PRAMOD LAXMAN GUDADHEversusELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2018 INSC 464
- Decided
- 9 May 2018
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
Section 151A mandates a bye‑election within six months of a vacancy unless the remaining term is less than one year, and since the vacancy occurred on 14‑Dec‑2017 with more than a year left before the next general election, the bye‑election must be held.
Summary
Petitioner Pramod Laxman Gudadhe filed a PIL challenging the Election Commission's decision to hold a bye‑election after the resignation of the Lok Sabha member from Bhandara‑Gondiya constituency. He argued that the remaining term would be less than one year, making the election futile and an undue burden on the exchequer. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, required a bye‑election within six months unless the remainder of the term is under a year. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language, the non‑obstante clause, and the absence of any pending election petition, concluding that the vacancy arose on 14‑Dec‑2017 and the next general election is in June‑2019, so the remainder exceeds one year. Consequently, the bye‑election must be held and the petition dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 151A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 bars a bye‑election when the remainder of the term is less than one year.
- Whether the period of the remaining term is the sole governing factor for holding a bye‑election in the absence of a pending election petition.
- Whether the High Court erred in interpreting Section 151A to prohibit the bye‑election on grounds of cost and the Model Code of Conduct.
Legislation cited
- Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 101(b), s. 147, s. 149, s. 150, s. 151, s. 151A, s. 84, s. 98(c)
Subjects
Judgment
[2018] 4 S.C.R. 397 397
PRAMOD LAXMAN GUDADHE A
v.
ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9968 of 2018) B
MAY 09, 2018
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR
AND DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
C
Representation of People Act, 1951 – s.151A – Interpretation
of – Justifiability of holding bye-election – On resignation of elected
representative of constituency in question, the petitioner, public
spirited person filed PIL contending that if the election commenced
in the month of May 2018, the effective period which the new D
incumbent would get would be only upto March 2019 that is less
than one year and therefore the new incumbent would not be in a
position to function with all vigour and render service and there
shall be huge expenditure in conducting the election – High Court
dismissed the writ petition – Held: There was no election petition
pending in the instant case – The elected candidate tendered his E
resignation on 08.12.2017 and the same was accepted by the
Speaker of Lok Sabha on 14.12.2017 – The command of s.151A is
to hold the election within a period of six months from the date of
occurrence of the vacancy – The next General Election to Lok Sabha
is in June, 2019 – Therefore, the remainder of the term is not less
F
than one year – The ground raised that the code of conduct would
come into play before the elections are held in June, 2019 is
absolutely sans substance as the Act does not contemplate so – It is
the period alone that should be the governing factor subject to the
pendency of election petition because that is not controlled by the
non obstante clause – Such an interpretation is in accord with the G
sanctified principle of democracy and the intention of the Parliament
is not to keep a constituency remaining unrepresented – The concern
expressed with regard to load on the exchequer cannot be treated
as a ground – It is so because the representative democracy has to
H
397
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A sustain itself by the elected representatives – High Court was right
in dismissing the writ petition – Election laws.
Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 151A commences with a non obstante
B clause and clearly states that notwithstanding anything contained
in Sections 147, 149, 150 and 151, a bye-election for filling any
vacancy referred to in any of the said Sections shall be held within
a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the
vacancy. The holding of election is controlled by a rider, namely,
C that the remainder of the term of a member in relation to a vacancy
is less than one year. There is a distinction between Sections
147, 149, 150 and 151 on the one hand and Section 151A of the
Act on the other. While interpreting these provisions, it has to
be kept in mind that though the right to elect a person is
fundamental to democracy, yet it is only a statutory right. It is
D also well settled in law that the legislations governing the said
right have to be strictly construed. [Paras 10, 12][402-D-E; 403-
B]
2. In the case at hand, no election petition was pending.
E The elected candidate tendered his resignation on 08.12.2017
and the same was accepted by the Speaker of Lok Sabha on
14.12.2017. The command of Section 151A is to hold the election
within a period of six months from the date of occurrence of the
vacancy. As the factual score depicts, the vacancy occurred when
the resignation was accepted by the Speaker of Lok Sabha on
F 14.12.2017. It is beyond any dispute that the next General
Election to Lok Sabha is in June, 2019. Therefore, the remainder
of the term is not less than one year. The ground raised that the
code of conduct would come into play before the elections are
held in June, 2019 is absolutely sans substance as the Act does
G not contemplate so. It is the period alone that should be the
governing factor subject to the pendency of election petition
because that is not controlled by the non obstante clause. Such
an interpretation is in accord with the sanctified principle of
democracy and the intention of the Parliament is not to keep a
H
PRAMOD LAXMAN GUDADHE v. ELECTION COMMISSION 399
OF INDIA AND ORS.
constituency remaining unrepresented. The concern expressed A
with regard to load on the exchequer cannot be treated as a
ground. It is so because the representative democracy has to
sustain itself by the elected representatives. The matter would
be different when an election dispute is pending against the
candidate that comes within the ambit and sweep of Section 84 or
B
Section 98(c) or Section 101(b) of the Act. That not being the
case, the view expressed by the High Court is absolutely
impregnable. [Para 16][406-C-G]
Election Commission of India v. Telangana Rastra
Samithi and Another (2011) 1 SCC 370 : [2010] 14 C
SCR 468 – relied on.
Sri Thomas Mates Gudinho v. Election Commission of
India, New Delhi and Others AIR 2002 Kant 232 –
approved.
D
D. Sanjeevayya v. The Election Tribunal, Andhra
Pradesh and others AIR 1967 SC 1211 : [1967] SCR
489 – referred to.
Case Law Reference E
[1967] SCR 489 referred to Para 13
[2010] 14 SCR 468 relied on Para 14
F
AIR 2002 Kant 232 approved Para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 9968 of 2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.04.2018 of the High Court G
of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench in PIL No. 31 of 2018.
Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv, Ms. Anangha S. Desai, Mehmood Umar
Faruqui, Satyajit A. Desai, Advs for the Petitioner.
H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, CJI. 1. In a hallowed democratic body polity,
the seminal requirement is fair and timely election. Purity of election
abandoning any kind of dogmatic idea is consubstantial to sustain the
fundamental concept of democracy which is a basic feature of our
B Constitution. If the ‘thought of democracy’ is sullied, the cornerstone of
the rule of law is corroded. When an individual, bereft of his status, goes
to an election booth to cast his vote, he feels empowered and dignified
and his self-esteem is accentuated as his inner conscience tells him that
in his exercise of franchise, he is choosing a representative who shall
represent the constituency. This is the very sense of feeling empowered.
C The participation makes him realize his political right and the collective
feels that there shall be governance in accord with the Constitution so
that the individual rights are protected and the collective aspirations are
taken care of. It has been said by many protagonists of democracy that
an atmosphere should always exist when precepts of democracy remain
D safe.
2. The Constitution of India gives emphasis on many aspects of
political rights having regard to the rights of an individual. Thus, in a
democracy, holding of elections becomes significant and the constitutional
and statutory provisions take care of it. Eligibility criteria has been provided
for to contest an election and sometimes more restrictions are added in
E respect of elections to the local self-governments. Delimitation and
reservation of constituencies are conceived of and fructified so that the
inclusive character of the Constitution is strengthened. The provisions in
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) are
engrafted to cover many aspects of election including the manner, method
F of holding elections and the grounds for setting aside the election. The
Act also obliges the competent authority to see to it that no constituency
remains unrepresented beyond a definite period. It is because the elected
representative is expected to echo the concerns of the electoral college
in entirety. The voters cannot be deprived of the said right if the statute
confers such a protection. Though the right to contest an election is not
G a fundamental right, yet no interpretation should be placed on a statutory
provision that will defeat the essential purpose of representation.
3. The prefatory note has become a warrant as the petitioner, a
voter of Bhandara – Gondiya parliamentary constituency, in this special
H
PRAMOD LAXMAN GUDADHE v. ELECTION COMMISSION 401
OF INDIA AND ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
leave petition, has, in an astute manner, conceived a challenge by A
propounding that the High Court has erroneously interpreted Section
151A of the Act.
4. The elected representative, who was elected to the
aforementioned constituency in the General Election to the Lok Sabha
conducted on 04.06.2014, tendered his resignation as the Member of B
Parliament under Article 101(3) of the Constitution read with Rule
240(1A) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok
Sabha on 08.12.2017 and the same was accepted on 14.12.2017.
5. As the seat fell vacant, the petitioner, a public spirited person,
approached the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench at C
Nagpur under Article 226 of the Constitution in Public Interest Litigation
No. 31 of 2018 contending, inter alia, that if the election commenced in
the month of May, 2018, the effective period which the new incumbent
would get is only upto March, 2019, that is, less than one year and,
therefore, he would not be in a position to function with all vigour and
render service to the public and further, there shall be huge expenditure D
in conducting the election. He had drawn support from Report No. 255
of the Law Commission of India on Electoral Reforms. Reliance was
placed on Section 151A of the Act to substantiate the stand that holding
of election was not permissible under the said provision.
6. The High Court, scrutinizing the language employed in Section E
151A, opined that the argument advanced by the petitioner was sans
substance and resultantly dismissed the Writ Petition.
7. We have heard Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel along
with Ms. Anangha S. Desai, learned counsel for the petitioner.
F
8. The dates pertaining to the holding of election and the resignation
are not controverted. Further, it is not a case where an election petition
was pending against the elected candidate before the High Court. It is
also not in dispute that the General Election to the Lok Sabha is to be
held in June, 2019.
G
9. The said being the undisputed factual position, we are only
required to analyse the statutory provisions and justifiability of the holding
of bye-election. Part IX of the Act deals with Bye-Elections. Section
147 deals with casual vacancies in the Council of States. Section 149
adverts to casual vacancies in the House of the People. Section 150
H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A states about casual vacancies in the State Legislative Assemblies and
Section 151 deals with casual vacancies in the State Legislative Councils.
Section 151A, which was inserted by the Representation of the People
(Amendment) Act (21 of 1996) with effect from 01.08.1996, being
relevant for the present purpose, is extracted below:-
B “151A. Time limit for filling vacancies referred to in sections
147, 149, 150 and 151.—Notwithstanding anything contained
in section 147, section 149, section 150 and section 151, a bye-
election for filling any vacancy referred to in any of the said
sections shall be held within a period of six months from the date
of the occurrence of the vacancy:
C
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply if—
(a) the remainder of the term of a member in relation to a vacancy
is less than one year; or
(b) the Election Commission in consultation with the Central
D Government certifies that it is difficult to hold the bye-election
within the said period.”
10. The aforesaid provision commences with a non obstante clause
and clearly states that notwithstanding anything contained in Section
147, Section 149, Section 150 and Section 151, a bye-election for filling
E any vacancy referred to in any of the said Sections shall be held within
a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy.
The holding of election is controlled by a rider, namely, that the remainder
of the term of a member in relation to a vacancy is less than one year. It
is further postulated therein that if the Election Commission in consultation
F with the Central Government certifies that it is difficult to hold the bye-
election within the said period, the principal part of the provision contained
in Section 151A would not apply. In the present case, we are not
concerned with the second postulate, for what has emerged for
consideration singularly pertains to the concept of period.
11. It is submitted by Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel for
G
the petitioner that the prohibition contained in Section 151A directly comes
into play and, therefore, the High Court would have been well advised to
restrain the Election Commission not to hold the election. It is further
propounded by him that the amount to be spent from the exchequer on
holding of an election ultimately casts a burden on the tax payers and
H
PRAMOD LAXMAN GUDADHE v. ELECTION COMMISSION 403
OF INDIA AND ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
additionally, the elected candidate will only have some ceremonial role A
since he would not be in a position to do anything for the members of the
electoral college and, therefore, the election should not be allowed to be
conducted.
12. At the very outset, we must make a distinction between Sections
147, 149, 150 and 151 on the one hand and Section 151A of the Act on B
the other. While interpreting these provisions, it has to be kept in mind
that though the right to elect a person is fundamental to democracy, yet
it is only a statutory right. It is also well settled in law that the legislations
governing the said right have to be strictly construed.
13. A two-Judge Bench in D. Sanjeevayya v. The Election C
Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others1, prior to the insertion of Section
151A of the Act, was dealing with the controversy that pertained to
occurring of a casual vacancy and, in that context, referred to the scheme
of the Chapter pertaining to bye-elections and analyzed Article 190(3)
of the Constitution. The Court, referring to the said Article and the various
provisions of the statute and after adverting to the fact situation where D
an election petition was pending challenging the election, held:-
“4. We are unable to accept the argument of the appellant as
correct. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 150 of the Act
must be interpreted in the context of Sections 84 and 98(c) and
other relevant provisions of Part III of the same Act. If the E
interpretation contended for by the appellant is accepted as correct
the vacancy must be filled by a bye-election as soon as a member
resigns his seat notwithstanding the pendency of an election petition
challenging his election. If the candidate who filed the election
petition eventually gets a declaration that the election of the member F
is void and that he himself had been duly elected there will be two
candidates representing the same constituency at the same time,
one of them declared to be duly elected at the General Election
and the other declared to have been elected at the bye-election
and an impossible situation would arise, It cannot be supposed
that Parliament contemplated such a situation while enacting G
Section 150 of the Act. Parliament could not have intended that
the provisions of Part VI of the Act pertaining to election petitions,
should stand abrogated as soon as a member resigns his seat in
1
AIR 1967 SC 1211
H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A the Legislature. It is a well settled rule of construction that the
provisions of a statute should be so read as to harmonise with one
another and the provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat
those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation
between them. …”
B Proceeding further, the Court ruled that when an election petition
has been referred to a tribunal by the Election Commission and the tribunal
is seized of the matter, the petition has to be disposed of according to
law. The Tribunal has to adjudge at the conclusion of the proceeding
whether the returned candidate has or has not committed any corrupt
practice at the election and secondly, it has to decide whether the second
C respondent therein should or should not be declared to have been duly
elected. A returned candidate cannot get rid of an election petition filed
against him by resigning from the seat in the Legislature, whatever the
reason for his resignation may be.
14. In this regard, reference to the authority in Election
D Commission of India v. Telangana Rastra Samithi and another2 is
extremely useful. In the said case, the respondent had challenged the
decision of the Election Commission of India not to hold the bye-elections
in respect of two Assembly Constituencies in the State of Andhra Pradesh
which was set aside by the High Court. The High Court had quashed
E the action placing reliance on Section 151A of the Act holding, inter
alia, that the said provision is mandatory especially when the vacancies
had already been notified by the Speaker of the Assembly as contemplated
under Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution. It is worth noting that the
High Court had ignored the pendency of the election petitions against
the candidates who had resigned on the foundation that uncertain
F consequences of the election petitions could not dilute the effect of Section
151A of the Act. The two-Judge Bench, scrutinizing the provisions of
the Act and Article 190(3)(b), stated:-
“45. The Act is a complete code for the conduct of elections by
the Election Commission of India appointed under Article 324 of
G the Constitution which provides for superintendence, direction,
control and conduct of elections to Parliament and to the
Legislature of every State and also of elections to the offices of
President and Vice-President held under the Constitution. The
2
(2011) 1 SCC 370
H
PRAMOD LAXMAN GUDADHE v. ELECTION COMMISSION 405
OF INDIA AND ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
provisions of Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution have, therefore, A
to be read along with the provisions of the 1951 Act. Section 84 of
the said Act cannot be rendered otiose by holding that all vacancies
on account of the aforesaid provision of the Constitution become
immediately available for being filled up by way of a bye-election.
The same reasoning applies in regard to Section 151-A of the
B
1951 Act and its impact on the latter part of Section 84 thereof.
As has been mentioned hereinbefore, a proceeding under Section
84 has to run its full course, particularly for the purposes of Section
8-A of the said Act. The views expressed by the Division Bench
of the High Court on this point cannot, therefore, be sustained.”
The Court went on to say that the introduction of Section 151A C
did not alter the position as far as the provisions of Section 84 and,
consequently, Sections 98(c) and 101(b) of the Act are concerned,
although a casual vacancy may have occurred within the meaning of
Section 150 of the Act. The Court made a distinction between the two
categories of vacancies, namely, vacancies in which election petitions D
had been filed and are pending and other vacancies where no such cases
were filed and pending. The Court opined that in the first category of
cases, the vacancies could not have been treated to be available for the
purposes of filling up within the time prescribed under Section 151A of
the Act merely because a member of the House of a Legislature of a
State had resigned and the same had been accepted by the Speaker. To E
arrive at the said conclusion, emphasis was laid on Section 84 of the
Act. In the second category of cases, the Court pronounced that the
vacancies would have to be construed as clear vacancies warranting
action under Section 151A of the Act.
15. A Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Sri F
Thomas Mates Gudinho v. Election Commission of India, New Delhi
and others3 , while interpreting Section 151A of the Act, has opined:-
“13. … Section 151A no doubt seeks to ensure that no
Constituency remains un-represented for more than six months.
But it is not unconditional. It is subject to two exceptions. i.e. G
where the remainder of the term of a member in relation to a
vacancy is less than one year or where the Election Commission
in consultation with the Central Government certifies that it is
3
AIR 2002 Kant 232
H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A difficult to hold the bye-election within the said period. Further
the non obstante clause is limited in its application to Sections 147,
149, 150 and 151. The non obstante clause does not refer to Section
84 or 98(c) or 101. It therefore follows that Section 151A will
have no application if an Election Petition is pending where the
prayer is not merely a challenge to the election of the elected
B
candidate, but also seeks a declaration that the petitioner or some
one else should be declared as having been elected under Sections
84 read with Section 101 of the Act.”
Be it noted, the said view has been approved in the case of
Telangana Rastra Samithi (supra).
C 16. In the case at hand, no election petition was pending. The
elected candidate tendered his resignation on 08.12.2017 and the same
was accepted by the Speaker of Lok Sabha on 14.12.2017. The command
of Section 151A is to hold the election within a period of six months from
the date of occurrence of the vacancy. As the factual score depicts, the
D vacancy occurred when the resignation was accepted by the Speaker
of Lok Sabha on 14.12.2017. It is beyond any dispute that the next
General Election to Lok Sabha is in June, 2019. Therefore, the remainder
of the term is not less than one year. Whether the election is to be held
or not would be governed by clause (b) to the proviso to Section 151A
and we are not concerned with the same. The ground raised that the
E code of conduct would come into play before the elections are held in
June, 2019 is absolutely sans substance as the Act does not contemplate
so. It is the period alone that should be the governing factor subject to
the pendency of election petition because that is not controlled by the
non obstante clause. Such an interpretation is in accord with the
F sanctified principle of democracy and the intention of the Parliament is
not to keep a constituency remaining unrepresented. The concern
expressed with regard to load on the exchequer cannot be treated as a
ground. It is so because the representative democracy has to sustain
itself by the elected representatives. We may hasten to add that the
matter would be different when an election dispute is pending against
G the candidate that comes within the ambit and sweep of Section 84 or
Section 98(c) or Section 101(b) of the Act. That not being the case, the
view expressed by the High Court is absolutely impregnable.
17. Consequently, Special Leave Petition, being devoid of merit,
stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
H Devika Gujral Petition dismissed.
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