Holding

The allotted property was only a plot of land, not premises within the Delhi Rent Control Act, so the landlord could recover possession by a civil suit.

Summary

The Prabha Manufacturing Industrial Co‑operative Society was allotted an "industrial plot" with a self‑constructed shed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property in 1949. The Society later sought a permanent allotment, but the Custodian sold the land at auction in 1960 to the predecessor of Banwari Lal. The Society challenged the sale, but the challenge failed. Banwari Lal filed a suit for eviction in 1977, arguing that the property was only a plot of land and not "premises" within the meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and therefore could be reclaimed through a civil suit. The Society appealed, contending that the allotment constituted a building/premises and that eviction should be sought before a Rent Controller. The Supreme Court examined the allotment letter, inspection reports, rent‑reduction order and other contemporaneous documents, concluding that the allotted property was merely a plot of land with a temporary shed, not a building as contemplated by the Act. The Court held that the lower courts' concurrent factual findings were not to be re‑examined under Article 136, and that the landlord was entitled to recover possession by a civil suit. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The property allotted to the Society qualifies as "premises" within the definition of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, s.2(i).
Whether an eviction suit for such property is maintainable in a civil court or must be pursued before a Rent Controller.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure
Constitution of Indias. 136
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 2(i), s. 44
Displaced Persons Act
Transfer of Property Act

Subjects

Delhi Rent Control Actpremises definitionevictionplot of landcivil suit vs rent controllerconcurrent findings of factArticle 136evacuee propertyco‑operative society

Judgment

A
PRABHA MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAL
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY
v.
BANWARI LAI'.,

FEBRUARY 14, 1989 B

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s. 2(i)-'-Plot of land-allotted by
Custodian of Evacuee Property and temporary structure put thereon~
Whether 'Premises'-Suit for eviction and possession in Civil Court-
Maintainability of.
c
Constitution of India, Article 136: Concurrent findings of fact-
Non-interference by the Court.

The appellant-society was temporarily allotted the property in D
question by way of a lease by the Custodian of Evacuee Property .in
March, 1949. In the allotment letter it was described as an 'Industrial
establishment' known as open compound. The inspection report dated
January 9, 1951 of the person who had delivered the possession to the
sodety described the property as a 'plot' on which the allottee promised
to start a factory. Sometime thereafter the society sought reduction of E
the assessment rent. The order of the Deputy Custodian thereon dated
March 31, 1955 granting the relief, again described the property as a
'plot' with a self-constructed shed. Subsequently, the society through
its letter dated January 21, 1957 requested that the said 'industrial plot'
·may be permanently allotted to it. However, the Custodian chose to sell
the property by auction on July 15, 1960 in favour of the predecessor- F
in-interest of the respondent. The society moved to have the said sale set
aside and in its application dated October 15, 1960 made to the con-
cerned authority it mentioned the property as an 'industrial plot'. That
application was eventually rejected by the Chief Settlement Commis-
sioner on August 25, 1961. In its revision petition before the Govern-
ment of India the contention of the society was that the plot was allotted G
to the society for industrial purpose and they had erected. a building and
installed machinery thereon. The Government order rejecting the revi-
sion petition too started with a recital that the Custodian had allotted
J 'an open plot of land' to the soeiety for industrial purposes and that the
~ society had erected 'a temporary structure' on the plot and also instal-
led some machinery. H

647
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1989) 1 S.C. R.
On February IS, 1968 the appellant society filed an application
A
under s. 44 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 seeking permission to
make repairs to the premises in question. The owners resisted the said
application on a preliminary objection that the peiitioners were not
tenants of any premises within meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
The Controller found that what was allotted to the petitioner society
B was only a plot and that the shed was self-constructed. The petitioner, ""If
therefore, being a tenant only with respect to an open site, which did
not come within the definition of a 'premises' as contemplated by the

c
Act, the petition under s. 44 was not maintainable.

The respondent instituted a suit against the society in 1977 seeking
its eviction and possession stating that the property was only a plot of
land and not 'premises' within the meaning of Delhi Rent Control Act,
1
and that the plaintiffs had terminated the tenancy of the defendants. All
the three courts below held in his favour.

In this appeal it was contended for the appellant-society that the
D property in question was a 'building' within the meaning of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 the eviction from which could he sought by the
landlord only from a Rent Controller on grounds specified in the Act
and not by a suit in a civil court under the Transfer of Property Act
read with the Code of Civil Procedure; that the references in the allot-
ment letter to 'industrial premises', to the 'industrial establishment
E known as open compound', and to the 'factory/workshop/industrial
establishment' clearly showed that what was allotted to the society was
not a mere plot but an industrial premises.

Dismissing the appeal,

F HELD: I. The property allotted to the appellant-society in res-
pect of which it was a tenant initially under the Custodian and later
under the plaintiff-respondent was only a plot of land. The plaintiff
was, therefore, justified in attempting to recover possession thereof by a
suit for possession in a civil court. (664F-G]

G 2. The letters addressed by the society to the Custodian and the
Settlement Commissioner as well as the application for reduction of
reut and the order, thereon, are valuable pieces of evidence both
because they are anterior to the litigation between the parties and also
because they reflected the representations of the society to, and the
findings of the very authority that allotted the said property. The
H society represented that it had been allotted only a plot of Ian~ and that
PRABHA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL IRANGANATHAN,_ J.) 649

~··· the shed had been put up thereon by itself and this plea would not have . A
been accepted by the Custodian had it not been correct. Both in the
""6'pening sentence as well as in the body of the order there is a clear
finding to this effect. This is a very strong circumstance to show that
what was allotted to the society was only a plot of land. Furthermore,
the findings of the Rent Controller in the application under s. 44 of the
-->r Rent Control Act filed by the society, right or wrong, had attained B
; finality as between the parties and it was not open to the society on
principles analogous to res-judicata to take a contrary stand in these
proceedings. [659F-H; 660A]
)·-,. 3. The refi:rence to 'industrial premises' in the allotment letter
i cannot be construed as a reference to 'premises' within the meaning of
the Rent Control Act. It was obviously a cyclostyled proforma allotting
c
an item of evacuee property and except for the portion where it con·-
tained a description of the property in question viz., 'open compound',
it only contained terms applicable to allotment generally. [66IF-H)

4. The finding on the point of the courts below are concurrent D
findings on a question of fact. This Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution does not normally reappraise the evidence or interfere
with such concurrent findings of fact, even if it is possible on tbe facts to
come to a contrary conclusion. [663G)

The decree for eviction not to he executed till February 28, 1990 E
provided the persons in occupation of the. premises file the usual
e..,.,· undertaking. [664G]
r'';' .
,' CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1504
ir"I' of1980.
la:,) .
f
~/, . From the Judgment and Order dated 20.5.1980 of the Delhi High
r '. Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 181of1979. · ··

S.K. Mehta, D. Mehta, A. Vachhar and Atul Nande for the
Appellant.
.,
G
Dr. Shankar Ghosh and Ashok Grover for the R~spondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATHAN, J. The appellant, a cooperative society,
(hereinafter referred to as 'the society'), resists a suit for possession f.
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

A laid by the respondent, contending .that the property in question is a 'f-'
'building' within the meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
('the Act'), the eviction of a tenant fro~ which can be sought by the
landlord only from a rent controller on grounds specified in the Act
and not by a suit in a civil court under the Transfer of Property Act
read with the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). This contention of the
B appellant has been rejected, concurrently, by the Assistant District -<:
Judge, the Additional District Judge and the High Court. In this
appeal, counsel for the appellant seeks to persuade us that all the three
courts have decided erroneously a substantial question of law raised by
it and that they ought to have dismissed the suit instead of decreeing it. t'
To get a cogent idea of the history of the litigation concerning this 1
C property and to properly appreciate the contentions urged, it is neces-
sary to set out the relevapt facts at some length ..
2(a) The property in question originally belonged to one Khan
Din Hussain Din but it came to be vested in the Custodian of Evacuee
Property on the owner being declared an evacuee on the eve of the
D partition of the country. The Custodian leased it out to one Pritam
Chand who occupied it in September 1947. There is on record an
undated survey report in a "proforma for residential premises" which
pertains to the period when Pritam Chand was in occupation. It
described the property covered by it thus:
1. Locality or street Hamilton Road, Delhi
E
2. H.C.No. III/1403-1406

3. No.&sizeofrooms 15' x 15'shed,3' x 8'
10' x 10'' 10' x 10'
10' x 10' Ver 40' x 8'
F shed 35' x 10' Open
space 50' x 45' use as
Motor Lorry Workshop.

(b) Subsequently, the allotment in favour of Pritam Chand
appears'lo have got cancelled and the Society applied for the allotment
G of the property to it for starting a factory. The application was granted
and the property was allotted, by way of a lease, to the Society by an .
order dated 28.3.1949. It is necessary to extract this order in full: -411!
ORDER

H "Subject: Allotment of industrial premises.
PRABHA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL [RANGANATHAN, J./ 651

With reference to your application dated - - I have A
to inform you that Industrial Establishment known as open
compound at Hamilton Road (Portion of Jai Hind Motor
Works) with 25 Front and 50 deep together with.all the
machinery and accessories kept there-in has been allotted
to you. Possession of the factory/workshop/Industrial
-x establishment will be delivered to you immediately after
your fulfilling the following conditions namdy:
B

1. Delivering at this office a communication addres-
sed to the Custodian undertaking to pay such deposit and
rent as may be assessed and required to be paid and to
execute the lease on the prescribed form. C

2. Filling a duly attested affidavit as per form 'A'
attached herewith.

3. Possession of stocks of consumable goods and
other stores and material, if any, will be given to you for D
safe custody as caretaker until the disposal thereof.

Assistant Custodian Industrial is hereby required to
deliver the possession of factory/workshop/Industrial
Establishment and other moveable property kept therein
(to) the above named allottee after satisfying himself that E
he has fulfilled conditions laid down above. If necessary,
the enforcement section will help the Assistant Custodian
and the allottee of the property. in accordance with the
procedure prescribed under law."

(c) A report on the use of the allotted plot submitted on 9 .1.51 is F
of some relevance. It clarifies that no machinery··had been allotted to
the Society and that power was being fitted. It says then:

"I have found nobody at the premises except a Gorkha
Chowkidar. I remember it very well that in the presence, I
gave the possession of the above-said plot to allottee who G
promised that they want to start a factory very soon, but it
is regretted that no advantageous use of the premises is
being made by the Co-operative. However, I have seen
new power connection being fitted on the premises. The
work might have (then) set back due to non-availability of
power. Any how-we must consult the file and subsequently ·H
call the allottee."
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1989] 1 S.C.R.
'
A (d) It appears that Pritam Chand was attempting to get the allot- 'r-
ment to 'the Society cancelled on the allegation that it had unautho-
risedly sublet the property. A letter was written, in this context, by the
Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies to the Custodian on
15.5.1954. This letter, on the subject of "Allotment of Industrial
Premises", reads as under:
B ---I._-
" Kindly refer to your order No. DC/IV/A/185 dated the
28th March, 1949 on the above subject under which the i"
house No. 2939-III/1403-1406 on Industrial Establishment
known as open compound at Hamilton Road (Portion of__ I .
Jai Hind Motor Works with 25' front and 56' deep) -.....,
t9gether with all machinery and accessories kept therein, 1
c was allotted to the Prabhat Manufacturing Co-operative
Industrial Society Ltd. ~

Before allotment one Shri Pritam Chand was occupy-
ing the whole premises. He is now again trying to take the
D premises allotted to the society. He therefore filed an
application to the Assistant Custodian against the Society
alleging that the premises had been sublet to Shri A jit
Singh Duni Chand and Banwari Lal. The Assistant Custo-
dian served the Society with a notice for cancellation of . ~ .
allotment of the said premise. The fact is that Shri Ajit
E Singh, is the Secretary of the Society and Shri Duni Chand
and Banwari Lal were its members. The question of sublet-
ting does not arise. A Government loan of Rs.4,000 was
also advanced to the society under the Rehabilitation
Scheme. Under the above circumstances I would request
-
you to allow the Society to function in the allotted pre!;_
F mises, so that it may be able to repay the Government loan'.'"-+-'
advanced to it."

( e) The Society made an attempt to have tlhe assessment of rent
reduced. The order of the Deputy Custodian dated 31.5.1955, under
which this relief was granted reads thus:
G
'This is revision petition by M/s Prabhat Mfg. Co- J, .,
operative Socio Industrial Society Ltd., against the assess- "
ment of rent. The petitioner has got a plot. There is a small
shed on this plot also. The petitioner was assessed on the
rental of Rs.50 on the basis of the M.A.R. It is contended
H before me that there is no M.A.R. for property No. 2939
PRABHA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL [RANGANATHAN, J.[ 653

but there is joint M.A.R. for house No. 1403-6. From the
A
copy of the assessment sheet, (it) appears that 1403-1406 is
equivalent to 2939-40. It is not clear therefore whether new
number has got an assessment of Rs.50 or there are several
numbers included in this assessment. I find that I inspected
this house on 20th March 1953 and asked the S.D.O. to let
me know the value of the plot and probable rent. At that B
time he had assessed the value of the plot at Rs.10970. The
present value of course will be more than that. However,
on the basis of this valuation, the rent of the petitioner's
plot if it were a vacant plot would work out to Rs.327 per
month exclusive of house tax. There is a small shed
also which is alleged to be self constructed. Considering
therefore all the circumstances I fix the rent of the petition-
c
ers plot at Rs.35 per month. As the petitioner is a co-
operative society, I· direct that rate should have retrospec-
tive effect. The petitioner is, however, directed to clear the
arrears within fortnight."
D
(f) After this order was passed, a survey report was made on
15.7.1955 which describes the property in the occupation of the
Society thus:
- ~-
1. Sr. No.
2. Road, Street, lane or Mohalla Hamilton Road E
3. Municipal House No. (old) IIl/1/4 (1403-6) old 2939 (new)
- 4.
5.
6. Accommodation available Plot with tin shed
No. & Size of rooms store
---¥ rooms, verandah, kitchen,
bath, courtyard etc.
27ft. North
61 ft. East
64.8 ft. West
F

24 ft. South
15. Description of present Manufacturing concern
occupation i.e. business Motor accessories and
service (Govt. or Pvt.) tools Redg. No. 199
other occupation) dated 24.3.49. G
._ .l. 16. Rent previously fixed Rs.50 reduced to
r- for the accommodation Rs.35

3.(a) Having thus got the plot on lease, the Society tried to
acquire the property for itself. There is on record a letter of the Society
dated 21.1.1957 requesting that the "industrial plot" may be perma- H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 1 S.C.R.

A neiltly allotte.d to it. However, the Custodian chose to sell the property 'r
by auction on 15.7.60 in favour of one Dina Nath (the predecessor-in-
interest of the present respondent Banwari Lal). The upset price was
Rs.21,000 and the sale was for Rs.23,000. Unfortunately, however,
except the information that sale deed in favour of Dina Nath was
executed on 13.7.61, there is no document on record about the exact
B nature and. condition of the property thus sold. )!;.··
,
(b) The Society moved to have ~he sale set aside on the ground
that, as the value of the property was less than Rs.10,000, it should
have been sold to the Society itself as the allottee and not to an out~
sider. In the course of these proceedings, it made an application on
1' ,.
C 15.10.60 to the concerned authority for a copy of the order declaring
the property to be saleable, the first paragraph of which reads thus:

"The· above mentioned property an Industrial Plot on
Hamilton Road No. 2939 (old No. 1403-1406) was sold by
auction on 15.7.60."
D
(c) The application of the Society was, eventually, rejected by
the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 25.8.1961 and so the appellant
filed a revision petition before the Government of India. In this peti-
tion, it is seen, the Society tried to take advantage of a Press Note of ~· .
the Government which enabled an allottee who had invested more
E than Rs.30,000 in a property to get a priority when the property came

-
to be allotted but this attempt was also unsuccessful. Certain reports
submitted by the concerned authorities in the context of the Society's
application have been placed on record. On 21.3.1962, the Executive
Engineer reported.

F "The land under property in question has been assessed a~· -t--·
Rs.17,500 while the structure value of it has been assessed
at Rs.3,883 giving a total value of Rs.21,383. The reserve
price of this property has been fixed at Rs.21,000"

Reports submitted by one T.C. Dewan contain the following obser-
G vations:

"I have been to the premises and obtained a list of machin- _.Jr ..,
ery now installed in the premises. The copy of the letter
dated 21.3.56 addressed to the C.S.C. is also attached. M/s
Prabhat Mfg. Co-op. Industrial Society want to have the
H premises transferred to them as Industrial concern.
P~HA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 655

The property has already been auctioned on A
15.7.1960.

The sale certificate has been issued in .favour of Dina
Nath s/o Charan Das on 13.6.61."

"I have to submit further that a part of the superstructure B
was evacuee and was valued with the plot. Some portion
has been made as a temporary shed etc. The position can
be made clear by consulting the valuation schedule oil the
.'r- property. The portion which was included in the valuation
at that time means at the time of auction as noted it was

.
definitely an evacuee structure. The rest is non evacuee
raised by the occupant." c
--..,,
It also appears that, in the course of these proceedings, Ajit -~ingh, on
behalf of the Society made a statement to the following effect in May,
1962:
D
"The above Society is in occupation of the premises since
the year 1949. There .was only a shed built in the premises
but the other portion was open plot when it was allotted to
us. The entire machinery has been installed by the Co-op.
Society. I can supply inventory of the machinery which has
been installed by the Society would be produced on E
8.5.62."

(d) The Society's revision petition was rejected on 6.8.62. The
order of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India starts with a
J
recital that the Custodian had allotted "an open plot of land" to the
--+· T·society for industrial purposes, and that the Society had erected "a F
temporary structure on this plot and also installed some machinery".
In para 3, the contention of the Society is stated to be "that the plot
was allotted to the Society for industrial purposes and they erected a
building and installed machinery worth about Rs.30,000 in it." The
order proceeds:
G
" ... the valuation officer was asked to assess the value of
the land, building and machinery. After a spot inspection
he reported that the value of land and building was about
Rs.21,000, whereas the value of the machinery installed in
March, 1956, according to the vouchers produced before
him by the Society came to only Rs.6,585. Hence, the value H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11989] 1 S.C.R.
A
of the machinery did not exceed that of the land.and build-
ing. Further, the Press Note of the 22nd March, 1956 re-
quired such allottees to submit applications to the Regional
Settlement Commissioner concerned with a certificate
from the Director of Industries of the State that they had
B established factories under the Commissioner, New Delhi.

4. It is, therefore, clear that this case is not covered
· by the Press Note of 22nd March, 1956. The property in

c
their occupation was rightly auctioned."

4. Now we come to the third chapter of the story. Dina Nath, the
purchaser of the property filed suit No. 1551/62, in the court of Rent
-1 · ..
'
Controller, Delhi seeking eviction of the appellant society from the
property in question on the ground of sub-letting, misuser, default in
payment of rent and requirement of the premises for the bona fide use ~
....
of the owner. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition. It is seen
D from the order of the Rent Controller that the owner had alleged that a
portion of the demised premises had been sublet, assigned or other-
wise parted with to M/s. Malviya Industries after 9.6.1952 without
obtaining the written consent of the landlord. The respondent had
shown that Malviya Industries was a proprietory concern of Ajit
Singh, who was in possession of the whole premises as a Secretary of
~-·
E the appellant society and that, apart from the fact that the goods
manufactured by the society were sold through Mal viya Industries,
there was nothing to show that any particular portion of the property
in question was exclusively used by Malviya Industries. It also appears ,...-
that the owner alleged that he required the premises in question for
purposes of re-building it. The controller held that as the property had

1~
F been given to the tenant for residential purposes and the proposed
reconstruction would change the character of the premises, this was . '

not permissible under the Act, and therefore, the landlord could not
be said to require the premises bona fide for re-building. On behalf of
the appellant it is urged that the fact the landlord filed a rent
control eviction petition as well as a finding in the order of the Rent
G Controller dated 16.1.1967 clearly show that the property in question
was a 'building' falling within the scope of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
It is also pointed out, from a copy of the application for eviction placed
on record, that in para S of the application it was stated that a work- -k ..
shop was situated on the piece of land and about 20 people (approx.)
were working therein and the details of the accommodation were
H shown as comprising of one tin shed as shown in the attached plan.
PRABHA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL [RANGANATHA.N, J.] 657
•
(b) In 1964 the society filed suit No. 294 of 64 against Dina Nath
A
and others. In this suit it prayed for an injunction restraining the
defendants from interfering with its possession and lawful enjoyment
of the property, inter alia, by preventing the plaintiff from carrying out
the necessary repairs to the premises in question. This suit was filed
during the pendency of the earlier suit filed in the rent controller's
court. It was alleged that the portion of the roof had started leaking B
and that, when the plaintiff began to make the necessary repairs to the
premises, the defendants began to interfere illegally with its possession
with the ulterior motive of securing the possession of the premises
otherwise than in due course of law. The defendants resisted this suit.
It appears that this suit was eventually dismissed but further details are
not available.
c
( c) It also appears that Banwari Lal had filed a suit for perma-
nent injunction against the Society restraining it from erecting any new
structure on, or making any additions or alterations to the property in
question. It is said that in one of the affidavits filed in the course of
these proceedings Banwari Lal stated as follows: D

"3. That the defendant is tenant of ground floor consisting
of a tin shed in house No. 2939, Hamilton Road, Delhi at a
monthly rent of Rs.35 which is a single storeyed property.

4. That the defendant has got no right title and interest to E

- erect any new structure on the first floor or to make any
additions and alterations in the aforesaid property without
the consent of the plaintiff."

There is no further information available regarding this suit.
F
(d) One more proceeding instituted by the appellant society has
also to be referred to: On 15.2.1968, the appellant filed an application
under section 44 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Suit No. 169-M
of 1968-69), seeking permission to make repairs to the premises in
question. This application was resisted by the owners on a preliminary
objection that the petitioner were not tenants of any premises within G
the meaning of Delhi Rent Control Act. This application was dismis-
sed on 9.3.1972. It is necessary to extract paragraph 5 of this order
since it is relevant to the controversy presently in questi,on:

"5. I also find it established on record that the petitioner
society is a tenant only with respect to an open site and the H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

A
structure thereon namely, the shed itself constructed by the .~
tenant. It is admitted (that) by Ajit Singh, who states him-
self to be the Secretary of the Society by the custodian, as it
was an evacuee property. A refemce to the allotment order
Ex. RW 1/1 which was produced by the clerk of the office
concerned, examined as R.W. l shows that the subject mat-
B ter of the allotment of the petitioner society was an 'Open ,.:..-
Compound'. It is further clear from the copy of an order
Ex. R.W. 1/1 that it was stated by the tenant, namely the
petitioner society before the custodian.that th.e shed was _ / .
self constructed and the rent was got reduced from Rs.50 - l •
per month to Rs.35 per month. This continues to be the ,
rent upto date, according to be that the petitioner society P
c continues to be in occupation of the same property, as it
was, when it was allotted to them by the Custodian, and it ~
is established from the evidence of the clerk of the office of
the Custodian. R.W. 1 and the orders produced by him,
namely R. W. 1/1 and R. W. 2/2, as well as the survey report
D Ex. R.W. 1/3 that what was allotted to the petitioner soci-
ety, was only a plot and that the shed was self constructed.
The petitioner has failed to substantiate the contention that
the respondent himself has treated him/them/as a tenant
because no certified copy of the previous pleadings has
been placed on the file. The petitioner, therefore, being a
E tenant only with respect to open site, which does not come
within the definition of a 'premises', as contemplated by
the Delhi Rent Control Act the petition under sec. 44 of
the act, is not entertainable."

5. The suit out of which the present appeal arises has to be ~- +-
F understood in the context of the above previous history. In 1977
Banwari Lal instituted suit No. 318/77 against the Society seeking
eviction of the Society from "the plot of land in question". It was
alleged that the plaintiff was the owner of the above said plot and that
the defendant had put up a shed thereon. It was alleged that the
Society had been occupying the property much earlier and that the
G plaintiff who came to the scene much later had mistakenly thought that
the defendant was the tenant of both the land and the shecl put up _,J,r ..
thereon and accordingly filed the petition under the Rent Control Act
for evicting the Society. Subsequently it was said, after examining the
records of the Custodian and allotment letter in favour of the
defendant he had come to know that the shed had been constructed by
H the defendant and that, as such the property from which the eviction
PRABHA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL [RANGANATHAN, J.] 659

was to be sought was only a plot of land and not 'premises' within the A
meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In these circumstances, it was
claimed that the plaintiff had terminated the tenancy of the defendants
and that the suit was being filed to recover possession of the property
from the tenants. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiff has succeeded in
all the three courts and hence the present appeal.
B
6. Shri S.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the Society, contends
that in this case both the parties had taken up inconsistent stands at
\.. __ different stages of the litigation and that, in that state of affairs, the
r courts below should have ignored the past conduct of both the parties
,, and gone by the contents of the documents of title in order to decide
the matter. Instead, he complains, the courts have held the conduct of C
y the Society "in some of the prior liftigation as negativing its claimfbut,
when it came to a consideration o the like conduct on the part o the
plaintiff, they have chosen to make light of it, accepting the lame
excuses put forward on his behalf. We shall, therefore, consider, at the
outset, the impact, if any, of the earlier· proceedings in this case on the
question at issue. D

7. The detailed narration of facts set out earlier will show that
.... the parties have not been consistent in their stands and have tried to
blow hot or cold as the occasion suited them. Taking up the stand of
the Society first, the Society, in its application to the custodian for
reduction of rent claimed-successfully-that what was allotted to it E
was only a plot of land and that the small shed thereon had been put up
by the Society itself. So also, in its application for aUotment dated
21.1.1957 and 15.10.1960, it referred to the property only as an indust-
·, rial plot. The letters addressed by the Society to the Custodian and
~~-'-{settlement Commissioner as well as the application for reduction of
1
rent and the order thereon are valuable pieces of evidence both be- F
cause they are anterior to the litigation between these two parties and
also because they reflect the representations of the Society to, and the
findings of, the very authority that allotted the property to the Society.
The Society represented that it had been allotted only a plot of land
and that the shed had been put up thereon by itself and this plea would
not have been accepted by the Custodian had it not been correct. Shri G
• ...... Mehta tried to argue that the Custodian has only reduced the rent on
general grounds and has given no finding that only a plot had been
allotted to the Society but we are unable to accept this contention as
both in the opening sentences as well as in the body of order there is a
clear finding to this effect. This is a very strong circumstance to show
that what was allotted to the Society was o~ly a plot of land. Secondly, H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

A the findings of the Rent Controller in the application under section 44
filed by the Society, right or wrong, have attained finality as between
the parties and it is not open to the Society on principles analogous to
res judicata to take a contrary stand in these proceedings.

8. It is true that in the suit for injunction filed in 1964 as well as )(-
B in its application under section 44 of the Rent Control Act th'e Society
took up a contrary position and claimed that the property was tenanted
'premises'. It is not clear why the Society filed the suit if the property
was subject to the Rent Control Act and, though it appears that the-~ /
plaintiff pointed out that the property was the subject of proceedings 1
under the Rent Control Act, the suit was eventually dismissed without I
any findings. Again, the Society's claim in the second set of proceed-
c ings was rejected by the Rent Controller in a reasoned order on .)\
9.J.1972. The statement of Ajit Singh of May, 1962 is ambiguous, as it
says on the one hand that there was a shed but also says on the other
that what was allotted to the Society was only an open plot. These are,
therefore, not of much help to the Society.
D
9. Turning next to the stand of the plainttiff, in December 1962,
soon after acquiring the property, he applied to the Rent Controller~
though unsuccessfully-for the eviction of the Society on the allega- ~
tion that the property comprised a shed, that it·had been unautho-
risedly sublet and that the plaintiff required it for reconstruction as
E residential premises. His explanation that this was due to some mis-
. taken notion has been accepted by the first appellate court. Counsel
for the appellant contends that this was a naive explanation which
should not have been accepted as the material on record shows that
Banwari Lal and Dina Nath were members of the Society and were(
fully aware of all the transactions and activities of the Society right""'~--
F from the inception and could not have been unaware of the nature of ·
the property allotted to the Society as alleged. There is some truth in
this but at the same time, it should be appreciated that, when filing this
application, the plaintiff might not have been fully aware of all the
legal implications of the situation. At the time of the action, the pro-
perty consisted of a land and shed. If the land belonged to the Custo-
G dian and the shed had been put up by the Society, what was sold to the
plaintiff was really only the right, title and interest of the Custodian ~ ~ '.
and the plaintiff could not have become the owner of the shed super-
structure. Strictly speaking, the Society was the tenant only in respect
of the land but it is possible that, without examining the niceties as to
what was the original allotment and the effect of subsequent structure
H having been put up on it by the lessee, the plaintiff may just have tried
PRABHA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL [RANGANATHAN, J.[ 661

to evict the Society by resort to the Rent Control Act. The question A
whether the property was 'premises' within the Rent Control Act was
not put in issue in that case and the decision of the Rent Controller
also rested on a very narrow finding which has no relevance to the
point at issue. We, therefore., think, that these proceedings do not
affect the present case of the plaintiff, particularly in view of the
specific findings given by the Rent Controller in the Society's B
application.

10. Summing up the position, therefore, it seems to us that the
. ·; "-..... history of the earlier litigation and findings given in the orders therein
r support the plaintiff's case rather than that of the Society as held by
.. the courts below. That apart, we do not think the position is different
exiiijf, as urged by Sri Mehta, we ignore all these proceedings as C
unhelpful to either side ·and._cg,ncentrate only on the documents on
which Shri Mehta relies as supporting his plea that the Society had got
an allotment of not a mere plot of land but of a building as well.

11. The first and most important document on which Shri Mehta D
places great reliance is the order of allotment dated 28.3.1949 by the
Custodian in favour of the Society. Co.unset lays stress on the refer-
ences in it to "industrial premises'', tc. the "'industrial establishment
known as open compound ... (portion ofJai Hind Motor Works)", to
"the factory/workshop/industrial establishment", to "possession of
stocks of consumable goods and other stores and material, if any", E
"and other movable property kept therein" and contends that the
document clearly shows that what was allotted to the Society was not a
mere plot of land but an industrial premises.

; 12. We are unable to accept the above contention for a number
-~-1· j· of. reasons. In the first place, the reference to 'industrial premises' in F
· this letter cannot be construed as a reference to 'premises' w1thm the
meaning of the Rent Control Act. The letter also refers to the allotted
property as factory, workshop and industrial establishment though,
admittedly, there was no such factory, workshop or establishment in
existence on that date. The letter also refers to stocks of consumable
goods, stores and movable property on the property but it is common G
ground that there was none of these things on the site at the time. It
was. obviously a cyclostyled proforma allotting an item of evacuee
property and, except for the portion where it contains a description of
the particular property in question viz. "open compound at Hamilton
Road (portion of Jai Hind Motor Works) with 25 front and 50deep", it
only contains terms applicable to allotments generally. In this case the H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

particular description is not of much help either. That the property was
A "known as office compound" does not necessarily mean that there
were premises inside the compound as was sought to be suggested. It is
equally consistent with the claim that it was only an open plot of land
inside a compound on which some motor works were located.

B 13. Secondly, in the absence ofa clear indication of the nature of
the property in the allotment letter, we may refer to the other ~-
documentary evidence on record. The inspection report of the person
who delivered the property to the Society dated 9 .1.1951, the order
dated 31.3.1955 of the Deputy Custodian, the letters of the Society-~/:
dated 21.1.1957 and 12.10.1960, the revision petition filed by the Soci- 1
C ety as well as the order dated 6.8.1962 thereon clearly indicate that
what was allotted to the Society was only a plot of land and that the
Society had put up a temporary structure and installed some machin- ><;
ery on it. The importance of these documents, as indicated earlier, lies
in the fact that they arise out of proceedings between the allotting
authority and the Society and relate to a point of time anterior to the
D commencement of the litigation between the Society and the plaintiff.
Shri Mehta invited our attention to the reports called for and submit-
ted in connection with the application under s. 33 of the Displaced
Persons Act filed by the Society. He pointed out that the report of the
Executive Engineer shows that the reserve price for the auction sale of ~
the property was fixed at Rs.21,000 by taking into account the value of
E the land at Rs.17 ,500 and the value of the structure of Rs.3.883 (in all
Rs.21,303) and that this had been further clarified by the report of
T.C. Dewan. But, as rightly pointed out by Dr. Ghosh for the plaintiff,
these were only reports submitted in 1962 (much later than the allot-
ment) in the context of justifying the action of the department in
auctioning the property in 1960 instead of allotting it to the occupant- ,
F Society. As mentioned earlier, the Society itself had pleaded, in its .~ -i--·-
application that it had been allotted the land and that it had put up ·
structure and machinery thereon worth Rs.31,000. It is clear that the
machinery installed by the Society on the land was not considerable. It
is seen from the order on the revision petition that the Society could
prove installation of machinery only to the extent of Rs.6,585. The
G effort of the Society was, therefore, apparently to contend that it had
been allotted only the fand for which an upset price of Rs.21,000 had
been fixed and that since it had also put up a structure and installed -*. -
machinery worth Rs.31,000, the property should not have been sold in
auction. An inspection was ordered and report of the Executive En-
gineer indicates that the value of Rs.21,000 had been fixed taking into
H account both the land and the structure thereon and not merely for the
PRABHA MFG. SOCIETY v. BANWARI LAL IRANGANATHAN, J.I 663

--f land. The report of T. C. Dewan was also to the effect that the upset
A
price of Rs.21,000 fixed in 1960 had taken into account a part of an
evacuee structure that had already existed on the land. These reports
were thus drawn up in the context of a controversy between the parties
as to the nature of the property allotted and the manner in which it had
been valued at Rs.21,000. These reports drawn up several years after
~)II the allotment, and intended to justify the department's action, cannot B
be of much evidentiary value. It is also significant that, although
Dewan's report states that "the position can be made clear by consult-
ing the valuation schedule· of the property" no attempt was made to
• "'\ /·· bring on record th.e valuation schedule which must have been drawn up
. r r
at the time of the sale, before fixing the upset price at Rs.21,000.
These documents cannot, therefore, be relied upon as to the state of C
the property when it was allotted to the Sodety.
14. Thirdly, the survey reports referred to by us earlier are help-
ful in indicating how the confusion in the case could have arisen. The
report made at the time of Pritam Chand's occupancy obviously covers
a much more extellllive property which consisted of an open space of
D
area 50' x 45 which was used as motor lorry workshop and a number
of sheds and a verandah. If we read thll letter of allotment in the
context of this report, it is clear that what was allotted to the Society

..... was only a portion of the Jai Hind Motor Works measuring 50' x 25' .
This makes it abundantly· clear that only an open space was allotted to
the Society. Even the report of 1955 shows the property (though some-
what larger in size than 50' x 25' shown in the allotment letter) only as E
a plot with tin shed. As, even on the Society's own showing, it had put
up a shed on the plot, we again reach the position that what was
originally allotted was only a plot of land .
. j 15. The allotment letter and the other documents referred to by
·--...-'I counsel for the Society do not, therefore, further its case. On the F
· contrary, they only reinforce the conclusion of the courts below. Actu-
ally, the findings on the point of all the three courts are concurrent
findings on a question of fact. The Additional District Judge has co-
gently collected together all the circumstances which militate against
the Society in its judgment and the High Court has approved this
summing up. This Court does not normally reappraise the evidence or G
.., ;!-- interfere with such concurrent findings of fact, even if it .is possible on
the facts to come to a contrary conclusion. We have, however, discus-
sed the material at great length and practically reviewed the entire
evidence on record as Shri Mehta submitted that the property is at
present occupied by a larger number of members of the petitioner
Society who are carrying on small business and that they will all be H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.

A thrown out on the road as a result of the decision of the courts below.
Even so, for reasons discussed above, we do not think we can come to
a contrary conclusion on the material on record.
16. The High Court has gone one step further. It has indicated
that, even if one accepted the best case of the appellant Society-that
B there was a shed on the land even at the time of the original
allotment-such plot-cum-shed cannot convert the land into 'premises'
within the meaning of the Rent Control Act. This was the prima facie
view of the court as it did not hear arguments from the parties on this
_ point. Counsel canvassed this point before us also. Shri Mehta, refer-
ring to Corporation of City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island,
AIR 1921 PC 240; Karnania Properties Ltd. v. Augustin, [1957] SCR
c 20; State of Bombay v. Sa~dar Venkat Rao Krishna Rao Gujar, [1963] 1
SCR 428 and Ghanshiam Das v. Devi Prsad & Another, [1966] 3 SCR
875 contended that the definition of premises envisages a building and
that, as per these decisions, anything that is built on land, even if it is
only a kacha shed, would be a building and this brings the property in
D question within the purview of the Act. On the other hand Dr. Ghosh
sought, by analogy of the principle of the decisions in Uttam Chand v.
S.M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716; S.M Gopalkrishna Chetty v.
Ganeshan & Ors., [1973] 1SCR273 and Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust
& Ors. v. Mahadev Vithan Kutwa, [1983] 1 RCJ 195, to contend that
what the Rent Control Act contemplates is a building let out qua
E building, may be with appurtenant land, but not a land let out for use
as land merely because there may be a small building on it. The rele-
vant question, he says, is what was the dominant subject matter of the •
allotment-the land or the building and this is a question which can
only be decided in the respondent's favour. We do not consider it
necessary to embark on a discussion of this aspect as we are satisfied,
F for the reasons already discussed, that the property allotted to the
Society in respect of which it was a tenant, initially under the custodian
and later under the plaintiffs, was only a plot of land and that the
plaintiffs were justified in attempting to recover possession thereof by
a suit for possession in the civil court.
It is further directed that the decree for eviction will not be
G
executed till 28.2.1990 provided the persons who are in occupation of
the premises in question file an undertaking pontaining the usual terms
within four weeks from today.
17. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed but, in the
circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
H
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.