Holding

The amendments to the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 – including Sections 4(1), 5(5‑B), 5(5‑C) and the appointment provisions – are constitutionally valid, within the State’s legislative competence, and do not violate Articles 14, 16 or the basic structure.

Summary

The Supreme Court dismissed three civil appeals filed by the Public Services Tribunal Bar Association challenging the constitutional validity of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 as amended by Act No. 5 of 2000. The Court held that the State Legislature had competence under Entry 41 of List II to enact and amend the Act, and that the amendments – including Section 4(1) limiting reference to an "order", Section 5(5‑B) and Section 5(5‑C) barring the Tribunal from granting interim relief in specified service matters, and the appointment provisions in Section 3 – are not arbitrary, do not violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution, and do not offend the basic structure. An omission or inaction by the authority can be challenged in the High Court under Article 226, so the public servant is not left without a remedy. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal’s power to grant interim relief was deliberately curtailed to avoid granting final relief at the interim stage, and that High Courts remain available for such relief in rare or mala‑fide cases. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and the amendments were upheld.

Issues considered

The constitutional validity of Section 4(1) of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, restricting reference to an "order" and excluding "inaction".
Whether Section 5(5‑B), which bars the Tribunal from granting interim relief in cases of suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination, compulsory retirement or reversion, violates Articles 14 and 16.
Whether Section 5(5‑C), which bars interim relief against an adverse entry, is unconstitutional.
The conformity of the appointment provisions in Section 3 (including sub‑section 4‑A and sub‑section 7) with the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the Constitution.
The legislative competence of the Uttar Pradesh Legislature to enact and amend the Act under Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.
Whether the amendments infringe the basic structure of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. 6(2)(b)
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 226, s. Article 227, s. List II Entry 41

Subjects

service tribunalinterim reliefconstitutional validitylegislative competenceArticles 14 and 16Article 226public servantadministrative lawappointment provisionsbasic structure doctrine

Judgment

A PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ANR

JANUARY 29, 2003

B [V.N. KHARE CJ AND ASHOK BHAN, J.]

Constitution of India, 1950:

VJ/ Schedule List 11 Ently 41-legislative competence of State to enact
C provisions of U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976-Discussed.

legislative action of State-Scope of-Discussed

U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976: (as amended by Act 5 of
2000):
D
Section 4(/)-Reference of claim to Tribunal with regard to an 'order'
pertaining to service matter- Validity of-Held: since no amendment or
clarification had come in the Act, an 'omission' and 'inaction' on the part of
the authority could be challenged by filing writ petition under Article 226 of
E the Constitution in High Court-Thus section 4 (/) constitutio11al/y va/id-
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226.

Section 5(5B)-Prohibiting Tribunal from passing interim order in respect
of an order made or purporting to be made by employer for the suspension,
dismissal, re}noval, reduction in rank, termination, compulsory retirement or
F reversion of public servant-Constitutional validity of-Held: Valid since the
cases in which operation of orders of dismissal, removal, termination etc. is
stayed by way of interim order is later on upheld at final stage then it results
in wrong usurpation of the office by employee during the operation of interim
order.

G Section 5(5C)-Prohibiting Tribunal from making interim order in respect
of an adverse ently of employees-Validity of-Held: Valid

Section 3(4A){b)-Held is in pari materia with Section 6(2){b) of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985·-Administrative Triqimals Act, 1985-
H Section 6(2){b).
666
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION"· STATEOFU.P. 667

U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 was promulgated for A
adjudication of disputes pertaining to employment matters of public
servants of State Government and employees of Government undertakings,
local bodies etc. The 1976 Act was amended from time to time. Sub section
(SB) of Section S was inserted which prohibited the Tribunal from passing
interim order in respect of order made or purporting t!'. be p1ade by B
employer for the suspension, dismissal, removal, reducti<ln in rank,
termination, compulsory retirement or reversion of public servant; sub
Section (SC) provided that the Tribunal shall have no power to make
interim ~rder in respect of adverse entry; Section 4(1) provided that public
servants could not approach the Tribunal for inaction on the part of
authority in respect of his legal rights; and Section 3 provided for C
appointment of Chairman, Vice-chairman (Judicial) and Vice-chairman
(Administrative) and Members. Various writ petitions were filed
challenging the constitutional validity of the newly added sections. High
Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act as well as the subsequent
amendments made therein. Hence the present appeal. D
, Appellants inter a/ia contended that the amendments brought about
•
in the Act are violative of fundamental rights guaranteed to a public
servant; that for effective adjudication to a cause of action complete
jurisdiction to grant relief including the interim relief should vest in one
and the same forum; that single cause of action cannot be split and divided E
for getting the interim and final relief in two different forums which works
out to be iniquitous, onerous and oppressive; that the High Court may
not intervene for giving interim relief as it is precluded from going il)to
dispute on merits at first instance which practically leaves the litigant from
getting any immediate relief against an order of transfer, termination,
suspension, removal, dismissal etc; that it also results in additional F
expenses to the litigant thus defeating the purpose of the Act itself thus
sub-section SB and SC are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution being arbitrary; and that the object of the amendments was
to bring the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 in tune with the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 198S whereas it is to the contrary. G
Respondents contended that a litigant is not left without any remedy,
he has a right to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution for redressal of his grievance for·interim relief; that the
power to grant interim relief from the Tribunal has not been taken away
completely, it has only been taken away partially; that this Court has H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A consistently been of the view that final relief could not be given at the
interim stage, in case the order of suspension or termination or dismissal j
~·
or removal is stayed at the interim stage it amounts to allowing the
petition itself at the interim stage; that taking away of the jurisdiction to
grant interim relief against an order of suspension, dismissal, removal,
reduction of rank, compulsory retirement or reversion of a public servant
B or to grant interim relief against an order of transfer or against an
adverse entry made in the record is not violative of Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution. ~
~

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
c HELD: I. Judicial system has an important role to play in our body
politir and has a solemn obligation to fulfill. In such circumstances it is
imperative upon the courts while examining the scope of legislative action
to be conscious to start with the presumption regarding the constitutional )r
validity of the legislation. The burden of proof is upon the shoulders of
D the incumbent who challenges it. It is true that it is the duty of the
Constitutional Courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by
the Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when the )

Parliament or State Legislature had assumed to enact a law which is void,
either for· want of constitutional power to enact it or because the
constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed or where the
E law infringes the fundamental rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part
III of the Constitution. (686-G, H; 687-A-B)

2. With regard to the challenge to Section 4(1) of the U.P. Public
Services (Tribunal) Act, inserted by Act No. 5 of 2000 on the ground that
a public servant could not approach the Tribunal for 'inaction' on the part c
F of the authorities in respect of his legal rights, the High Court has rightly '
~
taken the view that unless a clarification is made by the Legislature in
the Act clarifying that an order would include an 'omission' or 'inaction'
on the part of the authority, the 'inaction' on the part of the authority
can be challenged in the High Court by filing the writ petition under
,
G Article 226 of the Constitution. It cannot be said that the public servant '>.--

is left without a remedy to challenge any 'omission' or 'inaction' on the
part of the authority. Inaction by itself is an independent cause of action
and High Court can effectively deal with the same. (688-D-EI ~'

3.1. Dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement puts
JI an end to the relationship of employer and employee. In case of suspension,
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION r. STATE OF UP 669

reduction in rank or reversion the relationship of employer and employee A
continues. Interference at the interim stage \\'ith an order of dismissal.
removal, termination and co1npulsory retirement n'ould be giving the fina:J
relief to an employee at an interim stage \\ hich he \\'ould have got in case
1

the order of dismissal, re1noval, termination and compulsory retirement
is found not to be justified. If the order of dis1nissal, removal, term~.nation
and compulsory retirement is set aside then an employee can be B
compensated by moulding the relief appropriately in terms of arrears of
salary, promotions which may have become due or otherwise compensating
him in some other way. But in case the order of dismissal, removal,
termination and compulsory retirement is found to be justified then
holding of the office during the operation of the interim order would C
amount to usurpation of an office which the employee was not entitled to
hold. The action becomes irreversible as the salary paid to the employee
cannot be taken away as he has worked during that period and the orders
passed by him during the period he holds office (because of the interim
order) cannot also be put at naught. The Legislature in its wisdom thought

• it proper not to confer the power to grant interim relief, on the Tribunal.
State Legislature had the legislative competence to constitute a Service
Tribunal and it was for it to define the parameters of the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. 1690-F-H; 691-A-CI
D

3.2. Judicial review of an order regarding which the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal is barred would be available by approaching the High Court E
by filing petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. In an
extreme and rare case where the order is passed ma/a fide or without
following the procedure under lhe law then the employee can certainly

-
approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the
interim relief. High Court in such an extreme and rare case may in its F
wisdom stay the operation of the said order. Normally, the suspension is
made during a contemplated or a pending enquiry. During the suspension
period the employee is entitled for the suspension allowance. If the
suspension continues for indefinite period or order of suspension is passed
ma/a fide then it would be open to the employee to challenge the same by

-
approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In case G
.the order of reduction in rank or reversion is set aside then the employee
can be compensated by adequately moulding the relief while giving the
relief at the final stage. Power of the Tribunal to grant interim relief has
been taken away qua certain matters not completely. The power has been
taken away in matters where the grant of said relief at the interim stage H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] l S.C.R.

A would result in giving the relief which would normally be given while
disposing of the case finally. Simply because in a rare cases of microscopic ~
number a case is made out for stay of orders of suspension, transfer,
reduction in rank, reversion or termination, dismissal and compulsory
retirement and the employee is liable to approach High Court for interim r
stay by itself is no ground to strike down the law enacted by a Legislature
B which is within its competence to enact. Also when employee is to approach
High Court for interim relief ·resulting in some extra expense by itself is
~
no reason to strike down sub-section (5-B) being arbitrary and violative
of'Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (691-C-G; 692-G(

c 4. Adverse entry in the confidential report does not affect the
conditions of service of a public servant. Making of an entry in the
confidential report is an administrative act based on the subjective
satisfaction of the superior officer done on the objective criteria. It is an ~
assessment of the performance of the Government servant in one year. ~-

Assessment of performance in the past year may become a criteria
D affecting the future prospects of the employee. Invariably adverse entry
results in the passing of an order by the employer at a later stage and
such an order may result in giving rise tC) a cause of action. Sub-section
(5-C) does not debar the public servant to challenge adverse entry made
in the record. Public servant can approach the Tribunal to challenge the
E adverse entry made in the confidential report. Tribunal if satisfied can
set aside the adverse entry by way of a final order but stay of the adverse
entry at the interim stage may not be an appropriate relief. The reasons
given for upholding the validity of sub-section (5-B) would equally apply
for upholding the validity of sub-section (5-C). (692-A-DI

F 5. Sub-section (4-A) of Section 3 is in pari materia with Section 6(2)(b)
of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Sub-section (7) in Section 3 was
also substituted by adding the words "State Government after consultation
with the Chief Justice for which proposal will be initiated by the State
Government." In other words, the power of appointments with the State
Government has been retained but the same has to be exercised in
G
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as directed in Sanjai
Kumar Srivastava* case. Appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen
(Judicial) and (Administrative) and Members has now to be made in -,(,
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. The submission that
the amendment carried out in Section 3 regarding appointmefl( of
H Chairman, Vice-Chairmen (Judicial) as well as (Administrative) and
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION ,., STATE OFU.P. [ASHOK BHAN, J.] 671

Members is not in conformity with the corresponding provisions of A
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has no substance. (694-A-DJ

6. State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned provisions.
Further, the provisions enacted are not arbitrary and, therefore, nOt
violative of Articles 14 and 16 or any other provisions of the Constitution
and are not against the basic structure of the Constitution of India either. B
(694-EJ

SP. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261; L. Chandra
Kumarv. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261; KrishnaSahai v. State of UP.,
(1990) 2 SCC 673; Rajendra Singh Yadav v. State of UP., (1990) 2 SCC C
763; Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625; Delhi Cloth &
General Mills Co. Ltd v. Shri Rameshwar Dyal and Anr., [1961) 2 SCR 590;
UP. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishadv. Sanjiv Rajan, (1993) Supp. 3
SCC 311; State of Haryana v. Suman Dutta, (2000( 10 SCC 311; State of
Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co. and Ors., (1996( 3 SCC 709; State of
Bihar and Ors. v. Bihar Distillery ltd and Ors., [1997) 2 SCC 453 and Sanjai D
Kumar Srivastava v. State of UP. and Ors., Writ Petition No. 1619(MB) of
1993 decided by Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3946 of
2001.
E
From the Judgment and Order elated 5.5.2000 of the High Court ofU.P.
in WP 4285/99.

WITH

Civil Appeal Nos. 3947 of 2001 and 3948 of 2001. F

K.K. Venugopal, Ranjit Kumar, P.P. Rao, Subhash Chandra Srivastava,
Ajey S. Tiwari, V.K. Pandey, S. Wasim A. Qadri, Rahul Singh, Lakshmi
Raman Singh, Amit Bose, B.P. Singh, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, V.J. Francis,
Ashok Kumar Pandey, N.S. Gah!ot and Vishwajit Singh for the appearing G
parties.

X The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAN, J. These appeals are directed against a common order passed
by a Full Bench of Five Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Writ H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) l S.C.R.

A Petition No. 4285 (MB) of 1999, Public Services Tribunal Bar Association
v. State of U.P. and Anr., Civil Writ Petition No. 871 (MB) of 2000, Afzal ~
Ahmad Siddiqui v. State of U.P. and Ors. and Civil Writ Petition No. 1262
(MB) of 2000, Shireesh Kumar v. State of U.P. and Ors., wherein the High
Court has dismissed the writ petitions challenging the vires of the U.P. Public
B Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, as ainended from. time to time. The High
Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the Act as well as the subsequent
amendments made therein.

To effectively adjudicate the dispute arising in these appeals it would
be necessary to have a look at the events in a chronological order which are
C given in brief as under:

The U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 ( for short "the Act")
was promulgated relating to public servants of the State Government and the
employees of the government undertakings, local bodies etc. having power to
grant interim relief as well. Before the coming into force of the Act the
D public servants were approaching civil courts for redressal of their grievances
arising out of their service matters by filing civil suits before the civil court
of competent jurisdiction or by approaching the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. After the coming into force of the Act the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court was taken away. The decision to have a separate
service Tribunal was taken by the State Government after considering the
E increasing workload of the civil courts and the delay in disposal of the service
matters. The purpose for creating the Tribunal has been indicated in the
statement of objects of the Act, which reads as under:

"The number of cases in the courts pertaining to the employment
matters of the Government servants was constantly on the increase.
F This, besides increasing the workload in the courts also delayed
considerably the disposal of such cases. Such litigation also involved
money and time of government servants. In these circumstances, it
was decided to establish Public Services Tribunals to deal with cases
pertaining to employment matters of government servants and also of
G the employees of the local authorities and Government Corporations
and Companies, so that the employees may get quick and inexpensive
justice. It was also decided that after the establishment of the Tribunals
such suits be barred from being file in the subordinate courts."

Under the original Act the State Government constituted five Tribunals
H each comprising of an !AS Officer as a Chairman and a Judicial Officer of
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION"· STATEOFU.P. [ASHOK BHAN, J.] 673

the rank of District Judge as a Judicial Member. Each Tribunal was vested A
with the jurisdiction over service matters of different departments to the State
Government. Under Section 4 of the Act any person who is or has been a
public servant could file a claim petition in any manner relating to employment
.as such public servant if his employer had dealt with him in a manner which
was not in conformity with any contract or provisions of Article 16 or Article B
311 of the Constitution of India or with any rules or law having force under
Article 309 or Article 313 of the Constitution. Under Section 5 (5) U) of the
original Act the Tribunals had the power to pass interim orders in respect of
all matters within their jurisdiction including orders of dismissal. removal,
reduction in rank, tennination, reversion and compulsory retirement.

The Act was amended by the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal)
c
(Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. I of 1977). By the said amendment after
,,.,- sub-section (5) of Section 5, sub-sections (5-A) and (5-B) were inserted.
Under Section 5 (5-A) the Tribunal could pass an interim order in specific
type of cases, but under Section 5 (5-B) the Tribunal was prohibited from
passing interim orders in respect of the order made or purporting to be made D
by an employer for the suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank,
termination, reversion and compulsory retirement.

In the year 1982 a proviso was added to Section 4 of the Act by the
U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. 2 of 1982) E
divesting the Tribunal of the jurisdiction to deal with petitions arising out of
orders of transfer of a public servant.

In 1985 the Administrative Tribunals Act (Act No. 13 of 1985) was
enacted by the Parliament under Article 323-A of the Constitution providing
a Central Administrative Tribunal with benches for adjudicating disputes in F
respect of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed under
the Central Government and its undertakings in connection with the affairs
of the Union. Under Section 5(1) of the said Act Tribunal was to consist of
a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Judicial and Administrative Members. Under
Section 6(1)(c) of the said Act a person who hac' held the post of Secretary
to the Government of India or any other post under Central or State G
Government carrying a scale of pay which was not less than that of a Secretary
to the Government of India could be appointed as the Chairman of the Tribunal.
The original Act vested the entire power of appointment of Chairman, Vice-
Chairman, Administrative & Judicial Members of the Tribunal in the Central
Government without providing for their appointments being made in H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

Writ Petition No. 12437 of 1985, S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of
India and Ors., connected cases were filed in this CoLtrt under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 including Section 28 of the said Act whereby the High
B Courts were divested of their jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution in respect of matters within the juri1diction of the Administrative
Tribunals, i.e., in respect of service matters pe1taining to employees of the
Central Govemment, State Govemment or any undertaking which were brought
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. 'SP. Sampath Kumar's case and other
C connected cases were referred to and disposed of by a Constitution Bench of
this Court and the same is reported in [1987) I SCC I 24. By the said decision,
this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Administrative Tribunals
Act but directions were issued to the Central Government to amend the Act, )r
inter alia, to delete the provisions providing for IAS Officers to be appointed
as Chainnan of the Tribunal and providing for appointment of Chairman,
D Vice-Chairman and other members of the Tribunal in consultation with the
Chief Justice of India. Thereafter in I 987 by Administrative Tribunals
(Amendment) Act, section 6( I)( c) of the said Act .were omitted and section
6 (7) was substituted providing for appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairman
and members of the Tribunal in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

E In Krishna Sahai v. State of U.P., [I 990) 2 SCC 673 and Rajendra
Singh Yadav v. State of U.P., [I 990] 2 SCC 763, this Court directed the State
of U.P. to consider the feasibility of setting up an appropriate Tribunal under
the Central Tribunal Act, I 985 in place of the Services Tribunals functioning
at present, and in case the existing State Tribunals were continued. This
F. Court observed: )IL .
" ...... it would be appropriate for the State of Uttar Pradesh to change
its manning and a sufficient number of people qualified in Law should
be on the Tribunal to ensure adequate dispensation of justice and to
I . .

maintain judicial temper in the functioning of the. Tribunal. .."
G
In the later decision in Rajendra Singh Yadav's case (supra), this Court
reiterated its earlier view, a few other observations to improve the functioning
of the ·services Tribunal were made. The said observations read as under:

"We have been told that the Services Tribunal mostly consists of
H Administrative Officers and the judicial element in the manning part
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. STATEOFU.P lASHOKBHAN,J.] 675

of the Tribunal is very small. As was pointed out by us in S.P. A
Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, the disputes require judicial
handling and the adjudication being essentially judicial in character
it is necessary that an adequate number of judges of the appropriate
level should man the Services Tribunals. This would create appropriate
temper and generate the atmosphere suitable in aff adjudicatory
Tribunal and the institution as well would command the requisite B
confidence of the disputants. We have indicated in the connected
matter that steps should be taken to replace the Services Tribunals by
Tribunals under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. That would
give the Tribunal the necessary colour in terms of Article 323-A of
the Constitution. As a consequence of setting up of such Tribunals, C
the jurisdiction of the High Court would be taken away and the
Tribunals can with plenary powers function appropriately. The disputes
which have arisen on account of the Services Tribunals not having
complete jurisdiction to deal with every situation arising before it
would then not arise.
D
We have pointed out that notice has been issued in a later case
for the State's response to the question of Tribunals to be located at
different parts of the State. State of Uttar Pradesh territorially is the
second largest State in lndia but considering the population it comes
first. Almost every part of the State is well advanced and service
litigation in such setting is likely to arise everywhere. To locate the E
seat of the Tribunals at the State capital in such a situation is not
appropriate. The accepted philosophy relevant to the question today
is that justice should be taken to everyone's doors. This, of course,
is not a statement which should be taken literally but undoubtedly the
redressal forum should be available near about so that litigation may F
be cheap and the forum of ventilating grievance may not be difficult
to approach. Keeping that in view which is a legitimate consideratjon
it would be appropriate for the State Government to consider, firstly,
increase in the number of benches of the Tribunal and secondly, to
locate them not at the same station but at various sectors or depending
upon the number of institution of disputes and pendency at the level G
of independent Commissionerate or by clubbing two or three of them
together. This, of course, is a matter which would require further
examination at the administrative level and, therefore, we express no
opinion regarding location of such Tribunals although we are of the
definite view that there should be Tribunals available in different H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A parts of the State and all the benches of the Tribunal should not be
located at one place."
·+
Thereafter in 1992 the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) (Amendment)
Act (U.P. Act No. 7 of 1992) was promulgated amending drastically the
provisions of the original Act. Only one Tribunal with separate division and
B single member benches replaced the several Tribunals constituted under the
original Act. According to section 3(2) of the Amending Act the Tribunal
was to consist of one Chairman, one Vice-Chairman, Judicial and
Administrative Members. Under section 3(3)(c) of the Amending A;t an IAS
Officer could be appointed as Chairman of that Tribunal. Similarly, under
C section 3(4) (c) of the Amending Act an IAS officer could also be appointed
as Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal. Another significant change brought about
by the Amending Act was that vide Section 5-A of the Amending Act the
Tribunal was vested with the powers of punishment for its contempt in the
same manner as the High Court has under the provisions of the Contempt· of
Courts Act. Thereafter in 1993 Sri S. Venkat Ramani, an IAS officer was
D appointed by the State Government as Chairman of the Tribunal. Sanjai
Kumar Srivastava filed writ petition No.16 I 9(MB) of 1993 before the
Allahabad High Court challenging the appointment of Sri Venkat Ramani as·
Chairman of the Tribunal as well as challenging the constitutional validity of
the provisions of section 5(3) (c) and 5(4)(c) of the Act as amended in 1992
E whereby an IAS officer could be appointed as Chairman and Vice-Chairman
of the Tribunal. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court by its judgment
dated 26th May, 1995 struck down the provisions of Section 5 (3) (c) and
5(4) (c) of the Act and quashed the appointment of Sri Venkat Ramani an
IAS officer as Chairman of the Tribunal.

F In 1994 the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal),,, (Amendment) Ordinance
(U.P. Ordinance No. 23 of 1994) was promulgated whereby sub-section 5-C
was inserted to section 5 of the Act divesting the Tribunal from passing any
interim order in respect of an adverse entry awarded to a public servant and
providing that all interim orders passed in respect of any such adverse entry
before the promulgation of the Ordinance would stand vacated. This Ordinance
G in due course of time lapsed and thereafter in the year 1995 again the same
Ordinance was promulgated by U.P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1995 introducing
the same amendments as were in U.P. Ordinance No. 23 of 1994. This
Ordinance also lapsed in due course of time and thereafter on 25t!fAugust,
1995 the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) (Amendment) (Second) Ordinance,
.H 1995 (U.P. Ordinance No.32 of 1995) was promulgated by the Governor re-
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUl,AL BAR ASSOCIATION "·STATE OF U.P. (ASHOK BHAN, J.] 677

promulgating U.P. Ordinance No. 8 of 1995 which had lapsed on expiry of A
-+ ' the period specified in Article 213(2) of the Constitution.

In February, 1997 a former Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Justice
K.L. Sharma (retd.) was appointed as the Chairman of the Tribunal. Justice
Sharma retired as Chairman of the Tribunal on 10th July, 1999.
B
On 10th of September, 1999 U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Amendment
Ordinance,·1999 (U.P. Ordinance No. 17of1999) was promulgated by the
Governor ofU.P. and published vide notification dated 9th September, 1999.
By Ordinance No. 17of1999 Section 4(J) was substituted in place ofsect!on
4 of the Act, further Section (5-C) was added to Section 5. Writ Petition No. C
4285(MB) of 1999 was filed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Bar
Association. The constitutional validity of newly added Section 4( I), sub-
section (5-C) and Section 5(5-B) was challenged being ultra vires the
Constitution. A further prayer was made that a writ in the nature of mandamus
be issued commanding the State Government to modify the Act strictly in
conformity with the Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as per the D
law laid down by this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar's case (supra) and L.
Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, [1997] 3 SCC 261. Lastly it was prayed
that the U.P. Public Services Tribunal be given comprehensive powers to
1

grant interim relief to make the Tribunal more efficient and effective.
Subsequently the impugned U.P. Ordinance No. 17 of 1999 was replaced by E
U.P. Act No. 5 of2000. Thereafter an application for amendment of the writ
petition challenging the U.P. Act No. 5 of 2000 was moved which was
allowed.

Sri Satish Chand Shukla, a practising advocate of Allahabad High Court
filed writ petition No. 5 J03 (MB) of 1999 challenging the constitutional F
validity of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 on the ground that
the same was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature.

Shri Afzal Ahmad Siddiqui, a practising advocate filed writ petition
No. 748 (MB) of 1999 challenging the constitutional validity of Section 3(5), G
(7) and (8) of the Act with a prayer to annul the above sections in order to
remove the infirmities of the Act as pointed out by this Court in S.P.Sampath
X Kumar's case (supra). The same advocate Shri Afzal Ahmad Siddiqui filed
another writ petition No. 1636 (MB) of 1999 challenging the constitutional
validity of the U.P. Ordinance No. 17 of 1999. After the coming into force
of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 2000 replacing the Ordinance No.17 of 1999 Shri H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A Afzal Ahmad Siddiqui filed writ petition No. 871 (MB) of 2000 challe1"11ging
the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 2000. Relief claimed in writ petition +
No: 871 (MB) of 2000 was the same as had been claimed in writ petition
Nos. 748 (MB) of 1999 and 1636 (MB) of 1999 filed by him in which he had
challenged the provisions of the Ordinance.

B The provisions of the Act which are under challenge and other relevant
provisions are reproduced below for reference:

"Section 3. Constitution of the Tribunal -(I) As soon as may be after
the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunals)
(Amendment) Act, 1992, the State Government shall, by notification,
c establish a Tribunal to be called the State Public Services Tribunal.

(2) The Trbinual shall consist of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman
(Judicial), A Vice-Chairman (Administrative) and such number of
other Judicial and Administrative Members not less than five in each
category, as may be determined by the State Government.
D
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Chairman,
unless he-

(a) has been a Judge of a High Court, or

E (b) has, for at least two years held the post of Vice-Chairman, or

(c) has been a member of the Indian Administrative Service who has
held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any
other post under the Central or the State Government equivalent
thereto, and has adequate experience in dispensation of justice.
F (4) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Vice-Chairman
(Judicial) unless he,-

(a) has held the post of District Judge or any other J?OSt equivalent
thereto for at least five years; or

G (b) has, for at least two years, held the post of a Judicial Member.

(4-A) A person shall not be quaiified for appointment as Vice-
Chairman (Administrative) unless he-

(a) has, for at least two ye~rs, held the post of an Administrative
H Member; or
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION "·STATE OF U.P. [ASHOK BHAN, J.] 679

(b) has, for at least two years, held the post of Additional Secretary A
to the Government of India or any other post under the Central
or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less
than that of an Additional Secretary to the Government of India
and has, in the opinion of the State Government, adequate
experience in dispensation of Justice.
B
(5) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judicial
Member, unless he has held the post of District Judge, or any other
post equivalent thereto.

(6) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as an
Administrative Member, unless he has held, or has been eligible to C
hold, the post of Commissioner of a Division or Joint Secretary to the
Government of Cndia and has in the opinion of the State Government,
adequate experience in dispensation of justice.

(7) The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and every other member shall be
appointed by the State Government after consultation with the Chief D
Justice for which proposal will be initiated by the State Government:

Provided that no person shall assume the Office of Chairman, Vice-
Chairman or other member, as the case may be, unless he has resigned
or retired from, as the case may be, the Judgeship of the High Court,
or the Indian Administrative Service or the Uttar Pradesh Higher E
Judicial Service or any other service in which he was serving except
the service as Vice-Chairman or Member.

Section 4. Reference of claim to Tribunal-(J) Subject to the other
provisions of this Act, a person who is or has been a public servant
and is aggrieved by an order pertaining to a service matter within the F
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make a reference of claim to the
Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.

Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section "order" means an
order made by the State Government or a local authority or any other
Corporation or company referred to in clause (b) of Section 2 or by G
an officer, committee or other body or agency of the State Government
x or such local authority or Cor~oration or company:

Provided that no reference shall, subject to the terms of any contract,
be made in respect of a claim arising out of the transfer of a public H
servant.
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) I S.C.R .

.A Section 5. Powers and procedure of the Tribunal-( I )(a) The Tribunal
shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), or the rules of evidence contained
in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act I of 1872), but shall be guided
by the principles of natural justice, and subject to the provisions of
this s~tion and of any rules made under Section 7, the Tribunal shall
B hav~i power to regulate its own procedure (including the fixing of
places.and times of its sittings and deciding whether to sit in public
or private):

Provided that where, in respect of the subject-matter of a reference,
a competent court has already passed a decree or order or issued a
c ''· writ or direction, and such decree, order, writ or direction has become
final, the principle of res judicata shall apply.

Section (5-B) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing sub-sections,
c
the Tribunal shall have no power to make an interim order (whether
by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) in respect of an
D order made or purporting to be made by an employer for the
suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination,
compulsory retirement or reversion of a public servant, and every
interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other
manner), in respect of such matter, which was made by a Tribunal
E before the date of commencement of this sub-section and which if in
force on that day, shall stand vacated.

Section (5-C) Notwithstanding anything in the forgoing sub-sections,
the Tribunal shall have no power to make an interim order (whether
by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) in respect of an
F adverse entry made by an employer against a public servant, and
every interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any
other manner) in respect of an adverse entry, which was made by a
Tribunal before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Public
Services (Tribunal) (Amendment) Act, 2000 and which is in force on
the date of such commencement shall stand vacated."
G
The validity of Section 4(1) inserted by Act N0.5 OF 2000 has been
challenged on the ground that a public servant could not approach the Tribunal
for 'in action' on the part of the authorities in respect of his legal rights. If
there was inaction on the part of the employer a publi<;. servant had no
H remedy before the Tribunal and further the incumbent could not approach the
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION >«STATE OF U.P. [AS HOK BHAN, l.l 68 J

Civil Court for the reason that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had already A
been barred under Section 6 of the Act. That by the amendments made in the
impugned Act the powers of the Tribunal regarding judicial review of
administrative in-action deprives the litigants of their valuable right. Divesting
of power of judicial revie\v too was ultra vires to the Constitution of India.
Judicial review being basic .and essential feature of the Constitution as held B
by this Court in Minerva Mills Lid v. Union of India, reported in [1980] 3
SCC 625. The object of the Act was not to leave a public servant without any
remedy. It was further averred that initially there were provisions in the Act
conferring powers upon the Tribunal to grant interim relief. However, in due
course of time on one pretext or the other the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to
grant interim reliefs has gradually been taken away. Firstly embargo was put C
with respect to grant of interim relief in certain matters. Subsequently the
jurisdiction with respect to transfer was taken away and lastly the power to
make interim order in respect of an adverse entry made.~n employer
against a public servant has been taken away. By the impugned action of the
respondents the whole concept of the aims and objects of the Act have been
diluted. If the Tribunal is not conferred with full powers of the court and the D
authority to grant effective relief to the public servants then it cannot be the
real substitute of the courts. If the Tribunal is not empowered to deal with
every situation with respect to the services of the public servants then it will
loose its identity. If the rule of law is to prevail the Tribunal has to play
effective role in administration of justice and in the process the Tribunal E
should have all powers as are vested in courts. Challenging the later part of
sub-section (c) to the effect that "every order made whether b; way of
injunction or stay or any other manner in respect of an adverse entry which
was made by the Tribunal before the date this sub-section came into force
and which was in force on that date shall stand vacated", it was contended
that the interim orders granted by the Tribunal before the coming into force F
of section (5-C) with retrospective effect could not be nullified by exercise
of legislative power and only the provisions which are the basis of the judicial
orders could be amended. That the complete ouster of jurisdiction in the
matter of grant of interim relief from the Tribunal in specified cases was
u//ra vires to the Constitution as.there was no judicial remedy open for the G
incumbent. For example in the matter of suspension the Tribunal does not
have the power to grant any interim relief whereas the order may suffer from
legal infinnity, error of jurisdiction, mala fide and arbitrary exercise of power.
In view of these circumstances it was submitted that a public servant does not
have any judicial redress and continues under suspension during the period
of disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, it was submitted that right of livelihood H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R .

.A is a fundamental right of a government servant and by illegal termination of
his service the said right is infringed. The order of termination on the face
of it may be without jurisdiction and bad in law but since the Tribu'nal did
not have the power to grant interim relief such incumbent would go without
relief till the matter is frnally heard and decided. It takes considerably long
-B period before the dispute is finally decided and during this period the
incumbent faces financial and mental torture. Another submission made was
that judgment and orders of the Tribunal before the promulgation of the
amended Act could be executed after issuance of a certificate by the Tribunal
to the principal civil court under sub-section (7) of Section 5 of the Act.
However, by the amendment made in the impugned Act by U.P. Act No. 7
C of 1992, sub-section (7) of Section 5 was substituted by the following
provisions:-

"(7) The order of the Tribunal finally disposing of a reference shall
be executed in the same manner in which any final order of the State
Government or other authority or officer or other person competent
D to pass such order under the relevant service rules as to redressal of
grievances in any appeal preferred or representation made by the
claimant in connection with any matter relating to his employment to
which the reference relates would have been executed."

In view of the aforesaid substituted sub-section (7) of Section 5, the
E orders and judgment of the Public Services Tribunal cannot be executed as
a decree of civil court and they are executable only as orders of the State
Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass
such orders under relevant service rules. It was also contended that powers
and functions of the Tribunal as they stand today under the Act are not in
F consonance with the dictum of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar's case
(supra) and L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra).

The validity of Section 3 and especially an appointment of an
Administrative Member as Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal was challenged on
the ground that the same was contrary to the decision of this Court in S.P.
G Sampath Kumar's case (supra). That an IAS officer could not be made Vice-
Chairman because in the absence of a Chairman or Vice-Chairman(Judicial),
a Vice-Chainnan (Administration) could officiate as a Chairman which would -·
be contrary to the law laid down by this Court in S. P. Sampath Kumar's case
(supra).

H In the written statements filed by the respondents a preliminary objecti~n
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION " STATE OF U.P. [ASHOK BHAN. J) 683

was taken regarding the maintainability of the writ petition challenging the A
vi res of the Act by the Tribunal Bar Association which was not an aggrieved
party. On 1nerits it was sub1nitted that the a1nend1nents brought out in the Act
are in consonance with the directions issued by this Court in S.P. Sampath
Kumar's case (supra) and various other judgments/orders rendered by the
Allahabad. High Court. The amendments have been made to bring the U.P. B
Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 at par with the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985. That the appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman (Judicial)
as well as Vice-Chairman (Administration) as well as Members has now to
be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. That it has
been done in pursuance to the directions issued by the Allahabad High Court
in Writ Petition No. 1619(MB) of 1993 Sanjai Kumar Srivastava v. State of C
UP. and Ors., by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court wherein the
provisions of sub-section 3( c) and 4 (c) of Section 3 of the unamended Act
were struck down. These sub-sections (as they stood on the statute boo)>)
provided that an !AS officer could be appointed as Chairman. Now the
appointment of the Chairman, the two Vice-Chairmen and Members has to
be made by the State Government after effective consultation with the Chief D
Justice of the High Court on the basis of parameters indicated in Sanjai
Kumar Srivastava's case (supra) of the Allahabad High Court. That the State
Legislature was competent to enact the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act
as well as to carry out the amendments in it in exercise of its legislative
power. E
In regard to challenge of sub-section (I) of Section 4 that only an
'order' passed by the authority could be challenged and not the 'in-action' on
the part of the government to pass an order, it was submitted that order also
would mean omission and inaction on the part of the authority concerned for
• .i.
which a public servant could move the Tribunal. Advocate General who had F
appeared before the High Court on behalf of the State very fairly stated that
the 'inaction' or 'omission' to Act could also be challenged before the Tribunal.
Since no explanation/clarification had come in the Act, the High Court
observed:

"Now it is certain that there is no remedy provided in the Act to the G
Government employee to approach the Services Tribunal as far as
non-action of the State Government is concerned. Therefore we are
of the considered opinion that now the remedy open to such incumbent
is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It could be a blessing
in disguise to such employees as this Cou11 can even grant interim H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

After detailed examination of the various submissions made before it -..,.,
the High Cou11 upheld the constitutional validity of the Act as well as the
subsequent amendments made therein. In the concluding portions the High
Court culled out the conclusions as follows:
B
"(i) The composition of the Tribunal as provided by the impugned
Act is constitutional and valid.

(ii) The State Let;islature is competent to enact, revalidate on re-
enact any provision of law.
c (iii) The impugned Act (U.P.Act No.5 of 2000) does not suffer from
any colourable exercise of power.

(iv) The impugned Act is not inconsistent with the rights guaranteed Y
in Part III of the Constitution.

D (v) By issuance of the impugned Act there has neither been viol<.tion
of fundamental rights nor violation of the principles of basic
structure of the Constitution.

(vi) For non-action on the part of State Government in relation to
service matters of the State employees the remedy open is only
E under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

Shri Venugopal, learned senior advocate appearing in Civil Appeal No.
3946 of 200 I did not raise the point regarding the legislative competence of
the State Legislature to enact the Act or the various amendments brought
therein. The only submission made by him is that the amendments brought
p about in the Act are violative of fundamental rights guaranteed to a public
servant in the spirit of Social Justice and Welfare State concepts which
constitute the backbone cf the Indian Constitution and basic structure of the
Constitution. For effective adjudication to a cause of action complete
jurisdiction to grant relief including the interim relief should vest ,irt> one and
the same forum. Single cause of action cannot be split and divided for getting
G the interim and final relief in two different forums. A public servant is required
to approach the Tribunal to challenge the order of its termination whereas for
getting an interim relief against the order of termination he is forced to
approach the High Court. Right to get interim relief is ancillary to the main
relief and therefore should vest in one and the same forum. Splitting of the ·
H cause of action for getting the relief interim and the final works out to be
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION •·. STATEOFU.P. [ASHOK BHAN, J.) 685

iniquitous, onerous and oppressive. More often and so, the High Court may A
not intervene for giving interi1n relief as it is precluded from going into the
dispute on merits at the first instance which practically leaves the· litigant
from getting any i1nmediate relief against an order of transfer, termination,
suspension, removal, dismissal etc. It also results in additional expenses to
the litigant thus defeating the purpose of the Act itself. For the said reasons, B
according to him, sub-section 5B and 5C are violative of Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution being arbitrary.

Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior advocate appearing in Civil Appeal
Nos. 3947 & 3948 of 200 l contended that object of the amendments was to
bring the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 in tune with the C
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 whereas it is to the contrary. That the
impugned judgment does not deal with the question regarding holding of the
post of a Vice-Chairman by a non judicial member. In other respects he
adopted the submissions made by Shri Venugopal.

Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents D
contraverted the submissions made by the respective counsels appearing for
the appellants in the two sets of appeals. It was contended by him that a
)f litigant is not left without any remedy. He has a right to approach the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his
grievance for interim relief. Power to grant interim relief from the Tribunal
has not been taken away completely. It has only been taken away partially. E
Referring to the following judgments viz. (i) Delhi Cloth & General Mills
Co. ltd. v. Shri Rameshwar Dyal and Anr., reported in [1961) 2 SCR 590,
(ii) U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan reported in
[1993) Supp. 3 SCC 483; and (iii) State o/Haryana v. Suman Dutta reported
in [2000] I 0 SCC 311, it was contended that this Court has consistently been p
of the view that final relief could not be given at the interim stage. In case
the order of suspension or termination or dismissal or removal is stayed at the
inter~m stage it a1nounts to allowing the petition itself at the interim stage.
This Court in State of Haryana 's case (supra) has held that order oftennination
could not be stayed by interim order. In case any public servant is finally
ordered to be reinstated after quashing the order of termination, removal, G
dismissal, suspension etc., he can be compensated by the courts by
appropriately moulding the relief whereas in cases where the order of removal,
dismissal, termination etc. is stayed at the interim stage but later on the
petition is dismissed then the courts cannot mould the relief to undo the
mischief resulting from the interim order passed. That constitution of the H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) I S.C.R.

A forum to get redressal of grievance, the procedure prescribed and the right to
file an appeal, revision etc. are all creations of statute and the State Legislature
was competent to enact such a law. The same was not violative of Articles
14 & 16 of the Constitution~ Under the circumstances it was contended by
him that taking away of the jurisdiction to grant interim relief against an
order of suspension, dismissal, removal, deduction of rank, compulsory
B retirement or reversion· of a public servant or to grant interim relief against
an order of transfer or against an adverse entry made in the record is not
violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution.

The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two
C grounds, viz., (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of
the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any
other constitutional provisions. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell &
Co. and Ors., [ 1996] 3 SCC 709, this Court has opined that except the above
two grounds there is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by
the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation
D must necessarily fall within the four corners of the aforementioned two
grounds.

Power to enact a law is derived by the State Assembly from List II of
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 41 confers upon a State
Legislature the power to make State Public Services: State Public Services
E Commission. Under this Entry, a State Legislature has the power to constitute
State Public Services and to regulate their service conditions, emoluments
and provide for disciplinary matter etc. The State Legislature had enacted the
U.P. Public Services Tribunals Act, 1976 in exercise ofthe power vested in
it by Entry 41 of List II of seventh schedule. Power to enact would include
F the power to re-enact or validate any provision of law in the State Legislature
provid~d the same falls in a entry of List II of the VII Schedule of the
Constitution with the restriction that such enactment should not nullify a
judgment of the competent court of law .. The legislative competence of the
State to enact the U.P. Public Services Tribunal has not been questioned in
these appeals. The challenge put forth is to various am~ndments made is that
G the same are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution being arbitrary
as they are onerous arid work inequitably. In the present af>peals legislative
action of the State is under challenge. Judicial system has an important role
to play in our body politic and has a solemn obligation to fulfil. In such
circumstances it is imperative upon the courts while examining the scope of
H legislative action to be conscious to start with the presumption regarding the
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION ''·STATE OF U.P. [ASHOK BHAN, J] 687

constitutional validity of the legislation. The burden of proof is upon the A
shoulders of the incumbent who challenges it. It is true that it is the duty of
the Constitutional Courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by
the Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when the Parliament
or State Legislature had assumed to enact a law which is void, either from
want of constitutional power to enact it or because the constitutional forms B
or conditions have not been observed or where the law infringes the
fundamental rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part Hl of the Constitution.

In State of Bihar and Ors. v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. and Ors., reported
m [1997] 2 SCC 453, this Court indicated the approach which the Court
should adopt while examining the validity/constitutionality of a legislation. It C
would be useful to remind ourselves of the principles laid down which read:

"The approach of the court, while examining the challenge to the
constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of
constitutionality. The Court should to try to sustain its validity to the
extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is D
not possible to sustain it. The court should not approach the enactment
with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much
less inexactitude of language employed. [ndeed any such defects of
drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the
validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by
the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be E
lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and
clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. The same
approach holds good while ascertaining the intent and purpose of an
enactment or its scope and application (para 17)."

In the same paragraph the Court further observed as follows: F

"The Court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of
legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it, just as
the legislature and the executive are expected to show due regard and
deference to the judiciary. It cannot also be forgotten that our G
Constitution recognizes and gives effect to the concept of equality
between the three wings of the State and the concept of "checks and
balances)) inherent in such schen1e."

In the light of what has been stated above, we proceed to examine the
challenge to the various provisions of the Act. H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A The newly added sub-section (I) of Section 4 contemplates that subject
to the provisions of the Act a person who is and has been public servant
bt;ing aggrieved by an "order'' pertaining to the service matters within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal may make a reference to the Tribunal for redressal
of his grievances. Counsel appearing for the respondents fairly stated before
B us as had been stated by the Advocate General appearing for the State before
the High Court that an "order" would also.;mean '·'omission" and "inaction"
on the part of the authority concerned for wl\ich the public servant can move
the Tribunal. In the written statement filed by the respondents in the High
Court it was stated that an order would include an "omission" or "inaction"
on the part of the authority concerned and open to challenge. Since no such
C amendment or clarification had come in the Act, the High Court observed
that an "omission" and "inaction'' on the part. of the authority could be
challenged by filing a writ petition under Atticle 226 of the Constitution of
India in the High Court. It was observed that there is no remedy provided in
the Act to the Government employee to approach the Services Tribunal as far
as non-action of the State Government is concerned. The only remedy open
D is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

We agree with the view taken by the High Court that unless a
clarification is made by the Legislature in the Act clarifying that an order )(
would include an "omission" or "inaction" on the part of the authority, the
E "inaction" on the part of the authority can be challenged in High Court by
filing the writ petition under A1ticle 226 of the Constitution of India. It
cannot be said that the public servant is left without a remedy to challenge
any omission or inaction on the part of the authority. Inaction by itself is an
independent cause of action and the High Court can effectively deal with the
same.
F
Sub-sections (5-B) of Section 5 was introduced earlier in the principal
Act by Act No. l of 1977 after the same was assented to by the President of
India on 10th January, 1977. The same was challenged in the High Court in
the year 1978 by filing a Writ Petition No. 4255 of 1978. The validity of
Sub-section (5-B) was upheld which decision was not challenged in appeal.
G The High Court relying upon the reasons recorded in the earlier writ petition
upheld the vires of sub-Section (5-8). Since a point has been raised that
earlier decision by the two Judges and now the matter was being considered
by a larger Bench of five Judges, the full Bench should have examined the
point afresh and record an independent reason instead of upholding the validity
H of Sub-Section (5-8) for the reasons recorded in the earlier judgment by two
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BARASSOCIATION " STATE OF U.P. [ASHOK BHAN, J.] 689

Judges. We proceed to examine the validity of Sub-sections (5-B) and(5-C) A
of Section 5 independently of what had been held by the High Court in Writ
Petition No. 4255 of 1978.

Before we make a reference to the various provisions of that Act under
challenge and examine their validity it would be useful to refer to certain
decisions of this Court wherein the grant of interim stay in cases of dismissal, B
tennination or suspension has been examined.

In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. ltd. case (supra) this Court
examined the point as to whether a workman could be ordered to be reinstated
as an interim measure pending final adjudication by the Tribunal under the
Industrial Disputes Act. In the said case the employer dismissed the workman C
for disobeying the orders of the managing authority. The workman filed an
application before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 contesting his dismissal on various grounds, whereupon
the Tribunal passed an order to the effect that as an interim measure the
workman be permitted to work and if the management failed to take him D
(
back his full wages be paid from the date he reported for duty. The employer
challenged the order of the Tribunal by filing a writ petition before the High
Court which was dismissed. On appeal by a certificate of the High Court it
was held that the order of reinstatement could not be given as an interim
relief because that would be giving the employee the very relief which he
would get if order of dismissal is not found to be justified. Order passed by E
the Tribunal was held to be manifestly erroneous and set aside. It was observed:

" ... We are of opinion that such an order cannot be passed in law as
an interim relief, for that would amount to giving the respondent at
the outset the relief to which he would be entitled only ifthe employer
failed in the proceedings under s. 33-A. As was pointed out in Hotel F
lmperial's case [1960] I SCR 476, ordinarily, interim relief should
not be the whole relief that the workmen would get if they succeeded
finally. The order therefore of the Tribunal in this case allowing
reinstatement as an interim relief or in lieu thereof payment of full
wages is manifestly erroneous and must therefore be set aside ... " G
In U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad and Ors. case (supra)
it was held by this Court that it was desirable that an order of suspension
passed by a competent authority should not be ordinarily interfered by an
interiocutory order pending the proceeding. It was observed:

" ... Whether the employees should or should not continue in their H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the
authority concerned and ordinarily, the Court should not interfere
with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and
without there being even a prim a facie evidence on record connecting
the employees with the misconduct in question ... "

B In Suman Dutta 's case (supra) this Court set aside the order
,1
passed by
the High Court staying the order of termination as an interim 1heasure in the
pending proceeding. It was observed:

" ... We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court erred in law in
staying the order of termination as an interim measure in the pending
c writ petition. By such interim order if an employee is allowed to
continue in service and then ultimately the writ petition .is dismissed,
then it would tantamount to usurpation of public office without any
right to the same .... "

Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative
D exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the courts. This Court
consistently has been taken a view that orders of transfer should not be
interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a
vindictive manner.

From the above quoted decisions, it is evident that this Court has
E · consistently been of the view that by way of interim order the order of
suspension, termination, dismissal and transfer etc. should not be stayed during
the pendency of the proceedings in the Court.

Sub-section (5-B) provides that the Tribunal shall have not the power
to make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any
F other manner) in respect of an order made or purporting to be made by an
employer for the suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank,
termination, compulsory retirement or reversion ofa public servant. Dismissal,
removal, termination and compulsory retirement puts an end to the relationship
of employer and employee. In case of suspension, reduction in rank or
G reversion the relationship of employer and employee continues. Interference
at the interim stage with an <?rder of dismissal, removal, termination and
compulsory retirement would be giving the final relief to an employee at an
interim stage which he would have got in case the order of dismissal, re!noval,
termination and compulsory retirement is found not to be justified. If t~e
order of dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement is set
H aside then an employee can be compensated by moulding the relief
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF U.P. [ASHOK BHAN, J.] 69 J

appropriately in terms of arrears of salary, promotions which may have become A
due or otherwise compensating him in some other way. But in ca5e the order
of dismissal, removal, termination and compulsory retirement is found to be
justified then holding of the office during the operation of the interim order
would. amount to usurpation of an office which the employee was not entitled
·to hold. The action becomes irreversible as the salary paid to the employee B
cannot be taken away as he has worked during that period and the orders
passed by him during the period he holds office (because of the interim
order) cannot also be put at naught. The Legislature in its wisdom thought
it proper not to confer the power to grant interim relief on the Tribunal. State
Legislature had the legislative competence to constitute a service tribunal and
it was for it to define the parameters of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. An C
employee is not left without any remedy. Judicial review of an order regarding
which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is barred would be available by
approaching the High Court by filing petition under Article 226 or 227 of the
Constitution of India. In an extreme and rare case where the order is passed
ma/a fide or without following the procedure under the law then the employee D
can certainly approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
for the interim relief. The High Court in such an extreme and rare case may
in its wisdom stay the operation of the said order. In the case of suspension,
reduction in rank or reversion the relationship of employer and employee
remains. Normally, the suspension is made during a contemplated or a pending
enquiry. During the suspension period the employee is entitled for the E
suspension allowance. If the suspension continues for indefinite period or
order of suspension is passed ma/a fide then it would be open to the employee
to challenge the same by approaching the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. In case the order of reduction in rank or reversion
is set aside then the employee can be compensated by adequately moulding
the relief while giving the relief at the final stage. Power of the Tribunal to F
grant interim relief has been taken away qua certain matters not completely.
The power has been taken away in matters where the grant of said relief at
the interim stage would result in giving the relief which would normally be
given while disposing of the case finally. Simply because in a rare cases of
microscopic number a case is made out for stay of orders of suspension, G
transfer, reduction in rank, reversion or termination, dismissal and compulsory
retirement and the employee is liable to approach the High Court for interim
stay by itself is no ground to strike down the law enacted by a Legislative
which is within its competence to enact.

Sub-section (5-C) of Section 5 contemplates that the Tribunal shall H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A have no power to make an interim order in respect of an adverse entry.
~
Adverse entry in the confidential report does not affect the conditions of
service of a public servant. Making of an entry in the confidential report is
an administrative act based on the subjective satisfaction of the superior
officer done on the objective criteria. It is an assessment of the performance
of the Government servant in one year. Assessment of performance in the
B past year may be'come a criteria affecting the future prospectus of the employee.
Invariably an adverse entry results in the passing of an order by the employer ~
at a later stage and such an order may result in giving rise to a cause of
action. Sub-section (5-C) does not debar ~)J.e public servant to challenge ·the
adverse entry made in the record. The adverse entry made in the service
c record is open to challenge and a public servant can approach the Tribunal
to challenge the adverse entry made in the confidential report. Tribunal if
satisfied can set aside the adverse entry by way of a final order but stay of 'T
the adverse entry at the interim stage may not be an appropriate relief. The
reasons given by us for upholding the validity of Sub-section (5-B) would
equally apply for upholding the •:alidity of Sub-section (5-C) as well.
D
Sub-sections (5-B) and (5-C) are not arbitrary as contended by the
counsel forthe appellant as this Court in earlier cases has taken the. view that
orders of suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination, ~
compulsory retirement or reversion of a public servant normally should not
be interfered with at an interim stage as the employee can be suitably
E compensated in case the order of suspension, dismissal, removal etc. is found
not to be in order. The cases in which the operation of orders of dismissal,
removal, termination etc. is stayed by way of interim order is later on upheld
at the final stage then it results in wrong usurpation of the office by the
employee during the operation of the interim order. This act becomes
F irreversible and the employer cannot be suitably compensated by moulding
the relief at the final stage. In an extreme and rare case where the order is
prima facie on the face of it is ma/a fide or bad in law then it is open to a
public servant to approach the High Court by filing a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India for stay of such an order. The employee
is not left without any remc;dy. In an extreme and rare case an employee is
G to approach the High Court for interim relief resulting in some extra expense
by itself is no reason fo strike down the Sub-section (5-B) being arbitrary and ,,.._
violative of Articles l 4 and 16 of .the Constitution of India.

The Principal Act was _promulgated in 1976 for adjudication of the
H disputes pertaining to employment matters of public servants of the State
PUBLIC SERVICES TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIA TJON v. STATE OF U.P. [ASHOK BHAN. J.) 693
Government and the emp'oyees of the Government Corporations and A
Companies, local authorities etc. and the jurisdiction of the civil courts for
redressal of their grievances was taken away. It was set up with five Tribunals
and each Tribunal was independent and consisted of one Judicial member
and one administrative member. Out of them one member was the Chairman.
Constitution of the Tribunal was challenged in the High Court successfully. B
Consequently, the Ol'iginal Act was amended by U.P. Act No. 7 of 1992.
Sub-sections 3 (I), (2) (3) and (6) were amended. The Tribunal was constituted
• of one Chairman, a Vice Chairman at least five Judicial Members and Five
Administrative Members which were to function at different Benches
consisting of a Single Member or two members for the disposal of such
references of claims and other matters as may be specified by the Chairman. C
Under the Act 7 of I 992 an Administrative Member could be appointed as
Chairman and in fact Shri Venkatramani, !AS was appointed as the Chairman.
This Act was challenged by filing a writ petition in Sanjai Kumar Srivastava
in the High Court. It was contended that administrative member could not
become a Chairman and the appointment of Chairman, Vice Chairman and
members could not be made without consulting the Chief Justice of the State. D
This objection was upheld and accordingly Section 3 (3)(c) and Section 3
(4)(c) of the Act were struck down. State was permitted to make suitable
amendments to bring about suitable amendments in the Act. It was also
' directed that in future all appointments to the Tribunal be made only after
effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the State. Special Leave Petition E
filed against the judgment was dismissed by this Court. The Government
thereafter deleted the offending clauses of Section 3(3)(c) and Section 3(4)(c)
from the Act. Thereafter, Ordinance No. 17of1999 was promulgated which
culminating in th<; passing of Act 5 of 2000. Section 3 (2) of the Principal
Act was substituted for the words "a Vice-Chairman", the words "A vice-
• .A..
Chairman (Judicial) a Vice-Chairman (Administrative)''. From now onwards F
I there are two Vice chairmen instead of one Chairman. In Section 3(4)(b) the
words "or an Administrative" were deleted. Sub-section (4-A) was inserted
which prescribed the qualification for appointment as Vice-Chairman
(Administrative). Sub-section (4-A)(a) was the same as was earlier in Sub-
section 4 (b) by deleting the words "or an Administrative''. The new Sub- G
section (4-A) (b) was an addition now added in 1999. This is inpari materia
of Section 6 (2)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 except the
words "Additional Secretary" instead of "Secretary" to the Government of
India. Sub-Section (4-A) (b) is the same as the original Section 3 (6) except
adding the words as under:
H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A " "has adequate experience", the words "has, in the opinion of the
State Government, adequate experience" have been added." •··· 'T

Challenge to Sub-Section (4-A) (b) of Section 3 that.the same is not in
conformity with the judgment in Sanjai Kumar Srivastava case is unfounded
because this sub-section is in pari materia with Section 6(2)(b) of the
B Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Sub-Section (7) in Section 3 was also
substituted by adding the words "State Government after consultation with )ii.-
the Chief Justice for which proposal will be initiated by the State Government." ~

In other words, the power of appointments with the State Government has
been retained but the same has to be exercised in co·nsultation with the Chief
Justice of the High Court as directed by the High Court in Sanjai Kumar
c Srivastava case.

Appo!ntment_ 0L1h.e Chairman, Vice-Chairmen (Judicial) and
,.
(Administrative) and members has now to be made in consultation with the
Chief Justice of t'1e High Court. Submission that the amendment carried out
D in Section 3 regarding appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen (Judicial) f:
as well as (Administrative) and members ·is not in conformity with the
corresponding provisions of Administrative_ Tribunals Act, 1985 has no
substance.
"/.,
For the reasons stated above, we find that the State Legislature was
E competent to enact the impugned provisions. Further that the provisions
enacted are not arbitrary and therefore not violative of Articles 14, 16 or any
other provisions of the Constitution. They are not against the basic structure
of the Constitution of India either. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in
these appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs_.

F N.J. Appeals dismissed.
__....

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