Holding

Routine handcuffing of under‑trial prisoners without individualized, documented justification is unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14, 19 and 21, and such restraint may be used only as a last resort with judicial oversight.

Summary

The petitioner, an under‑trial prisoner, complained that he was repeatedly handcuffed while being escorted between Tihar Jail and the court despite a trial‑court order prohibiting such treatment. He filed a writ of habeas corpus under Article 32, alleging violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and invoking international human‑rights standards. The Court examined the statutory framework governing the use of handcuffs, notably the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 and the Punjab Police Rules, and held that the blanket classification of prisoners into "better class" and "ordinary" for handcuffing was arbitrary and violative of the constitutional guarantee of equality and dignity. Relying on precedents such as Sunil Batra and Maneka Gandhi, the Court emphasized that any restraint must be the least restrictive necessary and must be justified by concrete evidence of danger of escape. It directed that handcuffing may be employed only as a last resort, with reasons recorded contemporaneously and subject to judicial oversight. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the impugned provisions of the police rules were read down to the extent they permitted routine handcuffing.

Issues considered

The constitutionality of the Punjab Police Rules that permit routine handcuffing of under‑trial prisoners based on class distinctions.
Whether handcuffing of an under‑trial prisoner without specific, recorded justification violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
The scope of the State's power under the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 to impose physical restraints.
The procedural safeguards required under Article 21 when depriving a person of liberty through physical restraint.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 46, s. 49
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 220
Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955s. 9(2)(e)
Punjab Police Rules, 1934s. Rule 26.21-A, s. Rule 26.22

Subjects

handcuffingunder‑trial prisonerspersonal libertyhuman dignityArticle 14Article 19Article 21habeas corpusPolice Rulesconstitutional law

Judgment

855

PREM SHANK.AR SHUKLA A
v.
DELHI ADMINISTRATION
April 29, 1980
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND B
o. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]
Hu111an justice vis-a-vis Detention Jurisprudence-Manacling a man
accused at an ofiencc, constitutional validity of-Constitution of India Arti-
• cles 14, 19 and 21--ls.suance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for human 1

Justice under Article 32 of the Constitution-Univer.rol Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948 Articles 5 and IO read lvith nonns in Part III and the provi-
sions in the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955-Punjab Police Rules,
1934, r·o/. ll/ Chop. 25. Rule 26 : 22, 23.

Allo,ving the petition, the Court

HELD : Per /~er J. (On behalf of Chinnappa Reddy J. and himself).
D
1. The guarantee of human dignity forms part of an Constitutional cu17
ture and the positive provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 spring into action
to disshackle any man since to manacle man is more than to mortify him;
it is to dehumanize him and, therefore, to violate his very personhood, too
often using the mask of 'dangerousness' and security. Even a prisoner is
a person, not an animal, and an undertrial prisoner is
a fortiori so. Our nations founding document admits of no exception. E
Therefore. all measures authorised by the law must be taken by the Court
to keep the stream of prison justice unsullied. [862 D-F, 863 E-F]

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Ors., [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494; fol~
lowed.
2. Th~ Supreme Court is the functional sentinel on the qui vive wherei F
"habeas" justice is in jeopardy. If iron enters the soul of law and of the
.f enforcing agents of la\v-rather, if it is credibly alleged so-the Supreme
Court must fling aside forms of procedure and defend the complaining indivi;
dual's personal liberty under Articles 14, 19 and 21 after due investigation..
Access to human justice is the essence of Article 32. [864 A-BJ

3. Where personal freedom is at stake or torture is in store to read G
down the law is to write off the law and to rise to the remedial demand of
the mariacled man is to break human bondage, if within the reach of judicial
process. [864 F-GJ
4. There cannot be a quasi-caste system among prisoners in the egalitarian
context of Article 14, In plain language, to say that the "better class nnder,
trial be not handcuffed without recording the reasons in the daily diary
for considering the -necessity of the use on such a prisoner while escort to B
and from court" means that ordinary Indian undertrials shall be rentively
handcuffed during transit between jail and court and the better class prisoner
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.

A shall be so confined only if reasonably apprehended to be violent or rescued
and is against the express provisions of Article 21. [863 D-E, 865 G-H]

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621 @ 647; applied. 1_
Vishwanath v. State, Crl. Misc. Main No. 430 of 1978 decid¢ on
,-
6-4-79 (Delhi High Court); overruled_

B S. Though circurn.scribed by the constraints of lawful detention, the
indwelling essence and inalienable attributes of man qua n1an are entitled
to the great rights guaranteed by the Constitution. That is why in India,
as in the sin1ilar jurisdiction in America, the broader horizons of habeas corpus
spread out, beyond 'the orbit of release from illegal custody, into every
trauma and torture on persons in legal custody, if the cruelty is contrary to
law, degrades human dignity 01• defiles his persohhood to a degree that violaJes .·~
C Article' 21, 14 and 19 enlivened by the Preamble. [868 A-B, 867 G-H] '
6. The collection of handcuff law, namely, Prisoners (Attendance in
Courts) Act, 1955; Pun1ab Police Rules, 1934, (VoL Ill) Rules 26 : 22(i)
(a) to (f); 26.21A, 27.12, Standing Order 44, Instruction on handcuffs of
November, 1977, and Orders of April 1979, must meet the demands of
Articles 14, 19 and 21. Irons forced on undertria1s in transit must conform
D to the humane imperatives of the triple articles. Official cruelty, sans consti·
tutionality degenerates into criminality. Rules, St\1nding orders, Instruct'ions
and Circulars must bow before Part III of the Constitution. [872 B-D]

The Preamble sets the human tone and temper of the Founding Docu- ..
'1ent and highlights justice, Equality and the dignity of the individual, Arti-
cle 14 interdicts arbitrary treatment, discriminatory dealings and capricious
cruelty. Article 19 prescribes restrictions on free movement unless in the
E interests of the general public. Article 2) is the sanctuary of human values,
prescribes fair procedure and forbids barbarities, punitive or procedural.
such is the apercu. [872 C-E]

Maaeka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621 @ 641; Sunil
Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494 @ 545; reiterated.
F 7. Handcuffing is prbna f<icie inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable, is
over harsh nnd at the first blush, arbitro.ry. Absent fair procedure and
objective monitoring to inflict "irons" is to resort to zoological strategies
repugnant ro Artic1e 21. Surely, the competing claims of securing the pri-
soner from fleeing and protecting his personality from barbarity have to be
harmonized. To prevent the escape of an undertrial is in public interest,
reasonable, just and cannot, by itself be castigated. But to bind a man hand
G and foot, fetter his limbs V.'ith hoops of steel, shuffle him along in the streets
r nd stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile his. dignity,
vulgarise society and foul the soul of our Constitutional culture. [872 F-0]

8. Insurance against escape does not compulsorily required handcuffing.
There are other measures \Vhereby an escort can keep safe custody of a
detenu without the indignity and cruelty implicit in handcuffs or other iron
contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the hands or feet Or bo'h
has not merely a preventive impact but also a punitive hurtfulness. Manacles
are mayhem on the human person and inflict humiliarion on the be;rer.
P. S. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. 857

'Ille thtee con1poncnts of "irons" forced on the human person are : to band- A
cuff i.e., to hoop harshly io punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers
also·. Iron straps are insult and pain writ large, animalising victim and
keepers. Si~ce there are other ways of ensuring safety as a rule handcuffs
or other fetters shall not be forced on the person of an undertrial prisoner
ordinarily. As necessarily implicit in Ai;iicles 14 and 19, when there is no
compulsive 11Ced to fel1er a person's limbs it is sadistic, capricious, despotic
an<l demoralizing to humble a man by manacling him. Such arbitrary con- B
r duct surely slaps Article 14 on the face. The animal freedom of movement,
which even a detainee is entitled to under Article 19, cannot be cut down
cruelly by application of handcuffs or other hoops. It will be unreasonable
. so tO do unless the State is able to make out that no other practical way
of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and des-
perate and the circumstances s'o hostile to safe keeping. [872 G-H, 873 A-E]

9. Once the Supreme Court make it a constitutional mandare and law
c
that no i:risoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely or merely for the
convenience of the custodian or escort, the distinction between classes of
prisoners become constitutionally obsolete. Apart from the fact that econo-
mic and social importance cannot be the basis for classifying prisoners for
purposes of handcuffs or otherwise, a rich criminal or undertrial is in no
way different from a poor or pariah convict or under trial in the matter D
of .security risk. An affluent in custody may be as dangerous or desperate
as an indigent, if not more. He may be more prone to be rescued than an
ordinary person. Therefore, it is arbitrary and irrational to classify pri-
soners for Purposes of handcuffs, into 'B' class and ordinary class. No one
shall be fettered in any form based on superior class differential as the
law lreats them equally. It is brutalising to handcuff a person in public and
so is unreasonable to do so. Of course, the police escort will find it com- E
fortable to fetlel1 their charges and be at ease, but that is not a relevant
consideration. [873 'E-H]

10. The only circumstance which validates incapacitation by irons-an
extreme measurer-is that otherwise there is no other reasonable way of
preventing his escape, in the given circumstances. Securing the prisoner
being a necessity of judicial trial, the. State must take steps in this behalf. F
But even here, the policeman's easy assumption or scary apprehension or
subje.ctive satisfaction of likely escape if fetters are not fitted on the prisoner
is not enough. The heavy deprivation of personal liberty must be justifiable
as reasonable restriction in the circumstances. Ignominy, inhumanity and
affliction, implicit in chains and shackles are permissible, as not unreasonable,
only if every other less c1uel means is fraught with risks or beyond availabi-
• lity. So it is that to be consistent with Arts. 14 and 19 handcuffs must be G
the last refuge, not the routine· regimen. If a few more guards will suffice,
then no handcuffs. If a close watch by armed policemen will do, then no
handcuffs. If alternative measures may be provided, then no iron bondage.
Tllis is the legal norm. [874 A·CJ

Fnctional compulsions of security must reach that dismal degree that
no alternative will work except manacles. Our Funda1nental Rights are
heavily Joa<led in favour of personal liberty even in prison, and so, the tradi- H
tional approaches without reverence for the worth of the human rr~rson are
obs0Jete 1 although they die hard. Discipline can be exaggerated by prison
16-463 SCJ/80
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.

A keepers; dangerouslless can be physically worked up by escorts and sadistic
disposition, \Vhere higher awareness of constitutional rights is absent, IDaf'
overpower the finer values of dignity and humanity. [874 D·BJ

Therefore,. there must first be well-grounded basis for drawing a strong
inference that the prisoner is likely to jump jail or break out of custody
or play the vanishing trick. The belief in this behalf must be based on
antecedents which must be recorded and proneness to violence must be
auth~ntic. Vague surmises or general averments that the under-trial is a
crook or desperado, rowdy or maniac, cannot suffice. In short, save in rare
cases of -concrete proof readily available of the dangerousness of the prisoner
in transit-the onus of proof of which is on him who puts the person under
irons-the police escort will be committing personal assault or mayhem if
he handcuffs or fetters his charge. It is disgusting to see the mechanical
c way jn which callous policemen, cavalier fashion, handcuff prison.- in their
charge, indifferently keeping them company assured by the thought that the
detainee is under 'iron' restraint. [874 F-H]

11, Even orders of superiors are no valid justification as con.sti.tvtional
rights cannot be kept in suspense by superior orders, unless there is material,
sufficiently stringent, to satisfy a reasonable mind that dangerous and des-
D perate is the prisoner who is being transported and further that by adding
to the escort party or other strategy he cannot be kept under conlrol. It
iS hard to imagine such situations. It is unconscionable, indeed outrilgeous,
to make the strange classification between better class prisoners and ordinary
prisoners in the matter of handcuffing. Thi~ elitist concept has no basic
except that on the assumption the ordinary Indian is a sub-citizen an4 free.
doms under Part Ill of the Constitution are the privilege of the upper sector
E of society. [875 A-CJ

Merely because a person is charged with a &rave offence he can.not be
handcuffed. He may be very quiet, well-behaved, docile or even timid.
Merely because the offence is serious, the inference of escape-proneneas or
desperate character does not follow. Many other conditions mentioned in
the Police Manual are totally incongruous and must fall as unlawful. Taagi·
F ble testimony, documentary or other, or desperate behaviour, geared to
making good his escape, along will be a valid ground for handcuffing and
fettering, and even this may be avoided by increasing the strength of the
escorts or taking the prisoners in well~protected vans. And increase in the
number of escorts, arming them if necessary special training for escorts
police, transport of prisoners in protected vehicles, are easily available alter~
natives. [875 C·El
G - 12. Even in cases where, in extreme circumstances handcuffs have to be
put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously
the reasons for doing so. Otherwise, uD.der Art. 21 the procedure will be
unfair and bad in. law. Nor will mere recording of the reasons do, as that
can be a mechanical process mindlessly made. The escorting officer, when-
ever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasoos so
recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval. Otherwise, there is
H no control over possible arbitrariness in applying handcuffs and fetters. The
minions of the police establishment must make good their security recipes
by getting judicial approval. And, once the court directs that handcuffs •hall
P. S. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 859

.be off, no escorting authority can overrule judicial direction. This is implicj!. A
in Art. 21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in the very
procedure \vllich authorises stringent deprivation of life and liberty.
[875 G-l{, 876 A]
Ma11eka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621, and Sunil Batra v.
Delhi Administration, [1978] 4 SCC 494; applied.

13. Punjab Police Manual, in so far as it puts the ordinary Indian beneath
B
the better class breed (paragraphs 26.21A and 26.22 of Chapter XXVI) is
untenable and arbitrary and Indian humans shall not be dischotomised and tlte
common run discriminated against regarding handcuffs. The p.rovisions in par.i
26.22 that every under trial who is accused of a non-bailable offence punishable
with more than 3 years prison term shall be routinely handcuffed is violative of ·
Arts. 14, 19 and 21. So also para 26.22 (b) and (c). The nature of the ac-
cusation is not the criterion. The clear and present danger of escape breaking c
out of the police control is the determinant. And for this there 1 must be clear
mat~rial, not qlib assumption, record of reasons and judicial oversight and sllm-
mary hearing and' direction by the Court where the victim is produced. Para 2,,
22(1)(d), (e) and (f) also hover perilously near unconstitutionality unless read
down. Handcuffs are not summary punishment vicariously imposed at police
level, at once obnoxious 'and irreversible. Armed escorts, worth the salt, can
overpower any wiarmed undertrial and extraguards can make up exceptional
D
needs. Jn very special situations, the application of irons cannot be ruled
out. The prisone11 Cannot be tortured because others will demonstrate or
attempt his rescue. The plain law of under trial custody is thus contrary to
unedifying escort practice. [876 C-G]

14. The impossibility of easy recapture supplied the temptation to jump
custody, not the nature of the offence or sentence. Likewise, the habitual E
<>r violent 'escape propensities' proved by past conduct or present att~
are a surer guide to the prospects of running away on the sly or by use of
force than the oITence with which the person is charged or the sentence.
~fany a murderer, assilming him to be one, is otherwise a normal, \Vell-
behaved, even docile, person and it rarely registers in his mind to run aV\'ay
or force his escape. It is an indifferent escort or incompetellt guard, nGt
p
the Section with which the accused is charged, that must give the clue to
the few escapes that occur. To abscond is a difficult adventure. "Human
" rights" seriousness loses it valence whi:re administrator's convenience prevails
over cultural values. There is no genetic crimlnol tribe as such among
humans. A disarmed arrestee has no hope of escape from the law if reoa.p-
ture is a certainty. He heaves a sigh of relief if taken into custody as against
the desperate evasions of the chasing and the haunting fear that he may
be caught any time·. It is superstitious to ·practise the barbarous bigotry of G
handcuffs as a routine regimen-an imperial heritage well preserved. The
problem is to get rid of mind-cuffs which make us callous to hand-cuffing
a prisoner who may be a patient even in the hospital bed and tie him up
with ropes to the legs of the cot. [877 A-D, 878 A-CJ

15. The rule regarding a prisoner in transit between prison house and
court house is freedom from handcuffs and the exception, under conditions H
of judicial supervision will be restraints with irons to be justified before or
after. The judicial officers, before whom the prisoner is produced shall
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A interrogate the prisoner, as a rule, whether he has been subjected to hand~
cuffs or other 'irons' ~re3.tment and, if he has been, the official concerned ,
shall be asked ·to explain the action forthwith. [879 G-H, 880 A-BJ ,.:...

Per Pathak J. (Concurring)
1. It is an axiom of criminal law that a person alleged to have committed
an offence is liable to arrest. Sections 46 and 49 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure define the parameters of the power envisaged in the Code in the
matter of arrest And s. 46, in particular foreshadows the central principle
controlling the power to impose restraint on the person of a prisone:r while
in continued custody. Restraint may be imposed where it is reasonably
apprehended that the prisoner will attempt to escape, and it should not be
more than is necessary to prevent him from escaping. 1Viewed in the light
of the la\V laid down by this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration
and Ors., [1978] 4 SCC 494; that a person in custody is not wholly denuded
of his fundamental rights, the limitations flowing from that principle acquire
a profound significance. [880 C-FJ

The power to restrain, and the degree of restraint to be employed, are
not for arbitrary exercise. An arbitrary exercise of that power infringes
the fundamental rights of the person in custody. And a malicious use of
J)
that powe• can bring s. 220 of the Indian Penal Code into play.· Too often
is it forgotten that if a police officer is vested with the power to restrain
a person by handcuffing him or otherwise there is a simultaneous restraint
by the law on the police 'officer as to the exercise of that power. [880 F-G]
2. Whether a person should be physically restrained and, if so, what
should be the degree of restraint, is a matter which affects the person in
E custody so long as he· remains in custody. Consistent with the fundamental
rights of such person the restraint can be imposed, if at all, to a degree no
greater than is necessary for preventing his escape. To prevent his escape
is the object of imposing the reSltraint and that object at once defines that
power. [880 H, 881 Al
3. Section 9(2)(e) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Court) Act, 1955 em-
F po\vers the State Government to make rules providing for the escort of , ""'\..._
persons confined in a prison to and from c·ourts in which their attendance \.-
is required and for their cus'!ody during the period of such attendance. The
Punjab Police Rules, 1934 contain Rule 26.22 which classifies those cases '"
in which hand-cuffs may be applied. The classification has been attempted
somewhat broadly. But the classification attempted by some of the clauses
of Rule 26.22, particularly (a) to (c) which presume that in every instance •
G covered by any of these clauses the accused will attempt to escape cannot
be sustained. [881 C-E]

The rule should be that the authority responsible for the prisoners cus-
tody should consider the case of each prisoner individually and decide
\vbether the prisoner is a person who having regard to his circumstances,
general conduct, behaviour and character will attempt to escape or disturb
the peace by becoming violent. That is the basic criterion, and all provisions
H relating to the imposition of restraint must be guided by it. In the ultimate
ana~risis it is that guiding principle which must determine in each individual
case whether a restraint should be imposed and to what degree. [881 E-GJ
P. S. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 861

4. Rule 26.22 read with Rule 26.21 A of the Punjab Police Rules 1934 A
draw a distinction between "better class" undertrial prisoners and "ordinary"
undertrial prisoners, as a basis for determining who should be handcuffed
and who should not be. The social status of a person, his education and
habit of life associated with a superior mode of living is intended to protect
his dignity of person. But that dignity is a dignity which belongs to all,
rich and poor, of high social status and low, literate and illiterate. It is
the basic assumption that all individuals are entitled to enjoy- -that dignity B
that determines the rule that ordinarily no restraint should be imposed ex-
cept in those cases where there is a reasonable fear of the prisoner attempt~
ing to escape or attempting violence. It is abhorrent to envisage a prisoner
being handicuffed merely because it is assumed that he does not belong to
"a better class", that he does not possess the basic dignity pertaining to
every individual. Then there is need to guard against a misuse of the power
from other motives. It is grossly objectionable that the power given by C
the law to impose a restraint, either by applying handcuffs or otherwise,
should be seen as an opportunity for exposing the accused to public ridicule
and humiliation. Nor is the power intended to be used vindictively or by
way of punishment. Even Standing Order 44 and the instructions on hand-
cuffs of November 1977 operate some what in excess of the object to be
observed by the imposition of handcuffs, having regard to the central prin-
ciple that only he should be handcuffed who can be reasonably apprehended D
to attempt from escape or become violent. [881 G-H, 882 A-DJ

5. Whether handcuffs or other restraint should be imposed on a prisoner
is primarily a matter for the iecision of the authority responsible for his
custody. It is a judgment to be exercised with reference to each individual
case. It is fof! that authority to exercise its discretion. The primary deci·
sion should not be that of any other, The matter is one where the circums- E
tances may change from one moment to another, and inevitably in some
cases it may fill.I to the decision of the escorting authority midway to decide
on imposing a restraint on the prisoner. The prior decision of an external
authority can not be reasonably imposed on the exercise of that power. But
there is room for imposing a supervisory regime over the exercise of that
power. One sector of superviory jurisdiction could appropriately lie with" the
court trying the accused, and it would be desirable for the custodial authority J!'
to inform that court of the circumstances in which, and the justification for,
imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. It should be for the court
concerned to work out the modalities of the procedure requisite for the
i:mrpose of enforcing such control 882 E-GJ
•
6. In the present case, the question whether the petitioner should be G
handcuffed should be left to be dealt with by the Magistrate concerned before
whom he is brought for trial in the cases instituted against him.
[882 H, 883 Al

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1979.
(Under Article 32 of the Cunstitution.)
II
Dr. Y. S. Chitale, (Amicus Curiae) and Mukul Mudgal, for the
Petitioner.
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A R. N. Sachthey, H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER J.-"When they arrested my neighbour I did
not protest. Whe_n they arrested the men and women in the
B opposite house I did noi protest. And when they finally came
for me, there was nobody left to protest." (1)

This grim scenario burns into our judicial consciousness the moral'
emerging from the case being that if to-day freedom of one forlom
person falls to the police somewhere, tomorrow the freedom of many
c may fall elsewhere with none to whimper unless the court process in-
vigilates in time and polices the police before it is too late. Thi£
futuristic thought, triggered off by a telegram from one Shukla, pri-
soner lodged in the Tihar Jail, has prompted the present 'habeas•
proceedings. The brief message he sent runs thus:
D In spite of Court Order and directions of your Lordship in
Sunil LBatra V. Delhi handcuffs are forced on me and othen.
Admit writ of Habeas Corpus.

Those who are injured to handcuffs and bar fetters on others mae
ignore this grievance, but the guarantee ofhuman[dignity, which forms
E part of our constitutional culture, and the positive provisions of Arts.
14, 19 and 21 spring into action when we realise that to manacle man Is
more than to mortify him; it is to dehumanize him and, therefore,
to violate his very personhood, too often using the mask of 'dangerous-
ness' and £eCUrity. This sensitized perspective, shared by court and
F counsel alike, has prompted us to~examine~the_issue from'.a fundamental
viewpoint and not to dismiss it as a daily sight to be pitied and buried.
hi.deed, we have been informed that the High Court had earlier dis-
missed this petitioner's demand to be freed from fetters on his person
but we are far from satisfied going by what is stated in Annexure A to
the counter-affidavit of the Asst. Superintendent of Police, that the
G matter has received the constitutional concern it deserves. Annexure
A to the counter-affidavit is a communication from the Delhi
Administration for general guidance and makes disturbing reading as
it has the flavour of legal advice and executive directive and make£
mention ofa petition for like relief in the High Court:
H The petition was listed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yoge-
shwar Dayal of Delhi High Court. After hearing arguments,
(1) Pastor :tviiemoller.
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer,!.) 86 3

the Hon'ble Court was pleased to dismiss the petitionfikd,bythe A
petitioner Shri P.S. Shukla asking for directions for r.of putting
the handcuffs when escorted from jail to the court and back
to the Jail. In view of the circumstances of the case, it was
observed that no directions were needed. However, it came
to my notice that the requirements of Punjab Police Rules
B
contained in Volume III Chapter 25 Rule 26,22,23,!and High
Court Rules and Orders Volume III Chapter 27 Rule 19 are
not being complied with. I would also draw the attention of
all concerned to the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice
R.N. Aggarwal in Vishwa Nath Versus State, Cr!. .Misc.
Main No. 430 of 1978 decided on 6-4-1979 wherein it has been c
observed that a better class undertrial be not handcuffed with-
out recording the reasons in the daily diary for considering the
necessity of the use of such a prisoner is being escorted to and
from the court by the police, use of handcuffs be not reported to
unless there is a reasonable expectation that such prisoner will
use violence or that an attempt will be made to rescue him. D
The practice of use of handcuffs be follow<d in acccrdance with
the rules mentioned above.
In plain language, it means that ordinary Indian undertria/s shall be
routinely handcuff<d during transit between jail and court and the
better class prisoner shall be so confined only if reasonably appre-
hended to be violent or rescued. •
The facts are largely beyond dispute and need brief narration so
that the law may be discussed and decland. The basic assurr.ption we
humanistically make is that even a prisoner is a person, not an animal,
that an under-trial prirnner a fortiori so. Our nation's founding do-
cument admits of no exception on this subject as Suni/ Batra' s case( I) F
has clearly stated. Based on· this thesis, all measures authorised
by the faw must be takrn by the court to kc<p the stm m of prison
Justice unsullied .
• A condensed statemrnt of the facts may help ccr.cretise the l<gal
issue argued before us. A prisoner sent a tel< grim to a ji:cge of this G
court (one of us) complaining of forced handcuffs on him ar.d other
prisoners, implicitly protesting against the humiliation ar.d torture of
being held in irons in public, back and forth, when, as under-trials
kGpt in custody in the Tihar Jail, they were being taken to Delhi courts
for trial of their cases. The practice persisted, bewails the petitioner,
H
despite the court's direction not to use irons on him and this Jed to
(1) [1978] 4 s.c.c. 494.
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.R.

A the telegraphic 'litany' to the Supreme Court which is the functional
sentinel on the qui-vive where 'habeas' justice is in jeopardy. If iron
enters the soul of law and of the enforcing agents oflaw-rather, ifit is
credibly alleged so-this court must fling aside forms of procedure and
defend the complaining individual's personal liberty under Arts.
14, 19 and 21 after due iuvestigatiou. Access to human justice is the
B essence of Art. 32, and sensitized by this dynamic perspective
we have examined the facts and the law and the rival ver-
sions of the petitioner and the Delhi Administration. The blurred
area of 'detention jurisprudence' where considerations of prevention
..
of escape and personhood of prisoner come into concftict,
warrants fuller exploration than this isolated case necessitates and coun-
c sel on both sides (Dr. Chitale as amicus curiae, aided ably by Shri
.Mndgal, and Shri Sachthey for the State) have rendered brief oral
assistance and presented written submissions on a wider basis. After
all, even while discussing the relevent statutory provisions and consti-
tutional requirements, court and counsel must never forget the core
D principle found in Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."

And read Art. 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights:
Art. I 0: All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.

I' Of course, while these larger considerations may colour our mental pro-
cess, our task cannot over flow the actual facts of the case or the norms
in Part III and the Provisions in the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts)
Act, 1955 (for short, the Act). All that we mean is that where personal
freedom is at stake or torture is in store to read down the law is to
write off the law and to rise to the remedial demand of the manacled •
G man is to break human bondage, if within the reach of the judicial
process. In this jurisdiction, the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter
are a 1nariner's compass:

"The history of liberty has largely been the history of obser·
vance of procedural safeguards.
H
And, in Maneka Gandhi's case (1) it has been stated:
(!) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 at 647.
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer, J.) 865

'the ambit of personal liberty protected by Art. 21 is wide and A
comprehensive. It embraces both substantive rights to personal
liberty and the procedure provided for their deprivation."
Has the handcuffs device-if so, how far-procedural sanction? That
is the key question.
The prisoner complains that he was also chained but that fact is B
controverted and may be left out for the while. Within this frame of
facts we have to consider whether it was right that Shukla was shackled.
The respondent relies upon the provisions of the Act and the rules
framed thereunder and under the Police Act as making shackling
lawful. This plea of legality has to be scanned for constitutionality
in the light of the submissions of Dr. Chi tale who heavily relies upon c
Art. 21 of the Constitution and the collective consciousness relating
to human rights burgeoning in our half-century.
,
The petitioner is an under-trial prisoner whose presence is needed
in several cases, making periodical trips between jail house and magis-
trate's courts inevitable. Being in custody he may try to flee and so D
escort duty to prevent escape is necessary. But escorts, while taking
responsible care not to allow their charges to escape, must respect
their personhood. The dilemma of human rights jurisprudence
comes here. Can the custodian fetter the person of the prisoner, while
in transit, with irons, maybe handcuffs or chains or bar fetters?
When does such traumatic treatment break into the inviolable zone of E
guaranteed rights? When does disciplinary measure end and draconic
torture begin? What are the constitutional parameters, viable guidelines
and practical strategies which will permit the peaceful co-existence of
custodial conditions and basic dignity? The decisional focus turns on
this know-how and it affects tens of thousands of persons languishing
for long years in prisons with pending trials. Many Shuk!as in shackles F
are invisible parties before us that makes the issue a matter of moment.
We appreciate the services of Dr. Chitale and his junior Shri Mudgal'
who have appeared as amicus curiae and belighted the blurred area
., -of law and recognise the help rendered by Shri Sachthey who has
.appeared for the State and given the full facts.
G
The petitioner claims that he is a 'better class' prisoner, a
fact which is admitted, although one fails to understand how
there can be a quasi-caste system among prisoners in the egalitarian
-context of Art. 14. It is a sour fact of life that discrimi·
natory treatment based upon wealth and circumstances dies
hard under the Indian Sun. We hope the Ministry of Home . H
Affairs and the Prison Administration will take due note of the
£urvival after legal death of this invidious distinction and put all
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980} 3 s.c.R,

A prisoners on the same footing unless there is a rational classification
based upon health, age, academic or occupational needs or like
legitimate ground and not irrelevant factors like wealth, political im·
portance, social status and other criteria which are a hang-over of the
hierarchical social structure hostile to the constitutional ethos. Be
that as it may, under the existing rules, the petitioner is a better class
B prisoner and claims certain advantage for that reason in the matte(of
freedom from handcuffs. It is alleged by the State that there are several
cases where the petitioner is needed in the courts of Delhi. The
respondents would have it that he is "an inter-State cheat and a very
clever trickster and tries to brow-beat and misbehave'with the objecfto
escape from custody." Of course, the petitioner ,contends that his
c social status, family background and academic qualifications~warrant
his being treated as a better class prisoner and adds that the courtfhad
directed that for that reason he be not handcuffed. He also states that
under the relevant rules better class prisoners are exempt from hand·
·cuffs and cites in support the view of the High Court of Delhi that a
D better class under·trial should not be handcuffed without recording of
reasons in the daily diary for considering the necessity for the use of
handcuffs. The High Court appears to have observed (Annexure A to
the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State) that unless there be
reasonable ·expectation of violence or attempt to be rescued the
prisoner should not be handcuffed.
E The fact, nevertheless, remains that even apart from the High
Court's order the trial judge (Shri A. K. Garg) had directed the
officers concerned that while escorting the accused from jail to court
and back handcuffing should not be done unless it was so warranted.
" .... I direct that the officers concerned while escorting the
F accused from jail to court and back, shall resort to handcuffing
only if warranted by rule applicable to better class prisoners
and if so warranted by the exigency of the:situation on obtaining
the requisite permission as required under the relevant rules."
Heedless of judicial command the man was fettered during transit,
G under superior police orders, and so this habeas corpus petition and
this Court appointed Dr. Y. S. Chitale as amicus curiae, gave suitable
directions to the prison officials to make the work of counsel fruitful
and issued notice to the State before further action. "To wipe every
tear from every eye" has judicial dimension. Here is a prisoner who
bitterly complains that he has been publicly handcuffed while being
H escorted to court and invokes the court's power to protect the integrity
of his person and the dignity of his humanhood against custodial
cruelty contrary to constitutional prescriptions.
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer,!.) 867

The Superintendent of the Jail pleaded he had nothing to do with A.
the transport to and from court and Shri Sachthey, counsel for the
) Delhi Administration, explained that escorting prisoners between
custodial campus and court was the responsibility of a special wing of
the police. He urged that when a prisoner was a security-risk, irons
were not allergic to the law and the rules permitted their use. The peti-
B
tioner was a clever crook and by enticements wo\lld escape from
gullible constables. Since iron was too stern to be fooled, his hands
were clad with handcuffs. The safety of the prisoner being the onus
of the escort police the order of the trial court was not blindly binding.
The Rules state so and this explanation must absolve the police. Many
more details have been mentioned in the return of the police officer
concerned and will be referred to where necessary but the basic
c
defence, put in blunt terms, is that all soft talk of human dignity is
banished when security claims come into stern play. Sutely, no cut-
and-dried reply to a composite security-versus-humanity question can
be given. We have been persuaded by counsel to consider this grim issue
because it occurs frequently and the law must be clarified for the D
benefit of the escort officials and their human charges. Dr. Chita)e's
contention comes to this : Human rights are not constitutional clap
trap in silent meditation but part of the nation's founding charter
in sensitized animation. No prisoner is beneath the law and while
the Act does provide for rules regarding journey in custody when
the ceurt demands his presence, they must be read in the light of
the larger back drop of human rights.
Here is a prisoner-the petitioner-who protests against his being
handcuffed routinely, publicly, vulgarly and unjmtifiably in the trips
to and fro between the prison house and the court house in callous
contumely and invokes the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art.

•
r 32 to protect, within the limited circumstances of his lawful custody.
We must investigate the deeper issues of detainee's rights against
F

custodial cruelty ancl infliction of indignity, within the human rights
parameters of Part III of the Constitution, informed by the com-
passionate international charters and covenants. The raw history of
human bondage and the roots of the habeas corpus writ enlighten the G
wise exercise of constitutional power in enlarging the person of men in
unlawful detention. No longer is this liberating writ tramelled by the
traditional limits of English vintage; for, our.founding fathers exceeded
the inspiration of the prerogative writs by phrasing the power in larger
diction. That is why, in India, as in the similar jurisdiction in
America, the broader horizons of habeas corpus spread out, beyond the H
orbit of release from illegal custody, into every trauma and torture on
persons in legal custody, if the cruelty is contrary to law, degrades
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R,

A human dignity or defiles his personhood to a degree that violates Arts.
21, 14 and 19 enlivened by the Preamble.
The legality of the petitioner's custody is not directly in issue but,
though circumscribed by the constraints of lawful detention, the in-
dwelling essence and inalienable attributes of man qua man are
entitled to the great rights guranteed by the Constitution.
B
In Sunil Batra'i case'(supra) it has'been laid 1down by a Constitution
Bench of this Court that imprisonment does not, ipso facto mean that
fundamental rights desert the detainee.
There is no dispute that the petitioner was, as a fact, handcuffed
c on several occasions. It is admitted, again, that the petitioner was
so handcuffed on 6-10-1979 under orders of the Inspector of Police
whose reasons set out in Annexure E, to say the least, are vague and
unverifiable, even vagarious.
Counsel for the respondent in his written submissions states that
the petitioner is involved in over a score of cases. But that, by itself,
D is no ground for handcuffing the prisoner. He further contends that
the police authorities are in charge of escorting prisoners and have the
discretion to handcuff them, a claim which must be substantiated not
merely with reference to the Act and the Rules but also the Articles
of the Constitution. We may first state the law and then test that law
on the touch-stone of constitutionality.
E
Section 9(2)(e) of the Act empowers the State Government to
make Rules regarding the escort of persons confined in a prison to and
from courts in which their attendance is required and for their custody
during the period of such attendance. The Punjab Police Rules, 1934
(Vol. III), contain some relevant provisions although the statutory
F source is not cited. We may extract them here :
26.22(1) Every male person falling within the following
category, who has to be 'escorted in police custody, and
•
whether under police arrest, remand
Conditions in which or trial, shall, provided that he.
G handcuffs are to be appears to be in health and not
used. incapable of offering effective resis-
tance by reason of age, be carefully
handcuffed on arrest and before
removal from any building from which he may be taken after
arrest:-
·H (a) persons accused of a non .. bailable offence punishable
with any sentence exceeding in severity a term of three.
years' i1nprisonment.
P. s. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer, !.) 869

(b) Persons accused of an offence punishable under section
148 or 226, Indian Penal Code.
(c) Persons accused of, and previously convicted of, such an
0ffence as to bring the case under section 75, Indian
Penal Code.
(d) Desperate characters. B
' (e) Persons who are violent, disorderly or obstructive or
acting in a manner calculated to provoke popular de-
. monstration.

r (f) Persons who are likely to attempt to escape or to commit
suicide or to be the object of an attempt at rescue. This
rule shall apply whether the prisoners are escorted by
c
road or in a vehicle.
(2) Better class under-trial prisoners must only be hand-
cuffed when this is regarded as necessary for safe custody.
When a better class prisoner is handcuffed for reasons other
D
than those contained in (a), (b) and (c) of sub-rule (I) the
officer responsible shall enter in the Station Diary or other
appropriate record his reasons for considering the use of
hand-cuffs necessary.
This paragraph sanctions handcuffing as a routine exercise on arrest,
if any of the conditions (a) to (f) is satisfied. 'Better Class' under- E
trial prisoners receive more respectable treatment in the sense that
they shall not be handcuffed unless it is necessary for safe custody
Moreover, when handcuffing better class under-trials the officer con:
cerned shall record the reasons for, considering the use of handcuffs
necessary.
F
Better class prisoners are defined in rule 26.21-A which also may
be set out here :
•
26.21-A. Under-trial prisoners are divided into two
classes based on previous standard of living. The classify-
ing authority is the trying court subject to the approval of the
G
District Magistrate, but during
Classification of under- the period before a prisoner is
trial prisoners. brought before a competent court,
discretion shall be exercised by the
officer in charge of the Police Station concerned to classify
him as either 'better class' or 'ordinary'. Only those prisoners H
should be classified provisionally as 'better class' who by
social status, education or habit of life have been accustomed
870 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A to a superior mode of living. The fact, that the prisoner
is to be tried for the commission of any particular class of
offence is not to be considered. The possession of a certain
degree of literacy is in itself not sufficient for 'better class'
classification and no under-trial prisoner shall be so classified
whose mode of living does not appear to the Police officer
B
concerned to have definitely superior to that of the ordinary
run of the population; whether urban or rural. Under-trial
· prisoners classified as 'better class' shall be given the diet on
the same scale as prescribed for A and B class convict
prisoners in Rule 26.27(1).
c The dichtomy between ordinary and better class prisoners has rele-
- vance to the facilities they enjoy and also bear upon the manacles that
may be clamped on their person. Social status, education, mode
of living superior to that of the ordinary run of the population an
the demarcating tests.
D Paragraph 27.12 directs that prisoners brought into court in hand-
cuffs shall continue in handcuffs unless removal thereof is "specially
ordered by the Presiding Officer", that is to say, handcuffs even within
the court is the rule and removal an exception.
We may advert to revised police instructions and standing orders
E bearing on handcuffs on prisoners. since the escort officials treat these
as of scriptural authority. Standing Order 44 reads:
(I) The rules relating to handcuffing of political prisoners and
others are laid down in Police Rules 18.30, 18.35, 26.22, 26.23 and
26.24. A careful perusal of these provisions shows that handcuffs
F are to be used if a person is involved in serious non-bailable offences, ~-
is a previous convict, a desperate character, violent, disorderly or '
obstructive or a person who is likely to commit suicide or who may •
attempt to escape.
(2) In accordance with the imtructions issued by the Government
G of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi vide their letters No.
2/15/57-P-TV dated 26-7-57 and No. 8/70/74-GPA-I dated 8-11-74,
copies of which were sent to all concerned vide this Hdqrs. endst. 'y
No. 19143-293/C&T dated 3-9-76, handcuffs are normally, to be
used by the Police only where the accused/prisoner is violent,
disorderly, obstrnctive or is likely to attempt to escape or commit
e suicide or is charged with certain serious non-bailable] offences.
(3) xx xx xx
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer, !.) 871

(4) It has been observed that in actu1l practice prisoners/persons A
arrested by the police are handcuffed as a matter of routine. This
is t" be strictly stopped forthwith.
(5) Handcuffs should not be usei in routine. They are to be
used only where the person is desperate, rowdy or is involved in non-
bailable offence. There should ordinarily be no occasion to hand- B
• cuff persons occupying a good social position in public life, or pro-
fessionals like jurists, advocates doctors, writers, educationists' and
well known journalists. This is at best an illustrative list; obviously
it cannot be exhaustive. It is the spirit behind these instructions
that should be understood. It shall be the duty of supervisory officers
at various levels, the SHO primarily, to see that these instructions c
are strictly complied with. In case of non-observance of these
instructions severe action should be taken again!! the defaulter.

There is a procedural safeguard in sub-clause (6) :

(6) The duty officers of the police station must also ensure D
that an accused when brought at the police station or despatched,
the facts where he was handcuffed or otherwise should be clearly
mentioned along with the reasons for handcuffing in the relevant
daily diary report. The SHO of the police station and ACP of the
Sub·Division ,will ocnsion11ly check up the relevant daily diary to
see that these instructions are being complied with by the police station E
staff.
Pvlitical prisoners, if hiniculfed, should not be: walked through
the. streets (>~b·pira 7) and so, by im21ication others can be.
These orders are of April 1979 and cancel those of 1972. The F
,,r-instru~tio11 on h1nicu1f; of NJvem'Jer 1977 may be reproduced in
( fairness:

In practice it has been observed that handcuffs are being used
for under-trials who are charged with the offences punishable with
imprisonment ofless than 3 years which is contrary to the instruc-
G
tions of P .P.R. unless and until the officer handcuffing the undertrial
has reasons to believe that the handcuff was used because
the undertrial was violent, disorderly or obstructive or acting in
the manner calculated to provoke popular demonstrations or he
has apprehensions that the person so handcuffed was likely to
attempt to escape or to commit suicide or any other reason of that H
type for which he should record a report in D.D. before use of hand·
.cuff when and wherever available.
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A The above instructions should be complied with meticulously
and all formalities for use of handcuff should be done before the use
of handcuffs.
This collection of handcuff law must meet the demands of Arts.
14, 19 and 21. In the Sobraj case (1) the imposition of bar fetters on
B a prisoner was subjected to constitutional scrutiny by this Court.
Likewise, irons forced on undertrials in transit must conform to the
humane imperatives of the triple articles. Official crulety, sans
constitutionality, degenerates into criminality. Rules, Standing
·Orders, Instructions and Circulars must bow before Part III of the
Constitution. So the first task is to assess the limits set by these
C articles.
The Preamble sets the humane tone and temper of the Founding
Doc~ment and highlights Justice, Equality and the dignity of
the individual. Art. 14 interdicts arbitrary treatment discriminatory
dealings and capricious cruelty. Art. 19 prescribes restrictions on
D free movement unless in the interests of the general public. Art.
21 after the landmark case in Maneka Gandhi(2) followed by Sunil
Batra (supra) is the sanctuary of human values prescribes fair pro-
cedure and forbids barbarities, punitive or processual. Such is the
apercu, if we may generalise.
Handcuffing is prima facie inhuman and, therefore, unreason-
E able, is over-harsh and at the first flush, arbitrary. Absent fair pro-
cedure and objective monitoring, to inflict 'irons' is to resort to
zoological strategies repugnant to Art. 21. Thus, we must cric
tically examine the justification offered by the State for this mode of
restraint. Surely, the competing claims of securing the prisoner
F from fleeing and protecting his personality from barbarity have to
be harmonised. To prevent the escape of an under-trial is in pub-
lic interest, reasonable, just and cannot, by itself, be castigated.
But to bind a man hand-and-foot, fetter his limbs with hoops of
steel, shuflle him along in the streets and stand him for hours in the
courts is to torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society and foul
G the soul of our constitutional culture. Where then do we draw the
humane line and how far do the rules err in print and praxis ?
Insurance against escape does not compulsorily require hand-
cuffing. There are other measures whereby an escort can keep safe
custody of a detenu without the indignity and cruelty implicit in hand- ''·
cuffs or other iron contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the.
H
(I) Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494 at 545.
(2) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978] 1 S.C.C. 248.
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer, !.) 873

hands or the feet or both has not merely a preventive impact, but also A
a punitive hurtfulness. Manacles are mayhem on the human per-
son and inflict humiliation on the bearer. The Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Vol. II (1973 Edn.) at p. 53 states "handcuffs and fetters
arll instruments for securing the hands or feet of prisoners under
arrest, or as a means of punishment." The three components of
'irons' forced on the human person must be distinctly understood. B
Firstly, to handcuff is to hoop harshly. Further, to handcuff is to
punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers also. Iron
'; straps are insult and pain writ large, animalising victim and keeper.
Since there are other ways of ensuring security, it can be laid down as
a rule that handcuffs or other fetters shall not be forced on the per-
son of an undertrial prisoner ordinari!p. The latest police instruc- c
tions produced before us hearteningly reflect this view. We lay
down as necessarily implicit in Arts. 14 and 19 that nhen there is
no compulsive need to fetter a person's limbs, it is sadistic, capricious
despotic and demoralizing to humble a man by manacling him.
Such arbitrary conduct surely slaps Art. 14 on the face. The
minimal freedom of movement which even a detainee is entitled to D
under Art. 19 (see Sunil Batra, supra) cannot be cut down cruelly
by application of handcuffs or other hoops. It will be unreasonable
so to do unless the State is able to make out that no other practical
way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous
and desperate and the circumstance . so hostile to safe-keeping.
E

Once we make it a constitutional mandate that no prisoner
shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely or merely for the convenience
of the custodian or escort-and we declare that to be the law-the
distinction between classes of prisoners becomes constitutionally

r obsolete. Apart from the fact that economic and social importance
cannot be the basis for classifying prisoners for purposes of handcuffs
or otherwise, how can we assume that a rich criminal or under-trial
F

is any different from a poor or pariah convict or under-trial in the
matter of security risk ? An affluent in cu;tody may be as dangerous
or desperate as an indigent, if not more. He may be more prone to
G
be rescued than an ordinary person. We hold that it is arbitrary
and irrational to classify, prisoners for purposes of handcuffs, into
'B' class and ordinary class. No one shall be fettered in any form
based on superior class differentia, as the law treats them equally.
It is brutalising to handcuff a person in public and so is unreasonable
to do so. Of course, the police escort will find it comfortable to
H
fetter their charges and be at ease but that is not a relevant considera·
tion.
17-463 SCI/80
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll.
A The only circumstance which validates incapacitation by irons-
an extreme measure-is that otherwise there is no other reasonabl•
way of preventing his escape, in the given circumstances. Secuting
the prisoner being a necessity of judicial trial, the State must tale
steps in this behalf. But even here, the policeman's easy assnmp-
tion or scary apprehension. or subjective satisfaction of likely escape
if fetters are not fitted on the prisoner is not enough. The heavy
deprivation of personal liberty must be justifiable as reasonable
restriction in the circumstances. Ignominy, inhumanity and aftli<:-
tion, implicit in chains and shackles are permissible, . as not unrea-
sonable, only if every other less cruel means is fraught. with risks or
beyond availability. So it is that to be consistent with Arts. 14 and
c 19 handcuffs must be . the last refnge, not the routine regimen.
If a few more guards will suffice, then no handcuffs. If a close watch
by armed policemen will do, then no handcuffs. If alternative mea~
sures may be provided, then no iron bondage. This is the legal norm,

D · Functional compulsions of security must reach that dismal
degree that no alternative ·Will work except manacles. We mnst
realise that our Fundamental Rights are heavily loaded in favonr
of personal liberty even in prison, and so, the traditional approaches
withont reverence for the worth of the human person are obsolete, '!
althongh they die hard. Discipline can be exaggerated by prisor
E. keepers; dangeronsness can be physically worked up by escorts and
sadistic disposition, where higher awareness of constitutional rights
is absent, may overpower the Ji.~er valnes of dignity ,and ~nmanitY.
We regret to observe that cruel and nnnsnal treatment has an un-
happ) appeal to jail keepers and escorting officers, which must be
conntered by strict directions to keep to the parameters of the cons-
F titution. The conclnsion flowing from these considerations is that
there must first be well-grounded basis for drawing a strong
inference that the prisoner is likely to jnmp jail or break ont of I
custody or play the vanishing trick. The belief in this behalf must be
based on antecedents which must be recorded and proneness to
violence must'be authentic. Vague surmises or general avLrments
G that the under-trial is a crook or desperado, rowdy or maniac,
cannot suffice. In short, save in rare cases of concrete proof readily
available of the dangerousness of the prisoner in transit-the onus of.
proof of which is on him who puts the person under irons-the police
escort will be committing personal assault or mayhem if he handcuffs
or fetters his charge. It is disgusting to see the mechanical way in
H which callous policemen, cavalier fashion, handcuff prisoner in
their charge, indifferently keeping them company assured by the
thought that the detainee is under 'iron' restraint.
·P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer,!.) 875

Even orders of superiors are no valid justification as consti- A
tutional rights cannot be kept in suspense by superior orders, unless
} there is material, sufficiently stringent, to satisfy a reasonable mind
that dangerous and desperate is the prisoner who is being transporte<l
and further that by adding to the escort party or other strategy he
cannot be kept under control. It is hard to imagine such situations.
We must repeat that it is unconscionable, indeed, outrageous, to
make the strange classification between better class prisoners and
ordinary prisoners in the matter of handcuffing. This elitist concept
has no basis except that on the assumption the ordinary Indian is a
sub-citizen and freedoms under Part III of the constitution· are the
privilege of the upper sector of society.
c
We must clarify a few other facets, in the light of Police
'Standing Orders. Merely becauso a person is charged with a grave
-offence he cannot be handcuffed, He may be very 4uiet, well-behaved,
docile or even timid. Merely because the offence is serious, the
inference of escape proneness or desperate character does not follow. D
Many other conditions mentioned in the Police Manual are totally
incongruous with what we have stated above and must fall as unlaw-
ful. Tangible testimony, documentary or other, or desparate beha-
viour, geared to making good his escape, alone will be a valid
ground for handcuffing and fettering, and even this may be avoided
by. increasing the strength of the escorts or taking the prisoners in E
well. protected vans. It is heartening to note that in some States
in this country no handcuffing is done at all, save in rare cases, when
taking under-trials to courts and the scary impression that unless
the person is confined in irons he will run away is a convenient
myth.

r Some increase in the number of escorts, arming them if
necessary, special training for escort police, transport of prisoners
in protected vehicles, are easily availalble alternatives and, in fact,
F

are adopted in some States in the country where handcuffing is vir-
t tually abolished, e.g. Tamil Nadu.
G
Even in cases where, in extreme circumstances, handcuffs
have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record
contemporaneously the reasons for d0ing so. Otherwise, under
Art. 21 theprocedurewillbeunfair and bad in law. Nor will mere
recording the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical pr0cess mind-
l~sslY made. The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner H
produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presid-
ing Judge and get his approval. Otherwise, there is "no control over
I 876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R~

A pOEsible arbitrariness in applying handcuffs and fetters. The minions
of the police establishment must make good their seeurity recipes by
getting judicial approval. And, once the court directs that handcuffs
shall be off no escorting authority can overrule judicial direction. This
is implicit in Art. 21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness and
justice in the very procedure which authorises stringent deprivation
of life and liberty. The ratio in Maneka Gan<lhi's case and Sunil-
Batra's case (supra), read in its proper tight, leads us to this
conclusion. ..
We, therefore, hold that the petition must be allowed and hand-
cuffs on the prisoner dropped. We declare that the Punjab Polici>
.Manual, in so far as it puts the ordinary Indian beneath the better
class breed (paragraphs 26 ·21A and 26 ·22 of Chapter XXVI) is
untenable and arbitrary and direct that Indian humans shall not be
dichotomised and the common run discriminated against regarding
handcuffs. The provisions in para 26 ·22 that every under-trial who
is accused of a non-bailable offence punishable with more than J
D years prison term shall be routinely handcuffed is violative of Arts.
14, 19 and 21. So also para 26 ·22 (b) and (c). The nature of the
accusation is not the criterion. The clear and present danger of
escape breaking out of the police control is the determinent. Anti
for this there must be clear material, not glib assumption, recor<l
of reasons and judicial oversight and summary hearing and direction
E
by the court where the victim is produced. We go further to hold
that para 26 ·22 (1) (b), (e) and (f) also hover perilously near un-
constitutionality unless read down as we herein direct. 'Desparaie
character' is who ? Handcuffs are not summary punishment
vicariously imposed at police level, at once obnoxious and irreversible.
F Armed escorts, worth the salt, can overpower any unarmed under-
trial and extraguards can make up exceptional needs. In very
special situations, we do not rule out the application of irons. The
same reasoning appears to (e) and (f). Why torture the prisoner
because others will demonstrate or attempt his rescue ? The plain
law of undertrial custody is thus contrary to the unedifying escort
G practice. We remove the handcuffs from the law and humanize
the police praxis to harmonize with the satvic values of Part 'IJL
The law must be firm, not foul, stern, not sadistic, strong, not callous.

Traditionaliy, it used to be thought that the seriousness of the
possible sentence is the decisive factor for refusal of bail. The
H assumption was that this gave a temptation for the prisoner to escape.
This is held by modern penologists to be a psychic fallacy and the bail
jurisprudence evolved in the English and American Jurisdictions and
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 877

.in India now takes a liberal view. The impossibility of easy re- A
capture supplied the temptation to jump custody, .not the nature of
) the offence or sentence. Likewise, the habitual or violent 'escape
propensities' proved by past conduct or present attempts are a surer
guide to the prospects of running away on the sly or by use of force
than the offence with which the person is charged or the sentence..
Many a murderer, as$uming him to be one, is otherwise a normal, B
well-behaved, even docile, person and it rarely registers in his mind to
run away or force his escape. It is au indifferent escort or incom•
petent guard, not the Section with which the accused is charged,
that must give the clue to the few escapes that occur. To abscond
is a difficult adventure. No study of escapes and their reasons has
been made by criminologists and the facile resort to animal keep- c
ing methods as an easy substitute appeals to Authority in such
circumstances. 'Human rights', seriousness loses its · valence
where administrator's convenience prevails over cultural values.
The fact remains for its empirical worth, that in some States, e.g.
Tamil Nadu and Kerala, handcuffing is rarely done even in serious
cases, save in those cases where evidence of dangerousness, under- D
ground operations to escape and the like is available. It is interesting
that a streak of humanism had found its place in the law of handcuffing
even in the old Bombay Criminal Manual(!) which now prevails in the
Gujarat State and perhaps in the Maharashtra State.* But in the light
(!) Criminal Manual published by the Bombay High Court, Chapter 5, "Hand- E
cuffing of Prisoners", para 67. (and also para 213 of Criminal Manual
Gujarat).
(t) Unless the couft otherwise directs, no prisoner shall be handcuffed or
bound while being taken from the court premises to a jail or a borstal school :
Provided that if a police officer escorting such prisoner from the Court
premises to a jail or a borstal school, considers it necessary to do so
in exceptional circumstances such as violence on the part of the pri.. F
soner after leaving the Court Premises, and cannot get the directions
of the Court, he may handcuff or bind such prisoner after leaving
the premises
{2) No prisoner shall be handcuffed or bound when being taken from
a jai1 or a borstal school to the court Premises. unless the jai1or of
the jai1 or the Superintendent of the borstal school otherwise directs
in writing. If the jailor of a jail or the superintendent of borstal G
school from which the prisoner is being taken to the court considers
in the circumstances st<..ted in clause (1) above necessary to bind or hand~
cuff the Prisoner he may direct in writing the officer incharge of the
.escort to do so and the officer shall obey such direction.
• Provided that the officer in charge of the escort may handcuff and/
·Or bind the prisoner when he considers it ncecssary to do so in
.exceptional circumstances arising after leaving the jail or the borstal H
school Premises and it is ·not possible to obtain a direction from the
jailor or the sup~rintendent of the borstal school or the court.
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A of the constitutional imperatives we have discussed, we enlarge the
law of personal liberty further to be in consonance with fundamentat
rights of persons in custody.

There is no genetic criminal tribe as such among humans.
A disarmed arrestee has no hope of escape from the law if recapture
B
is a. certainty. He heaves a sigh of relief if taken into custody as
·against the desperate evasions of the chasing and the haunting fear
that he may be caught any time. It is superstitious to practise the·
barbarous bigotry of handcuffs as a routine regimen-an imperial'
heritage, well preserved. The problem is to get rid of mind-cuffs
c which make us callous to hand-cuffing a prisoner who may be a.
patient even in the hospital bed and tie him up with ropes to the legs:
of the cot.
Zoological culture_ cannot be compatible with reverence for
life, even of a terrible criminal.
D We have discussed at length what may be dismissed as of little
concern. The reason is simple. Any man may, by a freak of fate,.
become an under-trial and every man, barring those who through
wealth and political clout, are regarded as V.I'.Ps, are ordinary
classes and under the existing Police Manual may be man-handled
by handcuffs. The peril to human dignity and fair procedure is,
E therefore, widespread and we must speak up. Of course, the
1977 and 1979 'instructi,ons' we have referred to earlier show a change
of heart. This Court must declare the law so that abuse by escort
constables may be repelled. We repeat with respect, the observa-
tions in William King Jackson v. D. .E. Bishop.(!)
F (I) We are not convinced that any rule or regulation as
to the use of the strap, however seriously or sincerely con-
ceived and drawn, will successfully prevent abuse. The
present record discloses misinterpretation even of the newly
adopted ....
(2) Rules in this area are seen often to go unobserved.
G
(3) Regulations are e_asily ·circumvented
(4) Corporal punishment is easily subject to abuse in the
hands of the sadistic and the unscrupulous.
(5) Where power to punish is granted to persons in lower
H levels of administrative authority, there is an inherent and
natural difficulty in enforcing the limitations of that power.
(I) Federal Reports, 2nd series, Vol. 404, p. 571.
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Krishna Iyer,!.) '879

Labels like 'desperate' and 'dangerous' are treacherous. Kent A
S. Miller, writing on 'dangerousness' says: (I)
Considerable attention has been given to the role of psy-
chological tests in predicting dangerous behaviour, and
there is a wide range of opinion as to their value.
Thus far no, structured or projective test scale has been B
•
derived which, when used alone will predict violence in the
individual case in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, none has
• been developed which will adequately postdict let alone predict,
vioknt behaviour ..... .
, ... But we are on dangerous ground when deprivation of
liberty occurs under sut:h conditions .
c
. . . . The practice has been to markedly overprcdict. In
addition, the courts and mental health professionals involved
have systematically ignored statutory requirements relating to
dangerousnes' and mental illness ....
. . . . In balancing the interests of the state against the loss D
of liberty and rights of the individual, a prediction of dan-
gerous behaviour must have a high level of probability, (a con-
dition which currently does not exist) and the harm to be pre-
vented should be considerable.
A law which handcuffs almost every undertrial (who, Pre- E
sumably, is innocent) is itself dangerous.
Before we conclude, we must confess that we have been in-
ll11enced by the thought that some in authority are sometimes moved
by the punitive passion for retribution through the process of parad-
ing under-trial prisoners cruelly clad in hateful irons, We must F
alro frankly state that our culture, constitutional and other, revolts
against such an attitude ·because, truth to tell .
•
'each tear that flows, when it could ltave been spared, is an
accusation, and he commits a crime who with brutal inad-
vertancy crushes a poor earthworm.' (2)
G
We clearly declare-and it shall be obeyed from the Inspector
General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons to the escort
constable and the jail warder-that the rule regarding a prisoner in
transit between prison house and court house;, freedom from hand-
cujjs and the exception, under conditions of judicial supervision we
H
(I) Managing Madness, pp, 58, 66-68,
(2) Rosa Luxemburg.
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

have indicated earlier, will be restraints with irons, to be justified
before or after. We mandate the judicial officer before whom the
prisoner is produced to interrogate th~ prisoner, as a rule, whether he
has been subjected to handcuffs or other "irons" treatment and, if he
has been, the official concerned shall be asked to explain the action
forthwith in the light of this judgment.
B
PATHAK, J: I have read the judgment of my learned brother Krishna
Iyer with considerable interest but I should like to set forth my own
views shortly. •
It is an axiom of the criminal law that a person alleged to have
c committed an offence is liable to arrest. In making an arrest, declares
s. 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, "the police officer or other
person.making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the
person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody
by word or action." If there is forcible resistance to the endeavour
to arrest or an attempt to evade the arrest, the law allows the police
D officer or other person to use all means necessary to effect the arrest.
Simultaneously, S· 49 provides that the person arrested must "not
be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his
escape." The two sections define the parameters of the power en-
visaged by the Code in the matter of arrest. And s. 46, in particular,
foreshadows the central principle controlling the power to impose (
E restraint on the person of a prisoner while in continued custody. ).-- I
'
Restraint may be imposed where it is reasonably appreh!lnded
that the prisoner will attempt to escape, and it should not
be more than is necessary to prevent him from escaping. Viewed in
the light of the law laid down by this Court in Suni/ Batra v. Delhi
Administration and others(') that a person i.n custody is not wholly
F denuded of his fundamental rights, the limitations following
from that principle acquire a profound significance. The power
to restrain, and the degree of restraint to be employed, are not for
arbitrary exercise. An arbitrary exercise of that power infringes the
fundamental rights of the person In custody. And a malicious use
of that power can brings. 220 of the Indian Penal Code into play. Too
G often is it forgotten that if a police officer is vested with the power
to restrain a person by hand-cuffing him or otherwise there is a simul-
taneous restraint by the law on the police officer as to the exercise of
that power.
Whether a person should be physically restrained and, if so,
H what should be the degree of restraint, is a matter which affecls the
person in custody so long lfS he remains in custody. Consistent with
(I} [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494.
P. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Pathak, J.) 881

the fundemantal rights of such person the restraint can be imposed,
if at all, to a degree no greater than is necessary for preventing his
escape. To prevent his escape is the object of imposing the restraint,
~lid that object defines at once the bounds of that power. The princi-
ple is of significant relevance in the present case. The petitioner comp-
lains that he is unnecessarily handcuffed when escorted from the jail
)louse to the court building, where he is being tried for criminal offences, B
and back from the court building to the jail house. He contends that
there is no reason why he should be handcuffed. On behalf of the
• respondent it is pointed out by the Superintendent Central Jail,
Tihar, where the petitioner is detained, that the police authorities
take charge of prisoners from the main gate of the jail for the
purpose of escorting them to the court building and back,
c
and that the jail authorities have no control during such custody
over the manner in which the prisoners are treated. S.9(2) (e) of
the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 empowers the
State Government to make rules providing for the escort of persons
confined in a prison to and from courts in which their attendance D
is required and for their custody during the period of such
attendance. The Punjab Police Rules, 1934 contain Rule 26 ·22 which
classifies those cases in which handcuffs may be applied. The classi-
fication has been attempted some what broadly, but it seems to me that
some of the clauses of Rule 26'22, particularly clauses (a) to (cl, appear
to presume that in every instance covered by any of those clauses the E
accused will attempt to escape. It is difficult to sustain the classi-
fication attempted by those clauses. The rule, I think, should be that
the authority responsible for the prisoners custody should consider
the case of each prisoner individually and decide whether the prisoner
is a person who having regard to his circumstances, general conduct,
behaviour and character will attempt to escape or disturb the peace by F
-becoming violent. That is the basic criterion, and all provisions
-relating to the imposition of restraint must be guided by it. In the ulti-
·mate analysis it is that guiding principle which must determine in
each individual case whether a restraint should be imposed and to
what degree.
G
Rule 26 ·22 read with rule 26 ·21-A of the Punjab Police Rules,
1934 draw a distinction between "better class" undertrial prisoners and
"ordinary" undertrial prisoner as a basis for determining who should
,be .handcuffed and who should not be. As I have observed, the appro-
priate principle for a classification should be defined by the need to
. prevent the prisoner escaping from custody or becoming violent. The H
social status of a person, his education and habit oflife associated with
.a superior mode of living seem to me to be intended to protect his
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A dignity of person. :Qut that dignity is a dignity which belongs to all,
rich and poor, of high social status and low, literate and illiterate.
It is the basic assumption that all individuals are entitled to enjoy that
dignity that determines the rule that ordinarily no restraint should be
imposed except in those cases where there is a reasonable fear of the·
prisoner attempting to escape or attempting violence. It is abhorreat
B to envisage a prisoner being handcuffed merely because it is assumed
that he does not belong to "a better class'', that he does not possess-
the basic dignity pertaining to every individual. Then there is need to
guard against a misuse of the power from other motives. It is gmssty· •
objectionable that the power given by the law to impose a restraint,
either by applying handcuffs or other,\>ise, should be seen as an oppor--
c tunity for exposing the accused to public ridicule and humiliation.
- Nor is the power intended to be used vindictively or by way of punish-
ment. Standing Order 44 and the Instructions on Handcuffs of'
November, 1977, reproduced by my learned brother, evidence t1te-
growing concern at a higher level of the administration over the in-
D discriminate manner in which handcuffs are being used. To my mind,
even those provisions operate somewhat in excess of the object to be·
subserved by the imposition of handcuffs, having regard to the central
priuciple that only he should be handcuffed who can be reasonably-
apprehended to attempt an escape or become violent.

E Now whether handcuffs or other restraint should be imposed'
on a prisoner is primarily a matteifor the decision of the authority
responsible for his custody. It is a judgment to be exercised with re-
ference to each individual case. It is for that authority to exercise-
its discretion, and I am not willing to accept that the primary decisiono
should be that of any other. The matter is one where the circums-
F tances may change from one moment to another, and inevitably in-
somecases it may fall to the decision of the escorting authority midway
to decide on imposing a restraint on the prisoner. I do not think that
any prior decision of an external authority can be reasonably impose<t
on the exercise of that power. But I do agree that there is room for
'imposing a supervisory regime over the exercise of that power. 0.1e·
G sector of supervisory jurisdiction could appropriately lie with the court
trying the accused, and it would be desirable for the custodial authority
to inform that court of the circumstances in which, and the justi-
fication for, imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. It shoulti
be for the court concerned to work out the modalities of the procedure·
requisite for the purpose of enforcing such control.
H
In the present case it seems sufficient, in my judgment, that the-
question whether the petitioner should be handcuffed should· be left.
P. S. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. (Pathak, J.) 883

to be dealt with in the light of the observations made herein by the A
Magistrate concerned, before whom the petitioner is brought for
;.. trial in the cases instituted against him. The petition is disposed
ofaccordingly.

S. R. Petition a/loH-ed.

•

'