PRITHIPAL SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

                              PRITHIPAL SINGH
                                                                                      •
A
                                     v.
                          STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

                                OCTOBER 19, 2006

B                  [S.B. SINHA AND DALVEER BHANDARI, JJ.]


          Service Law:

          Constitution of India, 1950; Article 31 I:
c
           Charges of grave misconduct-Dismissal of a Sub-Inspector of Police
    from service-Setting aside the order ofdismissal, Appellate Authority directed
     completion of the departmental proceedings against the delinquent-Charges
     of misconduct not proved, hence, disciplinary proceeding against him was
     dropped by the Appellate Authority-Show Cause Notice-Order of the
D   Appellate Authority set aside by the Director General of Police-Filing of
    suit by the delinquent-Decreed by trial Court-Reversed by first Appellate
     Court-Second appeal dismissed by High Court-On appeal, Held: Incumbent
     was a Government servant and thus entitled to protection under Article
     31 I-His services could be terminated only after affording him reasonable
E    opportunity of hearing in respect of charges framed against him-Jn terms
     of Clause (b) of 2nd Proviso to Clause (2), Article 31!, holding of an enquiry
     could be dispensed with by the Authority when it is not practicable to hold
     such an enquiry-Existence of such an exceptional situation must be shown
     to exist on the basis of relevant material-In the present case, even such a
     question did not arise as departmental proceeding had been held and the
F    incumbent not found guilty-Once he was exonerated of the charges, the
     question of issuing an order of dismissal against him without even conducting
     a formal enquiry, did not arise-Hence, the judgment of the High Court and
     also of the First Appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court is
     restored-Punjab Police Rules, 1934-Rule 16.28.
G
          On a charge of grave misconduct against the appellant-Sub-Inspector
    of Punjab Police that he had let off one smuggler after accepting money, a
    departmental proceeding was initiated against him and he was dismissed from
    service. The Appellate Authority set aside the order of dismissal and directed

                                         8I4
H
                   PRITHIPAL SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                      815
completion of the disciplinary proceeding against the errant employee. In A
furtherance of the said direction, he was reinstated in service and the
disciplinary proceeding against him followed. Since misconduct alleged
against him was not proved, the disciplinary proceeding was dropped. Later, a
show-cause notice was served upon him in terms of Rule 16.28 of the Punjab
Police Rules, and after considering his reply, the Director General of Police B
set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority, resulting in his
dismissal from service. Aggrieved, he filed a suit, which was decreed by the
trial Court. On an appeal preferred by the State, the first Appellate Court
reversed the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, inter a/ia,
holding that the Director General of Police had enough material before him
to pass the order impugned in the suit. The second appeal filed by him C
thereagainst has been dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

      Allowing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: I.I. Appellant was a Government servant. He was entitled to the
protection as envisaged under A.rticle 311 of the Constitution of India. His D
services could, therefore, be terminated only by an Authority competent in
that behalf, upon being informed of the charges and after giving him a
reasonable opportunity of hearing in respect thereof. Clause (b) of 2nd Proviso
appended to Article 311 of the Constitution, however, provides for dispensation
of such enquiry where the Authority empowered to dismiss or remove an E
employee or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for reasons to be recorded
in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. (818-F, G)

       1.2. Once in the disciplinary proceedings appellant-employee was
exonerated of the charges framed against him, 1the question of taking recourse
to Clause (b) of 2nd Proviso appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the F
Constitution of India did not and could not arise. Although, the same had been
duly noticed by the Trial Judge, it failed to receive due attention of the Appellate
Court as also of the High Court The very purpose, for which the said provision
was enacted, had lost its relevance once a departmental proceeding was held.
The Director General of Police, while passing the order which had resulted G
in the dismissal of the appellant, furthermore failed to take into consideration
that in an appeal preferred by the delinquent from such an order it was
obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Auth1ority to produce all records to
show that there were enough materials before the Disciplinary Authority to
arrive at a positive and categorical finding that im the departmental proceeding
the witnesses were not likely to depose. It was not done. Resultantly, the entire H
    816                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A proceeding became vitiated in law.1819-E, F, GI
           1.3. Holding of a departmental proceeding is the rule and 2nd Proviso
    appended to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India provides for an
    exception. It is a trite law that existence of such an exceptional situation must
    be shown to exist on the basis of relevant materials. In the instant case, even
B   such a question did not arise as a departmentaJ proceeding had been held and
    the appellant was not found guilty therein. Once he was exonerated of the
    charges, the question of issuing an order of dismissal against him and that
    too, upon dispensation of a formal inquiry, did not arise. The judgment of the
    High Court as also of the 1st Appellate Court are set aside and that of the
C   trial court is restored. (821-E, F)

          Union ofIndia & Anr. etc. v. Tulsiram Patel etc., AIR (1985) SC 1416;
    Chief Security Officer & Ors. v, Singasan Rabi Das, [1991) I SCC 729 and
    Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., (Civil Appeal No. 1489 of 2004),
    decided of by Supreme Court on 25th January, 2006, referred to.
D
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5226 of2004.

         From the Final Judgment and Order dated 24.9.2002 of the High Court
    of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 3135/1996.

E         K.T.S. Tulsi, Seeraj Bagga and Sureshta Bagga for the Appellant.

          Kuldip Singh, R.K. Pandey and Arun K. Sinha for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

p         S.B. SINHA, J. Application of the 2nd proviso appended to Clause (2)
    of Article 311 of the Constitution of India is in question in this appeal, which
    arises out of a judgment and order dated 24th September, 2002 passed by the
    Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular Second Appeal No.3135 of 1996.
    The said question arises in the following circumstances :

G       Appellant was appointed as an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (for
  short, 'AS!') on 17.3.1980. He was put on probation. On completion of his
  period of probation, he was con finned on 31.3.1989. He was promoted to the
  post of Sub-Inspector on 29.l0.1985. While he was discharging his duties in
  the said capacity, on a charge of grave misconduct that he had let off one
H smuggler, named, Lakhwinder Singh after accepting money, a departmental
           PRITHIPAL SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (S.B SINHA,J.]             817

proceeding was initiated against him. He was dismissed from services by an A
order dated 7.1.1988 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Tam Taran. The
matter was carried in appeal and the Appellate Authority, being the Deputy
Inspector General of Police, set aside the said order of dismissal and directed
completion of the disciplinary proceeding, which had already been initiated.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said direction, Appellant was reinstated
in service on 4.11.1988 and was posted at Sangrur. The departmental proceeding B
that followed, the misconduct alleged against Appellant was found to have
not been proved. The disciplinary proceeding against Appellant was dropped
by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Sangrur, stating :

             "On completion of the Departmental Inquiry, the Report was C
        submitted to this Office. I have carefully examined the statements of
        prosecution witnesses, defence witnesses and the Report of the Inquiry
        Officer. On the basis of the evidence recorded the allegations levelled
        against SI Prithipal Singh are not proved because it has not been
        stated by any witness that SI Prithipal Singh, without registering a
        case against Lakhwir Singh had let off him after accepting money. D
        Besides this it has been stated by Budha Singh, father of Lakhwir
        Singh that neither his son was ever arrested by SI Prithipal Singh nor
        he or his son Lakhwir Singh has ever paid any money to him. After
        considering the statements of prosecution witnesses, defence
        witnesses and the Report of the Inquiry Officer, I drop the proceedings
        against SI Prithipal Singh as the allegations levelled against him are E
        not proved. A copy of this Order be given to him."

      A notice was served upon Appellant purported to be in terms of Rule
16.28 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short, 'the Rules'), asking him to
show cause as to why the order dated 18.10.1988 passed by the then Deputy F
Inspector General ('DIG', for short), Border Range, Amritsar, setting aside the
order of dismissal from service passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Tam Taran on 7. 7.1988, should not be set aside. Appellant filed his show
cause, inter a/ia, stating that there was no valid reason for dispensation of
departmental inquiry and once it had been initiated, the same should have
been completed. The Director General of Police, however, by an order dated G
5.2.1990 set aside the said order dated 18.10.1988 passed by the DIG, Amritsar,
opining:

           "..... After due appraisal of the facts and circumstances of the case,
       I do not see any force in the various contentions raised by the S.I.
       in his written reply. I further find that the impugned order passed by H
    818                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A          the Sr. Supdt. of Police, Tarn Taran was proper, valid and based on
           true facts and in accordance with law and did not warrant any
           interference. The conduct of the S.I. was reprehensible and the holding
           of departmental enquiry was rightly dispensed with by the competent
           authority after recording valid reasons therefor. I, therefore, hold that
           the decision taken by the appellate authority setting aside the
B          impugned order of dismissal passed by the Sr. Supdt. of Police, Tam
           Taran is erroneous, unwarranted and deserves to be quashed.

               In view of the above discussion, I hereby quash the appellate
           order dated 18.10.1988 passed by the D.l.G. of Police, Border Range
           reinstating S.I. Prithipal Singh No.259/J in service. In consequence the
c          order passed by the Sr. Supdt. of Police, Tam Taran dated 7.7.1988 is
           maintained resulting in the dismissal of S.I. Prithipal Singh No.259/J
           from service with immediate effect."

          A suit was filed by Appellant herein, questioning the validity of the
D said order in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Sangrur. In the said suit the
    defendant did not examine any witness. The suit was decreed by the
    Subordinate Judge, Ist Class, Sangrur by a Judgment and Decree dated
    16.3.1995, inter alia, opining that as Appellant was exonerated of the charges
    in the regular departmental inquiry, the question of dispensation of the
    departmental proceeding against him did not arise. On an appeal preferred by
E   the State, the Additional District Judge, however, reversed the said Judgment
    and Decree, inter alia, holding that the Director General of Police had enough
    material before him to enable him to pass the order impugned in the suit. The
    second appeal filed by Appellant thereagainst, as noticed hereinbefore, has
    been dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court by reason of the
F   impugned judgment.

          Appellant was a Government servant. He was entitled to the protection
    as envisaged under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. His services
    could, therefore, be terminated only by an Authority competent in that behalf;
    upon being informed of the charges and after giving him a reasonable
G   opportunity of hearing in respect thereof. Clause (b) of the 2nd Proviso
    appended thereto, however, provides for dispensation of such enquiry where
    the Authority empowered to dismiss or remove an employee or to reduce him
    in rank is satisfied that for reasons to be recorded in writing, it is not
    reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry.

H         Indisputably, the Disciplinary Authority being Senior Superintendent of
           PRITHIPAL SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B SINHA, J.)             819
Police, Tam Taran was of the said view. The said Authority, however, did not, A
in his order dated 7.7.1988, record that the conditions precedent for invoking
the said provisions stood fulfilled. He proceeded to exercise his jurisdiction
under the Rules without completion of the departmental proceedings. He
opined that a regular inquiry, without there being any material on record, as
laid down in Punjab Police Rules, was not practicable as the witnesses were
not likely to depose against him due to the fear of injury to their lives. No B
reason was assigned in support thereof. Appellant herein preferred an appeal
thereagainst. The learned Appellate Authority noticed that summary of
allegation had been served upon Appellant on 30.6.1988. He was of the
opinion that when the departmental enquiry was initiated, it was incumbent
upon the punishing authority to complete it and the provisions of Rule 16.28 C
of the Rules read with Section 7 of the Police Act, 186 I could not have been
circumvented in such a manner. It was categorically held :

            ".... As soon as a stigma is attacned against the Govt. Employee,
        then it is necessary to have a probe made into it. If the departmental
        enquiry had not been ordered then the dismissal order of SSP was not D
        open to challenge and in this manner, the dismissal order is illegal,
        void and not sustainable."

      It is not in dispute that pursuant thereto or in furtherance of the said
order dated 18. I0. I988, Appellant was reinstated in service. Thereafter the
departmental proceedings were held and therein the charges, having not been E
proved, were dropped. Once in the disciplinary proceedings Appellant was·
exonerated of the charges framed against him, the question of taking recourse
to Clause (b) of the 2nd Provision appended to Clause (2) of Article 3 I I of
the Constitution of India did not and could not arise. It is unfortunate that
although, the same had been duly noticed by the learned Trial Judge, it failed F
to receive due attention of the Appellate Court as also of the High Court. The
very purpose, for which the said provision was enacted, had lost its relevance
once a departmental proceeding was held. The Director General of Police,
while passing the order dated 5.2. I 990, furthermore failed to take into
consideration that in an appeal preferred by the delinquent from such an order
it was obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to produce all G
records to show that there were enough materials before the Disciplinary
Authority to arrive at a positive and categorical finding that in the departmental
proceeding the witnesses were not likely to depose. It was not done.
Resultantly, the entire proceeding became vitiated in law.

     This Court in Union of India & Anr. etc. v. Tulsiram Patel etc., AIR H
    820                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A (1985) SC 1416, held that                                                               .
                "It is not necessary that a situation which makes the holding of
           an inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the disciplinary
           inquiry is initiated against a government servant. Such a situation can
           also come into existence subsequently during the course of an inquiry,
B          for instance, after the service of a charge-sheet upon the government
           servant or after he has filed his written statement thereto or even after
           evidence has been led in part. In such a case also the disciplinary
           authority would be entitled to apply clause (b) of the second proviso
           because the word "inquiry" in that clause includes part of an inquiry.
           It would also not be reasonably practicable to afford to the government
c          servant an opportunity of hearing or further hearing, as the case may
           be, when at the commencement of the inquiry or pending it the
           government servant absconds and cannot be served or will not
           participate in the inquiry. In such cases, the matter must proceed ex
           parte and on the materials before the disciplinary authority. Therefore,
D          even where a part of an inquiry has been held and the rest is dispensed
           with under clause (b) or a provision in the service rules analogous
           thereto, the exclusionary words of the second proviso operate in their
           full vigour and the government servant cannot complain that he has
           been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank in violation of the
           safeguards provided by Article 311 (2).
E
                The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause
           (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should
           record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably
           practicable to hoJd the inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2). This is
           a constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in
F          writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty
           following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional."

          The said dicta was affirmed by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in
    Chief Security Officer & Ors. v. Singasan Rabi Das, (1991] l SCC 729, stating
G
           " ...... .It is common ground that under Rules 44 to 46 of the said Rules
           the normal procedure for removal of an employee is that before any
           order for removal from service can be passed the employee concerned
           must be given notice and an enquiry must be held on charges supplied
H          to the employees concerned. In the present case the only reason
              PRITHIPAL SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B SINHA, J.]            821

           given for dispensing with that enquiry was that it was considered not A
           feasible or desirable to procure witness of the security/other railway
           employees since this will expose these witnesses and make them
           ineffective in the future. It was stated further that if these witnesses
           were asked to appear at a confronted enquiry they were likely to
           suffer personal humiliation and insults and even their family members
           might become targets of acts of violence. In our view these reasons B
           are totally insufficient in law. We fail to understand how if these
           witnesses appeared at a confronted enquiry, they are likely to suffer
           personal humiliation and insults. These are normal witnesses and they
           could not be said to be placed in any delicate or special position in
           which asking them to appear at a confronted enquiry would render C
           them subject to any danger to which witnesses are not normally
           subjected and hence these grounds constitute no justification for
           dispensing with the enquiry. There is total absence of sufficient material
           or good grounds for dispensing with the enquiry."

      [See also Tarsem Singh v. State of Pubjab & Ors., (Civil Appeal No.1489 D
of 2004), disposed of by this Court on 25th January, 2006.)

       Holding of a departmental proceeding is the rule. The 2nd Proviso
appended to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India provides for an
exception. It is a trite law that existence of such an exceptional situation must
be shown to exist on the basis of relevant materials. In this C!ise, even such E
a question did not arise as a departmental proceeding had been held and the
appellant was not found guilty therein. Once he was exonerated of the charges,
the question of issuing an order of dismissal against him and that too, upon
dispensation of a formal inquiry, did not arise. The judgment of the High
Court as also of the 1st Appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial court F
is restored. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of case Appellant shall
be entitled to the costs, which is quantified at Rs.I 0,000/-.

         The appeal is allowed.

S.K.S.                                                          Appeal allowed.