PRALHAD SHANKARRAO TAJALE & ORS.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY (REVENUE) & ANR.
- Citation
- 2018 INSC 221
- Decided
- 8 March 2018
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Holding
Procedural laws must be construed liberally and not as penal provisions; consequently, delay in filing a review petition may be condoned to ensure substantive justice.
Summary
The appellants filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court challenging a revenue order concerning a land dispute, which was dismissed by a Single Judge. They withdrew an intra‑court appeal and were permitted to file a review petition, but the High Court Registry identified defects in the filing and directed them to cure them. After failing to cure the defects, the Registrar gave a further four‑week deadline, which was also missed, leading to the rejection of the review application and dismissal of their condonation of delay application. The Supreme Court held that procedural statutes should not be interpreted as penal provisions and must be applied liberally to achieve substantive justice. Consequently, the Court condoned the delay, granted the appellants one month to rectify the defects, and restored the review application for hearing.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the review petition solely on the ground of delay without condoning the procedural lapse.
- Whether procedural defects in filing a review petition can be condoned in the interest of justice.
- Whether procedural law should be construed liberally rather than as a penal provision.
Subjects
Judgment
[2018] 3 S.C.R. 627 627
PRALHAD SHANKARRAO TAJALE & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS
SECRETARY (REVENUE) & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 2601 of 2018) B
MARCH 08, 2018
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Practice and Procedure – Procedural laws vis-a-vis substantive
laws – Construction of – Writ petition filed by appellants challenging
C
order passed by State Minister for Revenue, dismissed by Single
Judge – Intra court appeal filed by appellants – Division Bench
permitted the appellants to withdraw the said appeal with liberty to
file review petition before Single Judge – Review petition filed by
appellants along with application for condonation of delay in filing
the review petition – Review petition had some defects in its filing D
and the appellants were directed by Registry of High Court to cure
the defects – Defects not cured by appellants – Review petition listed
before Registrar (Judicial-1) for passing appropriate orders –
Registrar granted four weeks’ time to the appellants to cure the
defects also directing that failing to cure the defects will result in
E
refusing the registration of the review petition, i.e., it will result in
rejection of the review petition – Application filed by appellants
filed for setting aside the said order, dismissed by Single Judge on
ground of delay – On appeal, held: As far as possible, procedural
laws should not be construed like a penal provision to punish the
parities – Having regard to the nature of controversy involved in F
the case, High Court should have been liberal and condoned the
delay and granted the appellants one more opportunity to cure the
defects – Impugned order set aside – Delay in filing the application
filed by appellants before High Court is condoned.
Allowing the appeal, the Court G
HELD: 1.1 Procedural laws should not be construed like a
penal provision to punish the parities as far as possible. Having
regard to the nature of controversy involved in the case, the High
Court should have been liberal in taking a view in the matter and
accordingly should have condoned the delay and granted the H
627
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.
A appellants one more opportunity to cure the defects. The interest
of justice demanded one more opportunity to the appellants to
comply with the orders of the Registry. [Paras 16, 17] [631-B, G]
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr.,
AIR 1955 SC 425 : [1955] SCR 1 – relied on.
B 1.2 The delay in filing the application filed by the appellants
before the High Court is hereby condoned. The appellants are
granted one month’s time as an outer limit to cure the defects
pointed out by the Registry in their Review Application.
[Para 19] [632-A]
C Case Law Reference
[1955] SCR 1 relied on Para 16
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2601
D of 2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Application No.120/2016.
Ms. Deeplaxmi S. Matwankar, Dr. Ravindra Chingale, Chander
Shekhar Ashri, Advs. for the Appellants.
E Nishant Katneshwarkar, Ms. Deepa M. Kulkarni, Advs. for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.
F 2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order
dated 18.07.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in
Civil Application No.120 of 2016 in Rejected Case No.149 of 2016 in
Rejected Case No.148 of 2016 whereby the Single Judge of the High
Court dismissed the appellants’ application on the ground of delay.
G 3. In order to appreciate the short question involved in the appeal,
few facts need mention infra.
4. The appellants herein were the Writ/Review Petitioners before
the High Court in the proceedings out of which this appeal arises. On
28.08.2012, the appellants filed a petition being Writ Petition No.8516 of
H
PRALHAD SHANKARRAO TAJALE & ORS. v. STATE OF 629
MAHARASHTRA & ANR. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
2012 before the High Court of Bombay questioning therein the legality A
and correctness of the order dated 14.05.2012 passed by the State
Minister for Revenue (MH). It was in relation to a certain land dispute
whereby the appellants’ revision application was dismissed.
5. On 27.11.2012, the Single Judge of the High Court dismissed
the appellants’ writ petition. The appellants felt aggrieved and filed intra B
court appeal (L.P.A.No.33 of 2013) before the Division Bench.
6. By order dated 22.03.2014, the Division Bench permitted the
appellants to withdraw the intra court appeal and granted them liberty to
file review petition before the Single Judge against the order by which
their writ petition was dismissed. C
7. The appellants accordingly filed review application (Review
Application No.3330/2015 in W.P.No.8516/2012) on 17.04.2014. The
appellants also filed application for condonation of delay in filing the
Review application.
D
8. According to the Registry of the High Court, the Review
Application had some defects in its filing. The appellants were, therefore,
directed to cure the defects so that the Review Application could be
listed for orders before the appropriate Bench.
9. As the appellants did not cure the defects pointed out by the E
Registry of the High Court, the Review Application was listed before
the Registrar (Judicial-1) on 19.10.2015 for passing appropriate orders
in filing the Review Application.
10. The Registrar, by his order dated 19.10.2015 further granted
four weeks’ time to the appellants to cure the defects and at the same F
time directed that failing to cure the defects will result in refusing the
registration of the Review Application, i.e., it will result in rejection of
the Review application.
11. Felt aggrieved by the order dated 19.10.2015 passed by the
Registrar, the appellants filed an application being Civil Application No.120 G
of 2016 and prayed therein for setting aside of the order dated 19.10.2015
passed by the Registrar and for restoration of Review Application No.
St. 3330 of 2015, which was dismissed due to non-compliance of the
Registrar’s mandatory order dated 19.10.2015.
H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.
A 12. By impugned order, the Single Judge dismissed the appellants’
application essentially on the ground of delay, which has given rise to
filing of the present appeal by way of special leave by the Writ/Review
petitioners in this Court.
13. On 05.03.2018, we requested Ms. Deepa M. Kulkarni, learned
B counsel for the State of Maharashtra, who was present in Court, to
accept notice on behalf of the Respondent-State to enable us to dispose
of the appeal finally on that day having regard to the short issue involved
in the appeal. Learned counsel, on our request, accepted the notice on
behalf of the respondent-State.
C
14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and while
setting aside of the impugned order, we restore the review Application
No. (St. 3330/2015) for its hearing by the appropriate Bench in accordance
with law.
D
15. Paras 8, 12 and 13 of the impugned order, which deal with the
issue, read as under:
“8. In Review Petition, office raised objections on 14th July,
2015. On 1st June, 2015 as the Applicants failed to remove
E all office objections, Section Officer made noting that all
office objections are not removed on 14 th July, 2015.
Thereafter the matter appeared before the learned
Registrar (Judicial-I) on 15th July, 2015, 19th August, 2015,
21 st September, 2015 and 19th October, 2015. No one
appeared on behalf of Applicants before the Registrar
F
(Judicial-I) for removal of office objections. Hence, the
Registrar (Judicial-I) passed conditional order on
19th October, 2015 granting four weeks time to remove all
office objections, failing which, matter will stand
rejected.
G
12. As the Applicants failed to disclose the sufficient cause
for delay, I am of the opinion that Applicants have not made
out any case for allowing the Civil Application.
13. Hence, Civil Application stand rejected.”
H
PRALHAD SHANKARRAO TAJALE & ORS. v. STATE OF 631
MAHARASHTRA & ANR. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
16. This case reminds us of the apt observations made by the A
learned Judge of this Court, Vivian Bose J., in Sangram Singh vs.
Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425. His Lordship,
speaking for the Bench, in his distinctive style of writing with subtle
power of expression reminded the Courts as to how the code of procedure
should be construed in the context of rights of the parties to the lis,
B
which affects their lives and properties. His Lordship reminded that
procedural laws should not be construed like a penal provision to punish
the parities as far as possible. The following is the classic passage, which
is always followed for doing substantial justice to the parties to the lis:
“A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is
procedure something designed to facilitate justice and C
further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and
penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too
technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for
reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be
guarded against (provided always that justice is done to D
both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance
of justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are
grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires
that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions
should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings
that affect their lives and property should not continue in E
their absence and that they should not be precluded from
participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions
and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect
to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our
laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is F
reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.”
17. In our opinion, keeping in view the aforementioned observations
and further having regard to the nature of controversy involved in the
case, the High Court should have been liberal in taking a view in the
matter and accordingly should have condoned the delay and granted the G
appellants one more opportunity to cure the defects. The interest of
justice demanded one more opportunity to the appellants to comply with
the orders of the Registry.
18. As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly,
allowed. The impugned order is set aside. H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 3 S.C.R.
A 19. The delay in filing the application filed by the appellants before
the High Court is hereby condoned. The appellants are granted one
month’s time as an outer limit to cure the defects pointed out by the
Registry in their Review Application.
20. On curing the defects by the appellants, the Review Application
B be placed before the appropriate Bench for passing orders in accordance
with law.
Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.
C
D
E
F
G
H
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