POLAMRASETTI MANIKYAM & ANR.versusTEEGALA VENKATA RAMAYYA & ANR.

                    [2014] 1 S.C.R. 1127


            POLAMRASETTI MANIKYAM & ANR.                           A
                              v.
          TEEGALA VENKATA RAMAYYA & ANR.
           (Civil Appeal Nos. 2456-2457 of 2014)
                    FEBRUARY 19, 2014
                                                                   B
 [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]

   ANDHRA PRADESH COURT FEES AND SUITS
VALUATION ACT, 1956:
                                                                   c
     s.37 - Computation of court fee in a suit for cancellation
of sale de.ed - For the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction -
Held: s.37 contains a special rule for valuing the property for
the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and there is no reason
to substitute the expression "value of the property" used in s.
                                                                   D
37 with the expression "market value of the property".

     In a ~uit for cancellation of a sale deed, the question
for consideration before the trial court was whether s. 37
of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation
Act, 1956 authorized the valuation of the suit on the basis        E
of the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed or
on the basis of the market value of the property as on the
date of presentation of the plaint for the purpose of court
fee and jurisdiction. The Civil Judge took the view that
the court fee was to be calculated as per the market value         F
on the date of presentation of the plaint and not as per
the value shown on the document. Consequently, it was
held that the court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to
entertain the suit and the plaint was returned under 0. 7,
r. 10 CPC for presentation ~efore- the proper court. The           G
view was affirmed by ttte':appellate court as also the
single Judge of the High Court.

    Allowing the appeals, the Court
                             1127                                  H
    1128    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2014] 1 S.C.R.


A      HELD: 1.1 Section 37 of the Andhra Pradesh Court
  Fees Act, 1956, which deals with the suits for
  cancellation of decrees etc., is not governed by other
  Sections of the Court Fees Act, such as s. 7 and other
  related provisions. Ifs. 37 is interpreted in the light of the
8 expression "save as otherwise provided" used in s. 7, it
  becomes clear that the rule enshrined therein is a clear
  departure from the one contained in ~- 7 read with ss. 24,
  26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 42 and 45, which provide for payment
  of court fee on the market value of the property. In that
C context, s. 37 is a stand alone provision, wherein the
  legislature has designedly not used the expression
  "market value of the property". Section 37, therefore,
  contains a special rule for valuing the property for the
  purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and there is no
  reason to substitute the expression "value of the
D property" used in s. 37 with the expression "market value
  of the property". (para 16] (1137-E-H; 1138-A]

       Satheedevi v. Prasanna and another 2010 (6) SCR 657
    =(2010) 5 sec 622 - relied on.
E
       Kolachala Kutumba Sastri v. Lakkaraju Bala Tripura
  Sundaramma & Ors. AIR 1939 Mad. 462, Lakshminagar
  Housing Welfare Association v. Syed Sarni @ Syed
  Samiuddin & Ors. (2010) 5 ALT 96, T.S. Rajam Amma/ v.
F V.N. Swaminathan & Ors. AIR 1954 Mad.152 - disapproved.

        Krishnan Damodaran v. Padmanabhan Parvathy 1972
  KLT 774, P.K. Vasudeva Rao v. K.C. Hari Menon AIR 1982
  Ker 35, Pachayammal v. Dwaraswamy Pillai 2006 (3) KLT
  527 Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran 1964 KLT 895 and
G Uma Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad 1966 KLT
  1046, Allam Venkateswara Reddy v. Golla Venkatanarayana
  AIR 1975 AP 122; Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chaandrayya
  AIR 1927 Mad 825; Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder (1967) 80
  Mad LW 19 (SN) and Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu
H Pillai (1968) 83 Mad LW 789 - stood approved.
 POLAMRASETII MANIKYAM v. TEEGALA VENKATA 1129
                 RAMAYYA
     1.2 In the circumstances, the judgment of the High          A
Court is set aside. Consequently, the orders passed by
the appellate court as well as the trial court would stand
quashed. The trial court is directed to proceed with the
suit in accordance with law and the declaration made by
this Court. [para 17] [1138-B-C]                                 B

                     Case Law Reference:
  AIR 1939 Mad. 462             disapproved          para 3
  (2010) 5 ALT 96               disapproved          para 3
                                                                 c
  AIR 1954 Mad. 152             disapproved          para 5
  2010 (6 ) SCR 657             relied on            para 8
  1972 KLT 774                  stood approved       para 10
                                                                 D
  AIR 1982 Ker 35               stood approved       para 10
  2006 (3) KLT 527              stood approved       para 10
  1964 KLT 895                  stood approved       para 10
  1966 KLT 1046                 stood approved       para 10     E

  AIR 1975 AP 122               stood approved       para 13
  (1967) 80 Mad LW 19 (SN) stood approved            para 13
  AIR 1927 Mad 825              stood approved       para 13     F
   (1968) 83 Mad LW 789         stood approved       para 13
    CIVIL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
2456-2457 of 2014.
                                                                 G
     From the judgment and order dated 20.08.2010 in CRP
No. 2539 of 2010 and dated 19.01.2011 in CRP 6557 of 2010
                        .
of the High Court of A.P. at Hyderabad .

    V. Sridhar Reddy (for V.N. Raghupathy} for the Appellants.
                                                                 H
    1130         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A       Y. Raja Gopala Rao for the Respondents.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. Leave granted.

B        2. We are, in this case, concerned with the interpretation
    of Section 37 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits
    Valuation Act, 1956 (for short "the Court Fees Act") as to
    whether it authorizes the valuation of the suit on the basis of
    the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed or to be
c   valued on the basis of the market value of the property as on
    the date of presentation of the plaint for the purpose of Court
    Fee and jurisdiction.

       3. Learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High
D Court in the impugned judgment placing reliance on the Full
  Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Kolachala
  Kutumba Sastri v. Lakkaraju Bala Tripura Sundaramma &
  Ors. AIR 1939 Mad. 462, and the Division Bench Judgment of
  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Lakshminagar Housing
  Welfare Association v. Syed Sarni @ Syed Samiuddin & Ors.
E (2010) 5 ALT 96, held that in a suit for cancellation of sale deed,
  Court Fee has to be determined on the market value of the
  property as on the date of presentation of the plaint and not the
  value shown in the registered sale deed, the legality of which
  is under challenge in these appeals.
F
        4. The Appellants/Plaintiffs filed O.S. No.114 of 2008 on
    21.7.2008 before the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Kothavalasa,
    seeking, inter alia, the following reliefs :-

           "(a)    to cancel the alleged sale deed dated 2.8.2002
G                  which was got registered as No.2496/05 by the
                   Sub-Registrar, Kothavalasa on dt. 30 July, 2005 as
                   the orders of District Registrar dt. 26.07.2005 as it
                   was obtained fraudulently;

H          (b)     direct the defendants to pay the cost of the suit."
POLAMRASETTI MANIKYAM v. TEEGALA VENKATA 1131
     RAMAYYA [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
      5. Value of the suit for the purposes of Court Fee and           A
jurisdiction was shown as the value of the deed to be cancelled
i.e. Rs.1 lakh. Court Fee of Rs.3,426/- was paid under Section
37 of the Court Fees Act, deposited vide Challan No.4239075
dated 29.7.2008. The Appellants/Plaintiffs filed I.A. No.374 of
2008 under Order IX Rule 1 and 2 CPC for grant of temporary            8
injunction restraining the Respondents therein from interfering
with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property and
also filed I.A. No.375 of 2008 and sought an order restraining
the Respondents from operating the sale deed until the disposal
of the suit. During enquiry in I.A. No.375 of 2008, the                C
Appellants/Plaintiffs got market value certificate dated
4.10.2002 as Exh.A-6 showing the market value of the property
as Rs.19,36,000/- by the year 2002 and contended that the
 alleged sale for Rs.1 lakh was a fraudulent transaction. The
 Respondents raised an objection that the Civil Judge has no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the Plaintiffs case is that   D
the market value of the property is more than Rs.1 lakh. It was
contended that for cancellation of sale deed, Court Fee has to
 be calculated on the current market value, but not as per value
shown on the document. Reliance was placed on the judgment
of the Madras High Court in Kolacha/a Kutumba Sastri (supra)           E
and T.S. Rajam Ammal v. V.N. Swaminathan & Ors. AIR 1954
 Mad. 152, wherein it was held that in a suit for cancellation of
sale deed, Court Fee payable is on the niarket value of the
 property involved as on the date of the plaint and not on the
consideration recited in it.                                           F

     6. Learned Civil Judge vide his order dated 25.11.2008
took the view that the Court Fee has to be calculated as per
the market value on the date of presentation of the plaint and
not as per the value shown on the document. Consequently, it G
was held that the Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain _
the suit and the plaint was returned under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC
for presentation before the proper Court.

     7. The Appellants/Plaintiffs, aggrieved by the said order,
                                                                       H
    1132     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 1 S.C.R.


A   filed C.M.A. No.2 of 2009 in the Court of the Judge, Family
    Court-cum-District and Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram. The
    appellate Court dismissed the appeal vide its order dated
    29.10.2009 holding that the Court below has no jurisdiction to
    entertain the suit and the plaint was correctly returned for
8   presentation before the appropriate Court holding that the Court
    Fee has to be calculated as per the market value of the property
    as on the date of presentation of the plaint and not on the value
    shown in the registered sale deed.

        8. The Appellant, aggrieved by the said order, filed Civil
C Revision Petition No.2539 of 2010 before the High Court of
  Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. The learned Single Judge of the
  Andhra Pradesh High Court, as already stated, placing reliance
  on the judgment of the Madras High Court in T.S. Rajam
  Ammaf (supra) and also the Full Bench decision of the Madras
D High Court in Kolacha/a Kutumba Sastri (supra) and also a
  Division Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
  Lakshminagar Housing Welfare Association (supra), took the
  view that un(jer Section 37 of the Court Fees Act, for
  cancellation of the sale deed the suit has to be valued on the
E basis of the market value of the property governed by the sale
  deed on the date of presentation of the plaint for the purposes
  of Court Fee and jurisdiction and not on the basis of sale
  consideration mentioned in the sale deed. The appellants then
  filed a review petition being Review CRP No.6557 of 2010
F seeking review of the judgment based on the Judgment of this
  Court in Satheedevi v. Prasanna and another (2010) 5 SCC
  622. The review petition was, however, dismissed on
  19.1.2011. Aggrieved by the same, these appeals have been
  preferred.
G       9. We are, in this case, concerned with the interpretation
    of Section 37 of the Court Fees Act, which reads as follows :-

         "37. Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc. - (1) In a suit
         for cancellation of a decree for money or other property
H        having a money value, or other document which purports
 POLAMRASETTI MANIKYAM v. TEEGALA VENKATA 1133
      RAMAYYA [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
    or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,       A
    whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in
    money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be
    computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit, and
    such value shall be deemed to be :-
                                                                       B
      (a)   If the whole decree or other document is sought to
            be cancelled, the amount or value of the property
            for which the decree was passed or other document
            was executed;

      (b)   If a part of the decree or other document is sought        C
            to be cancelled, such part of the amount or of the
            value of the property.

    (2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability
    under it cannot be split up and the relief .claimed relates        o
    only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff
    or to the plaintiffs share in any such property, fee shall be
    computed on the value of such property, or share or on the
    amount of the decree, whichever is less.

     Explanation : A suit to set aside an award shall be               E
    deemed to be a suit for cancellation of a decree within the
    meaning of this section."

      10. When the matter came up for hearing, the learned
counsel for either side brought to our knowledge a judgment            F
of this Court in Satheedevi (supra) and submitted that a similar
issue came up for consideration in the above-mentioned case
while interpreting Section 40 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit
Valuation Act, 1959, which is pari materia with Section 37 of
the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956.           G
While interpreting the scope of Section 40 of the Kerala Act,
this Court had occasion to examine the ratio laid down by Full
Bench of the Madras High Court in Kolachala Kutumba Sastri
(supra) and took .the yiew that in the said the interpretation of
Section 7(iv-a) ofthe·court Fee Act, as case, the Madras High
                                                                       H
    1134     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 1 S.C.R.


A Court was primarily concerned with amended by the Madras
  Act, which refers to the valt.;e of the property simplicitor and the
  Court interpreted the sa!T'e as market value. It was pointed out
  that the Full Bench was not called upon to interpret a provision
  like Section 40 of the Act. Consequently, it was held that the
B ratio of that judgment cannot be relied upon for the purpose of
  interpretation of Section 40 of the Act. While doing so, the Court
  also opined that the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High
  Court in Krishnan Oamodaran v. Padmanabhan Parvathy
  1972 KLT 774, P.K. Vasudeva Rao v. K.C. Harl Menon AIR
c 1982 Ker 35, Pachayammal v. Dwaraswamy Pillai 2006 (3)
  KLT 527 and the learned Single Judge judgments in Appikunju
  Meerasayu v. Meeran 1964 KLT 895 and Uma Antherjanam
  v. Govindaru Namboodiripad 1966 KLT 1046 do not lay down
  the correct law since the High Court had failed to appreciate
  that the legislature has designedly used a different language
0
  in Section 40 of the Act and the term "market value" has not
  been used therein.

         11. We have already indicated that Section 40 of the
    Kerala Act and Section 37 of the Court Fees Act are pari
E   materia provisions. Consequently, the reasoning of this Court
    in Satheedevi (supra) could be safely applied when we
    interpret Section 37 of the Court Fees Act.

         12. In Satheedevi (supra), this Court while interpreting
F   Section 40 of the Kerala Act held as follows :-

         "17. Section 40 deals with suits for cancellation of
         decrees, etc. which are not covered by other sections. If
         this section is interpreted in the light of the expression
         "save as otherwise provided" used in Section 7(1 ), it
G        becomes clear that the rule enshrined therein is a clear
         departure from the one contained in Section 7 read with
         Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 which provide
         for payment of court fee on the market value of the
         property. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special rule.
H
POLAMRASETTI MANIKYAM v. TEEGALA VENKATA 1135
     RAMAYYA [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.)
  18. Section 40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation       A
  of a decree for money or other property having a money
  value, or other document which purports or operates to
  create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in the
  present or in future, any right, title or interest in money,
  movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on           B
  the value of the subject-matter of the suit and further lays
  down that such value shall be deemed to be, if the whole
  decree or other document sought to be cancelled, the
  amount or value of the property for which the decree was
  passed or othe.r document was executed. If a part of the          c
  decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such
  part of the amount or value of the property constitute the
  basis for fixation of court fee. Sub-section (2) lays down
  that if the decree or other document is such that the liability
  under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates
                                                                    0
  only to a particular item of the property belonging to the
  plaintiff or the plaintiffs share in such property, fee shall
  be computed on the value of such property, or share or on
  the amount of the decree, whichever is less.

   19. The deeming clause contained in the substantive part         E
   of Section 40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for
   cancellation of a document which creates any right, title or
   interest in immovable property, the court fee is required
   to be computed on the value of the property for which the
   document was executed. To put it differently, the value of       F
   the property for which the document was executed and not
   its market value is relevant for the purpose of court fee. If
   the expression "value of the subject-matter of the suit" was
   not followed by the deeming clause, it could possibly be
   argued that the word "value" means the market value, but         G
   by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has
   made it clear that if the document is sought to be
   cancelled, the amount of court fee shall be computed on
   the value of the property for which the document was
   executed and not the market value of the property. The           H
                                                            ./
    1136     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014) 1 S.C.R.


A        words "for which" appearing between the words "property"
         ard "other documents" clearly indicate that the court fee
         is required to be paid on the value of the property
         mentioned in the document, which is the subject-matter of
         challenge.
B
         20. If the legislature intended that fee should be payable
         on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit filed
         for cancellation of a document which purports or operates
         to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any present
         or future right, title and interest, then it would have, instead
c        of incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on the
         value of subject-matter, specifically provided for payment
         of court fee on the market value of the subject-matter of
         the suit as has been done in respect of other types of suits
         mentioned in Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48.
D
         The legislature may have also, instead of using the
         expression "value of the property for which the document
         was executed", used the expression "value of the property
         in respect of which the document was executed". However,
         the fact of the matter is that in Section 40(1) the legislature
E        has designedly not used the expression "market value of
         the property".

       13. Applying the above reasoning, this Court in Satheedevi
  (supra) upheld the view expressed by learned Single Judge of
F the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam Venkateswara Reddy
  v. Golla Venkatanarayana AIR 1975 AP 122 and the Division
  Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Venkata
  Narasimha Raju v. Chaandrayya AIR 1927 Mad 825,
  Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder (1967) 80 Mad LW 19 (SN) and
G Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai (1968) 83 Mad LW
  789 and ruled that those judgments have laid down the correct
  law.

         14. This Court in Satheedevi (supra), therefore, gave its
    seal of approval to the judgment of learned Single Judge of the
H    \
 POLAMRASETTI MANIKYAM v. TEEGALA VENKATA 1137
      RAMAYYA [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam Venkateswara Reddy                A
(supra), wherein learned Single Judge took the view that in a
suit for cancellation of sale deed which was executed for a
specified amount, the Court Fee has to be paid on that amount
and not on the basis of the market value of the property at the
presentation of the plaint.                                          B

      15. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the impugned
judgment, while interpreting Section 37 of the Court Fees Act,
placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment in
Lakshminagar Housing Welfare Association (supra), wherein            C
the Bench, as already indicated, placed reliance on the Full
Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Kolachala
Kutumba Sastri (supra), though a reference was made to the
 learned Single Judge Bench judgment in Allam Venkateswara
Reddy (supra). Since we are in agreement with the reasoning
in Satheedevi (supra), which has given its seal of approval to       D
the reasoning of the learned Single Judge judgment of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam Venkateswara Reddy
(supra), the judgment of the Division Bench in Lakshminagar
Housing Welfare Association (supra) is no more good law.
                                                                     E
     16. We are of the view, Section 37 of the Court Fees Act,
which deals with the suits for cancellation of decrees etc. is not
governed by other Sections of the Court Fees Act, such as
Section 7 and other related provisions. If Section 37 of the
Court Fees Act is interpreted in the light of the expression         F
"save as otherwise provided" used in Section 7 of the Court
Fees Act, it becomes clear that the rule enshrined therein is a
clear departure from the one contained in Section 7 read with
Sections 24, 26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 42 and 45, which provide for
payment of Court Fee on the market value of the property. In         G
that context, we are also of the view that Section 37 is. stand
alone provision, wherein the legislature has designedly not used
the expression "market value of the property". Section 37 of the
Court Fees Act, therefore, contains a special rule for valuing
the property for the purpose of Court Fee and jurisdiction and
                                                                     H
    1138      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A we do not see any reason why the expression "value of the
  property" used in Section 37 be substituted with the expr-eSsion
  "market value of the property"

       17. In such circumstances, we are inclined to set aside the
  judgment of the H.igh Court and allow these appeals.
8
  Consequently, the otders passed by the appellate Court as well
  as the High Court wpuld stand quashed. The trial Court is
  dfrected to proceed with the suit in· accordance with law and
  the declaration made by this Court.

C          18. The Appeals are, accordingly, allowed. However, there
    will be no order as to costs.

    R.P.                                          Appeals allowed.