Holding

The Court held that the High Court erred in not exercising its power under Section 482 because the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of Section 420 IPC, and the District Police Chief had no jurisdiction to order further investigation; therefore the criminal proceedings were quashed.

Summary

The appellant, Peethambaran, was charged under Section 420 IPC for allegedly cheating persons by promising jobs in exchange for money. The FIR led to two police final reports: the first concluded the case was false due to lack of evidence, while the second recorded a further investigation ordered by the District Police Chief, which the appellant argued was unlawful. The High Court refused to quash the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the power under Section 482 should have been exercised and whether the District Police Chief could lawfully order further investigation. The Court held that the ingredients of Section 420 were not proved, the non‑exercise of Section 482 was not justified, and the District Police Chief lacked authority to order further investigation. Consequently, the criminal case was quashed and the High Court order set aside.

Issues considered

Whether the non‑exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC by the High Court was justified in the present facts.
Whether the District Police Chief, Kottayam, could lawfully order further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.
Whether the factual matrix satisfied all the essential ingredients of offence under Section 420 of the IPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 173(8), s. 190, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 420

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCquashing of criminal proceedingsSection 420 IPCfurther investigationreinvestigationmagistrate powersfalse casecheatingKerala

Judgment

1144 [2023]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 4 S.C.R. 1144 [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A PEETHAMBARAN
v.
STATE OF KERALA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1381 of 2023)
B MAY 03, 2023
[KRISHNA MURARI AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 – Quashing of
proceedings – Non-exercise of power u/s. 482 – Justification of –
Appellant charged u/s. 420 along with the other accused persons
C
for cheating the de-facto complainant and other persons for certain
sum in exchange for securing jobs – Registration of FIR – Final
report that as no proper evidence, case should be considered as a
false case – Another final report filed which stated that Inspector
of Police conducted further investigation as per order passed by
D District Police Chief – Petition for quashing of the proceedings –
Petition not quashed – On appeal, held: No material on record to
show that the representation made by accused No.1, the appellant
or the de facto complainant, was false or that they had prior
knowledge of such representation being false and made only with
the intention to deceive – Only ingredient was that in the ordinary
E
course, none of the persons would have given the accused any
money, and thus, were induced to deliver property which otherwise
they would have not – With only one ingredient being fulfilled and
mere statements made to show dishonest intention or falsity of
statement, the threshold of s. 420 is not breached, constituting the
F offence – Thus, the non-exercise of the power u/s. 482 not justified
– Order passed by the High Court set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s.
420.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 173(8) – Report of
police officer on completion of investigation – District Police Chief
G ordered the further investigation pursuant to which the second final
report filed – Permissibility of – Held: Magistrate has the power to
order further investigation – Fresh investigation/re-investigation/
de novo investigation fall within the purview of the jurisdiction of a
higher court – Order from the District Police Chief is not the same
as an order issued by the concerned Magistrate – Thus, the District
H
1144
PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. 1145

Police Chief could not have ordered further investigation, as that A
power rests either with the magistrate or with a higher court and
not with an investigating agency.
Investigation: Further investigation and fresh investigation/
re-investigation/de novo investigation – Difference between –
Explained – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. B
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762 : [2012] 13
SCR 1005; T.T Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC
181 : [2001] 3 SCR 942; Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya
and Ors v. State of Gujarat 2019 SCC OnLine 1346;
Randhir Singh Rana v. State (NCT of Delhi) (1997) 1 C
SCC 361 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 880; G.V Rao v. L.H.V
Prasad (2000) 3 SCC 693 : [2000] 2 SCR 123; Hari
Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha (1973) 2
SCC 823; Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006) 4 SCC
359 : [2006] 3 SCR 1086; Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI
(2001) 7 SCC 536 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 646; Devendra D
Nath Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2023) 1 SCC
48; Paramjit Batra v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 13
SCC 673; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 2021 E
SCC OnLine 315; Vijay Kumar Ghai and Ors. v. State
of West Bengal and Ors. (2022) 7 SCC 124 – referred
to.
Case Law Reference
[2012] 13 SCR 1005 referred to Para 7 F
[2001] 3 SCR 942 referred to Para 7
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 880 referred to Para 7
[2000] 2 SCR 123 referred to Para 7
(1973) 2 SCC 823 referred to Para 7 G
[2006] 3 SCR 1086 referred to Para 15
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 646 referred to Para 16
(2023) 1 SCC 48 referred to Para 19
(2013) 13 SCC 673 referred to Para 21 H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 referred to Para 22
(2022) 7 SCC 124 referred to Para 24
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1381 of 2023.
B From the Judgment and Order dated 06.11.2019 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLMC No. 6314 of 2018.
Zulfiker Ali P. S., Manoj V. George, Ms. Shilpa Liza George, K M
Vignesh Ram, Nasib Masih, Ms. Darshna Nair, Ms. Akshita Agrawal,
Advs. for the Appellant.
C G. Prakash, Adv. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave Granted.
D 1. Two questions arise for consideration- one, whether under the
recognized parameters of exercise of power under Section 482, in the
facts of the present case, the non- exercise of power is justified and
two, whether the District Police Chief, Kottayam could have ordered
the further investigation pursuant to which the second final report was
E filed?
2. The instant appeal by special leave petition has been filed against
an order of the High Court of Kerala passed in Crl. MC No. 6314 of
2018 dated 6th of November, 2019 whereby a prayer to exercise powers
under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was disallowed
F and proceedings under Criminal Case No. 1326/2017 was found unfit to
be quashed.
3. The Appellant has been charged under Section 420 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, for having cheated, alongside accused no.1, now
deceased, the de-facto complainant, namely Sunesh and seven other
G persons of a sum totaling three lakh eighty-three thousand five hundred
and eighty-three rupees, in exchange for securing jobs for them or their
wives at the Kottayam Rubber Board, as clerks.
4. An FIR was registered bearing number 1838 of 2015 under the
above stated section on 24th October, 2015. The accused No.2 before
us is the uncle of the de-facto complainant.
H
PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. 1147
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

5. The Final Report (hereafter, FR-I) placed on record dated 30th A
December, 2015 records that the complainant was asked to produce
documents in this regard, but despite notice, the same were not produced,
nor were any other documents, in regards to any financial transaction. It
then states- “As there is no proper evidence in this regard, it shall be
considered as a false case…”
B
6. Interestingly, another Final Report (hereafter, FR-II) forms part
of the record. It states that witness number 10, namely S. Anilkumar,
Inspector of Police, Viakom, conducted further investigation as per Order
No. D2-43642/16/K passed by the District Police Chief, Kottayam.
7. It has been urged by way of this appeal that in effect, a re- C
investigation had been ordered, in violation of the procedure laid down in
law. Further it has been argued that; the ingredients of Section 420, IPC
have not been met- and therefore the High court has erred in not quashing
the proceedings subject of the petition under Section 482; No specific
role has been attributed to the appellant; That in all of the witness
statements, the name mentioned is that of the de-facto complainant who D
gave the money to the deceased accused number 1 namely, Babu and
was the instigator in other people giving the money to him. The Appellant
seeks reliance on Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali1; T.T Antony v. State of
Kerala2; Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya and Ors v. State of Gujarat3;
Randhir Singh Rana v. State (NCT of Delhi)4; G.V Rao v. L.H.V E
Prasad5; Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha6.
8. Having taken note of the facts that have led to the present
appeal by special leave petition and the chief arguments made, we now
proceed to examine the law on the issues before us.
9. On the second question, that is whether District Police Chief, F
Kottayam’s order was permissible in law or not, the relevant provisions
of CrPC is Section 173 (8) which reads as under:
“(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further
investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-
section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon G
1
(2013) 5 SCC 762
2
(2001) 6 SCC 181
3
2019 SCC OnLine 1346
4
(1997) 1 SCC 361
5
(2000) 3 SCC 693
6
(1973) 2 SCC 823 H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains
further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the
Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in
the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub- sections (2) to (6)
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports
as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub- section
B
(2).”
10. The evolution of Section 173 CrPC has been noted by this
Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra). In Para 25, it is opined
that investigation after the coming into force of the Cr.PC, 1973 will
include all proceedings under Cr.PC for collection of evidence conducted
C by a police officer. “All” would undoubtedly then include Section 173 (8)
as well. The power therefore, under Section 190, of a Magistrate ordering
such investigation, would encompass further investigation under Section
173 (8).
11. It has been argued on behalf of appellants that, in effect, a
D reinvestigation has been conducted,
12. This Court in Vinay Tyagi (supra) gave detailed consideration
to the powers under Section 173 and Section 482 of CrPC.
“43. At this stage, we may also state another well- settled canon
E of the criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of
the Constitution of India to direct “further investigation”, “fresh”
or “de novo” and even “reinvestigation”. “Fresh”, “de novo” and
“reinvestigation” are synonymous expressions and their result in
law would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with
F the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another,
provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it
is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by
the superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection.
*** *** *** ***
G
45. The power to order/direct “reinvestigation” or “de novo”
investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in
exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code,
there is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except
that the investigating agency can file a closure report (where
H according to the investigating agency, no offence is made out).
PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. 1149
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

Even such a report is subject to acceptance by the learned A
Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a
report. For valid reasons, the court may, by declining to accept
such a report, direct “further investigation”, or even on the basis
of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto,
summon the accused.”
B
13. Per contra, the State would contend that only further
investigation upon the order of the District Police Chief was conducted.
In respect of further investigation, in Vinay Tyagi (supra) this Court has
observed:
22. “Further investigation” is where the investigating officer obtains C
further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has
been filed before the court in terms of Section 173(8). This power
is vested with the executive. It is the continuation of previous
investigation and, therefore, is understood and described as “further
investigation”. The scope of such investigation is restricted to the
discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose D
is to bring the true facts before the court even if they are discovered
at a subsequent stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly
described as “supplementary report”. “Supplementary report”
would be the correct expression as the subsequent investigation
is meant and intended to supplement the primary investigation E
conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant
feature of further investigation is that it does not have the effect
of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation conducted
by the investigating agency. This is a kind of continuation of the
previous investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh evidence
and in continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating F
to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, it has
to be understood in complete contradistinction to a
“reinvestigation”, “fresh” or “de novo” investigation.
14. This distinction between further investigation and fresh
investigation/reinvestigation/de novo investigation being that the former G
is a continuation of the previous investigation and is done on the basis of
discovery of fresh material, whereas the latter can only be done when
there is a definite order of the court to that effect which must states the
reason as to why the previous investigation is incapable of being acted
upon. H
1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A 15. In Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar7, it was observed that
upon submission of a report in terms of Section 173 (2) (i) the concerned
Magistrate has three courses of action available before him:
(i) Accept the report and proceed further
(ii) Disagree with the report and drop the proceedings.
B
(iii) Direct further investigation under Section 156 (3) which is
the power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence,
and require them to make a further report.
16. In Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI8 it was observed that although
C the section is not specific in respect of the Court’s power to order further
investigation, the power of the police can be set into motion upon the
order of such a court. It was further observed that this order should not
be interfered with even in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of a
higher court.

D 17. The above two cases make it amply clear that a magistrate
has the power to order further investigation and the cases referred to
earlier make clear that fresh investigation/reinvestigation/de novo
investigation fall into the purview of the jurisdiction of a higher court.
18. In the present case, as is clear from FR II that S. Anilkumar,
Inspector of Police, Vaikom conducted further investigation as per Order
E
No.D2-43642/16/K, passed by a police officer and not by any duly
empowered judicial officer.
19. The Chief Police Officer of a district is the Superintendent of
Police who is an officer of the Indian Police Service. Needless to state,
an order from the District Police Chief is not the same as an order
F
issued by the concerned Magistrate. Referring to Vinay Tyagi (supra),
this Court in Devendra Nath Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors.9 noted
that there is no specific requirement to seek leave of the court for further
investigation or to file a supplementary report but investigation agencies,
have not only understood it to be so but have also adopted the same as a
G legal requirement. The doctrine of contemporanea exposito aids such
an interpretation of matters which have been long understood and
implemented in a particular manner to be accepted into the interpretive
7
(2006) 4 SCC 359
8
(2001) 7 SCC 536
9
H (2023) 1 SCC 48
PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. 1151
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

process. In other words, the requirement of permission for further A
investigation or to file a supplementary report is accepted within law and
is therefore required to be complied with.
20. In the facts at hand, it is clear that such a permission was
never taken, granted or ordered. Consequently, FR-II is without basis.
In FR-I it has been stated that in the absence of any documents in respect B
of the financial transactions, the instant case may be treated as a false
case. This, then would necessarily imply that after due investigation
conducted by a duly authorized person, the conclusion is that the
ingredients of the section mentioned in the FIR have not been met and
no case is made out.
C
21. In Paramjit Batra v. State of Uttarakhand10 (two-Judge
bench) it was observed that the High Court must use its powers under
Section 482 only sparingly and to facilitate the ends of justice. It was
also observed that the court must see must see whether a dispute which
is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In
such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal D
proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.
22. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal11 (two-Judge bench) seven
instances were laid out wherein the exercise of either the power of
Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the Inherent Powers under
Section 482, Cr.PC would be justifiably exercised. They are- E

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused.
F
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code. G
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same

10
(2013) 13 SCC 673
11
1992 Supp (1) 335 H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A do not disclose the commission of any offence and make
out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
B without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
C is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
D
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
E on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
23. These categories of cases have been quoted with approval by
a bench of three judges in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra12. The principles in respect of the exercise of
F power under Section 482 CrPC have been summarised as under:
A. The Police has a statutory right as well as a duty under the
Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate cognizable
offences;
B. Courts are not to stymie any investigation into a cognizable
G offence;
C. When the perusal of the FIR however, does not disclose
any offense of any nature whatsoever, the court is not to
permit the investigation to proceed.
12
H 2021 SCC OnLine 315
PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. 1153
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

D. The powers under this section are to be used ‘sparingly’ A
and with due circumspection. While doing so, the Court
ought to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose
the commission of the cognizable offence or not, without
going into the merits of the case.
E. In exercise of this power, it is not for the court to go into B
questions of legitimacy or reliability of the allegations made
in the FIR/Complaint;
F. Quashing of a complaint should not acquire the stature of
the rule, and should be a rarity, and nor should, in exercise
of such power, an investigation be unnecessarily cut short; C
G. The Police and the Courts are two distinct organs of the
State with perspicuous spheres of activities, with
complementary functions, and so, unwarranted interference
by the latter into the former’s work is loathe, save in the
interest of securing justice and preventing miscarriage D
thereof;
H. It must be noted that procedure is well establish to deal
with an FIR upon which, post investigation, no merit is found,
then the officer can file the suitable application to that effect
which will be considered by the learned Magistrate seized E
of the matter;
24. The offence alleged in the FIR is Section 420 IPC which is a
serious form of cheating include inducement in terms of delivery of
property and/or valuable securities. The ingredients that must be met in
order to constitute an offence under the section have been noted by this F
Court in Vijay Kumar Ghai and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and
Ors.13 by a bench of two judges (consisting one of us, Krishna Murari,
J.):
“35.To establish the offence of cheating in inducing the delivery
of property, the following ingredients need to be proved:
G
(i) The representation made by the person was false.
(ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the representation he
made was false.

13
(2022) 7 SCC 124 H
1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A (iii) The accused made false representation with dishonest intention
in order to deceive the person to whom it was made.
(iv) The act where the accused induced the person to deliver the
property or to perform or to abstain from any act which the person
would have not done or had otherwise committed.
B
36. As observed and held by this Court in R.K. Vijayasarathy v.
Sudha Seetharam [R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019)
16 SCC 739 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 454] , the ingredients to constitute
an offence under Section 420 are as follows:

C (i) a person must commit the offence of cheating under Section
415; and
(ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced to:
(a) deliver property to any person; or

D (b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or
sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security. Thus,
cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence
under Section 420IPC.”
25. Significantly, no material has been placed on record to show
E that the representation made by accused No.1 Babu (now deceased),
the present appellant or the de facto complainant, was false or that they
had prior knowledge of such representation being false and made only
with the intention to deceive. There are only statements to the effect
that despite reminders by the seven persons no jobs were secured for
them or their wives. The only ingredient out of the four required, being in
F the present case is that in the ordinary course, none of the persons would
have given the accused any money, and therefore were induced to deliver
property which otherwise they would have not. No proof of any financial
transaction is on record, much less concerning the present appellant.
26. With only one ingredient being fulfilled and mere statements
G made to show dishonest intention or falsity of statement, the threshold of
Section 420 is not breached, constituting the offence.
27. Therefore, the first question is answered in the negative.
28. In terms of second question, the above discussion makes clear
H that the District Police Chief, Kottayam could not have ordered further
PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. 1155
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

investigation, as that power rests either with the concerned magistrate A
or with a higher court and not with an investigating agency.
29. Given the above, the order dated 6th of November, 2019 in
Crl. MC No. 6314 of 2018 passed by the High Court of Kerala is set
aside and Criminal Case No.132 of 2017 is quashed. The appeal is allowed
in the above terms and the pending application(s), if any, stand disposed B
of.

Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Rakhi, LCRA)

C

D

E

F

G

H