Holding

A delay of about one month in holding a test identification parade, absent any proven motive or irregularity, does not invalidate the identification evidence and does not warrant interference with the conviction.

Summary

The appellant, Pramod Mandal, was convicted under Section 396 IPC for a dacoity and murder that occurred on 13 January 1989. He appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the conviction on the ground that the Test Identification Parade (TIP) was held about a month after the incident and that only one eyewitness (PW‑4) identified him, alleging that lack of electricity at the time of the offence rendered the identification unreliable. The Court examined the evidence of electricity supply, found it was present, and held that the eyewitness, who had sustained multiple injuries and observed the assailants closely, was reliable. It further observed that a one‑month delay, without any proven motive or irregularity, does not per se invalidate the identification, and that no fixed rule exists regarding the period for TIP or the number of identifying witnesses. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction.

Issues considered

The effect of a one‑month delay in conducting a Test Identification Parade on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
Whether the alleged absence of electricity at the time of the offence undermines the credibility of the identification.
Whether the prosecution must demonstrate a motive or irregularity for the delay in the TIP to overturn a conviction.
Whether a single identifying witness can suffice for conviction in a dacoity case.

Legislation cited

Subjects

test identification paradedelayeyewitness identificationdacoitySection 396 IPCsingle witness convictionelectricity supplyidentification reliability

Judgment

PRAMOD MANDAL A
v.
STA TE OF BIHAR

SEPTEMBER 17, 2004

[P. VENKATARAMA REDDI AND B.P. SINGH, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860-Section 396-Prosecution case that appellant along
with six others committed dacoity and murder-All the witnesses supported
prosecution case-There was nothing to discredit them-Conviction by
Additional Session Judge, upheld by High Court-On appeal held, there is C
no reason to doubt the genuineness of the Test Identification Prade or the
veracity of witnesses-Hence no interference called for.

Criminal Trial:

Test Identification Parade-Period for completing Test and the number D
of witnesses required to identifY the accused-Neither possible nor prudent
to lay down invariable rule-These matters to be left to the wisdom of the
courts offacts.

Test Identification Prade-Held a month after the occurrence-No
motive to delay the holding of TIP pleaded and no irregularity alleged-Held, E
delay was not such as would cast a doubt on the ability of the witnesses to
identifY the accused within 30 days.

Appellant along with six others was tried for alleged offence
committed under Section 396 IPC. Except one all accused were convicted F
by Trial Court. Appeal against conviction was dismissed by the High
Court. Appellant alone has appealed against judgment of the High Court.
Main contention of appellant is alleged delay in holding Test Identification
Parade.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court G

HELD : 1. DW-1, who was examined to prove that there was no
supply of electricity at the time the occurrence took place, was neither
the author of entry in register nor was he the certifying officer. High
Court rightly rejected this witness and held there was supply of electricity H
479
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A when occurrence took place and the witnesses, therefore, had sufficient
light and opportunity to identify the dacoits. (484-E, F)

2. In Wakil Singh 's case the Court has not laid down an invariable
rule that if the Test Identification Parade is held after three and a half
months or if there is only one identifying witness, "it would be unsafe
B to convict the accused" because the Court prefaced this observation by
the words "in the circumstances unless the evidence is absolutely clear".
(487-B)

Wakil Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1981] (Supp.) SCC 28 and
Subhash and Shiv Shankar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1987] 3 SCC 331,
c distinguished.

Soni v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 3 SCC 368 and Anil Kumar v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (2003) 3 SCC 569, referred to.

3. The defence has not imputed any motive to the pf"osecution for
D the delay in holding the Test Identification parade, nor has the defence
alleged that there was any irregularity in the holding of the Test
Identification Parade. The evidence of the Magistrate conducting the
Test Identification Parade as well as the Investigating Officer has gone
unchallenged. In the facts and circumstances of this case the holding of
E the Test Identification Parade, about one month after the occurrences,
is not fatal to the case of the prosecution as· there is nothing to suggest
that there was any motive for the prosecution to delay the holding of tllte
Test Identification Parade or that any irregularity was committed in
holding the Test Identification Parade. (489-B, C, D)

F Bharat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1973] 3 SCC 896, referred
to.

4. It is neither possible nor prudent to lay down any invariable rule
as to the period within which a Test Identification Parade must be held,
or the number of witnesses who must correctly identify the accused, to
G sustain conviction. Rule prescribing such period would only benefit the
professional criminals in whose cases the arrest is delayed as the police
have no clear clue about their identity, they being persons unknown to
victims. The offenders may be unknown to the victim and the case
depends solely on the identification by the victim, who is otherwise found
H to be truthful and reliable. Such cases must be left to the wisdom of the
PRAMOD MANDAL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 481

Courts of fact which must consider all aspects of the matter in the light A
of the evidence on the record before pronouncing upon the acceptability
or rejection of such identification. [489-H; 490-A, B, C, DJ

Anil Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2003) 3 SCC 569; Brij Mohan
v. State of Rajasthan, [1994) 1 SCC 413; Daya Singh v. State of Haryana,
[2001) 3 SCC 468 and State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, [2000) 1 SCC 471, B
referred to.

5. There is no reason to suspect the truthfulness and credibility of
PW-4. He appears to be a witness on whom the Court can place implicit
reliance. The Courts below have found his evidence to be reliable after C
critical scrutiny of his testimony. The traumatic experience of that fateful
day in which a young girl lost her life within his view, must have left the
faces of assailants imprinted in his memory which certainly would not
have diminished or got erased within a period of only 30 days. There is,
therefore, no reason to doubt either the genuineness of the Test
Identification Parade or the veracity of witness. [491-H; 492-A, BJ D

Ma/khan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2003) 5 SCC
746, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 174 E
of 2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.4.2002 of the Patna High Court
in Crl. A. No. 125 of 1995.

Ratan Kumar Choudhuri, Satyajeet Kumar for the Appellant. F
B.B. Singh and Kumar Rajesh Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.P. SINGH, J. : In this appeal by special leave the sole appellant is. G
Pramod Manda! who alongwith six others was put up for trial before the 6th
Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur in Sessions Case No. 739 of 1990
charged of the offence under Section 396 IPC. It is not necessary to refer
to the charges framed against the remaining accused since they are not
appellants. before us. The trial court by its judgment and order of April 24, . H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 1995 found the appellant guilty of the offence under section 396 IPC and
sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. The appellant
preferred Criminal Appeal No.125 of 1995 before the High Court of
Judicature at Patna which was dismissed by the High Court by its impugned
judgment and order of.April 5, 2002.
B
We may only observe that of the seven persons put up for trial before
the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge one Deepak Yadav was given the
benefit of doubt and acquitted. One Parsuram Paswan was sentenced to life
imprisonment both under sections 396 and 302 IPC, while Rajesh Kumar
Yadav was sentenced to life imprisonment under section 396 IPC. The
c remaining accused were sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment under
section 396 IPC. The appeals preferred by the remaining accused have also
been disposed of by the High Court by the impugned judgment.

The case of the prosecution is that the informant Dr. Balmiki Singh is
a resident of Mohalla Sahebganj, Nath_nagar. On January 13, 1989 at 2010
D hours he lodged a first information report at P.S. Nathnagar in which he stated
that on that date at about 7.30 p.m. while he was watching the television, other
members of the family were in the house. His son Priyadarshi Ashok, PW-
1 had gone to the fields and had not returned. While he was watching the
television he saw that three persons entered his house with concealed faces.
E Of them two were armed with pistols and they demanded the keys from him.
He could identify accused Parsuram Paswan by his voice, stature and eyes.
He then heard the cries of his daughter-in-law coming from another room
and when he rushed to her room he found that two other persons were
threatening her, of whom one was armed with country made pistol. His
daughter-in-law handed over to them whatever ornaments she was wearing
F
at that time. Two other persons then entered the room who picked up some
articles. Those two persons had not concealed their faces. Some other dacoits
also entered the room of his daughter-in-Jaw and started making demands
from her. A relative of his, namely Rajiv Kumar Mishra, PW-4, who was
residing- with him, told his daughter-in-law to handover the keys to the
G dacoits. Thereafter the dacoits asked Rajiv to open the almirah but he was
unable to do so. One of the dacoits threatened to kill him if he did not open
the almirah. Seeing this, the informant rushed and caught that hand of the
dacoit in which he was holding the pistol and pushed him towards the
verandah. Thereafter the informant's daughter, Rani Purnashri started raising
alarm. Some of the dacoits were in the courtyard of the house and he
H
PRAMOD MANDAL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 483

recognized one of them as Rajesh Yadav who was armed with a pistol. A
Rajesh Yadav exhorted Parshuram to fire and thereafter Parshuram fired
hitting his daughter Rani Pumashri. The dacoits also exploded bombs. The
,.
informant claimed to have recognized one of the miscreants as Deepak Yadav
who assaulted him on his back with the barrel of his pistol as a result of which
his grip over one of the dacoits, whom he had caught, loosened and that dacoit B
slipped away. Thereafter the dacoits fled away. His daughter Rani Pumashri
succumbed to her injuries. By this time his son Priyadarshi Ashok, PW-I
had also come. He mentioned in his report that Aruni, Rajiv Kumar M{shra,
PW-4 and Madan Sriharsha, PW-2 were also injured. In the report he also
gave descriptions of other dacoits whom he had not recognized.
c
A motive was suggested in the report itself. The informant stated that
he had a dispute with Rajesh Yadav and Deepak Yadav over the demolitior.
of a ridge in his field. An incident took place in August, 1988 when he had
been threatened by them.
D
PW.11 lndradeo Singh the investigating officer was examined by the
prosecution. Dr. Kailash Jha, PW-6 was the doctor who had conducted the
post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased. PWs-8, 9 and 10 were
the three Magistrates who conducted Test Identification Parades on different
dates. Apart from these witnesses, several eye witnesses were examined,
namely PW-1, Priyadarshi Ashok, son of the informant, PW-2, Madan E
Sriharsha, another son of the informant, PW-3 Vijayshree, daughter of the
informant and PW-4 Rajiv Kumar Mishra, relative of the informant. PW-5,
Dr. Balmiki Singh is the informant himself. All the witnesses have supported
the case of the prosecution and there is nothing in the evidence to discredit
them. The trial court as well as the High Court have.carefully scrutinized F
the evidence of these witnesses and have concluded that the prosecution had
proved that a dacoity took place in the house of the informant at about 7.30
p.m. on January 13, 1989 and in the course of the commission ofthe'Clacoity
the daughter of the informant was shot dead by one of the dacoits.

Learned ·counsel for the appellant did not even attempt to persuade us G
to hold that the prosecution case was false and such an occurrence had not
taken place at all. He rightly drew our attention to the evidence on record
in support of the defence that on the date of occurrence there was no
electricity supply in that area between 6.55 p.m. and 7.55 p.m. and, therefore,
identification of the 'lPPellant in electric light was not possible, and that there H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A was no light from any other source which could have made his identification
possible. It was further submitted that the convictiOn of the aprellant is based
on the sole identification by PW-4 Rajiv Kumar Mishra. It is not safe to
convict the appellant on the basis of his identification.

We shall first consider the evidence adduced by the defence to establish
B
that on the date of occurrence between 6.55 p.m. and 7.55 p.m. there was
no supply of electrical energy to Mohalla Sahebganj in Nathnagar. To prove
this fact DW-1 Naval Kishore Yadav was examined. He was a correspondence
clerk in the Area Electricity Board, Nathnagar, Bhagalpur. He produced a
register and claimed that supply of electricity to different areas was noted
c in the said register by the Switch Board Operator, Arun Kumar Sah. From
the register it appeared that from 6.55 p.m. to 7.55 p.m. on the date of
occurrence there was no supply of electricity to the area in question. The
entry referred to by him was 'in the handwriting of Mr. Arun Kumar Sah. He
further stated that the entry had been certified by the Assistant Engineer Shri
B.K. Srivastava. This witness admitted in cross-examination that the entry
D
sheets were not bound. He also admitted that the register did not show in
which areas electricity was being supplied.

The High Court has attached no weight to the evidence of this witness.
He was neither the author of the entry in the register nor was he the certifying
E officer. The Switch Board Operator who is stated to have made the entry
and the Assistant Engineer who is stated to have certified that entry wei-e not
examined. There was overwhelming evidence of witnesses to the effect that
there was supply of electricity at the time when the occurrence took place.
Indeed PW-5 stated that he was watching the television when the dacoits
entered his house. The High Court, therefore, rejected the evidence ofDW-
F
1 and held on the basis of the evidence on record that there was supply of
electricity at the time when dacoity was committed in the house of PW-5 and
the witnesses, therefore, had sufficient light and opportunity to ide~tify the
dacoits.

G The next question is whether the evidence of PW-4 Raj iv Kumar Mishra
must be accepted. The courts below have concurrently found Rajiv Kumar
Mishra, PW-4 to be a reliable and trustworthy witness. It has been noticed
that Rajiv Kumar Mishra had suffered as many as 5 injuries in the course
of the occurrence, three of them being incised injuries and the remaining two
were abrasions. This has been proved by Dr. Mirtunjay Kumar, PW-7 who
H
PRAMOD MANDAL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 485

examined PW-4. It will thus appear that PW-4 was in the forefront trying A
to defend the members of the family from the onslaught of the dacoits. It
is in that process that he was severely injured by the dacoits. Obviously he
had sufficient opportunity to notice the features of the dacoits from close
quarters. He has been mentioned in the first information report as the person
who had advised the informant's daughter-in-law to handover the keys to the B
dacoits. It is also stated that thereafter the dacoits wanted him to open the
almirah and when he was not able to open the almirah, he was threatened
with death by the dacoits. We are, therefore, quite clear in our mind
that Rajiv Kumar Mishra, PW-4, being a young man tried his level best
to resist the dacoits to the extent possible in the circumstances and in that
process he was severely assaulted.
c
So far as the appellant is concerned, PW-4 had a special reason to
remember his features. He deposed that he identified the dacoits in the light
of electric bulb. He further deposed that Tuntun Choudhary had assaulted
him on his left leg. Similarly the appellant Pramod Mandal had tried to D
assault him with an iron rod. It also appears from the record that this witness
had stated these facts before the Judicial Magistrate who conducted the Test
Identification Parade and this fact had been noted by the Magistrate in the
Identification Chart. It cannot, therefore, be said that the role assigned to
the appellant by PW-4 was an after thought.
E
It was then submitted that the appellant was arrested on January 17,
1989 and he was put up for Test Identification Parade on February 18, 1989.
Thus there was a delay of one month in holding the Test Identification Parade
and, therefore, the identification by witnesses in such an identification parade
belatedly held was not reliable, particularly when there was only one F
identifying witness against the appellant.

Shri B.B. Singh, learned counsel for the State submitted that the
evidence in this case discloses that the witnesses had ample opportunity to
see the accused in electric light since the place of occurrence was the house G
of PW-5. They had abundant opportunity to notice their features from close
quarters and, therefore, it could not be said that only a month after the
occurrence their memory faded to such an extent that they could not have
identified the culprits on account of lapse of time. Secondly it is submitted
that in this case, having regard to the evidence on record, the quality of H

-
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

·A evidence of PW-4 is such that even if th.e Test Identification Parade was not
held, his identification in court could be acted upon. Lastly he submitted that
there is no complaint by the appellant that he was either shown to the witness
before the holding of the Test Identification Parade or that there was any
irregularity in the holding of the Test Identification Parade. He further
B emphasized the fact that having regard to the nature of occurrence, it was
not as if the witnesses had only a fleeting glimpse of the accused. The
evidence on record proves that the occurrence continued for about 25 minutes
and, therefore, the witnesses had ample opportunity to notice the physical
features of the dacoits which must have got imprinted in their memories. So
far as PW-4 is concerned, he submitted that this witness had deposed in court,
c and had also earlier stated before the Magistrate conducting the Test
Identification Parade, that the appellant Pramod Manda! had attempted to
assault him with an iron rod. This statement was not even challenged in his
cross-examination.

D The parties have relied upon the decisions of this Court which we shall
consider hereafter.

Learned counsel for the appellant placed considerable reliance on the
decisions of this Court in [1981] Supp. SCC 28: Wakil Singh and Others
v. State of Bihar. In that case the trial court had acquitted the appellants but
E the High Court on appeal reversed the order of acquittal and convicted them.
The judgment of the High Court was impugned before this Court. Wakil
Singh, the first appellant in the appeal, had been convicted by the High Court
on the basis of the testimony of PW-9 who was the sole identifying witness.
This Court noticed that the Test Identification Parade was held about 3Yi
·p months after the dacoity and observed that in view of such a long lapse of
time it is not possible for a human being to remember the features of the
accused and he is, therefore, very likely to commit mistakes. In these
circumstances unless the evidence is absolutely clear, it would be unsafe to
convict the accused for such a serious offence on the testimony of a single
witness. This Court also noticed the fact that though PW-9, the identifying
G witness was present on September 4, 1965 when a Test Identification Parade
was held, he was not asked to identify the appellant, but the witness identified
the accused four days later. This circumstance also threw some doubt on the
complicity of the appellant. Moreover it was observed that since the High
Court was reversing an order of acquittal it failed to consider the fact that
there being only one witness who identified the accused concerned, the view
H
PRAMOD MANDAL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 487

taken by the trial court could not be said to be not a reasonable possible view. A
This Court, therefore, upheld the order of acquittal.

It will thus be observed that this Court in the aforesaid judgment has
not laid down an invariable rule that if Test Identification Parade is held after
3 Yi months or if there is only one identifying witnc-:; "i+ would be unsafe B
to convict the accused" because the court prefaced this observation by the
words "In these circumstances unless the evidence is absolutely clear". It
is well settled that it is open to a court of fact to assess the quality of evidence
and to determine whether the evidence on record justifies a conviction. If
the court comes to the conclusion that the evidence does not prove conclusively
the guilt of the accused the court may order his acquittal. Such an order of c
hcquittal cannot be set aside by a court sitting in appeal unless it records a
finding that the view taken by the trial court was not a possible reasonable
view of the evidence on record. In Wakil Singh 's case this Court found that
the view of the trial court could not be said to be not a reasonable possible
view and, therefore, interference by the High Court was not justified. It &lso
D
noticed the fact that the identifying witness though present was not asked to
identify on the first day, but was asked to do so on the fourth day. Moreover, ·
the Test Identification Parade was held after 3-1/2 months. These features
which existed in the case of Wakil Singh (supra) are absent in the instant case
and, therefore, the said decision is clearly distinguishable.
E
Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the decision of this
Court in [ 1987] 3 SCC 331 : Sub hash and Shiv Shankar v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, wherein this Court held that a long interval of nearly 4 months
before the Test Identification Parade was held, made it doubtful whether
inspite of this interval of time the witnesses were able to have a clear image F
of the accused in their minds and identify him correctly at the Test
Identification Parade. In the instant case the Test Identification Parade was
held only a. month after the occurrence and not after four months as in the
case of Subhash and Shiv Shankar (supra). The delay in the instant case is
not such as would cast a doubt on the ability of the witnesses to identify the
accused. (}

Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the decision of this
Court in [1982] 3 SCC 368 : Soni v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The said
judgment is a brief judgment where on the facts of the case the court doubted
the identification by the witnesses in view of the delay in holding of the Test H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Identification Parade. However, this judgment does not lay down any
principle of law which may be applied to the facts of the
present case. It is a decision on the facts of the case and cannot be
treated as a binding precedent. In fact the said judgment was noticed
by this Court in [2003] 3 SCC 569 : Anil Kumar v. State of Uttar
B Pradesh and this Court after extracting the relevant part of the judgment
observed :-

"It is to be seen that apart from stating that delay throws a doubt
on the genuineness of the identification parad~ and observing that
after lapse of such a long time it would be difficult for the witnesses
c to remember the facial expressions, no other reasoning is given why
such a small delay would be fatal."

Learned counsel for the State submitted that in the instant case there
was no inordinate delay in holding the Test Identification Parade so as to
create a doubt on the genuineness of the Test Identification Parade. In any
D
event he submitted that even if it is assumed that there was some delay in
holding the Test Identificatio~ Parade, it was the duty of the accused to
question the investigating officer and the Magistrate if any advantage was
sought to be taken on account of the delay in holding the Test Ide_ntification
Parade. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in (1973) 3 SCC
E 896 : Bharat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh. In the aforesaid judgment
this Court observed thus :-

"In Hasib v. State of Bihar, AIR (1972) SC 283; it was
,;:iserved by the Court that identification parades belong to the
investigation stage and therefore it is desirable to hold them at the
F
earliest opportunity. An early opportunity to identify tends to
minimize the chances of the memory of the identifying witnesses
fading away due to long lapse of time. Relying on this decision,
counsel for the appellant contends that no support can be derived
from what transpired at the parade as it was held long after the arrest
G of the appellant. Now it is true that in the instant case there was
a delay of about three months in holding the identification parade
but here again, no questions were asked of the investigating officer
as to why and how the delay occurred. It is true that the burden
of establishing the guilt is on the prosecution but that theory cannot
be carried so far as to hold that the prosecution must lead evidence
H
PRAMOD MANDAL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 489

to rebut all possible defences. If the contention was that the A
identification parade was held in an irregular manner or that there
was an undue delay in holding it, the Magistrate who held the parade
and the Police Officer who conducted the investigation should have
been cross-examined in that behalf'.
B
In the instant case we find that the defence has not imputed any motive
to the prosecution for the delay in holding the Test Identification Parade, nor
has the defence alleged that there was any irregularity in the holding of the
Test Identification Parade. The evidence of the Magistrates conducting the
Test Identification Parade as well as the Investigating Officer have gone
unchallenged. Learned counsel for the State is, therefore, justified in C
contending that in the facts and circumstances of this case the holding of the
Test Identification Parade, about one month after the occurrence, is not fatal
to the case of the prosecution as there is nothing to suggest that there was
any motive for the prosecution to delay the holding of the Test Identification
Parade or that any irregularity was committed in holding the Test Identification D
Parade.

Learned counsel for the State has also relied upon the decision of this
Court in [2003] 3 SCC 569 : Anil Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh wherein
the Test Identification Parade was held 4 7 days after the arrest of the
appellants. This Court after considering several decisions of this Court E
including the decisions in [1994] 1 sec 413 : Brij Mohan v. State of
Rajasthan, [2001] 3 sec 468 : Daya Singh v. State of Haryana and (2000]
l SCC 471 : State of Maharashtra v. Suresh concluded that since the
identifying witness was attacked by the assailants including the appellant and
another, he had a clear look at the assailants. When his younger brother came F
to save him he was killed by the assailants while the witness also received
serious injuries. These were circumstances which would have imprinted in
the memory of the witness the facial expressions of the assailants and this
impression would not diminish or disappear within a period of 47 days.
Similar was the case of the· father and the mother of the identifying witness
who had seen the assailants attacking their sons and one of their sons getting G
killed. In their memory also the facial expressions of the assailants will get
embossed. A mere lapse of 47 days would not erase the facial expressions
from their memory.
'
It is neither possible nor prudent to lay down any invariable rule as to H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A the period within which a Test Identification Parade must be held, or the
number of witnesses who must correctly identify the accused, to sustain his
conviction. These matters must be left to the Courts of fact to decide in the
facts and circumstances of each case. If a rule is laid down prescribing a
period within which the Test 1dentification Parade must be held, it would only
B benefit the professional criminals in whose cases the arrests are delayed as
the police have no clear clue about their identity, they being persons unknown
to the victims. They therefore, have only to avoid their arrest for the
prescribed period to avoid conviction. Similarly, there may be offences
which by their very nature may be witnessed by a single witness, such as
rape. The offender may be unknown to the victim and the case depends solely
c on the identification by the victim, who is otherwise found to be truthful
and reliable. What justification can be pleaded to contend that such
cases must necessarily result in acquittal because of there being only
one identifying ~itness? Prudence therefore demands that these matters
must be left to the wisdom of the courts of fact which must consider
D all aspects of the matter in the light of the evidence on record before
pronouncing upon the acceptability or rejection of such identification.

Lastly in [2003] 5 SCC 746 : Malkhansingh' and Others v. State of
Madhya Pradesh a three Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us (B.P.
E Singh, J.) was a Member, after considering various decisions of this Court
observed thus :-

'.'It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of
identification in court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section
9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena
F of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity
of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence
Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the
statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the
accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very na~re
G inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test
identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness
of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence
to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of
witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers ....
to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule
H
PRAMOD MANDAL v. STATE [B.P. SINGH, J.] 491

of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, A
the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony
it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The
identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there
is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the
investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to B
claim a test identification parade. They do not constitute substantive
evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Failure to hold a test identification
parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification
in court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be
a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept C
the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration".

Learned counsel for the State submitted that having regard to the
principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions it was open to him to contend
that even in the. absence of the Test Identification Parade the conviction of
D
the appellant would be fully justified on the basis of the evidence of PW-
4 alone who identified him in court. In this case, however, his identification
in court is corroborated by his identification in the Test Identification Parade.

We find considerable force in the submission advanced by the learned
counsel for the State. This is not a case where the testimony of PW-4 in court E
is not corroborated by an earlier identification in test identification proceeding.
Since we have found no irregularity or unfairness in the holding of the Test
Identification Parade, it must be held that the evidence of PW-4 is amply
corroborated by the result of the test identification proceeding. Moreover we
have found that the occurrence did take place in the house of PW-5. PW- F
4, is an eye witness, being a relative of PW-5, residing with him. There was
sufficient light to enable the witnesses to identify the dacoits. The presence
of PW-4 cannot be disputed because he bore the brunt of the attack by the
dacoits having suffered three incised wounds and two other injuries. No
reason has been suggested why this witness should have falsely implicated
the appellant. The dacoity took place for about 25 minutes and PW-4, being G
in the forefront of the defence, had ample opportunity to notice the
appearance and physical features of the culprits. So far as the appellant is
concerned, PW-4 categorically stated that he had attempted to hit him with
an iron rod. This fact he also stated before the Magistrate who conducted
the Test Identification proceeding. We, therefore, find no reason to suspect H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A the truthfulness and credibility of this witness. He appears to be a witness
on whom the court can place implicit reliance. The courts below have found
his evidence to be reliable after critical scrutiny of his testimony. The
traumatic experience of that fateful day in which a young girl lost her life
within his view, must have left the faces of the assailants imprinted in his
B memory which certainly would not have diminished or got erased within a
period of only 30 days. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt ~ither the
genuineness of the Test Identification proceeding or the veracity of the
witness.

We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the·same is accordingly
C dismissed.

K.G. Appeal dismissed.