP (C) Nos. 7659-7660 of 2004)
JULY 21, 2008 B

[C.K. THAKKER AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s. 12- Contempt of court
- Violation of orders passed by Supreme Court - Contempt c
petitions - Held: Wilful and deliberate disobedience of the
orders passed by the apex Court can never be said to be bona
fide, honest or in good faith - It calls for serious view to ensure
proper administration of justice - On facts, there was inten-
~ tional and deliberate violation and disobedience of the orders
0
dated 26.04.06 and 10.01.05 -Apology tendered by contem-
ners not an act of penitence, contrition or regret - Acceptance
of such apology would be allowing contemners to go away with
impunity after committing gross contempt of court - Contem-
ners held guilty uls. 12 of the Act, r/w s.94(c}, 0 39 r.2-A CPC
and Article 129 and awarded simple imprisonment for two E
weeks - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.94(c}, 0 39, r 2-A
(as amended by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1976) - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 129.
_., The dispute in the instant SLPs pertains to the trans- F
fer of and construction on certain properties claimed to
be joint family properties. By this Court's order dated
26.04.04 the interim relief restraining the defendants from
putting up any construction on suit land as also transfer-
ring the same, granted by the High Court was allowed to G
be continued. Subsequently, by order dated 10.01.05,
,,, SLPs were disposed of holding that any construction by
purchasers on ·suit properties would be subject to out-
come of suit; that any third party right that may be cre-
1169 H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 10 S.C.R.

A ated, should be done after notice to petitioners; and that
the pendency of proceedings should be notified to third
parties. However, respondents allegedly sold the prop-
erty, received consideration and executed sale deeds
without notice, acting in violation of this Court's order
B dated 26.4.2004 and 10.1.2005. Hence the present con- ,.
tempt petitions.
Disposing of the contempt petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. From the overall considerations of the mat-
e ter and viewed in the light of series of events, the respon-
dents-contemners have disregarded and violated the or-
ders passed by this Court on 26.04.04 and 10.01.05 and
the contemners are responsible for such act. Consider-
ing the facts and circumstances in their entirety, ends of
justice would be served if the respondents/contemners
0
are held guilty u/s. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, +
r/w s. 94(c) and Rule 2-A of Order 39 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 as amended by the Code of Civil Proce-
dure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and Article 129 of the Con-
stitution. The respondents-contemners are ordered to un-
E dergo simple imprisonment for a term of two weeks.
[Paras 44, 45 and 69] [1191-E-F 1200 E-Fl
2. 1 With regard to the defence that Development
Scheme was jointly promoted for part 'A' land and part 'B'
F land, is clearly an after thought and the plea has befm put
forward without there being anything on record. Though "'
it was stated that initially, M, H, Rand RG were given shops
in part 'B' property, no such agreements/deeds have been
placed on record. It was then stated that after interim stay
G was vacated and request was made by them to allot them
shops in part 'A' property, no evidence/material has been
addu~ed by the contemners. Stereo-type affidavits have
been filed sworn on one and the same day, July 29, 2006 .,_
after contempt notice was served upon the respondents.
Even the sale-deeds do not recite part 'A' or 'B' of the prop-
H

J
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1171
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS.

erty or the fact that earlier the allottee was granted shop A
in part '8' property but after the disposal of the SLPs, re-
quest was made by the purchaser to convert the allot-
ment from part 'B' property to part 'A' property. Therefore,
....
the so-called defence is apparently to avoid conse-
quences of contempt proceedings. Moreover, the defence B
does not appear to be probable. Normally, no reasonable
and prudent man/woman who purchases immovable
property with a 'clear' title would request the owner of the
property to allot him/her property over which his title is
not clear, which is the subject-matter of litigation, for which c
a suit is pending and the matter is sub-judice in a Court of
law. [Paras 36 and 37] [1188 E 1189 C]
2.2 There was no question of raising a plea that the
acceptance of cheques during the pendency of the in-
terim orders represented the amount of consideration D
booked prior to the issuance of interim orders. If initial
booking and payment was in relation to part 'B' property,
it was immaterial and altogether irrelevant whether it was
prior or subsequent to filing suit by the plaintiffs or grant
of interim orders either by High Court or by this Court. E
Thus, the pleas are inconsistent, conflicting and irrecon-
cilable. [Para 38] [1189 F-G]
2.3 During the pendency of the proceedings and
. inspite of interim orders passed by this Court, agreements
have been entered into by the contemners, cheques had F
been accepted and consideration had been received at
least in part. So far as the first order passed by this Court
on 26.04.04 is concerned, there was total prohibition from
creating any interest in favour of third party either by sale,
mortgage, transfer, assignment, gift or 'in any other man- G
ner whatsoever'. Hence, entering into an agreement or ac-
ceptance of full or even part consideration would be hit
<..
by the said order. It would amount to 'creation of interest'
prohibited by this Court. [Para 39] [1189-G, 1190-B]
H
-t
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
"
A 2.4 'Injunction' or 'no injunction', the title of the de-
fendants was 'under challenge'. It was 'cloudy' and un-
less and until the suit is decided, it cannot be said that they
had 'clear and marketable title'. Though the legal position
is clear and beyond controversy, it is found that an express, ,.._

B unambiguous and unequivocal statement is made by the
contemners in all sale deeds that their title to the property
is 'clear and marketable'. It was also stated that they were
independent owners, possessors and occupiers of the
property and there was no right, interest, part share, claim
c anybody else therein. [Para 40] [1190 D-F]
of
2.5 It was submitted that it was specifically and clearly
stated that a suit was pending in the Court of Civil Judge
and it was also clarified that the documents were executed
subject to the final decision in the suit; that if the owner of
D the property does not state that he has title over the prop- + t
erty he seeks to transfer and that such title is 'clear and
marketable', no reasonable and prudent man would come
forward to purchase such property. However, that does not f
mean that in such case, a person whose title is challenged
,,
E and the proceedings are pending will be permitted to say r
that his title is 'clear and marketable' and there is no im-
pediment on the contemners from transferring the prop-
erty in favour of purchasers. [Para 41] [1190-F, 1191-B]
2.6 In any case, there is clear breach and violation of
>
F the order of this Court, dated 10.01.05 so far as 'notice' to
the petitioners is concerned. It is not disputed even by
the contemners that in some cases, notice as to creation
ofthird party interest had been given after creation of such
interest by filing pursis in the Court. [Para 42] [1191 B-C]
r
~
G
2. 7 The submission that this Court had not ordered
that 'prior' notice should be given to the petitioners re- ...
garding creation of third party rights and hence, there was "

no violation of the direction of the Court cannot be ac-
cepted. This Court has stated; "Any third party right which
'"
H (
)\
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1173
-: CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS.

is created shall be done after notice to the petitioners. The A
direction has only one meaning and it is that third party
interest can only be created after notice to the petitioners.
Admittedly, that was not done, at least, in few cases. [Paras
43 and 44] [1191 C-E]

3.1 It is clear that punishing a person for contempt of B
Court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action
should not be taken. At the same time, however, it is not
only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and
maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law which
may call for such extreme step. If for proper administra- c
tion of justice and to ensure due compliance with the or-
ders passed by a Court, it is required to take strict view
under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the po-
tent weapon of contempt. [Para 59] [1197 E-G]
D
Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and Ors.
2003 (11) SCC 1 ; Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. v. State of Bihar
and Ors. 1999 (7) SCC 569; Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors. v. Hirak
Ghosh and Ors. 2002 (4) SCC 21; Commissioner, Karnataka
Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah 2007 (7) SCC 689; All Bengal
Excise Licensees Association v. Raghabendra Singh and Ors. E
2007 (11) SCC 374; Tayabbhai M. Bagasarawala v. Hind Rub-
ber Industries (P) Ltd. 1997 (3) SCC 443-referred to.

Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd. 1974 AC 273
~ - referred to.
F
3.2 In the instant case, both the orders passed by
this Court on April 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005, were
explicitly clear. The first order totally prohibited/restrained
the respondents/contemners from creating any interest
whatsoever in the suit property. lnspite of the said order, G
interest had been created by the contemners in the suit
property. But even otherwise there is intentional disobe-
dience and wilful breach of the subsequent order dated
January 10, 2005 inasmuch as transactions had been
entered into without issuing notice to the petitioners. They H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A could not have been entered int~ by the respondents b~
fore issuance of notice to the petitioners. The respondents
were clearly aware of the order. In fact, the action was
sought to be defended and justified on the ground that the
Court had not directed 'prior' notice, and as such, non-is-
8 suance of notice before entering into sale transactions
would not amount to disobedience of the order of the Court
cannot be accepted. In the circumstances, it must be held
that the disobedience of the order by the contemners was
wilful, intentional and deliberate. [Para 60] [1197 G -1198-C]
C 4.1 The suomission that in the affidavit in reply, the
respondents have stated that if this Court comes to the
conclusion that they had committe~ contempt of Court,
the Court may accept unconditional and unqualified apol-
ogy and may discharge notice; and that the statutory pro-
. D vision itself enacts that no, apology shall be rejected
merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional [Ex-
planation to s. 12(1)] cannot be accepted. The contem-
hers have intentionally and deliberately violated the or-
ders of the Court. The orders were clear, unambiguous
E and unequivocal having one and only one meaning. Wil-
ful and deliberate disobedience of the orders passed by
the apex Court of.the country can never be said to be bona
fide, honest or in good faith. If it is so, the action calls for
serious view to ensure proper administration of justice.
F [Paras 61 and 62] [1198 D-G]
4.2 An apolegy is neither a weapon of defence to
purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to op-
erate as a universal panacea, 'it is intended to be evidence
of real contriteness [Para 64] [1199 D]
G
4.3 In the in~tant case, the so-called apology is not
an act of penitence, contrition or regret. It has been ten-
dered as a 'tactful move' when the contemners are in the
tight corner and with a view to ward off the Court. Accep-
tance of such apology in the case. on hand wou-ld be al- .
H
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1175
'(
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS.

lowing the contemners to go away with impunity after A
committing gross contempt of Court. On the facts and in
the circumstances of the case, imposition of fine in lieu of
imprisonment would not meet the ends of justice. [Para
68) [1200 C-E]
M. Y Shareaf v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of B
--;

Nagpur 1955 (1) SCR 757; M.B. Sanghi v. Hil]h Court of
Punjab and Haryana 1991 (3) SCR 312 - relied on.
Hiren Bose, Re AIR 1969 Cal 1; T.N. Godavarman
Thirumulpad through the Amicus Curiae v. Ashok Khot and c
Anr. 2006 (5) SCC 1 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
2003 (11) sec 1 Referred to. Para 50
1999 (7) sec 569 Referred to. Para 51 D
1973 (3) All ER 54 Referred to. Para 52
2002 (4) sec 21 Referred to. Para 53
2001 (7) sec 689 Referred to. Para 54
E
2001 (11) sec 374 Referred to. Para 55
1997 (3) sec 443 Referred to. Para 56
AIR 1969 Cal 1 Referred to. Para 63
1955 (1) SCR 757 Relied on. Para 64 F

1991 (3) SCR 312 Relied on. Para 64
2006 (5) sec 1 Refer.red to. Para 65
1984 (3) sec 405 Referred to. Para 65 G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition
(C) Nos. 12-13 of 2006 in SLP (C) 7659-7660 of 2004
..
Shyam Divan, Jay Savla, Reena Bagga and Akshit Gadnrik
for the Contemners/Applicants.
H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A Uday Lalit, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Sanjay Kapur,
Shubhra Kapur, Raj iv Kapur and Arti Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. The present contempt petitions are
.,..
B filed by the petitioners against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, alleged
contemners, praying that they be held guilty of 'civil contempt'
for violating orders passed by this Court on April 26, 2004 and
on January 10, 2005 and be punished accordingly. A prayer is
also made directing the contemners to deposit the amount re-
c ceived from third parties in consideration of transfer of property
effected by them during the period of interim orders of this Court.
2. Shortly stated the facts of the case are that petitioners
and respondent Nos. 1, 4 and 5 (in Special Leave Petitions)
are real brothers and heirs and legal representatives of one
D Dhulabhai Patel. It was the case of the petitioners that in 1961,
one Chandulal Muljibhai Parikh and Dhulabhai Patel (father of "
petitioners and respondent Nos. 1, 4 and 5) purchased land
bearing Revenue Survey Nos. 459/2, 464, 465, 466/1 and 466/
2 admeasuring 6 acres and 9 gunthas ofvillageAtladara, Taluka
and District Baroda in the State of Gujarat from one Parvatibai
E
Ingle by a registered sale deed. According to the petitioners,
the amount of consideration was paid from the funds of Hindu
Undivided Family (HUF) of Dhulbhai Patel, but name of respon-
dent No. 1 Chandrakant Dhulabhai Patel was shown as the pur-
chaser of the property being the eldest son of decdeased
F Dhulabhai Patel along with Chandulal Muljibhai Parikh. Respon- A.

dent Nos. 4 and 5 were minors at that time. Respondent No. 1,
Chandrakant Dhulabhai Patel was also studying in a college
and was having no source of income whatsoever. The entire
amount was paid by deceased Dhulabhai. According to the pe-
G titioners, several documents revealed that the property was
managed by HUF of Dhulabhai Patel. In October, 1986,
Dhulabhai died. No partition by metes and bounds had been ...._
effected between the sons of deceased Dhulabhai and the prop-
erty continued to remain as HUF property. The petitioners used
to manage prope~y after the death of Dhulabhai.
H
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1177
"I'
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

3. In 1990, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was A
entered into between respondent No. 1, Chandrakant Patel,
being eldest son of Dhulabhai Patel family on one hand and
heirs of deceased Chandulal Parikh on the other hand where-
.... under it was agreed that a portion of land towards western side
<f would be treated as property of deceased Dhulabhai Patel and B
his family members.

-- 4. In 1998, however, respondent No. 1 in conspiracy with
third party and behind the back of the petitioners and respon-
dent Nos. 4 and 5 executed an agreement to sell the share of
c
HUF property belonged to the petitioners and other members
of deceased Dhulabhai Patel. A collusive suit came to be filed
by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (partners of Mis Om Shivam Cor-
poration) in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Baroda,
being Special Civil Suit No. 311 of 1999 for specific perfor-
y
mance of agreement, dated January 18, 1998 against respon- D
dent No. 1 and within less than a month, a collusive and fraudu-
lent consent decree was passed. The petitioners were neither
aware of the suit nor the decree passed therein. It was only when
a caveat was filed by Mis Om Shivam Corporation, a partner-
ship firm that the petitioners suspected foul play. They, there- E
fore, made an inquiry and came to know about the suit and col-
lusive decree. Immediately, they filed a suit being Special Civil
Suit No. 605 of 2002 in the Court of Civil Judge, (Senior Divison),
Baroda for declaration, partition of joint family property and their
share in the said property. Along with the plaint, the petitioners F
filed an application (Exh. 5) under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') for interim injunction re-
straining the defendants from putting up any construction on the
land admeasuring 1,43,000 sq. ft. towards western side of the
G
land bearing Revenue Survey Nos. 459/2, 464, 465, 466/1 and
466/2 and from entering into any transaction of sale, gift, mort-
·" gage or from dealing with the property in any other manner or
from handing over possession of the suit land to anyone else.
The trial Court issued notice to the defendants, but did not grant
H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
•
A injunction as prayed by the petitioners-plaintiffs. The petition-
ers challenged the said order by filing Appeal from Order No.
140 of 2003 and the High Court of Gujarat vide its order dated
May 2, 2003 directed the trial Court to dispose of the Applica-
tion (Exh. 5) on merits within 15 days from the re-opening of the _,,__
B courts after summer vacation. ""
5. The trial Court thereafter heard the matter and dismissed
the Application by refusing interim injunction. The petitioners
once again preferred an appeal against the said decision in ~
'
the High Court being Appeal From Order No. 241 of 2003. Along
c with Memorandum of Appeal, the petitioners filed Civil Applica-
tion No. 5083 of 2003 for interim injunction. In paragraph 8 of
the Civil Application, the petitioners prayed for interim relie-F.
The High Court by an order dated July 23, 2003, granted ex-
parte ad interim relief in terms of paragraph 8(A).
D
6. The said paragraph read as under;
8. The applicants, therefore, pray that :
(A) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal
of the aforesaid Appeal from Order, the Hon'ble
E Court may be pleased to issue an injunction
restraining opponents Nos. 1 to 3 herein, from
putting up any construction on the suit land either
themselves or through their agents and/or
servants and from disposing of the said
F property or creating any interest therein in favour ,.
of a third party either by sale, mortgage, transfer,
assignment, gift or in any other manner
whatsoever.

G 7. It is thus clear that though interim injunction was re-
fused by the trial Court, the High Court on July 23, 2003, granted
.
the prayer of the petitioner and issued interim injunction during
_._,_
the pendency and final disposal of Appeal from Order instituted
by the petitioners-appellants.

H 8. The High Court then heard the matter and by judgment

_:
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1179
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

and order dated March 26, 2004 dismissed the appeal observ- A,
ing that considering the facts and circumstances of the case in
their entirety, the order passed by the trial Court below Applica-
tion Exh. 5 called for no interference. Interim relief which was
granted earlier was ordered to be vacated.
9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-ap- 8
pellants in the High Court, at that stage, made a prayer to the
Court to continue interim relief granted earlier so as to enable
the petitioners-appellants to approach higher forum. After hear-
ing the learned counsel for the parties and noting objections
raised by the other side, the Court continued interim relief C
granted earlier for four weeks.
10. Paragraphs 35 and 36 of the judgment which are rel-
evant read as under;
35. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of 6
the case and having regard to the legal position
concerning the point in issue, this Court is of the
view that the impugned order passed by the Trial
Court below an application Exh. 5 does not call for
any interference in this Appeal From Order. E,
Accordingly, this Appeal From Order is dismissed.
Interim relief granted earlier is vacated.
36. At this stage, Mr. A.J. Patel, the learned advocate
appearing for the appellants requested to continue
the interim relief granted earlier by this Court for the F.
period of six weeks so as to enable the appellants
to approach the higher forum. Mr. Bhatt and Mr.
Nanavati, learned advocate appearing for the
respondents Nos. 1, 2 & 3 respectively have strongly
objected to the extension of interim relief. After G
considering their submissions on this issue, the
interim relief granted earlier is extended for four
weeks from today.
(emphasis supplied) H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 10 S.C.R.

A 11. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners ap-
proached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.
7659-7660 of 2004. On April 26, 2004, this Court issued no-
tice and continued interim order passed by the High Court which
was, as noted earlier, in terms of prayer para 8(A). The order,
B da.ted April 26, 2004 passed by this Court read as under;
"The interim order already granted by the High Court will
continue subject to further orders of this Court".
12. Notices were served on the respondents who ap-
e pea red. Affidavits and further affidavits were thereafter filed and
Special Leave Petitions were disposed of by this Court on Janu-
ary 10, 2005.

13. The said order read thus;
"The dispute in these special leave petitions pertains to
D
the construction on certain properties which are claimed
to be the joint family properties. By the impugned interim
order, the High Court has permitted construction to be
made on the suit properties. We have considered the
reasoning of the High Court. While not affirming the
E
correctness of the prima facie opinion expressed therein,
we are of the view that the interest of the parties will be
adequately protected if a conditional order is passed. The
special leave petitions, are, accordingly, disposed of by
making it clear that any construction which is made by
F the respondent - purchasers on the disputed properties
will be subject to the outcome of the suit. Any third party
right which is created shall be done after notice to the
petitioners. The pendency of the proceedings shall also
be notified to each of the third parties so involved. The
G Trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously,
preferably within a period of six months from the date of
the communication of this order.
(emphasis supplied)

H 14. The allegation of the petitioners in the present Con-
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1181
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
"
tempt Petitions is that in spite of interim order passed by this A
Court on April 26, 2004, as modified by final order dated Janu-
ary 10, 2005, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 (contemners) dealt
with and transferred the suit property by entering into agree-
ments, accepted the amount by way of consideration, executed
sale-deeds in favour of third parties without notice to the peti- B
tioners, allowed construction to be made and thereby commit-
ted wilful disobedience and intentional violation of the order of
the Court and they are liable to be punished in accordance with ·
law.
15. On these petitions, notices were issued on February c
6, 2006. The respondents appeared and filed affidavits. Hav-
ing satisfied that the pleadings were complete, the Registry was ,
directed to place the matters for final disposal. That is how the
matters have been placed before us.
D
16. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that
in spite of the orders passed by this Court, the contemners sold
the property, received consideration and executed sale-deeds.
No notice was given to them about the transactions before they
were entered into. The orders of this Court were abundantly
clear. The first order dated April 26, 2004, totally restrained the E
respondents from taking any action during the pendency of the
-; proceedings. In spite of such clear-cut order, properties were
sold and several other actions were taken by the contemners
and they are liable to be punished for committing contempt of
;. Court. It was also submitted that even under the order dated F
January 10, 2005, when Special Leave Petitions were disposed
of and earlier interim order was modified, the contemners had
acted in violation of the directions. And on that ground also, they ·
are liable under the Contempt of Courts Act.
G
17. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in this connec-
tion, referred to agreements to sell as well as sale deeds and
acceptance of part payment or full payment of consideration
during the intervening period between July 23, 2003 when the ,
High Court granted interim relief in terms of para 8(A) and also
H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A orders dated April 26, 2004 and the final order dated January
10, 2005 by this Court. It was urged that though the suit was
pending before the trial Court and the matter was sub-judice, in
agreements to sell as also in sale deeds, an express and un-
equivocal statement was made by the contemners that their title
B to the property is 'clear' and 'marketable'. It was ordered by the
Court on January 10, 2005 that if any third party right would be
created, it "shall be done after notice to the petitioners". No such
notice, however, was given to the petitioners. It was only after
the properties were sold that a 'pursis' was filed in the triai Court
c stating therein that certain properties were sold by the defen-
dants. Thus, there was clear breach of orders of this Court and
the contemners are liable to be punished for violating the in-
terim orders.
18. The learned counsel for the respondents-contemners,
D on the other hand, submitted that the Contempt Petitions are
liable to be dismissed. The respondents had not wilfully and
intentionally violated interim orders of this Court. No doubt, the
High Court, granted interim injunction in Civil Application in Ap-
peal from Order on July 23, 2003 but finally Appeal from Order
E itself was dismissed. Similarly, this Court on April 26, 2004 con-
tinued interim relief but ultimately, dismissed Special Leave Pe-
titions on January 10, 2005 by modifying earlier interim order. It
was also submitted that this Court never ordered to give 'prior'
notice to the petitioners before entering into any agreement or
F executing sale-deed. It was, therefore, not necessary for the re-
spondents either to issue notice or to intimate petitioners be- -'-
fore entering into any transaction. But in certain cases, even
'prior notice of transaction was given to the petitioners by the
respondents; though in some cases, such notice was given af-
G ter entering into agreements/transactions but the same could
not be said to be violative of the orders passed by this Court.
Alternatively, it was submitted that even if the Court finds that
there is 'technical' breach of the orders of this Court, the re- "'·
spondents have tendered t.:nconditional and unqualified apol-
H ogy which may be accepted b:t this Court and contempt pro-
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHUlABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1183.
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

ceedings may be dropped against them by showing magna- A
nimity and taking lenient view. ·
19. We have given most anxious and thoughtful consider-
ation to the rival contentions of the parties. We have also gone ·
through the relevant record and orders passed by the High Court ,
as also by this Court. We have perused affidavits and further 8
affidavits filed by the parties to these petitions. We have care-
fully g~ne through various documents on record.
20. We have reproduced both interim orders passed by
this Court; (i) order, dated April 26, 2004, and (ii) order, dated c
January 10, 2005. Under the first order, larger relief was granted,
obviously because at that stage, the Court on prima facie satis-
faction of the case, issued notice to the respondents. More-
over, even the High Court which had granted interim relief on
July 23, 2003, continued. the said relief (though Appeal from
0
Order was dismissed and interim relief was vacated) so as to
enable the aggrieved parties to approach this Court. On Janu-
ary 1C), 2005, however, this Court disposed of Special Leave
Petitions. But taking note of the pendency of the main matter
· . (suit), the Court did not totally vacate interim relief but modified
it by imposing certain conditions. The question before us is E
whether the contemners had violated both the orders or any of
--\
· the two orders and whether such violation or disobedience was
wilful or intentional as alleged by the petitioners. If so, what pun-
ishment should be imposed on the contemners and what should
be the final order in these contempt petitions. ·F
21. Before proceeding with the consideration of rival con-
tentions, it may be stated for the completion of record that Spe-
cial Civil Suit No. 605 of 2002 instituted by the petitioners herein
(plaintiffs) was decreed· by the IXth Additional Senior Civil ,G
Judge, Vadodara on May 23, 2006 and it was declared that
plaintiff Nos. 1 ~nd 2 and defendant Nos. 1, 4 and 5 each has 31
16 share in the suit property a.nd defendant Nos. 7, 8 and 9
each has 1/48 share in the said property. Prelimin.ary decree
was ordered to be drawn up accordingly. It was also stated that H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A the defendants against whom the decree is passed have chal-
lenged the decree by filing First Appeal in the High Court and
the matter is sub-Judice.
22. Now, it is the case of the ·petitioners that in spite of
interim orders of this Court, dated April 26, 2004 and January
8 10, 2005, in gross violation, wilful disobedience and intentional
breach thereof, the contemners had sold certain properties with-
out notice to the petitioners. It was stated that the contemners
executed a sale-deed in favour of Madhuben Rohit and
Jasodaben Thaker on August 30, 2005 for consideration of
C Rs.3,30,000/-. The contemners accepted a cheque of
Rs.2,00,000/- bearing No. 531526, dated October 15, 2004.
Similarly, an agreement to sell was executed in favour of
Hemlataben Shah for Rs.3,00,000/- on May 26, 2005 and the
entire amount was received by three cheques; cheque
D No.719372, dated April 15, 2004; cheque No.719374, dated
April 22, 2004 and cheque No. 216684, dated April 29, 2004.
Again, a sale deed in favour of Smt. Ranjit Gulati was executed
by accepting a cheque of Rs.51,000/- dated September 10,
• 2003, a cheque of Rs.1,00,000/- dated October 8, 2004 and a
E cheque of Rs.1,39,000/- dated April 26, 2004. By producing
additional documents on record, the petitioners have stated that
sale-deeds were executed by the contemners in favour of
Jayesh Natwarlal Parikh on August 18, 2005; Hemaben
Jayeshbhai Parikh on August 18, 2005, Rashmikaben
F Navinchandra Desai on August 30, 2005 and Tolaram
Radharam Popat on April 25, 2005. All these transactions were
entered into in gross violation and breach of the orders of the
Court and the contemners may; therefore, be punished for com-
mitting contempt of Court.
G 23. The respondents have filed affidavits denying the alle-
gations levelled by the petitioners and asserting that they have
not committed any act in disobedience of the order of the Court
and the contempt petitions are liable to be dismissed.
24. Respondent No. 1 (Chandrakant Dhulabhai), in his af-
H
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1185
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

fidavit, dated June 16, 2006 (filed on August 17, 2006) stated A
that the contempt petitions are 'primarily' directed against re-
spondent Nos. 2 and 3 who are alleged to have violated the
orders of this Court. It was stated that the orders were required
to be complied with by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and were not
directed against respondent No. 1. It was also stated that the B
respondent No. 1 is 67 years old and has been impleaded just
to harass him without making any averment/allegation against
him. It is, therefore, prayed to dismiss contempt petitions against
him.
25. A counter-affidavit is also filed by respondent Nos. 2 C
and 3 controverting the averments and denying the allegations
of the petitioners in the Contempt Petitions. It was stated that
during the operation of interim order dated April 26, 2004, they
had neither executed any sale deed nor created third party in-
terest in the suit property. The ch~ques said to have been ac- D
cepted by them during interim orders represented the amount
paid towards consideration of the apartment booked prior to
the issuance of interim orders.
26. Regarding the allegation that the title of the suit prop- E
erty was described as 'clear and marketable', it was stated that
as per the order of the Court, what was required to be men-
tioned was the pendency of the proceedings. In all the sale
deeds, executed by the respondents, specific recital was made
that the transaction was subject to pendency of civil suit and
final decision therein. F
27. Regarding the third allegation of not giving notice to
the petitione.rs, it was stated that no 'prior' notice was required
as per the order of this Court. It was stated;
a. in order to protect the interest of the parties, this
/
G
,. Hon'ble Court passed a conditional order stating inter
alia "any third party rights which is created shall be
done after notice to the petitioners". This Hon'ble
Court has not used the word "prior" as alleged. This
Hon'ble Court had desired that as and when third H
1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S. C.R.

A party rights are created, the petitioners should be
duly informed. The purpose of such information was
to enable-the petitioners to protect their interest by
impleading such third parties in the pending suit.
b. Admittedly, initially, by pursis dated 1.3.2005, the
B petitioners were given' prior intimation about the
creation of third party rights. However, subsequently
it was found that out of the 11 sale deeds which were
proposed to be executed and about which prior
intimation by pursis dated 1 .3.2005 was given - 7
c sale deeds could not be executed for quite some
· time, as the deal could not be finalized. Further,
before executing the sale deeds, 2 buyers/third
· parties/allottees got the deals transferred in some
other name, viz. name of their wife/child.
D
28. Hence, as per legal advice. obtained, the intimation
was being submitted before the Hon'ble Civil Court aftertaking
·endorsement of Advocate for the petitioner.
29, It was further stated by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that
E originally land bearing Survey Nos. 459/2, 464, 465, 466/1 and
466/2, adme~suring 26.608 Sq.M. was jointly purchased by
Chandrakant Dhulabhai Patel and Chandulal Muljibhai Parikh
in 1961. In 1990, however, an understanding had been arrived
at between the heirs and legal representatives of Chandulal
F Parikh and Chandrakant Dhulabhai Patel and as per partition,
50% land situated on the western side (Part 'A') fell to the share
of Chandrakant Patel whereas 50% land on the eastern side
(Part 'B') came to the share of Parikh family. It was further stated
that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 entered into Development Agree-
G ment with Parikh family for 50% eastern side land (Part 'B') '
which came to the share of Parikh family and also with respon-
dent No. 1 Chandrakant Patel for western side of land (Part
'A'). The scheme was thus jointly p1omoted for part 'A' land and
part 'B' land. In course of time, property 'A' became disputed
property, but there was no dispute as to property of part 'B'. If
H
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1187
'(
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

was also stated that part 'B' property abuts 30 metres wide road A
while part 'A' property abuts 40 meters wide T.P. Road. Thus,
part 'A' property (suit property) was having better location and
higher commercial value.
-J.
30. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 admitted that Madhuben
Rohit and Jasodaben Thaker deposited Rs. two lacs on Octo- B
ber 15, 2004 for booking one of the shops which was to be
constructed on Part 'B' property. But after the disposal of Spe-
cial Leave Petitions on January 10, 2005, the injunction came
to an end regarding part 'A' property. Under the circumstances,
request of Madhuben and Jasodaben for allotment of shop in c
part 'A' property instead of part 'B' property was favourably con-
sidered and accepted. Cases of Hemlataben Shah,
Rashmikaben and Ranjit Gulati were identical. Sale-deed in
favour of Dr. Tolaram Popat was executed on January 24, 2005,
i.e. after final disposal of SLP and there was no interim injunc- D
tion at that time.
31. It was, therefore, submitted that respondent Nos. 2 and
3 had not created any right in favour of third party during the
operation of interim order and there was no question of taking
proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. E

32. Regarding notice to petitioners, the respondents stated
that pursis, Ex. 88 was filed in the trial Court wherein details
had been supplied in respect of 11 transfer ·deeds which were
to be executed. Thereafter, again pursis, Ex. 106 was filed on F
September 01, 2005 in which all details were given. Thus, they
have not violated the order of this Court.
33. Finally, it was stated;
"Without prejudice to the above, the respondents tender
G
their unconditional apology to this Hon'ble Court."
;>"

34. In affidavit-in-rejoinder, the petitioners have stated that
after examining oral and documentary evidence, the compe-
tent Court passed a decree in favour of plaintiffs declaring
shares of plaintiffs and defendants. Meanwhile, however, the H
•
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
y

A respondents disposed of several properties. It was reiterated
that illegally and with mala fide intention, the respondents ere-
ated third party interest in gross defiance of interim orders and
by making inconsistent and contradictory statements. A false
statement was made by respondents in sale deeds and in agree- I-
.._
[
B ments to sell that the title of the respondents over the property
was 'clear and marketable'. As to properties part 'A; and 'B', it
was stated that the contention was wholly irrelevant inasmuch
as the trial Court decreed the suit by holding the plaintiffs as
joint owners of the property.
c 35. Further affidavit was thereafter filed by respondent Nos.
2 and 3 on February 25, 2008 on the question of title deeds. It
was stated that in sale deeds, a statement was made that "third
party has no right, title, interest or claim and the property (sub-
ject-matter of sale deed) was not under attachment". But it was
D also stated that the suit was pending and the sale-deeds were .,,
executed subject to final decision in the suit. Thus, the respon-
dents had acted bona fide. They have not only notified in the
sale-deeds the pendency of civil suit but also have gone a step
further and stated that the sale-deeds were being executed sub-
E ject to final decision in the pending suit. It was, therefore, sub-
mitted that the Contempt Petitions should be dismissed.
36. From the facts stated above, it is proved that there is
breach of interim orders passed by this Court. So far as the !__

defence as to properties falling in parts 'A' and 'B' is concerned,
F in our opinion, it is clearly an after thought and the plea has ...
been put forward without there being anything on record. Though
it was stated that initially, Madhuben, Hemlataben, Rashmikaben
and Ranjit Gulati were given shops in part 'B' property, no such
agreements/deeds have been placed on record. It was then
G stated that after interim relief was vacated and request w~s
made by them to allot them shops in part 'A' property, no evi-
dence/material has been adduced by the contemners. A ste- '<.

reo-type affidavits have been filed sworn on one and the same
day, July 29, 2006 after contempt notice was served upon the
H respondents. Even the sale-deeds do not recit~ part 'A' or 'B'
)-
;

..,
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1189
,.. CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

of the property or the fact that earlier the allottee was granted A
shop in part 'B' property but after the disposal of the Special
Leave Petitions, request was made by the purchaser to convert
the allotment from part 'B' property to part 'A' property. The so-
called defence, therefore, is apparently to avoid consequences
of contempt proceedings. B
37. Moreover, the defence does not appear to be prob-
able. Normally, no reasonable and prudent man/woman who
purchases immovable property with a 'clear' title would request
the owner of the property to allot him/her property over which
his title is not clear, which is the subject-matter of litigation, for c
which a suit is pending and the matter is sub-Judice in a Court
of law.
38. Further, the pleas advanced by respondent Nos. 2 and
3 are inconsistent, conflicting and irreconcilable. On the one
D
I hand, it was asserted that during the operation of the interim
order, dated April 26, 2004, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had not
created third party interest in the suit property and the cheques
said to have been accepted by them during the pendency of
proceedings 'represented the amount paid towards consider-
ation of the apartment booked prior to the issuance of the in- E
terim orders,' while on the other hand, it was stated that initial
booking was for shops to be constructed on part 'B' property,
but subsequently, after dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, at
the request of purchasers, allotment was converted from part
'B' property to part 'A' property. If it were so, there was no ques- F
tion of raising a plea that the acceptance of cheques during the
pendency of the interirr orders represented the amount of con-
sideration booked prior to the issuance of interim orders. If ini-
tial booking and payment was in relation to part 'B' property, it
was immaterial and altogether irrelevant whether it was prior or G
subsequent to filing suit by the plaintiffs or grant of interim or-
~
ders either by the High Court or by this Court.

39. We are, therefore, fully convinced that during the pen-
dency of the proceedings and in spite of interim orders passed
H
"
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A by this Court, agreements have been entered into by the con-
temners, cheques had been accepted and consideration had
been received at least in part. So far as the first order passed
by this Court on April 26, 2004 is concerned, there was total
prohibition from creating any interest in favour of third party ei-
B ther by sale, mortgage, transfer, assignment, gift or' in any other
manner whatsoever'. Hence, entering into an agreement or
acceptance of full or even part consideration would be hit by the
said order. In our considered view, it would amount to 'creation
of interest' prohibited by this Court.
C 40. The matter did not end there. Special Leave Petitions
were filed in this Court by the petitioners against an interim or-
der not granting injunction below Application, Ex.5. Though the
High Court granted such injunction, but it was vacated at the
time of dismissal of Appeal from Order. But all the parties to the
D suit were aware that the main matter (suit) was pending and
rights of contesting parties in the suit-property were yet to be
decided. In the circumstances, 'injunction' or 'no injunction', the
title of the defendants was 'under challenge'. It was 'cloudy' and
unless and until the suit is decided, it cannot be said that they
E had 'clear and marketable title'. Though the legal position is
clear and beyond controversy, we find that an express, unam-
biguous and unequivocal statement is made by the contemners
in all sale deeds that their title to the property is 'clear and mar-
ketable'. It was also stated that they were independent owners,
F possessors and occupiers of the property and there was no
right, interest, part share, claim of anybody else therein.
41. It was, no doubt, submitted by the learned counsel for
the contemners that it was specifically and clearly stated that a
suit was pending in the Court of Ciyil Judge (Senior Division),
G Vadodara and it was also clarified that the documents were
executed subject to the final decision in the suit. It was further
submitted that if the owner of the property does not state that he
has title over the property he seeks to transfer and that such title
is 'clear and marketable', no reasonable and prudent man would
H come forward to purchase such property. To this extent, the
PATELHAJNIKANT DHULABHAI &ANR. v. PATEL 1191
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

learned counsel is right. That, however, does not mean that in A
such case, a person whose title is challenged and the proceed-
ings are pending will be permitted to say that his title is 'clear 1

and marketable' and there is no impediment on the contem-
ners from transferring the property in favour of pur.chasers.
42. Finally, in any case, there is clear breach and violation 1 B
of the order of this Court, i.e. order, dated January 10, 2005 so
far as 'notice' to the petitioners is concerned. It is not disputed
even by the contemners that in some cases, notice as to ere- 1

ation of third party interest had been given after creation of such
interest by filing pursis in the Court. c
43. The learned counsel for the contemners half-heartedly '
submitted that this Court had not ordered that 'prior' notice should
be given to the petitioners regarding creation of third party rights
and hence, there was no violation of the direction of the Court.
D
" 44. We are unable to agree with the submission. This Court
has stated; "Any third party right which is created shall be done
after notice to the petitioners." In our view, the direction has
only one meaning and it is that third party interest can only be
created after notice to the petitioners. Admittedly, that was not E
done, at least, in few cases. It is, therefore, clear that there is
1

violation and disobedience of the orders of the Court and the
contemners are responsible for such act.

45. From the overall considerations of the matter in the
light of series of events, we hold that the respondents-contem- F
ners have disregarded and violated the orders passed by this ,
Court on April 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005.
46. The next question is whether for disobedience of the
order passed by this Court, the respondents/contemners are
G
1

liable to punishment? In this connection, we may refer to some
of the legal provisions. Article 129 of the Constitution declares
this Court (Supreme Court) to be "a Court of Record having all,
the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for the
contempt of itself'. Clause (c) of Section 94 of the Code of Civil
H
1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A Procedure, 1908 enacts that in order to prevent the ends of
justice from being defeated, the Court may, commit the person
guilty of disobedience of an order of interim injunction to civil
prison and direct his property be attached and sold. Rule 2A of
Order XXXI?< as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure
B (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976) reads thus:
2A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of
injunction-(1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction
granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or
breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was
c granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction
or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or
proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the
person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be
attached, and may also order such person to be detained
D in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months,
unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.
(2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in
force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if
the disobedience or breach continues, the property
E attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court
may award such compensation as it thinks fit to-the injured
party and shall pay the balanQe, if any, to the party entitled
thereto.
F 47. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
have also been invoked. Section 2 of the Act is a definition •
clause. Clause (a) enacts that contempt of court means 'civil
contempt or criminal contempt'. Clause (b) defines 'civil con-
tempt' thus;
G (b) 'civil contempt' means wilful disobedience to any
judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.
48. Reading of the above clause makes it clear that the
H following conditions must .be satisfied before a person can be ....
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI &ANR. v. PATEL 1193
'( CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

held to have committed a civil contempt; A
(i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a Court (or an undertaking
given to a Court);
(ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, B
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a
Court (or breach of undertaking given to a Court);
and
(iii) such disobedience of judgment, decree, direction,
order, writ or other process of a Court (or breach of G
undertaking) must be wilful.
49. Section 12 provides punishment for contempt of Court.
The relevant part of the provision reads thus;
S. 12 - Punishment for contempt of court-(1) Save as D
otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other
law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or
with both: E
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the
punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being
made to the satisfaction of the court.
Explanation.-An apology shall not be rejected merely on F
the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused
makes it bona fide.

-
"
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
-time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in
excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any Contempt
either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
G

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court
, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice H
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R
y

A .and that a sentence of imprisonment is ·necessary shall,
instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct '
that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not
exceeding six months as it may think fit.

'I
B
50. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha &
Ors., (2003) 11 SCC 1, this Court had an occasion to consider
the concept of 'wilful disobedience' of an order of the Court. It
was stated that 'wilful' means an act or omission which is done
c voluntarily and with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law
requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to
disobey or to disregard the law. According to the Court, it signi-
fies the act done with evil intent or with a bad motive for the pur-
pose. It was observed that the act or omission has to be judged
D
having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
51. ·In Kapi/deo Prasad Sah & Ors. v. State of Bihar &
Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 569, it was held that for holding a person to
have committed contempt, it must be shown that there was wil- ,;

E ful disobedience of the judgment or order of the Court. But it
was indicated that even negligence and carelessness may
amount to contempt. It was further observed that issuance of
notice for contempt of Court and power to punish are having far
reaching consequences, and as such, they should be resorted
to only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the court's ;d
F
order is made out. A petitioner who complains breach of Court's
order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of
the Court's order and if such allegation is proved, contempt can
be said to have been made out, not otherwise. The Court noted
that power to punish for contempt is intended to maintain effec-
G
Lve legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the
cours· of justice.
·52. In the celebrated decision of Attorney General v. Times
Newspaper Ltd.; 1974 AC 273: (1973) 3 All ER 54: (1973) 3
H l/VLR 298; Lord Diplock stated: I
•'
\
I
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1195
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
'(

'There is an element of public policy in punishing civil A
contempt, since the administration of justice would be1
undermined if the order of any court of law could be
disregarded with impunity."
53. In Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh & Ors.,
• (2002) 4 SCC 21, this Court held that the Contempt of Courts B
1

_, Act has been introduced in the statute-book for securing confi-'
dence of people in the administration of justice. If an .order
passed by a competent Court is clear and unambiguous and
not capable of more than one interpretation, disobedience or
c
- breach of such order would amount to contempt of Court. There1
can be no laxity in such a situation because otherwise the Court'
orders would become the subject of mockery. Misunderstand-
ing or own understanding of the Court's order would not be a
permissible defence. It was observed that power to punish a
) person for contempt is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in thet D
../,
'· hands of Judiciary but that by itself operates as a string of cau-
tion and cannot be used unless the Court is satisfied beyond
doubt that the person has deliberately and intentionally violated
the order of the Court. The power under the Act must be exer-
cised with utmost care and caution and sparingly in the larger E
interest of the society and for proper administration of justice
delivery system. Mere disobedience of an order is not enough
to hold a person guilty of civil contempt. The element of willing-
ness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge
within the meaning of the Act. F
54. In Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C.
Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.)
observed that once a direction is issued by a competent Court,
it has to be obeyed and implemented without any reservation. If
an order passed by a Court of Law is not complied with or is G
! ignored, there will be an end of Rule of Law. If a party against
..... whom such order is made has grievance, the only remedy avail'-
able to him is to challenge the order by taking appropriate pro-
' ceedings known to law. But it cannot be made ineffective by nqt
complying with the directions on a specious plea that no such H
'
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
y

A directions could have been issued by the Court. Upholding of
such argument would seriously affect and impair administra-
tion of justice.
55. In All Bengal Excise Licensees Association v.
Raghabendra Singh & Ors., (2007) ·11 SCC 374, this Court
8 considered several cases and observed that wilful and deliber-
ate act of violation of interim order passed by a competent Court
would amount to contempt of Court.•
56. A reference in this connection may also be made to a
c decision of this Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarawala v. Hind
Rubber Industries (P) L(d., (1997) 3 SCC 443. In that case., the ,,.-
plaintiff-landlord filed a suit against the defendant-tenant in the \
c·ity Civil Court for. permanent injunction restraining the defen-
dant from carry.ing on construction in the suit premises. Ad in- '
)
D terim injunctio.n was grC:tnted by the Court. Defendant's applica-
tion for vacating injunction was dismissed. The defendant, how-
ever, committed breact) of injunction. The plaintiff, hence, filed
an application unde.r Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A of the Code. The
defendant came forward-and raised an.objection as to jurisdic-
tion of the Court and power to grant injunction. The High Co~rt.
E ultimately, upheid the objection and ruled that City Civil Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit l_t was, therefore, argued
by the defendant that he cannot be. punished for disobedience.
of an order passed by a Court whic~ had no jurisdiction to en-
tertain a suit or to gra'nt injunction. Tile High Court upheld the
F contention. The plaintiff approached this Court.
57. This Court observed that until the question of jurisdic-
tion had been decided, the City Civil Court possessed power
to make interim orders. The Court could also enforce them. A
G subsequent decision that the Co.urt had no jurisdiction tq enter-
tain the sui~ did not render interim ord~rs passed earlier non
est or without jurisdiction. A party committing breach .of such
orders could not escape the consequences of such disobedi-
ence and violation thereof. Accordingly, the Court held the de-
H fendant gyilty for intentionally and delibe.rately violating interim
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1197
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

order and convicted him under Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX of the A
Code and sentenced him to one month's imprisonment.
_58. Speaking for the Court, Jeevan Reddy, i stated;
"Can· it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court and
the High Court during this period of six years were all non B
est and that it is open to the defendants to flout them
merrily, without fear of any consequence. The question is ,
whether the said decision of the High Court means that no
person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the
interim/ interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e., c
for violations and disobedience committed prior to the
decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction.
Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High 1

Court (on the question of jurisdiction), no one can be
punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the
0
interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the
High Court, would indeed be subversive of the Rule of
Law and would seriously erode the dignity and the
authority of the courts.
(emphasis supplied) E
59. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a
person for contempt of Court is indeed a drastic step and nor-
mally such action should not be taken. At the same time, how-
ever, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold
and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law which may F
call for such extreme step. If for proper administration of justice
and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a Court,
it is required to take strict view under the Act, it should not hesi-
tate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt.
G
60. Now, in the instant case, both the orders passed by
this Court on April 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005, were explic-
itly clear. The first order totally prohibited/restrained the respon~
dents/contemners from creating any interest whatsoeve·r in the
suit property. As held by us, in spite of the said order, interest H
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A had been created by the contemners in the suit property. But
even otherwise there is intentional disobedience and wilful
breach of the subsequent order dated January 10, 2005 inas-
much as transactions had been entered into without issuing
notice to the petitioners. We have already held that they could /
s not have been entered into by the respondents before issuance
of notice to the petitioners. The respondents were clearly aware
of the order. In fact, the action was sought to be defended and
justified on the ground that the Court had ·not directed 'prior'
notice, and as such, non-issuance of notice before entering into
c sale transactions would not amount to disobedience of the or-
der of the Court. We are unable to uphold the contention. In the
circumstances it must be held that the disobedience of the or-
der by the contemners was wilful, intentional and deliberate.
61. The question then is whether the case calls for imposi-
D tion of punishment on the contemners. The learned counsel for
the contemners submitted that in the affidavit in reply, the respon-
dents have stated that if this Court comes to the conclusion that
they had committed contempt of Court, the Court may accept
unconditional and unqualified apology and may discharge no-
E tice. The counsel submitted that the statutory provision itself en-
acts that no apology shall be rejected merely on the ground that it
is qualified or conditional [Explanation to Section.12(1 )].
'". 92.. We must frankly admit our inability to agree·with the
learned counsel. In the light of what is stated above, we are
F convinced that the contemners have intentionally and deliber-
ately violated the orders of the Court. We are also convinced
that the orders were clear, unambiguous and unequivocal hav-
ing one and only one meaning. Wilful and deliberate disobedi- .
ence of the orders passed by the apex Court of the country can '
G never be said to be bona fide, honest or in good faith. If it is so,
the action calls for serious view to ensure proper administra-
tion of justice.
63. In Hiren Bose, Re, AIR 1969 Cal 1 : 72 Cal WN 82, the
H High Court of Calcutta stated;
PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI & ANR. v. PATEL 1199
CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

"It is also not a matter of course that a J.udge can be A
expected to accept any apology. Apology cannot be a
weapon of defence forged always to purge the guilty. It is
intended to be evidence of real contrition, the manly
~
consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted and
the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the B
wrong-doer's power. Only then is it of any avail in a Court
of justice But before it can have that effect, it should be
tendered at the earliest possible stage, not the latest. Even
if wisdom dawns only at a later stage, the apology should
be tendered unreservedly and unconditionally, before the c
Judge has indicated the trend of his mind. Unless that is
done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace
but it ceases to be an apology It ceases to be the full, frank
and manly confession of a wrong done, which it is intended
to be".
" D
64. It is well-settled that an apology is neither a weapon of
defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to
operate as a universal panacea, it is intended to be evidence
of real contriteness [Vide M. Y Shareaf v. Hon'bfe Judges of
the High Court of Nagpur; (1955) 1 SCR 757: M.B. Sanghi v. E
High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1991) 3 SCR 312].
65. In TN. Godavarman Thirumulpad through the Am-
icus Curiae v. Ashok Khot & Anr., 2006 (5) ·SCC 1, a three
Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the ques-
tion in the light of an 'apology' as a weapon defence by the con- F
temner with a prayer to drop the proceedings. The Court took
note of the foilowing observations of this Court in L. D. Jaikwa/ v.
State of UP, (1984) 3 sec 405:
"We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say
G
sorry-and forget' school of thought in administration of
contempt jurisprudence. Saying 'sorry' does not make the
slipper taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical
word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology
and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and
H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A not from the. pen. For it is one thing to 'say' sorry-it is
another. to 'feel' sorry".
66. The Court, therefore, rejected the prayer and stated;
)
"Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered
B at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, the apology
is shorn of penitence and hence it is liable to be rejected.
If the apology is offered at the time when the contemnor
finds that the court is going to impose punishment it ceases
·to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward".
c 67. Similar view was taken in other cases also by this Court. (
68. We are also satisfied that the so-called apology is not
an act of penitence, contrition or regret. It has been tendered as
a 'tactful move' when the contemners are in the tight corner and
with a view to ward off the Court. Acceptance of such ·apology
0
in the case on hand would be allowing the contemners to go
away with impunity after committing gross contempt of Court.
In our considered opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances
of the case, imposition of fine in lieu of imprisonment will not
E meet the ends .of justice.
69. Considering the f9cts and circumstances in their en-
tirety, in our opinion, ends of justice would be served if we hold
tl)e respondents/contemners guilty under Section 12 of the Con-
/tempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Section 94(c) and Rule 2-
F/ A of Order XX.XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as
amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1976 and Article 129 of the Constitution and order the respon-
dents-contemners to undergo simple imprisonment for a term
of two weeks i.e. fourteen days.
G 70. Ordered accordingly.
N.J. Contempt Petitions disposed of.

t
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