Holding

Public‑interest litigation is maintainable and violations of labour statutes by contractors, for which the State is the principal employer, constitute infringements of fundamental rights, especially the prohibition of forced labour and child labour, warranting judicial intervention.

Summary

The People's Union for Democratic Rights filed a public‑interest writ petition alleging that contractors engaged in the construction of Asian Games projects in Delhi were violating multiple labour statutes, including the Minimum Wages Act, Equal Remuneration Act, Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, Employment of Children Acts and the Inter‑State Migrant Workmen Act, and that children under 14 were employed in hazardous construction work. The petitioners sought enforcement of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21, 23 and 24 of the Constitution and directed the Union of India, Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority to ensure compliance. The Court held that the petitioners had locus standi under the liberalised rule of standing and that violations of the statutes amounted to breaches of fundamental rights, particularly the prohibition of forced labour under Article 23 and the child‑labour ban under Article 24. It further ruled that the Union and the public authorities, as principal employers, were liable to enforce the statutory obligations of the contractors. The Court ordered that minimum wages be paid directly to workers, prohibited deductions by jamadars, directed periodic inspections by appointed ombudsmans, and mandated that future contracts include clauses ensuring direct payment of wages and compliance with all labour laws. The petition was allowed.

Issues considered

The locus standi of a public‑interest organization to file a writ under Article 32 on behalf of workmen.
Whether violations of labour statutes constitute breaches of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21, 23 and 24.
The extent of the State's (Union of India, Delhi Administration, DDA) liability as principal employer for contractors' non‑compliance.
The constitutional scope of Article 23's prohibition of "begar" and "other similar forms of forced labour" including cases of sub‑minimum wages.
The applicability of the Employment of Children Acts to construction work and the constitutional prohibition under Article 24.

Legislation cited

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970s. 20, s. 7
Employment of Children Act, 1938s. 3
Employment of Children Act, 1970
Equal Remuneration Act, 1976
Inter‑State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979s. 13, s. 14, s. 15, s. 16, s. 17, s. 18
Minimum Wages Act, 1948

Subjects

public interest litigationlocus standiforced labourArticle 23Article 24minimum wageschild labourcontract labourequal remunerationinter‑state migrant workmenconstitutional lawlabour lawsocial justice

Judgment

A '456
'PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS AND OTHERS

v.
B
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

September 18, 1982 •

[P.N. BHAGWATI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]
c Public Interest Litigation, scope and need for-Violation of various labour 4
. Asian
laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work connected with the \T_
Games like Constitution of India, 1950 Arts. 24, Minimum wages Act, 1948,
Equal Remuneration Act. The employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970, Inter-
state Migrant workman (Regulation of Employment and conditions of Service) Act,
1970 and contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970-Locus~standi- •
Maintainability of the writ and remedial relief that could be granted-Duties of
Court regarding sentencing in cases of violation of Labour Laws-Constitution of ·
India Articles 14, 23, 24 and 32--Scope of Article 23 Meaning of''begar" Duty of
State when violation of Arts. 11, 23 and 24 is complained.

Petitioner No. 1,, is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting
democratic rights. It c'ommissioned three social scientists for the purpose of
investigating. and inquiring into the conditions under which"the workmen engaged
in the various Asiad Projects were working. Based on the report made by these
three social scientists after personal investigati~n and study the 1st petitioner add-
ressed a letter to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bhagwati complaining of viola#on of
....various labourlaws by the reSpondents' and/or their agents and seeking interfe--
rence by the Supreme Court to render social justice by means of appropriate
directions to thC affected workmen. The' Supreme Court 'treated the letter as a
F writ petition on the judicial side and issued notice; to· the Union of India, Delhi
Administration and the Delhi Development Authority.

The allegations in the petition were :

-
G (i) The various authorities to whom the execution of the different
projects was entrusted engaged contractors for the purpo~e of car-
rying out the construction work of the projects and they were
registered as principal emploYers under section 7 of the Contract
Labour (Regulation and~AboJition) Act; 1970. These contractors
engaged workers through "Jamadars" who brought them from
different parts of India particularly the States of Rajasthan, Uttar
Pradesh and Orissa and paid to these Jamadars the minimum wage
of Rs. 9.25 per day pe·r worker and not to the workmen direct. The
Jamadars deducted Rupee one p~r day per worker as t~eir commis-
PEOPLE'~ UNION v. UNION OJ! INDIA: . 457

sion with the result that there was a violation of the provisions Or A
... the Minimum Wages Act; .

.(ii) Th~.,provisions of Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were violated as'
the women w~>rkcrs wei:e being paid RS. 7/- per day, the balance of
the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by . the
Jamadars:
B
,
(iii) There was violation of Article 24 of the Constitution and of the
prov.isions of the Employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970 in
asmuch 3.s children below 'the age of 14 years were employed by the
contractors in the construction work of the various projects;

(iv) There was viOlation of the· provisions of the Contract Labour
(Regulations. and Abolition) Act, 1970 which resulted in depriva· c
tion and exploitation ~f the Workers ~nd denial of their right to
proper living condition and medical and other facilities un'der the
Act; and

(v) The provisions of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979, though brought
into force as far back as 2nd Octobe~ 1980 in the Union Territory D
of Delhi were not implemented by t~e Contractors.

AlloWing the petition, the Court.,

HBLD: 1:1. Public.interest litig'ation which is strategic arm of the legal
aid movement and which is int~nded to bring justice within the reach of the poor
masses: who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a totally different E
•• - kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is essentially of an
adversary character where there is a dispute between two li1igating parties, one
making claim or seeking relief against the other and that other opposing
such claim or resisting such relief. Public interest litigation-is brought before
the .court .not for the purpose of enfo~ing the right of one individual '
against another as happens in the case of ordinary litigation. but it is inten-
ded to promote and indicate public intCrest which demands that violations of F
constitutional or legal rights of Jarge number of people who are poor, ignorant or
'\.,.in a socially or ecoiiomically disadv3.ntaged Position should ~ot go unnoticed and
unredressed. That would be destructive of the Rule of Law which forms one
of the , essential elements of pubJiC interest i~ any democratic form of Govern-
' ment. [467 C-F)

l :2. The Rule of Law does not mean that the protection of the law must G
,be available only to a fortunate ~few or that the law should be alJowed to be pro-
stituted by the vested interests for protecting and upholding the status quo under
the guise of enforcement of their civil and political rights. The poor too have
civil ~nd political rights and the Rule of law is meant for them also, though today
· it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and the alcohol
kings have the Fundamental rights to carry on their busin~ss and to fatten their H
purses by exploiting the consuming public, ~rtainly the "chamaras" to belonging
1
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] i S.C.R.
I '
to the lowes\ strata of society have Fundamental Right to earn on honest living
through their sweat and toil. ·Large oUfubers of men, women and children who
constitute the bulk of an population are today living a sub human existence in
conditions of object poverty; utter grinding poverty has broken their back and.
sapped their moral fibre. They have no faith in the existing social and economic
system. ·Nor can these poor aitd deprived sections of humanity afford to enfotce
theifcivil and political rights. [467 F-H; 468 A-DJ
B
1:3, The only solutiOn of t;naking civil .i~d politica_l rights meaningful to
these large sections of society would be to remake the material conditions and
restructure the social and economic order so that they may be able to realise the·
economic, social and cultural rights. Of course, the task of restructuring the
social and economic order so that the social and economic right.becOme a
meaningful reality for the poor and lo.;ly sections of the community is one which
c legitimately be!Ongs to the legislature and the executive but mere initiation of.
social and economic rescue prograffimes by the executive arid the legislature would
, not"be eno~gh and.it is only through muiti~dimensional strategies including public
interes't litigation that these social and economic rescue programmes can be made
effective. [468 G-Hi 469 B-D]

D 1:4. Public interest liii~ation, is essentia!Jy a cooperative or collaborative
e'ffort on the part .of the petitioner, the State or public authority and the Court to
secure observance of the constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privilegea
conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and to reach social
justice -to them. The State or public authority against whom public interest litiga·
tion is brought should be as much interested·in ensurirtg basic human rights, cons·
titutional as well as legal, to those who are iq. a socially and econo~ically disad-
E vantaged position, as the petitioner who brings the public interest litigation before
the court. The State or public authority which is arrayed as a respondent in
public interest litigation shculd, in fact, welcome it, as it would gjve it an oppor·
tunity to right a wrong or to redress an .injustice done to th~ p0or and weaker sec-
tions of the community whose welfare is and must be tlie prime coOcem of the
State or the public authority. [469 D-F]

F 1:5. The legal ~id movement and public interest -litigation s~ek to bring
justice to these .forgotten specimens of humanity who constitute the bulk of the
citizens of India: and who are really and truly the "People of India wQo gave to _ ·'
theffiselves this magnificient Constitution. Pendency of large afrears in the courts
cannot be any reason for i;Ienying access of justice to the poor and weaker sections
of the community. [470 E-F] '
G'
1:6. The time has now come when tbe courts must become the courts for
the poor and struggling masses of this country. _,.They must shed their character
as upholders of the established order and the stritus quo. They must be sensitised
to the need-of doing justice to the large masses of people to whom justice bas
' ' , been denied by a cruel and heartless society for, generations. Th~ realisation must
H' come to them that social justice is the signature tune of our Constitution and
. it i~ their sole'mn duty under the C~nstinition to enforce the baSic human rights
of the poor and vulnerable sections of the community and actively help in the
. PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 459

realisation.of the constitutional goals. This new change has to come if the
A
judicial system is to become·an effective instrument of social justice for without'
it, it cannot survive for long. FortunatE~ly thi~ change is gradually taking place and
public interest litigation is playing a large part in bringin.g about this change. It
is through public interest litigation that the problems of_ the poor ar~ now
coming to the forefront and the ~ntire theatre of the law is changing. It holds out
great possibilities for the futQ.re. This writ peiition is on~ su~h ins ta nee of public' B
in~rest liti~otion .. [470 G-H; 471 A-CJ

2. It is true that construction industry does not find a· plai;e on the sche-
dule to the Employment of Childfen Act, 1938 and the Prohibition enacted in
'.> section 3 sub~section ( 3) 'Of that Act against the emploYment of a child who bas
not completed his fourteenth year cannot apply ·to em.ploymCnt in construction
industry. But, apart hltogether frOm the requirement of Convention No. S9'of\ c
the International Labour Organisation and ·ratified byrlndia, Article ~4 of the
Constitution provides that no child below the age of 14 shall bC employed to work
in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment. This is
a coristitutional prohibition which, even if not followed up by appropriate lcgis-
. lation, must ~p·erate prOpiro vi"gore and cori.struction work Deing ·plainly a:D.d.
a
indlibitably hazardous employment, it is cle8r that by reason of tbi~ Constitu-
tional pfohibition, no child beJOw the age of 14 years can be allowed tO be cnga.. D
ged in construction ·work. Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of specifica-
tion of constructio.~ industfy in the Schedµle to the Employffient of Children ~Act
1938, no child below the age of 14 years. cap be employed in construction work
and the Union of lndia as also every state Governme11l must ensure that this
const!tutional mandate is ll~t violated in any part of the CoUntry. [474 A-Fl, .

.. 3. Magistrates and Judges in the country must view violaVons of labour
laws with strictness and wheneVer any violations of labour laws lire established
.I;
before them, they should punish the errant employers by , imposing· adequate
pu~ishment'. The labour laws are en:1;cted for improving the conditions of workers
and the emploYers cannot be allOwed tO buy off immunity against violations of
labour laws by paying a paltry fine which they' would not mind paying, because
\by violating the labour laws they would be making profit which would far exceed
the amount of. the fin~. If violations of labour laws _are to be~ puni~hed with If'
meagre fines, it .would be impossible {o enSure observance of the labour IawS and
the·labdur l:iws would be reduced. to nullity. They would remain merely paper
tigers without any .teeth or claws. [476 E-H] •
I ' 4:1 ~ It is true that the complaint of the petitioners in the writ petition
is in regard to the violations of the provisions of ·various labOur laws designed
for the wdfare of workmen, and therefore from a strictly traditional point of view G
it wollld be only the workmen whose legal rights are· violated who would be ...-
entitled to approach the court for judicial redress .• But the traditional rule of
standing which confines access to the,judiCial process only to those to whom legal
iQ.Jury is caused or legal wrong is done has now been jeitisoned by the Supreme
• Court and the narrow ·confines within which the rule of standing was imprisoned
for long years as a result af inheritance ·.bf the Anglo-sax on system of jurispru- H
dence. have been broken a~~ : new ~imensi9n has beCn _given to the doctrine ?f (
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963) I s.c.R.

A locus standi which has revoJutionised the whole concept of access to justice in a
way not known before to ~he Western System of jurisprudence. [477 F-H]

4:2. Having regard to the peculiar socio-economic conditions prevailing
in .the country where there is considerable poverty, illiteracy and ignorance
obstructing and impeding accessibility to the judicial process, it would ~esult
in closing the doors of justice to the poor and deprived sections oft.he communi-
B ty if the traditional rule of standing evolved by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that
only a perSon wronged can sue for judicial redress were to be blindly adhered to
and followed, and it is therefore necessary to evolve a new strategy by relaxing
this tr!tditional rule of standing in order that justice may become easily available
to the lowly and the lost. [478 A-C] ·

c 4:3. Where a person or class Of persons to whom legal injury is caused or
le8:al wrong is done is by reason of pov!']'ty, disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position Dot able to approach the Court for judicial redress, any
member of the public acting bonafide and not out of any extraneous motivation
may move the Court for judicial redress of the legal injury or wrong sufferred by
such person or class of persons and the judicial process may be set in motion by
any public spirited individual or institution even by addressing a letter to the
0 cOurt. Where judicial redress is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong
suffered by a person or class of Qersons who by reason of poverty, disability or
socially o.r economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the court
and the court is moved for this purpose by a member of a public by addressing a
letter drawing the attention of the court to such legal injury or legal Wrong, court
would ca.st aside all technical rules of procedure and entertain the Jetter as a
wfit petition on the judicial side and take ~ction upon it .. [478 C-F]
. '
E
Here, the workm'en whose rights are said to have been violated and to
whom a Jife of basic human dignity has been denied are poor, ign~rant, illiterate
•
humans who, by reason of their poverty and social and economic disability, arc
unable· to approach tbe courts for judicial redress and hence the petitiOI]ers have,
under the liberalised rule of standing, locus standi to maintain the pr~sent writ
petition espousing the cause of the workmen. The petitioners are not acting
F ma/afidt or out of e1'traneous motives since the first petitioner is admittedly an
organisation dedicated to the protecting and cnfOrcement Or Fundamenta.J Rights
and making Directive Pi::inciples of State Policy enforceable and jus-ticiable.
There can be no doubt that it is out of a sense of public service that the present
litigation has been brought by the petitiOners and it is clearly maintainable.
{478 G-H; 479 A-BJ •
G 4:4. The UniOn,..of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Dcve-.
Jopment Authority cannot escape their obligation to the workmen to ensure
observance of the provisions of various labour law by its contractors and
for non-compliance wit!! the laws by the contractors, the workmen would clearly
have a cause of actions against them as pri~cipal employers. So far as to Con-
tract Labour (Regulation and Abolit_ion) Act, 1970 is conce[ned, section 20 is cJear
H that if any amenity required to be provided u.nder sections 16 to-18 or 1!1 for the
,
PEOPLE'S UNION V. UNION OF INDIA 461

benefit of- the workmeri employed in an establishment is not Provided by the con- A
tractor, the· obligation to provide such amenity rests on the priticipal emplo-
yer. [479 C-D]

Sections 17'and 18 of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of _Service) Act 1979 also make ·principal employer
_liable to make payment of_the wages to the wages to the migrant workmen emplo-
. yed bY, the contractor as also to pay the allowances provided) .under sectiOns 14 ~
and 15 and _to provide the facilities specified in section 16 of such migrant work-
men. [479 F-G] '

Article 24 of the Constitution embodies a Fundamental Right which is
> plainly and indubitably enforceable against every one and by reason of its compul-
sive mandate, no ·one can employ a child below the age of 14 years in a
hazardous . employment. Since, construction .work is a hazardous· employ- c
ment, no child below the· age of 14 years can be employed in constructions work
and therefore, not only are the contractors under a constilutional mandate
not to em Ploy any child . below the. age of 14 years, but it is also the duty of the
Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority
to ensure that this constitutional obligation is obeyed by the contractors to whom
they have entrusted the construction work of the v3rioUs Asiad Projects. Similar-
ly the respondents must ensuie compliance with by the contractors of the Provi- D
sions of the 'equal Remuneration Act, 1946 as they express.the principle of
equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. [479 G-H; 480 A-DJ

No doubt, the contractors are liable to pay the minimum wage to the
workmen employed by them under the Minimum Wage Act 1948 but the Union of
• India. the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority who havo
_, entrusted the construction work to the con~ractors .would equaHy·be resPonsiblc E
to ensure that the minimum wage is paid to the workmen by their contractors.
[480 G-H]

5:1. It is true thatlthe present writ petition cannot be maintained by the
petitioners unless they can sh'ow some violation of a Fundamental Right, for it
is only for enforcement right that a writ petition can be maintain~d in this Cou'rt F
under Article 32. But, certainly the following comPlaints do legitimately form thC
subject matter of a writ petition under Article 32; namely, (i) the complaint of
'- .. violation of Article 24 based on the averm'ent that children below the age of 14
years are employed in the construction work of the Asiad Projects, (ii) allegation
• of non-observance of the provisions of the Equal Remuneration )\.ct ~946, is in
effect and substance a complaint of breach of the principle of equality before the
law enshrined in Article 14; and (iii) the complaint of non-observance of the provi- G
sions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 ancJ, the Inter-
state Migrant Workmen (Regulations of Employment and Conditions of Service),
Act 1979 as it is a complain't'relating to violation of Article 21. !'iow the rigbts'and
benefits conferred on the workmen employed by a contractor under the provisions
•• of the Contract· Labour (Regulation and Ab~lltion Act 1970 and the Inter-St.ate
Migrant Workmen Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act · H
1979 which became enforceable w.e.f. 4-6-1982 are clearly intended to ensure basic

\
462 .· SUPREME CoUilT REPORTS [!983] I s.c.a.

A human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any of these
. rights and benefits to which they, are entitled under the provisions of these two pie-
ces of social welfare legislation, that would clearly be a violation of Articl~ 21 by
the Union of India, the.Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Autho-
rity which, as principal employers, are n1ade statutorily responsibl~ for securing
suCh rights and benefits to tbe workmenj and' (iv) the complaint in regard to non-
payment'"ar minimum wage to the workmen under the Minimum Wages Act 1948,
8 is also one relating to breach of a Fundamental Right enshrined in Article 23
which is violated by non-payment of minimum wage to the workmen.
[481 D -H; 482 A-Fl

Maneka G,andhi v. Union_ of lndiq, [1978] 2 SCR 663; Francis Coralie Mullin
v. The Administrator of Union Territory of Delhi & Others, [1981] 2 SCR 516,
applied.
c 5:2. Many of the fu!-ldatnental rights enacted in Part III opei:ate as limita-
tion~· on the power of the State and impose negative obligations on the State not
to encroach on individual liberty aod they are enforceable only against the State.
. .,..•
But there are Certain fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution which are
enforceable against the whole w~rld and they are to be found inter alia in Articles
.
17, 23 and 24. [483 C-D] .
D ,5:3. Article 23 is clearly designed to protect the individual not only
against the State but also against other private citizens. Article 23 is nbt limited
in its application against the State but it prohibits ''traffic in human beings and
·begar and other similar forms of fofced Jabour" ptactised by anyone else. -:rbe
prohibition against "traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of
forced labour" is clearly intended to be a general prohibition, total in its effect
a~d'an pervasive in its range and it is enforceable not only against the State but
E also against any other person indulging in any such practice.. [ 484 G-H; 485 A]
. . . .
5:4. The word ''begar" in Article 23 is not~ word of common~Use in
English language, bllt a word of Indian origin which like many other words has
found its way·. in English vocabulary. It is a form of forced labour under which
3: person is compelled, to work without receiving any re?1uneration. Begar is thus
clearly a film of forced .,,labour.· [ 485 E-G]
F
S. Vasudevan v. s.b. Mil/al AIR 1962 Born. 53 applied.

5:5. It is not merely 'begar• which is constitutionally prohibited by
A'rticle 23 but also all other similar forms, of forced labour.· Article 23 strikes
at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itsClf, becatse it is violative of ·
•
human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. To contend tbat exacting
G le.hour by passing some remuneration, though it be inadequate will not attract
the provisions of Article ~3 is to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition
against forced Jabour enacted in Article 23. The contention is not only ill;:
founded, but does not accord with the principle enunciated by this Court in
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India that when interpreting the P{OVisions of the •
H Constiiution conferring·fundamental rights, the. attempt of the Court should be.
· to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental 'rights rather than to attenuate
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 463

-theit meaning and content. The Constitutio~ makers did not intend to strike
A
only at certain for.ms of (orced labour leaving it~ open to the socially or econo-
nlically powerful sections of the commuri.ity to explpit the poor and weaker
Sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. There could be no logic or
reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service to another
Without receiving any remunercition at an', . it should be regarded 1,\5. a pernicious
practice sufficient to attract the-con.demnation of Artiele 23, but if some remune- B
ration is paid for .it, then it should be outside the i,nhibition· of~tbat Article. To
intCrpret Article 23 as contended would be reducing Article 23 to a m~re rope of
sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a .person
.belonging to a socially or economically dominant class to exact labour or service
frOm a person belongillg to the deprived and vulnerable sectioQ_.of the community
by paYing a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Art ..
23. It would not be right to place on·the language of ·Article 23 an interpreta-
tion which would emasculate its beneficient provisions aiid defeat the very pur-
c
pose of.enacting them. Article 23 is'' intended to ·abolish every fofm o( forced
lobour. [486 E·H; 487 A.DJ

5:6. ' The words ''other similar forms of forced labour" are' used in
Article 23 riot with a view to importing the particular characteristic of 'beg·ar'
that labour or service should be exacted without payment of any rembneration D
but with a view to bringing withii;l the scope and ambit o~ that Article alt other
.. forms of forced labour and since 'begar' is· one form of forced Jabour, the ConSti-\
tution makers 'used tbe words '"other similar forn1s of forced labour". If the
i-equire":'ent that labour or work should be exacted without any reo:i.un~ration ·
, were imported in other foqns of force.:i labour. they would straight~away coine
·within the meaning of the word 'begar' ~nd in that event there would be no need
to have the additional words "otbe. similar forms of forced labour." These
E.
words woUJd be rendered futile~and n1~:1ningiess and it is a well recognised rule of
intefpretation' that the court should :ivoid. ·a construction which has the effect of
rendering any words used by the leg;s a'ture superfluous redundant. [487 E~G]
. '

The object of adding these words was clearly to expand the· reach and
content of Article 23 by including, in addition to 'begaf', other forms of forced
F
labour within the prohibition of that Article. Every form 'of forced labou; -
' '
'begar', or o~herwise, is within ·the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no
diffeience whether the person who is f'orced to give his labour or servic~ to
another is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paiCL labour supplied
by a persOn \1.:ould be hit by Article 2~ if it is forced labour, that is; labour supplied
• hot willingly but as a result o·f force or' compuJsion. For example, where a G
· person has entered into a contract of ser,vice with another for a period
J of thre¥ years and he wishes to discontinue serving such other person before the
· expifation of the- period of three years, if a IaW were to 'provide that in such a
case the cOntract s,hat'I be specifically enforc~d and he. shall be co~pelled to
• serve for the full period of three years, it would clearly amount to forced labour
and sU.ch a law would be void as offending. Article 23. That _is why specific H
perfon;naace of a contr~ct of service 'cannot bC: enforced against an employee

'
i
t

464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.c.R

A and the employee cannot be forced by compulsion of law to continue to serve
the employer. Of course, if there is a breach of the contract of service, the
employee would be liable to pay damages to the employer but he cannot be
forced to continue_ to serve the employer without breaching the injunction of
Article 23. (487 H; 488 A·D]

Baily v. A_alabama, 219 US 219:55 Law Ed. 191; quoted with approval,
B
5:7. Even if a person has contracted with another to perform strvice and
there is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even
remuneration, he cannot be forced by compulsion of law or ·otherwise, to continue •
to perform such service, as that would be forced labour within the inhibition of
A_rticle 23, .which strikes at every form of forced lab~ur even if it has its origin in
c a contract voluntarily entered into by tbe person obligated to provide labour ,or
service, for tbe reasons, namely; (i) it offends against human dignity to compel a
pc:rson to provide labour or service to another if he does not wish to do so, even
though it be breach of the contract entered into by him; (ii) there should be no
serfdom or involuntary setvitude in a free democratic India which respects the
dignity of the individual and the worth of the human per..son; (iii) in a country
like India w~ere there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no
D equality of bargaining power, a contract of service m3y appear on its face 'Volun~
tary but it.may, in reality, be involuntary, because while entering into the contract
the employee by reason of his economically helpless condition, may have been
faced with Hobson's choice, either to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms
dictated by the powerful employer. It would be a traVesty of justice to hold
the employee in suCh a case to the terms of the contract and to compel him to
serve the employCr even though he may not wish to do so. That would aggra~ ·
vate the inequality and injustice from which the employee even otherwise suffers
E on account of his ecoliomically disadvantaged position and lend the authority of
law to the exploitation of the poor helpless employee by the econoibically power~
fol employer. Article 23 therefore, provides . . that
. no one shall be forced to provide
labour or service against his will, even though it be under a contractor of
service. [490 C-H]

F Pollock v. Williams, 322 US 4:88_ Lawyers Edn. 1095; referred to.

-5:8. Where a person provides labour or services to another for remunera-
tion which is Jess tha~ ihe minimu~ wage, the labour or service provided bY him
clearly faJJs within the scooe and ambit. of the words "forced labour" under
Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come to the court for enforcement
of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct payment
G of t,!le minimum wage to him so that the labour or service providel,1 by him ceases
to be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied. [492 F-G]

5:9. Ordinar1ly no one would willingly supply labour or service to ano-
ther for less than the minimu~ wage, when he knows that under the law he is
entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or service provided by him. .There-
H fore when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remu~
neration which i~ lc::ss ·tb(\.n the ~inimu~ ·wa~e, b<i is acting under the force of
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA 465

some compulsion whi~h drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is A
entitled under Jaw to receive. What Article 23 prohibits is 'forced labour' that
is labour or service which a· person is forced to provide." [491 B-D]

5:10. 'Force' which would inake such labour Or service cforced labow'
\ may arise in seve;a.1 ways. It may be physical force which may-compel a Person
to- provide labour br service to another or it may be force exerted through a legill
provision such as ~ provisio~ for imprisonmeOt Or fine in case the empioyee fails B
to provide Jabour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger
and poverty, want and destitution. Any · factof which deprives a person of a
choice of alternative and compels him to adopt one particular course Of actioD
. '
may properly be regarded as 'force' and if labour or servic~ is compelled as a
result of such 'force', it would be 'forced labour'. Where a person is suffering
> from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight disease or to
feed his wife and children or even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding c
poverty has broken his back and reduced him to.a state Of htlpl<5~Dt:~5 and des-
pair and where no other employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his
poverty, he would. have no choice but to ·accept aD.y work that comes his, way,
even if the remuneration offered to hirr1 is Jess than the minimum wage. He
would be in no Position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept
what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent -
with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circum- D
stances and the labour or ser'(ice provided by him would be clearly 'forced labour'.
The word 'forced' should not be read in a ~arrow and restricted manner so as to
be confined only. to physical .or legal 'force' particularly when the national
eharaCter, its fundamental document has promised to build a new soci~list repub-
lic where there will be -socio-economic justice for all and e'\'ery one shall have the
right tO work, to education and to adequate meariS of livelihood. The constitu-
.tion makers have given u.s one cf the most remarkable documents in ltistory for E
• ushering in a new socio-economic order and the ConstitutiOn which they have
forged for us has a·sociaJ purpose and an economic mission and, .therefore, every
word or phrase in the Constitution n1ust be interpreted in 1a manner which would
3dvancc thi.;. socio-economic Objective of the ConstitutioD. It is a fact that in a
capitalist society economic circumstances e.xert much greater pressure on an indi-
vidual in driging him to a particular ..course of action than phYsical comprilsio.n
or force of legislative provi.sion. The word 'force' must therefore be construed F
to include not only physical or legal force but force arising from the compulsion
of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in
•want and compels him to provide labour or service even though.the remuneration
received for it is lesS than the minimum wage. Of course, if a person provides
labour or service to another agains't receipt of the minimum wage, it would not
be possible 'ro say that the labour or service provided by him is 'forced labour'
because he gets what he is entitled under Haw to receive. No inference can reason- G
ably be drawn in sue:h a case that h.e iS forced to provide labour or serVice for the
simple reason that would be providing labour or sefvice against receipt of what
is lawfully payable to him just likC any ,other person who is not under. the force
of any compulsion.· [491 D-H; 492 A-El

6. Wherever any fundamentl\1 right which i~ ~nforceable against pri~ate H
• individual~ !JUCh a~~ for example, 4
fupd4mental ri~ht enacted in Articl.e l7 or :?:3
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' (1983] l S.C.R.
A or 24 is being vio1ated. it is the constitutional obligation of the State to take
necessary steps for the putpose of interdicting such violatiOn and ensuring obser-
vance of th.e fundamental right b:Y the private individual who is transgreSsing the·
same. The fact that the. person whose fundamental right is violated can always
approach the court for the purp~se of Cnforcem'ent of bis fundamental ·right. can-
not absolve the State from its constitutional obligation to see ih-at there is no
violation of the fundamental right of such person, particularly when he belongs to
B the weaker sectio.n of humanity and.is unable to wage a legal battle against a
1
strong.and powerful opponent who is exploitin'g him. [493 A-DJ

ORIGINAL JurusmcTION: Writ Petition No. 8143 or'1981.
•
(Unde~ article 32 of the Constitution of India)
c Govind Mukhoty in person and A.K. Ganguli for the
petitioner.

Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. I.

D N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondents Nos. 5
and 6.

Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya for Res-
pondent No. 7. •
E
The Judgment of the Court was' delivered by

BHAGWATI, J. This is a writ petition brought by way of public'
interest litigation in order to ensure. observance of the provisions of
various Jabour· laws in relation to workmen. employed in the cons-
·F truction work of various projects connected with the Asian Games.
The 111atter was .brought to the attention of the Court by the !st
petitioner which is an organisation formed for the purpose of pro•
tecting democratic rights by ;.,eans of a letter addressed to one of us
(Bhagwati, J .). The letter was based on a report made by a team of
G three social scientists who were commissioned by the Jst petitioner
for the 'purpose of investigating and inquiring into the conditions
under which the workmen engaged in the various Asiad Projects
were working. Since the Jetter, ·addressed by the. I st petitioner was
based on the report made by three social scientists after personal
H investigation and study, it was treated as a writ petition on the judic •
cial side and. notice was· issued upon it inter alia to the Union of
India, Delhi Development Authorityand Delhi Administration which
•
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)' 467

were arrayed as respondents to the writ petition. These respondents A
filed their respective· affidavits in reply to the allegatio~s contained -~
in the writ petition and_ an affidavit was filed on behalf of the peti·
tioner in rejoinder to the affidavits in reyly and the writ petiti~n was
argued before us on the basis of these pleadings.

• B
. Before we proceed to deal, with the facts giving rise to this .writ
.
petition, we may repeat what we have said earlier in various orders
• made by us from time to time dealing with public interest litigation .
-> We wish to point out with all tlie emphasis at our command tllat
public interest litigatfon which is a strategic arm of the legal aid
movement and which is intended to bring justice within the reach or c
. the poor ~asses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity,
.is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional __
litigation which is essentially of an adversary character where there
. is a dispute between two litigating parties, one making claim or .seek·
ing reljef against the other. and that other opposing such claim or
resisting such relief. Public interest litigation is brought before the D
court not for the purpose of enforcing .the right of one individual
against another as happens in ti,e case of ordi;,ary litigation, but it
is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which demands_
that violations of constitutional or legal rights of large numbers of
• people who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically dis-
advantaged position should not go unnoticed and unredressed. That E
would be destructive of the Rule of Law which forms one of the
essential elements of public interest in any democratic form of
government. The Rule of Law doe_s not mean that the protection
of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that the law
should be allowed to be prostituted by the vested interests for. pro-
F
tecting and upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement
of their civil and political· rights. The p9or too have civil and politi.
cal rights and the Rule of -Law is meant for them also, though today
it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and
the alcohol kings have the Fundamental Right to carry on their busi- G
ness and to.fatten their purses by exploiting the consuming public,
have the 'chamars' belonging to the lowest strata of society nd
Fundamental Right to earn an honest liv.ing through their sweat ·and
toil ? The former can approach the courts ~with a formidable .army
... of distinguished lawyers paid in four or five figures per day and if
t\leir right to exploit is upheld against the government under the H
label of Fundamental Ri(lht, the courts are praised for their boldness

..
468 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) I s.c.ll.

and courage and their independence and fearlessness are applauded
and acclaimed. But, if the. Fundamental Right of the. poor and
helpless victims of injustice is sought to be enforced by public
interest litigat~on, the so called champions of human rights frown
upon it as waste of time of the highest court in the land, which,
according to them; should not engage itself in such small and trifling
B matters. Moreover, these self-styled hum.an fights activists rorget
that civil anil political rights, priceless and invaluable as they are for
freedom and democracy, simply do not exist for the vast masses of
our people. Large numbers of men, women and children who cons- •
titute the bulk of our population are today living a sub-human
existence in conditions of abject poverty: utter grinding poverty has
c broken their back' and sapped tbeir ·moral fibre. They have no faith
in. the existing social and economic system. What civil and political
·rights are these poor and· deprived sections of humanity going to
enforce 1 This was ·brought out forcibly by W. Paul Gormseley at
the Silver. Jubilee ·Celebrations of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights at the Banaras Hindu University : · •
D

"Since India is one of those countries which has given a
pride of place to the basic human rights and freedoms in its
Constitution in its chapter on Fundamental Rights and, on
E . the Directive Principles of State Policy and has already com-
.Pleted twenty-five years of independence, the question may
be raised whether or not the Fundamental Rights enshrined
in our Constitution have any meanin.g to the millions of our
people to whom·food, drinking water, timely medical facili;
ties and relief from disease and disaster, education and job
F opportunities still remain unavoidable. We, in India, should
on this occasion study . the Human· Rights declared and
defined by the United Nations· and compare them with the
. rights available In practice and secured by the law of our
country."
G
'-.
The only solution for making civil and political rights _meaningful to
these large sections of society ·would be to remake the material con-
ditions and restructure the social and economic order so that they
may be able · to realise the economic,· social and cultural rights. ·
H There is indeed close relationship between civll and political rights
on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the
other and this r\lllitionsbip is so obvious ihat the Internatio.nal
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION'OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)' 469

Human Rights Conference in Tehran called by the General Assembly A
in 1968 declared in a final proclamation :

"Sin~e human ~ights and fundamenfal freedoms are
indivisible, the full realisation of civil and political· rights
without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural ·
rights. is impossible.. " B
•
Of course, the task of·restructuring the social and economic order
so that the so~ial and economic rights become a meaningful reality
for the poor and lowly sections of the community is one which legi-
timately belongs to th.e legislature and the executive, but mere initia- c
tion of social and economic rescue programmes 'hy the executive and
the legislature would not he enough and it is only through multi- ,
dimensional strategies including public interestlitigation that these
social and economic rescue programmes can be made effective. ·
Public interest litigation, as we conceiye it, is essentially· a .co·oper~
tive or collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State or D
public authority and the court to secure ob_servance of the constitu-
tional or legal rights, benefits and privileges conferred upon the
vulnerabi°e sections of the community and to reach social justice to
them. The State or public au!hority against wh.om public interest
litigation is brought should be as much interested in\ -· ensuring basic
. -
human rights, constitutional as well as legal, to those who are in a E
socially and economically disadvantaged position, as the petitioner
w~~ brings the public interest ,litigation before· the Court. The state·
or public authority which is arrayed as a respondenl'in public inte-
rest litigation should, in fact, welcome it, as it would give it an oppor•.
'.(unity to tight a wrong or to redress an injustice done to the poor
•"-... and weaker sections of the community whose welfareis and must be F
h the prime concern of the State or the public authority.

' '
, There is a misconception in the. minds of some lawyers, journa-: ·
lists and men 'in public life that public interest ·litigation is unneces::""- 'G
·sarily cluttering up the files of the court and adding to the already· ·
staggering arrears of cases which are pending for.Jong years and)t.
shoul.d not iherefore be encouraged by the court. This is, to our
mind; a 'totally perv,erse view smacking of elitist and status quoist
approach. Those who are decryfog publiC interest litigation do not H
seem ·to realise that courts ire not meant only for the rich and the
well-to-do, for the landlord 11nd the gentry, for the business magnat~
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983]. J s.c.R

A and the industrial tycoon, but they exist also for the poor and the
down-trodden the have-nots and the handicapped and the half-
hungry millions of our countrymen. So far the courts have been
used only for the purpose of vindicating the rights of the wealthy
and the affluent. It is only these privileged classes which have been
able to approach the courts for protecting their vested interests. It
B is only the moneyed who have so far had the golden key to unlock
the doors of justice. But, now for the first time the portals of the
court are being thrown open to. the poor and the down-trodden, tl~e
ignorant and the illiterate, and their ·cases are coming before the
courts through public interest litigation which has been made possible
by the recent judgment delivered by this Cc,urt in Judges Appoint-
·c ment and Transfer cases. Millions of persons belonging to the
deprived and vulnerable sections of humanity are looking· to the
courts for improving their life conditions ani:J ma.king b;isic human
rights meaningful for them. They have been crying for justice but
their cries have so far been in the wilderness. They have been suffer- •
D ing injustice. silently with the patience of a rock, without the strength
. even to shed any tears. Mahatma· Gandhi once said to Gurudev
Tagore, "I have had the pain of watching birds, who for want of
strength could not be coaxed even into a flutter of their wings. The
human bird under the Indian sky gets up weaker than when he pre-
tended to retire. For millions it is an eternal trance." This.is true ..
of the 'human bird' in India even today after -more than 30 years of
independence. The legal aid movement and public interest litigation
seek to bring justice to these forgotten specimens of humanity who
constitute the bulk of the citizens of India and who are really and
truly the "People of India" , who gave to themselves this magnificent
Constitution. it is true that there are large arrears pendfog in the .
F courts but, that cannot be any reason for denying access to justice to )
the poor and weaker sections of the community. No State has a · .· ·
right to tell its citizens that because a large number of cases of the __,
rich and the well-to-do are pending in our courts, we will not help •
the poor to come to the courts for seeking justice until the staggering
load of cases of people who can afford, is disposed of. The time
G has now come when the courts must become the courts for the poor
and struggling masses of _this country They must shed their charac-
ter as upholders of the established order and the status quo. They,
must be sensitised to the need of doing justice to the large masses of
people to whom justice ·has been de?ied by a cruel and heartless
~ociety for generatjoµs, The realisation must c?me to them that
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, i.) 471

social justice is the signature tune of our Constitution and it is their A
solemn duty under the Constitution to enforce the basic human
rights of the poor and vulnerable sections of the community and acti-
vely help in the realisation of the constitutional goals. This ne_:v
change has to come if the judicial system is to become an effective
instrument of social justice, for without it, it cannot survive for
long. Fortunately, this change is gradually taking place and public B
· interest litigation is playing a large part in bringing about this
change. It is through public interest litigation that the problems of'
the poor are now coming to the fore front and the entire theatre of
• the law is ~banging. It holds out great possibilities for the future .
This writ petition is one such instance of public interest litigation.
c
~·
I The Asian Games take place periodically in different parts of
Asia and this tim~ India is hosting the Asian Games. It is a highly
prestigious undertaking and in order to accomplish it successfully
according to international standards, the Government of India had
to embark upon various construction projects which included build- D
ing of fly-overs, stadia, . swimming pool, ·hotels and Asian Games
village complex. This construction work was framed ·out by the
Government of India amongst various Authorities such as the Delhi
Administration, the Delhi Development Authority and the 'New Delhi
Municipal Commiitee. It is not necessary for the purpose of the
, present writ petition to set out what particular project E
was entrusted to ·which authority because it is not the purpose
of this writ petition to firld ·fault with any particular authority for
'not observing the labour laws in relation to ·the workmen employed
in the projects which are being executed by it, but to ·ensure that in
future the labour laws are implemented and the rights of the workers
under the ·labour laws are riot violated. These various authorities to
F
' whom the execution of the different projects was entrusted engaged
\.._ contractors for the purpose of carrying out the construction work of
l.-... the projects and they were registered as principal employers under
section 7 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act,
1970. The contractors started the construction work of the projects
G
and for the purpose of carrying out . the construction work, they
engaged workers through jamadars. The jamadars brought the
workers from different parts of India and particularly the States of
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and got them employed by the
contractors. The workers were entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. H

'
\
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19831 i s.c.il.
·A 9.25 per day, that being the minimum wage fixed for workers emplo-
yed on the construction of roads and in building operations but the
case of the petitioners was that the workers were not paid this mini-
mum wage and they were exploited "1Jy the contractors and the jama-
dars. The Union of India in the affidavit reply filed on its behalf by
.....
Madan Mohan; Under Secretary, Ministry o( Labour· asserted that
B the contractors did pay the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per day but
frankly admitted that this minimum wage was paid to the jamadars
thrdugh whom the workers were recruited and the jamadars deducted
rupee one per day per ·worker as their commission and paid only·
Rs. 8.25 by way of wage to the workers. The result was that in fact •
the workers dld not get the minimum wage of Rs. 9.i5 per day. The
c . petitioners also alleged· in the writ petition that the provisions
of the ·Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were violated and
women workers w~re being paid only Rs. 7 /- per day and the balance
of the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by the jamadars.
It was also pointed out by the petitioners that there was violation of
i
D Article 24 of the Constitution and of the provisions of the Employ-
ment of Children Act, 1938 in as much as children belo·w the age of
14 years were employed by the contractors in the construction ·work
of the various projects. The petitioners also alleged violation of the
provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act
1970 and pointed out various breaches o.f those provisions by the
E contractors which resulted in deprivation and exploitation of the
workers employed in the. construction work of most oJ the projects.
II was also the case of the petitioners thaflhe workers were denied
proper living conditions and medical and other facilities io which •
·they were entitled under the provisions of the Contract Labour
. (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970'. The petitioners also complain-
F
• ed that the contractors were not implementing the provisions of thl.l-
Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Con-
ditions of Service) Act 1979 though that Act was brought in force in
the Union Territory of Delhi as far back as 2nd Octdber 1980. The
report or' the team of three social scientists on which the ~rit petition
G
was based set out various instances of viOlations of the provisions of
the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Equal RemuneratiOn Act 1976,
A.rticle 24 of the Constitution, The Employment of Children Actl970,
and the.Jnter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment
and c;onditions of Service) Act 1979.
B
These averments made on behalf of the petitioners were denied ·,.
in the affidavits in reply filed on behalf of the Union of India, the
~EOPLB 1 s UNION V. UNION OF INDIA ,(Bhagwati, J.) 473

Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority. It was A
asserted by these authorities that so far as the Equal . Remuneration
Act 1976 and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act ·
1970 were concerned, the provisions of these labour laws lVere 'being ·
complied with by the contractors and .whenever any violations of
these labour laws were btought lo the attention of the. authorities as
a result of periodical inspections carried O\lt by them, a;tion by way
B
of pro'secution was being taken against the contractors. The provi-
sions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 were, according to the Delhi
Development Authority, being observed by the contractors and it
was pointed out by the Delhi Development Authority·.ln its affidavit
in reply that the construction .work of _the projects entrust'd to it
was being carried out by the contractors under a written cqntract c
entered into with them and this written contract incorporated
'"Model Rules for the Proteciion, of Health and sa;itary .(\rrange- ·
merits for Workers employed by Delhi Development Authority or its

- Contractors" which provided for various facilities to be given to the
· workers employed in the construction work and. also ensured to them
payment of minimum wage The Delhi Administration was not so
D
I
categorical as the Delhi Development Authority in regard to the
observance of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Aci 1948 and
)
in its affidavit in reply it conceded that the jamadars through whom
the workers were recruited might be deducting rupee one per day per
' worker from the minimum wage payable to the ''workers. The Union
E
of India was however mere frank and it clearly admitted in its affi·
davit in reply that the jamadars were di:ducting rupee one per day
per worker from the wage payable to the workers with the result
that the workers did pol get the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per,day
and there was violation of the·provisions of the Minimum Wages
r' Act, J9 48~
• F
~ . ,· \
'- So far as the Employment of Children A.ct 1938 is concerned
the case of the Union or India, the Delhi Administration and the
·Delhi Developmeni Authority was that 'no complaint in regard to
the violation of the provisions of .that Act was at any time received.
by them and they disputed that there Wa< any violation ot these G
provisions by the contractors. It was also contended · on behalf of
these Authorities that the Employment of Children Act 1938 was
not applicable in case of employment in the construction work of .
these projects, since construction' industry is not a process specified
, . El
· in the Schedule and is therefore not within the provisions of sub~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983l 1s.c.R.

\ section (3) of section 3 of that Act. Now unfortunately this con-
tention urged on behalf of the respondents is well founded, because
construction industry does not find a place in the Schedule to the
.Employment of Children Act 1938 ~nd the, prohibition enacted in
section 3 su"b-section (3) of that Act agafost the employment of a
child who has not completed his fourteenth year cannot. ·apply to
B employment in construction industry. This is a sad and deplora_ble
omission which,,we think, must· be immediately set right by every
State Government by amending the Schedule so as to include cons-
truction industry in it in e;ercise of the power conferred under
section 3A of the Employment of Children Act, 1938,. We hope and
trust that every State Government will take the necessary steps in this
0 behalf without any undue delay, because construction work is clearly
a hazardous occupation and it is absolutely essential that the employ-
ment of children under the age of 14 years must be prohibited in
.• --'
~

I
every type of _construction work. That would ·be in consonance
with Convention No .. 59 adopted by the .International Labour Organi-
sation and ratified by India. But apart altogether from the require-
. ment of Convention No. 59, we have Article 24 of the Constitution
which provides that no chlld below- the age of 14 shall be employed
to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous •
employment. This is a constitutional prohibition which, even if not
followed up by appropriate legislation, must operate proprio vigore
and construction work being plainly and indubitably a hazardous
E' em_ployment, it is clear that by reason of this constitutional prohibi-
/ tiO"D, ·no child below the age of .14 years can be allowed to be engaged •.
i11 construction work. There can therefore be no doubt that not-
. withstanding the absence of specification o( construction industry in
the Schedule to the Employment of Children Act 1938, no child
below the age of 14 years can he employed in construction. work and
the Union of fodia as also every State Government must ensure that
this constitutional mandate is not violated ·in any part of the country.
Here, of course, ihe plea of the Union of India, the Delhi Adminis-
. tration and the Delhi Development Authority was that no child below
the·age of 14 years was at any time employed in the construction
work of these projects and in any event DO complaint in that behalf
G was received by any of these Authorities and hence there. was no
violation of the constitutional prohibition enacted in Article 24. So
far as the complaint in reg_ard to non-observance of the provisions
of the Inter State M.igrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment
and Conditions of Service) Act 1979 was concerned, the defence of
H the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and' the Delhi Develop-
ment Authority that though this Act had come into force in the
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati. i.) 475
Union Territory of Delhi w_ith effect from 2nd October 1980, the A.
power to enforce the provisions of the Act was delegated to the
Administrator'of the Union Territory of Delhi only on 14th July
1981 and thereafter also the provisions of the Act could· not been
enforced because the Rules to be made un~er -the Act had not been
finalised until 4th June 1982. It is difficult to understand as to why
in the case of beneficient •legislation._ like_ the Inter State Migrant B
Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)
Act 1979 it should have taken more than 18 months for the Govern-
ment of India to delegate the power to enforce the provisions of the
)
Act to the -. Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi and
another almost l i months to make the Rules under the Act. It was --
well kriown that a large number of migrant workmen coming from c
different States were employed in the construction work of various
Asiad projects and if the provisions of a social welfare legislation
like the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment
and Conditions of Service) Act 1979 were applied and the benefit'~f
-such provisions made available to these migrant workmen, it would
have gone a long way towards ameliorating their -conditions of work
-_and ensuring them a decent living with basic human- dignity, We
very much wished that the provisions of this Act had been made
applicable earlier to the migrant workmen employed in the construc-
iion work of these projects though we must oonfess that we do not
r. see why the enforcement of the provisions of the Act should have E
been held up until the making of the Rul~s. It is no don bt true that
there are certain provisions in the Act which cannot be enforced
unless there are rules made under the Act but equally there are other
provisions which do not need any prescription by the Rules for their
enforcement ond these latter provisions could certainly have been
enforced by the Aministrator of the Union Territory - of nClhi F
in _so far as migrant workmen employed in these projects were con-
cerned. There can be no doubt that in any event from and after
4th June, 1982 the provisions of this beneficient - legislation have
-become enforceable and the migrant workmen employed in the cons-
tructi<;>n work of these projects are entitled to the dghts and bCnefits
conferred upon them under those provisions. We need not -point G
out that so far as the rights_ and benefits conferrec;I upon migrant
workmen under the provisions of section_- 13 to I 6 of the Act are
concerned, the responsibility for ensuring such rights and benefits
rests not only on the contractors-but.also on the Union ·or India the
Delhi Administration or the Delhi Development Au tborlty who is H
s\JP1UJMB COURT RBPOR'l'S fl 983) I s.c.k.
A the principal employer in relation to the construction work entrusted
..
by it to the contractors. We must confe;s that we have serious
doubts whether the provisions of this Act are being implemented in
relation to the migrant workmen employed in the construction work
of th~se projects and we have therefore by our Order dated I Ith
· May 1982 appointed three Ombudsmen for the pqrJJ.ose of m'aking
B periodic inspeytion and reporting to us whether the provisions of
this Act are being implemented at least from 4th June 1982.

. · We must in fairness point out that the Union of India has .
stilted in its affidavii in reply that a number of prosecution have ·
c been launched against the contractors for violations of the provision
. of various labour laws and in Annexure I to its affidavit in reply it·
has given detailed particulars of such prosecutions. It is apparent
from the particulars given in this Annexure that the prosecutions
launched against the cantractors were_primarily for offences such as
non-maintenance of relevant registers non-provision of welfare and
D health facilities such as first aid box, latrines, urinals etc. and non-
issue of wage slips. We do not propose to go into the details of
tliese prosecutions launched against the contractors but we are shocked ·
to find that in cases of violations of labour laws enacted for the
benefit of workmen, the Magistrates have been imposing only small
fines of Rs. 200/- there abouts. The Magistrates seem to view the.
·E violatfons of labour laws .with great indifference and unconcern as ·if
they are trifling offences undeserving of judicial severity. They seem ..
to over-look the fact labour laws are enacted for improving the con-
ditions of workers and the employers cannot be allowed to buy off
immunity against violations of labour laws by paying a paltry fine
which they would not mind paying, because by violations the labour
F laws they would be making profit which would far exceed the amount
of the fine. If violations of labour laws are going to b.e punished
only by meagre. fines, it would be impossible to ensure observance of
the labour laws and the labour laws would be reduced to nullity.
They would remain merely paper tigers without any teeth - or claws.
We would like to impress upon the Magistrates and Judges in the
G country that violations of labour laws must be viewed with strictness
and;whenever any violations of labour laws are established before
them,'they should punish ihe errant employers by imposing adequate
punishment.·
H
We may· c~nveniently at this stage, before proceeding to
examine the factual aspects of the case, deal with two prelhninary
PEOPLE'S UNION Ii. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)

I objections raised on behalf of the respondents aga~nst the maintain-
A
ability of the writ petition. 'The first preliminary objection was
that the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain the writ, petition
since, even on the averments made in the writ petition, the rights
said to·· have been violated were t]lose of the workers einployed iii
the con~tru.ction w'ork of the various- Asiad projects and not of the
petitioners and the petitioners cou.ld not therefore have any cause of
B
action. The second preliminary objection urged on behalf of the res-
pondents was that in any event no writ petition cquld lie against tho
respondents, because the workmen whose rights were said to have
been violated were employees of the contractors and not oftthe respon-
dents and the cause of action of the workmen, if any, ·was therefore
against the contractors and not against the respondents. It was also·_
c
contended as part of this preliminary objection that no writ petitfon
under article 32 of the Constitution could lie against the respondents for
the alleged violations of the rights of the workmen under the various
labour laws, and the remedy, if any, was only under the provisions
of those laws. These two preliminary objections were pressed before
D
us on behalf of the Union of Imlia, the Delhi Administration and the
Delhi Development Authority with a view to shutting out an inquiry
by this Court into the violations of various labour laws alleged in 'the
writ petition, but we do not think·there is any substan'ce in them
and they must be rejected. Our reasons for saying so are as
follows: E
- The first preliminary objection raises the question of locus
· standi of the petitioners to maintain the writ petition._ It .is true,
' that the complaint of the petitioners in the writ petition is in regard
to the violations of the provisions of various labour laws designed
for the welfare of workmen and therefore from a strictly traditional F
point of view, it would be only the workmen whose legal rights
are vio_lated who would be entitled to approach the -court for
-judicial redress. But the traditional rule of st~nding which confines
.. .
, access to the judicial process only to those to whom legal inj~ry is .
caused or legal wrong is done has now -been jetisoned by this Court
and the narrow confines within which the rule of staillliilg was G
imprisoned for long years as a result of inheritance of the Anglo-
Saxon System"6f jurisprudence have been' broken and a new dimen-·
sion has been given to- the doctrine of locus standi which has·
revoluiionised the whole concept of access to justice in a way not
known before to the Western System of jurisprudence. This Court H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] 1 s.c.k.
A has taken the view that, having regard to the peculiar socio- .
economic conditions prevailing in the country where there is,
considerable poverty, illiteracy and ignorance obstructing and
impeding accessibility to the judicial process, it would result in clos-
ing the doors of justice to the poor and deprived sections of the
community if the traditional 'rule of standing evolved by Anglo-
B Saxon jurisprudence that only a person wronged can sue for judicial
redress were to be blindly adhered to and followed, and it is there-
fore necessary to evolve a new strategy by. relaxing this traditional
rule of standing ir! order that justice may became easily available to
the lowly and the lost. It has been held by this Court in its recent
judgment in the Judges Appointment and Transfer case, in a major
c break-through which in the years to come is likely to impart new
'
significance and relevance to the judicial system .and to transform it
into as instrument of socio-economic change, that where a person or
class of persons to whom legal injury. is caused or, legal wrong is
done is by reason of poverty, disability or socially or econoinically
-r
disadvantaged position not able to approach the Court for judicial
D redress, any member of the public acting bona fide and not out of
any extraneous motivation may move the Court for judicial redress.
of the legal injury or wrong suffered by such person or class of
persons and· the judicial process may be set in motion by any public
spirited individual or institution. even by addressing a letter to the
court. Where judicial redress· is sought of a legal injury or legal
E wrong suffered by a person or 'class of persons who by reason •
of poverty, disability or socially or economically disaqvantaged
position are unable to approach the court and the court is moved
for this purpose' by a member of a public by addressing a letter
drawing the attention ·of the court to such legal injury or legal
wrong, court would cast aside all technical rules· of procedure and
F entertain the letter as a Writ petition OD the judicial sidO and take
action upon it. That is what has happened in the present case.
Here the workmen whose rights are said to have been violated and·
to whom a life of basic human dignity has been denied are poor,
ignorant, illiterate humans who, by reason of their poverty and social
G and economic disability, are unable to approach the courts for
judicial redress and hence the petitioners, have under the liberalised
rule of standing, locus standi to maintain the present writ. petition
·espousing the cause of the workmen. It is not the case of the ,
respondents that tlie petitioners are acting mala fide or out of extra-
H neous motives and in fact the respondents cannot so allege, since
..
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 479
A
the first p~titioner is admittedly an .organisation ·dedicated to the
protection and enforcement of Fundamental Rights and' making
Directive Principles of State Policy enforc~able and justiciable.
'There can be no doubt that it is out of a sense of public ·service
.that the present litigation has been brought by the petitioners and it
is clearly maintainable. '

We must then proceed to consider the first limb of the second
preliminary objection. It is true that the workmen whose cause has
been championed by the petitioners are employees of the contractors
but the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi
Development Authority which have entrusted the' construction··work
c
1'
. I
of Asiad projects to the contractors cannot escape th.eir obligation
for opservance of the various labour laws by.the contractors. So far
as the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 is
concerned, it is clear that under section 20, if any ·amenity required
to be provided under·sections 16, 17, 18 or 19 for the benefit of the 0
workmen employed in an establishment is not provided by the
contractor, the obligation to provide such amenity rests on the
principal employer and therefore if in the construction work of the
Asiad projects, the contractors do not carry out the obligations.
impcsed upon them by any of these sections, the Union of India,
• the Delhi Admlnistration and the Delhi Development Authority as E
principal employers would be liable and these obligation~ would be
enforceable against them. The same position obtains .in regard to
the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation 'of Employment and
Conditions of Service) Act 1979. In the case of this Act also,
sections 17 and 18 make the principal employer liable to make pay-
ment of the wages to the ·migrant workmen employed by the F
contractor as also to pay the allowances provided under. sections f4
and 15 and to provide the facilities specified in section 16 to sue!)
migrant workmen, in case the contractor fails to do so and these
obligations are also therefore clearly enforceable against the Union
'of India, the Delhi . Administration and the Delhi Development G
Authority as principal ,employers. So far as Article 24 of the
Constitution 'is concerned, it embodies a fundamental right wbich.'is
plainly and indubitably enforceable against every one and.by reason
of its compulsiv_e mandate, no one can employ a child below the age
of 14 years in a hazardous employment and since, as pointed out .
H
/ above, construction work is a hazardous employment, no child below
(he a~e of 14 years can be employed in construction wor!< and there
480' SUPREME COUR1 REPORTS . [19831 1 s.c.a.

A f-0re, not only are the contractors under a 'constitutional mandate
riot to employ any chHd below the age of 14 years, but it is also .the
duty of the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi
Development Authority to ensure that this constitutional.obligation
is obeyed by the contractors to whom they have 1 entrusted the
construction work of the vari.ous Asiad projects. The Union of
8 India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development
Authority cannot. fold their hands in despair and become silent
spectators of the breach of a constitutional prohibition being com- - '
mittee\ by their own contractors. So also with regard to the
observance of the provisions of the Equal R~muneration Act 1946,
the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develo-
c . ment Authority cannot avoid iheir obligation to ensure that these
provisions are COJ!lplied with by the contractors. It is the principle1
of equality em bodied in Article 14 of the Constitution which finds
expression in the provisions of. the Equal Remuneration Act 1946
ana if the Union of India, the Delhi Administration or the Delhi
D Development Authority at any \ime finds that the provisions of the
Equal Remuneration Act' 1946 are not observed and the principles
of equality before the law enshrined in Article 14 is violated. by its •
own contractors, it cannot ignore such violation and sit quiet by
adopting a non-interfering ·attitude and taking shelter under the
executive that the violation is being committed by the contractors •
E and not by it. If any particular contractor is committing a breach
of the provisions of tl\_e Equal Remuneration Act 1946 and tl;ius
denying equality before the Jaw· to the workmen, the Union of
India, the Delhi Administration or the Delhi Development
Authority as the case may be, would be under an obligation to
ensure that the contractor observes the provisions of the Equal
F Remuneration Act 1946 and does· not breach the equality clanse
.'enacted in Article 14 .. The Union qf India, the Delhi. Administration
and the.. Delhi Development Authority must al$o ensure that the
minimum wage is paid to the workmen as provided under the
Minimum Wages Act 1948. The contractors are, of course, liable'
to pay the minimum wage· to the workmen employed by them but
G the Union of India the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develop-
ment Authority who have entrusted the ·eonstruction work to the
contractors would equally be responsible to ensure that the minimum
wage js paid to the workmen by their contractors. This obligation
which even otherwise rests on rhe: Union of India, the Delhi
,Administration and the Delhi Development Authority is adc!itionally
\

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwatl, J.) 481

re-inforced by section 17 of the. Inter State Migrant Workmen A
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions .of Service) Act 1979 in
so far as migrant workme_n are concerned. It is obvious, therefore,
that the Union Of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi
Development Aut~ority cannot escape their obligation to the w~rk
men to ensure observance of these labotlr laws by the contractors
and if these labour laws are not complied with by the contractors, B
the workmen would clearly have a cause of action against the
Union of India, the Delhi Administration a.nd tlie Delhi Development
Au tbority. 1

That takes us to.a consideration of the· other limb -0f the -c
second preliminary objection. The argument of the respondents
under this bead of preliminary objection was that a writ petition ·
under Article 32 cannot be maintained unless it complains of a breach
of some fundamental right cir the other and since what were alleged in
. the present writ petition were merely violations of the labour laws
enacted for the benefit of ,the workin~n and n9t. breaches of any D
fund.amental rights, the present writ petition w~s not maintainable
and was liable to M dismissed. Now it is: true that, the present writ
petitiop ·cannot be maintained by the ·petitioners unless they can
show some violation of a fundamental right, for . it ·is only for
enforcement of a fundamental right that a writ petition can be ·
maintained in this Court under Article 32. So far we agree with E
the contention of the respondents but there our agreement ends. We
cannot accept the plea of the respondents that the present writ peti- '.
tion does not complain of any breach o.f a fundamenta1'right. The
complaint of violation of Article 24 based on the averment that
children below the age of 14 year_s are employed in the construction
·work of the Asiad projects is clearly a complaint of violation of a F
fundamental right. So also when, the petitioners allege non-
observ~nce of the·provisions of the·· Equal. Remuneration Act 1946,
it is in 'effect and substance a complaint of breach of the principle
/"of equality before the law enshrined in Article 14 ·and it can hardly
be disputed that such a complaint can legitimately form the s~bject
matter of a writ petition under Article 32. Then there is the
G
complaint of non-observanc; of the provisions of the Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970 ·and the Inter State
Migrant Workmen (Regulation of· Employment and Conditions,
of Service) Act I 979 and this is also in our opinion a com-
-H
plaiut relating to viol11tion of_ Article 21. This· Article has
. '-
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.c.R.

A acquired a new dim~osioo as· a result of the decision of this
Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(') and it bas received
its most expansive interpretation. in Francis Coralie Mullin v. The
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors,(') where it has been
held by this Court that the right to life guaranteed under this Article
is not confined merely to physical existence or to the use of any
B faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul communi-
cates with outside world but it also includes within jts scope and
. ambit the right to live with basic human . dignity and ,the State
cannot deprive any one of this precious and invaluable right because
DO J)rocedure by which ~uch deprivation may be effected can ever be
regarded as reasonable, fair and just. Now the rights and benefits
c conferred on the workmen employed by a contractor under the
provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act .
1970 and the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employ-
.men! and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 are clearly intended to
ensure basic human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are ~
deprived of any of these rights . and benefits to which they are .
..
D entitled. under the provisions of these two .Pieces of social welfare
legislation, that would clearly be a violation of Article 21 by the
Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develop- •
ment Authority which, as principal employers, are made statutorily
responsible for securing such rights and benefits to the workmen ..
That leaves for consideration the complaint in rega.rd to non-pay-
ment or"minimum wage to the workmen under the Minimum Wages
Act 1948. We are of the view that this complaint is also one
relating to breach of a 'fundamental right and for reasons which we
shall presently state, it is the fundamental right enshrined in Article
'2:> which. is violated by no~- payment of minimum wage to the
F workmen.

Article 23 enacts a very important fundamental right in the.
following terms :

"Art. 23 : Prohibition of traffic in human beings and~forced
labour- -

(I) Traffic in human beings and begar and other
similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and
H
(I) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 663.
(2) (1981) 2 S.C.R. SIC$,
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 48

any contravention of this provision shall be an A
offence punishable in accordance with law.

(2) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State
from imposing compulsory service for public.
purposes, and in imposing such service the State
shall not make any discrimination on grounds
B
only of religion, race, caste or class or any of
them.

Now many of the fundamental rights enacted in Part III operate as
limitations on the power of the State and impose negative obligations .
c
-~- un the State not to encroach on individual liberty and they are
enforceable only against the State. But there are certain funda-
mental rights conferred by the Constitution which are enforceable
against the whole world and they are to be found inter alia in _
Articles 17, 23 and 24. We have already di,scussed th'\' true scope
and ambit of Article 24 in an- earlier portioe of this judgment and D
hence we.do not propose to say anything more about it._ So also_
we need not expatiate on the proper meaning and effect of the
fundamental right enshrined in Article 17 since we are not concerned
with that Article in the present. writ petition. It is Article 23 with
' which we are concerned and that Article is clearly designed to
protect the individual not only against ·the State but also against E
other private citizens. Article 23 is not limfted in its application
against the State but it prohibits "traffic in human beings and begar
and other- similar forms of forced labour" practised by anyone else.
The sweep of Article 23 is . wide. and unlimited and it strikes at
traffic in human beings and begar and other -similar forms of forced
· labour" wherever they ar-e -found. The reason for enacting this F
provision in the chapter on fundamental fights is to be found in the
socio-economic condition of the people.at the time when the Consti-
tution came to 'be. enact~d. The C~hstitution makers, when they set
out to frame the Constitution, found that they had the enormous
G
task before theni of changing the socio-economic structure of the
country and bringing about socio-economic regeneration with a view
to reaching social and economic· justice to the common man. Large
masses of people, bled white by well nigh two centuries of foreign
rule; were Jiving in abject poverty and destitution with ignorance
and illite~acy accentuating their helplessness and despair. The H
society had degenerated into a· status-orient~<! _,hier~rchical society -

I
•

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1983] I S.C.R•.

A with little respect for the dignity of individual who was in the lower
rungs of the social ladder or in an economically impoverished.
condition. The. political revolution was completed and it had
succeeded in bringing freedom to the counrty but freedom was not an
end· in itself, it was .only a means to an end, the end being the raising
or'the peopl~ to higher levels of achievement and.bringing about'
B their total ,,dvancement and welfare. Political freedom had no
meaning unless it was accompanied by social and economic freedom '
and it was therefore necessary to carry forward the social and
economic revolution with a view to creating 'social economic condi-
tions in which every one would be able to enjoy basic human rights
and participate in the fruits of freedom and liberty in an egalitarian
c social and economic framework. It was with this end in view that
the constitution makers .enacted the Directive Principles of State
Policy in Part IV of the Constitution setting out the constitutional
goal of a new socio-economic order. Now there was one feature of
our natio~l life which was ugly and shameful and which cried for
D urgent attelition and that was the existence of bonded or forced
labour in large parts of the country. This evil was the relic of feudal
. exploitative society and it was totally incompatible with the new
·egalitarian socio-ec-:momic order which, "We the people of India"
were determined to build and constituted a gross and most revolting
'denial of basic human dignity. It ~as therefore' 11ecessary to eradi-
E cate this pernicious practice and wipe it out altogether from the
; n~tional scene and this had to be done immediately because with
the advent of freedom, such practice could not be allowed to
continue to blight the national life any longer. Obviously, it would
not have been. enough merely. to include abolition of forced labour i"o
the Directive Principles of State Policy, because then the outlaying
F 'of this practice would not have been legally enforceable and it would
_have continued to plague ·our national life in violation of the basic
constitutional norms and values untill some appropriate legislation
-could be brought by the legislature forbidding' such practice. The
Constitution ·makers therefore decided to give teeth to their resolve
to obliterate and wipe out this 'evil practice by enacting consti-
G tutional prohibition against it in the chapter on fundamental rights,
so that the abolition- of such practice may beco me enforceable and
effective as soon as the Constitution came into force. This is the
reason why the provision enacted in Article 23 was included in the
chapter on fundamentar rights. The prohibition againsi "traffic in (
n· )lµman beings and begar and other similar forll\s of forced labour"

. •
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION op' INDIA' (Bhagwati. J.) 485

is clearly intended to be a general prohibition, tot.al in 'it~ effect and. A·
all pervasive in jts range and it is 'enforceable not . only . against the
State bnt also $inst any other person indulging in ,any. such ·
practiee.
' -
The question then is as to· what is the true scope and meaning
of the expression "traffic in human beings. and begar and other B
similar forms of forced labour" in Article 237 What are the forms
of 'forced labour' prohibited by that Article and what kind of labour •
provided by a person can be regarded as 'f"rced labour' so as to
fall within this prohibition ? · '

c
When the Constitution makers · enacted Article 23 they had
before them Article of the Universal. Declaration of Huinan Rights
oui .they deliberately departed from its language and employed words
'which would make the reach and content of Article 23 much wider.
than that of Article 4 of the Universal Declaraticin of Human Rights.
They banned 'traffic in human b~ings which. is an· expression of D
much clarger amplitude than "slave trade" and they also interdicted
"begar and other similar forms of forced labour". The question is ·
what is the scope and ambit of the expression 'begar and other
similar forms of forced labour?" In this ·expression wide enough to
include every conceivable form of forced labour and what is-the true
scope and meaning of the words "forced labour·?" The ~ord 'begar' E
in this Article is not a word of common use in English language.' It
is a_ word of Indian origin which like many other words has.found
its way in the English vocabulary. It is very difficult to fo.rmulate
a precise defi~ition of the_ word begar' but there . can be no
doubt that it• is a form· of 'forced labour under which a person is
compelled to work without receiving any remuneration. Moles- · FI
;,...._ ~orth describes 'begar' as "labour or ,service. exacted by a govern-
ment or person in 'power without giving remuneration for it."
Wils'on's glossary of Judicial and. -Revenue Terms-. gives~ the
following meaning of the wotd 'begar' : "a forced lab 0iirer, ·one
pressed to carry burthens for individuals or the public. Under. the G
old system, when pressedJor public service, no pay was given. The
Begari, though still liable to be pressed for public objects, now recei-
ves pay : For~ed labour for private service is prohibited.", "Begar"
may ,therefore be loosely described as labour or service whieh a per-
- s'on is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for· it. That
was th~ meaning of the word '!>e~'!r"accepted by a l)iyi~io!l Bench
486 SUPRJlME COURT RJlPORTS [1983] l s.c.R..

A of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.~. Mital.(') ~Begar'
is thus clearly a film of forced labour. Now it is not merely 'begar'
which is unconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23 but also all other · -~
similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour
in whatever form it niay manifest itself, because it is violative of
human dignity and is contrary to basic human .values. The practice
of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instru-
ment dealing with human rights. It is ·interesting to find that as far
, back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
came into being, International Labour Organisation adopted Conven-
tion No. 29 laying down that every member of the International
tabour Organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress
c the use of forced or compulsory labour in ·all its forms" and this
prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the
lnternation~l Labour Organisation in 1957... The words "forced or
compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited
meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of
these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the
D European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced
or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts
a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be
found. · The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent ,
· laid some empba:sis on the word 'similar' and contended that it is
E 0

not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23
•

but only such form of forced labour as is similar to 'begar' and since
'begar' means labour or service which a person is forced to give with-
out receiv_ing any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is
limited .only'to thosef~rms of forced labour where labour or service
is exacted from a person without paying any remunerat'ion at all an<j r
if some. remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would· not _,./
fall within the words 'other similar forms of forced lab.our: This
contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition
against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and· is in our opinion not
well founded. It does not accord with the principle enunciated by
this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(') that when
G
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferring funda-
mental rights, the. attempt qfthe court spould be to expand the reach
and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their

(!) AIR 1962 Born. 53.
(2) [1978) 2jSCR 621.
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (llhagwati, J,) 48'7
A
meaning and content. It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution
makers should have intended to strike .only at certain forms of forced
labour leaving it open to the socially or economically powerful
sections of the community to expioit the poor and weaker sectionsby
resorting to other forms of forced labour. Could there be any logic
o·r reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or
service to another without receiving any remuneration at all it should,
be 'regarded as a pernicious practice sufficient to attract the condem·
nation of Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid for it, then it
• should be outside the inhibition of that Article ? If this were the
. true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced to a mere rope of
sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society ' c
for a person belonging to a socially ·Or economically dominant class
~ I
to exact.labour or serivce from a person belonging to the deprived
and vulnerable section pf the community by paying a negligible
'
amount of remuneration ·and thus escape the rigour of Article 23.
We do not think it would be right to place on the language of Article
23 an interpretation which would emasculate. its beneficent provi- D
'sions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clear
of the view that Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of
forced" labour. The words "other similar forms of forced labour are
used in Article 23 not with a view to importing the particular charac-
teristic of 'begar' that labour or service should be exacted without
payment of any remuneration but with a view to bringing within the
scope and ambit of that Article all other forms of forced labour and
since 'begar' is o_ne form of forced labour, the Constitution makers
used the words "other similar ·forms of forced labour," If the
• requirement that labour or work should be exacted Without any
_remuneration were imported in other forms of forced labour, they
would straightaway come w.ithin !he meaning of the word 'begar'
F
-~ and in that event there would be no need to have the additional
;....._
, words "other similar forms of forced labour." These words would
- .. be rendered futile and meaningless and it is a well° recognised rule of
interpretation that the court should avoid a ·construction which as· •
'' G
the effect of rendering any words used by.the legislature· superfluous
or redun.dent. The object of adding these words was clearly to expand
the reach and content of Article 23 by including, in addition to
'begar', other forms of forced labour within the prohibition of that
Article. Every form of forced labour 'begar' or otherwise, is within the
inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no difference whether the per- H

'
48~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) 1 S.C.R.

son who is forced to give his labour or service to another is remune-
rated or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a
person would be hit by this Article if it is forced labour, that is,
labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or compulsion.
Take for example a case where a person has entered into a contract
of service with another for a period of three years and he wishes ·to
B discontinue serving such other person before the expiration of the
period of three years. If a law were to provide that in such· a case
' the contract shall be specifically enforced and he shall be compelled
to serve for the full period of three years, it would clearly amount to
forced labour and such a law would be void as offending Article 23.
O' That is why specific perfotmance of a contract of service cannot be.
enforced against an employee and the employee ca1;1not be forced by
compulsion of law to continue to serve the employer. Of course, if
there is a breach of the contract of service, the employee would be
+
I
· liable to pay damages to the ·employer but he cannot be forced to
continue to serve the empioyer without breaching the injunction ·of
Article 23. This was precisely the. view taken by the Supreme Court
D
of United States in Baily v. Alabama(') while dealing witb•a similar
provision in the Thirteenth Amendment. There, a legislation enact-
ed by the Alabama State providing that when a person with intent
to injure or defraud his employer enters into a contract in writing
for the purpose of any service and obtains money or other property
E from the employer and without refunding the money or the p_roperty
refuses or fails to perform such service, he will be punished with
of fine. The constitutional validity of this legislation was
challenged on the gronnd that it violated the Thirteenth Amendment
-which inter a/ia provides : "Neither slavery nor involuntar/servitude
shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their juris-
diction···. This challenge was upheld by.a majority of the Court and
Mr. Justice Hughes d~livering the majority opinion said :

"We cannot escape the conclusion that although the
statute in terms is to punish fraud, still iti; natural and •
inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for crime those
G who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal
service in liquidation of a debt, and judging its purpose by
its effect that it seeks in this way to provide the means of
compulsion tl~~ough which performance of such service may
•
H (I) 219 U.S. 219 : 55 L. Ed. 191.
PllOPLB;S UNION v. UNION OF INl>IA (Bhagwati, J.). 489

be secured. The question is whether such a statute is A
constitution_al".
The learned J:idge proceeded to explain the scope and ambit ,of the
expression 'involuntary servitude' in the following words :

"The. plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever B
name and form and all its badges arid incidents, to render
impossible any st~te of bondage ; to make labour free by
' prohibiting that control by which the personal serviye of c--
one men is disposed of or . coerced for another's benefit,
which is the essence of involuntary servitude." .

Then, dealing with the contention that the employee in that case had.
voluntarily contracted tO' perform the service wpich was sought to be/
compelled and there was therefore no violation· of the provisions of
the Thirteenth Amendment, the .learned Judge observed :

D
"The fact that .the debtor contracted to perform the
. labour which is sought to be compelied does not withdraw
the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the
statute. The full intent of ihe constitutional provision'Could
be defeated with obvious facility if through the guise 'of
. contracts under· which advances had been made, debtors. E
could be held to compulsory service. It i~ the compulsion
of the service that the statute inhibits; for when that occurs,
the condition of servitute is created which would: be not less
involuntary because of the original agreement to ·work out
the indebtedness. The . contract exposes the debtor to
liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to enforced F
18.bour."·

'-· and proceeded to ehiborate ibis thesis by pointing out :
.. ' "Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or 'invo-·
luntary, but this implies simply a difference in~ the mode of G
origin, but-none in the character of the servitude. The one
"exists
- where the debtor
,
voluntarily contracts to enter the
service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the
debtor by some. provision of 'law. But peonage however
created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude. ·The H
· peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by 'the pay-
490 StJPltEMI! COUllt Rl!POlltS [1983] 1 s.c.R.
A ment of the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A
clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary
performance of Jabour or rendering of services in payment
of a debt. In the latter case the debtor though contracting
to· pay his indebtedness by labour of service, and subject·
like any other contractor to an action for damages for.
B breach of that contract, can elect at any time to·break it,
and no law or force compels performance or a continuance
of the service." ·

It is therefore clear that even if a person has contracted with another
to perform service and there is consideration for such service in the
shape of liquidation of debt or even remuneration, he cannot be
forced by compulsion of law or otherwise to continue to perform such
service, as that would be forced labour within the inhil;>itian of.
Article 23c -·This Article strikes at every form of forced labour. even
0 if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person ..
obligated to provide Jabour or service Vide Pollock v. Williams.(')
The reason is that it offends against human dignity to compel a
person to provide labour or service to another if he does. not ,wish to
do so, e~n, though it be in breach of the contract en_tered into by
him. There should be ·DO serfdom or involuntary servitude in a free
democratic India which respects the dignity of tbe individual and the
E
worth of the human person. Moreover, in a country like India
·where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no·
equality of bargaining power, a contract of service may appear on
its face voluntary but it may, in reality, be involuntary, because
while entering into the contract, the employee, by reason of his
economically helpless condition, may have been faced-with Robson's
choice, either to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms dictated
by the powerful employer. It would be a travesty of justice to hold
. th~ employee in_ such a case to·the terms of the contract and to
compel him to serve ihe employer even though he may not wish to
do so. That would aggravate the inequality and injustice from which
the employee eve_n otherwise suffers on account of his economically
G disadvantaged position and leild the authority of law to the exploi-
tation of the poor helpless employee by the economically powerful
employer. Article 23 therefore says that no one shall be ·forced to

ff (I) 322 U.S. 4:88 Lawyers Edition 1095.
. PEOPLE'S UNION v._ UNION «:F INDIA (Bhagwatl, J.) 491

provide labour or service against his will, even though it be :under _a
A
=ontract of service.
I

Now the next question that arises for consideration is whether
there is any breach of Article 23 when a person .provides labour or B
service to the State or to any other person and is paid less than the
minimum wage for it. · It is' obvious that ordinarily no one would
willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the mini·
mum ·wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get
-minimum wage for the ·Jabour or service provided by him. It may
therefore be -legitimately presumed· that when a person provides c
labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration which is
less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some
compuision which drives him to work though he is paid Jess than
what he is entitled ui\der law to receive. What Article 23 prohibits
is 'forced labour' that is labour or service which a person- is forced
to provide and 'force' which would make such labour or service D
'forced labour' may arise in several .ways. It may he physical
force which may compel.a person to provide labour- or service to
another or it may pe force exerted through '! legal provision such
as a· provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails
.to provide labour or service or it may even be_ compulsion arising
from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which E
deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him .to
adopt one particular course of action may properiy be regarded as
'force' and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such
'force', it would we 'forced labour'. Where a person is suffering
from hunger or starvation, when he bas no resources at ail to fight
disease or fe_ed bis wife and children or even to hide their nakedness,
F
where utter grinding poverty bas broken his ·back and reduced him
to a state of helplessness and ·deSPair and where no· other employ-
ment is available to alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would
\ have no choice but to acceept .any work that comes hims way, even
if the remuneration offered to him is less than the !Ilinimum wage.·
He would be in no position to bargain with the employer; he would
G
have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be
acting not _;is a free agent with a choice between alternatives but
J!Dder the cpmpulsion of economic circumstances and the Jabour or
• service provided by him would be clearly 'forced Jabour.' There is
H
no reason why the word 'forced' should be read in a narrow and
492 SUPREM~ COURT lti!PORl'S (1983) 1 s.c.ll.
A .restricted manner so. as to be confined only to physical or legal
'force' particularly when the national charter, its fundamental
document has promised to build a new soc.ialist republic where there
will be socio-economic justice for all and every one shall have the
right to work, to education and to adequate means of livelihood.
The constitution makers have given us one of the most remarkable
B ,documents in history for ushering in a new socio-economic order
and the .Constitution wbich they have forged for us has a social
purpose and an economic mission and therefore every word or
phrase in the Constitl!tion must be interpreted in a manner which
would advance the socio-economic objective of the Constituti 0n. It
is ncit unoften that in·capitalist society economic circumstance exert
c \ '
much greater pressure on an individual in driving him to a particular
course of action than physical compulsion or force of legislative
provision. The word 'force'. must therefore-be construted to i!Jclude
not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the
compulsion of economic circumstance which leaves no choice of
alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide Jabour
D
or service even though the remuneration received for it is less than
. the minimuni wage of course, if.a P.,rson provides labour or service
to another against receipt of the minimum wage, 'it would not be
possible to say that the labour or service provided by ])im is 'forced
. Jabour' because he gets what he is entitled under law to receive.
E No inference can reasonably be drawn in . such a case that ·he is
forced to. provide labour or service for the simple ~eason that he
would be providing labour or service against receipt of what is
lawfully payable to him just like any other person who is not under
the force of any compulsion. We are therefore of the v,iew that
where a·person provides labour or ser:vice to another for remunera-
F tion which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service
provided by him cleariy fafls within the ;scope and ambit of the
words 'forced labour' under Article 23. Such a person would be
entitled to come to the court for enforcement of his fundamental
right tinder Article 23 by asking the· court io direct payment of the
minimum wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him
G ceases to be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied.
It is' therefote clear that when the petitioners alleged that minimum
wage was not paid t.o the workmen employed by the contractors, the
complaint was really in effect and substance a compl!lint against
violation of the fundamental r.ight of the workmen under .•
H Article 23.
•
PEOPLE'S UNION V, UNION OF.INntA (8hagwati, !.) 493

Before leaving this subject, We may point out with all the A
emphasis tit our command. that whenever any fundamental right,
which is enforceable against private individuals such as, for example·
a fundamental right enacted in Article 17 or 23 or -24 is being
violated; it is the constitutional obligation of the State to take the
· necessary steps for the purpose ·of' ,interdicting such violatioQ and
ensuring observance of tbe·fundameotal ·right by the private .iodivi· B
dual who is transgressing the. same. Of course, the person whose
fundamental right is violated can always approach the court- for the
purpose of ~nforcemeot of his fundamental right, but that cannot
absolve the State from its constitutional obligation to see that there
. is no violation of the fundamental righL,.of such person,· particularly·
ivheo he belongs to the weaker section humanity 'and is unable to c
,wage a legal 'battle against a strong .and powerful opponent who. is
. exploiting him. The Union of India, the Delhi AdmioistratiOn and
the Delhi Development Authority must therefore be held to be under
an obligatioo'fo ensure <;>bservance of these various labour laws·by
the contractors and if the provisions ·Of any of these labour laws are
violated by the contractors, the petitioners indicating the cause of D
the workmen are entitled to enforce this obligation against the
Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develop-
ment Authority by· filing the present writ petition. The preliminary
objections urged on behalf of the respondents must. accordingly be
rejected. E

Having disposed of these preliminary objections, we may tnm· •
to consider whether there was any violation of the provisions of the
Minimum Wages Act 1948, Article 24 of the Constitution, the
Equal Remuneration Act 1976, the Contract labour (Regulation
and Abolition) Act 1970 and 'the Inter State Migrant, Workmen F
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act ·1979
\.
by the contractors. The Union !Jf India in its affidavit in reply
·admitted that there were. certain.violations, committed by the contra·
ctors but hastened to add that for these violations prosecutions were
• initiated against the errant contractors and no •violation of any of
the labour .laws was allowed togo unpunished. The Union of India
G
'also conceeded in its affidavit in reply that Re. I/· per worker per ·day
was deducted by the jamadars from the wa:ge payable to the workers
.. with the result that the workers did not -get the minimum wage of
Rs. 9.25 per day, but stated that proceedings had been taken for
H
the purpose of recovering the amount of the snort fall in minimum
wage from the contractors. No particular~ were however S;ven of
1
• '
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1983) I !.C.R.

such . proceedings adopted by/ the Union of India or the Delhi
A
Administration or the Delhi DevClopment Authority. It was for this
J
reason that we directed by our order dated 11th ·May 1982 that
whatever is the minimum . wage for the time being or if the wage
payable is higher than· such wage, shall be paid by the contractors
to the workmen directly without the intervention of the jamadars and
B that the jamadars shall not be entitied to· deduct or recover any amount ·
from the minimum wage payable to the workmen as and by way of
commission or otherwise. He would als.o direct in additio.n that if the •
..Union of India or the Delhi Administration or the Delhi Develop·
ment Authority finds and for !his purpose it may hold such i.nquiry
as is possible in the circumstances that any ·of the workmen has not
c received the minimum wage payable to him, it •.hall take the .J
necessary legal action against the contractrs. whether by way of__,
proesC1,1tion or by way of recovery of the amount of the short-fall. , ·
We would also suggest. that ,hereafter whenever any contracts are
given . by. the. government' or any other. governmental authority
including a public sector corporation, it should be ·ensured by intro·
. D ... · ducing a suitable provision in the contracts that wage shall be.paid ·
by the contractors to the workmen directly without the intervention
of any jamadars or, thekadars and th.at the contractors shall ensure
.that no· amount by ·way of commission or otherwise is deducted or
., recovered by the Jamadars from the wage of the workmen. So far as
· observallce of the other labour laws by the contractors is concerned, •
E · the Union of India, the' Del hf Administration and the Delhi Develop·
meut Authority disputed the claim of the. petitioners that the provi·
sions of these labour laws wel'ci not being implemented . by the
contractOrs save in _a -few instances where prosecutions bad _been
launched agai11st the contractors. Since it would not be possible
\
for this Court .to take evidence for ·the purpose of deciding this
F factual dispute between_ the parties and ·wealso wanted to ensure
. that in any event the provisions of these various laws enacted for the
·benefit of the workmen were strictly observed and implemented by
the contractors, we by ciur order dated 11th· May 1982 appointed ,
· three Ombudsmen and requested them to make periodical inspectio~s T
G · of the .sites of the construction work: the purpose of ascertaining
for
whether the provisions of these labour laws were being carried out.
• and the. workers were receiving the benefits and amenities provided
for them ·under these beneficient statutes or . whether the"re were ariy
. violations of. these provisions being committed by tile contractors ·so
H · that on the basis of the reports of. the three, Ombudsmen, this Court
could give further direction in the matter if fo~nd necessary. We may

\
PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 495

add that,whenever any construction work is being carried out either
departmentally or through contractors, the government or any other
- governmental authority including a public sector corporation which
is carrying out such work must take great care to see that the
provisions of the labour laws are being strictly observed and they
should not wait for any c,;mplaint to be received from the work~en
in regard to nonobservance of any such provision before proceeding B
~.to• take action against the erring olllcers or contractor, but they ·
should institute an effective,system of periodic inspections .coupled
with occasional surprise inspe~tions by the higher officers in order
·to ensure that there are no violations of the, provisions of· labour
laws and the workmen are not denied the rights _and benefits to
which they are entitled under such provisions ahd if any such c
violations are found, immediate action should be taken against
defaulting officers or contractors. That is the .least which a govern-
ment or a governmental authority or a public sector corpo~ation
. ·is expected to do in a social welfare state .
D
These are the reasons for which .we made our Order dated
1Ith May 1982.
S.R. Petition allowed.
'-..