PRITHAWI NATH RAMversusSTATE OF JHARKHAND AND ORS.

A                             PRITHA WI NA TH RAM
                                        v.
                     STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ORS.

                                AUGUST 24, 2004
B
           [ARJJIT PASAYAT AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.]

         Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 :

         Ss. 11 and 15--Contempt Jurisdiction-Scope of-Non-compliance
C of order of High Court-Aggrieved party filing application for initiating
  contempt proceedings-Court examining correctness of the order and
  declining to take action for contempt-Held, the court exercising contempt
  jurisdiction cannot traverse beyond the order the non-compliance of which
   is alleged-It cannot test correctness or otherwise ofthe order-Cunstitution
D of India, 1950-Article 215-Practice and Procedure.
                         ·'
         In an application for initiating contempt proceedings for non-
    compliance of an order of the High Court, a single Judge proceeded
    to examine the correctness of the said order and held that the directions
E   given therein could not have been given and, therefore, there was no
    scope for taking any action for contempt. Aggrieved, the applicant filed
    the present appeal.

        Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter back to the High
F   Court, the Court.

         HELD : 1.1. While dealing with an application for contempt, the
    Court is primarily concerned with the question whether the earlier
    decision which has received its finality has been complied with or not
    and whether conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed
G   default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order, is
    contumacious. It would not be permissible for a Court to examine the
    correctness of the earlier decision which has not been assailed and to
    take the view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. The
    Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is
H   alleged. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give
                                       740
                  PRITHAWI NATH RAM v. STATE                       741

additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising A
review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of
contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and
indefensible. [742-G-H; 743-A-C; 744-C-D)

     KG. Derasari and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., [2001) IO SCC
496 and Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather, AIR (1994) SC B
2252, relied on.

     TR. Dhananjaya v. J. Vasudevan, (1995] 5 SCC 619, referred to.

     Niaz Mohammad and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1994] 6
sec 352, held inapplicable.                                               c
      1.2. If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order, which in
its opinion is wrong or against rules, or its implementation is neither
practicable nor feasible, it should always either approach the court
that passed the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate court. At D
the same time, in a given case, even if ultimately the interim order is
vacated or relief in the main proceeding is not granted to a party, that
cannot be taken as a ground for dis-obedience of any interim order
passed by the Court. (744-A-B, E-F)

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5024 of E
2000.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 7.3.2000 of the Patna High Court
in M.J.C. No. 262 of 1999.

                                WITH                                      F
     I.A. Nos. I 0-11 of 2004

    Raju Ramachandran, Zaiki Ahmed Khan and Irshad Ahmad for the
Appellant.

     B.B. Singh for the Respondent.                                       G
     Anil Kumar Jha for State of Jharkhand.

     Lakshmi Raman Singh for Respondent.

     Anurag Sharma and Navin Prakash for B.P.S.C.                         H
    742                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. : Appellant filed an application under
    Sections 11 and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short the 'Act')
    read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the
B 'Constitution'). The foundation of such application was alleged non-
    compliance of the directions given by a learned Single Judge of the Patna
    High Court in CWJC 1120 of 1998 by order dated 30.3.1999.

          A learned Single Judge of the said High Court, while dealing with
C   the application for initiation of contempt proceedings, has passed the
    impugned judgment holding that it would not be proper to take any action
    for contempt. Though learned Single Judge noticed that the scope of
    consideration while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt
    proceedings was confined to the question whether there was compliance
    with the order or not, yet proceeded to examine the correctness of the order
D   and called upon the parties to satisfy him that the direction of the kind
    contained in the order dated 30.3.1999 could be issued. After an indepth
    analysis, he came to hold that the directions could not have been given and
    therefore there was no scope for taking any action for contempt.

E        Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single
    Judge has not kept the correct parameters oflaw in view while dealing with
    the application for contempt. In essence he has sat in judgment over the
    decision rendered by another learned Single Judge. It was not open in the
    contempt proceedings to examine whether the order, non-implementation
F   of which was being urged, is valid or not. That is beyond the scope of
    consideration.

          In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that there can be
    no straight jacket formula which can be applied in such matters. If the order
    was not capable of being implemented, certainly it was open to the learned
G   Single Judge dealing with the application for initiation of contempt
    proceedings to consider whether the order was legal or not.

         While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really
    concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has
H   received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be
           PRITHAWI NATH RAM v. STATE [PASAYAT, J.]                    743

permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision A
which had not been assailed and to take the view different than what was
taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in KG. Derasari
and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., [2001) IO SCC 496. The Court
exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question
of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed B
default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there
was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the concerned party
to approach the higher Court if according to him the same is not legally
tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher
Court. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself C
powe.r to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the
Court passing the judgment or order. Though strong reliance was placed
by learned counsel for the State of Bihar on a three-Judge Bench decision
inNiaz Mohammad and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1994] 6 SCC
352, we find that the same has no application to the facts of the present
case. In that case the question arose about the impossibility to obey the D
order. If that was the stand of the State, the least it could have done was
to assail correctness of the judgment before the higher Court. State took
diametrically opposite stands before this Court. One was that there was no
specific direction to do anything in particular and, second was what was
 required to be done has been done. If what was to be done has been done, E
 it cannot certainly be said that there was impossibility to carry out the
orders. In any event, the High Court has not recorded a finding that the
direction given earlier was impossible to be carried out or that the c1irection
given has been complied with.

      On the question of impossibility to carry out the direction, the views
                                                                             F
expressed in T.R. Dhananjaya v. J. Vasudevan, [1995] 5 SCC 619 need
to be noted. It was held that when the claim inter se had been adjudicated
and had attained finality, it is not open to the respondent to go behind the
orders and truncate the effect thereof by hovering over the rules to get
round the result, to legitimize legal alibi to circumvent the order passed G
by a Court.

     In Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather, AIR (1994) SC
2252, it was held that if a party is aggrieved by the order, he should take
prompt steps to invoke appellate proceedings and cannot ignore the order H
    744                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A and plead about the difficulties of implementation at the time contempt
    proceedings are initiated.

        If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order which in its opinion
  is wrong or against rules or its implementation is neither practicable nor
B feasible, it should always either approach to the Court that passed the order
  or invoke jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. Rightness or wrongness of
  the order cannot be urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong the
  order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the
  party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt
C the Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is
  alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or
  what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot
  test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or
  delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while
  dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The
D same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter,
  the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh
  consideration. It shall deal with the application in its proper perspective
  in accordance with law afresh. We make it clear that we have not expressed
  any opinion regarding acceptability or otherwise of the application for
E initiation of contempt proceedings.

          In a given case, even if ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief
    in the main proceeding is not granted to a party, the other side cannot take
    that as a ground for dis-obedience of any interim order passed by the Court.

F        It is to be noted that after re-organisation of States, the dispute
    presently pertains to the State of Jharkhand, which has been substituted in
    place of original respondent, the State of Bihar.

           Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
G
    R.P.                                                         Appeal allowed.