Supreme Court of India
POONAMversusDULE SINGH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1284
- Decided
- 6 November 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Failure to disclose a conviction, even for a non‑serious offence, in the affidavit required under Rule 24‑A renders the nomination improperly accepted and the election of a returned candidate void under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.
Summary
The petitioner, Poonam, was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and failed to disclose this conviction in the affidavit required by Rule 24‑A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 when filing her nomination for councillor. The trial court declared her election void under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961, a decision upheld by the High Court. The petitioner argued that the conviction was for a non‑serious offence, had been set aside on appeal, and that the election result was not materially affected. The Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement to disclose any conviction is mandatory, irrespective of the offence’s seriousness, and that non‑disclosure renders the nomination improperly accepted, automatically voiding the election without needing proof of material effect. The Court also rejected the petitioner's claim of an exceptional case for special leave under Article 136, noting the lack of any justification for condoning the breach. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether non‑disclosure of a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the affidavit filed under Rule 24‑A constitutes a breach that voids the election under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.
- Whether a subsequent acquittal of the conviction affects the disqualification arising from the earlier non‑disclosure.
- Whether the seriousness of the offence or lack of moral turpitude can render the non‑disclosure immaterial.
- Whether the material effect on the election needs to be proved when the nomination is improperly accepted.
- Whether the Supreme Court should entertain the Special Leave Petition under Article 136 in the present circumstances.
Legislation cited
- Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961s. 22(1)(d)(iii)
- Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994s. Rule 24-A
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The High Court upheld the judgment of the trial Court by recording a finding that by failing to disclose conviction in the affidavit filed along with nomination form, there was a breach of Rule 24-A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 and was rightly set aside. Headnotes† Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 – s.22(1)(d)(iii) – Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 – Petitioner suffered a conviction u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Subjects
Election petitionNon-disclosureCriminal antecedentsDeclaration of criminal antecedentsArticle 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of IndiaFalse and incorrect informationNon-compliance of the provisions of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994AffidavitMoral TurpitudeMaterial information
Judgment
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 1284
Poonam
v.
Dule Singh & Ors.
(Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12000 of 2025)
06 November 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and
Atul S. Chandurkar,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The High Court upheld the judgment of the trial Court by recording
a finding that by failing to disclose conviction in the affidavit filed
along with nomination form, there was a breach of Rule 24-A of
the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 and
the petitioner’s election was rightly set aside.
Headnotes†
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Madhya Pradesh
Municipalities Act, 1961 – s.22(1)(d)(iii) – Madhya Pradesh
Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 – Petitioner suffered a
conviction u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and
was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period
of one year and also ordered to pay compensation – The fact
of her conviction, had not been disclosed in the affidavit filed
along with the nomination form as required by Rule 24-A of
the Rules of 1994 – Trial Court declared her election as null
and void – Revision application before the High Court was
dismissed – Correctness:
Held: Undisputably, the petitioner was convicted on 07.08.2018
u/s.138 of the Act of 1881 – On consideration of the statutory
provisions as well as the documentary material on record it becomes
clear that under Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994, every candidate
contesting elections is required to furnish information which includes
declaration of criminal antecedents, etc. – The information required
to be furnished is with regard to any pending criminal case in
which the candidate is charged or any criminal case that has
been disposed of and has resulted in his conviction – Same is
also necessary u/Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India – Failure
* Author
2 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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to furnish such affidavit can result in rejection of the nomination
paper – It is an admitted position that, the petitioner failed to
disclose her conviction for the offence punishable u/s.138 of the
Act of 1881 – By failing to disclose her previous conviction, the
petitioner furnished false and incorrect information as regards her
criminal antecedents – As a result the verification of her affidavit
was false and incorrect – The acceptance of her nomination form
has therefore been rightly held to be improper – She being the
returned candidate, her election was rendered void – As far as
plea for exceptional case made by the petitioner is concerned, the
same cannot be accepted – Both the Courts have concurrently
found that the petitioner failed to disclose her conviction without
any justifiable reason – In these facts therefore, no special or
exceptional case has been made out by the petitioner for this
Court to exercise jurisdiction u/Art.136 of the Constitution of India.
[Paras 10, 13, 15, 24, 25]
Case Law Cited
Pritam Singh v. State, 1950 INSC 9 : [1950] 1 SCR 453 – followed.
Ravi Namboothiri v. K.A. Baiju & Others, 2022 INSC 1187 : [2022]
18 SCR 273; Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another, 2024 INSC
289 : [2024] 4 SCR 394 – distinguished.
Resurgence India v. Election Commission of India and Another,
2013 INSC 617 : [2013] 9 SCR 360; Krishnamoorthy v. Shivakumar
and Others, 2015 INSC 960 : [2015] 4 SCR 987; Union of India v.
Association for Democratic Reforms, 2002 INSC 253 : [2002] 3
SCR 696; Kisan Shankar Kathore v. Arun Dattatray Sawant &
Others, 2014 INSC 384 : [2014] 7 SCR 258; People’s Union for
Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India and Another, 2023 INSC
176 : [2023] 3 SCR 985; Sri Mairembam Prithviraj @ Prithviraj
Singh v. Shri Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh, 2016 INSC 1000 :
[2016] 9 SCR 687 – referred to.
List of Acts
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Madhya Pradesh Municipalities
Act, 1961; Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994.
List of Keywords
Election petition; Non-disclosure; Criminal antecedents; Declaration
of criminal antecedents; Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India;
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 3
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
False and incorrect information; Non-compliance of the provisions
of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994; Affidavit; Moral Turpitude;
Material information.
Case Arising From
EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 12000 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.03.2025 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in CR No. 213 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Vivek Tankha, Sr. Adv., Inder Dev Singh, Ms. Niti Richhariya, Ashish
S Sharma, Lucky Jain.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Sarvam Ritam Khare, Kushagra Sharma, Akarsh Khare, Pashupathi
Nath Razdan, Abhinav Srivastav, Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Astik
Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Atul S. Chandurkar, J.
1. The petitioner suffered a conviction under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. She, however, failed to disclose
her conviction in the nomination form for the election to the post
of Councillor. Her election was challenged by the first respondent,
and the trial Court unseated her from the post of Councillor holding
her to be disqualified under the provisions of The Madhya Pradesh
Municipalities Act, 1961. The revision application preferred by the
petitioner having been dismissed, she has preferred the present
Special Leave Petition.
2. In the elections held for the post of Councillor at Nagar Parishad,
Bhikangaon, the petitioner came to be elected from Ward No.5
securing the highest number of votes. Notification to that effect
dated 04.10.2022 came to be issued. The first respondent filed
an election petition under Section 20 of the Madhya Pradesh
4 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter, “the Act of 1961”) read with The
Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 (hereinafter
“the Rules of 1994”) and sought a declaration that the petitioner
be held disqualified for holding the post of Councillor and that her
seat be declared as vacant. In the election petition, it was pleaded
by the first respondent that on 07.08.2018, the petitioner had been
convicted in proceedings filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter, “the Act of 1881”). She had been
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year
and also ordered to pay compensation. The fact of her conviction,
however, had not been disclosed by the petitioner in the affidavit
filed along with the nomination form as required by Rule 24-A of
the Rules of 1994. Though other grounds of challenge were also
raised, same are not relevant for the present purpose. It was thus
prayed that the petitioner be declared disqualified from holding the
post of Councillor.
3. The petitioner filed her reply and opposed the election petition by
raising a plea that the order of conviction dated 07.08.2018 was
no longer in existence as the same had set aside in appeal. She
stated that the election petition was liable to be dismissed as she
had not incurred any disqualification as mentioned in Section 35 of
the Act of 1961.
4. The parties led evidence before the trial Court and after considering
the same, the learned Judge of the trial Court held that the petitioner
had been convicted under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 which
fact had not been disclosed in the affidavit filed along with the
nomination form. It was further held that since it was mandatory
on the part of a candidate to disclose if he/she had suffered any
conviction, the voters had a right to obtain correct information. As
the conviction of the petitioner was not mentioned in her affidavit,
it was clear that this had affected the voters from Ward No.5. The
election of the petitioner was held to be materially affected. It was
thus concluded that since the petitioner failed to disclose the fact of
her conviction in her affidavit, she was disqualified from continuing
as a Councillor. By the judgment dated 17.02.2025, the election
of the petitioner was set aside holding her to be disqualified for
holding the post of Councillor from Ward No.5. Her election was
declared null and void.
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 5
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
5. The petitioner being aggrieved by her disqualification challenged the
same by filing a revision application before the High Court under
Section 26 (2) of the Act of 1961. One of the contentions raised on
behalf of the petitioner was that the order of conviction had been
set aside on 30.12.2022 and hence the same could not be the basis
for unseating her. It was also urged that the first respondent had
failed to prove that the election of the petitioner had been materially
affected on account of non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 24-A
of the Rules of 1994. The learned Judge of the High Court held that
the petitioner had failed to disclose the fact of her conviction in her
affidavit filed along with the nomination form. This resulted in breach
of Rules 24-A of the Rules of 1994. Consequently, the provisions of
Section 22(1) (d) (iii) of the Act of 1961 were attracted and the same
was the ground for declaring the election of the petitioner to be void.
While arriving at this finding, it was observed that the petitioner did
not enter into the witness box to establish that by failing to disclose
her conviction, her election was not materially affected nor did it
influence the election. The judgment of the trial Court was thus
upheld by recording a finding that by failing to disclose her conviction
in the affidavit filed along with nomination form, there was a breach
of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 and the petitioner’s election was
rightly set aside. The revision application was thus dismissed. Being
aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution of India
6. Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner made
the following submissions:
a. The election of the petitioner was wrongly declared as null
and void. Assuming that there was a failure on the part of
the petitioner to disclose her conviction under Section 138 of
the Act of 1881, it could not be said that such non-disclosure
was of a substantial nature that would affect the outcome of
the election for it to be set aside. The conviction was for an
offence not involving moral turpitude and therefore such non-
disclosure was not of a material nature. The offence being
compoundable in nature and the conviction of the petitioner
having been subsequently set aside, no material difference could
be stated to have been made on account of non-disclosure of
such conviction in the affidavit. To substantiate this contention
6 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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the learned Senior Advocate placed reliance on the decisions
in Ravi Namboothiri vs. K.A. Baiju & others1 and Karikho
Kri vs. Nuney Tayang and another2. It was thus urged that
the election of the petitioner having been wrongly set aside,
she was liable to be restored to her elected post.
b. The first respondent (election petitioner) had failed to prove
that the election of the petitioner as a returned candidate had
been materially affected on account of non-disclosure of her
conviction in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form.
Hence, her election could not have been set aside under Section
22 (1) (d) (i) or (iii) of the Act of 1961. There were no pleadings
in the election petition that by the improper acceptance of the
petitioner’s nomination form or on account of non-compliance of
the provisions of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994, the election of
the petitioner had been materially affected. This material aspect
was not taken into consideration while unseating the petitioner.
7. On the other hand, Mr. Sarvam Ritam Khare, learned Advocate
appearing for the first respondent opposed the appeal by urging
as under:
a. The fact that the petitioner had been convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 not having
been disclosed in the affidavit required to be filed under Rule
24-A of the Rules of 1994, it was clear that the nomination form
of the petitioner was wrongly accepted in breach of Section
22 (1)(d) (i) of the Act of 1961. There had also been non-
compliance with the requirements of the Act of 1961 and the
Rules of 1994 thereby affecting the petitioner’s nomination. On
this count, the election of the petitioner had been rightly set
aside. In support of this submission the learned Advocate placed
reliance on the decisions in Resurgence India Vs. Election
Commission of India and another3 and Krishnamoorthy Vs.
Shivakumar and others.4
1 2022 INSC 1187
2 2024 INSC 289
3 2013 INSC 617
4 2015 INSC 960
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 7
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
b. Since the petitioner was convicted on 07.08.2018 and the said
conviction continued to operate when the nomination form was
filed, the subsequent acquittal of the petitioner on 30.12.2022
after the elections were held was of no consequence. The
eligibility of a candidate was required to be determined as on the
date of submission of the nomination form. Both the Courts had
rightly found that the conviction of the petitioner was operating
when she had submitted the nomination form.
c. After the election of the petitioner was set aside, fresh elections
were held to fill in the vacancy as caused. The petitioner had
again contested the said election but was unsuccessful. Since
the petitioner had lost the subsequent election, the challenge
raised by her to the order passed by the trial Court had now
been rendered infructuous.
On these grounds, it was urged that there was no case made
out to interfere with the impugned adjudication.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and
with their assistance we have also perused the documentary
material on record. Before considering the challenge raised by the
petitioner, it would be necessary to first deal with the submission of
the first respondent that by virtue of the subsequent election to fill
in the vacancy caused by the disqualification of the petitioner, her
challenge as raised had been rendered infructuous. In this regard,
it is necessary to note that after the present proceedings were
filed, a bye election was notified and the polling was scheduled on
07.07.2025. This Court on 25.06.2025 directed that though the bye
election could be held, the result thereof would be subject to outcome
of the present proceedings.
It is thus clear from the aforesaid that the holding of the subsequent
election for filling in the vacancy caused by the unseating of the
petitioner was made subject to outcome of these proceedings. It
therefore cannot be gainsaid that with the conduct of the bye elections,
the challenge raised by the petitioner to the order passed by the trial
Court had become infructuous. Notwithstanding the conduct of the bye
elections, the present challenge would be required to be adjudicated
on merits since the rights of the petitioner stand protected by virtue
of the interim order dated 25.06.2025. The said contention raised
by the first respondent therefore cannot be accepted.
8 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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9. Coming to the challenge raised by the petitioner, it is to be noted from
the pleadings of the first respondent in the election petition that the
petitioner had failed to disclose the fact that on 07.08.2018 she had
been convicted under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. This material
fact was required to disclosed by her in the affidavit mandated to be
filed under Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 along with her nomination
form. To appreciate this contention, it would be first necessary to
refer to the relevant statutory provisions. Section 22 (1) (d) of the
Act of 1961, insofar as it is material fact for the present purpose
reads as under:
“22. Grounds for declaring election or nomination to be
void- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the
Judge is of the opinion - …………
(d) that the result of the election, or nomination in so far
as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially
affected –
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination;
or
(ii) by the improper acceptance or refusal of any
vote or reception of any vote which is void; or
(iii) by the non-compliance with the provisions of this
Act or of any rules or orders-made there under
save the rules framed under Section 14 in so
far as they relate to preparation and revision
of list of voters;
he shall declare the election or nomination of
the returned candidate to be void.”
The aforesaid statutory provisions indicate that the election of
returned candidate can be declared to be void on account of
improper acceptance of his/her nomination form or on account of
non-compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1961 or the Rules
of 1994 or orders made thereunder.
10. Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 requires each candidate to furnish
information with regard to declaration of criminal antecedents, assets,
liabilities and educational qualifications. The said provision insofar
as it is relevant for the present purpose reads as under:
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 9
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
“24-A. (1) Each candidate shall furnish the information
relating to -Declaration of criminal antecedent, assets,
liabilities and educational qualification-
(i) any pending criminal case in which he is charged
and any disposed criminal case in which he has
been convicted;”
Rule 24-A (2), (4) and (5) of the Rules of 1994 being relevant are
reproduced hereunder:
“(2) The nomination paper shall be rejected, if the affidavit
is not enclosed.”
“(4) The Returning Officer shall, as soon as may be after
furnishing of the information to him under sub-rule
(1), display the aforesaid information by affixing a
copy of the affidavit, at a conspicuous place at his
office for the information of electors of the concerned
ward for which the nomination paper is filed and, shall
on demand from any other candidate/elector of the
ward, make available the information received of the
candidate and, shall also publicize the information
received through the media.”
“(5) If any candidate or elector files an affidavit against
the information contained in the affidavit filed by a
candidate under sub-rule (1), it shall also be displayed
in the manner prescribed in sub-rule (4).”
11. As required by Rule 24-A(5) of the Rules of 1994, the petitioner filed
her affidavit in the prescribed format. The relevant portion of the said
affidavit dated 09.09.2022 reads as under:
AFFIDAVIT
As per Rule 24-A(1)(5)(Amended) of the M.P. Nagarpalika
Nirvachan Niyam, 1994
For election to Parshad Ward No.5 from Nagar Parishad,
Bhikangaon
(6) I have been/have not been convicted of an offence(s)
[other than any offence(s) referred to in sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2), or cover in sub-section(3), of section 8 of
10 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951)]
and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more.
If the deponent is convicted and punished as aforesaid, he
shall furnish the following information: In the following cases,
I have been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by
a court of law:
A The details of cases, Section (s) of the Nirank
concerned Act(s) and description of the
offence(s) for
B Name of the Court(s), Case No. and Nirank
date(s) of order(s):
C Punishment imposed Nirank
D Whether any appeal was/has been filed Nirank
against the conviction order. If so, details
and the present status of the appeal:
VERIFICATION
I, the deponent, above named, do hereby verify and declare
that the contents of this affidavit are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief and no part of it is
false and nothing material has been concealed there from.
I further declare that:
(a) There is no case of conviction or pending case against
me other than those mentioned in items 5 and 6 of
part A and B above;
(b) I, my spouse, or my dependents do not have any
asset or liability, other than those mentioned in items
7 and 8 of Part A and items 8, 9 and 10 of Part B
above.
Verified at this day of 09/09/2022
DEPONENT
(emphasis supplied by us)
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 11
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
12. Undisputably, the petitioner was convicted on 07.08.2018 under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881. The conviction was in force when
the petitioner submitted her nomination form on 09.09.2022. In the
affidavit filed under Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994, the petitioner
failed to disclose her conviction as stated above. To that extent, the
plea raised by the first respondent and accepted by both Courts that
there was a failure on the part of the petitioner in not disclosing her
conviction in the affidavit filed under Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994
which in turn resulted in non-compliance with the provisions of the
Act of 1961 or the Rules of 1994 is correct.
13. On consideration of the statutory provisions as well as the
documentary material on record it becomes clear that under
Rule 24-A (1) of the Rules of 1994, every candidate contesting
elections is required to furnish information which includes declaration
of criminal antecedents, etc. The information required to be furnished
is with regard to any pending criminal case in which the candidate
is charged or any criminal case that has been disposed of and has
resulted in his conviction. Failure to furnish such affidavit can result
in rejection of the nomination paper. The Returning Officer is required
to display the nomination furnished by each candidate by affixing
a copy of the affidavit at a conspicuous place at his office so as to
provide information to the electors from the concerned ward. He
is also required to publicise the information received through the
media. Similarly, contents of the affidavit required to be filed under
Rule 24-A (1) are also required to be displayed in the aforesaid
manner. The object behind disclosing such information is to enable
the voters to get knowledge about the criminal antecedents, assets,
liabilities and educational qualifications of the candidates contesting
the elections. That such information is required to be furnished in
furtherance of the right to information available to the electorate under
Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India is now well-settled.
14. In this context, it would be necessary to refer to the three Judge
Bench decision in Union of India vs. Association for Democratic
Reforms.5 While considering the question whether a voter had
a right to get relevant information including that with regard to
involvement in an offence, this Court while recognising such right to
5 2002 INSC 253
12 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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get information in the context of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
of India held as under:
“In our view, democracy cannot survive without free and
fair election, without free and fairly informed voters. Votes
cast by uninformed voters in favour of X or Y candidate
would be meaningless. As stated in the aforesaid passage,
one-sided information, disinformation, misinformation and
non-information all equally create an uninformed citizenry
which makes democracy a farce. Therefore, casting of a
vote by misinformed and non-informed voter or a voter
having one-sided information only is bound to affect the
democracy seriously. Freedom of speech and expression
includes right to impart and receive information which
includes freedom to hold opinions. Entertainment is implied
in freedom of ‘speech and expression’ and there is no
reason to hold that freedom of speech and expression
would not cover right to get material information with regard
to a candidate who is contesting election for a post which
is of utmost importance in the democracy.”
It thereafter concluded as under:
“Under our Constitution, Article 19(1)(a) provides for
freedom of speech and expression. Voters’ speech or
expression in case of election would include casting of
votes, that is to say, voter speaks out or expresses by
casting vote. For this purpose, information about the
candidate to be selected is must. Voter’s (little man citizen’s)
right to know antecedents including criminal past of his
candidate contesting election for MP or MLA is much more
fundamental and basic for survival of democracy. The little
man may think over before making his choice of electing
law breakers as law makers.”
15. It is an admitted position that, the petitioner failed to disclose her
conviction for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Act of 1881 and that she had been sentenced to imprisonment
for a period of one year. It is also not disputed that on 09.09.2022
when the petitioner submitted her affidavit as required by
Rule 24-A (1) of the Rules of 1994, her conviction was in force.
The petitioner was therefore obligated to furnish information about
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 13
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
her conviction and consequently being sentenced to imprisonment
for a period of one year. She however failed to do so. Pertinently,
Rule 24-A (1) requires a declaration to be made of an order or
conviction, irrespective of the quantum of sentence imposed. In other
words, the material information to be furnished is the fact of any
conviction suffered by a candidate. It is therefore clear that by failing
to disclose her previous conviction, the petitioner furnished false and
incorrect information as regards her criminal antecedents. As a result
the verification of her affidavit was false and incorrect despite the fact
that the petitioner had full knowledge of her conviction which she had
subjected to further challenge. As a consequence, the ground under
Section 22 (1) (d)(iii) of the Act of 1961 became available for
declaring her election to be void. Further, as a result of such false
information being furnished by the petitioner in her affidavit filed under
Rule 24-A (1) of the Rules of 1994, her nomination paper was
improperly accepted.
These factual aspects have been considered by the trial Court and
thereafter affirmed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction. This factual position was not contested by the learned
Senior Advocate for the petitioner. It is thus clear that by failing to
disclose her conviction and consequent sentence of imprisonment
for a period of one year, a ground for declaring her election as
Councillor became available to the first respondent.
16. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner tried to extricate the
case of the petitioner from such position by urging that the conviction
of the petitioner was not for an offence involving moral turpitude.
It was a conviction under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 and thus
it could not be said that there was any serious or heinous crime
committed by the petitioner. For her conviction in such an offence, the
petitioner was not liable to be visited by an order of disqualification
under the Act of 1961. To substantiate this contention he sought to
derive support from the decisions of this Court in Ravi Namboothiri
and Karikho Kri (supra).
Having considered both these decisions, we find that the same are
clearly distinguishable in view of the statutory provisions involved
therein as well as the relevant factual aspects. In Ravi Namboothiri
(supra), the appellant therein was finally convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 38 read with Section 52 of the Kerala Police
14 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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Act, 1961 and was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200/-. The said appellant
however while filing his nomination for the elections to the Panchayat
failed to disclose the fact of his conviction under Section 38 read with
Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act, 1961. On this count his election
to the Panchayat was set aside as he had suppressed information
with regard to his past conviction. The appellant challenged his
disqualification before this Court. It was found that what was required
to be disclosed under Section 52(1A) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj
Act, 1994 were the details with regard to criminal cases in which the
candidate was involved at the time of submission of his nomination.
Reference was made to the previous of Section 102 (1)(ca) of the
Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 which made furnishing of details by
an elected candidate under Section 52 (1A) a ground for declaring
an election to be void if such details furnished were fake. It was
held by this Court that the word “involvement’’ in a criminal case at
the time of filing of the nomination in Section 52 (1A) would only
mean cases where a criminal complaint was pending investigation/
trial, cases where the conviction and/or sentence was current at the
time of filing of the nomination and cases where the conviction was
the subject matter of any appeal or revision pending at the time of
nomination. It was found that besides Rule 6, Form No. 2-A required
details even of cases where the candidate was convicted earlier.
Since the said appellant had failed to disclose details of his earlier
conviction in Form No.2-A, his election was liable to be declared
as void under Section 102 (1)(ca). This Court however found that
under provisions of Section 38 and 52 of the Kerala Police Act, 1961,
the conviction of the said appellant was for disobedience of the
directions issued by a police officer. By observing that such offence
could not be treated to be a substantive offence, it was observed
that protest was a tool in hands of the society and therefore failure
on the part of said petitioner to disclose his conviction for the offence
consequent upon holding a ‘dharna’ in front of the Panchayat Office
could not be taken as a ground for declaring an election to be void.
It further observed that the Kerala Police Act, 1961 was a successor
legislation of certain police enactments of the colonial era, whose
object was to scuttle the democratic aspirations of the indigenous
population. Accordingly, this Court held that the High Court was not
correct in declaring the election of the said petitioner to be void on
the ground that he had failed to disclose to in Form No.2-A of his
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 15
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
conviction which amounted to undue influence on the free exercise
of the electoral right.
17. We may note that in the aforesaid decision, the requirement was to
furnish information with regard to involvement in a criminal case as
required by Section 52(1A) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994.
Further the said appellant on his conviction was merely sentenced
to fine of Rs.200/- for the offence under Section 38 read with
Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act, 1961. There was no sentence
of imprisonment.
In the present case, the petitioner after her conviction was sentenced
to an imprisonment for a period of one year. The affidavit required to
be filed under Rule 24-A (1) of the Rules of 1994 specifically requires
furnishing of details as regards any sentence of imprisonment for a
period of one year or more. The statutory requirement in the present
case is thus distinct from the requirements in Ravi Namboothiri
(supra) which makes the said decision distinguishable.
18. In Karikho Kri (supra), the successful candidate in the assembly
elections was found to have not disclosed in his affidavit details
with regard to ownership of vehicles, failure to submit no dues
certificate with regard to electricity charges and municipal dues.
His election was declared to be void under Section 100 (1)(d)(i)
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. While considering
the challenge to the judgment of the High Court, this Court found
that the vehicles in question had either been gifted or sold by the
appellant prior to filing of his nomination and hence the said vehicles
could not be considered to be owned by his family members. It was
further found that the said appellant had disclosed the value of his
assets which included the value of the vehicles in question. It was
then found that what was not disclosed by the appellant was not of
a substantial nature so as to impact his candidature or the result of
the election. In fact, a finding was recorded that there were no actual
outstanding dues payable by the appellant and hence there was no
defect whatsoever so as to render the acceptance of his nomination
form to be improper. Additionally, it was found that though the election
of the appellant had been invalidated under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it had not been shown
as to how the result of the election had been materially affected
by the acceptance of his nomination form. On these counts, the
16 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
judgment of the High Court was set aside and the election of the
said appellant was found to be valid.
The aforesaid facts are sufficient to distinguish the said decision in
the wake of the undisputed facts of the present case. The petitioner
herein having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of one year which fact was not disclosed in the affidavit filed
along with the nomination form is sufficient to hold that the ratio of
the aforesaid decision cannot be applied to the present case.
19. It is now necessary to deal with the contention raised on behalf of the
petitioner that notwithstanding her conviction, the same was not for
committing a serious offence or one touching upon moral turpitude. The
conviction being under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, the petitioner
was not liable to be unseated for her conviction for a minor offence.
We are unable to accept this contention which seeks to dilute the
fact of non-disclosure of the petitioner’s conviction in the nomination
form. Rule 24A-(1) requires a candidate to disclose any order of
conviction suffered by him by filing an affidavit along with the relevant
information before the Returning Officer. The format of the affidavit
prescribed under the Rules of 1994 requires a disclosure as regards
conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a duration of one year
and more. The validity of Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 has
not been subjected to any challenge. It would therefore have to be
treated as valid. Its compliance has been made mandatory as failure
to furnish such information along with an affidavit as prescribed
visits a candidate with the consequence of non-compliance of the
provisions of the Rules of 1994. This in turn is a ground to challenge
the election of the returned candidate. In absence of any provision
in the Rules of 1994 that would enable the Court to condone such
non-compliance or exempt its compliance on the ground that the
conviction was for a non-serious offence or one not involving moral
turpitude, adopting such course as urged would do violence to the
Act of 1961 and the Rules of 1994.
20. At this stage, we may refer to the decision of this Court in
Krishnamoorthy (supra) wherein this Court considered the effect
of non-disclosure of criminal cases in respect of serious offences
including those involving moral turpitude. After noting that the right
to contest an election was neither a fundamental right nor a common
law right, it was observed as under:
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 17
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
“The controversy which has emanated in this case is
whether non-furnishing of the information while filing an
affidavit pertaining to criminal cases, especially cases
involving heinous or serious crimes or relating to corruption
or moral turpitude would tantamount to corrupt practice,
regard being had to the concept of undue influence”.
It was thereafter concluded in paragraph 86 as under:
“In view of the above, we would like to sum up our
conclusions:
(a) Disclosure of criminal antecedents of a
candidate, especially, pertaining to heinous
or serious offence or offences relating to
corruption or moral turpitude at the time of filing
of nomination paper as mandated by law is a
categorical imperative.
(b) When there is non-disclosure of the offences
pertaining to the areas mentioned in the
preceding clause, it creates an impediment in
the free exercise of electoral right.
(c) Concealment or suppression of this nature
deprives the voters to make an informed and
advised choice as a consequence of which it
would come within the compartment of direct
or indirect interference or attempt to interfere
with the free exercise of the right to vote by the
electorate, on the part of the candidate.
(d) As the candidate has the special knowledge of
the pending cases where cognizance has been
taken or charges have been framed and there
is a non-disclosure on his part, it would amount
to undue influence and, therefore, the election
is to be declared null and void by the Election
Tribunal under Section 100(1)(b) of the 1951 Act.
(e) The question whether it materially affects the
election or not will not arise in a case of this
nature.”
18 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
This Court was concerned with the suppression of various cases of
embezzlement by the concerned candidate in his nomination form.
The reference to heinous or serious offences or offences relating to
corruption or moral turpitude would have to be seen in that factual
backdrop. This Court was not dealing with an offence that was not
heinous or not involving moral turpitude. It is therefore not the ratio of
Krishnamoorthy (supra) that disclosure only of serious and heinous
offences is mandated and that failure to disclose conviction for a
minor or non-serious offence could be condoned, as a principle.
We may however clarify that ultimately it is a matter of exercise of
judicial discretion in the given facts of the case, as was exercised
in Ravi Namboothiri (supra), as to whether such non-disclosure is
fatal or not. Hence, the decision in Krishnamoorthy (supra) cannot
be the basis to hold that non-disclosure of conviction in case of a
minor offence was always intended to be condoned and not viewed
seriously.
21. The plea raised by the petitioner that her election could not be set
aside in the absence of it being proved that the result of the election
had been materially affected on account of the improper acceptance
of her nomination form need not detain us. Once it is found that there
has been non-disclosure of a previous conviction by a candidate,
it creates an impediment in the free exercise of electoral right by a
voter. A voter is thus deprived of making an informed and advised
choice. It would be a case of suppression/non-disclosure by such
candidate, which renders the election void.
22. In this regard, we may refer to the decision in Kisan Shankar
Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant & Others6. Therein the
election of the returned candidate to the Legislative Assembly was
challenged by a voter from the constituency on the ground that the
nomination form of the returned candidate had been improperly
accepted by the Returning Officer and that the election was void
due to non-compliance of the provisions of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951. There were in all five candidates in the fray. In
the election petition, the High Court held that the returned candidate
failed to make material disclosures in the affidavit filed along with
the nomination form and hence the nomination form was improperly
6 2014 INSC 384
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 19
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
accepted by the Returning Officer. It further held that the result of
the election was materially affected due to non-disclosure of relevant
information. Accordingly, the election of the returned candidate was
set aside. While considering the challenge to the said judgment, this
Court noted that the aspect of non-disclosure of material information
was an admitted fact. Referring to the decisions in Association
for Democratic Reforms (supra) and People’s Union for Civil
Liberties (PUCL) Vs. Union of India and another7, it was held
that if the required information as per the guidelines of the Election
Commission was not given, the same would amount to suppression/
non-disclosure of relevant information. On the aspect of the result of
the election being materially affected due to non-disclosure of such
information, it was observed in paragraph 28 as under:-
“Issue No. 8 pertains to the question as to whether the
election result was materially affected because of non-
disclosure of the aforesaid information. The High Court
took note of provisions of Section 100 (1)(d)(i) and (iv) and
discussed the same. Thereafter, some judgments cited by
the appellant were distinguished and deciding this issue
against the appellant, the High Court concluded as under:
“137. In my opinion, it is not necessary to
elaborate on this matter beyond a point, except
to observe that when it is a case of improper
acceptance of nomination on account of invalid
affidavit or no affidavit filed therewith, which
affidavit is necessarily an integral part of the
nomination form; and when that challenge
concerns the returned candidate and if upheld,
it is not necessary for the Petitioner to further
plead or prove that the result of the returned
candidate has been materially affected by such
improper acceptance.
138. The avowed purpose of filing the affidavit
is to make truthful disclosure of all the relevant
matters regarding assets (movable and
immovable) and liabilities as well as criminal
7 2023 INSC 176
20 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
actions (registered, pending or in respect
of which cognizance has been taken by the
Court of competent jurisdiction or in relation
to conviction in respect of specified offences).
Those are matters which are fundamental to
the accomplishment of free and fair election.
It is the fundamental right of the voters to be
informed about all matters in relation to such
details for electing candidate of their choice.
Filing of complete information and to make
truthful disclosure in respect of such matters
is the duty of the candidate who offers himself
or who is nominated for election to represent
the voters from that Constituency. As the
candidate has to disclose this information on
affidavit, the solemnity of affidavit cannot be
allowed to be ridiculed by the candidates by
offering incomplete information or suppressing
material information, resulting in disinformation
and misinformation to the voters. The sanctity
of disclosure to be made by the candidate flows
from the constitutional obligation.”
Affirming the said finding, it was held in paragraph 38 as under:-
“…Once it is found that it was a case of improper
acceptance, as there was misinformation or suppression
of material information, one can state that question of
rejection in such a case was only deferred to a later date.
When the Court gives such a finding, which would have
resulted in rejection, the effect would be same, namely,
such a candidate was not entitled to contest and the
election is void…”
23. In Sri Mairembam Prithviraj @ Prithviraj Singh Vs. Shri Pukhrem
Sharatchandra Singh8, two candidates were in the election fray.
The returned candidate failed to submit any documents as regards
his educational qualification alongwith the nomination form. The
acceptance of his nomination form was accordingly challenged. The
8 2016 INSC 1000
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 21
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
High Court held that the declaration made by the returned candidate
as regards his educational qualification was false. The said finding
was upheld by this Court. On the question as to whether the election
of the returned candidate was materially affected due to such
improper acceptance of the nomination form, reference was made
to the decision in Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra). It was thereafter
held in paragraph 23 as under:-
“23. Mere finding that there has been an improper
acceptance of the nomination is not sufficient for a
declaration that the election is void under Section 100 (1)(d).
There has to be further pleading and proof that the result
of the election of the returned candidate was materially
affected. But, there would be no necessity of any proof in
the event of the nomination of a returned candidate being
declared as having been improperly accepted, especially
in a case where there are only two candidates in the fray.
If the returned candidate’s nomination is declared to have
been improperly accepted it would mean that he could
not have contested the election and that the result of the
election of the returned candidate was materially affected
need not be proved further. We do not find substance
in the submission of Mr. Giri that the judgment in Durai
Muthuswami (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this
case.”
Though in the aforesaid case there were only two candidates who
contested the elections, the principle that failure to disclose relevant
information in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form
amounted to non-disclosure of material information was accepted.
That such wrongful acceptance of the nomination form of the returned
candidate would result in the election being materially affected
rendering it void was recognised as a consequence.
24. Even otherwise, it is clear from the decision in Krishnamoorthy
(supra) that non-furnishing information pertaining to criminal
antecedents has the effect of causing undue influence which creates
an impediment in the free exercise of electoral right by a voter. When
there is such non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, this Court held
in paragraph 86(e) that the question whether the election is materially
affected or not would not arise in such a case.
22 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
It is thus clear that by failing to disclose her conviction under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881, the petitioner suppressed material
information and thus failed to comply with the mandatory requirements
of Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994. The acceptance of her
nomination form has therefore been rightly held to be improper. She
being the returned candidate, her election was rendered void. It is
thus obvious that on account of such wrongful acceptance of her
nomination form, the election was materially affected. This contention
of the petitioner also fails.
25. We may now indicate why discretion under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India does not deserve to be exercised in the present
case. The Constitution Bench in Pritam Singh vs. State9 while
explaining the scope and powers of the Court under Article 136
has held that:
“Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special
leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special
circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice
has been done and that the case in question presents
features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the
decision appealed against.”
Having considered the entire matter, we are not persuaded to hold
that the petitioner has made out an exceptional case for this Court
to hold that notwithstanding the failure on the part of the petitioner
to disclose her conviction leading to the sentence of imprisonment of
one year, such lapse should be condoned. The information furnished
in her affidavit filed under Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 has been
found to be incorrect and false. The petitioner rests on her subsequent
acquittal in appeal, which event occurred after her election. She did
not step into the witness box to explain her inadvertence, which is
now sought to be put forward. The plain reading of Rule 24-A(1) and
its requirement does not admit of any doubt whatsoever. Moreover,
both the Courts have concurrently found that the petitioner failed to
disclose her conviction without any justifiable reason. In these facts
therefore, no special or exceptional case has been made out by the
petitioner for this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India. In the passing, we may observe that the
9 1950 INSC 9
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 23
Poonam v. Dule Singh & Ors.
petitioner had contested the bye election that had occasioned by
her removal and she lost the same.
26. For all the above reasons, the Special Leave Petition stands
dismissed.
Result of the case: Special Leave Petition dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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