Holding

A higher court may not set aside an acquittal unless the trial court's finding is perverse, arbitrary, or unsupported by evidence; here the trial court’s reasons were sound, so the acquittal stands.

Summary

The appellants were charged with murder under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC for allegedly tying a woman to a tree and beating her with heated weapons. The Sessions Court acquitted them, finding the sole eye‑witness, the husband of the deceased, unreliable due to contradictions, omissions and lack of corroboration. The Punjab and Haryana High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting the accused under Section 304 Part I IPC and imposing ten years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a higher court cannot overturn an acquittal unless the trial court's appreciation of evidence is perverse, arbitrary, or unsupported by evidence, and that the trial court's reasons were “good and sturdy.” Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, restored the acquittal, and ordered the appellants’ release.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court can overturn an order of acquittal on a mere difference of view without a perverse or arbitrary appreciation of evidence.
Whether the sole eye‑witness testimony, marred by contradictions, omissions and lack of corroboration, can support a conviction.
Effect of an 18‑hour delay in lodging the FIR on the reliability of the prosecution case.
Whether the absence of physical evidence (ligature marks, recovered weapons) defeats the prosecution’s case.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 61
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304 Part I, s. 34

Subjects

acquittalappellate revieweye‑witness testimonycorroborationdelay in FIRIPC 302IPC 304Section 34evidentiary reliabilitySupreme Court

Judgment

PRITAM NATH AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB

AUGUST I, 2002

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.] B

Penal Code: Sections 302134 and 304-Part II.

Criminal Trial:
c
Murder Case-Accused acquitted on benefit of doubt-Reversal thereof
by the High Court-Power of High Court-Scope and ambit of-Held, High
Court could not upset an order of acquittal as if it is another trial Court to
record conviction, when reasons furnished by trial Court are good and sturdy.

Testimony of eye-witnesses-Reliance thereon-Held, when material D
contradictions, omissions and improvements were found in the evidence of
prosecution witnesses and in the absence of corroboration of such evidence
by independent witness, it cannot be relied on-Evidence Act, 1872.

According to the prosecution, PW2 took the deceased, his wife, to E
accused-appellant, Sadhus and their Chelas (appellant Nos. 2 and 3) for
getting rid of evil spirits which had seized her. These accused and co-
accused tied the deceased to a tree and gave blows to her with iron rods,
trishul and chimtas on various parts of her body. PW2 tried to intervene,
but accused assured him that she would not die. She became unconscious
during the night and died on the next day. F
Accused were tried for offences under Section 302 read with Section
34 IPC but were acquitted by the Sessions Court on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. On appeal, High Court reversed the Order of trial Court. Hence
this appeal. G
It was contended for the appellants that since the order of acquittal
was not based on a misreading of evidence or otherwise perverse, it did
not call for interference by the High Court; that there was an unreasonable
delay of 18 hours in lodging of FIR; and that there was serious H
397
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A contradictions and omissions in t.he statements of PW2-the only eye-witness
· in the case-whose evidence was unreliable and unsafe to convict the
accused-appellants.

Allowing the appeal, tbe Court

B HELD: 1. The Judgment of the High Court shows that there is no
reference to the statements of the witnesses at least on material aspects of
the prosecution case. It only states that the case of murder was not spelt
out as there was no intention on the part of the accused to cause death
but they could be safely attributed with the knowledge that death could
C be caused in such a situation and as such convicted them for offence
punishable under Section 304-11 IPC. The approach of the High Court and
consideration of the case, that too for reversal of the order of acquittal,
has been unsatisfactory and casual. (403-E; 403-G)

2.1. There was delay of 18 hours in lodging the FIR. No ligature
D marks were found on the body of the deceased as against the prosecution
story that the deceased was tied to a tree with rope and that was the
position throughout the night. No burn marks were found on the clothes
of the deceased as is evident from the statement of PWS, the Investigating
Officer, though there were several burn injuries on the body of the
deceased as per the prosecution. The body was not identified by PW2, the
E husband of the deceased at the place of the occurrence or at inquest raising
serious doubts about his presence itself. PWI, the doctor in his evidence,
has stated that when he gave opinion, seized weapons were not shown to
him by the police; the weapons when produced were not sealed; on them
the name of the accused, case number and name of the deceased were not
F mentioned. PW2, the sole eye witness, in his evidence has stated that when
police went to the spot with him all these weapons were lying at the spot
and were taken into possession. PW8, the Investigating Officer, has
deposed that the weapons were recovered at the instance of co-accused
(who is not before this Court). The rope with which the deceased was
alleged to have been tied to the tree was also not recovered. These
G infirmities gave rise to serious doubts as to the prosecution case and
involvement of the appellants in the commission of the offence. When the
material contradictions and omissions and improvements in the evidence
of PW2 were found and there was no corroboration to his evidence by
other independent witnesses. The trial Court was right in not relying oh
H his evidence. Thus no interference by the High Court was called for or
PRITAMNATH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (SHIVARAJV. PATIL, J.] 399

warranted when the reasons given by the trial Court for recording A
acquittal are good and sturdy. (404-A-F)

2.2. The High Court could not upset an order of acquittal as if it
was another trial Court to record conviction forgetting that it was sitting
in first appeal against an order of acquittal. The High Court failed to keep
in its mind the well-settled principles in the matter of reversing an order B
of acquittal. )404-G]

2.3. Having regard to the discussion made and reasons given by the
trial Court, it cannot be said that the appreciation of evidence was perverse
or arbitrary or findings recorded were based on no evidence or material
evidence was not considered. The High Court committed a grave error in C
convicting and sentencing the accused, reversing the order of acquittal
merely because it could take a different view. In a case like this it is the
duty of this Court to interfere so as to do substantial justice. (404-H; 405-A]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. D
216 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.3.2001 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Crl. No. 488-DBA of 1991.

Ms. Jaspreet Gogia and Vipin Gogia for the Appellants.
E
Bimal Roy Jad, Pankaj Kumar Singh and Ms. Sunita Pandit, for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHIVARAJ V. PATIL J. In this appeal, by special leave, the appellants F
have assailed the judgment of the High Court reversing the order of acquittal
made in their favour by the trial court and convicting them under Section
304-11 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000 each.
G
The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that PW-2 Ram Charan and
Vidya Rani, the deceased, had been married about 18 years prior to the
incident. At about 6/7 P.M. on 4th August, 1989, Ram Charan took his wife
to the dera of the appellants situated in village Sahera for getting her treated
from the evil spirits, which had seized her. Kewal Nath, a co-accused, and
Pritam Nath, appellant No. I, claimed to be Sadhus in the said dera and the H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A appellants Nos. 2 and 3, viz., Pritam Singh and Raghbir Singh, were their
chelas, who were all present there. PW-2 Ram Charan told them that his wife
had been seized by evil spirits and requested them to help and treat her,
whereupon these appellants and Kewal Nath, the co-accused, tied Vidya Rani
to a tree and started giving blows with iron rods, trishul and chimtas on
various parts of her body. Witnessing the same for some time PW-2 got
B alarmed and tried to intervene telling them that the treatment might kill her.
The accused, however, assured him that Vidya Rani would not die. However,
she became unconscious during the night. The next day at about 1.00 P.M.,
PW-2 came to know that his wife had died. Then he raised a roula, which
attracted Bhagwan Singh, Balbir Singh, Bhola Ram and Surinder Singh. Then
C he left for the police station, Mulepur with Bhola Ram and Surinder Singh
and reached there at about 2.00 P.M. In the police station his statement Ex.
PD was recorded and further investigation was taken up. After completion of
the investigation challan was filed. They were tried by the sessions court for
the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

D After trial the learned sessions judge, for the reasons recorded in the
judgment, held that the prosecution failed in its efforts to prove the case
against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and consequently acquitted
them. The State filed appeal in the High Court challenging the order of
acquittal passed by the trial court. The High Court found fault with the order
E of acquittal and held accused guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part-
11 read with Section 34 IPC. Hence they were convicted and sentenced as
already stated above.

The learned counsel for the appellants strongly contended that the High
Court was not right in reversing the order of acquittal adopting an approach
p contrary to well-settled position in law as expressed in various pronouncements
of this Court. The order of acquittal did not call for interference as it was not
based on a misreading of evidence or otherwise perverse. Merely because the
High Court could perhaps take a different view was not a ground for disturbing
,•
the judgment of acquittal. The learned counsel further pointed out that there
was delay of 18 hours in lodging the FIR for which there was no proper
G explanation although Ram Charan claimed to have been an eye witness to the
incident; there were serious contradictions and omissions in the statements of
witnesses; PW-2 was the only so called eye witness, whose evidence was
unreliable and unsafe to convict the appellants as rightly recorded by the trial
court giving various reasons for not relying on his evidence; the High Court
H lightly brushed aside the reasons given by the trial court for acquitting the
PRITAMNATH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [SHIVARAJV.PATIL, J.] 401

appellants. A
In opposition, the learned counsel for the State made submissions
supporting the impugned judgment adopting the reasons given in the impugned
judgment.

We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned B
counsel for the parties. The sustainability of the impugned judgment is to be
tested on the basis of crystalised judicial view and repeatedly pronounced
principles as to the scope and ambit of disturbing or reversing an order of
acquittal recorded by a trial court.

In this case, mainly the conviction of the appellants was sought on the C
basis of sole testimony of PW-2 Ram Charan, the husband of the deceased.
The learned sessions Judge was aware that there was no legal bar for convicting
an accused on the solitary testimony of an eye witness provided the same was
unimpeachable and suffered from no infirmities and was corroborated by
independent circumstances in the shape of medical evidence and other D
evidence. Judging by that standard after the scrutiny of statement of PW-2
the trial court held that his evidence was not reliable to act upon for the
reasons recorded in its judgment, which read: -

"The witness states that the accused were lifting the weapons wielded
by them, namely iron, trishul and chimta which have been heated up E
in the Dhooni but this part of the statement is an improvement upon
the statement made by this witness under Section 61 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which does not indicate that the weapons were being
lifted from the Dhooni before giving injuries to the deceased. While
improvement on a non vital issue may be overlooked but when a
prosecution witness makes an improvement on an aspect to which is F
material for the case, the courts are reluctant to rely upon such an
improvement and normally reject the same. In the case in hand, the
improved version was put forth to corroborate the medical evidence
available in the postmortem report which indicated presence of a
large number of burn wounds. As the improvement is on a very G
material aspect of the case, I am afraid that the same would have to
be ruled out of consideration. Another portion of testimony of Ram
Charan which does not stand closer scrutiny is the assertion regarding
Vidya Rani being tied up with a rope to a sheesham tree. In the
postmortem report, there are no marks on the dead body indicating
that the deceased had been tied up and so this part of the story too H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A has to be ruled out of consideration. Looked at from another angle
too, the part of the testimony of Ram Charan which asserts that the
injuries were caused to Vidya Rani with hot weapons is rendered
unreliable because although there are bum injuries present on the
dead body yet the clothes of the deceased do not have any
corresponding bums and in this state of affairs the court cannot but
B infer that Ram Charan was either not present when injuries were
caused to the wife or that he is withholding the details thereof which
too would not help in any way to enhance the reliability of the
testimony of this witness.

c Having come to the conclusion that the statement of Ram Charan
regarding the manner in which the injuries were caused to Vidya
Rani is unreliable, I may tum to another aspect of the case in which
the conduct of the witness at the time when his wife being caused
injuries has to be gone into. Ram Charan asserts that after taking
Vidya Rani to the Dera of Kewal Nath for treatment of evil spirits she
D was tied with sheesham tree and beaten up with hot chimta, trishul
and iron rod. He also asserted that when the accused started causing
injuries to the deceased he called upon them to desist from doing so
as though may endanger the life of Vidya Rani. He also asserted that
he was unable to interfere because of a threat which has been held

E
out by the accused to him. This conduct of the husband to say the
least appears to be highly unnatural for once he apprehended danger
to the life of his wife he would have raised a hue and cry and either
1
intervened to prevent the causing of further injuries to her or at least
would have gone to the neighbouring village and sought assistance
for rescuing the lady. Ram Charan did not respond in this manner and
F this part of his conduct when scrutinized in the light of the fact that
his statement regarding the actual incident has already been held by
me to be unreliable renders this part of his testimony also
untrustworthy. We thus have a case in which the testimony of the
solitary eye witness does not come up to the mark and is replete with
infirmities which cannot be overlooked. Taken in its entirety it has to
G be held that Ram Charan is not a witness of truth and his statement
t-
regarding the circumstances in which his wife is alleged to have met
her end is totally unreliable."
f
Referring to the recoveries, which were stated to have been made at the
H instance of Kewal Nath, the co-accused, who is not before this Court in this
PRITAMNATH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [SHIVARAJV.PATIL, !.] 403
'
appeal, the learned sessions Judge observed that the recovery of iron rod, A
chimta and trishul by themselves would not in any way help the court to
fasten criminal liability on the accused. It may be added that weapons were
not even recovered from these appellants.

The High Court in the impugned judgment has opined. that the findings
recorded by the trial court were palpably erroneous and could not have been B
given on the evidence that has been led by the prosecution, that too without
re-appreciating and objectively evaluating or scrutinizing the evidence of
witnesses. The High Court states, "It is true that in the FIR Ram Charan did
not mention that the weapons wielded by the accused had first been heated
before Vidya Rani had been beaten but the basic fa~t remains that he had C
clearly stated that she had been given a severe beating with the weapons. The
omission to state that the weapons had been heated, to our mind, is of little
consequence in the light of the fact that Ram Charan could not possibly have
anticipated that what he believed to be a simple treatment for his wife's
problem would end in her tragic death. It is also true that the FIR had been
lodged after a delay of 18 hours but in the background of the case, this fact D
by itself pales into insignificance."

A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that there is no
reference to the statements of the witnesses at least on material aspects of the
prosecution case. The judgment contains narration as to prosecution story,
arguments of the learned counsel and reproduction of injuries found on the E
deceased running into four pages, the reasons and discussion is only found
in one paragraph and portion from the said paragraph is· already extracted
above. In the penultimate paragraph the High Court only states that the case
of murder was not spelt out as there was no intention on the part of the
accused to cause death but they could be safely attributed with the knowledge F
that death could be caused in such a situation and as such convicted them for
offence punishable under Section 304-11, !PC.

In our view the approach of the High Court and consideration of the
case that too for reversal of the order of acquittal has been unsatisfactory and
if we may say so it has been casual. Th~ _ffjgh-Goun did not consider the case G
before it, as it ought to have been.by a court of first appeal on facts. The
High Court did not dislodge the reasons given by trial court for acquittal.
Further the evidence was neither discussed nor scrutinized nor analysed to
show how the trial court was wrong in appreciating the evidence, considering
the probabilities of the case and recording findings.
H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A There was delay of 18 hours in lodging the FIR, no ligature marks were
found on the body of the deceased as against the prosecution story that the
deceased was tied to a tree with rope and that was the position through out
the night; no bum marks were found on the clothes of the deceased as is
evident from the statement of PW-8, the Investigating Officer, though there
B were several burn injuries on the body of the deceased as per the prosecution;
the body was not identified by PW-2 Ram Charan, the husband of the deceased
at the place of the occurrence or at inquest raising serious doubts about his
presence itself. PW-I, the doctor, in his evidence has stated that when he
gave opinion on 6.8.1989, the weapons stated to have been seized were not
shown to him by the police; the weapons when produced were not sealed; on
C them the name of the accused, case number and name of the deceased were
not mentioned. PW-2, the sole eye witness, in his evidence has stated that
when police went to the spot with him all these weapons were lying at the
spot and were. taken into possession. PW-8, the Investigating Officer, has
deposed that the weapons were recovered on 12.8.1989 at the instance of co-
accused Kewal Nath, who is not before us in this appeal. The rope with
D which the deceased was alleged to have been tied to the tree was also not
recovered. These infirmities gave rise to serious doubts as to the prosecution
case and involvement of the appellants in the tommission of the offence.
When the material contradictions and omissions and improvements in the
evidence of PW-2 were found and there was no corroboration to his evidence
E by other ihdependent witnesses, it was fatal to the prosecution case. The trial
court was right in not relying on his evidence.

No interference by the High Court in such an appeal was called for or
warranted when the reasons given by the trial court for recording acquittal
are good and sturdy. The trial court had the advantage and benefit of observing
F during the trial the demur and conduct of the witnesses from its commencement
to completion and with that background on proper and objective appreciation
of the evidence as a whole recorded a finding of acquittal supported by
reasons. The High Court could not upset an order of acquittal as if it was
another trial court to record conviction forgetting that it was sitting in first
G appeal against an order of acquittal. The High Court failed to keep in its mind
the well-settled principles in the matter of reversing an order of acquittal.

Assuming one other view was possible to be taken by the High Court, ....•
that was not enough in the light of well-settled position in law. In this case,·
having regard to the discussion made and reasons given by the trial court,
H extracted above, it cannot be said that the appreciation of evidence was
PRITAMNATII v. STATE OF PUNJAB lsmvAlV.PA~IL, J.] 405

perverse or arbitrary or findings recorded .were bJ.d on no evidence or A
material evidence was not considered. The Hlgh Court,1in our view, committed
' , "I
a grave error in convicting and sentencing the accused, reversing the order
of acquittal merely because it could take a different. '
view. In a case like this

so as to do substantial justice. I
it is the duty of this Court to interfere with the impugi\ed judgment and order
· I·... . · B
In the result for the reasons stated above the impugned judgment of the
High Court is set aside, that of the trial cotirt is restored and the appellants
be set at liberty forthwith, if they are not [equired in any other case. The
appeal is ordered accordingly. .. ·

S.K.S. Appeal allowed. C

'