PREM SAGARversusDHARAMBIR AND ORS .
- Citation
- 2003 INSC 574
- Decided
- 29 October 2003
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- DORAISWAMY RAJU
Holding
Life imprisonment is the normal punishment for murder and the death penalty is reserved for the rarest of rare cases; consequently, the High Court's commutation to life is justified, and the conviction of Karambir under Section 34 IPC is unsustainable.
Summary
The case involved three accused—Dharambir, Joginder and Karambir—who were convicted for the murders of Dalbir, Vijender and Smt. Kitabo under Sections 302, 34 and 120‑B of the IPC. The trial court sentenced Dharambir and Joginder to death and Karambir to life imprisonment; the High Court commuted the death sentences to life but upheld all convictions. Two appeals were filed: Criminal Appeal No. 242/2003 by the accused challenging their convictions and sentences, and Criminal Appeal No. 243/2003 by the informant Prem Sagar seeking restoration of the death penalty. The Supreme Court examined the credibility of the eyewitness testimony, found it reliable, and held that the conviction of Karambir under Section 34 could not be sustained, leading to his acquittal. It also reiterated that death penalty is an exception, reserved for the "rarest of rare" cases, and therefore upheld the High Court's commutation of the death sentences to life imprisonment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal of the accused in part (acquittal of Karambir) and dismissed the informant's appeal. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that life imprisonment is the general rule for murder, with death punishment only in exceptional circumstances.
Issues considered
- Whether the death sentences imposed on Dharambir and Joginder should be upheld or commuted to life imprisonment.
- Whether the conviction of Karambir under Section 34 IPC is supported by the evidence.
- Whether the High Court erred in altering the death sentences to life sentences.
- Whether the informant's appeal for reinstating the death penalty is maintainable.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 366
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 302, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
PREM SAGAR A
v.
DHARAMBIR AND ORS .
•
OCTOBER 29, 2003
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]
B
Penal Code, 1860 :
Section-302-Murder-Death sentence-Imposition of-Principles-
Held : Brutality in inbuilt in every murder but in case of every murder, C
death sentence is not imposed-Life imprisonment is the rule and death
sentence is the exception-The latter is imposed in rarest of rare cases.
The appellants along with their two real brothers and mo~her, in
·an six accused, were charge-sheeted ror the murder of three persons. D
The first two appellants were awarded the death sentence by the trial
court while the third appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for life. In appeal, the High Court commuted the death sentence to life
sentence in the case of the first two appellants. However, the convictions
were maintained. Hence the appeal.
E
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: I. Brutality is inbuilt in every murder but in case of every
· murder, death sentence is not imposed. Life imprisonment is the rule
and death sentence is the exception. The latter is imposed in rarest of F
rare cases. [1041-A-B)
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
243 of 2003.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.9.2002 of the Punjab and G
Haryana High Court in Murder Ref. No. 2 of 2002.
WITH
CrL A. No. 242 of 2003. H
1037
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A P.C. Jain, Balbir Singh Gupta, R.N. Kush, Prem Malhotra and Vinay
K. Garg for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court wa~ delivered by
B ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. : These two appeals are interlinked being
directed against the same judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
While Criminal Appeal no. 242/2003 is by the convicted persons, Criminal
Appeal no. 243/2003 is by the informant. The three appellants in Criminal
Appeal No. 242/200.3 have been found guilty of offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code,
C 1860 (for short the 'IPC'). While accused-appellants Dharambir and
Joginde~ were awarded death s.entence by learned Sessions Judge, Hisar,
appellant-Karambir was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Each
of the accused persons was asked to pay a fine ofRs. 25,000 each. In appeal
before.the High Court, the death sentence was commuted to life sentence
. iJ in case. of accused-Dharambir and Joginder. The convictions, however,
were. maintained. It is to be noted that accused-Joginder, as per the
information given to this Cou'rt by learned.counsel for the appellants, has
died during pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the appeal so far he is
concerned, has abated.
E
The backgrounds facts are as under:
Appellants (Dharambir, Joginder Singh and Kara~bir) along with
their two real brothers - Jagbir Singh and Jasbir Singh and their mother
Vanaspati, in all six accused, were charged sheeted by the learned trial
F Court on the allegations that about 7-8 days prior to the date of occurrence
i.e. 29.6.2000, in the area of village Mayyar, resolved to do an illegal act
to commit the. murder. of Dalbir; Vijender and Smt. Kitabo and they
murdered them in pursuance of the said agre~m~nt and thereby committed
offence under Section 120-B IPC. The second charge against the appellants
G was.that on 29.6.2000 at about 10.30 p.m. in the area of the said village
and in pursuance of their conspiracy, they _murdered Dalbir, Vijender. and
Smt. Kitabo and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section
302 read with Section 120-B IPC. Thirdly, on the same day, time and place, :!
appellant-Dharambir in furtherance of common intention of co-accused
H Joginder and Karambir committed murder by intentionally causing the
PREM SAGAR v. DHARAMBIR [PASAYAT, J.) 1039
- death of Dalbir and thereby he committed an offence punishable under A
Section 302 IPC while his co-accused Joginder and Karambir committed
an offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. Fourthly, on the same
·day and in the said area of village Mayyar and in furtherance of common
intention Dharambir and Joginder committed murder by intentionally
causing the death of Kitabo and thereby they committed an ·offence B
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Fifthly, on the·
same day, time and place and in furtherance of their common intention,
all the three appellants did commit murder by intentionally causing the
death of Vijender and thereby committed an offence punishable under
Section 302/34 IPC.
c
Interestingly, in this case the first information report was lodged by·
accused-appellant Dharambir before ASI Vinod Kumar (PW12) but during
investigation he found that Dharambir along with two others were the '
assailants and after investigation charge sheet was placed,
D
During trial and before the High Court, prosecution relied on the
version of Prem Sagar (PWl::i) who claimed to be an eyewitness. The trial
court and the High Court found his evidence to be credible, cogent and
acting on it directed conviction and imposed sentence as aforesaid. In view
of the death sentence imposed on two persons, reference was made to the E
High Court for confirmation under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short the 'Cr.P.C.'). As noted above, the High Court
converted the death sentence into life sentence. While accused persons
have questioned the correctness of the judgment so far as their conviction
and sentence are concerned, the informant has contended that the
High Court was not justified in altering the death sentence to life sentence. F
It is accepted by the learned counsel for the State that no appeal
has been preferred by the State for alteration of death sentence to life
sentence.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned G
counsel for the appellants submitted that the evidence of PWl 5 does not
inspire confidence, and is highly doubtful. His conduct after the occurrence,
when he is supposed to have travelled his village side at great distance on
foot, when transport facilities were available, to have returned to the place
of occurrence on foot or by an inconvenience mode of transport is highly H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A unusual and lacks credibility. It is further submitted that so far as accused
Karambir is concerned, the prosecution has not established his role. He has
been convicted by application of Section 34 IPC. In fact, PW-15 has clearly
stated that he was not present when Kitabo and Dalbir were assaulted. He
is supposed to have followed deceased Vijender and to have prevented him
B while he was trying to run away. PW-1'5 in his cross-examination has
clearly accepted that it was accused-Dharambir who caused his fall. It is
also submitted that in the circumstances noticed by the High Court there
is no ·scope for interference with the life sentence awarded. Learned
counsel. for the State submitted that Section 34 is clearly applicable for the
C accused-Karambir. The slip of tongue committed by PW15 to say that
accused-Dharambir had caused fall of deceased-Vinod cannot be magnified
to soch an extent as to rule ciut involvement of accused-Karambir. Learned
counsel for the informant-appellant, Prem Sagar submitted that in a case
of such brutal murders where three person lost their lives death sentence
D had rightly been awarded. by the trial court and the High Court should not
have interfered.
We have perused the judgment and the evidence on record. The
evidence of PWIS has been rightly acted upon by the trial court and the
High Court. This witness is relative of both the deceased and the accused.
E Therefore, there is no reason as to why he would falsely implicate the
accused persons. Added to that in spite of the elaborate cross-examination
nothing fragile in his testimony has surfaced. His evidence is cogent,
truthful and trustworthy. Therefore, the conviction. so far as accused-
Dharambir is concerned, cannot· be faulted. Similarly, in the case of
F accused-Joginder in respect of whom the appeal has abated because of his
death. So far as accused-Karambir is concerned, in view of the scenario
as highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants, the prosecution has
not linked him with the occurrence in a manner as to attract applicability
of Section 34 IPC. When the eye-witness (PW-15) himself has stated that
G it was accused-Dharambir who caused fall of deceased-Vijender it was not
for the High Court to say it was a slip of tongue. Had it really been so,
different course was to be adopted before the trial court, which the
prosecution did not do. That being so, the conviction of accused-appellant
Karambir cannot ~e maintained and is set aside. He be set at liberty
H forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.
PREM SAGAR v. DHARAMBIR [PASAYAT. J.] 1041
Coming to the appeal filed by the informant we find that the High A
Court has taken note of various decisions of this Court and the principles
laid down as to when death sentence would be appropriate. Brutality is
inbuilt in every murder but in case of every murder death sentence is not
imposed. Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is the exception.
The latter sentence is imposed in rarest of rare cases. Taking note of the B
mitigating circumstances indicated by the High Court, we do not find any
scope for interference with the life sentence awarded and to alter same to
death sentence.
In the result, Criminal Appeal no. 242/2003 is allowed to the extent
of acquittal so far as accused-Karambir is concerned, but conviction of C
accused-Dharambir is affirmed. The Criminal Appeal no.243/2003 filed by
the infonnant-Prem Sagar is dismissed.
V.S.S. Criminal Appeal No. 243/03 dismissed
Criminal Appeal No. 242/03 allowed. D
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