Holding

The conviction was set aside because the extra‑judicial confession was inadmissible and the circumstantial evidence failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Summary

The appellant Pradeep Kumar was convicted for the murder of Umesh Chowdhary based on an alleged extra‑judicial confession, alleged animosity between the parties, and the recovery of keys and money. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the reliability of the confession, the credibility of witnesses who were themselves suspects, and the lack of independent forensic corroboration of the recovered items. The Court found that the confession was inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and was not supported by trustworthy testimony. It also held that the circumstantial evidence did not satisfy the stringent requirements for conviction and left reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellant, ordering his immediate release.

Issues considered

The admissibility of the extra‑judicial confession under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Whether the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, including recovered keys and money, sufficiently proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt
The reliability of witnesses who were themselves suspects
The applicability of the presumption of innocence in the absence of corroborated evidence
The proper legal standards for conviction based on circumstantial evidence

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murderextra‑judicial confessioncircumstantial evidencepresumption of innocenceSection 27 Evidence Actacquittalmiscarriage of justicewitness reliability

Judgment

682 [2023]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 2 S.C.R. 682 [2023] 2 S.C.R.

A PRADEEP KUMAR
v.
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1304 of 2018)
B
MARCH 16, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
Penal Code,1860 – ss. 302,34,201 – Two accused persons
(including appellant) were convicted for offence of murder by trial
C
Court –The prosecution case, rested upon three circumstances (a)
the alleged confessional statement of appellant;(b) prior animosity
between appellant and the deceased; and (c) the recovery of material
from the appellant – The High Court upheld the conviction of
appellant and acquitted co-accused – On appeal, held: The
D testimonies of PW-12(son of the deceased) and PW-13(co-villager)
negated circumstances that there was tension between the deceased
and the accused, which was, the motive of commission of crime –
Recovery of materials i.e keys and the money, there is no independent
corroborated material except for the confessional statement of the
E accused, which also is not proven on record – Further, the extra
judicial confessional statement of the appellant, apart from being
hit by s.27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, it not to have been supported
by PW-1 and PW-7, who as is evident, was himself a suspect, if
witness was himself a suspect, his testimony cannot be said to be
reliable and trustworthy – The testimony of star witness PW-19-
F
investigating officer was found to be unworthy of any credence
and hence unreliable – The testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses were found unreliable – Neither the chain of circumstances
to have been completely established nor the guilt of the accused
alone, having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyond
G reasonable doubt – The presumption of the guilt of appellant by
both the courts below is based on improper and incomplete
appreciation of evidence which has resulted into travesty of justice
– Judgment of High Court and trial Court set aside – Appellant
acquitted –Evidence Act,1872 – s.27.
H
682
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 683

Allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1. The impugned judgement to say the least, is
sketchy. The presumption of the guilt of appellant-accused by
both the courts below is based on improper and incomplete
appreciation of evidence which in the considered view of this
Court, has resulted into travesty of justice. [Para 10][688-F-G] B
2. When this court came to the deposition of PW-12 son of
the deceased, unequivocally he states that “... later on the police
personnel told me that accused persons have thrown my father
after committing murder...” Now this totally belies the testimony
of his grandfather (PW-10). To similar effect, it is the testimony C
of PW-13 who only adds that “...Later on I came to know that
victim has been murdered. I heard from the villagers...”.
Significantly, her statement that she was not informed by her
husband (PW-7), of the deceased being murdered by the Appellant
was not recorded in her previous statement with which she was
confronted. But what is crucial is her deposition is that her D
husband himself was a suspect and that she admits it to be correct,
“... that the police personnel took my husband for inquiry in
connection with the murder of deceased. The police personnel
kept my husband for one day...” This negates one of the
circumstances that there was tension between the deceased and E
the accused, which was, the motive of commission of crime, i.e.
issue of use of the shop inter se the parties. [Para 19][690-G-H;
691-A-C]
3. This Court noticed in respect of the next circumstance,
which is the recovery of keys and the money, that there is no F
independent corroborated material except for the confessional
statement of the accused, which also is not proven on record.
Even otherwise, the keys, the currency notes and the blood
stained clothes were not sent for chemical analysis. There is only
an unexhibited copy of the FSL Report of the alleged blood
stained clothes of the Appellant which stands not proven by G
anyone. Also none has come forward to depose that the accused
had kept the keys of the shop with himself, for after all, it is not
the case of the prosecution that the shop belonged to the accused.
[Para 20][691-C-E]
H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.

A 4. The substratum of the evidence, that is the extra judicial
confessional statement of the Appellant, apart from being hit by
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, this Court finds it
not to have been supported by PW-1 and PW-7, who as is evident,
was himself a suspect. He admits it to be “...correct to say that
the Inspector had detained me and some villagers where the dead
B body was laying...” and “...it is correct to say that I did not disclose
the statement made by accused-appellant to any other person
before 4 o’clock...” We have already noticed his wife (PW-13) to
have supported this statement. Now, if this witness was himself a
suspect, his testimony cannot be said to be unimpeachable or
C free from blemish. This witness, in this Court’s considered view,
cannot be said to be reliable and trustworthy. [Para 21][691-E-G;
692-B]
5. Dealing with the star witness of the prosecution which is
the Investigation Officer, (PW-19), this Court finds his testimony
to be wholly unworthy of any credence: unbelievable; and the
D witness to be unreliable. This we say so for the reasons that he
did not record the statement of PW-10 or PW-7 in respect any
prior animosity between the deceased and the accused. The
evidence pertaining to the genesis of the crime was not collected
by him. He also does not state as to what made him detain
E accused-appellant on 3.10.2023. Be that as it may, he did not
examine witnesses, who in considered view of this Court, perhaps
may have thrown some light about regard to the actual occurrence
of the incident. He admits that houses of few co-villagers are just
at a distance of 30 to 70 meters from the spot of the crime. Yet,
he did not examine any of them. Why so? No explanation is
F forthcoming. Crucially, he admits that, “the investigation
concluded having no direct evidence” indicating the time and
the manner in which the crime took place. He admits to have
prepared some document in relation to the keys recovered from
the accused however no such fact is recorded in his diary. In fact,
G such fact is not found recorded in the Panchnama prepared by
him. The basis for the Investigation Officer (PW-19) to have
arrived at the guilt of co-accused is missing in his statement. In
fact, he does not even state to have suspected co-accused of
having committed any crime. The sole basis for the Investigation
Officer (PW-19) to have arrested the Appellant for having
H committed the crime is his extra judicial confession (Ex. P.11)
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 685

which, apart from becoming inadmissible, is of no use as it has A
not led to recovery of any new fact – be it the place of the grocery
shop; prevailing tension between the accused and the deceased;
recovery of the body of the deceased near the Dodki drain: All
these facts were known to the police from before and as far as
recovery of money and keychain is concerned we have already
B
discussed issue. [Para 22][692-C-H; 693-A-B]
6. In the present case, the circumstances present, taken
together, do not establish conclusively only one hypothesis, that
being the guilt of the accused-appellant. The presumption of
innocence remains in favour of the accused unless his guilt is
proven beyond all reasonable doubts against him. [Babu v. State C
Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189]. The cherished principles or golden
threads of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through
the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly which was
done by the Courts below. In the present case, this Court finds
neither the chain of circumstances to have been completely D
established nor the guilt of the accused alone, having committed
the crime to be proven, much less beyond reasonable doubt. [Paras
25, 26][693-F-H; 694-A]
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Another v. State of
Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : [1974] 1 SCR 489;
Hari Charan Kurmi vs State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC E
1184 : [1964] SCR 623; Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam,
(2013) 12 SCC 406 : [2013] 3 SCR 830; Hanumant
Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR 1952 SC 343
: [1952] SCR 1091; State v. Mahender Singh Dahiya,
(2011) 3 SCC 109 : [2011] 1 SCR 1104; Sahadevan v. F
State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 : [2012] 4 SCR 366;
Kali Ram v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808 : [1974] 1
SCR 722; Babu v. State Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 :
[2010] 9 SCR 1039; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State
of Mahrashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88;
Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1970) G
3 SCC 474; Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC
219 : [1975] 1 SCR 753; Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 : [1983] 3 SCR 280 –
referred to.
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686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
[1974] 1 SCR 489 referred to Para 6
[1964] SCR 623 referred to Para 7
[2013] 3 SCR 830 referred to Para 9
B [1952] SCR 1091 referred to Para 9
[2011] 1 SCR 1104 referred to Para 9
[2012] 4 SCR 366 referred to Para 12
[1974] 1 SCR 722 referred to Para 24
C
[2010] 9 SCR 1039 referred to Para 25
[1985] 1 SCR 88 referred to Para 26
[1975] 1 SCR 753 referred to Para 27
[1983] 3 SCR 280 referred to Para 27
D
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1304 of 2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.07.2017 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 940 of 2004.
E Rahul Kaushik, Sudhir Kulshreshtha, Sameer Kulshreshtha, Advs.
for the Appellant.
Gautam Narayan, Ms. Asmita Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. On 01.10.2003, Umesh Chowdhary, a resident of village
Chitarpur falling within the territorial limits of Police Station Dhaurpur
District was allegedly murdered by accused Pradeep Kumar (Appellant
No. 2 in CRA No.940 of 2004) before the High Court Chhattisgarh,
G Bilaspur and Bhainsaalias Nandlal (Appellant No.1. before the High
Court in the very same appeal) in relation to which FIR No.126/03 (Ex.P-
6) was registered at Police Station Dhaurpur.
2. On 02.10.2003, Investigation Officer, I. Tirkey (PW-19)
commenced investigation and after verifying the place of occurrence
sent the dead body for post-mortem analysis which was conducted by
H
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 687
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

Dr. Kamlesh Kumar (PW-14) in terms of his report (Ex.P-10). A
Investigation revealed that the crime was committed on account of
animosity which the Appellant was harbouring against the deceased.
The motive being the former’s desire to use the shop in possession of
the deceased in village Chitarpur.
3. The Trial Court, based on the extra judicial confessional B
statement (Ex.P-11) of accused Pradeep Kumar made in the presence
of Ramkripal Soni (PW-1) and Gopal Yadav (PW-7), the depositions of
Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) father of the deceased, co-villagers Sirodh
(PW-6), Radhika (PW-13) wife of (PW-7), all establishing the factum of
prior animosity/“tension” inter se the parties; and with the addition of
the police recovered keys of the shop of the deceased and his currency C
notes amounting to Rs.300/- from the possession of the Appellant. The
Court convicted both the accused in relation to offences punishable under
Section 302/34 IPC and 201/34 IPC and sentenced them to serve
imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.500/- in relation to the offence
under Section 302/34 as also suffer imprisonment for seven years and D
pay fine of Rs.500/- in respect of the offence punishable under Section
201 IPC.
4. The Trial Court found the testimonies of both PW-1 and PW-7
reliable (despite PW-1 not supporting the prosecution) and the prosecution
to have established the factum of accused Pradeep Kumar having E
confessed his guilt before the Investigation Officer (PW-19). The Ld.
Trial Court also found the recovery of articles seized as a result of the
disclosure of statement, to be an additional link, as a chain of events, in
support of the case set up by the prosecution.
5. However in an appeal preferred by both the accused, the High F
Court upheld the conviction of accused Pradeep Kumar in relation to all
the offences and the sentences in terms thereunder, but acquitted accused
Bhainsa alias Nandlal on all counts.
6. Hence, the present appeal filed by the Appellant – accused
Pradeep Kumar. Significantly, none of the Courts below have returned G
finding to the effect that the guilt of the accused stands proven by the
prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, howsoever grave or
probable it may be, cannot substitute the evidence, be it circumstantial
or direct in nature, in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the onus of which, at the first instance, is to be
discharged by the prosecution. The distance between “may be” and H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.

A “must be” is quite large and it divides vague conjectures from solid
conclusions. [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Another v. State of
Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793.]
7. The High Court, by relying upon the principles of law enunciated
by the Apex Court in Hari Charan Kurmi vs State Of Bihar, AIR
B 1964 SC 1184, to the effect that confession of a co-accused being
inculpatory in nature, cannot be used against the accused, acquitted
Bhainsa alias Nandlal.
8. However, in so far as accused Pradeep Kumar is concerned
the Court found testimonies of (PW-1) and (PW-7) to be absolutely
C inspiring in confidence and that the witnesses “being independent and
disinterested”, having no reason to “manufacture evidence”, “falsely
implicating” the accused. Further, the High Court held that the defence
was not able to show that the extra-judicial confession made by Pradeep
Kumar (Appellant No.2) before the said witnesses was “involuntary” or
“made on account of any coercion”, “inducement”, “promise” or “favour”.
D The Court below also held that there is no reason “whatsoever” to
disbelieve the testimonies of PW-1 & PW-7 qua the issue of extra judicial
confession.
9. The accused cannot be convicted on the principles of
preponderance of probability. It is the duty of this Court to ensure
E avoidance of miscarriage of justice at all costs and the benefit of doubt,
if any, given to the accused. [Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013)
12 SCC 406, Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. (AIR
1952 SC 343) and State v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC
109].
F 10. The impugned judgement to say the least, is sketchy. The
presumption of the guilt of accused Pradeep Kumar by both the courts
below is based on improper and incomplete appreciation of evidence
which in the considered view of this Court, has resulted into travesty of
justice.
G 11. The prosecution case, at best, rests upon three circumstances
(a) the alleged confessional statement of accused Pradeep Kumar made
before PW-1 and PW-7; (b) prior animosity/“tension” between Pradeep
Kumar and the deceased; and (c) the recovery of the keys of the shop
of the deceased and his currency notes amounting to Rs.300/-on the
asking of the accused.
H
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 689
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

12. Since both the Courts below have placed paramount significance A
and reliance to the extra judicial confession made by the Appellant, it is
important to take note of the principles enunciated by this Court in the
case of Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 as under:
“ 16. …..
(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. B
It has to be examined by the court with greater care and
caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence. C
(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and
evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent
circumstances and is further corroborated by other
prosecution evidence.
(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, D
it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and
inherent improbabilities.
(vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other
fact and in accordance with law.”
13. Before we deal with each of the aforesaid circumstances, we E
must place on record certain undisputed facts. Those being (a) the
homicidal death of deceased Umesh Chowdhary S/o Gajadhar
Chowdhary, (b) the identity of the deceased, (c) the recovery of the
dead body of the deceased from the Dodki Nala of village Chitarpur,(d)
the post-mortem of the dead body conducted by PW-14 affirming the F
deceased to have died as a result of asphyxia due to throttling and (e)
the cause of the death being homicidal in nature. The ante-mortem analysis
reflects multiple abrasions present on the front portion of the neck of the
deceased caused by a hard and blunt object. There was a fracture ofthe
hyoid bone, congestion in both the lungs and the trachea rings.
G
14. Proceeding further, examining the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses we find that it is the case of Manorama Devi (PW-11), w/o
the deceased to have deposed that on 1.10.2003 finding her husband not
to have returned home at night, asked her elder son Vinay Kumar (PW-
12) to visit the shop and makes enquiries. Soon, he returned informing
H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.

A that his father’s dead body was lying besides the road at Dodki Nala
with marks of injuries. On the basis of suspicion, Gajadhar Chowdhary
(PW-10) father of the deceased lodged a complaint with the police bearing
FIR No.126/03 (Ex.P-6) dated 2.10.2003.
15. Significantly, at this point in time, neither PW-11 nor PW-12
B had suspected any person to have committed the crime.
16. Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) states that it was he who made
inquiries about the death of the deceased and as disclosed to him by
Sirodh (PW-6), owner of the shop, deceased was lastly seen by him
closing the shop around 8:00 PM. We note that there is a significant time
C gap between when the deceased was lastly seen by him and the time of
the crime. Also he was not seen in the company of the accused. In his
testimony he states that accused Bhainsa and Pradeep Kumar killed
Umesh Chowdhary but then this fact is based on “his suspicion” for the
reason that accused had “harboured animosity” in connection with the
shop. Well that is about all and without any further elaboration.
D
17. Significantly, even this limited fact is not disclosed in the
complaint. Also to this effect, wefind there is material improvement in
his testimony. That apart, we do not find this witness to be reliable or his
testimony worthy of credence. He failed to make inquiries about the
cause of the incident from any of the villagers. He is not a spot witness.
E He is also not the witness who had lastly seen the Appellant with the
deceased or the Appellant having gone either towards the shop of the
deceased or the place of occurrence of the incident, both being two
separate places. However, what is crucial,rendering his version to be
self belied, in his unequivocal admission that, “no quarrel ever took place
F prior to the fatal incident between the deceased and the accussed” and
that he “never lodged any report in connection with any quarrel.”
18. To this very effect, we may also take note of the deposition of
Sirodh (PW-6) who, in any event, has not supported the prosecution in
Court.
G 19. When we come to the deposition of Vinay Kumar (PW-12)
son of the deceased, unequivocally he states that “... later on the police
personnel told me that accused persons have thrown my father after
committing murder...” Now this totally belies the testimony of his
grandfather Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10). To similar effect, it is the
testimony of Radhika (PW-13) who only adds that “...Later on I came
H
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 691
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

to know that Umesh has been murdered. I heard from the villagers...”. A
Significantly, her statement that she was not informed by her husband
(PW-7), of the deceased being murdered by the Appellant was not
recorded in her previous statement with which she was confronted. But
what is crucial is her deposition is that her husband himself was a suspect
and that she admits it to be correct, “...that the police personnel took my
B
husband for inquiry in connection with the murder of deceased. The
police personnel kept my husband for one day...” This negates one of
the circumstances that there was tension between the deceased and the
accused, which was, the motive of commission of crime, i.e. issue of
use of the shop inter se the parties.
20. We notice in respect of the next circumstance, which is the C
recovery of keys and the money, that there is no independent corroborated
material except for the confessional statement of the accused, which
also is not proven on record. Even otherwise, the keys, the currency
notes and the blood stained clothes were not sent for chemical analysis.
There is only an unexhibited copy of the FSL Report of the alleged blood D
stained clothes of the Appellant which stands not proven by anyone.
Also none has come forward to depose that the accused had kept the
keys of the shop with himself, for afterall, it is not the case of the
prosecution that the shop belonged to the accused.
21. The substratum of the evidence, that is the extra judicial E
confessional statement of the Appellant, apart from being hit by Section
27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, we find it not to have been supported
by Ramkripal Soni (PW-1) and Gopal Yadav (PW-7), who as is evident,
was himself a suspect. He admits it to be “...correct to say that the
Inspector had detained me and some villagers where the dead body was
laying...” and “...it is correct to say that I did not disclose the statement F
made by accused Pradeep to any other person before 4 o’clock...” We
have already noticed his wife Radhika (PW-13) to have supported this
statement. Now, if this witness was himself a suspect, his testimony
cannot be said to be unimpeachable or free from blemish. Still further,
deposition of PW-7 reveals the witness not to have deposed truthfully G
and the prosecution to have introduced another theory as according to
him the accused had immediately, after the incident confessed the crime
with him. This was in the night intervening first and second October,
2003. But then, he does not disclose such fact to anyone. We may remind
the prosecution that he is a co-villager. His version also appears to be
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692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.

A false for he admits voices and noises were audible from the place of the
occurrence of the incident and that he heard none on the fateful day. He
admits that there are houses of other persons including Ramsanehi, closer
to the spot of crime. He did not bother to make inquiries for ascertaining
the truth from any of the co-villagers, including all those named by him.
This witness, in our considered view, cannot be said to be reliable and
B
trustworthy and this we say so for the reason, that as according to his
deposition, he received information of the death of deceased at 7:00-
8:00 AM, the following morning and yet he did not visit the spot of the
crime until the police reached, which was at 10:00 AM and only much
later, got his statement recorded at about 4:00 PM. His stoic silence, in
C not informing or meeting any of the family members of the deceased,
neighbours or Police is unexplainable.
22. Dealing with the star witness of the prosecution which is the
Investigation Officer, I. Tirkey (PW-19), we find his testimony to be
wholly unworthy of any credence: unbelievable; and the witness to be
D unreliable. This we say so for the reasons that he did not record the
statement of Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) or Gopal Yadav (PW-7) in
respect any prior animosity between the deceased and the accused.
The evidence pertaining to the genesis of the crime was not collected by
him. He also does not state as to what made him detain accused Pradeep
Kumar on 3.10.2023. Be that as it may, he did not examine witnesses,
E who in our considered view, perhaps may have thrown some light about
regard to the actual occurrence of the incident. He admits that houses
of Ramsevak, Gopal and Rashriare just at a distance of 30 to 70 meters
from the spot of the crime. Yet, he did not examine any of them. Why
so? No explanation is forthcoming. Crucially, he admits that, “the
F investigation concluded having no direct evidence” indicating the time
and the manner in which the crime took place. He admits to have prepared
some document in relation to the keys recovered from the accused
however no such fact is recorded in his diary. In fact, such fact is not
found recorded in the Panchnama prepared by him. The basis for the
Investigation Officer (PW-19) to have arrived at the guilt of co-accused
G Bhainsa is missing in his statement. In fact, he does not even state to
have suspected Bhainsa of having committed any crime. The sole basis
for the Investigation Officer (PW-19) to have arrested the Appellant for
having committed the crime is his extra judicial confession (Ex. P.11)
which in our considered view, apart from becoming in admissible, is of
H no use as it has not led to recovery of any new fact– be it the place of
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 693
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

the grocery shop; prevailing tension between the accused and the A
deceased; recovery of the body of the deceased near the Dodki drain:
All these facts were known to the police from before and as far as
recovery of money and keychain is concerned we have already discussed
issue.
23. Apart from sending the dead body for post-mortem, the B
Investigation Officer (PW-19) does not state what investigation he
conducted on the crime spot. It is the case of the prosecution that only
this person conducted the investigation and that he was not engaged in
any other crime or had to attend to other urgent work, resulting into the
delay thereof. Perusal of the First Information Report (Ex.P-6) does
C
reveal Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) to have disclosed the name of
accused Pradeep Kumar as a suspect in the crime. Whether such report
was lodged in time or not, itself is in doubt. That apart if the Investigation
Officer (PW-19) was himself aware of the suspect then what prevented
him from immediately detaining or examining him. In fact, it has come
on record that other persons were detained as suspects. The investigation D
conducted is absolutely shady and has been done in a casual manner. In
this backdrop it cannot be said that the prosecution witnesses, more
specifically (PW-19), (PW-10) and (PW-7) have deposed truthfully.
24. It is important to note that the cardinal principles in the
administration of criminal justice in cases where heavy reliance is placed E
on circumstantial evidence, is that where two views are possible, one
pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence,
the one which is favourable to the accused must be adopted. [Kali Ram
v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808].
25. In the present case, we state that the circumstances present F
before us, taken together, do not establish conclusively only one hypothesis,
that being the guilt of the accused, Pradeep Kumar. The presumption of
innocence remains in favour of the accused unless his guilt is proven
beyond all reasonable doubts against him. [Babu v. State Kerala, (2010)
9 SCC 189]. The cherished principles or golden threads of proof beyond G
reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be
stretched morbidly which was done by the Courts below.
26. In the present case, we find neither the chain of circumstances
to have been completely established nor the guilt of the accused alone,
having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyond reasonable H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.

A doubt. This Court has stated essential conditions that must be fulfilled
before an accused can be convicted in a case revolving around
circumstantial evidence in the landmark case of Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Mahrashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
B following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an
accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
C circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be”
established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction
between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as
was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl
D LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p.
807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and
not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague
E conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should
not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused
is guilty,
F (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one
to be proved, and

G (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.”
27. Normally, we do not interfere with the concurrent findings of
fact of the Courts below. We step in only in exceptional cases or where
H
PRADEEP KUMAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 695
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]

gross errors are committed, overlooking crying circumstances and well A
established principles of criminal jurisprudence leading to miscarriage of
justice. Hence it becomes our bounden duty to correct such findings in
view of the principles enunciated in Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (1970) 3 SCC 474, Balak Ram v. State of U.P.,
(1975) 3 SCC 219 and Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai V. State of Gujarat,
B
(1983) 3 SCC 217.
28. To conclude, we state that both the courts below, erred in
finding the Appellant guilty of having committed the crime, charged for,
under Section 302/34 IPC read with 201/34 IPC. Hence we set aside
the findings of guilt and sentence arrived at vide judgment dated
28.08.2004 by the Ld. Trial Court as subsequently affirmed by the High C
Court in its judgement dated 21.07.2017 in CRA No.940 of 2004 titled as
Bhainsa @ Nandlal and Anr. vs. The State of Chhattisgarh.
29. The appeal is allowed and the Appellant stands acquitted of
all the charges framed against him.
D
We direct the Appellant Pradeep Kumar be released forthwith
unless required in any other case.

Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)
E

F

G

H