POOJA RAVINDER DEVIDASANIversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA&ANR.

                          [2014] 14 S.C.R. 1468


A                    POOJA RAVINDER DEVIDASANI
                                    v.
                    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA&ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2604-2610 of 2014)
B
                          DECEMBER 17, 2014
               [SUDHANsu· JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                                                                 ••
                        N:V. RAMANA, JJ.]
                                                '
         Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ,... s. 141 - Vicarious ·
C liability- Inference of- Held: Liability uls. 141 can be inferred
  on a person only when such person was at the helm of affairs
  of the Company actively looking after its day to day affairs,
  at the material time - There should be specific averment
  against such person showing as to how the person was
D responsible
            ..
                 for the conduct of business
                                         .     of the Company.
         Code ofCiiminal Procedure, 1973 :- s. 482- Criminal
   proceeding - Initiated u/s. 138 rlw. s.' 141 of Negotiable .
   Instruments Act- Quashing of Held: Criminal law n·ot to be
E set into motion as a matter of course without examining nature
   of a/legations and evidence in support thereof and without
   ascertaining whether the offence was prima facie committed
 · - In the present case, continuation of the criminal
   proceedings against the appellant-accused Act is pure abuse
F of process of law - The appellant cannot be held vicariously
   liable for the act of the Company as her role in the day tp day
   affairs of the company was not explained - Negotiable
   lnstrumentsAct, 1881-s.138rlws.141.
              Allowing the appeals, the Court
G             HELD: 1. Summoning of an accused in a criminal
         case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into
         motion as a matter of course. The order of the Magistrate
         summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied
         his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable
H
                                   1468
    ..
      POOJARAVINDERDEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                   1469
             MAHARASHTRA&ANR.

thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made A
in the complaint and the evidence both oral and
documentary in support thereof and would that be
sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing
charge holT!e to the accused. The Magistrate has to
carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and B
may even himself put questions to the complainant and
his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness
of the allegations or oth.erwise and then examine if any
offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the
accused. [Para 22][1483-F-H; 11-84-A-B]                      c
     Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial
     Magistrate & Ors. (1998) 5 SCC 343.: 1998 (3)
     SCR 104- retied on.
      2. To fasten vicarious liability under Section 141 of ·
                                                              0
the Negotiable Instruments· Act, on a person, at the
material time that person shall have been at the helm of
affairs of the Company, one who actively looks after the
day-to-day activities of the Company and particularly.
responsible for the conduct of its business. Simply E
because a person is a Director of a Company, does not
make him liable under the Act. Every person connected
with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the
provision. There must be specific averments against the
Director showing as to how and in what manner the F
Director was responsible for the conduct of the.business
of the Company. [Paras 17 and 20][1481-D-F; 1483-A]
     National Small Industries Corporation v. Harmeet
     Singh Paintal &Anr. 2010 (3) SCC 330: 2010 (2)
     SCR 805; Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta &Anr.         G
     (1971) 3 SCC 189: 1971 (3) SCR 748; State of
     Karnataka v. Pratap Chand & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC
    .335 : 1981 (3) SCR 200; Sabitha Ramamurthy
     &Anr. v. R.B.S. Channbasavaradhya (2006) 10
     SCC 581 : 2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 126- relied on.           H
.. 1470        SUPREME COURT REPORTS'            [2014] 14 S.C.R.


   A      . 3. The vicarious liability u/s. 141 can be informed
       only if the requisite statements, which are required to be
       averred in the complaint petition, are made so as to make
       the accused therein vicariously liable for the· offence
     . committed by the company. By verbatim rep~oducing the
    B wording of the Section without a clear statement of fact
       supported by proper evidence, tso as to make the
       accused_ vicariously liable, is a ground for quashing
       proceedings initiated against.such person u/s. 141.
       [Para .21)[1483"D·EJ
    c          4. The factum of appellant resigning from the
        Board of Directors is established. Two persons,· were
       ·inducted as Director-Operations cif the Company on the
        same date, the appellant had ceased to be a Director..
        Respondent No. 2 was well aware of the change of
    D. Directors. Respondent No, 2 on the cine hand ·raises a.
                                .          '        .
        doubt about the genuineness of Form 32, a public
        document, through which the default Company had
        communicated the change of.Directors to the Registrar.
        ·of the companies and on the other hand; he has arrayed
    E the two newly appointed Directors-Operations as
        accused whose names were communicated" to the
        Registrar of Companies by the _very :same Form 32.
         [Paras 24, 25 and 26][1485-D; 1486-A~c. EJ
           5. In the entire complaint, neither the role of the
    F appellant.in the affairs of the Company was explained.
      nor in what manner the appellant is responsible for tne
      conduct of business of the Company, was explained.
      The trade finance facility was extended by the
      Respondent No. 2 to the default Company after the
    G appellant resigned from the Board of Directors. [Para 28)
      [1487-B-D]
              6. Therefore, continuation of the criminal
          proceedings against the appellantu/s.138 r/w. s. 141 of
    H
      POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                   1471
             MAHARASHTRA&ANR.

the Act is a pure abuse of process of law and it has to be   A
interdicted at the threshold. [Para 28][1487-D]
       7. It cannot be said that the appellant is liable u/s .
. 138 r/w. s. 141, because the cheques were issued by
  virtue of letter of Guarantee from the appellant-accused.
 The Letter of Guarantee issued by the appellant gives B
  way for a civil liability. To settle the scores between the
  parties which are more in the nature of a civil dispute,
 the parties cannot be permitted to put the criminal law
  into motion and Courts cannot be a mere spectator to it.
 The Superior Courts should maintain purity in the C
  administration of Justice and should not allow abuse of
 the process of the Court. [Paras 29 and 30][1487-E-H;
  1488-A]
     Gunma/a Sales Private Ltd. v. Anu Mehta & Ors.          D
     2015 (1) sec 104.- relied on.
     Chand Dhawan v. JawaharLa/(1992) 3 SCC 317':
     1992 (2) SCR 837; Ma/wa Cotton and Spinning
     Mills Ltd. y. Virsa Singh Sidhu (2008) 17 SCC
     147 : 2008 ( 12 ) SCR 68 - referred to.                 E
                    Case Law Reference ,
     1992 (2) SCR 837            referred to   Para 12
    . 2008 (12) SCR 68           referred to   Para 12
                                                             F
     2015 (1) sec 104            relied on     Para 14
     2010 (2) SCR 805            relied on     Para 17
     1971 (3) SCR 748            relied on     Para 18
     1981 (3) SCR 200            relied on .   Para 19
                                                             G
     2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 126     relied on·    Para 21
     1998 (3) SCR 104            relied on     Para 22


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1472        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 14 S.C.R.


 A         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
       Appeal Nos. 2604-2610 of 2014.
           From the Judgment and Order dated 06.10.2010 of the
      High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition·
     ·Nos.614-620of2010.                     '
 B
          . Akhil Sibal, Mrs. Vanita Bhargava, Ajay Bhargava, Nitin
       Mishra, Pradeep Chindra; Nikhil Chawla (for M/s. Khaitan &
     · Co.),Advs., for the Appellant.          ·
            Gaurav Pachnanda, Sr.Adv., Biju Mattam, Tabrez M., Ms.
 C     Shruti Gupta, Ms. lndu Shrma, A. P. Mayee, Nitin Lonkar, A.
       Selvin Raja, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, Advs., for the
       Respondents.                      ·        ·         ·
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 D          N·. V. RAMAN A, J. 1. Leave granted.
           2. These appeals by special leave are filed by the
     appellant challenging the impugned judgment and order dated
     6'h October, 2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
     Bombay in Writ Petition Nos. 614-620 of 2010 whereby the
 E · High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellant
     seeking quashing of the complaints filed by the Respondent
   • No.2 under Section 138 read with Section 141 .of the
     Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafterreferred to as
     "the N.l.Act").                          : .             .   ·
 F
           3, The brief facts of these appeals are that Respondent
     No. 2, a finance Company, filed seven complaints under the
     N.I. Act against the appellant and others viz., (1) Complaint
     No. 3370/SS/2008 claiming Rs.1,64,69,801-14 (2) Complaint
 G No. 3641/SS/2008 claiming Rs.1,06,55,289:91 (3) Complaint
     No. 3368/SS/2008 claiming Rs. 1,41,95,806-40 (4) 3640/SS/
     2008 claiming Rs. 85,21,294/- (5) 3369/SS/2008 claiming
     Rs. 1,88, 12,292/-(6) 3642/SS/2008 claiming Rs. 1,69,95,353-
     50 and (7) Complaint No. 4086/SS/2009 for a claim of
     Rs. 8,08,973-25. In all the complaints the allegation was that
 H the Respondent No. 2 Company had extended trade finance
       POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                         1473
        MAHARASHTRA&ANR. [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

.facility to M/S Elite International Pvt. Ltd. to which the appellant A
 was a Director at the relevant time and several Cheques (119
 in number) issued by M/S Elite International Pvt. Ltd.
 aggregating to Rs.8,64,58,810-16, in discharge of its liability
 towards part payment, stood dishonoured with the banker's
 remarks "insufficient-funds". According to the complainant, at B
 the material time, the accused (appellant) was in charge and
 at the helm of affairs of M/S Elite International Pvt. Ltd. and
 therefore she is vicariously liable for the default of the Company
 as she is responsible for the conduct of i_ts business.
 Metropolitan Magistrate, 12'h Court, Bandra, Mumbai took            c
 cognizance of the complaints and issued process against the
 accused (appellant) for the offence punishable under Section
 138 of the N.1. Act.
       4. The aggrieved appellant filed Criminal Writ Petitions
  before the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeking           D
  quashing of the criminal proceedings pending oefore the
. Metropolitan Magistrate. The High Court initially by an interim
  order dated 28'h July, 201 Q granted stay of the criminal
  proceedings qua the appellant and directed the trial to be
. proceeded against the other accused. Finally, by the impugned      E
  order, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the
  appellant. Challenging the said order of dismissal, the
  appellant has preferred these appeals before this Court.
       5. The main contention advanced by the learned counsel
 for the appellant is that the appellant is merely a housewife · F
 who was appointed as a Non-Executive Director of M/_s Elite ·
 International Private Ltd. and had no active role in the conduct
 of business of the Company, particularly in the issuance of the
 cheques in question. As a matter of fact, the appellant had G
 resigned as the Director much before the issuance of the
 cheques in question, her resignation was also approved by
 the Board of Directors in the meeting held on 17'h December,
 2005: The resignation of the appellant as Director of M/S Elite·
 International Pvt. Ltd. has also been informed to the
 Registrar of Companies by Form No. 208 under Section 159, H
1474         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A     Schedule V, Part II of the Companies Act, 1956 when the annual
       return for the year ending on 31•' March, 2006 was filed. The
       trade facility was sanctioned by the Respondent No. 2 on 19'h
       January, 2005 as per the Letter of Guarantee executed by the
       appellant on the same date. The effective date of .resignation
 B     of the appellant as Director of the Company was 17'h
       December, 2005. With the result of approval of her resignation
       by the Board of Directors, the appellant ceased to play any
       role in the activities of the Company. The Cheques in question
       were issued by the Company in the year 2008 i.e. about two
 c     and half years after resignation of the appellant as Director.
       This fact itself emphasizes that the appellant was not involved
       in the affairs of the Company when the Cheques were issued
       and had no role either in the conduct of the business of the
       Company or in issuing the Cheques. ·
 D            6. After resignation of the appellant as a Director, Form
       32 under the Companies Act, 1956, pursuant to Section
       303(2), was filed by M/S Elite International Pvt. Lia. on 20'h
       December, 2005 with the Registrar of Companies indicating
       the appointments and changes among Directors. Jn the said
·E     Form 32, the nanies of two Directors who were newly appointed
       were shown with remarks "appointed as a Director-Operations"
       and against the name of the appellant the remarks "resigned
       as a Director" were shown. Taking note of this Form 32,
       Respondent No. 2 arrayed the newly appointed Directors as
 F     accused Nos. 4 & 5 in the complaints. It is thus clear that the
       Respondent No. 2 is well aware of the fact that the appellant
       was no longer a part of MIS Elite International Pvt. Ltd, yet
       initiated criminal proceedings fastening vicarious liability on
       the appellant.
 G             7 .. Learned counsel submitted that t6 fasten vicarious
        liability it is necessary under Sedion 141 of the N.l. Act that
        the complainant must aver and prove how and in what manner
       ·the appellant was responsible in the conduct of the business
        of the Company. The complainant shall also state in the light of
 H
      POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                       1475
       MAHARASHTRA&ANR. [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

proviso to Section 141 (1 ), in what capacity the appellant was A
in charge of day to day affairs of the default Company at the
relevant time, particularly when cheques were issued.
Respondent No. 2 (complainant) did not fulfill these
prerequisites contemplated by the Act but sought to impute
the appellant with vicarious liability only on account of the fact B
that the appellant had attended the Board Meeting of M/S Elite
International Pvt. Ltd. held on 14"' August, 2004. In that meeting,
the Board of Directors authorized another Director to execute
necessary documents in connection with trade finance facility
from Respondent No. 2. The mere presence of the appellant C
in the Board Meeting on 14'hAugust, 2004 would not amount
to an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
Merely arraying a Director of a Company as an accused in the
Complaint and making a bald or cursory statement without
attributing any specific role, that the Director is responsible D
for the conduct of the business would not make a case of
vicarious liability against a Director of the company· under
 Section 141 of the N. I. Act. Similarly, simply stating that the
appellant was in charge of the affairs of the Company would
 not be sufficient to justify the allegation under Section 138 of E
the N .I. Act. In other words, the complainant must explain the
 role.specifically attributable to the appellant in the commission
of the offence. Placing reliance on this Court's judgment irr
 National Small Industries Corporation Vs. Harmeet Singh
 Paintal &Anr. (2010) 3 SCC 330 learned.counsel submitted F
that the law is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases
that the complainant should specifically show as to how and in
what manner the accused w;:is responsible.
       8. Despite Respondent No. 2 has knowledge of the
  resignation of the appellant as Director of the Company and G
  she has no role in the issuance of cheques in question, yet as
  an arm twisting measure, the complainant arrayed the appellant
  in the complaint as a defaulter and initiated criminal
                                                   '         .
. proceedings against her. Knowing fully well about the change
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1476         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 14 S.C.R.

                                              t
 A     of Directors, Respondent No. 2 unnecessarily dragged the
       name of appellant into the litigation in a .casual and callous
       manner and initiated criminal proceedings against her along
       with the existing Directors of the Company which is untenable ·
                                    •
       under .the law. The Metropolitan Magistrate without proper
 B     application of mind issued process and the High Court also
       erred in construing the penal provision enunciated under the
       N.I. Act, and wrongfully dismissed the Criminal Writ Petitions
       filed by the appellant under Section 48.2, Cr.P.C.
              9. In support of his contention that the appellant was no
 C...., more a Director of the Company arid responsible for the
        conduct of its business at the relevant time, learned counsel
        relied upon the following:
        (i) Agenda item 4 of the Minutes of the Board meeting
 D dated 171h December, 2005 which reads as .under:
            "4. RESIGNATION OF DIRECTOR
              Chairman placed before the Members of the Board a
              letterreceived from Ms. Pooja Devidasani tendering her
          • . resignation as a Director of the Company.
 E
            Members of the Board noted the same and then they
            unanimously resolved as under:
            RESOLVED THAT resignation tendered by Ms. Pooja
            Devidasani be and is hereby accepte'i::I from the
 F         ·conclusion of this Board Meeting".· · ·           ·
         (ii) Form 32 submitted to the Registrar of Companies in
   pursuance ·of requirements of provisions of the Companies
   Act, 1956 in which against the nam·e of appellant; it was shown
   as "resigned as a Director". Whereas against the names of
 G Mr. Hitesh Haria and Mr. Parag Tejani., the words "appointed
   as a Director-Operations" were shown. Against the column
   "Date of appointment or change" the dates against all the above
   three persons were shown as 17'h De'cember, 2°005. Taking
 H note of these changes; Respondent No. 2 arrayed the newly
       POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                           1477
        MAHARASHTRA&ANR. [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

added Directors as defaulters, but not omitted the appellant          A
who has resigned as a Director whi.ch is specified in the very
Form 32.
     (iii) The Annual Return filed by the Company for the year
ending 31 ''March, 2006 which also showed that the appellant
was no longer a Director of the Company. In Column IV of the          8
Annual Return against the name of appellant, it was. clearly
mentioned as "Date of ceasing : 17-12-2005".
      (iv)A letter dated 5'" February, 2009 issued by the default
Company in favour of Respondent No. 2. In the said letter, while ·    c
forwarding certain details/information, a list of Directors was
also sent. The said list did not contain name of the appellant.
       Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the
 light of the above Respondent No. 2 was fully aware that
 appellant was ceased to be a Director of the Company (a) D
 prior to the issuance of cheques (b) prior to the dishonor of
 cheques (c) prior to the date of issuance of legal notice (d)
 prior to the expiry of 15 days period after issuance of legal
 notice after which cause of action to file criminal complaints
 arose and (e) prior to the filing of the criminal complaints.  E
        10. Learned counsel finally submitted that the allegations
  set out in the complaint do not constitute any offence against
  the appellant and the High Cour:t committed a manifest error
. in interpreting Section 141 of the N.I. Act in its proper
  perspective, which led to travesty of justice. He therefore urged   F
  for setting aside the impugned judgment and quash the criminal
  proceedings against the appellant.
       11. Learned senior counsel appearing for the
  respondents, on the other hand, supported the impugned G
  judgment of the High Court and submitted that by dismissing
  the writ petitions of the appellant the High Court had neither
· committed any illegality nor misinterpreted the provisions of
  the M.l.Act. Vehemently contendingthatthe resignation of the
  appellant itself is a disputed fact, he submitted that no certified H
.1478         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 14 S.C.R. ·


  A     copy of Form 32 was produced by the appellant and only a
        certified copy of Annual Return has beeri filed before this Court.
        Under Section 79 of the Evidence Act, 1872, a Court can
        presume genuineness of a document only when a certified copy
        is filed .. Even if certified copy of Form 32 t5- produced by the
  B     appellant to contend that at the time of issuance of cheques,
        she had already resigned, when such Form 32 is disputed by
        the complainant, it shall be the bounden duty of the appellant
        to prove such Form 32 by leading evidence in the trial. Only
        supplying a copy of Form 32, without proving its contents, would
  C     not be sufficient to quash a complaint under Section 138 read
        with Section 141 of the N. I. Act.
            12. In support of his contention that when the Form 32
      furnished by the appellant was disputed by the Respondent
      No. 2 the High Court cannot draw an inference on the basis of
  D such disputed document, learned counsel relied on decisions ·
      of this Court in Chand Dhawan Vs. Jawahar Lal ( 1992) 3
      SCC 317, Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills Ltd. Vs. Virsa
      Singh Sidhu (2008) 17SCC147. Therefore, the High Court
      was right in dismissing the writ petitions preferred by the
  E . appeJlant. Hence the appellant cannot take the plea of her
      resignation to escape from legal liability that too wh.en the
      resignat[on itself is a disputed fact. Unless and until trial takes
      place, it cannot be held that the appellant is no more a Director
      and noi liable. At the material time relating to the financial
  F transaction between Respondent No, 2 and the accused
      Company, the appellant was a Director and looking after the
      day to day affairs of the Company as a Director and hence
      she is liable to be prosecuted since .she had connived in the
      commis~ion of offence.             ·
  G           13, Learned counsel further submitted that apart from
        the averments made in the complaint; the appellant has also
        exec.uted an irrevocable Letter of Guarantee on 19'h January,
        2005 in favour of Respondent No. 2-Complainant, for availing
        trade finance facility. In the said -letter of Guarantee, the
  H
      POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                       1479
       MAHARASHTRA&ANR. [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

appellant categorically "undertook that in the event   of    the A
Company failing or neglecting or refusing to pay the amount
remaining unpaid, the same would be payable by her. She .
further agreed that her liability and obligation under the
Guarantee shall be continuing, absolute, unconditional and
irrevocable until the borrower is fully discharged from all B
liabilities, irrespective of any disputes or differences between
the partjes. The binding clause of the guarantee reads:
     "I, the Guarantor, expressly, irrevocably and
     unconditionally agree that your Company shall be entitled
     to enforce this Guarantee without making any demand         C
     ori or taking any proceedings against the Client for all
     the amounts due and payable by the Client to your
     Company under and in relation to the Agreement".
     The cheques in question were issued on the basis of the D
said Guarantee given by the appellant and on the simple
ground of resignation.she cannot deviate from vicarious liability.
as per the assurance given by herin the Letter of Guarantee.
      14. Learned counsel for the respondents made a
reference to the Judgment of this Court ln Gunma/a Sales E
Private Ltd. Vs. Anu Mehta & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.
2228 of 2014) decided on October 17, 2014 and submitted
that once in a complaint filed under Section 138 read with
Section 141 of the N .I. Act, the basic averment is made that
the Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct F
of the business of the Company at the relevant time when the
offence was committed, the Magistrate can issue process ·
against such Director and the basic averment is sufficient to
make out a case against the Director. Hence, learned senior
counsel concluded that there is no illegality in issuing process G
against the appellant.
     15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
arguments adv.anced by the counsel on either side at length.
The questions that arise for determination are (i) whether the
                  '                                               H '·
1480       " SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A  appellant is liable for prosecution under Section 138 read with
   .Section 141 of the N.I. Act for the alleged offence of dishonor
    of cheques committed by the default Company?; (ii) whether
  ·the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petitions filed
    by the appellant seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings
 B initiated against her by the Respondent No. 2?
            16. Before delving into the merits of the case, it woul\J
     · be apt to take. note of relevant portions oflhe complaints filed
      ·by Respondent Nd. 2 which read thus: ..
 c          "I say that the accused No. 2 to 5 on behalf of accused
            No. 1 have approached us with request.for trade finance
           facility and accordingly the said facility has been granted
            by us to the accused as per their request and
           requirement. .
 D           I say that accused No. 1 is private limited Company of
             which accused No. 2, 3 & 5 are Directors and accused
             No. 4 is the Director &authorized signatory of accused
             No. 1 MIS.Elite International Pvt. Ltd.-lmprest. At all
             material time relevant and. relating to the complaint,
 E          accused No. 2 to 5 ·Nere and are in charge of and
             responsibleJor the conduct of business of accused No.
             1 a.nd are also looking after day to day affairs of accused
             No. 1. It is further submitted that accused No. 2 to 5 with
             accused No. 1 are liable to be prosecuted and I or
 F          connived in the commission of the present offence, in
            their capacity as a Director/signatory of the said private
           ·.limited Company. ·                            ·
           . I say that as narrated in para 4 accused No..2 to 5 being
             responsible for the affairs of accused No. 1 i.e. private     .1
                                                                            I
 G          limited Company are liable to be prosecuted for having
             committed a criminal offence in the event of failure on
             their part to comply with the requisitions contained in the
             statufory notice dated 03"11-08, which was sent to them
             both under RP.AD; & UP.C. on 06/11/08. I say that notice
 H
      POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                      1481.
       MAHARASHTRA&ANR.[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

       was received by all the accused on or about 08/11/08      A
     . and notice sentthrough U.P.c.· are deemed to have been
       served.However, accused have failed and neglected to
       make our payment under the above said.dishonored
       cheques".·
       17. There is no dispute that the appellant, who was wife 8
 of the Managing Director, was appointed as a Director of the
 Company-MIS Elite International Pvt. Ltd. on 1''July, 2004. ·
·and had also executed a Letter of Guarantee on 19th January,
 2005. The cheques in question were issued during April, 2008
 to September, 2008. So far as the dishonor of Cheques is c·
 concerned, admittedly the cheques were not signed by the
 appellant. There is also no dispute that the appellant Was not
 the M~naging Direetor but on_ly a non-executive Director of the
 Company. Non-executive Director is no doubt a custodipn of
 the governance of the Company but does not_involve in the D
 day-to-day ,affairs of the running of its business and only
 monitors the executive activity. To fast@n vis;arious liability
 under Section 141 of the Act on a person, at the material time ·
 that person. shall have been at the helm of affairs of the
 Company, one who actively looks after the day~to-day activities E
 of the Company and particularly responsible for the conduct of
 its business. Simply because a person is a Director of a
 Company, does not make him liable under the N.1.Act. Every
 person connected with the Company will noUall into the i;imbit .
 of the provision. Time and again, it has been asserted by this · F
 Court that only those persons who were 'in charge Of and
 responsible for the conduct ofttie business of the Company at ·
 the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal
 action. A Director, who was not in charge of and was not
 responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at G
 the relevant time, will not be liable for an offence under·section
 141 of the N.I. Act. In National Small Industries Corporation
 (supra) this Court observed:

                                                                 H
1482         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2014) 14 S.C.R.


 A            "Section 141 ·is a penal provision creating vicarious
            . liability, and which, as per settled law, must be strictly
              construed. It is therefore, not sufficient to make a bald
              cursory statement in a complaint that the Director
              (arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and responsible
 B            to the company for the conduct of the,business of the
           . company without anything more as to the role of the
              Director. But the complaint should speltout as to how
              and in what mannerRespondent       •
                                                   1J was in charge of or
              was responsible to the accused Company for the conduct
 c            of its business. This is in consonance with strict
              interpretation of penal statutes, especially, where such
              statutes create vicarious liability.
            . A company may have a number of Directors and to make
              any or all the Directors as accused in a complaint merely
 D            on the.. basis of a statement that they are in charge of and
              responsible for the conduct of the business of the
              company without anything more is not a sufficient or
              adequate fulfillment of the requirements under Section
              141.
 E
            18. In Girdhari Lal Gupta Vs. D.H. Mehta &Anr. (1971)
       3 SCC 189, this Court observed that a person 'in charge of a
       business' means th.at the person should be in overall control of
       the day to day business of the Company.

 F          19. A Director of a Comp~any is liable to be convicted for
    . an offence committed by the Company if he/she was in charge
      of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of its
      business or if it is proved that the offence was committed with ·
      the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any
 G . negligence on ttie pact of the Director concerned [See: State
      ofKarnatakaVs . .Pratap Chand & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 335).
            20. In other words,' the law laid down by this Court is that
       for making;aDirector of a Company liable 'for the offences
       committed by the. Company under Section 141 of the N.I. Act,
'H
       POOJA RAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                    1483-
        MAHARASHTRA&ANR. [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

  there must be specific averments against the Director A
  showing as to how and in what manner the Director was
· responsible for the conduct of the business of the
  Company.
     21. In Sabitha Ramamurthy & Anr. Vs~ R.8.S.
 Channbasavaradhya (2006) 10 SCC 581, it was held by B
 this Court that it is not necessary for the complainant to
 specifically reproduce the wordings of the section but what is
 required is a clear statement of fact so as to enable· the court
 to arrive at a prima facie opinion that the accused ls vicariously
 liable ..Section 141 raises a legal fiction. By reason of the C
 said provision, a person although is not personally liable
 for commission of such an offence would be vicariously
 liable therefor. Such vicarious liability can be inferred so
 far as a company registered or incorporated under the
 Companies Act, 1956 is concerned only if the requisite D
 statements, which are required to be averred in the
 complaint petition, are made so as to make the accused
 therein vicariously liable for the offence committed by
 the company. By verb.atim reproducing the wording of the
 Section without a clear statement ·of fact supported by proper .E
 evidence, so as to make the accused vicariously liable, is a
 ground for quashing proceedings initiated against such person
 under Section 141 of the N.l.Act.
           •
      22. As held by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr.       F
 Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. (1998) 5 SCC 343,
 summoning of an accused in a cri.minal case is a serious
 matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of
 course. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused .
 must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the G
 case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the
 nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence
 both oral and documentary in support the(eof.and would that
 be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge
 home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent H
1484         SUPREME COURT REPORTS
                              , .                      [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence
   before summoning of the accused. Th~ Magistrate· has to
   carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may
   even himself put questions to the complainant and his
   witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the
 B allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is
   prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.
                                                  '.
            23. In Gunma/a Sales Private Ltd. (supra) on which
       learned counsel for the respondents has heavily relied, this
       Court at Para 33(c) held:                          ·
 c
               "In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the
               complaint, the High Court may, despite the presence
               of the basic averment, quash the complaint
               because of the absence of more particulars about
 D
               role of the Director in the complaint. It may do
               so having come across · some unimpeachable,
        .. · uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond
            ·..susp1c1on or doubt or totally acceptable
            . circumstances which may clearly indicate. that
               the Director could not have been concerned with
 E
               the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand .
               the trial would be abuse of the process of the court.
               Despite the presence of basic aver,merit, it may .
               come to a conclusion that no·case is made out
               against the Director. Take for instance a case of
 F
               a Director suffering from a terminal illness who
               was bedridden at the relevant time. or a Director
               who had resi'gned long before issuance of
               cheques. In such cases, if the High Court is
               convinced that prosecuting such a Director is
 G           .merely an arm-twisting tactics, the High Court may
           .. quash the proceedings. It bears repetition to state
               that to establish such case unimpeachable,
               urn:ontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or
               doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances wi.11 have
 H
       POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                      1485
        MAHARASHTRA&ANR. [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

      to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such         A
      cases may be few and far between but the possibility
     iof_such a case being there cannot be ruled out".
      24. In the light of the law laid down by this Court, the
present case be examined. It is not in dispute that two
persons, namely, Parag Tejani and Hitesh Haria, were inducted B
as Director-Operations of the Company w.e.f. 1?'h December,
2005 by virtue of a resolution passed by the Company on the
same date. It is on the same date the appellant had ceased to
be a Director as per the Annual Report which is not disputed
by the Respondent No. 2. A perusal of the Complaint shows C
that Respondent No. 2 has made the newly appointed
Directors-Operations Parag Tejani and Hitesh Haria also as
accused stating that all the accused approached him with a
request for trade finance facility and accordingly the said facility
was granted as per their request. It thus gives an impression D
that Respondent No. 2 is well aware of the change 'Of Directors
in the.accused Company. In spite of knowing the developments
taken place in the Company that the appellant was no longer a
Director of the Company and two new Directors were inducted,
the Respondent No. 2 has chosen to array all of them as E
accused in the Complaints. Moreover, Responde_nt No. 2 had
not disputed this fact emphatically in the proceedings before
the High Court. We have gone though the reply affidavit filed
by Respondent No. 2 before the High Court of Bombay.
                                                                  F
        25. A bare reading of the averment of Respondent No. 2
 before the High Court, suggests that his case appears to be
 that the appellant has not proved her resignation in unequivocal
 terms and it is a disputed question of fact. It is noteworthy that
 the respondent No. 2 except making a bald statement and
 throwing the burden on the appellant to prove authenticity of G
.documents, has not pleaded anywhere that the public
documents Form 32 and Annual Return are forged and
fabricated documents. Curiously, respondent No. 2 on the one
 hand raises a doubt aboutthe genuineness of Form 32, a public
                                                                  H
1486       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A   document, through which the default Company had
     communicated the change of Directors to.the Registrar of the
     Companies with the effect of resignation of the appellant and
     induction of two Directors-Operations and on the other hand,
     he has arrayed the two newly appointed Directors-Operations
 B as accused whose names were communicated to the
   · Regil!trar of Companies by the very same Form 32. The
     respondent/complainant cannot be permitted to blow hot and .
     cold at the l!ame time. When he denies the genuineness of
     the document, he cannot act upon it and array the newly
 c   appointed Directors as accused.
          26. We have also perused the copy of Annual Return filed
   by M/S Elite International Pvt.· Ltd. for the year 2006, on 31 •1
   March, 2006 furnished in Form 20B as per Section 159 of the
   Companies Act, 1956. Column IV of Schedule V....; Part 11 of
 D tt)eAnnual Return, requires information regarding Directors/
   Manager/Secretary (Past and Present) in which against the
   name of Devidasani Ravinder Pooja-appellant it was
   mentioned "Date of ceasing : 17-12-2005". Admittedly, a
   certified copy of the Annual Return became part of record ..
 E Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the factum of
   appellant resigning from the Board of D~rectors is established.
          27. Unfortunately, the High Court.did not deal the issue
   in a proper perspective and committed error in dismissing the
   writ petitions by holding that in the Complaints filed by the .
 F Respondent No. 2, specific averments were made against the
   appellant. But on the contrary, taking the complaint as a whole,
   it can be inferred that in the entire complaint, no specific role
   is attributed to the appellant in the commission of offence. It is
   settled law that to attract a case under Section 141 of the N .I.
 G Act a specifjc role must have been played by a Director of the
   Company for fastening vicarious liability. But in this case, the
   appellant was neither. a Director of the accused Company nor
   in charge of or involved in the day to day affairs of the Company
   at the time of commission of the allege'd offence. There is not
 H
      POOJARAVINDER DEVIDASANI v. STATE OF                         1487
       MAHARASHTRA&ANR. [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

even a whisper or shred of evidence on record to show that          A
there is any act committed by the appellant from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn that the appellant could
be vicariously held liable for the offence with which she is
charged.
       28. In the entire complaint, neitherthe role of the appellant B
in the affairs of the Company was explained nor in what manner
the appellant is responsible for the.conduct of business of the
Company, was explained. From the record it appears that the
trade finance facility was extended by the Respondent No. 2 ·
to the default Company during the period from 13'h April, 2008 C
to 14th October, 2008, against which the Cheques were issued
by the Company which stood dishonored. Much before that on
17'h December, 2005 the appellant resigned from the Board
of Directors. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that
continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant D
under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N .I. Act is a
pure abuse of process of law and it has to be interdicted at the
threshold.
     29. So far as the Letter of Guarantee is concerned, it         E
gives way for a civil liability which the respondent No. 2-
complainant can always pursue the· remedy before the
appropriate Court. So, the contention that the cheques in
question were issued by virtue of such Letter of Guarantee
and hence the appellant is liable under Section 138 read with       F
Section 141 of the N.l.Act, cannot also be accepted in these
proceedings.
     30. Putting the criminal law into motion is not a matter of
course. To settle the scores between the parties which are
more in the nature of a civil dispute, the parties cannot be G
permitted to put the criminal law into motion and Courts cannot
be a mere spectator to it. Before a Magistrate taking
cognizance of.an offence under Section 138/141 of the N.I.
Act, making a person vicariously liable has to ensure strict
                                                                    H
1488         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  · [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A     compliance of the statutory requirements. ifhe Superior Courts
       should maintain purity in the administration of J.ustice and ,
       should not allow abuse of the process of the Court. The High ·
       Court ought to have quashed the complaint against the
       appellant which is nothing but a pure abuse of process of law. ·
 B            31. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that
       this is a fit case for quashing the complaint, and accordingly
       allow these appeals by setting aside the impugned judgment
       passed by the High Court and quash the criminal proceedings
       pending against the appellant before the Trial Court.          ·
 c
       Kalpana K. Tripathy                             · Appeals allow.ed.