Holding

The appellant’s act of throwing a shoe at the judge constituted contempt of court, warranting conviction, with the sentence reduced to one month imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000.

Summary

Advocate R.K. Garg, appearing for a petitioner in a Rent Act matter, threw his shoe at the presiding judge after the petition was dismissed for non‑payment of process fee under Order 9 Rule 2 CPC. The judge sought to arrest him under Section 228 IPC and referred the matter to the Himachal Pradesh High Court under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court found Garg guilty of contempt, sentencing him to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.200. On appeal, Garg argued that he acted under an irresistible impulse provoked by the judge’s alleged abusive language and that his unconditional apology warranted leniency. The Supreme Court held that the act of hurling a shoe at a judge constituted contempt, rejected the defence of provocation, and reduced the imprisonment to one month while increasing the fine to Rs.1,000, to be paid to a Legal Aid Society. The Court emphasized that such conduct is highly unbecoming of a practising lawyer and condemned violations of professional ethics.

Issues considered

Whether hurling a shoe at a judge amounts to contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether the appellant’s claim of provocation or irresistible impulse can excuse the contemptuous act.
Whether the sentence imposed by the High Court is appropriate in view of the appellant’s apology and repentance.
Whether Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act bars the High Court from taking cognizance of the contempt.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 10, s. 15, s. 19, s. 2
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 228

Subjects

contempt of courtlegal professional ethicslawyer misconductcriminal contemptsentencingapologyjudicial authority

Judgment

536

A R.K. GARG, ADVOCATE
v.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

April 22, 1981
B
(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C. ], AND A.P. SEN, J.)

Contempt of Courts A.ct 1971, Ss.2, 15 and 19-Adilocate appearing in case--
Throwing shoe at presiding Judge-Guilty of contempt of Court-Punished with
imprisonment and fine.

c Legal Profession-Professional ethics and cultured conduct-Results of viola-
tion of.

The appellant a practising Advocate appeared for the petitioner in a petition
under the Rent Act. When the case was called out for hearing, the Judge noticed
that the petitioner had not paid the process fee, as a result of which the summons
could not be issued to the respondent. The Judge, proceeded to dismiss the
D petition under Order IX Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. Taking umbrage
at the dismissal of the petition the appellant hurled his shoe at the Judge which
hit him on the shoulder. The Judge intending to proceed under Section 228 of
the Penal Code issued a warrant of arrest against '.the appellant. The appellant
evaded the warrant and successfully managed to prevent proceedings being taken
by the Judge for the contempt of his Court. The Judge thereupon made a refe-
rence to the High Court under Section '15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
E 1971.

Before the High Court the appellant did not dispute that he hurled a shoe
at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying that he acted under an irresis-
tible impulse generated by the provocative language used by the Judge. The
High Court being satisfied, that the appellant was making a false allegation that
the Judge had used abusive language against him and that he had given an un-
F true version of the very genesis of the incident, held the appellant guilty of con-
temptfof Court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and a
fine of Rs. 200/-.

In the appeal to this Court it was pleaded that the appellant evidently lost
his balance and whether or not there was any justification for it, he acted under
the impulse of grave passion for which he had been sufficiently punished by the
G publicity which the incident had received and the notoriety which he had invited
for himself and as the appellant was genuinely repentent for his conduct he
should be enlarged on a mere admonition.

Allowing the appeal in part,
H HELD : 1. (i) The sentence of simple imprisonment for six months is redu-
ced to a period of one month and the fine for Rs. 200 /- is enhanced to Rs. 1000/-.
R.K. GARG V. HIMACHAL .PRADESH 537

The fine if recovered shall be paid over to the Legal Aid Society functioning in A
the State. [540 GJ

(ii) The appellant is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a
practising lawyer. He hurled his shoe at the Judge in order to overawe him and
to bully him into accepting his submission that the case should not be dismissed
under Order IX Rule 2 C.P.C.. The appellant did his best or worst to see that
the petition was not dismissed for non-payment of process fee and finding that 8
the Judge was not willing to accept his argument, he took out his shoe in
show of his physical prowess. [540 C]

(iii) The appellant's behaviour is condemned. It is most reprehensible
remembering that, as a practising lawyer he is an officer of the Court. [540 D]

__.....,..-- (iv) A long sentence of imprisonment is not imposed on the appellant since
be has tendered an unconditional apology to this Court and to the trial Judge.
c
The appellant is deeply regretful and genuinely contrite. He has suffered enough
in mind and reputation and no greater purpose is going to be served by subject-
ing him to a long bodily suffering. [540 E, F]

2. (i) The argument or the appellant's counsel in the High Court that :
"better part of discretion is to ignore it instead of fanning it. It is a tuss~l bet- D
we tn legal profession and judiciary", is as much to be regretted as the conduct of
the appellant before the trial Judge. [541A-B]

(ii) The Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the mechanism, which
administers justice to the people. A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned
instrument in the setting of a Court room. But Members of the Bar will do well E
to remember that flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct
will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without which no demo-
cracy can survive. [541 E, Fl

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Contempt Appeal No. 19
of 1981.
F
From the judgment and order dated the 17th November, 1980
of the Himachal Pradesh High Court at Simla in Contempt Petition
(Cr!.) No. 7 of 1980. '

· V. M. Tarkunde, S.S. Ray, K. K. Venugopal, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, G
Kapil Sibbal, C. M. Nayar and L. K. Pandey for the Appellant.

L. N. Sinha, A,ttorney General for the Respondent (Registrar,
High Court) ·

K. Parasaran, Soli. General and Miss A. Subhashini for the H
Respondent (State of H. P.)
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 S.C.R

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
I
CHANDRACHUD, C. J. This is an appeal under sec. 19(1)b of the
Contempt of Courts Act 1971, ("the Act'',) against the judgment of y
the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated November 17, 1980 in
Contempt Case (Criminal) No. 7 of 1980, whereby the appellant
B was sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of
Rs. 200.

The appellant practises as an Advocate at Solan which is a
district place in the State of Himachal Pradesh. It appears that
only one court generally sits at Solan which is that of the Senior Sub-
c Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate. The learned Judge, who pre-
sides over that Court, also exercises the powers of a Rent Controller
and of the Court of Small Causes. On June 18, 1980, Shri Kuldip
Chand Sud, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court, was hearing
a petition under the Rent Act in which the petitioner was represented
by the appellant. When the case was called out for hearing, the
D learned Judge noticed that the petitioner had not paid the process
fee, as a result of which the summons could not be issued to the
respondent. The Judge therefore proceeded to dismiss the petition
under Order 9, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. Taking um-
brage at the dismissal of the petition, the appellant hurled his shoe
at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder. The Judge asked his
E Orderly to take the appellant in custody but the appellant slipped
away. The Judge evidently wanted to proceed under sectior 228 of
the Penal Code for which purpose he issued a warrant of arrest
against the appellant. The appellant successfully evaded the warrant
and managed to prevent proceedings being taken by the Judge for
the contempt of his court. The Judge then made a reference to the
F High Court of Himachal Pradesh under section 15(2) of the Act.
The High Court issued notice to the appellant enclosing therewith a
copy of the reference made by the Judge.

The appellant did not dispute in the High Court that he hurled
a shoe at the Judge. He explained his conduct by saying that he
G acted under an irresistible impulse generated by the provocative
language used by the Judge. The appellant's version is like this :
On the previous date of hearing, the Judge had directed
the appellant to pay fresh process fee and to supply the
address of the respondent to the Rent Act petition. The
H appellant informed the Judge that he was unable to comply
R.K. GARG v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) . 539

with that order since the respondent had been admitted to A
a hospital and had since left the hospital. The house in
which the respondent lived was locked. The Judge then
y declared that he proposed to take action under Order 9
Rule 2 of the,Civil Procedure Code. The appellant asked
the Judge to record his statement as to why· he was unable
to pay the process fee and supply the address of the res- B
pondent. Instead of recording the appellant's statement,
the Judge remarked : "You rascal, I will set you right".
The appellant protested at the abusive language used by
the Judge, but the Judge retorted 1 "I repeat what I said".
The appellant thereafter lost control over himself and under

---- the "extreme heat of moment and passion, his hand fell on
his shoe" which he threw towards the dais. Many persons
were present in the court who witnessed the incident. After
c

hurling the shoe at the dais, the appellant took off his coat
and tie and told the court : "An unfortunate incident has
happened. Do you want to take any action (against me ?
I surrender". Upon this the Judge remarked : , "You D
scoundrel get out of my court". The appellant thereafter
left the court room.

The High Court had called for the comments of the Judge on the
version of the appellant, from which it was satisfied that the appel-
lant was making a false allegation that the Judge had used abusive E
language against him. The High Court also held that the appellant
. had given an untrue version of the very genesis of the incident since
the Judge had not given any direction for furnishing the complete
address of the respondent before him.

Many technical contentions were raised in the High Court, one F
of them being that section 10 of the Act was a bar to the High Court
taking cognizance of the matter. It is unnecessary to go into that
question or into .various other matters raised in the High Court on
behalf of the appellant since, Shri V. M. Tarkunde and Shri S. S.
Ray who appear on behalf of the appellant, stated before us that
the appellant did not desire to take a contentious attitude. It was G
stated on behalf of the appellant that he was prepared to tender an
unconditional written apology to this Court and to produce evidence
before us of his havi:ig tendered a similar apology to the trial court.
Such apologies have been duly tendered.
H
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant appealed
to us in all their persuation that in view of the fact that the appellant
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 3 s.c.R.

'A was genuinely repentant for his conduct, he should be enlarged on a
mere admonition. Counsel plead that the appellant evidently lost
his balance and whether or not there was any justification for it, he
acted under the impulse of giave passion for which- he has been
sufficiently punished by the publicity which the incident has received
and the notoriety which he has invited for himself.
'
B
We had made it clear to the learned counsel at the very time
when they -conveyed to us the willingness of the appellant to apolo-
gise that we offer no promise or inducement that if the appellant
apologises we will take a lenient view of the matter. In our opinion
the appellant is guilty of conduct which is highly unbecoming of a
practising lawyer. He hurled his shoe at the Judge in order evidently
to overawe him and to bully him into accepting his submission that
the case should not be dismissed under Order 9 Rule 2, C.P.C. The
appellant did his best or worst to. see that the petition was not dis-
missed for non-payment of process fee and finding that the Judge
was not willing to accept his argument, he took out his ;hoe in show
D of his physical prowess. We cannot adequately condemn the appel-
lant's behaviour which strikes us as most reprehensible, remembering
that, as a practising lawyer, he is an officer of the court. Such
incidents can easily multiply considering the devaluation of respect
for all authority, whether in law, education or politics.

E We do not, however, propose to impose a long sentence of
imprisonment on the appellant, since he has tendered an uncondi-
tional apology to this Court and to learned trial Judge. The appel-
lant was present in our Court at the time when his appeal was argued
and though, on such occasions, histrionics cannot entirely be ruled
out, we did form an impression, backed by our small little experience
F of life and its affairs, that the appellant is deeply regretful and genu-
~inely contrite. He has suffered enough in mind and reputation and
no greater purpose is going to be served by subjecting him to a long
·bodily suffering. Accordingly, we reduce the sentence of six months
to a period of one month, enhance the fine from Rs. 200 to Rs. I 000
and direct that the fine, if recovered, shall be paid over to a Legal
'G Aid Society, if any, functioning in the State of Himachal Pradesh.
The High Court will decide which society should get the money, if
there is more than one such society, of which there is precious little
·likelihood. Order accordingly.

H We will be failing in our duty if before parting with the case
we did not. draw attention to what the appellant's counsel Shri
R.K. GARG v. HJMACHAL PRADESH (Chandrachud, c. J.) 541

Bhagirath Das said in the High Court during the course of his argu-. A.
ments. Shri Bhagirath Das told the learned Judges of the High··
Court:
y "Better part of discretion is to ignore it instead of
fanning it. It is a tussel between legal profession and judi-
ciary". (emphasis supplied since it must have been placed). B.
This part of the argument of the appellant's counsel in the High
Court is as much to be regretted as the conduct of the appellant
before the learned trial Judge. Discretion is undoubtedly the better
part of valour but we did not know, until we read the argument
advanced by the appellant's counsel in the · High Court, that the c
better part of discretion is to ignore that a practising advocate had
hurled a shoe at a Judge. We are also unable to understand how ·
the High Court was "fanning': the incident by taking cognizance of,
it, which it was its clear duty to do. It makes sorry reading that·
"a tussel between legal profession and judiciary" should find its
culmination in a member of that noble profession throwing a shoe. D
at a Judge.

Those who are informed of the question and think deeply
upon it entertain no doubt that the Bar and the Bench are an inte• ·
gral part of the same mechanism which administers justice to the
people. Many members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar a.nd. E:
their past association is a source of inspiration and pride to them.
It ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestion"-
ably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just · as charity has to·
begin at home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. ·A discourteous~
Judge is like an ill-timed instrument' in the setting of a courtroom. :
But members of the Bar will do well to reme111ber that such flagrant: F
violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result ,
in the ultimate destruction of. a system without which no democracy ·
can survive.
All this, of course, is said without meaning any disrespect to
Shri Bhagirath Das. Not he, but what he said, is the cause of this
comment. G

N.V.K. , Appeai p;rtly allowed. ·