Holding

The Supreme Court held that the State’s acquisition after the expiry of the 25‑year period was unlawful, the urgency clause was improperly invoked, and compensation for the illegal occupation must be determined by an arbitrator, not a District Judge.

Summary

Punalur Paper Mills Ltd. owned premises that were requisitioned by the West Bengal government in 1973. Section 10B of the West Bengal Premises Requisition Act required the property to be released within 25 years, i.e., by 15 August 1998, but the State failed to do so and later attempted to acquire the land using a notification under the Land Acquisition Act, invoking the urgency provision of Section 17. The High Court struck down the urgency‑based acquisition and ordered the State to vacate, while directing compensation to be assessed by the Chief Judge. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view that the State was on notice to release the premises, that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked, and that compensation for the illegal occupation after the requisition period cannot be assessed by a District Judge under Section 11(1)(b). An arbitrator was appointed to determine damages, and WBMDTCL was ordered to vacate the premises within four months.

Issues considered

The State’s authority to acquire the premises after the 25‑year requisition period had expired.
Whether the urgency provision of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act could be invoked in the present facts.
Whether compensation for illegal occupation after the requisition period can be assessed by a District Judge under Section 11(1)(b) of the West Bengal Requisition Act.
Whether WBMDTCL qualifies as a "State" within Art.12 of the Constitution for the purpose of unlawful possession.
The appropriate mechanism for determining compensation for the period of unlawful occupation.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 12
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17(1), s. 17(4), s. 4, s. 5A, s. 6
West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947s. 10B, s. 11(1)(b)

Subjects

Premises requisitionLand acquisitionSection 10BSection 17 urgencyCompensation assessmentArbitrationState as per Art.12

Judgment

[2021] 3 S.C.R. 1 1

PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. A
v.
WEST BENGAL MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING
CORPORATION LTD. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 738-739 of 2021) B
MARCH 01, 2021
[R. F. NARIMAN AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1947 – Requisition of Premises – Scope of s. 10B –
C
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss. 4 and 17(4) – Premises owned by
appellant was requisitioned under the West Bengal Requisition Act
by WBMDTCL – s. 10 B was inserted by way of amendment in West
Bengal Requisition Act which provides that property requisitioned
under the said act had to be released by the State Government on
or before the expiry of a period of 25 year from date of requisition D
– After the lapse of said period, premises was not released, however,
by way of notification u/s. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the
premises was sought to be acquired for the public purpose for
providing the office of WBMDTCL – Said notification was challenged
before Single Judge of High Court, in the mean time another
E
notification u/s. 4 of Land Acquisition Act was issued, this time by
invoking the urgency provision u/s 17(4) – Single Judge struck down
the composite notifications by holding that the urgency provision
was wrongly invoked and directed WBMDTCL to vacate premises –
The Division Bench of High Court upheld the order of Single Judge
and set aside the order of acquisition and directed that the vacant F
possession of the premises should be handover to appellant – It
was also observed that WBMDTCL had been enjoying the said
property without paying any money subsequent to the expiry of 25
years – It was further held that the Chief Judge, City Civil Court
shall asses the compensation for the period of 16.08.1998 till the
G
possession is made over to appellant – Three separate appeals were
filed before the Supreme Court against the said order, one by the
State and second by appellant only on the limited ground, namely,
compensation cannot be assessed by District Judge and third one
by WBMDTCL – Held: The impugned judgment of Division Bench
H
1
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A of the High Court is correct in law as the State was on notice from
the date of insertion of s.10B, that the Premises would have to be
released on or before 15.08.1998 – This gave the State the time of
11.5 years to act and acquire the premises but State issued the
notification long after the requisition period lapsed – Hence, the
appeal filed by the State are dismissed – Appeal filed by the appellant
B
on the limited ground, namely, compensation is allowed as it is clear
from the cursory reading of the provision that the compensation for
the illegal occupation of the premises cannot be assessed by the
District Judge u/s 11(1)(b) of the West Bengal Requisition Act, as
s.11(1) refers to compensation during the period of requisition and
C not after the property continues to remain with the state without any
authority of law even after the requisition period ends – Hence, the
impugned judgment of the Divison Bench of the High Court is set
aside to that extent – Arbitrator is appointed to determine the
compensation that is payable by way of damages for occupation of
the premises without any authority of law – WBMDTCL directed to
D
vacate the premises.
Constitution of India: Art. 12 – State – Unlawful Possession
– Held : WBMDTCL, which is a “State” within the meaning of Art.
12 of Constitution of India, continued in unlawful possession of
the premises since 15.08.1998 without paying a single pie towards
E compensation till date – Therefore, arbitrator is appointed to
determine the compensation that is payable by way of damages for
occupation of the premises without any authority of law.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court

F HELD: 1. On the facts of this case, the impugned judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court is correct in law. In this
case, the State was on notice from 31.03.1987, i.e., from the date
of insertion of section 10B in the West Bengal Requisition Act,
that the Premises would have to be released on or before
15.08.1998. This gave the State the time of 11.5 years to act and
G acquire the Premises. Such acquisition could easily have been
done by way of a notification under section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act before the lapse of the 25-year period, and would
have also preserved the valuable right contained in section 5A of
the Land Acquisition Act. As a matter of fact, as correctly held by
H the Division Bench, long after the requisition period elapsed on
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 3
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD.

15.08.1998, the State issued a notification under section 4 of the A
Land Acquisition Act, without invoking any urgency provision.
To then say that the urgency provision could be invoked on
account of the Single Judge’s order dated 22.06.2000, is to
attempt to infer from the said order, much more than it actually
said. Therefore, the Division Bench rightly held that at best this
order could possibly refer to the acquisition proceedings that B
had already been initiated by the notification of 12.08.1999 under
section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. In any case, this order
could not and did not wash away the lethargy of the State in
initiating acquisition proceedings, which ought to have been done
before the 25-year period elapsed, by preserving the valuable C
right contained in section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, which
could have been availed of by the owner of the Premises, i.e., the
Appellant. [Para 19][15-D-H; 16-A]
2. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is fortified
by several judgments. It is clear that the appeals filed by the
D
State, namely, civil appeals arising out of SLP(C) No.10581-10583
of 2020 have to be dismissed. [Para 20, 24][16-B, 23-F]
3. Coming to the appeals filed by the Appellant, the said
appeals are only on a limited ground, namely, that compensation
for the illegal occupation of the Premises cannot be assessed by
the District Judge under section 11(1)(b) of the West Bengal E
Requisition Act, as section 11(1) refers to compensation during
the period of requisition and not after the property continues to
remain with the State without any authority of law even after the
requisition period ends. A cursory reading of the aforesaid
provision will make it clear that the Appellant is correct in its F
submission, which is therefore accepted and the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench is set aside to this extent. Civil
appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 9834-9835 of 2020 and SLP
(C) Nos. 9837-9838 of 2020 are thereby allowed. [Paras 25, 26][23-
G-H; 24-A,D]
G
4. A very disturbing feature of these appeals is the fact that
WBMDTCL, which is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution of India, has continued in unlawful possession
of the Premises since 15.08.1998 without paying a single pice
towards compensation till date. Following the judgments of this
Court, most notably, Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India, H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A (1990) 3 SCC 182 and Krishan Lal Arneja, this court appoints
Retd. Judge, High Court of Calcutta as arbitrator to determine
compensation that is payable by way of damages for occupation
of the Premises without any authority of law. A written authority
to appoint such arbitrator is to be furnished to us immediately,
i.e., within a week from 23.02.2021. If not so furnished,
B
WBMDTCL will be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 100 per square
foot, per month (being the average of the rental amounts paid by
other tenants in the same building since August 1998 as per the
Valuation Report dated 30.11.2019 prepared by a Chartered
Engineer, Engineer Commissioner & Valuer of Alipore Judges’
C Court for the entire period of illegal occupation of the Premises
within four months from the date of this judgment. [Para 27][24-
E-G]
5. If written authority for appointment of the arbitrator is
received within time, the learned arbitrator is to proceed on a
D prima facie view of the case submitted to him by the parties to
determine interim compensation payable within a period of two
months of entering upon the reference. This is owing to the fact
that not a single pice has been paid for the last 22 years for the
illegal occupation of the Premises by WBMDTCL. Further,
neither party is to take any adjournment before the arbitrator
E within this period of two months, so that the arbitrator can decide
the interim compensation that is to be paid. After such interim
order, the learned arbitrator will proceed to deliver a final award.
[Para 28][24-H; 25-A-B]
6. WBMDTCL has asked for reasonable time to vacate the
F premises. However, in light of the fact that WBMDTCL has been
in possession of the Premises without any authority of law for the
last 22 years, we do not feel that it is justified to give time as
prayed for, till the end of this year. Thus, this court only grants
time of four months from the date of this judgment to vacate the
G Premises, conditional upon the responsible officer filing an
undertaking before this Court, that they will vacate the Premises
within four months and handover vacant possession of the
Premises to the Appellant, and that the interim compensation, if
ordered before such date, will be paid within the time stipulated
by the arbitrator so appointed. [Para 29][25-C-D]
H
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 5
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD.

7. In the civil appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 9837-9838 of 2020, A
though no one appears on behalf of West Bengal Sugar Industries
Development Corporation Ltd., who have been in illegal
occupation of a portion of the fifth floor of premises no. 13, Nellie
Sengupta Sarani (Lindsay Street), Calcutta, measuring
approximately 1350 square feet, the same directions apply qua
B
WB Sugar Industries. Thus, WB Sugar Industries is also to submit
a written authority to appoint the arbitrator within a week from
23.02.2021, failing which they shall pay a sum of Rs. 100 per
square foot, per month, for the entire period of illegal occupation
of the Fifth Floor Premises, within four months from the date of
this judgment. Further, WB Sugar Industries is given four months C
to vacate the Fifth Floor Premises, upon the submission of an
undertaking to vacate and handover vacant possession of the
Fifth Floor Premises to the Appellant, and to pay the interim
compensation within the time to be stipulated by the arbitrator.
These appeals are disposed of accordingly. [Paras 30, 31][25-E-
D
G]
Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC
453 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 801 – relied on.
State of U.P. v. Keshav Prasad Singh, (1995) 5 SCC
587 : [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 329; State of A.P. v. E
Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC 739 : [2003] 2
SCR 908 – distinguished.
Banwarilal & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, C.W.P.
No. 2385 of 1988 reported in 1991 Supp DRJ 317;
Union of India v. Shakuntala Gupta, (2002) 10 SCC F
694; Union of India v. Shakuntala Gupta, (2002) 7 SCC
98; Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3
SCC 182 : [1990] 1 SCR 983 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 329 distinguished paras 14, 16 G
[2003] 2 SCR 908 distinguished paras 14, 17
(2002) 10 SCC 694 referred to para 21
(2002) 7 SCC 98 referred to para 21
H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 801 relied on para 22
[1990] 1 SCR 983 referred to para 27
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 738 -
739 of 2021.
B From the Judgment and Order dated 30.09.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Calcutta in APO 298 and APO 303 of 2017.
With
Civil Appeal Nos.740–741 and 742–744 of 2021.
Mukul Rohatgi, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Advs., Ramesh
C
Singh, Gautam Narayan, Pankaj Jain, Mahesh Agarwal, Ashok Kumar
Jain, Bijoy Kumar Jain, Suhaan Mukerji, Vishal Prasad, Nikhil Parikshith,
Abhishek Manchanda for M/s. Plr Chambers & Co., Kunal Vajani,
Debanjan Mandal, Jishnu Chowdhury, Sandip Dasgupta, Ayan Kumar
De, Ms. Madhavi Khanna, Shubhang Tandon, Kunal Mimani, Ms. Liz
D Mathew, for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. F. NARIMAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
E 2. In the facts of these appeals, the entire second floor of premises
no. 13, Nellie Sengupta Sarani (Lindsay Street), Calcutta [“the
Premises”], measuring approximately 7500 square feet, owned by
Punalur Paper Mills Ltd. [“Appellant”], was requisitioned under the
West Bengal Premises Requisition And Control (Temporary Provisions)
F Act, 1947 [“West Bengal Requisition Act”] on 16.08.1973. Pursuant
to certain judgments of this Court, section 10B was inserted in the West
Bengal Requisition Act by way of an amendment on 31.03.1987. The
said section reads as follows:
“10B. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10 or section
G 10A, the State Government shall release from requisition any
property requisitioned or deemed to be requisitioned under this
Act on or before the expiry of a period of twenty-five years from
the date of such requisition:
Provided that the benefit of this section shall not be available until
after the expiry of a period of five years from the date of coming
H
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 7
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD. [R. F. NARIMAN, J. ]

into force of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control A
(Temporary Provisions) (Second Amendment) Act, 1986.”
3. As a result of the operation of section 10B of the West Bengal
Requisition Act, any property requisitioned under the Act had to be
released by the State Government on or before the expiry of a period of
25 years from the date of requisition. For the Premises, this 25-year B
period ended on 15.08.1998, obligating the State to release the Premises.
It is common ground between the parties that the Premises was not in
fact released and physical possession remained with the West Bengal
Mineral Development and Trading Corporation Ltd. [“WBMDTCL”].
4. Subsequent to the lapse of such period, by way of a notification C
under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [“Land Acquisition
Act”], published on 12.08.1999, the Premises was sought to be acquired
for the public purpose of providing the permanent office accommodation
of WBMDTCL. This notification of 12.08.1999 was challenged in Writ
Petition No. 1045 of 2000 filed on 18.04.2000 before the High Court of
Calcutta by the Appellant, who owned the said Premises. It may also be D
mentioned that Writ Petition No. 1042 of 2000 was also filed by the
Appellant on 17.04.2000, seeking handover of vacant possession of the
Premises since the 25-year period prescribed by section 10B of the
West Bengal Requisition Act had ended.
5. By an order dated 22.06.2000, in Writ Petition No. 1042 of E
2000, a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta held as follows:
“The learned counsel Mr. Bhattacharji appearing on behalf of the
Respondent no. 4 as well as the learned counsel Mr. Dutt
appearing on behalf of the State submitted that three months time
should be granted to the Respondent no. 4 to vacate the premises F
in question without prejudice to its rights to take such appropriate
legal steps as are available to it to acquire the property in question,
accordingly such an order is passed with the consent of the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners. The learned counsel have
also submitted that [insofar] as the compensation is concerned G
the same may be decided by the Court on materials to be placed
by them by filing separate affidavit.
Let such affidavit be filed within three weeks from the date, reply,
if any, within two weeks thereafter with liberty to mention the
matter before me as and when I will be sitting singly.
H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A The writ petition is kept alive only for the purpose of determination
of the amount of compensation to be paid by the Respondent No.
4 to the Writ Petitioner for occupying the property in question
subsequent to coming to an end of the order of requisition until
delivery of possession thereof is effected in terms of this order.
This order has been passed by consent of all the parties and the
B
counsel appearing for parties have signed a copy of the same in
acknowledgement thereof and the same is kept with the record.”
6. On the same day, in Writ Petition No.1045 of 2000, the Single
Judge passed the following order:
C “The interim order already granted is vacated as the learned
counsel for the petitioner does not press for continuation of the
same after having seen the newspaper publication of the
notification in question. It is made clear that Court has not decided
any issue in the instant writ petition.

D Affidavit-in-opposition to this writ petition shall be filed [in]
3 (three) weeks from date, reply, if any, within 2 (two) weeks
thereafter and liberty to mention the matter before the appropriate
Bench.
All parties to act on a signed copy of this dictated order on
E the usual undertaking.”
7. Without pursuing the section 4 notification of 12.08.1999, another
notification for the same property was issued on 04.08.2000, under section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, this time invoking the urgency provision
under section 17(4) thereof, as follows:
F “In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (4) of Section
17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act I of 1894), the Governor
is pleased to direct that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act
shall not apply to the lands as described in the schedule above to
which in the opinion of the Governor, the provisions of Sub-section
(1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable”
G
8. A declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act soon
followed, on 11.08.2000. These two notifications became the subject of
challenge in Writ Petition No. 3003 of 2000 filed by the Appellant on
05.09.2000, on the ground that the urgency provision was improperly
invoked, and thus the composite notification dated 04.08.2000, under
H
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section 4 read with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, would have A
to be set aside.
9. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, by an
order dated 16.01.2017, disposed of all three writ petitions, namely, Writ
Petition Nos. 1042, 1045 and 3003 of 2000. The learned Single Judge,
noting that the urgency provision had wrongly been invoked in the facts B
of this case, followed the judgments of this Court and struck down the
composite notification under section 4 read with section 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act, dated 04.08.2000. Consequently, he directed
WBMDTCL to vacate the Premises within three months and handover
vacant possession to the Appellant.
C
10. On appeal, the learned Single Judge’s judgment and order
dated 16.01.2017 was set aside by consent of the parties, and the writ
petitions were to be heard de novo in the six different appeals that were
filed by the Land Acquisition Collector, WBMDTCL and the First Land
Acquisition Collector. As a result, a de novo hearing of the writ petitions
was taken up by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, D
which passed the impugned judgment and order dated 30.09.2019. After
setting out the facts of this case, the questions that the Division Bench
put to itself were as follows:
“5. After hearing the rival contentions and considering the materials
on record, we are of the view that the moot questions to be E
considered while disposing of the three writ petitions and the six
appeals arising therefrom are as follows:
a. After the expiry of 25 years from the date of requisition,
were the appellants liable to vacate the requisitioned
property being the said property? F
b. Is respondent / writ petitioner no. 1 entitled to any
compensation on WBMDTCL having overstayed at the
said property after expiry of 25 years from the date?
c. In the facts of the instant case, could the said respondents
G
acquire the said property by applying the special powers
in case of urgency as provided in section 17 of the 1894
Act particularly when they had proceeded to acquire
the property by following the normal method and had in
fact given a notice under section 4 of the 1894 Act on
12th August, 1999? H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A d. Could the right of objection available to the respondent /
writ petitioner no.1 be taken away in the facts and
circumstances of the instance case?”
11. The Division Bench held:
“6. We take up the two issues together as they are inter-related in
B the instant case. A conjoined reading of the letters dated 25th
March, 1997 issued by WBMDTCL and 23rd September, 1997
issued by the Land Acquisition Collector, it will appear that both
the State and the WBMDTCL were aware of the fact that on
completion of 25 years from the date of requisition, the
C requisitioned property had to be released from requisition and had
to be vacated. The provisions of section 10B of the said Act also
say so and, as such, in the letter dated 23rd September, 1997, the
Land Acquisition Collector had specifically indicated that the
requiring body has to vacate possession after completion of 25
years of requisition. Despite such specific knowledge, WBMDTCL
D did not vacate the said property on expiry of 15th August, 1998.
The said State / respondents who had requisitioned the property
also did not take any step to have the said property released of
the requisition and possession be returned to the owner of the
same.
E It also appears that WBMDTCL have been enjoying the said
property without paying any money for the same subsequent to
the expiry of 25 years.”
12. Referring to the order of the Single Judge dated 22.06.2000,
the Division Bench then went on to hold:
F
“It further appears that on 22nd June, 2000 at the invitation of the
State / respondents and WBMDTCL, an order was passed giving
three months’ time to vacate the said property with the consent of
the petitioner. It will also appear that the compensation to be paid
by the WBMDTCL (respondent no.4 in the said writ petition) to
G the writ petitioner for occupying the property in question subsequent
to coming to an end of the order of requisition until delivery of
possession thereof was left to be decided by the Court. The writ
petition being WP No.1042 of 2000 was kept alive only for the
purpose of determining the amount of such compensation.
Affidavits were invited and from the gamut of the said order dated
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22nd June, 2000, it is evident that the affidavits were called for A
also for the purpose of determining the compensation. It will also
appear from the said order that the order to vacate the said property
was without prejudice to the rights of the State to take such
appropriate legal steps as available to it to acquire the property in
question. At the time when the said order dated 22nd June, 2000
B
was passed, the section 4 notification and the objection under the
provisions of section 5A were already on record. The Court was
conscious about the same. The order thereof has to be interpreted
that the said property had to be vacated within a period of three
months from the date of the order and at the same time, there
was no embargo on the part of the State to proceed with the C
acquisition. The view in favour of such interpretation of the order
dated 22nd June, 2000 is further emboldened from another order,
also passed on the same day in WP No.1045 of 2000 when the
Court vacated the interim order earlier passed staying the hearing
of the objection filed by the respondent / writ petitioner no.1 in
D
terms of the provisions of section 5A of the 1894 Act. It is,
therefore, apparent that the Court while passing the two orders
had clearly meant that WBMDTCL had to vacate the premises
within three months from 22nd June, 2000 and, at the same time,
the State Authorities were free to proceed with the acquisition
proceeding initiated by publication of the section 4 notice on 12th E
August, 1999 after hearing out the objection filed by respondent /
writ petitioner under the provisions of section 5A of the 1894 Act.”
13. After referring to some of the judgments of this Court, the
Division Bench then concluded:
“13. The findings in these judgments, therefore, clearly answer F
the question of the scope of judicial review raised by the appellants.
In the instant case, the property was requisitioned in the year
1973 until a few months prior to expiry of the 25 years period; no
request was made for re-requisitioning of the property. Receiving
such request as discussed hereinabove, the State / respondents G
gave a firm view that the property has to be vacated on expiry of
the period of 25 years and the same cannot be re-requisitioned.
However, the State expressed a view that the property can be
acquired if a request to that effect is made. The State / respondents,
thereafter, proceeded to acquire the property without invoking
H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A the extraordinary power available to the Government under section
17(1) read with section 17(4) of the said Act. So it is clear that at
the relevant point, the Government did not form an opinion as to
invoking of the urgency clause. The Government, therefore, was
of the view that the acquisition proceedings could wait for few
months for completion of an enquiry under section 5A of the 1894
B
Act. This is also evident from the steps taken by the Government
on issuance of notice under section 4 and inviting objections under
section 5A of the 1894 Act. After amendment to the said Act of
1947 made in 1986 with the introduction of section 10B, it was
known to the WBMDTCL being the requiring body as also the
C Government that on expiry of 25 years, the property was to be
released from requisition. Even if we consider that a five years
gap for the release of the property after 25 years was available
under the said Act that takes us to the year 1991. There was
ample time between 1991 and 1998 when the 25 years came to
an end to acquire the property in the normal procedure by
D
conducting an enquiry if the WBMDTCL or the Government was
so keen in maintaining the registered office of WBMDTCL at the
said property or for providing the said property to maintain the
registered office of WBMDTCL thereat. No steps for acquiring
the property were taken for all these years. The acquisition
E proceeding too under the normal mode was commenced on 10th
/ 12th August, 1999. Pursuant to such notification, objection under
section 5 was invited and the same was filed by the respondent /
writ petitioner no.1. During the time when the hearing of the
objection of section 5A of the 1894 Act was kept pending, the
respondents / writ petitioners approached this Court by filing two
F
writ petitions being WP Nos.1042 and 1045 of 2000 in the month
of April, 2000. So the challenge to the notification under section 4
was made within a reasonable time period from the publication of
the notification. The fact situation at that material point clearly
established that no case of urgency was in the mind of the
G Government. Only after the order of 22nd June, 2000, was
obtained at the invitation of the State / respondents and the
WBMDTCL, the three months period to vacate the said premises
was used to invoke the extraordinary powers of urgency to dispense
with the enquiry under section 5A of the 1894 Act.”
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“15. The facts of the instant case are also not such that the A
acquisition could not brook the delay for even a few weeks or
months. That apart and in any event, using the order dated 22nd
June, 2000 as a fact situation to invoke the urgency clause smacks
of mala fides and is, as such, vitiated. We, therefore, set aside the
order of acquisition invoking the provisions of section 17(1) read
B
with section 17(4) of the 1894 Act. It is declared that the preliminary
notification under section 4 which was cancelled by invoking the
provisions of section 17(1) had stood lapsed by efflux of time as
no section 6 declaration followed within a period of one year. This
will, however, not prevent the Government from initiating
acquisition proceedings afresh, if entitled to in law. The possession C
of the said property should be vacated and possession thereof to
be made over to the respondents / writ petitioners within a period
of three months from date. These directions are peremptory.
16. The Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta shall also assess
the compensation / rent / occupational charges for the period of D
16th August, 1998 till the possession of the said property is made
over to the respondents / writ petitioners. Section 11(1)(b) of the
1947 Act provides for the same.
17. The writ petitions being WP Nos.1042, 1045 & 3003 of 2000
are disposed of in the light of the observations made hereinabove.” E
14. Ms. Liz Mathew, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the
State of West Bengal, assailed the impugned judgment of the Division
Bench by arguing that the order of the Single Judge dated 22.06.2000
had made it clear that the State could take appropriate steps to initiate
land acquisition proceedings, which were then done pursuant to such F
order on 04.08.2000. Taking shelter under this order, she therefore argued
that it would not be possible to strike down the notification under section
4 read with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, since this was done
pursuant to the order dated 22.06.2000. For this purpose, she relied upon
the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. Keshav Prasad Singh,
(1995) 5 SCC 587 and State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 G
SCC 739.
15. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior advocate appearing on
behalf of the Appellant, stoutly refuted these arguments and relied upon
certain judgments of this Court which covered the issue in the Appellant’s
H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A favour. In any case, he also argued that given the conduct of the parties
in not vacating the Premises by 15.08.1998 and continuing to be in
unauthorised possession till date, as well as not paying a single paisa
towards compensation, this Court ought not to entertain the State’s
appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
B 16. The judgments of this Court relied upon by Ms. Liz Mathew
are distinguishable from the facts of this case. In State of U.P. v. Keshav
Prasad Singh, (1995) 5 SCC 587, this Court dealt with a specific case
of urgency, namely, a mandatory injunction issued by a Civil Court to
demolish a compound wall and to restitute possession. This Court, thus,
had no difficulty in stating that there was a need for immediacy in the
C case, as follows:
“5. The next question is whether the Government would be justified
in exercising its power under Section 17(4) and dispense with the
inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Mandatory injunction issued
by the civil court to demolish the compound wall and to restitute
D possession to the respondent had to be complied with. There is
thus urgency. The public purpose was obvious as the compound
was required to be retained to protect the safety of the office.
The object of Section 5-A enquiry was to show whether there
was no public purpose or the land was not suitable or some other
E lands may be acquired. All these relevant and related facts are
redundant due to the facts of the case.”
17. Likewise, in State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4
SCC 739, on the facts of the case, this Court held that the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh could not have struck down the acquisition of property
F on the ground of mala fides only because the State had lost in eviction
proceedings and initiated acquisition proceedings, after giving an
undertaking to vacate a dilapidated 100-year old school building. This
Court therefore held:
“17. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held the action of
G acquisition of the property by the State as malicious in law only
because before passing of adverse orders by the court against it,
no action for acquisition of the building which was in its occupation
since 1954, was initiated. In our opinion, even if that be the situation
that the State as tenant of the school building took no step to
acquire the land before [the] order of eviction and direction of the
H High Court, it cannot be held that when it decided to acquire the
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 15
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD. [R. F. NARIMAN, J. ]

building, there existed no genuine public purpose. If only the A
possession of the property could be retained as a tenant, it was
unnecessary to acquire the property. The order of eviction as
well as the direction to vacate issued by the High Court only provide
just, reasonable and proximate cause for resorting to acquisition
under the Land Acquisition Act. Resort, therefore, to acquisition
B
at a stage when there was no other alternative but to do so to
serve a genuine public purpose which was being fulfilled from
1954 signifies more a reasonable and just exercise of statutory
power. Such exercise of power cannot be condemned as one made
in colourable or mala fide exercise of it.”
18. This judgment is completely distinguishable also for the reason C
that the urgency provision contained in section 17 of the Land Acquisition
Act was not invoked, it being held that the continuance of a school served
a genuine public purpose, which public purpose could not suddenly be
deemed to become non-existent, only because the State had lost in eviction
proceedings. D
19. On the facts of this case, the impugned judgment of the Division
Bench is correct in law. In this case, the State was on notice from
31.03.1987, i.e., from the date of insertion of section 10B in the West
Bengal Requisition Act, that the Premises would have to be released on
or before 15.08.1998. This gave the State the time of 11.5 years to act E
and acquire the Premises. Such acquisition could easily have been done
by way of a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
before the lapse of the 25-year period, and would have also preserved
the valuable right contained in section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.
As a matter of fact, as correctly held by the Division Bench, long after
the requisition period elapsed on 15.08.1998, the State issued a notification F
under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, without invoking any urgency
provision. To then say that the urgency provision could be invoked on
account of the Single Judge’s order dated 22.06.2000, is to attempt to
infer from the said order, much more than it actually said. Therefore, the
Division Bench rightly held that at best this order could possibly refer to G
the acquisition proceedings that had already been initiated by the
notification of 12.08.1999 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.
In any case, this order could not and did not wash away the lethargy of
the State in initiating acquisition proceedings, which ought to have been
done before the 25-year period elapsed, by preserving the valuable right
H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A contained in section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, which could have
been availed of by the owner of the Premises, i.e., the Appellant.
20. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is fortified by
several judgments. In Banwarilal & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India,
C.W.P. No. 2385 of 1988 reported in 1991 Supp DRJ 317
B [“Banwarilal (Delhi HC)”], a Division Bench of the High Court of
Delhi, vide an order dated 04.02.1991, quashed a similar notification in
the context of a similar provision contained in the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. The High Court of Delhi
held:
C “8. In the Notification challenged before us the only thing that is
stated is that the property was required for the “residential use of
government servants.” There is not a whisper of what was the
urgency to take immediate possession and to deny the right of
raising [objections] to the owner under Section 5-A of the Act.
The Notification under Sections 4 and 17(1) in the present case,
D therefore, stand vitiated for non-compliance of the requirement
of mentioning urgency in the Notification itself. What is more
objectionable is the fact that the building was already in occupation
of the officers of Delhi Administration and the Administration knew
that the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties
E Act was to lapse on 10.3.1987. Thus, they had sufficient time to
make alternate arrangement for the residence of their officers
and there was no urgency whatsoever for invoking the provisions
of Section 17(1). The provisions of Section 17(1) cannot be utilised
to cover up the laxity or lethargy of the Administration to take
appropriate steps in time for making available alternate
F accommodation for its officers.”
(page 320)
“13. In Assam Sillimanita Limited v. Union of India (AIR 1990
SC 1417) the Supreme Court had appointed an Arbitrator for
G determining the damages in case of unlawful termination of a
lease. Considering the fact that more than three years have
elapsed since the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act has lapsed, it would be more just and appropriate
that an Arbitrator is appointed in the present case to determine
the damages payable by Delhi Administration instead of making
H
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 17
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD. [R. F. NARIMAN, J. ]

the petitioners run to the Civil Court for that purpose. We appoint A
Mr. T.V.R. Tatachari, former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court, as
an Arbitrator who will enter upon the reference within four weeks
of the communication of this order to him. He may make the
Award within a period of four months thereafter. The Arbitrator
will not be obliged to give reasons for his conclusions. The parties
B
will be at liberty to produce their valuers before the Arbitrator for
the assessment of damages, if they so desire. The petitioners as
well as the Delhi Administration will pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/-
each to the Arbitrator as the initial payment towards his fees. A
copy of this order [be] sent to the learned Arbitrator by the
Registry.” C
(pages 321-322)
21. This judgment of the High Court of Delhi travelled to this
Court, the Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India being
dismissed on 21.03.1991. In other off-shoot proceedings as well, such
as Union of India v. Shakuntala Gupta, (2002) 10 SCC 694, the D
judgment in Banwarilal (Delhi HC) (supra) was again confirmed on
14.11.2000. A review against the aforesaid order met with the same fate
in Union of India v. Shakuntala Gupta, (2002) 7 SCC 98, in which
this Court dismissed the review on merits on 27.08.2002, stating:
“15. In any event the order dated 14-11-2000 was not legally E
erroneous. The notification under Section 4 was a composite one.
The “opinion” of the Lt. Governor that the provisions of Section
17(1) of the Act were applicable, as expressed in the last paragraph
of the impugned notification, was relatable in general to the 14
properties specified in the notification. The impugned notification F
was quashed in Banwari Lal case [Banwari Lal & Sons (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India, DRJ 1991 Supp 317] inter alia on the
ground that the “opinion” of the Lt. Governor as expressed in the
notification was insufficient for the purpose of invoking the
provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act. This ground was not peculiar
to the premises in Banwari Lal case [Banwari Lal & Sons (P) G
Ltd. v. Union of India, DRJ 1991 Supp 317] but common to all
fourteen properties. The urgency sought to be expressed in the
impugned notification cannot be held to be sufficient for the
purposes of Section 17(1) in this case when it has already been
held to be bad in Banwari Lal case. [See observations in Abhey H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A Ram v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 421 (para 11); Delhi Admn.
v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (2000) 7 SCC 296 (paras 53-55)] The
expression of urgency being one cannot be partly good and partly
bad like the curate’s egg. It must follow that the acquisition in
respect of the respondent’s premises as mentioned in the
notification which were sought to be acquired on the basis of
B
such invalid expression of “urgency” cannot be sustained.”
22. These judgments were then followed in Union of India v.
Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453 [“Krishan Lal Arneja”].
After setting out the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, this
Court held:
C
“16. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities
under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down
under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such
powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency
enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land
D proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose,
however laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid
of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power
deprives a landowner of his right in relation to immovable property
to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses
E with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The authority must
have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause
under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose,
real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e.
whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum
period within which the objections could be received from the
F landowners and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be
completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not
exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired
urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to
acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or
G overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly,
exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as
due to earthquake, flood or some specific time-bound project where
the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous.
A citizen’s property can be acquired in accordance with law but
in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be
H
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 19
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD. [R. F. NARIMAN, J. ]

appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just A
opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of
the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the
State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking
urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity,
lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State administration.
B
xxx xxx xxx
21. One more aspect to be noticed is, as observed by the High
Court, that the properties in question continued to be in possession
of the appellants; in other words, there was no urgency of taking
immediate possession nor was there any immediate threat of C
dispossessing them from the properties. At the most, after the
lapsing of the Requisitioning Act on 10-3-1987, their possession
over the properties would have been unauthorised, maybe so long
they continued in unauthorised possession of the properties, they
were liable to pay damages for their occupation for a few months
during which period they could have completed acquisition D
proceedings in the normal course without resorting to provisions
of Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act. During the course of the
hearing, we specifically asked the learned counsel for the appellants
in this regard, the only answer was that the appellants being the
Union of India and others did not want to remain in the unauthorised E
possession of the properties. We are not convinced by this reply
so as to justify invoking urgency clause to acquire the properties.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case in these
appeals, the authorities could have completed acquisition
proceedings in a couple of months even after providing opportunity
for filing objections and holding inquiry under Section 5-A of the F
Act if they were really serious.
22. In the objects and reasons of Act 20 of 1985, it is stated that
all the properties which were requisitioned prior to the amendment
of the Act in 1970 were required to be released from requisition
or acquired by 10-3-1985; although the Government is expeditiously G
implementing the policy of acquiring or releasing from requisition
the requisitioned properties, a number of them are expected to be
needed by the Government even after 10-3-1985 for public
purposes; the Ministry of Defence is taking action for either
releasing or acquiring the requisitioned properties. It was, H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A therefore, decided to extend the maximum period for which the
properties could be retained under requisition by a period of two
years. Thus, it is clear that the authorities were aware that the
properties were to be released or acquired and the maximum period
was extended up to two years for the purpose. From 1985 to
1987 they had sufficient time to acquire the properties in question
B
in the usual course. They had enough time to provide opportunity
for filing objections and holding inquiry under Section 5-A of the
Act. There was no need to invoke Section 17 of the Act. The
office memorandum dated 19-7-1979 extracted above shows that
the Executive Council took the decision in view of the amendment
C in the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952 that all the requisitioned/leased houses which were with the
Administration for more than 10 years were to be released to
their owners immediately and all the occupants of requisitioned/
leased houses were requested to furnish the relevant information
by 16-7-1979 failing which the officer concerned will be liable for
D
eviction from the requisitioned house without provision for
alternative accommodation. Here again, it is clear that the
authorities were in the know of the situation in the year 1979
itself. Further, the minutes of the meeting held on 8-4-1985 in the
room of the Secretary (PWD/L&D), Delhi Administration, Delhi
E show that the position regarding all the requisitioned properties in
Delhi which were requisitioned under the 1952 Act was reviewed.
The said meeting was attended by: (1) Secretary (PWD/L&D),
(2) Joint Director (Training), (3) Additional District Magistrate
(Registration) and Under-Secretary (LA). In the said meeting, it
was decided that all the pre-1970 residential buildings which were
F
partially requisitioned and were not in full occupation of the Delhi
Administration should be derequisitioned in stages.
xxx xxx xxx
27. Thus, from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 20
G of 1985, statement by the Minister concerned to the Lok Sabha
on 28-3-1985, the office memorandum aforementioned and the
minutes of meeting dated 8-4-1985, it is sufficiently clear that the
appellants were fully aware that they had to make arrangements
either for acquiring the properties or derequisitioning them by
making alternate arrangement within a period of two years i.e. up
H
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 21
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD. [R. F. NARIMAN, J. ]

to 10-3-1987 inasmuch as no further extension of the Requisition A
Act was possible. Further having regard to the observations made
by this Court in the case of Vora [(1984) 2 SCC 337 : (1984) 2
SCR 693] , there would have been no justification for the appellants
to continue the properties in question under the Requisitioning Act
any more. If the appellants were really serious in acquiring the
B
properties in question, they had almost 2 years’ time even after
taking the decision to acquire them or derequisition them within
which time, acquisition proceedings could be completed in the
usual course without depriving the respondents of their valuable
right to file objections for acquisition and without dispensing with
inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. C
xxx xxx xxx
29. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and the material
available on record, we are of the view that invocation of urgency
clause was without justification and was untenable as held in
Banwari Lal [Banwari Lal & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, D
DRJ 1991 Supp 317 (Del HC) [Ed.: This order of the High Court
was affirmed by the Supreme Court while dismissing the SLP
(No. 4458 of 1991) in Union of India v. Banwarilal & Sons (P)
Ltd. by its order dated 21-3-1991 quoted in para 5 below. See also
para 11 below. See connected case at (2004) 5 SCC 304.]] and E
Shakuntala Gupta [Union of India v. Shakuntala Gupta, (2002)
7 SCC 98 [Ed.: See also the earlier order reported at (2002) 10
SCC 694.]] . This Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh
[(1980) 2 SCC 471] as to the use of emergency power under
Section 17 of the Act has observed that: (SCC p. 477, para 16)
F
“[I]t is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man’s property
is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious
the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable
and pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this
administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for
good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does G
not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing
land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles
14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act.
Here a slumbering process, pending for years and suddenly
H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A exciting itself into immediate forcible taking, makes a travesty
of emergency power.”
30. In Om Prakash v. State of U.P. [(1998) 6 SCC 1] referring
to State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 471] this
Court in para 21 has observed that: (SCC pp. 23-24)
B “[A]ccording to the aforesaid decision of this Court, inquiry
under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has a flavour
of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the
Constitution though right to property has now no longer
remained a fundamental right, at least observation regarding
C Article 14, vis-à-vis, Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
would remain apposite.”
In the present appeals, the appellants have not been able to show
before the High Court any genuine subjective satisfaction
depending upon any relevant material available to the State
D authorities at the time when they issued the impugned notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act and dispensed with Section 5-A
inquiry taking aid of Section 17(4) of the Act. A Bench of three
learned Judges of this Court in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State
of Maharashtra [(1977) 1 SCC 133 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 49] has
expressed that Section 17(4) cannot be read in isolation from
E Sections 4(1) and 5-A of the Act and has expressed that having
regard to the possible objections that may be taken by the
landowners challenging the public purpose, normally there will be
little difficulty in completing inquiries under Section 5-A of the
Act very expeditiously. In the same judgment, it is also stated
F that: (SCC p. 148, para 38)
“The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be
applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a
nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A
of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of
G an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under
Section 5-A which has to be considered.””
23. Justifying the quashing of the notification under section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act along with the invocation of urgency under
section 17 thereof, this Court then concluded:
H
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 23
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD. [R. F. NARIMAN, J. ]

“35. The alternative argument urged on behalf of the appellants A
that if the impugned notification suffers from infirmity in relation
to invoking urgency clause, it can be quashed only to the extent of
invoking the aid of Section 17 and the said notification can be
sustained confining it to Section 4 of the Act, cannot be accepted.
Otherwise, the same common notification stands quashed in
B
respect of a few parties as in the cases of Banwari Lal [Union
of India v. Banwarilal & Sons (P) Ltd., SLP (C) No. 4458 of
1991 dated 21-3-1991] and Shakuntala Gupta [Union of India
v. Shakuntala Gupta, (2002) 7 SCC 98 [Ed.: See also the earlier
order reported at (2002) 10 SCC 694.]] and it stands sustained in
respect of others i.e. the respondents in these appeals leading to C
anomalous situation. Added to this, if the argument, as advanced
on behalf of the Union, is accepted, the notification under Section
17 of the Act invoking urgency clause would stand quashed but
the landowner would nonetheless be deprived of the possession
of the property as also payment of 80% of compensation under
D
Section 17(3-A) of the Act. Such an unjust result cannot be
allowed to happen by quashing the notification in part only to the
extent of Section 17 of the Act and maintaining it for the purpose
of Section 4 of the Act. Thus, having regard to the facts and
circumstances brought on record in these appeals, it is not possible
to accept this argument particularly when the very foundation of E
invoking Section 17 was invalid and unjustified as upheld by this
Court in Banwari Lal‡ and Shakuntala Gupta [Union of India
v. Shakuntala Gupta, (2002) 7 SCC 98 [Ed.: See also the earlier
order reported at (2002) 10 SCC 694.]].”
24. Given the aforesaid, it is clear that the appeals filed by the F
State, namely, civil appeals arising out of SLP(C) No.10581-10583 of
2020 have to be dismissed.
25. Coming to the appeals filed by the Appellant,1 the said appeals
are only on a limited ground, namely, that compensation for the illegal
occupation of the Premises cannot be assessed by the District Judge G
under section 11(1)(b) of the West Bengal Requisition Act, as section
11(1) refers to compensation during the period of requisition and not
after the property continues to remain with the State without any authority
1
Civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.9834-9835 of 2020 and SLP (C) Nos.9837-
9838 of 2020. H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A of law even after the requisition period ends. Section 11(1) of the West
Bengal Requisition Act reads as follows:
“Provisions regarding compensation.
11. Procedure for fixing compensation.-
(1) Where any premises are requisitioned under this Act, there
B shall be paid to all persons interested compensation the amount of
which shall be determined in the manner, and in accordance with
the principles hereinafter set out, namely:
(a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by
agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement;
C (b) where no such agreement can be reached, the State
Government shall appoint a District Judge or an Additional
District Judge as arbitrator;…”
26. A cursory reading of the aforesaid provision will make it clear
that the Appellant is correct in its submission, which is therefore accepted
D and the impugned judgment of the Division Bench is set aside to this
extent. Civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 9834-9835 of 2020 and
SLP (C) Nos. 9837-9838 of 2020 are thereby allowed.
27. A very disturbing feature of these appeals is the fact that
WBMDTCL, which is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, has continued in unlawful possession of the Premises
E
since 15.08.1998 without paying a single pice towards compensation till
date. Following the judgments of this Court, most notably, Assam
Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 182 (see paragraphs
13 and 14) and Krishan Lal Arneja (supra), we appoint Shri Soumitra
Pal (Retd. Judge, High Court of Calcutta) as arbitrator to determine
F compensation that is payable by way of damages for occupation of the
Premises without any authority of law. A written authority to appoint
such arbitrator is to be furnished to us immediately, i.e., within a week
from 23.02.2021. If not so furnished, WBMDTCL will be liable to pay a
sum of Rs. 100 per square foot, per month (being the average of the
rental amounts paid by other tenants in the same building since August
G
1998 as per the Valuation Report dated 30.11.2019 prepared by Banibrata
Mukherjee, Chartered Engineer, Engineer Commissioner & Valuer of
Alipore Judges’ Court) for the entire period of illegal occupation of the
Premises within four months from the date of this judgment.
28. If written authority for appointment of the arbitrator is received
H within time, the learned arbitrator is to proceed on a prima facie view of
PUNALUR PAPER MILLS LTD. v. WEST BENGAL MINERAL 25
DEVELOPMENT AND TRADING CORP. LTD. [R. F. NARIMAN, J. ]

the case submitted to him by the parties to determine interim compensation A
payable within a period of two months of entering upon the reference.
This is owing to the fact that not a single pice has been paid for the last
22 years for the illegal occupation of the Premises by WBMDTCL.
Further, neither party is to take any adjournment before the arbitrator
within this period of two months, so that the arbitrator can decide the
B
interim compensation that is to be paid. After such interim order, the
learned arbitrator will proceed to deliver a final award.
29. WBMDTCL has asked for reasonable time to vacate the
premises. However, in light of the fact that WBMDTCL has been in
possession of the Premises without any authority of law for the last 22
years, we do not feel that it is justified to give time as prayed for, till the C
end of this year. Thus, we only grant time of four months from the date
of this judgment to vacate the Premises, conditional upon the responsible
officer filing an undertaking before this Court, that they will vacate the
Premises within four months and handover vacant possession of the
Premises to the Appellant, and that the interim compensation, if ordered D
before such date, will be paid within the time stipulated by the arbitrator
so appointed.
Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 9837-9838 of 2020
30. In these appeals,2 though no one appears on behalf of West
Bengal Sugar Industries Development Corporation Ltd. [“WB Sugar E
Industries”], who have been in illegal occupation of a portion of the
fifth floor of premises no. 13, Nellie Sengupta Sarani (Lindsay Street),
Calcutta [“Fifth Floor Premises”], measuring approximately 1350
square feet, the same directions apply qua WB Sugar Industries. Thus,
WB Sugar Industriesis also to submit a written authority to appoint the
arbitrator within a week from 23.02.2021, failing which they shall pay a F
sum of Rs. 100 per square foot, per month, for the entire period of illegal
occupation of the Fifth Floor Premises, within four months from the date
of this judgment. Further, WB Sugar Industries is given four months to
vacate the Fifth Floor Premises, upon the submission of an undertaking
to vacate and handover vacant possession of the Fifth Floor Premises to
G
the Appellant, and to pay the interim compensation within the time to be
stipulated by the arbitrator.
31.These appeals are disposed of accordingly.
Ankit Gyan Appeals disposed of.
2
Civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 9837-9838 of 2020. H