PURNI DEVI & ANR.versusBABU RAM & ANR.

                   [2024] 4 S.C.R. 37 : 2024 INSC 259

                               Purni Devi & Anr.
                                      v.
                               Babu Ram & Anr.
                        (Civil Appeal No. 4633 of 2024)
                                   02 April 2024
               [Sanjay Karol* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

                             Issue for Consideration
       A suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff. Application for execution was
       filed before the Tehsildar (settlement), Hiranagar on 18.12.2000. The
       application was rejected on 29.01.2005. The Tehsildar observed that
       plaintiff had not applied before the Court with appropriate jurisdiction.
       Whether the period (18.12.2000 to 29.01.2005) diligently pursuing
       execution petition before the Tehsildar, would be excluded for the
       purposes of computing the period of limitation or not.

                                     Headnotes
       Limitation Act, 1963 – s. 14 – J&K Limitation Act – Art.182 –
       The High Court dismissed the execution application preferred
       by the plaintiff being barred by limitation – Sustainability:
       Held: In the present case, it is not in dispute that:- (i) Both the
       proceedings are civil in nature and have been prosecuted by
       the Plaintiff or the predecessor in interest; (ii) The failure of the
       execution proceedings was due to a defect of jurisdiction; (iii)
       Both the proceedings pertain to execution of the decree dated
       10.12.1986, which attains finality on 09.11.2000; (iv) Both the
       proceedings are in a court – No substantial averment has come
       on record to substantiate the claim that the predecessor in
       interest of the Plaintiff approached the Tehsildar with any mala
       fide intention, in the absence of good faith or with the knowledge
       that it was not the Court having competent jurisdiction to execute
       the decree – On a perusal of the record, it is apparent that the
       Plaintiff has pursued the matter bonafidely and diligently and in
       good faith before what it believed to be the appropriate forum
       and, therefore, such time period is bound to be excluded when
       computing limitation before the Court having competent jurisdiction
       – All conditions stipulated for invocation of s.14 of the Limitation
       Act are fulfilled – Therefore, the period from 18.12.2000, when


* Author
38                                                               [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


      the execution application was filed to 29.01.2005, when the prior
      proceeding was dismissed, has to be excluded while computing
      period of limitation – The impugned order of the High Court
      dated 09.04.2018 and Munsiff Court, Hiranagar dated 28.11.2007
      (dismissing application of plaintiff as being barred by limitation) are
      set aside – The execution application of the Plaintiff is restored
      to the file of the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar for fresh consideration.
      [Paras 32, 37, 38, 39, 40]

                                Case Law Cited
           Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy,
           Irrigation Department [2008] 5 SCR 1108 : (2008) 7
           SCC 169; M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE [2015] 7 SCR
           291 : (2015) 7 SCC 58 – relied on.
           Prem Lata Agarwal v. Lakshman Prasad Gupta
           and others [1971] 1 SCR 364 : (1970) 3 SCC 440;
           Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop.
           Bank Ltd. [2021] 3 SCR 806 : (2021) 7 SCC 313;
           Laxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill v. State
           of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. 2022 SCC Online SC
           1790 – referred to.
           J&K Bank Limited etc. v. Amar Poultry Farm AIR 2007
           J&K 56 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
      Limitation Act, 1963; J&K Limitation Act; Code of Civil Procedure,
      1908.

                               List of Keywords
      Application for execution; Appropriate jurisdiction; Limitation;
      Computing the period of limitation; Pursued the matter bonafidely
      and diligently; Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court
      without jurisdiction.

                              Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4633 of 2024
      From the Judgment and Order dated 09.04.2018 of the High
      Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu in CREV No.
      33 of 2008
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                         39

                    Purni Devi & Anr. v. Babu Ram & Anr.


                          Appearances for Parties
     Nitin Sangra, Riju Ghosh, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Advs. for the
     Appellants.
     Sunil Fernandes, Sr. Adv., Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Diksha Dadu,
     Advs. for the Respondents.
                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment
     Sanjay Karol, J.
     Leave Granted.
2.   The present appeal arises from the final judgment and order in Civil
     Revision No.33/2008 dated 09.04.2018 of the High Court of Jammu
     and Kashmir at Jammu, whereby the judgment and order of Munsiff,
     Hiranagar, in File No. 70/Execution dated 28.11.2007 came to be
     affirmed, wherein the execution application preferred by the Plaintiff
     herein was dismissed, being barred by limitation.
     Factual History
3.   The genesis of the case at hand dates back to 01.06.1984, wherein
     the predecessors in interest of the Appellant (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)
     filed a suit for possession against the Respondents (hereinafter
     “Defendants”) herein. On 10.12.1986, this suit was decreed by learned
     Munsiff, First Class Hiranagar, in favour of the Plaintiff, and the
     Defendants were directed to deliver vacant and peaceful possession
     of the property to the Plaintiff. This decree was challenged by the
     Respondents before the learned District Judge, Kathua, in First
     Appeal, which came to be dismissed on 09.02.1990. Thereafter, the
     Respondents preferred a Second Appeal before the High Court of
     Jammu and Kashmir which came to be dismissed vide Order dated
     09.11.2000. No further appeal was preferred. Therefore, the decree
     of the learned Munsiff Court attained finality on 09.11.2000.
4.   The present lis arises from the application for execution filed by the
     predecessor in interest of the Plaintiff, before the learned Tehsildar
     (Settlement), Hiranagar on 18.12.2000. This application came to be
     rejected on 29.01.2005, whereby the learned Tehsildar observed
     that the Plaintiff had not applied before the Court with appropriate
     jurisdiction.
40                                                          [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


5.    The Plaintiff thereafter, on 03.10.2005 preferred a fresh application
      for execution before the Court of Munsiff, Hiranagar. This
      application resulted in the order dated 28.11.2007, whereby, the
      learned Munsiff Court dismissed the application as being barred
      by limitation, which has come to be confirmed vide the impugned
      order.
      Reasoning of the Courts below
      Munsiff Court, Order dated 28.11.2007
6.    The question framed for determination was whether the execution
      petition was filed within time and whether the period of limitation for
      filing the execution petition is 3 years or 12 years.
7.    The Court after a careful perusal of Article 182 of the J&K Limitation
      Act (which provides for 3 years) and Section 48 of the Civil
      Procedure Code (which provides for 12 years, hereinafter “CPC”),
      observed that, Article 182 deals with period of Limitation for filing
      an execution application for the first-time seeking enforcement of a
      decree. Meanwhile, Section 48 of the CPC deals with subsequent
      applications and fixes an outer limit when execution remains
      unsatisfied.
8.    The application was held to be required to be filed within 3 years,
      as required by Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act, which would run
      from when the second appeal came to be dismissed. Accordingly,
      the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar, held the application to be time-barred
      and therefore, dismissed.
9.    There was no argument or discussion about the exclusion of time
      period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act at this stage.
10. The Plaintiff preferred Civil Revision No.33/2008 against the aforesaid
    order which came to be dismissed vide the Impugned Order, dated
    09.04.2018.
      Impugned Order
11. The Impugned Order also framed the question as to whether for
    execution of a decree, the application has to be filed within 12
    years as prescribed by Section 48 of the CPC or within 3 years as
    prescribed by Article 182 of J&K Limitation Act.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                         41

                      Purni Devi & Anr. v. Babu Ram & Anr.


12. Reliance was placed on a judgment rendered by the High Court
    in J&K Bank Limited etc. v. Amar Poultry Farm1 wherein it was
    observed that limitation for the first execution application shall be
    governed by Article 182 of the J&K Limitation Act. Further reliance
    was placed on the judgment of this Court in Prem Lata Agarwal v.
    Lakshman Prasad Gupta and others2 (2-Judge Bench) wherein
    Section 48 of the CPC came to be considered. This Court observed
    that Section 48 provides for a maximum time limit provided for
    execution, but it does not prescribe the period within which each
    application for execution was to be made.
13. The argument of the Plaintiff that time spent in pursuing the
    proceedings before the Tehsildar is required to be excluded, has
    been recorded and rejected by the High Court.
14. It was finally held vide the Impugned Order that the dismissal of
    the execution petition is well reasoned and, therefore, cannot be
    interfered with. However, while disposing off the revision, the Court
    observed that the State Code of Civil Procedure is required to be
    brought to 12 years.
     Submissions on behalf of the Appellant/Plaintiff
15. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that the reasoning
    of the learned High Court that the Plaintiff had chosen a wrong
    forum and is not entitled to exclusion of time runs, contrary to the
    law laid down by this Court that the provisions of Section 14 of the
    Limitation Act, 1963 are meant for grant of relief, where a person
    has committed some mistake and such provisions should be applied
    in a broad manner. Furthermore, the provision of Section 14 of the
    Limitation Act is para materia to the provisions of Section 14 of the
    Limitation Act, as applicable to the then State of Jammu and Kashmir.
16. The Plaintiff has sought to place reliance on the judgment of this Court
    in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation
    Department3 (3-Judge Bench) and M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE4


1   AIR 2007 J&K 56
2   [1971] 1 SCR 364 : (1970) 3 SCC 440
3   [2008] 5 SCR 1108 : (2008) 7 SCC 169
4   [2015] 7 SCR 291 : (2015) 7 SCC 58
42                                                          [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                     Digital Supreme Court Reports


      (2-Judge Bench) wherein it was expounded that the provisions of
      Section14 of the Limitation Act are to advance the cause of justice
      and must be interpreted to do so rather than abort proceedings.
17. It has been further submitted that in light of the facts of the present
    case, the Plaintiff is entitled to exclusion of time consumed in pursuing
    their remedy before the learned Tehsildar, in view of Section 14(2) of
    the Limitation Act. The filing of the application by the predecessor of
    the Plaintiff before the Tehsildar for implementation of the judgment
    and decree dated 09.10.1986 was under a genuine bona fide belief
    and in good faith that the Tehsildar possess the jurisdiction to execute
    decrees passed by a Civil Court.
18. In lieu of this conspectus, it has been submitted that previous recourse
    to a mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum by the Plaintiff
    cannot be said to be bereft of bona fides, due diligence or lacking
    in good faith.
19. Further, it is not disputed that in view of Section 105 and 112 of the
    Land Revenue Act, the Court of learned Tehsildar, Settlement, has
    all the trappings of a Court and thus would fall within the scope and
    ambit of the expression “Court” for the purpose of Section14 of the
    Limitation Act.
20. Lastly, in view of the facts submitted above, it would be a travesty
    of justice, if, on mere technicalities, the Plaintiff is deprived from
    reaping the fruits of the decree.
      Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
21. Learned counsel for the Respondents has vehemently opposed the
    stand taken by the Plaintiff. It has been submitted that the Plaintiff is
    taking this plea for the first time before this Court and did not raise
    the plea of Section 14 of the Limitation Act before the Courts below.
22. It was a deliberate act of wilful disobedience at the Plaintiff’s end
    and the plea of Section 14 of the Limitation Act ought to have been
    raised at the very first instance.
23. It is further submitted that the Plaintiff herein has not approached
    the Court with clean hands. They have concealed the fact that they
    did not enter appearance in the Second Appeal and thereafter, had
    filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte order, which was
    allowed, and only thereafter, the second appeal was dismissed vide
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        43

                    Purni Devi & Anr. v. Babu Ram & Anr.


     the impugned order. This Court in M.P. Steel (Supra) has reiterated
     that ‘due diligence’ and ‘good faith’ means that the party who invokes
     Section 14 is not guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction.
     Issue before this Court
24. In view of the submissions raised, the issue which arises for
    consideration of this Court is as to whether the period (18.12.2000
    to 29.01.2005) diligently pursuing execution petition before the
    Tehsildar, would be excluded for the purposes of computing the
    period of limitation or not.
     Analysis & Consideration
25. The relevant portion of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is extracted
    as under, for ready reference:
           “Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in
           court without jurisdiction. …
           …
           (2) In computing the period of limitation for any
           application, the time during which the applicant has
           been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
           proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or
           of appeal or revision, against the same party for the
           same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding
           is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from
           defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
           is unable to entertain it.”
           ….
26. The Plaintiffs have submitted that the provision of Section14 of
    the Limitation Act, finds place in the Limitation Act applicable
    to the then State of J&K, which has not been contested by the
    Respondents.
27. On a perusal of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, which is also
    applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it is evident that it
    carves out an exception excluding the period of limitation when the
    proceedings are being pursued with due diligence and good faith
    in a Court “which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like
    nature, is unable to entertain it”.
44                                                           [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


28. The first objection raised by Defendants is that the plea of exclusion
    of limitation has not been raised before the Courts below and cannot
    be raised at the first instance before this Court.
29. We do not find merit in this submission, the learned High Court in
    paragraph 9 has categorically recorded the submission of the Plaintiff
    pertaining to the exclusion of time spent in pursuing the proceedings
    before the learned Tehsildar. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
    plea of exclusion has been raised for the first time, before this Court.
30. The principles pertaining to applicability of Section 14, were
    extensively discussed and summarised by this Court in Consolidated
    Engg. Enterprises (Supra), wherein while holding the exclusion of
    time period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act to a petition under
    Section 34 of the Arbitration Act it was observed:-
            “21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of
            time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction.
            On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that
            the following conditions must be satisfied before Section
            14 can be pressed into service:
            (1)   Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil
                  proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
            (2)   The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due
                  diligence and in good faith;
            (3)   The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect
                  of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
            (4)   The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must
                  relate to the same matter in issue; and
            (5)   Both the proceedings are in a court.”
31. This Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra) further
    expounded that the provisions of this Section, must be interpreted
    and applied in a manner that furthers the cause of justice, rather
    than aborts the proceedings at hand and the time taken diligently
    pursuing a remedy, in a wrong Court, should be excluded.
32. In the present case, it is not in dispute that:-
      (i)   Both the proceedings are civil in nature and have been
            prosecuted by the Plaintiff or the predecessor in interest.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        45

                    Purni Devi & Anr. v. Babu Ram & Anr.


     (ii)   The failure of the execution proceedings was due to a defect
            of jurisdiction.
     (iii) Both the proceedings pertain to execution of the decree dated
           10.12.1986, which attains finality on 09.11.2000.
     (iv) Both the proceedings are in a court.
33. The only objection pointed out by the Respondent to the ingredients
    for invocation of Section 14, is that the Plaintiff have not approached
    this Court with clean hands and did not approach the Court of the
    Tehsildar diligently and in good faith.
34. The judgment of this Court in M.P. Steel (Supra) discussed the
    phrases, “due diligence” and “in good faith” for the purposes of
    invocation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. While considering
    the application of Section 14 to the Customs Act, it was observed:
            “10. We might also point out that Conditions 1 to 4
            mentioned in the Consolidated Engg. case [(2008) 7
            SCC 169] have, in fact, been met by the Plaintiff. It is
            clear that both the prior and subsequent proceedings are
            civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party. The prior
            proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in
            good faith, as has been explained in Consolidated Engg.
            [(2008) 7 SCC 169] itself. These phrases only mean
            that the party who invokes Section 14 should not be
            guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction. Further, there
            should be no pretended mistake intentionally made
            with a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing
            the opposite party.
                 xxx				             xxx				               xxx
            49. ……. the expression “the time during which the
            plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence
            another civil proceeding” needs to be construed in
            a manner which advances the object sought to be
            achieved, thereby advancing the cause of justice.”
                                               (emphasis supplied)
35. The judgments in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra) and
    M.P. Steel (Supra) have been followed consistently by this Court.
    For instance in Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop.
46                                                           [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                             Digital Supreme Court Reports


       Bank Ltd.5 (2-Judge Bench), while holding Section 14 to be applicable
       to applications under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
       Code, 2016 and the SARFAESI Act, it was observed:-
              “75. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to be read as a
              whole. A conjoint and careful reading of sub-sections (1),
              (2) and (3) of Section 14 makes it clear that an applicant
              who has prosecuted another civil proceeding with due
              diligence, before a forum which is unable to entertain the
              same on account of defect of jurisdiction or any other
              cause of like nature, is entitled to exclusion of the time
              during which the applicant had been prosecuting such
              proceeding, in computing the period of limitation. The
              substantive provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of
              Section 14 do not say that Section 14 can only be invoked
              on termination of the earlier proceedings, prosecuted in
              good faith.”
36. More recently, in Laxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill v. State
    of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.6 (2-Judge Bench), this Court followed
    the dictum in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra) and M.P.
    Steel (Supra) to exclude the time period undertaken by the Plaintiff
    therein in pursuing remedy under Writ Jurisdiction, in the absence
    of challenge to the bona fides of the Plaintiff, in view of Section 14.
37. No substantial averment has come on record to substantiate the
    claim that the predecessor in interest of the Plaintiff approached the
    Tehsildar with any mala fide intention, in the absence of good faith
    or with the knowledge that it was not the Court having competent
    jurisdiction to execute the decree. The object to advance the cause
    of justice, as well must be kept in mind.
38. We do not find the reasoning given by the learned High Court in
    paragraph 9 while rejecting the plea for exclusion of time to be
    sustainable. On a perusal of the record, it is apparent that the Plaintiff
    has pursued the matter bonafidely and diligently and in good faith
    before what it believed to be the appropriate forum and, therefore, such
    time period is bound to be excluded when computing limitation before



5     [2021] 3 SCR 806 : (2021) 7 SCC 313
6     2022 SCC Online SC 1790
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                           47

                    Purni Devi & Anr. v. Babu Ram & Anr.


     the Court having competent jurisdiction. All conditions stipulated for
     invocation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are fulfilled.
39. Therefore, in view of the above discussion the period from 18.12.2000,
    when the execution application was filed to 29.01.2005, when the
    prior proceeding was dismissed, has to be excluded while computing
    period of limitation, which results in the execution application filed
    by the Plaintiff, being within the limitation period prescribed under
    Article 182 of the Limitation Act as well, which is 3 years.
40. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the
    High Court dated 09.04.2018 and Munsiff Court, Hiranagar dated
    28.11.2007 are set aside. The execution application of the Plaintiff
    is restored to the file of the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar for fresh
    consideration, in consonance with the view on limitation which has
    been decided above.
41. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. No order as to costs.


     Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan                    Result of the case:
                                                             Appeal allowed.