Holding

A person attains a specified age on the day preceding the anniversary of his birth, the day of birth being counted as a whole day; therefore the appellant had attained the age of 28 on 1 January 1984 and was disqualified.

Summary

The Rajasthan Public Service Commission advertised a direct recruitment exam for the Rajasthan Administrative Service in 1983, stipulating that candidates must be at least 21 years old on 1 January 1984 and must not have attained the age of 28 on that same day. The appellant, born on 2 January 1956, was initially allowed to sit the written exam but was later disqualified on the ground that he had attained 28 years of age on 1 January 1984. He challenged the disqualification before the High Court under Article 226, arguing that he would only complete 28 years at the end of 1 January 1984. The Single Judge accepted this view, but a Division Bench reversed, holding that under the rule the day of birth counts as a whole day and a person attains a specified age on the day preceding the birthday anniversary. The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench, relying on Section 4 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, and English case law, and held that the appellant had indeed attained the age of 28 on 1 January 1984, rendering him ineligible. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

How should the age limit in Rule 11‑B of the Rajasthan State & Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1962 be interpreted with respect to the date of attainment of age?
Does the day of birth count as a whole day for the purpose of computing age, thereby making the appellant attain 28 years on 1 January 1984?
Is Section 4 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 applicable to the statutory interpretation of the recruitment rule?

Legislation cited

Indian Majority Act, 1875s. 4

Subjects

age computationstatutory interpretationrecruitment eligibilityRajasthan Administrative ServiceIndian Majority ActRule 11‑Blegal age

Judgment

A

PRABHU DAY AL SESMA
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.
B
AUGUST 28, 1986

[A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ.)

Rajasthan State & Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by
Competitive Examination) Rules, 1962-Rule l l B-Age-Determina- C
lion of-"Must have attained the age of 2 l years and must nor have
attained the age of 28 years"-Interpretation of.

Indian Majority Act, 1875-S. 4-Age-Computation of-How
,,.-- . determined.
D
Indian Administrative -service (Appointment by Competitive
Examination) Regulations, 1955-Rule 4-"must have attained the age
of 21 years and must not have attained the age of 28 years"-Inter-
pretation of. '
For direct recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative Service E
and allied services of the Government of Rajasthan by a competitive
examination to he held in 1983, the Rajasthan Public Service Commis-
sion prescribed that the candidate should have attained the age of 21
years on January 1, 1984 and should not have attained the age of 28
. years i.e. on the 1st day of January next folloWing the last date fixed for
receipt of application. F

The appellant was allowed to appear in ttie written examination,
but later on he was intimated by the Commission that his candidature
was rejected on the ground that he had attained the age of 28, years on
January 1, 1984 and was therefore ineligible for consideration.
G
The writ petition filed by the appellant' under Art. 226 was
allowed by a Single Judge holding that if the date of birth of the appel-
lant was January 2, 1956 he would complete the age of 28 years only at
the end of the day of January 1, 1984 and therefore he could not be said
\
to have attained the age of 28 years on that date.
H
665
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11986] 3 S.C.R.
A On appeal by the respondents, a Division ·Bench reversed the
judgment of the Single Judge.

In appeal to this Court, on behalf of the appellant it was con-
tended: {i) that the DMsion Bench erronously introduced the legal con-
B cept of the age of majority as laid down in s. 4 of the Indian Majority
Act 1875 for the purpose of interpreting r. 11-B of the Rajasthan State
and Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Competitive Exami-
nation) Rules 1962 and (ii) that as commonly· understood, a persan
attains a particular age after he had completed a given number of years
and there is no reason why the words of r. 11-B "must have attained the
age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of 28 years" should
c not be 'understood in the ordinary sense.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD: l. In the absence of any express provision, while calcu•
D lating a person's age, the day of his birth must be counted as a whole
day and he attains the specified age on the day preceding, the anni-
versary of his birthday. One of the well accepted rules for computation
of time is that fractions of a day will be omitted in computing a period of
time in years or months in the sense that a fraction of a day will be
treated as a full day.A legal day commences at 120' dock midnight and
E continues until the same hour the following night. This principle is in
conformity withs. 4ofthe Indian Majority Act 1875. [671F-G]

G. Vatsala Rani, P.M.G. Kiniv. Selection Committee for Admis-
sion to Medical Colleges, Bangalore Medical College, Bangalore-2, AIR
1967 Mysore 135, Rex v.Sooffin, LR I 1930] I KB 741 & Shurey, Savory
F v. Shurey, LR 11918] I Ch. 263, approved.

Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn. vol. 37, para 178 at 100,
relied upon. ·

i. The object and intent in making r. llB of the Rajasthan State
G & Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Competitive Examina-
tion) Rules, 1962 was to prescribe the age limits upon which the eligibil-
ity of a candidate for direct recruitment io the Rajasthan Administra-
tive Service and other allied services is governed. The expression "must
not have attained the age of 28 years on the first day of January next
following the last day fixed for receipt of application" in r. llB has to
H be interpreted by applying the aforesaid principle and not on the basis
PRABHU DAYAL v. STATE [SEN, J.I 667

adopted by UPSC while interpreting r. 4 of the Indian Administrative A
Services (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, f955
framed by the Central Government in pursuance of r. 7 of the IAS
(Recruitment) Rules. 1954. [670A-B] ·

3 .• The last _day fixed for receipt of application in this ca..--e, was 's
January 1, 1983. First day of January next following that day would be
January 1, 1984. the appellant having been born on January 2, 1956, he
had not only attained the age of 28 years but also completed the same at
12 o'clock on the midnight of January 1, 1984. On the next day i.e. on
January 2, 1984, the appellant would be one day more than 28 years.
· The Division Bench of the High Court was, therefore, right in holding
that the appellant was disqualified for direct recruitment of the c
Rajasthan Administrative Service in the examination held by the
Rajasthan Public Service Commission in 1983. [673C-D]

The Court emphasised the need for a provision like the proviso tor. 4
of the Indian Adlilinistrative Service (Appointment by Competitive Exami-
D
nation) Regulations 1955 conferring the power of relaxation on the State
Government under certain conditions without which a deserving candidate
would be rendered ineligible for appointment and advised the Govern-
ment to consider the question of relaxing the upper age limit in the case of
the appellant in order to mitigate the hardship, if otherwise permissible,
because he exceeded the upper age limit just by one day. [673E-F]
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 531
of 1986

·From the Judgment and Order dated 22.5.1984 of the Rajasthan
,i .High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 114 of 1985.
, . F
Sushi! Kumar Jain and Sudhanshu A trey a for the Appellant.

B.D. Sharma for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
0

..
\
SEN, J The short point involved in this appeal by special leave
pertains to the determination of age at a particular point of time. The
question is whether the appellant having his date of birth as January 2,
1956 had attained the age of 28 years on January 1, 1984 and was
therefore disqualified from being considered for direct recruitment H>
H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11986) 3 S.C.R.

A the Rajasthan Administrative Service under r. 11-B of the Rajasthan
State & Subbordinate Service (Direct Recruitment by Competitive Exa-
mination) Rules, 1962. (for short 'the Rules').

Put very briefly, the essential facts are these. The Rajasthan
B Public Service Commission invited applications for direct recruitment
to the Rajasthan Administrative Service and allied services of the
Government of Rajasthan by a competitive examination to be held in
1983. Under the directions issued by the Commission, the minimum
age prescribed for candidates was 21 years and the maximum 28 years.
It was prescribed that the candidate should have attained the age of 21
years on January I, 1984 and should not have attained the age of 28 years
c i.e. on the first day of January next following the last date fJXed for receipt
of application. The appellant was allowed to appear in the written exami-
nation, but by an order dated June 12, 1984, the Assistant Secretary to
the Commission intimated the appellant that his candidature was rejected
on the ground that he had attained the age of 28 years on January I, 1984
D and was therefore ineligible for oonsideration. Feeling aggrieved, the
appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and
contended that his date of birth was January .Z, 1956 and that he had not
attained the age of 28 years on January I, '1984. His claim was contested
by the respondents who pleaded that the appellant had attained the age of
28 years on January I, 1984 and therefore his form was properly rejected.
E During the pendency of the writ petition, the High Court by an interim
order dated September 14, 1984 directed the Commission to interview the
appellant if he was otherwise eligible for being considered except on the
ground of age. The appellant was acrordingly interviewed but the result
was withheld. A learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated
January 19, 1985 held that if the date of birth of the appellant was January
F 2, 1956 he would oomplete the age of28 years only at the end of the day of.·
January 1, 1984 and there he could not be said to have attained the age of
28 years on that dale. He accordingly held that the Commission was not
justified in rejecting the candidature of the appellant on the ground that
he had attained the age of 28 years on January 1, 1984 and therefore ~as
not eligible for consideration.
G
On appeal, a Division Bench disagreed with the view expressed
by the learned Single Judge and reversed his judgment on the ground
that the words used in r. 11-B of the Rules are, 'must not have attained
the age of 28 years on the first day of January next following the last
date fixed for receipt of application' and not that he should have
H completed the age of 28 years on that day. They relied upon the
PRABHU DAYAL v. STATE [SEN, J.I 669

undisputed fact that the first day of January next following the last A
date fixed for receipt of application in this case was January I, 1984.
Accordingly, they held that the appellant was born on January 2, 1956
and, as such, he had attained the age of 28 years as soon as the first day
Qf January, 1984 commenced. They further held that the appellant had
not only attained the age of 28 years, but had also completed the same
B
at 12 o'clock in the midnight of January 1, 1984. According to the
learned iudges, on January 2, 1984, the appellant would be one day
more than 28 years and, as such, he was disqualified to appear at the
examination under r. 11-B of the Rules. The conclusion of the learned
Judges may best be stated in their own words:

"In calculating a person's age, the day of his birth must be c
counted as a whole day and he attains the specified age on
the day preceding, the anniversary of his birth day."

In coming to that conclusion the learned Judges relied upon the
language of r. 11-B of the Rules which prescribes the age limit for the
D
said examination and also referred to s. 4 of the Indian Majority Act,
1875. They have relied on certain decisions of different High Courts,
particularly to that in G. Vatsala Rani represented by guardian and
father, P.M.G. Kini v. Selection Committee for Admission to Medical
Colleges, Bangalore Medical College, Bangalore-2 represented by the·
Secretary, AIR 1967 Mysore 135 and to some English decisions laying
E
down the principle for determination of age.

It is argued that the learned Judges were in error in introducing
the ,legal concept of the age of majority as laid down in s. 4 of the
Indian Majority Act, 1875 for the purposeofinterpreting r. 11-B. It is
said that the purpose of r. 11-B framed by the Government was to
F
prescribe the m_aximum and minimum age limits for entry into the
Rajasthan Administrative Service and allied servkes of the Govern-·
ment of Rajasthan: It is submitted that as commonly understood, a '
·person attains a particular age after he has completed a given number
of years. It jg said that there is no reason why the words of r. 11-B
'must have attained the age of 21 years and must not have attained the
G
age of 28 years' should not be understood in the ordinary sense. At
first blush, the contention advanced appears to be rather attractive but
on deeper consideration it cannot prevail.

Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the fact
that the Union Public Service Commission has been interpreting the H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C. R.

A words 'must have attained the age of 21 years and must not have
attained the age of 26 years on the first day of August next following'
in the way the appellant contends for. These words are taken from r.
4 of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Competitive
Examination) Regulations,
. 1955 framed by. the Central Government in
B pursuance of r. 7 of the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment)
Rules, 1954. Presumably, there would be similar provisions laying
down the qualification as to age in other central services as well. R. 4
insofar as material reads:

"4. Conditions of Eligibility-
ln order to he eligible to compete at th'! examination, a
c candidate must satisfy the following conditions,
namely:-
(i) . . . .
(ii) Age- He must have attained the age of 21, and
not attained the age of 28 on the first day of August of
D the year in which the examination is held:

Provided that the upper age limit may be relaxed
in respect of such categories of persons as may from
time to time, be notified in this behalf by the Central
Government, to the extent and subject to the condi-
tions, notified in respect of each category."
E
Undoubtedly, the Union Public Service Commission has been
interpreting the provision as to attainment of age in a like manner.
This would be clear from the advertisement issued by it on December
8, 1984 which is in these terms:
F
"Age limit: (ka) The candidate 'should have attained the age
of 21 years on !st August, 1985. but should not have at-
tained the age of 26 years, that is, .he should .not have born
before the 2nd August, 1959 and after the lst August,
1964,"
G
We are afraid, the interpretation of r. ll-B of the Rules cannot pro-
ceed upon the basis adopted by the Union Public Service Commission.

Rule 11-B of the Rules provides:

H "11-B. Age. Notwithstanding anything contained regarding
;

PRABHU DAYAL v. STATE (SEN: J.] . 671

age limit in any of the service Rules governing through the A
agency of the Commission to the posts in the State Service
and in the Subordinate· Service mentioned in ·schedule I
and in Schedule II respectively, a candidate for direct re-
cruitment to the posts to be filled in by combined competi-
tive examinations conducted by the Commission unaer B
these Rules must have attained the age of21 years and must
>· not have attained the age ·of 28 years on the first day of
January next following the last date fixed for receipt of
application~" -

."r' ..·· It is plain upon the language of r. I 1-B that a candidate 'must have
attained the age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of 28 c
. years on the first day of January next following the last date fixed for .
receipt of application'. Last day fixed for receipt of application in this
r case, was January· 1, 1983. First day of January next following that day
would be January I, 1984. The object and intent in making r. 11-B was
- to prescribe the age limits upon which the eligibility of a candidate for D
direct recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative Service and other
allied services is governed. At first impression, it may seem that a
person born on January 2,.1956 would attain 28 years of age only on
·January 2, 1984 and not on January, I, 1984. But this is not quite
accurate. In calculatiiig a person's age, the day of his birth must be
! ·"""' counted 3s a whole day and he attains the specified age on the day E
preceding; the anniversary of his birth day. We have to apply well
accepted rules for computation of time. One each rule is that fractions
of a day will be omitted in computing a period of time in years or months

-. in the sense that a fraction of a day wilt be treated as a full day. A legal
~j· day commences at 12 o'clock midnight and continues until the same
. hour the following. night. There is a ·popular misconception that a
person does attain a particular age unless and until he has completed a
F
given number of yeiirs. In the absence of any express provision, it is
well-settled that any specified age in law is to be computed as having
been attained on the day preceding
~ . /
the anniversary
,
of
. th.e birth day.
ln Halsbury's Laws of England. 3rd edn., vol. 37, para 178 at p. G
100, the law was stated thus:

"In computing a period of time, at any rate, when counted.
in years or months, no regard is generally paid to fractions
- of a day, in the sense that the period is regarded as comp- H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A lete although it is short to the extent of a fraction of a day

Similarly, in calculating a person's age the day of his
birth counts as a whole day; and he attains a specified age
on the day next before the anniversary of his birth day."
B
We have come across two English decisions on the point. In Rex
v. Scoffin, LR [1930] l KB 741 the question was whether the accused +.
had or had not completed 21 years of age. S. 10(1) of the Criminal
Justice Administration Act, 1914 provides that a person might be sent

c
to Borstal if it appears to the court that he is not more than 21 years of
age. The accused was born on February 17, 1909. Lord Hewart, CJ I
f1I
held that the accused completed 21 years of age on February 16, 1930
and that he was one day more than .21 years of age on February 17,
1930 which was the Commission day of Manchester Assizes.
'Y'

D In Re. Shurey, Savory v. Shurey, LR (1918] 1 Ch. 263 the question
that arose for decision was this: Does a person attain a specified age in
law on the aniversary of his or her birthday, or on the day preceding that
anniversary? After reviewing the earlier decisions, Sargant, J. said
that law does not take cognizance of part of a day and the consequence
is that person attains the age of twenty-one years or of twenty-five
. ___..:
years, or any specified age, on the day preceding the anniversary of his
E
twenty-first or twenty-fifth birthday or other birthday. as the case
maybe.

F
From.Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn., vol. 45, para 1143
at p. 550 it appears ihat s. 9 of the Family Law Reforms Act, 1969 has
abrogated the old common law rule stated in Re. Shurey, Savory v.
Shurey (supra).
--l
-
It is in recognition of the difference between how a person's age
>-
is legally construed how it is understood in common parlance. The
Legislature has expressly provided ins. 4 of the Indian Majority Act,
G 1875 that how the age of majority is to be computed. It reads:

"4. Age of majority how computed-
In computing the age of any person, the day on which he
~
was born is to be included as a whole day, and he shall be
deemed to have attained majority, if he falls within the first
H paragraph of s. 3, at the beginning of the twenty-first an-
PRABHU DAYAL L STATE !SEN. J.i 673
/

niversary of that day, and if he falls within the second A
paragraph of s. 3, at the beginning of the 18th anniversary
of that day."

The Section embodies that in computing the age' of any person, the day
on which he was born is to be included as a whole day and he must be B
deemed to have attained majority at the beginning of the eighteenth
anniversary of that day. As already stated, a legal day commences at
12 o'clock midnight and continues until the sa\lle hour the following
night. It would therefore appear that the appellant having been born
on January 2, 1956, he had not only attained the age of 28 years but

~
. I
also completed the same at 12 o'clock on the midnight of January 1,
1984. On the next day i.e. on January 2, 1984, the appellant would be c
one day more than 28 years. The learned Judges were therefore right
in holding that the appellant was disqualified for direct recruitment to
the Rajasthan Administrative Service and as such was not entitled to
appear at the examination held by· the Rajasthan Public Service
Commission in 1983. We affirm the view taken by the learned Judges
D
as also the decisions in G. Vatsala Rani's case, (supra).

It is rather unfortunate that the appellant should upon the con-
struction placed on r. J1-B of the Rajasthan State and Subordinate
Services (Direct Recruitment by Competitive Examination) Rules.
>- 1962 fail to secure entry into the Rajasthan Administrative Service and
allied services of the Government of Rajasthan merely because he
E
exceeds the upper age limit just by one day. The Government ought to
consider the question of relaxing the upper age limit in the case of the
appellant in order to mitigate the hardship, if otherwise permissible.
There is need for a provision like the proviso to r. 4 of the Indian
Administrative Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination)
Re.gulations, 1955, conferring the power of relaxation on the. State F
Government undrr certain conditions without which a deserving
candidate would be rendered ineligible for appointment.

The result is that the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismis-
sed. There shall be no order as to costs.
G

A.P.J. Appeal dismissed.