Holding

The Court held that the circumstantial evidence, together with the statutory presumption under Section 113A, established the guilt of the accused, and the conviction stands.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the conviction of Pawan Kumar and co‑accused for abetment of suicide, dowry harassment and related offences under Sections 306, 498A, 201 and 193 of the IPC. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and a statutory presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, while the defence argued that the deceased's dying declaration showed an accidental death. The Court held that the chain of circumstantial facts, though not every link was directly proved, was sufficient to exclude reasonable doubt and that the presumption of abetment applied because cruelty was established. The dying declaration was deemed unreliable and could not overturn the inference of suicide. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences.

Issues considered

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to convict the accused of abetment of suicide.
Whether the dying declaration of the deceased negates the inference of suicide.
Whether Section 113A of the Evidence Act creates a presumption of abetment of suicide in the facts of the case.
Whether the death was accidental or a result of suicide.
Whether the convictions under Sections 306, 498A, 201 and 193 IPC are legally justified.

Legislation cited

Evidence Act, 1882s. 113A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 193, s. 201, s. 306, s. 498A

Subjects

circumstantial evidencedying declarationabetment of suicideSection 113Adowry harassmentcrueltyIPC 306IPC 498AIPC 201IPC 193criminal law

Judgment

._... PAWANKUMAR A
V.
~
STATE OF HARYANA

MARCH 13, 2001

[U.C. BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKRlSHNAN, JJ.] B

Evidence Act, 1882 :
_;t
Suicide-By married ivonian-A.hetment r~f-Presurnption as f(J-Do1v1y
torture-lie Id: In the circumstance o,f the case, accused co1n1ni1ted cruelty
toivards his deceased-1v~fe-Hence, High Cou1t rightly presunied accusPd abet-
c
red suicide uf his wife-Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 306, 498-A, 201and193.

Criminal Trial :

l'ircumstantial Evidence-Conviction based upon-Just~fication by-
field: Chain of events 1nust be so complete as to leave no doubt that the act D
is done by the accused person-\Vlzile it is true that there should be no rnissing
links but every link ne~d not appear on the suiface o.fthe evidence, since so1ne
links may only be infelTe:.1 f1vm proven fact-St1vng s~tspicion is not sufficient
to justify conviction-Where t\vo vie111s are possible the one in favour of tlze

-;_
accused must be accepted. E
The appellant-accused was convicted by the trial court for offences
under Sections 306, 498-A, 201 and 193 of the Penal Code, 1860. The
conviction was upheld by the High Court. Hence this appeal.

According to the prosecution, the appellant's ,vjfe was subjected to F
frequent dowry harassments as a result of which there was a strained
relationship between them. On the fateful day; the appellant's wife was
found lying burnt in her kitchen and the Assistant Sub-inspector of Police
recorded her dying declaration in which she had stated that nobody was
responsible for the fire which was accidental. However, the trial court and
G
the High Court rejected the dying declaration and held the appellant guilty
of abetment of suicide.
>
... On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the dying dcclara-
tion itself would negate any suicidal death but depicted a clear accidental
·· incident resulting iu the death of the deceased. H
389
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Dismissing the appeal, the Court
--·
HELD : 1.1. Success of the prosecution on the basis of circnmstantial
evidence "ill depend on the availability of a complete chain of events so as
not to leave any doubt for the conclusion that the act must have been done
by the accused person. While, however, it is true that there should he no
B missing links, in the chain of events so as far as the prosecution is con•
cerned, it is not that every one of the links must appear on the surface of
the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the
proven facts. Circumstances of strong suspicion without, however, :any
conclusive evidence are not sufficient to justify the conviction and it is on
C this score that great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial
evidence. In any event, on the availability of two inferences,. the one in
favour of the accused must be accepted. [391-G-H]

State of U.P. v. As/wk Kumar Srivastava, AIR (1992) SC 840, referred
to.
D
I. I. The evidence on record, ascribed to be circumstantial, ought to
justify the inference of the guilt from the incriminating facts and circum·
stances, which are incompatible with the innocence of the accused or gnilt
of any other person. [392-F]
E
Ba/winder Singh v, State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350, relied on.

2.1. The circumstances in the contextual facts and the materials on
record substantiate the requirements of Section 113-A ofthe Evidence Act,
1882 and ha,ing regard to the language used in Section 498-Aof the Penal
F Code, 1860 it is clear that cruelty is written large as regards the conduct of
the appellant towards bis deceased-wife. [397-D]

2.2. The death of the deceased was caused by burn injuries only and
having considered the nature of injuries and since one cannot hut rule out
an accidental death, the death of the deceased cannot but he attributed to
G be suicidal on the basis of the circumstances as are available on record
with the situation existing and ha,ing regard to statutory presumption,
this Court cannot hut lend concurrence to the opinion expressed by the
High Court. The circumstances pointedly point out the accused as a guilty
person as an abettor and on the wake of the aforesaid the order of convic-
H tion cannot be interfered with. [397-H; 398-A-B]
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 391
Balwinder Singh v. Stale of Punjab, AIR (1996) SC 607; Lakhjit Singh A
v. Stale of Punjab, (1994) Supp. I SCC 173; State of Punjab v. Gurdip Sing/'
(1996) 7 SCC 163 and Sharad Binlhichand Sardo v. State of Maharashtra,
(1984) 4 sec 116, held inapplicable.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
1386 of 1999. B

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.5.99 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Crl.A. No. 184-SB/87.

R.K. Jain, Sushil Kumar, Saajeev Sachdeva and Sanjay Jain for the
Appellant. C

Ms. Monika Balhara, S.R. Sharma, V. Sudheer and Mahabir Singh for
the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
BANERJEE, J. The appellants, charged for the offences under Sec-
tions 306, 498A, 201 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code, were found guilty
of offences by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra under Sections 306
and 498(A) of the Code and were sentenced to undergo R.l. for six years.
The High Conn thongh dismissed the appeal qua appellant No. I, Pawan
Kumar but as regards the appellant Nos. 2 and 3, sentences were reduced to
E
six mouths under both cour.ts respectively and .it is this order of dismissal
which is under challenge before this Court in the appeal by the grant of
special leave.

Before advening to the rival contentions, be it noted that the entire F
matter hinges on circumstantial evidence. There is also however existing on
record, a dying declaration, but its effect on the matter, shall be discussed
shortly hereafter in this judgment. Incidentally success of the prosecution on
the basis of circumstantial evidence will however depend on the availability
of a complete chain of events so as not to leave any doubt for the conclusion
lhat the act 111ust have been done by the accused person. While however, it G
is lrUe that there should be no missing links, in the chain of events so far
as the prosecution is concerned, but it is not that every one of the links must
appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only
be inferred from the proven facts. Circumstances of strong suspicion without
however, any conclusive evidence are not sufficient to justify the conviction H
t
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A and it is on this score that great care must be taken in evaluating the
circumstantial evidence. In any event, on the availability of two inferences,
the one in favour of the accused must be accepted and the law is well settled
on this score, as such we need not dilate much in that regard excepting
however, noting the observations of this Court in the case of State of U.P
v. As/wk Kumar Srivastava, AIR (1992) SC 840 wherein this Court in
B
paragraph 9 of the report observed:-

"The Court has, time out of number, observed that while appreciating
circumstantial evidence the Court must adopt a very cautious ap-
proach and should record a convicti0n only if all the links in the chain
c are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis
of innocence is capab]e of being negatived on evidence. Great care
must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the
evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one
in favour of the accused must be accepted. The circumstance relied
upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative
D effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the
hypothesis of guilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must
meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however,
far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution
evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law
E permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise.

The other aspect of the issue is that the evidence on record, ascribed
to be circumstantial, ought to justify the inferences of the guilt from the
incriminating facts and circumstances which are incompatible with the inno-
cence of the accused or- gllilt of any other person. The observations of this
F Court in the case of Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350,
lends concurrence to the above.

Referring to the prosecution case at this stage it appears that Ekta, the
sister of Sudarshan Kumar was married to Pawan Kumar appellant No. I.
After four months of the marriage, Ekta went to Sudarshan Kumar alongwith
G her husband Pawan Kumar and told him that a sum of Rs.10,000 was being
demanded by Pawan Kumar, his father and mother. Sudarshan promised to
pay that amount after a couple of days after arranging for it. Accordingly,
three days thereafter Sudarshan accompanied by one Jag Pal Saini went to
the house of the accused at Shahbad and paid the amount of Rs.10,000 to
H Smt. Kaushalya Devi. After about one year, Ekta again came to the house
•

PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.} 393
of Sudarshan with a definite grievance about being pestered for money by A
her husband and parents-in-law. At that time, she stayed at the house of
1 Sudarshan for eight months and never wanted to go back by reason of
consistent harassment with beating. As a matter of fact, a feeling of being
fed up together with despondency has completely over-powered her. Subse-
quently, a panchayat was held and at the asking of village Panchayat,
B
Sudarshan agreed to send and did send Ekta with Ram Asra to the house of
her parents-in-Jaw at Shahbad. However, the appellants continued harassing
_; Ekta for dowry. Sudarshan came to know of this fact whenever he visited Ekta
at Shahbad and as and when she came to meet her parents at karera Khurd.
It is further the case of the prosecution that about two months prior to the
occurrence, Sudarshan booked a marnti van for himself and appellant-Pawan c
Kumar came to know about it. He went to the house of Sudarshan and-told
him that either the said van be given to him or he may book another van
for bim. Su<larshan however, refused to accede to the demand. Pawan Kumar
went back leaving the impression that it would not bring good result. On
17.9.1985, Sudarshan received a telephonic message that Ekta was burnt.
D
Sudarshan, accompanied by Dr. Krishan Lal, Sham Sunder and mother of
Ekta went to Shahbad. On reaching Shahbad, they came to know that Ekta
had been taken to PG.I., Chandigarh by the accused. Sudarshan along with
his companions reached PG.I., Chandigarh and found that Ekta had died. He
took the dead body and brought it to Shahbad and lodged a report to the
police. The report was recorded by AS! Fateh Singh and he took up the E
investigation of the case. He reached at the spot. At that time, the kitchen
of the house was locked and one AS! was put on guard. The dead body along
with the inquest report was sent for post mortem examination. On the next
day, the spot and the dead body were got inspected by the team summoned
from Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban. Thereafter, the AS! inspected F
the spot himself and prepared a rough site plan. He took into possession
certain articles, which were sealed. The statements of other witnesses were
---(
recorded. The appellants were arrested. On the completion of investigation,
challan was filed. Thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions
where the learned Additional Sessions Judge tried it and the conviction as
G
above was made by him.

Incidentally, the defence has also led evidence to show that Ekta died
of an accident and not a suicidal death and on this score strong reliance was
~ placed on the dying declaration by Ekta made before the Police Officer.
Though, however, dying declaration is stated to be a got np document and H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) 2 S.C.R.

.A not worth even the paper on which it was written. The same is however, noted
herein below :

"I was married with Pawan Kumar Sia Ram Asra caste Arora Rio
Sainda Mohalla, Shahabad about 4-5 years before. My husband is
cloths dealer and his shop is situated in Main Bazar Shahabad. We
B live togetl1er wit]l our parents-in-law. Today in morning at about 8.3Q
AM my husband and my father-in-law Ram Asra had already been
gone at shop and my mother-in-law Smt. Kanshalaya Devi also had
gone to the honse of neighbour for visit. I was alone at house. Today
at about JO AM I was boiling the Milk in Kitchen on a stove kerosene
c Oil was finished from the stove. It had taken a bottle of kerosene oil
which was lying in kitchen for filling up in stove. Then that bottle
of kerosene oil fell down from my hands and broken. The kerosene
oil from the bottle fell upon my cloths and on the bums stove, so that
reason my cloths get on fire on this I started crying on this a number
of persons and women came to the spot. They put off the fire from
D my clothes and from body. Later on my husband reached there. I was
brought in Civil Hospital Shahabad for treatment. This fire set on due
to broken the bottle of kerosene. No body have fault in this matter.
This fire was put on by chance and not I had put on fire by anybody.
Statement heard and it is correct.
E
Attested LT!,
Ekta Rani
Sdl- Arnn Kumar.AS!, •
PS Shahabad W/o Pawan Kumar
17.9.85 "
F
Mr. Sushi! Kumar, learned Senior Advocate contended that the sole
issue in the matter under consideration is whether the death of Ekta can be
ascribed to be an accidental death or a cose of suicide? Needless to record
that the High Court negated the case of accidental death and held the
appellants guilty of abetment to the act of suicide and it is on this count that
G the appeal of the appellant No. I before the High Court was rejected whereas
the two other aPPellants had their sentences reduced.

In support of the appeal it has rather emphatically been contended that
the dying declaration itself would negate any suicidal act, but depicted a clear
H accidental incident resulting in the death. It is this dying declaration which
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE [BANERJEE, l.] 395
the learned Trial Judge, as also the High Court ascribed it to be not worth A
the paper on which the same was written and does not deserve the credence
of acceplance of the same. Peculiarities are the ways which can however,
easily be noticed: The kerosene on the stove got finished as a result of which
further filling of kerosene was required and hence a bottle was taken, which
accidentally slipped out and broken. But the factum of the stove not having
B
any kerosene, has been ignored, since absence of kerosene would put off the
ignition and thete would be total extinguishment of fire. The resultanl effect
_) of such an extinguishment mean and imply that one would require a match
stick to ignite the kerosene- since there is no automatic flow of fire available.
The fact, Ekta died of bum injuries stands admitted which has been stated
lo be accidental and nol suicidal. It is on lhis swre however, the prosecution c
laid evidence 10 depict that the accident could not have happened as stated
in the dying declaration and it has been an evidence created to cover up the
suicide. Strong reliance has been placed on the evidence of SeniorScientific
Officer Shri J.L. Gaur (PW.2) who in no uncertain terms ruled out any
accidenlal bum injury in the matler. On an examination of the body it was
D
observed that a part of the scalp. hair on the top of head eye brow, eye lashes
and pubic hair were burnt and singed. However, hairs on the sides and back
of the head had escaped any injury. The body was burnt practically all over
excepting the feel and their soles. Three kerosene stoves were available in
the kitchen, two being with sufficient fuel for use and the other one lying
lotally idle in another comer of the room with accumulation of dust on them. E
In any evenl, the third stove lying in the other comer was not having even
a smell of kerosene. Pieces of broken glass bottle with no smell of kerosene
were available in the kitchen and one of the bottom piece of boltle had fungus
like deposil clearly indicating non user of the bottle as a container of kerosene
for quile sometime. Significantly, there was a match box, a broken match box F
lying on the floor at a distance of about four feet from the stove. The used
. ---{ sticks of malch box were available near the slove. The match box emitted
smell of kerosene. PW.2 has also spoken of non-availability of any milk or
milk container even in the kitchen. The further finding of PW.2 is that both
the stoves were in working condition and the air pressure valves of the stove
were found in open position having the lids of the tanks of the stove dry and
G
tithtly closed. PVf 2 further spoke of an unused funnel lying on the floor
of the room which also did not have any kerosene smell.
---<!,

It is for reasons as_ above that leam~d Sessions Judge and the High
Court refused to pul any credence on -the defence of accidental burn injury. H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A If the accidental injury is ruled out and which we also feel the same way as
that of the other two Courts, the obvious conclusion would be suicidal death ~
and on that issue a further question arises as regards abetment. An analysis
of the evidence of PW.3, Sudarshan Kumar (brother of the deceased) depicts
tl1e behavioural pattern received at the in-laws place by Ekta. Occasional
demand for money and failure Iv meet the same, however, resulted in beating
B
up of the girl, Ekta, and as a matter of fact in September 1985 she c'ame back
to the house of complainant all alone and this arrival, the complainant
described as the aftermath of torture which in fact did put her up in a bad
shape. Defmite evidence is available on record that Ekta stayed with the
complainant for about 8 months and it is only thereafter the appellant No.2
c wanted to take back Ekta. The brother of complainant PW.3 however,
pointedly refused though after some persuasion and assurance of the father-
in-law, in the presence of some other members of the family, of proper
treatment to the daughter-in-law, the complainant agreed and Ekta thus went
back to the in-laws place. Further evidence, however, records that there has
D been no improvement of the behavioural pattern and she was subjected to
dowry torture as also various abusive treatment by reason of not being able
to bear a child. Incidentally, the two families, namely the bride's and groom's,
related to each other and it is on this score that learned Senior Advocate in
support of the appeal contended tliat dowry torture or even user of any
abusive language were all figments of imagination : The evidence however,
E tell a different story - The torture continued.and reached its peak in July 1985
by reason of a l>ooking of a Maruti Van by the complainant which was asked
to be delivered to the accused/appellant, on refusal, however, to comply with
the demand for delivery of the van by the complainant, the relationship was
further estranged and PW 3 was given a warning as regards the events to
F follow and it is only thereafter this incident of burn injury took place. A
number of relatives were also examined and their evidence corroborate this
state of affairs as narrated by the complainant PW.3. >
The learned Senior Advocate in support of the appeal further contended
that the factum of the hospitalization of Ekta in any event negates any ill
G treatment or t01ture, but to be treated as a positive evidence of goodwill and
affection. We are, however, unable to record our concurrence therewith •
having due regard to the evidence and other materials available on record.
There is thus preponderance of evidence of dowry torture and it is on this >·
couut that Section 113(A) of the Evidence Act ought to be taken note of.
H Section 113(A) reads as below:-
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 397
"113(A). Presumption a' ta abetment of suicide bya married woman.- A
1 When die question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman
had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and
it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven
years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such
relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may
B
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that
such suicide bad been abetted by her husband or by such relative of
.Ji. her husband.

Explanation:- For the purposes of this Section, "cruelty" shall
have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the!ndian Penal Code
c
(45-1860)."

Incorporation of Section !13(A) of the Evidence Act in the statute
book, depicts a legal presumption though however, the time period of within
seven years of marriage is the pre-requisite for such a presumption. The
circumstances as noticed hereinbefore in the contextual facts and the materials D
on record substantiate the requirements of Section 113 (A) and having regard
to the language used in Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code there cannot
be any hesitation in coming to a finding that cruelty is written large as regards
the conduct of the appellant herein towards Ekta. Needless to state that
Section 113(A) itself by way of an explanation provides that 'cruelty' shall
"I E
have the same meaning as is attributed under Section 498(A) of the Indian
Penal Code which reads as below:-

"(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health( whether mental or physical) of the woman; or F
(b) harassment of the woman where snch harassment is with a view
--{
to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand. for any property or valuable security or is on account of
failure by her or any person related to her, to meet such demand."
G
On the wake of the aforesaid and by reason of the fact and the death
of Ekta was caused by bum injuries only and having considered the nature
of injuries and since one can not but rule out an accidental death as discussed
-4 hereinbefore, the death of Ekta cannot but be attributed to be suicidal on the
basis of the circumstances as is available on record with the situation existing
and having regard to statutory presumption, this Court can not bnt lend H
< ;·.; '•

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.
A concurrence to the opinion expressed by the High Court. The decisions of
this Court as relied upon by Mr. Sushi! Kwnar (viz. : Balwillder Singh v. Slate
of Punjab, AIR (1996) SC 607: Lakhjit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab,
[1994] Supp I SCC 173: State of Punjab v. Gurdip Singh & Ors., (1996] 7
SCC 163 Sharad Birdhiclumd Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, [1984) 4 SCC
116, do not however, advar.ce the matter any further since each ca.<e shall
B
have to be dealt in the light of its own factual sphere and judicial precedents
do not render any assistance whatsoever by reason of the peculiar factual
matrix. In the facts of the matter under consideration, the circumstances
pointedly point out the accused as a guilty person as abettors and on the wake
of the aforesaid the order of conviction cannot be int~rt'ered with. The High
C Court has been lenient enough in dealing with the appellant Nos.2 and 3 by
reducing the sentence, but since there is no cross appeal, we do not wish to
record any contra view as regards the sentence as well.

In that view of the matter, this appeal fails and thus stands dismissed.

D v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.

,;.;,:,

•I', ): j.

1 .