Supreme Court of India
R.K.JAINversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1993 INSC 204
- Decided
- 14 May 1993
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- A M AHMADI
Holding
The appointment of Harish Chander as President of CEGAT is valid under the statutory Rules, and the claim of public‑interest immunity is unsustainable, though the court need not disclose the documents.
Summary
The petitioners, led by R.K. Jain, sought the immediate appointment of a senior High Court judge as President of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) and an enquiry into alleged mal‑functioning. The government appointed Harish Chander, a senior vice‑president of the Tribunal, as President, prompting the petitioners to challenge the appointment as contrary to a convention of appointing a sitting or retired High Court judge, and to strike down certain CEGAT Rules as violative of Article 43. The Union also claimed public‑interest immunity under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act and Article 74(2) of the Constitution to withhold documents. The Court held that the appointment was valid under the Rules, that the claim of privilege was unsustainable (though it declined to disclose the documents), and that the petitioners lacked locus to question the selection. However, the Court directed amendment of Rule 10(4) to ensure future appointments of a sitting or retired judge, ordered an inquiry into CEGAT’s functioning, and recommended a Law Commission study. The petitions were disposed of without costs.
Issues considered
- The validity of the appointment of Harish Chander as President of CEGAT under the 1987 Rules.
- Whether the CEGAT Rules (especially Rule 10(3) and 10(4)) violate Article 43 and the basic structure of the Constitution.
- The petitioners' locus standi to challenge the appointment and the functioning of the Tribunal.
- The applicability of public‑interest immunity under Sections 123, 124 of the Indian Evidence Act and Article 74(2) to withhold the sealed file.
- The extent of the court's power to direct the appointment of a sitting or retired High Court judge as President.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 142, s. Article 217, s. Article 226, s. Article 227, s. Article 32, s. Article 323A, s. Article 323B, s. Article 43, s. Article 74(1), s. Article 74(2), s. Article 75(3), s. Article 75(4), s. Article 77(3), s. Article 78
- Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal Members (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1987s. Rule 10(1), s. Rule 10(2), s. Rule 10(3), s. Rule 10(4), s. Rule 1c, s. Rule 3, s. Rule 6
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113, s. 114, s. 123, s. 124, s. 161, s. 162
Subjects
judicial reviewpublic interest litigationtribunal appointmentpublic interest immunityexecutive privilegeCEGATconstitutional lawArticle 43Article 74Indian Evidence Actrule nisiappointment of judges
Judgment
L
'
A R.K.JAIN
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
MAY 14, 1993
B
[A.M. AHMADI, M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ]
Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal Members (Recmit-
men t and Conditions of Sen1 ice) Rules, 1987: Rules 1c,3,6,
10.-CEGAT-President-Appointment of-Appointment of senior Vice-Presi-
dent as President-Legality and validity of-Appointment held valid bw need for
c appointing a silting or retired High Court Judge as President emphasised-Need
for aniendment of Rule 10(4) emphasised.
CEGAT-Writ in public interest-Allegation of mal-functioning in
CEGAT-Eramination of allegation by a high level team directed.
D
Indian Evidence Act, 1871: Sections 113, 114 and 161. State
Documents-Right of Government to claim immunity from disclosure-Scope
of-Claim for immunity should be supported by affidavit by Head of Department
indicating reasonsforclaim-Oatlt ofoffice secrecy adumberated in Article 74 (5)
and Schedule 111 of Constitution does not absolve Minister from stating reasons
E
in support of immunity-It is duty of Court and not exec111ive to decide whether a
doc11ment needs immiinityfr01ri disclos11re.
Constitutipn of India, 1950:
F Article 75(3) and Schedule lll-Cabinet-Role and functions of-Cabii1et
documents-Need for secrecy-Extent of imm1111icyfrom disclosure.
Article 74 (1)-Scope of-Advice tendered by Ministers to President-Bar
ofjudicial review is to tlzefactwn of advice tendered by Council of Ministers to
President-blll not to record i.e. material on which advice is founded.
Articles 323A and 3138-Tribunals set up under-Need for a study by law
Commission suggesting measures for improved functioning of Ti ibunals
emphasised.
...
H
802
803
--
R.K. JAIN v. UNION OF INDIA
Judicial Review-ls basic fearure of Constitution-Cannot be disper,:sed A
with by creating Tribunals under Articles 323A and 323B of
Cons1itl//ion-Alternative Mechanism devised for judicial review should be
effective and efficient-Court's anguish over in effectivity of alternative mecha-
nism devised for judicial review expressed Appeal to a Bench (lf two Judges of
High Court over orders of Trib1mal suggested.
B
Sen·ice law-Selection-Rule conferring power on Central Govemme111 to
make appoi111111e11t-Co11rt can nor sit over the choice of selection.
· Sen·ice law-Challenge to legality of offending action-Only aggrieved
person has locus-Third party has no locus to canvass the legality of action. c
Maxim: Salus Popules Cast S11pre111a Lax-Meaning of
By a letter dated December 26, 1991 addressed to the Chief Justice of
India, the petitioner, Editor, Excise Law Times, complained that ever since D
the retirement of President of the Customs, Excise and Gold control Appellate
Tribunal (CEGA T) in 1985 no appointment of President was made as a result
of which the functioning of th~ Tribunal was adversely affected. He also
alleged mal-functioning in the CEGA T and sought directions for immediate
appointment of the President as well as an enquiry .into the mal-functioning
of CEGAT. The letter was treated as a Writ Petition in public interest E
--
litigation and on February 25, 1992, this Court issued Rule Nisi to Union of
India to make immediate appointment of the President of CEGA T, prefer-
ably a senior High Court ,Judge. Aller the directions were issued by this
Court, Respondent No. 3, who was initially appointed as Judicial Member
and subsequently as Senior Vice-President of the Tribunal, was appointed as.
President. F
The petitioner filed another petition challenging the appointment of
President and sought to quash the same on·dte grounds that (1) the appoint-
ment was in breach of judicial order passed by this Court on FebruarJ 25,
1992 because as per the convention a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court G
should have been appointed as President in consultation with the Chief
Justice of India; even though High Court Judges were available no serious
attempt was made to requisition the services of one of them for appointment
as President; (2) before the Act was made a positive commitment was made
time and again b~· the Government on the Ooor of the House that judicial .
independence of CEGA T is .fine qua non to sustain the confidence of the H
~-
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 3 s·.c.R.
A litigant pu!llic. The appointment of any person other than sitting or a.retired
judge of the High Court as President would be in its breach; and (3) the
appointment of Respondent No. 3 as a Judge of the Delhi High Court was
turned down by Chief .Justice of India doubting his integrity, therefore
appointment of such a person as President of CEGA T would undermine the
confidence of the litigant public in the efficaq' of judicial adjudication, even
B though Rules may permit such appointment.
The petitioncy also prayed that Rules 10(1)(3) and (4) of the CEGAT
Members (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1987 should be
struck down as violative of Article 43 of the Constitution; the rules were ultra
vires of the basic structure of the Constitution, namcl~· independence of
c
,Judiciary. On l\fay 4, 1992this Court issued Ruic Nisi and on the next date of
llearing the relevant file on which decision regarding the appointment of
President was made produced in the Court bu ton behalf ot'the Union oflndia
an objection was taken by the Additional Solicitor General that this Court
cannot inspect the tile as he intended to claim privilege. Accordingly, pursu-
D ant to the directions given by this Court that a formal application may be
made setting out the grounds on which the claim for privilege was founded,
the Finance Secretary and the Minister of State for Finance filed affidavits
claiming privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act and
Article 74. (2) of the Constitution stating that the Government had no
objection fm· the Court to peruse the file but claimed privilege to disclose the
E contents of the file to the petitioner.
On behalf of the Union of India it was contended that a Cabinet Sub-
Committee approved the appointment of Respondent No. 3 as President of
CEGAT and by operation of Article 77(3) and 74(1), the appointment was
made by the President. The file constitutes Cabinet documents forming part
F
of the preparation of the documents leading to the formation of the advice
tendered to the President. Section 123 of the Evidence Act and Article 74 (2)
precluded this Court from enquiring into the nature of the advice tendered to
the President and the documents were, therefore, immune from disclosure.
The disclosure would cause public injury preventing candid and frank
G discussion and expression ofvicws by the bureaucrats at higher level and by
the Minister/Cabinet Sub-Committee causing serious idjur~· to public ser-
vice.
On behalf of Respondent No.3 it was contended that .(1) he had an
excellent and impeccable record of sen•ice without any adverse remarks and
H dropping of his recommendatfon for appointment as a Judge of Delhi High
R.K. JAI:-1 v. UNION OF INDIA 805
Court could i10t be construed adv~rsc to him; (2) the Government had A
prerogative to appoint any member, or Vice Chairman or Senior Vice
President as President and Respondent No.3 being the Senior Vice President,
was considered and recommended by the Cabinet Committee for appoint-
ment. Hence he was validly appointed as President.
Disposing the petitions, this Court, B
llLl.I>: /',.,. 1<111111111111111r I
I. The claim in the affidavits of the State Minister for Finance and the
Secretary for immunity of state documents from disclosure is unsustainable.
However, having perused the file and given anxious considerations, the Court
is of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light
c
of the view taken, it is not necessar~· to disclose the contents of the records to
the petitioner or his counsel.
1.1. Section 123 of the Evidence Act gives right to the Government to
claim privilege, in other words immunity from disclosure of the unpublished
.D
official state documents in public interest. The initial claim for immunitJ'
should be made through an affidavit generally by the Minister concerned, in
his absence by the Secretary of the department or head of the Department
indicating that the documents in question have been carefully read and
considered and the deponent has been satisfied, suppot·ted by reasons or
grounds valid and germance, as to why it is apprehended that public interest E
would be injured by disclosure of the document summoned or called for. The
claim for immunity should never be on administrative routine nor be a garb
to avoid inconvenience, embarrassment or adverse to its defence in the action,
the latter themselves a ground for disclosure.
1.2. When a claim for public interest immunity has been laid for non· F
disclosure of the State document-;, it is the Minister's 'due discharge of duty'
to state on oath in his affidavit the grounds on which and the reasons for which
he has been persuaded to claim public interest immunity from disclosure of
the State papers and produce them. He takes grave risk on insistence of oath
of secrecy to amid filing an affidavit or production of State documents and the
Court may be constrained to draw such inferences as are available at law. G
Accordingly the oath of oftice of secrecy adumbrated in Article 75(4) and
Schedule III of the Constitution does not absolve the Minister either to state
the reasons in support of the public interest immunity to produce the State
documents or as to how the matter was dealt with or for their production when
discovery order nisi or rule nisi was issued. On the other hand it is his due H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A discharge of the duty as a Minister to obey rule nisi or discovery order nisi and
act in aid of the Government.
Attorney Genera/v.Jonathan Cape Lid., 1976 Q.B. 752; Sankey v. Whit/an,
[1979] 53 A.L. R. 11 and Whirl.am ''·Australian Consolidated Press, [1985] 60
A.L.R. 7, referred to.
B
1.3. If the Court is satisfied from the affidavit and the reasons assigned
for withholding production or disclosure, the Court may pass an appropriate
order in that behalf. If the Court still desired to peruse the record for
C
satisfying itself whether the reasons a~signcd in the affidavit would justify
withholding disclosure, the court would, in camera, examine the record and
...
satisfy itself whether the public intcrcstsubscrvcs withholding production or
disclosure or making the documents as part of the record.
1.4. By operation of Section 162 of Evidence Act the final decision in
regard to the validity of an objection against disclosure raised under Section
D 123 would always be with the Court.
1.5. The Court is not bound by the statement made by the Minister or the
Head of the Departmcntin the affida,·it and it retains the power to balance the
injury to the State or the public service against the risk of injustice.
E
The real question which the Court is required to consider is whether
public interest is so strong to override the ordinary right and interest of the
litigant that he shall be able to lay before a Court of justice the relevant
evidence. In balancing the competing interests it is the duty of the court to sec
that there is the public interest that harm shall not be done to the nation or the
F public service by disclosure of the document and there is a public inte1·cst that
the administration of justice shall not be frustrated by withholding docu-
ments which must be produced if justice is to be done.
1.6. The basic question to which the court would, therefore, have to
address itself for the purpose of deciding the validity of the objection would
G
be, whether the document relates to affairs of State or the public service and
if so, whether the public interest in its non-disclosure is so strong that it must
prevail over the private interest in the administration of justice and on that
account, it should not be allowed to be disclosed.
H State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 333; S.P. Gupta& Ors.
R.K. JAIN v. UNION OF INDIA 807
etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc., 1982 (2) S.C.R. 365; relied on. A
Conway v. Rimmer, 1968 A.C. 910 (H.L); D. v. National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 1918 A.C.171 (H.L.); Bunnah Oil Co.
Ltd. v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England, 1980 A.C. 1090
(H.L.); Butters Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer, 1982 A.C. 888 (H.L.); Air
Canada,.. Secretary of State for Trade, [1983) 2 A.C. 394 (H.L.); Council B
of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 A.C. 374
'·
(H.L.); United State v:Reynolds, (1935) 345 U.S.1; EnvironmentalAge.ncy
v. PalS)' T Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (35) L. Ed.2nd 119; Newyoud Times v. U.S.,
[1971] 403 U.S. 713; U.S. v. Richard M. Nixon, [1974) 418 U.S. 683 =41
L.Ed. 2nd 1035; Robindon v. State of South Australia, 1931 A.C. 704 (PC); C
Shankey v. Wlzitlan, [1979] 53 A.L.R. l; FAilnsurances Ltd. v. The Hon Sir,
Henry Arthur Winneke and Ors., [1982) 151 C.L.R. 342; Whitlan v.
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd., [1985] 60 A.L.R. 7; Minister for Arts
Heritage and Environmemand Ors. v. Peko Wal/send Ltd. and Ors. [1987]
75 A.L.R. 218; Commonwealth ofAustralia v. Northern Land Council and
Anr. (1991] 103 A.L.R. 267; R. v. Slzinder, 1954 S.L.R. 479 Gagnon v. D
Ouebec Securities Commission, 1964 S.C.R. 329; Bruce v. Waldron, 1963
V.L.R. 3; Re Tunstall, fa.P. Brown, [1966] 84 W.N. (Pt2) (N.S.W.);
Corbett v. Social Security Commission, 1962 N.Z.L.R. 878; Greednz Inc.
v. Governor General, [1981) 1 N.L.R. 172; Apponhamy v. Illangarutllle,
[1964] 66 C.L.W.17; Jamaica in Allen v. By.fields (No.2) [1964] 7 W.I.R.
... 69 and Scotland in Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, [1956]
Scotland Law Time 4, referred to.
E
Mecannic on Evidence, 4th Edn. by John w. Strong, referred to.
1.7. Every communication which proceeded from one officer of the State F
to another or the officers inter se does not necessarily per-se relate, to the
affairs of the State. Whether they so relate has got to be determined by
reference to the nature of the consideration, the level at which it was
considered, the contents of the document or class to which it relates to and
their indelible impact on public administration or public service and admin-
.... istration of justice itself. G
2. The power to issue 'discovery order nisi' is express as well as.inherent
as an integral power of judicial review and process in the Court to secure the
attendance of any person or discovery or production of any document or to
order investigation in that behalf. However, in an appropriate case, depend- H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
'
A ing on facts on hand, Court may adopt such other procedure as would be
wan·anted. The petitioner must make a strong prima facie case to order
discovery order nisi, etc. and it must not be a haunting expedition to fish out
some facts or an attempt to cause embarrassment to the respondents nor for
publicity. But on issuance of rule nisi by this Court under Article 32 or a
discovery order nisi the Government or any authority, constitutional, civil,
B judicial, statutory or otherwise or any person, must produce the record in
their custody and disobedience thereof would be at the pain of contempt.
3. The Cabinet known as Council of Ministers headed by Prime Minister
under Article 75 (3) is the driving and steering body responsible for tty:
governance of the country. Collective responsibility under Article 75(3) of the
_...
c
Constitution inheres maintenance of confidentiality as enjoined in oaths of
office and of secrecy set forth in Schedule III of the Constitution that the
Minister will .not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person
or persons any matter which shall be brought under his consideration or shall
become known to him as Minister except as may be required for the 'due
D discharge of his duty as Minister'. The base and basic postulate of its
significance is unexceptionable. But the need for and effect of confidentiality
has to be nurtured not merely from political imperatives of collective respon-
sibility envisaged by Article 75(3) but also from its pragmatism.
Satwant Singh Sawlmey v. D. Ramarathnam Asstt. Passport Officer, [1967]
E 3 S.C.R~ 525; Magnbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India and Allr., [1969) 3
S.C.R. 254; Shams her Singh v. State of Punjab, [1975] 1S.C.R.814; Rai Sabhib
Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. v. State of Punjab, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 225 and.
-
Commonwealth ofAustralia v. Northern Land Council & Anr., [1991] 103 A.L.R.
267, referred to.
F
Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government; Patrick Gordon Walker, The
Cabinet, 1973 Revised Ed. p.178; John P. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet, 2nd
Edn. p.11; 0 Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, Constillltional and Administra-
tive Law, 7th Edn. p. 301; Walker, The Cabinet, p. 183; Halsbury's Laws of
England, 4th Edn. Vol. 8 para 820; Bagehot, I and The English Constitution,
G 1964 Edn., referred to.
3.1. The Court would be willing to respond to the executive public
· interest immunity to disclose certain documents where national security or
high policy, high sensitivity is involved. Information relating to national
H security, diplomatic relations, internal '"'curity or sensitive diplomatic corre-
R.K. JAIN v. UNION OF INDIA 809
spondence per se are <;lass documents and that public interest demands total A
immunity from disclosure. Even the slightest divulgence would endanger the
lives of the personnel engaged in the services etc. The maxim Salvs Popules
Cast Suprema I.Ax which means that regard for public welfare is the highest
law, is the basic postulate for this immunity.
Asiatic Petroleum v.Anglo-Persian oil, 1916 K.B. 822; Duncan v. Cammell B
Laird, 1942 A.C. 624; Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for Civil
Service, 1985 A.C. 374 and MarkHosemballR. v.Home Secreta1yexparte
Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. 766, referred to.
3.2. But it would be going too far to lay down that no document in any c
particular class or one of the categories of Cabinet papers or decisions or
contents thereof should never, in any circumstances, be ordered to be
produced.
Robinson v. State of South Australia, [1931] A.C. 704 (PC); S.P. Gupta v.
Union of India & Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 365; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & D
Ors., [1975]2S.C.R.333;Conwayv.Rimmer1968A.C.910(HL);Burmah
Oil Co. Ltd. v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England, 1980 A.C.
1090 (HL ); Reg. v. Lewes Justices, Ex Pa rte Secretary ofState for the Home
Department, 1973 A.C. 388 and D. V. National Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children, [1978] A.C.171; Air Canada v. Secretary of State
E
for Trade, [1983] 2 A.C. 394 (HL); Shankey v. Whit/an, [1979] 53 A.L.R.
1; Harbour Corp of Queensland v. Vessey Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., [1986] 67
A.L.R 100; ManthalAustralia Pvt. Ltd. v. Minister/or Indus ti)', Technology
and Commerce, [1987] 71 A.L.R.109; Koowarta v.Bjelke-Petersen, [1988]
92F.L.R.104; United States v.RichardM. Nixon, [1974] 418 U.S.683=41
Lawyers Ed. 2nd Ed.1039;Attorney Generalv.Jonathan Cape Ltd.1916 F
Q.B. 752; Minister for Arts Heritage and Environment and Ors. v.
Pekowallsend Ltd. and Ors., (1987) 75 A.L.R. 218; Commonwealth of
Australia, v. Northern Land Council and Anr., [1991] 103 A.L.R. 267;
Australian Community Party & Ors. v. Commonwealth & Ors., [1950-51]
83 C.L.R. 1 and Queen v. Tohe)', [1982-83) 151 C.L.R.170, referred to.
G
-· 3.3. Undoubtedly, the Prime Minister is enjoined under Article 78 to
communicate to the President all decisions of the Council of Minister relating
to the administration of the affairs of the Union and proposals for legislation
and to furnish such information relating to the administration or reconsidera-
-. tion by the Council of Minister if the President so requires and submit its H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 3 S.C.R.
A decisions thereafter to the President. That by itself is not conclusive and does
not get blanket public interest immunity from disclosure. The Council of
Ministers though shall be collectively responsible to the House of the people,
their acts are subject to the Constitution; Rule oflaw and judicial review are
parts or"the scheme of the Constitution as basic structure and judicial review
is entrusted to this Court (High court under Article 226).
B
3.3.1. The communication of cabinet decisions or policy to the President
under Article 74(1) gives only limited protection by Article 74(2) of judicial
review of the actual tendered to the Presidentoflndia. The rest of the me and
',
all the records forming part thereof are open to in camera inspection by this
Court. Each case must be considered on its own facts and surrounding
c
scenario and decision taken thereon.
Jyoti Prakash Mitter v. Chief Justice Calcutta High Court, [1965] 2 S.C.R.
-
53 and Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash, [1971] 3 S.C.R. 483, referred to.
D 3.3.2. Article 74(2) is not a total bar for production of the records. Only
the actual advice tendered by the Minister or Council of Ministers to the
President and the question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered
by the Minister or Council of Ministers to the President, shall not be enquired
into by the Court. In other words, the bar ofjudicial review is confined to the
factum of advice, its extent, ambit and scope, but not the record i.e. the
E
material on which the advice is founded.
•.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors., [1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, referred to.
4. Judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed of
F qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came
to made or the procedure adopted whether fair, just and reasonable. Exercise
of Judicial Review is to protect the citizen from the abuse of the power etc. by
.an appropriate Government or department etc. In Court's considered view
granting the compliance of the above power of appointment was conferred on
the executive and confided to. be exercised wisely. When a candidate was
G found qualified and eligible and was accordingly appointed by the executive
to hold an office as a Member or Vice-President or President of Tribunal, this
Court cannot sit over the choice of the selection, but it be left to the executive
to select the personnel as per law or procedure in this behalf.
H Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India & Ors., [1992] 2 S.C.C. 428,
R.K. JAIN y,. UNION OF INDIA 811
distinguished. A
S. In service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved
person i.e. non-appointee to assail the legality of the offending action. Third
party has not locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action.
Only public law declaration would be made at the behest of the petitioner, a
public spirited person. Therefore, the contention that there was need to B
evaluate the comparative merits of Respondent and the senior most Member
for appointment as President would not be gone into in a public interest
litigation. Only in a proceedings initiated by an aggrieved person it may be
open to be considered.
c
6. It is expedientto have a sitting or retired senior Judge or retired Chief
Justice of a High Court to be the President. The rules need amendment
immediately. Government had created a healthy convention of providing that
the Tribunals will be headed by a President who will be a sitting or a retired
judge of the High Court. This Court to elongate the above objective directed
the Governmentto show whether the convention is being followed in appoint- D
ment of the President of CEGA T and further directed to .consider appoint-
ment of a Senior Judge or a retired Chief Justice of the High Court as it
President. Adnj.ittedly Chief Justice of India was not consulted before ap-
pointing Respondent No.3 as President of CEGA T The solemn assurance
given to the Parliament that the Tribunal bears a judicious blend by appoint-
ment ofa High Court Judge as President was given a go-bye. E
6.J. \Vhile making statutory rules the executive appears to hal'e made
the .appuintment of a sitting or retired High Court Judge as President
unaUnictive and Directly frustrating the legislative animation. A sitting
Judgf:, when he is entitled to continue in his office upto 62 years, would not he· F
wilUng to opt to serve as President, if his superannuation as President is co-
te·.minus with 62 years. He would be attracted only if he is given extended
t':aree years more tenure after his superannuation. But Rule 10 (3) says that
the total period of the enure of the President by a sitting or retired Judge is
'a. period of three years or till he attains the age of 62 years, whichever is
earlier', i.e. co-terminus with superannuation as a Judge of the High Court. G·
The. proviso is only discretionary at the whim of the executive depleting
independence and is an exception to the rule. Thereby, practically the spirit
of the Act, the solemn assurance given by the Government to the Parliament
kindling hope in the litigant public to have a sitting or a retired Judge
appointed as President has been frustrated deflecting the appointment of a H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R:
A judicially trained judge to exercise judicial review. Court is constrained to
observe that the rules, though statutory, were so made as to defeat the object
of the Act.
7. There are persistentallegations again.'it mal-functioning ofthe CEGA T
and against Respondent No. 3 himself. Though this Court exercised sclf-
B restraint to assume the role of an investigator to charter out the ills surfaced,
suffice to say that the Union Government cannot turn a blind eye to the
persistent public demands and the Court directs to swing into action, an
indcpth enquiry made expeditiously by an officer or team ofofficers to control
the mal-functioning of the institution. It is expedient that the Government
should immediately take action in the matter and have fresh look.
8. The Tribunals set up under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitu-
tion or under an Act oflegislature are creatures of the Statute and in no case
can claim the status as Judges of the High Court or parity or as substitutes.
However, the personnel appointed to hold the office under the State arc called
D upon to discharge judicial or quasi-judicial powers. So they must have
judicial approach and also knowledge and expertise in that particular branch
of constitutional, administrative and tax laws. The legal input would undeni-
ably be more important and sacrificing the legal input and not giving it
sufficient wcightage and teeth would definitely impair the efficacy and
effectiveness of the judicial adjudication. It is, therefore, necessary that those
E who adjudicate upon these matters should have legal expertise, judicial
experience and modicum oflegal training as on many an occasion different
and complex questions of law which baffle the minds of even trained judges
in the High Court and Supreme Court would arise for discussion and decision.
F M.B. Majumdar v. Union of India, [1990) 3 S.C.R. 946; Union of India,..
Paras Laminates Ltd., [1990] 49 E.L.T. 322 (SC); Krishna Sahai & Ors. v.
State of UP. & Ors., [1990]2S.C.C.673,andRajendraSingh Yadav &Ors.
v. State of U.P. & Ors .. [1990] 2·S.C.C. 763, referred to.
8.1. Equally the need for recruitment of members of the Bar to man the
G Tribunals as well as the working system by the Tribunals need fresh look and
regular monitoring is necessary. An expert body like the Law Commission of
India should make an in-depth study in this behalf including the desirability
of bringing CEGA T under the control of Law and Justice Departm~nt in line
with Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and make appropriate urgent recom-
H mendations to the Government oflndia who should take remedial steps by an
R.K. JAIN ,._ UNION OF INDIA 813
appropriate legislation to overcome the handicaps and ditliculties and make A
the Tribunals effective and etlicient instruments for making judicial review
efficacious, inexpensive and satisfactory.
8.2. For inspiring confidence and trust in the litigant public they must
have an assurance that the person deciding their causes is totally and
completely free from the influence or pressure from the Government. To B
maintain independence imperativity it is necessary that the personnel should
have at least modicum oflegal training, learning and experience. Selection of
competent and proper people instill people's faith and trust in the office and
help to build up reputation and acceptability. Judicial independence which is
essential and imperative is secured and independent and impartial adminis·
c
tr-ation of justice is assured. Absence thereof only may get both law and
procedure wronged and wrong headed views of the facts and may likely to
give rise to nursing grievance of injustice Therefore, functional fitness,
experience at the Bar and aptitudinal approach arc fundamental for efficient
judicial adjudication. Then only as repository of the confidence, as its duty,
the Tribunal would properly and efficiently interpret the law and appl~· the D
law to the given set of facts. Absence thereof would be repugnant or deroga·
tory to the Constitution.
Union ofIndia v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth &Anr. [1978] 1 S.C.R.423,
referred to.
E
9. Judicial review is the basic and essential feature of the Indian
constitutional scheme entrusted to the judiciary. It cannot be dispensed with
by creating Tribunal under Articles 323A and 3238 of the Constitution. Any
institutional mechanism or authority in negation ofJudicial review is destruc-
tive of basic structure, So long as the alternative institutional mechanism or F
authority set up by an Act is not less effective than the High Court, it is
consistent with constitutional scheme. The faith of the people is the bed-rock
on which the edifice of judicial review and efficaq of the adjudication arc
founded. The alternative arrangement must, therefore, be eflcctive and
efficient.
G
Keshwanand Bharativ. Union ofIndia, [1973]Suppl. S.C.R.1; Waman Rao
v. Union of India, [1980) 3 S.C.R. 587; Ragl111nathrao Ganparrao v. Union
of India [1993] 1SCALE363; Krishna Sw~i v. Union of India, [1992] 4
S.C.C. 605; S.P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., [1987] l S.C.R.
435 and J.B. Chopra v. Union of India. f1987 J l S.C.C. 422, referred to. 11
"
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS Jl'J'J~l 1 S.C.R.
A 9 .1. It is necessary U1 express Court's anguish over the ineffectiv it~· ofthe
alternative mechanism devised for judicial review. The _judicial review and
remcd~· arc fundamental right'> of the citizens. The dispensation of.justice by
the Tribunals is much to be desires. Court is not doubting the abilit,y of the
members or Vice-Chairman (non-Judges) who ma~' be expert-; in their
regular scn•icc. But judicial adjudication is a special process and would
B etlicientl~· be adm'inistered by advocate Judges. The 1·emcd~· of appeal by
special leave under A1·ticle 136 to this Court also proves to he costl~· and
prohibitive and f'ar-tlung distance too is working as a constant constraint to
litigant public who could ill afford to reach this Court. An appeal to a Bench
of two Judges of the respective High Court-; over the orders of the Tribunals
within its teri-itorial jurisdiction on questions oflaw would assuage a growing
c t'ccling of'injustice of those who can ill-afford to approach the Supreme Court.
I 0. No one can suppose that the executive will never be guilt~· of the sins
common to all people. Sometimes the~· may do things which they ought not to
do or will not do things the~· ought to do. The Court must he alive to that
D possibility of the executive committing illegality in it-; process, exercising it-;
powers, reaching a decision which no reasonable authority would have
reached or otherwise abuse its powers, etc. If' the proceeding, decision or
order is influenced hy extraneous considerations which ought not to have
been taken into account, it cannot stand and needs correction, no matter of the
nature of'the statutory body or status or stature of the con~titutional function-
E ary though might have acted in good faith. It is, therefore, the function of the
Court to see that lawful autho1·ity is not abused.
l 0 ..1. Under modern conditions of responsible Government, Parliament
should not always be relied on as a check on excess of power by the Council
of Ministers or Minister. Though the Court would not substitute it-; views to
F
that of the executive on matters of policy, it is its undoubted power and duty
to sec that the executive exercises its p~wer only for the purpose for which it
is granted. It is the constitutional; legitimate and lawful power and duty of this
Court to ensure that powers, constitutional statutory or executive are exer-
cised in accordance with the Constitution and the law. This may demand,
G though no doubt only in limited number of cases, Yet the inner workings of
government may be exposed to public gaze.
Per Ahmadi J. (For himself and Punchhi, 1.) (Concurring)
If t. This Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Central
R.K. JAIN v. UNION OF INDIA 815
~ Government in the choice of the person to be appointed as a President so long A
as the person chosen possesses the prescribed qualification and is otherwise
eligible for appointment. Respondent No. 3 was a Senior Vice-President when
the question of filling up the vacancy of the President came up for consider-
ation. He was fully qualified for the post under the Rules. No challenge is made
on that count. Under Rule 10 (1 ), the Central Governm.ent is conferred the
power to appoint one of the Members to be the President. Since the validity B
of the Ruic is not questioned there can be no doubt that the Central Govern-
ment was entitled to appoint Respondent No. 3 as President.
·I.I. This Court cannot interfere with the appointment of Respondent
- No. 3 on the ground that his trlick record was poor or because of adverse C
reports on which account his appointment as a High Court Judge had not
materialised. Assuming that the allegations against Respondent No. 3 are
factually accurate, this Court cannot sit in judgment over the choice ofthe·
person made by the Central Government over the choice of the person made
by the Central Government for appointment as a President if the person
chosen is qualified and eligible for appointment under the Rules. D
2. However, to instill the confidence of the litigating public in the
CEGA T, the Government must make a sincere effort to appoint a sitting
Judge of the High Court as a President of the CEGA Tin consultation with the
Chief Justice oflndia and if a sitting Judge is not available the choice must fall
on a retired Judge as far as possible. E
3. Sub-rule (4) of Rule I 0 of the CEGA T Members (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1987 needs a suitable ·change to make it
sufficiently attracth·e for sitting High Court Judges to accept appointment as
the President of the CEGA T. The rules empower the Central Government to F.
appoint any member as the President of the CEGAT. It is true that under sub-
rulc (4), a serving Judge and under the proviso thereto, a retired Judge, can
also be appointed a Member and President simultaneously.
In the case of a serving Judge his age of superannuation is fixed at 62
years but in the case of the retired Judge he may be appointed for a period of G
three years at the most. Insofar as a service High Court Judge is concerned,
he holds office until he attains the age of 62 years, vide Article 217 of
- Constitution. It, therefore, beats common sense why a sitting Judge of the
High Court would opt to serve as the President of the CEGAT if he is to retire
at the same age without any benefit. On the contrary, he would lose certain H
816 SUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
J- -
A perks which are attached to the office of a High Court.I udge. El·cn status-wise
he would suffer as his decisions would be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226,227 of the Constitution. He may agree to accept
the offer only if he had an extended tenure of at least three years.
4. The allegations made by Petitioner in regard to the working the
B CEGA T arc grave and the authorities can ill-aford to turn a Nelson's eye to
those allegations made by a person who is fairly well conversant with the
internal working of the Tribunal. Refusal to inquire into such grave allega-
tions, some of which arc capable of verification, can only betrays indifference
and lack ofa sense of urgency to tone up the working of the Tribunal. It is high
time that the administrative machinery which is charged with the duty to
c
supervise the working of the CEGA T wakes-up from it'> slumber and initiates
prompt action to examine the allegations by appointing a high level team
which would immediately inspect the CEGA T, identify the causes for the
crises and suggest remedial measures. This cannot brook delay.
D 5.1. The time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various
Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323A and 3238
in the Constitution. A sound justice delivery system is a sine qua non for the
eflicicnt governance ofa countr~· wedded to the rule oflaw. An independent
and impartial justice delivery system in which the litigating pu~"lic has faith
and confidence alone can deliver the goods. After the incorporation of these
E two articles, Acts have been enacted where under Tribunals have been
constituted for dispensation of justice. Sufficient time has passed and experi-
ence gained in these last few years for taking stock of the situation with a view
to finding out if they have served the purpose and objectives for which they
were constitute<!
5.2. Complaints have been heard in regard to the functioning of other
Tribunals as well and it is tim'~ that a bodv
. . like the Law Commission of India
has a ·compr·ehensivc look-in with a view to suggesting measures for their
improved functioning. That body can also suggest changes in the different
statutes and crnlve a model on the basis whereofTribunals may be constituted
(; or reconstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence. An intensive
and extensive study needs to he undertaken by the Law co'mmission in regard
to the constitution ofTrihunals under various statutes with a view to ensuring
their independence so that the public confidenl:e in such Tribunals ma~·
inaease and the quality of their performance may improve. It is strongly ...,.
H rc1c·11mml·nded to the Law Commission oflndia to undertake such an exercise
-l_ R.K. JAIN v. UNION OF !:\'DIA [AHMADI. J1
817
..,._ on priorit~· basis. A
6. On the facts of the case it is not necessary to disclose the contents of
the records to the petitioner or his counsel.
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 90 & 312of1992.
B
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India; ,
D.D. Thakur, Tapash Ray, M.L. Verma, Gaurav Jain, and Ms. AbhaJain for
. the Petitioner in W.P. No. 90 of 1992.
c
R.P. Gupta for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 312/92.
G. Ramaswamy, Attorney General, D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General, B.
Parthasarthy, C.V.S. Rao, A.S. Bhasme and Chava Badri Nath Babu for the
Respondent. D
R.K. Jain, a11J l{<tllJ.111 '.\lukhniL'L' 111r thL' Customs, Excise & Gold (Control)
Appellate Tribunal. "
K.K. Venugopal, Ms. Pallav Shisodia and C.S.S. Rao for the Respondent.
E
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
AHMADI, J. We have had the benefit of the industry, erudition and
exposition of the constitutional and jurisprudential aspects of law on the various
questions urged befote us in the judgment of our esteemed Brother K. Ra- F
maswamy, J. But while concurring with the hereinafter mentitincd conclusions
recorded by him we would like to say a few words to explain our points of view.
Since the facts have been set out in detail by our learned Brother we would rest
content by giving an abridged preface which we consider necessary.
It all began with the receipt of a letter dated December 26, 1991, from Shri G
R.K. Jain, Editor, Excise Law Times, addressed to then Chief Justice of India, Shri
M.H. Kania, J.. complaining that as the Customs, Excise and Gold Control
Appellate Tribunal (for short 'the CEGAT') was without a President for the last
over six months the functioning of the Tribunal was adversely affected, in that, the
Benches sit for hardly two hours or so, the sittings commence late at about 10.50 H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
)-
A a.m., there is a tendency to adjourn cases on one pretext or the other so much so
that even passing of interim orders, like stay orders, etc., is postponed and
inordinately delayed, and the general tendency is to work for only four days in a
week. The work culture is just not there and the environmental degradation that has
taken place is reflected in the letter of Shri G. Sankaran dated June 3, 1991 who
prematurely resigned as the President of the CEGA T. Lastly, he says that there
B were nearly 42,000 appeals and approximately 2000 stay petitions pending in the
CEGA Tin vol ving revenue worth crores of rupees, which will remain blocked for
long. Three directions were sought, namely,
----
"(i) the immediate appointment of the President to the CEGAT, preferably
a senior High Court Judge;
c
(ii) order an enquiry into the mal-functioning of the CEGAT; and -
(iii) issue all other directions as your Lordship may deem fit and necessary.,..
D This letter was directed to be treated as Public Interest Litigation and notice
was issued to the Union of India restricted to relief No. (i) i.e. in regard to the
appointment of the President of the CEGAT. On April 29, 1992, the learned
Additional Solicitor General informed the Court that the appointment of the
President was made. On the next date of hearing the relevant file on which the
decision regarding appointment was made was produced in a sealed envelope in
E
Court which we directed to be kept in safe custody as apprehension was expressed
that the file may be tempered with. The focus which was initially on the working
of the CEGAT and in particular against the conduct and behaviour one of its
Members now shifted to the legality and validity of the appointment of respondent
No. 3 as its President. Serious allegations were made against respondent No. 3 and
F his competence to hold the post was questioned. It was contended that his
appointment was made in violation of the Rules and convention found mentioned
in the message of Shri Y. V. Chandrachud, the then Chief Justice of India, dated
October 5, 1992 forwarded on the occasion of the inauguration of the CEGA T. The
further allegation made is that even though High Court Judges were available no
serious attempt was made to requisition the services of one of them for appoint-
G ment as President of the CEGA T. To put a quietus to the entire matter at an early
date we called the file from the Registry on May 4, 1992 but wtien we were about
to peruse the same the learned Additional Solicitor General contended 'that the
Court cannot inspect it because he desired to claim privilege'. We, therefore,
H
directed that a formal application may be made in that behalf before the next date
of hearing and returned the file to enable the making of such an application. --
R.K . .I.'\[.'\ 1-. t·.'\10.'\ OF ISl>IA (AH\1i\DI. II
819
'
Accordingly. rhe then Finance Secretary tiled an affidavitdaiming privilege und1!r A
sections I 2.:1 and 124. Evidence Act. and Article 74(2) of the Constitution. The
Minister of State in the l::inance Department was also directed to 11le an affidavit
in support of the claim for privilege which he did. It is in this context that the
question of privilege arose in the present proceedings.
Our learned Brother RamaswamyJ. dealt with this question elaborately. B
After referring to the provisions of the relevant Statutes and the Const!tution as
well as the case-Jaw of ho th foreign and Indian courts. the authoritative text books.
etc. he has concluded as under :
"Ha\'ing perused the file and given our anxious consideration we are of the c
opinion that on the facts of the case ..... it is not necessary to disclose the
contents of the records of the petitioner or his counsel."
We are in respectful agreement with this conclusion recorded by our learned
Brother though not entirely for all the reasons which have weighed with him.
D
On the question of appointment of respondent No. 3 as the President of the
CEGAT we must norice a few provisions contained in the CEGAT Members
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service). Rules, 1987 (hereinafter called 'the
Rules"). Rule 2(i.:) defines a member, to include the President oftheCEGATalso;
Ruic 3 prescribes the qualifications forappointment and Rule 6 sets out the method
E
of recruitment of a member through a Selection Committee consisting of a Judge
of the Supreme Cnurt of India nominated by the Chief Justice of India. Rule I0
pm vi des for the appointment of the President. It says that the Central Government
shall appoint one of the members w be the President. Sub-rule (2) then provides
as under:
F
'"(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 6, a sitting or retired judge
of a High Court may also be appointed by the Central Government as a
member and President simultaneously ...
Sub-rule (4) and the proviso thereto bear reproduction :
'"(4) Where a ser\'ing judge of a High Court is appointed as a
member am.I President, he shall hold office as President for a period
of three years from the date of h1s appointment or till he attains the
age of 62 years, whichever is earlier: H
)- .
820 St'PREME cot:RT REPORTS ( 1993] 3 S.C.R.
A Provided that where a retired judge of a High Court above the age
of C12 years is appointed as President. l1e shall hnld office ti.1r such
period 1wt exceeding ·three years as may be determined by the
Central Government at the time of appointment M re-appoint-
ment.··
B It will thus he seen that the rules empower the Central Government to app\)int any
member <JS the President of the CEGA T. It is true that under sub-rule (4), a serYing
judge and under the prn\"iso thereto, a retired judge, can also be appointed a
Member and President simultanelmsly. In the case of a serving judge his ageof
superannuatiun is lixed at 62 years but in the case of a retired judge he may be
c appointed for a period of three years at the most. Insofar as a ser\'ing High Court
Judge is concerned. he holds oflice until he attains the age of 62 years, vide Article
217 of the ConstitutilHl. Ii'. therefore. heats common sense why a sitting Judge of
the 1-ligh Court would upt to serve as the President of the CEGA T if he is tn retire
at the same age without any benefit. On the contrary he would lose certain perks
\vhich are attached tu the uffice of a High Court Judge. Even status-wise he would
D suffer as his decisions would he subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. He may agree w accept the offer unly
ifhe had an extencleJ tenure or at least three years. We are, therefore, in agreement
with uur learned Brother that sub-rule (4 J of Rule 10 of the Rules needs a suitable
change to make it sufficiently attractive f1ir sitting High Court Judges to accept
ap1x>intment as the President of the CEGAT. We alsll agree with our learned
E Brother that to instill the Cllllfidence uf the litigating public in the CEGA T. the
Government must make a sincere effort to appoint a sitting Judge \)f the High (\iurt
as a President of the CEGA Tin consultation of the Chief Justice 11f India and if a
sitting Judge is I)l)t a\'ailable the ch\lice must fall on a retired Judge as far as
possible. This would bl:! consistent with the assurance given by the Finance
Depanment as is. retlected in the letter nf Shri Chandrachud, extract wherefrom is
F
repruduccd by our learned Brother in his judgment.
Shri Harish Chandra was a Senior Vice-President when the questi\ln of
filling up the vacancy of the President came up for consideratiun. He was fully
qualified for the post under the Rules. No challenge is made on that count. Under
G Rule I 0( I) the Central Government is conferred the power to appoint 1:ine llf the
Members to bl:! the President. Since the validity of the Rule is not questioned there
can be no doubt that the Cl·ntral Governinent was entitled to appoint respondent
No. 3 as the President. But it was said that the track record ot"respondent No. 3 was
111)\Jr and he was hardly fit to hold the post of the President of the CEGA T. It has
H been aYerred that respondent No. 3 had heen in the past proposed for app\)intment
l R.K. JAi::-: "· l'1':10'.'J OF INDIA IAH!\1ADI. JI 821
I
as a Judge of the Delhi High Court but his appointment did not materialise due to A
certain adverse reports. Assuming for the sake of argument that these allegations
are factually accurate, this Court cannot sit in judgment over the choice of the
person made by the Central Government for appointment as a President if the
person chosen is qualified and eligible for appointment under the Rules. We,
therefore, agree with our learned Brother that this Court cannot sit in judgment
nver the wisdom of the Central Government in the choice of the person to be B
appointed as a President so long as the person chosen possesses the prescribed
qualification and is otherwise eligible for appointment. We, therefore, cannot
interfere with the appointment of respondent No. 3 on the ground that his track
record was poor or because of adverse reports on which account his appointment
- as a High Court Judge had not materialised.
The allegations made by Shri R.K. Jain in regard to the working of the
c
CEGAT are grave and the authorities can ill afford to turn a Nelson's eye to those
allegatinns made hy a person who is fairly well con\'ersant with the internal
working of tl1e Tribunal.
D
Refusal to inquire inti) such gra\'e allegations. some of which are capable of
verification, can 1mly betray indifference and lack of a sense of urgency to tone up
the working of the Tribunal. Fresh articles have appeared in the Excise Law Times
which point to the sharp decline in the functioning of the CEGAT pointing to a
serious management crises. It is high time that the administrative machinery which
is ·charged with the duty to supervise the working of the CEGAT wakes-up from E
its slumber and initiates prompt action to examine the allegations by appointing
a high le\'el team which would immediately inspect the CEGA T, identify the
causes for the crises and suggest remedial measures. This cannot brook delay.
Lastly, the time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various F
Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323A 323B in the
Constitution. A sound justice delivery system is a sine qua 11011 for the efficient
governance of a country wedded !1) the rule of law. An independent and impartial
justice delivery system in which the litigating public has iaith and confidence
alone can deliver the goods. After the incorporation of these two articles, Acts have
been enacted whcreunder tribunals have been constituted for dispensation of G
justice. Sufficient time has passed and experience gained in these last few years
for taking stock of the situatil)n with a view to finding out if they· have serve the
purpose and objectives for which they were constituted. Complaints have been
heard in regard to the functioning of othei tribunals as well and it is time that a hnJy
like the Law Commission of India has comprehensive look-in with a view l\l II
~------------~---
822 Sl'PRE\·IE COURT REPORTS (1993] 3 S.C.R.
A suggesting measures for their improved functioning. That hody can also suggest
changes in the different statutes and evolve a modd on the basis whl!reoftribunals
may be constituted or rec1Jnstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence.
An intensive and extensive study needs to be undertaken by the Law Conunission
in regard to the constitution ol tribunals under various statutes with a view to
ensuring their independence so that the public confidence in such tribunals may
increase and the quality or their performance may improve. We strongly recom-
--
B
mend ti' the Law Commission or India tti undertaki.:: such an exercise on priority
basis. A copy of this judgml!nt may be forwardl!d by the Registrar of this Court to
the Member-Secretary or the Conuuission for immediate action.
We have thought it wise to clarify the extent of our concurrence with the
c
views expressed by our learned Brother in his judgment to avoid possibility of
doubts being raised in future. We accordingly agree with our learned Brother that
the writ petitions should stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
K. RAMA SW A MY, .J. : The same facts gave birth to the twin petitions for
D disposal by a common judgment. On October 11, 1982, the Customs Central
Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal for short ·cEGAT came into
existence with Justice F.S. Gill as its President. After.he retired in I 985 no Judge
was appointed as President. In letter dated December 26. I 991, addressed to the
Chief Justice of India, the petitioner highlighted the mal-functioning of the
CEGAT and the imperative to appoint a sitting or retired judge of the High Court
E as President to revitalise its functioning and to regenerate wanning and withering
faith of the litigant public of the efficacy of its adjudication. Treating it as writ
petition. on February 25. 1992 this court issued rule nisi to the first respondent,
initially to make immediate appointment of the President of the CEGAT, prefer-
ably a senior High Court Judge. On March 30~ 1992 when the l)nion · s counsel
stated that the matter was .under active consideration of the government. having
F
regard to the urgency, this court hoped that the decision would be taken within two
weeks from that date. On April 20, 1992 the karned Addi. Solicitor General
reported that the appointment of the President had been made, however. the order
was not placed on record. In the meanwhile the petitioner filed writ petition No.
312 of 1992 impugning the appointment 1)f Sri Harish Chander, as President and
G sought to quash the same being in violation ·of the direction issued by this Court
on February 25, I 992 and to strike down RiRes IO(I ), (3) and (4) of the CEGAT
Members (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules 1987. ior short the
'Rule' as violative of Art. 43 of the Constitution. Rule nisi was also issued to the
respondents in that writ petition on May 4, 1992. The file in a se~tled CO\'er was
H produced. The first and the third respondents were directed to tile their counters
l R.K. JAIN 1·. UNION OF l:"DIA !RAMASWAMY. J.J
823
- within four weeks. This court also directed the first respondent "to retlect in the
counter what was the actual understanding in regard to the convention referred to
in the letter of the then Chief Justice of India dated October 5, 1982"; "What
A
procedure was followed at the time of the appointment by first respondent"'; and
"whether Chief Justice of India was consulted or whether the first respondent was
free to choose a retired or a silting Judge of the High Court as President of the
Tribunal with or without consultation of the Chief Justice oflndia". ''It should also B
point out what procedure it.had followed since then in the appointment of the
President of the Tribunal ... It should also clarify whether "before the third
respondent was appointed as the President, "any effort or attempt was made to
ascertain if any retired or a sitting Judge of the High Court cu.uld be appointed as
the President of the Tribunal .. and directed to post the .:a~cs for final disposal on
July 21, 1992. At request, to enable to government to me a counter, the file was
c
returned.
The Solicitor General though brought the file on July 21, 1992. objected to
ciur inspecting the file and desired to claim privilege. The file was directed to be
kept in the custody of the Registrar-General till further orders. The union was D
directed to file written application setting out the grounds on which the claim for
privilege is founded and directed the Registry to return the sealed envelop as the
Solicitor General expressed handicap to make precise claim of the privilege for
want of file. Thereafter an application was filed supported by the affidavit of the
Secretary, Finance and the State Minister also filed his affidavit. Counter affida-
vits and rejoinders were exchanged in the writ petitions. The Attorney General also E
appeared on behalf of the Union. The government's claim for privilege is founded
upon s. 123 of the Indian Evidence Act and Art. 74 (2) of the Constitution of India.
Later on the Solicitor General modified the stand that the government have no
objection for the court to peruse the file but claimed privilege to disclose the
contents of the file to the petitioner.
F
Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 postulates that "no one shall
be permitted to give any evidence derived from unpublished official records
relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head
of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as he
thinks fit". Section 124 provides that no public officer shall be compelled to G
disclose conununkations made to him in official confidence. ·'when he considers
.... that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure''. S. 162 envisages
procedure on production of the documents that a witness summoned to produce a
document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to the court, notwith-
standing any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. 11
824 Sl."PREtvlE COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.
J
A "The validity of any such objection shall be decided by the court ... The court, if it
deems lit, may inspect the documents, unless it refers to matters of State, or take
other evidence to enable it to determine on i.ts admissibility.
The remedy under Art. 32 of the Constitution itself is a fundamental right to
enforce the guaranteed rights in Part III. This court shall have power to issue writ
B of haheas-Cl)rpus. mandamus, certiorari, q11owarra1110 or any other appropriate
writ or direction or order appropriate to the situation to enforce any of the ;
fundamental right (power of High court under Art. 226 is wider). Artlcle 144
enjoins that all authorities, ci vii and judicial, in the territory oflndia shall act in aid
of this Court. Article 142 (I) empowers this Court to make such orders as is
C necessary for doing rnmplete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.
Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by the Parliament, by
Clause 2 of Art. 142, this Court ''shall have all and every power to make any order
for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or
production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt·
of itself. ..
D
When this Court was moved for an appropriate writ under Art. 32, rule nisi
would be issued and for doing complete justice in that cause or matter, it has been
invested with power to issue directions or orders which includes ad interim orders·
appropriate to the cause. All authorities, constitutional, civil judicial, statutory or
persons in the territory of India are enjoined to act in aid of this court. This court
E while exercising its jurisdiction, subject to any law, if any, made by Parliament
consistent with the exercise of the said power, has been empowered by CI. 2 of Art. ·
142 with all and every power to make any order to secure attendance of any person,
to issue ''discovery order nisi" for production of any documents, or to order
investigation .... Exercise of this constituent power is paramount to enforce not
only the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III but also to do complete justice
F
in any matter or cause. presented or pending adjudication. The power to issue
"discovery order nisi" is thus express as weII as inherent as an integral power of
Judicial review and process in the court to secure the attendance of any person or
discovery or prnduction of any document or to order investigation in that behalf.
However, in an app~opriate case, depending on facts on hand, court may adopt
G such other procedure as would be warranted. The petitioner must make strong
prima facie case to order discovery order nisi, etc. and it must not be a hunting
expedition to fish llUt some facts or an attempt to cause embarrassment to the
respondents nor h>r publicity. But on issuance of rule nisi by this Court under Art.
32 ora discovery order nisi the government or any authority, constitutional. civil,
H judicial. statutory or otherwise nr any person, must produce the record in their
l R.K. JAIN r. UNIO\' 01: l\'l>IA I RAMASWAMY ..I.I
825
custody and disobedience thereof would be at the pain of contempt. A
•
Section 123 of the Evidence Act gives right to the government, in other
words, to the minister or in his absence head of the department, to claim privilege,
in other words immunity from disclosure of the unpublished official state docu-
ments in public interest. In a democracy, governed by rule of law State is treated
at par with a person by Art. 19( 6) in commercial/industrial activities. It possessed
B
of no special privileges. This Court in Slate of U.P. v. Raj f'f_arain & Ors. [1975]
2 SCR 33.3 at 349 held that an objection claiming immuni(y should be raised by
an affidavit affirmed by the head of the department. The court may also require a
Minister to affirm an affidavit. They must state with precision the grounds or
reasons in support of the public interest immunity. It is now settled law that the C
initial claim for public interest immunity to produce unpublished official records
for short "state documents" should be made through an affidavit generally by the
Minister concerned, in his absence by the Secretary of the department or head of
the Department. In the latter case the court may require an affidavit of the Minister
himself to be filed. The affidavit should indicate that the documents in question
have been carefully read and considered and the deponent has been satisfied, D
supported by reasons or grounds valid and germane, as to why it is apprehended
that public interest would be injured by disclosure of the document summoned or
called for. If the court finds the affidavit unsatisfactory a further opportunity may
be given to file additional affidavit or be may be summoned for cross-examination.
If the court is satisfied from the affidavit and the reasons assigned for withholding
production or disclosure, the court may pass an apprnpriate order in that behalf. E
The Court though would give utmost consideration and deference to the view of
the Minister, yet it is not conclusive. The claim for immunity should never be on
administrative routine nor be a garb to avoid inconvenience, embarrassment or
adverse to its defence in the action, the latter themselves a ground for disclosure.
If the court still desires to peruse the record for satisfying itself whetherthe reasons
F
assigned in the affidavit would justify withholding disclosure, the court would, in
camera, examine the record and satisfy itself whether the public interest subserves
withholding production or disclosure or making the document as part of the
record.
On the one side there is the public interest to be protected; on the other side G
of the scale is the interest of the litigant who legitimately wants production of some
documents. which he believes will support his own or defeat his adversary's case.
Both are matters of public interesl, for it is also in the public interest that justice
should be done between litigating parties by production of all relevant document~
for whi9h public interest immunity has been claimed. They must be weighed onl' 1l
826 Sl1PRE:V1E COt'RT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
J
A competing p·ublic interest in the balance as against another equally competing
public administration of justice. The reasons are: there is public interest that harm
shall not be done to the nation or the public service by disclosure of the document
in question and there is public interest that the administration of justice shall not
be frustrated by withholding the document which must be produced, if justic;e is
to be done. The court also should be satisfied whether, the evidence relates to the
U affairs of the State under sec. 123 or not; evidence is relevant to the issue and
admissible. As distinct from private interest, the principle on which protection is
given is that where a conllict arise between public and private interest, private
interest must yield to the public interest. In S.P. Gupta & Ors. etc. ere v. Union of
India & Ors. etc. ere. [ 1982] 2 SCR 365, this court by seven Judges· bench held
that the court would allow the objection to disclosure if it finds that the document
c relates to affairs of State and its disclosure would be injurious to public interest,
but on the other hand, if it reaches the conclusion that the document does not relate
to affairs of State or that the public interest does not compel its non-disclosure or
that the public interest in the administration of justice in the particular case before
it overrides all other aspects of public interest, it will overrule the objection and
D order disclosure of the document.
When an objection was raised against disclosure of a particular document
that it belongs to a class which in the public interest ought not to be disclosed,
whether or not it would be harmful to disclose that class document or the contents
of that particular document forming part of the class would be injurious to the
E interest of the state or the public service, it would be difficult to decide in vacuum
the claim because it would almost invariably be supported by an affidavit made
either by the Minister or head of the department and if he asserts that to disclose
the contents of the document would or might do to the nation or the public service
a grave injury, the court out of deference will be slow to question his opinion or
to allow any interest, even that of justice, to prevail over it unless there can be
F
shown to exist some factors suggesting either lack of good faith or an error of
judgment on the part of the minister or the head of the department or the claim was
made in administrative routine without due consideration or to avoid inconve-
nience or injury to their defence. However, it is well-settled law that the court is
not bound· by the statement made by the minister or the head of the department in
G the affidavit and it retains the power to balance the injury to the State or the public
service against the risk of injustice. The real question which the court is required
to consider is whether public interest is so strong to override the ordinary right and
interest of the litigant that he shall be able to l_ay before a court of justice of the
rdevant evidence. In balancing the competing interest it is the duty of the court to
II sec that there is the public interest that harm shall not be done to the nation or the
I<" I \I\; 1·. I "NI<)\,, I lf f\;lJl/\ ,l{A\l.\S\\'A,\JY. J.; . 827
public service hy disclosure of the document and there is a publk interest that the A
administratinn or justice shall not be frustrated by withholding documents which
must be produced if justice is to be done. Iris. therefore, the paramount right and
duty of the court not of the cxecuti\'c to decide whether a document will be
produced or may be withheld. The court must decide which aspect of public
interest predominates nr in other words whether the public interest which requires
that the documem should not be produced outweighs the public interest that a court B
of justice in performing its functions should not be denied access to relevam
evidence. In some cases, therefore. the court must weight one competing aspect
uf the public interest against the other, and decide where the balance lies. If the
nature of the injury to the public interest is so grave a character then even private
interest or any other interest cannot be allowed to prevail over it. The basic
question t.o which the court would. therefore, have to address itself for the purpose
c
of deciding the validity of the objectinn would be, whether the document relates
to affairs of Stale or in other words, is it of such a character that its disclosure would
be against Ille interest of the State or the public service and if so, whether the public
interest in- its non-disclosure is so strong that it must prevail over the private
interest in the administration of justice and on that account, it should not be allowed D
to be disclosed. By operation of Sec. 162 of Evidence Act the final decision in
regard to the validity of an objection against disclosure raised under section 123
would always be with the court. The contention, therefore, that the claim of public
interest inununity claimed in the aflidavit of the State Minister for Finance and the
Secretary need privacy and claim for immunity of state documents from disclosure
is unsust1inablc. E
·1ne same is the law laid down by the Commonwealth countries, see Conway
v. Rimmer.1968 A.C. 910, (H.L.); D. v. Narional Society/or tlze Prevention of
Cruelty to Children1 l 978 AC 171. (H.L.); Burmalz Oil Co. ltd. v. Governor and
CtMpany of1he Bank of Englwu~l 980 AC 1090 (H.L.); Butters Gas and Oil Co.
F
\. Hamme5I 982 AC 888 (H.L.);AirCanada v. Secretaryo/Statefor Trade [1983]
l AC 394 (H.L.); and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for tile Civil
Sen 1ice_,l 985 AC 374 (f-I.L.); Pursuant to the law laid down in Conway's, case the
Administration of Justice Act, 1970 was made enabling the court to order
disclosure of the documents except where the court, in exercise of the power under
sections 31 to 34, considered that compliance of the order would be injurious to G
the public interest consistent with the above approach is the principle laid by this
.court in S.P. Gupta's case.
In United States of America the Primacy to the executive privilege is given
only Where the court is satisfied that disclosure of the evidence will expose militan II
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1993] 3 S.C.R.
A secrecy or of the document rdating to foreign relations. ln other respects the wurt
would reject the assertion of executive pri\'ilege. /11 United States v. Reynolds
119351345 U.S. I; Environmenll// Protection Agency v. Patsy T. Mink l410] U.S.
73 (35) L. Ell. 2nd 11: Newyork Times v. U.S. ll 971] 403 US 731: Pentagan Papers
c.1~~ and.". U.S. v. Riclwrd M. N1~ron J l 974]418 US 683 =41L.Ed2nd 1035. What
is kn, 1wn as Watergate Tapes case. the Supreme Court 1)flJ .S.A. reject ell the claim
U of the President not to disclose the conversation he had with the officials. The
Administrative Procellure Act 5, Art 552 was made. Thereunder it was broadly
conceded to permit access to official information. Only as stated hereinbcforc the
President is to withhold top secret documents pursuant to executive order to be
classified and stamped as "highly sensitive matters vital to our national defence
and foreign policies". In other respects under the Freedom of Information Act.
c documents are accessible to production. In the latest Commentary hy McCormick
on Evidence. 4th Ed. by John W. Strong in Chapter 12, surveyed the development
of law nn the executive privilege and stated that at p. 155, that "once we leave the
restricted area of military·and diplomatic secrets," a greater role for the judiciary in
the determination of governmental claims 1'f privilege becomes not only desirable
D but necessary .............. Where these privileges. are claimed. it is for the judge to
lktermine whether the interest in governmental secrecy is outweighed in the
particular case by the litigant's interest in obtaining the evidence sought. A
satisfactory striking of this balance will, on the one hand, require consideration of
the interests giving rise to the privilege and an assessment of the extent to \vhich
disclosure will realistically impair those interests. On the other hand, factors which
E will affect the litigant ·s need will include the significance of the evidence sought
for the case, the availability of the desired information from other sources, and in
some instances the nature of the right being asserted in the litigation ...
In Robinson v. State of So111h J\11stralia_, I 93 l A.C. 704 PC: Slwnkev ,._
\.Fhitlw~[ 1979] 53 ALR p. l; FJ\J lns11rances Ltd. v. The Hon. Sir, Henry Arth11s
F
Winneke and Ors, [ 1982] 151CLR342; Whit/an v. A11stra/ian Consolidated Press
Ltd:l[l 985] 60.ALR p.7 ;Minister.for Arts Heritage and Enviro11111e111 and Ors. v.
Pekoi Wa/lsend Ltd and Ors; [l 987i75 ALR 218 and Co111111onwealth ofA11stralia
v. Northern Land Co1111ci/, and Anr. [1991\ 103 ALR 267. Australian Courts
consistently rejected the executive privilege and exercise the power to determine
G whether the documents need immunity from disclosure in the puhlic interest. The
same view was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Shinder 1954
SLR 479 and Gagnon v. Quebec Sernrities Commission [1964] SCR 329; The
S11pre111e Court of Victoria in Bruce,._ \Valdrun. [1 %3] YLR p.3; The Co11rt of
Appeal of New Sowh Wales in Re Tuns rail. £1:. P. Brown. [1966] 84 W .N. (Pt. 2)
RX. JAIN v. 11'.'!!0N OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY. J.f . 829
[N.S.W.] 13. The Court of Appeal of the New Zealand in Corbettv. Social S~curity A
Commission [1962] N.Z.L.R. 878, Creednz Inc v. Governor General [1981] 1
N.L.R. p. 172; The Supren:e Court of Ceylon in Apponhamy v. lllangd.retute,
[1964] 66 C.L.W. ·17. The Court of Appeal of Jamaica in Allen v. Byfield [No.21
[ 1964] 7 W .LR. 69 at page 71 and The Court of Session in Scotland in Glasqow
C01poration v. Central Land Board, [1956) Scotland Law Time p.4.
B
The learned Solicitor General contended that a Cabinet sub-committee
constituted under Rules of Business approved the appointment ofHarish Chander
as President of CEGAT. The President accordingly appointed him. By operation
of Art. 77 (3) and 74(1), the appointment was made by the President. The file
constitµtes Cabinet documents forming part of the Preparation of the documents
c
leading to the formation of the advice tendered to the President. Noting of the
officials which lead to the Cabinet note and Cabinet decision and all papers
brought into existence to prepare Cabinet note are also its part. Section 123 of the
Evidence Act and Article 74(2) precludes this court from enquiring into the nature
of the advice tendered to the President and the documents are, therefore, immuned
from disclosure. The disclosure would cause public injury preventing candid and I')
frank discussion and expression of views by the bureaucrats at higher level and by
the Minister/Cabinet Sub-committee causing serious injury to public service.
Therefore, Cabinet papers, Minutes of discussion by heads of departments; high
level documents relating to the inner working of the government machine and ail
papers concerned with the governmentpolicies belong to a class doc.uments which .
in the public interest they or contents thereof must be protected against disclosure. E
The executive power of the Union vested in the President by Operation of
Art. 53( 1) shall be exercised by him either directly orthrough officers subordinate
to him in accordance with the Constitution. By operation of Art. 73( 1), subject to
the provisions of the constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend
F
to the matters. with respect _to which Parliament has power to make laws. Article
75(1) provides that the Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and the
other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime
Minister; Art. 75(3) posits that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively
responsible to the House of the People; Art. 75(4) enjoins that before a Minister
enters upon his office, the President shall administer to him the oaths of office and G
of secrecy according to the forms set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule to
the Constitution. Article74(1) as amended by section 11 of the Constitution 42nd
Amendment Act, 1976 with effect from January 3, 1977 postulates that there shall
be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head to aid and advise the
President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such
.H
830 SUPREME'. COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A advice. The proviso thereto added by section 11 of the Constitution 44t\1 Amend-
ment Act, 1978 which came into effect from June 20, 1979 envisages that
"provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider
such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accor-
dance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration." Clause (2) declares
that "the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Minister
B to the President shall not be inquired into in any court." In Satwant Singh Sawhney
v. D. Ramarathnam. Asstt. Passport Officer [1967] 3 SCR 525, and in Maganbhai
IshwarbhaiPatelv. Union oflndiaandAnr. (1969] 3 SCR 254, this Court held that
the Ministers are officels subordinate to the President under Art.·53 (1) or the
·Governor under Art. .154 (l),_ as the case may be.
c
The President exercises his executive power under Art: 74 (1) through the
Council of Ministers with the Prime fy1inister as its head who shall be collectively .
responsible to the House of People. T~e exercise of the power would be as per the
rules of business· for convenient transaction of the Govt. administration made
under Art. 77(3), viz .. the Govt. oflndia (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961 for
D ~hort the 'Business R'Ules'. The Prime Minister shall be duty bound under Art. 78
to communicate to the President all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating
to the administration of the affairs of the Union and proposals for legislation etc. ·
The details whereof are not material. Article 77(1) prescribes that "all executive
actions of the Govt. of lndi3: shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the
President and shall be authenucated in the manner specified in the Rules made by
E the President". The President issued business rules and has allocated diverse
functions to the Council of Ministers, its committees and the officers subordinate
to them.
In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1975] 1 SCR 814, a Bench of seven
Judges, speaking through Ray, CJ., held that the executive power is generally
F
described as the residue which does not fall within legislative or judical i:>ower but
executive power also partakes of legislative or judici~ actions. All powers and
functions of the President, except his legislative powers, are executive powers of
the Union vested in the President under Art. 53(1). The President exercises his
functions, except conferred on him to be exercised in his discretion, with the aid_
G and advice of the Council of Ministers as per the business rules allocated among
his Ministers or Committees: Wherever the constitution requires the satisfaction
of the P.resident, the satisfaction required of him by the Constitution is not the
personal satisfaction of the President, but is of the Cabinet. System of Govt. The
Minister lays down t]Je policies. The Council of Ministers settle the maiornolicies.
The civil servant does it on behalf of the Govt. as limb of the Govt._:The dedsi~
H of any Minister or officer under the rules is the decision of the President.
· .. ~ R.K. JAIN"· UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAM)'.."J.]
831
Cabinet is a constitutional mechanism to ensure that before important A
decisions are reached many sides of the question are weighed and considered
which would mean that much work must be done beforehand in interdepartmental
discussions and in the preparation of papers for Cabinet Committees. Political
decisions of importance are in their nature complies and need sufficient time and
considerate thought. Equally, the decisions relating to public service need probity
and diverse consideration. The Cabinet system is extremely well adapted to B
making considered decisions with all due speed and expedition. The principle of
ministerial responsibility has a verity of meanings precise and imprecise, authen-
tic and vague. Parliament rarely exercises direct control over Ministers. Though
the floor of the House is the forum for correcting excesses of the government but
rarely a place where a Minister can be expected to keep the information secret.
Therefore, the Minister is answerablf? for his decision to the Parliament is fanciful.
c
Sir Ivor Jennings, in hi8 'Cahiner (i11rem111e11. , stated that the Cabinet is the
supreme directing authority.'. It mtegrates what would otherwise be a heteroge-
neous collection of authorities exercising a Val?t variety of functions. Neither the
Cabinet nor the Prime Minister, as such, claims to exercise any powers conferred D
by law. They take the decision, but the acts which have legal effect are taken by
others - the Pdvy Council, a Minister, a statutory commission and the like. At page
81, it is stated, that the existence and activities of these co-ordinating ministers
does not impair or diminish the responsibility to Parliament of the qepartmental
ministers whose policies they co-ordinate. The ministers are fully accountable to
, Parliament for any act of policy or administration within their departmental E
jurisdiction. It does not follow that the co-ordinating ministers are non-respon-
sible. Having no statutory powers as co-ordinating ministers, they perform in that
capacity no formal acts.But they share in the collective responsibility of the Govt.
-as a whole, and, as Minister they are accountable to Parliament. At page 233, he
stated that the Cabinet has to decide policy matters. Cabinet is policy formulating
F
body. When it has determined on a policy, the appropriate department carries it
out, either by administrative action within the law or by drafting a bill to be
submitt('.d to Parliament so as to change the law. The Cabinet is a general
controlling body. It neither desires, nor is able to deal with all the numerous details
of the Govt. It expects a minister to take all decisions which are not of real political
importance. Every Minister must, therefore, exercise his own discretion as to what G
matters arising in his department ought to receive cabinet sanction. At page 351,
he stated that civil servants prepare memorandum for their Ministers. Ministers
discuss in Cabinet. Proposals are qebated in the House of Commons. All the .
- persons.involved are peculiar people and nobody knows what the man in the back
. street thinks of it ~ll, though the politician ?ften thinks he cioes. On the Cabinet H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A Minister's responsibility at page 449, he stated that when it is said that a Minister
is responsible to Parliament, it is meant that the House of Commons (in our
constitution Lok Sabha) may demand an explanation. If that explanation is not
considered satisfactory and the responsibility is collective, the House will vote
against the Govt. and so compel a resignation or a dissolution. If the responsibility
is not collective, but the act or advice was due to the negligence of or to an error
B of judgment by a Minister and the House disapproves, the Minister will resign.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Ed., Vol. 8, para 820, it is stated that
the Cabinet control of legislative and executive functions, the "modem English
system of government is the concentration of the control of both legislative and
c executive functions in a small body of men, presided over by the Prime Minister,
who are agreed on fundamentals and decide the most important questions of policy
secretly in the Cabinet. The most important check on their power is the existence
of a powerful and organised parliamentary opposition, and the possibility that
measures proposed or carried by the government may subject them to popular
disapproval and enable the Opposition to defeat them at the next general election
D and supplant them in their control of the executive. In Great Britain, Cabinet
system is based on conventions. Patrick Gordon Walker in his 'The Cabinet' 1973
Revised Ed. at p. 178 stated that basically Cabinet is a constitutional mechanism
to ensure that before important decisions are reached many sides of the question
are weighed and considered. This ~eans that much work must be done beforehand
in interdepartmental discussions and in the preparation of papers for Cabinet
E Committees and the Cabinet. Cabinet that acts without briefs or over-hastily 'think
for themselves' usually, in my experience, make mistaken decisions. Political
decisions of importance are in their nature complex and need some time and
thought. The cabinet system is extremely well adapted to making considered
· qecisions with all due speed. Cabinet discussions as distinct from Cabinet
decisions must, from their nature, be kept secret. At page 184 he maintained that
F the main effective change towards less secrecy would be for the Cabinet to share
with Parliament and public more of the factual information on which the govern-
ment makes some of their decisions. Moves in this direction have begun to be
taken. In his "the British Cabinet" John P. Mackintoslt, 2nd Edn. atp. 11 stated that
if there is. dissension between Ministers, matters may be thrashed out in private and
G the contestants pleaa in tum with the Prime Minister, but it is in the Cabinet that
the confli~t must be formally sol v.ed, the minority either accepting the decision and
assumingjointresponsibility or, if the)'. cannot tolerate it, tender their resignations.
At p.529, he stated that some decisions are taken by the PrimeMinisteralone, some
in consultation between him and the senior Ministers, while others are left to heads
H of departments, to the full Cabinet, to the concerned Cabinet Committee, or to the
"K.JAIK 1·. llNIONOFINDIA [RAMASWAMY.J.]
833
permanent officials. Of these bodies the Cabinet holds the central position A
because, though it does not often govern in that sense, it is the place where disputes
are settled, where major policies are endorsed and where the balance of the forces
emerge if there is disagreement. In the end, most decisions have to be reported to
the Cabinet and Cabinet Minister are the only ones who have the right to complain,
if they have not been informed or consulted. 0. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson
in their Constitwional and Administrative Law, 7th Ed. at p.301 stated that the B
duties of Cabinets are:
"(a) the final determination of the policy to be submitted to Parliament; (b)
the supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the policy
prescribed by the Parliament; and (c) the continuous coordination and delimitation C
in the interests of the several departments of State." The Cabinet, giving collective
·'advice'' to the Sovereign through the Prime Minister, was said to exercise under
Parliament, supreme control over all departments of State, and to be the body
which coordinate the work on the one hand of the executive and the legislature, and
on the other hand of the organs of the executive among themselves .... At p.307,
they stated that "conunittee system has increased theefficiency of the Cabinet, and D
enables a great deal more work to be done by Ministers". The Cabinet itself is left
free to discuss controversial matters and to make more important decisions, and
its business is better prepared. The system also enables non-Cabinet Ministers to
be brought into discussions. At p.309 it is stated that "the responsibility of
Ministers is both individual and collective". The individual responsibility of a
Minister for the performance of his official duties is both legal and conventional: E
it is owed legally to the sovereign and also by convention to Parliament.
Responsibility is accountability or answerability. The responsible Minister is the
one under whose authority an act was done, or "who must take the constitutional
consequences of what has been J, 111c either by himself or in his department".
F
In 'the Cabinet' Walker, at page 183 stated that the feeling is widespread that
the Cabinet shrouds its affairs in too much secrecy and that Parliament, Press and
public should be able to participate to a greater degree in formula,tion of p111icy.
With few exceptions Cabinet decisions have to be made public in order to he made
effective, although a small number that do not need to be executed, do not hecome
known, for instance talks with a foreign country or a decision not to take some G
action. All other cabinet decisions are necessarily disclosed and are subject to
public scrutiny. Cabinet discussions as distinct from Cabinet decisions must, from
their nature, be kept secret. Cabinet discussions often depend upon confidential
advice from civil servants or reports from Ambassadors. If those are disclosed and .
thus become subject to public attack, it would be extremely difficult forthe cabinet H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A to secure free and frank advice. In Rai Sahib Ram Jawa~·a Kap11r & Ors. v. The
State of Punjab (1955] 2 SCR 225 at 236, this Court held that the existence of the
!aw is not a condition precedent for the exercise of the executive power. The
executive power connotes the residual government function that remain after
legislative and judicial functions are taken away, subject to the provisions of the
Constitution or the law.
B
It would thus be held that the Cabinet known as Council of Ministers headed
by Prime Minister under Art. 75(3) is the driving and steering body responsible for
the governance of the country. They enjoy the confidence of the Parliament and
remain_in office so long as they maintain the confidence of the majority. They are
C answerable to the Parliament and accountable to people. They bear collective
responsibility and shall be bound to maintain secrecy. Their executive function
comprises of both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into
execution, the in,itiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of
social arid economic welfare, direction of foreign policy. In short the carrying on
or s·upervision of the general administration of the affairs of Union of India which
D includes political activity and carrying on all trading activities, the acquisition,
holding and disposal of property and the making t)f contracts for any purpose. In
short the primary function of the Cabinet is to formulate the policies of the Govt.
in confirmity with the directive principles of the Constitution for the governance
of the nation; place before the Parliament for acceptance and would carry on the
executive function of the State as per the provisions of the Constitution and the
E laws.
Collective responsibility under Art. 75(3) of the Constitution inheres main-
tenance of confidentiality as enjoined in oaths of office and of secrecy set forth in
Schedule III of the Constitu,tion that the Minister will not directly or indirectly
communicate or reveal to any person or persons any matter which shall be brought
F
under his/her consideration or shall become known to him/her as Minister except
as may be required for the "due discharge of his/her duty as Minister"'. The base
and basic postulate of its significance is unexceptionable. But the need for and
effect.of confidentiality has to be nurtured not merely from political .imperatives
of c.ollective responsibility envisaged by Art. 75(3) but also from its pragmatism.
G Bagehot in his 'The English Constitution', 1964 Edition at p. 68 stated that the
most curious point about the Cabinet is that so very little is known about it. The
..d meetings are not only secret in theory. but secret in reality. By the present practice,
no official minute in all ordinary cases is kept of them. Even a private note is
1 discouraged and disliked .......... But a Cabinet, though it is a committee of the
H legislative assembly, is a committee with a power which no assembly would-unless
R.K. JAIN v. UNJON OF INDIA !RAMASWAMY. J.] 835
- for historical accidents, and after happy experience-have been persuaded to
entrust to any committee. It is a committee which can dissolve the assembly which
A
appointed it; it is a committee with a suspensive v~to-a committee with a power
of appeal.
In Commonwealth ofAustralia v. Northern Land Council & Anr. [1991] 103
Australian Law Reports, p. 267, the Federal Court of Australia - General Division, B
was to consider the scope of confidentiality of the cabinet papers, collective
· responsibility of the Council of Ministers and the need for discovery of the Cabinet
note-books and dealt with the q11estion thus : "The conventional wisdom of
contemporary constitutional practice present secrecy as a necessary incident of
collective responsibility. But historically it seems to have derived from the 17th c
century origins of the cabinet as an inner circle of Privy Councillors, sometimes
called the Ca~inetCouncil who acted as advisors to the monarch ... ,........ However,
· that basis for confidentiality has to be assessed in the light of the political
imperatives of collective responsibility." Confidentiality has been described as
the natural correlative of collective responsibility. It is said to be difficult for
Ministers to make an effective defe~ce in public of decisions with which it is D
known that they have disagreed in the course of Cabinet discussions. The Cabinet
as a whole is responsible for the advice and conduct of each of its members. If any
member of the Cabinet seriously dissents from the opinion and policy approved
by the majority of his colleagues it is his duty as aman of honour to resign. Cabinet
secrecy is an essential part of the structure of government which centres of political
experience have created: To impair it without a very strong reason would be E
vandalism, the wanton rejection of the fruits of civilisation.
By operation of Art. 75 (3) and oaths of office and of secrecy taken, the
individual Minister and the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as its
head, as executive head of the State as a unit, body or committee are individually
F
and collectively responsible to their decisions or acts or policies and they should
work in unison and harmony. They individually and collectively maintain secrecy
of the deliberations both of administration and of formulating executive or
legislative policies. Advice tendered by the Cabinet to the President should be
unanimous. The Cabinet should stand or fall together. Therefore, the Cabinet as
a whole is collectively responsible for the advice tendered to the President and for G
"
the conduct of business of each of his/her department. They require to maintain
secrecy and confidentiality in the performance of that duty of office entrusted by
the Constitution and the laws. Political promises or aims as per manifesto of the
political party are necessarily broad; in their particular applications, when votec
to power, may be the subject of disagreement amo_ng the members oJ the Cabinet. H.
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A Each member of the Cabinet has personal responsibility to his conscience and also
responsibility to the Government. Discussion and persuasion may diminish
disagreement, reach unanimity, or leave it unaltered. Despite persistence of
disagreement, it is a decision, though some members like it less than oth~rs. Both
practical politics and good Government require that those who like it less must still
publicly support it. If such support is too great a strain on a Minister's conscience
B or incompatible to his/her perceptions of commitment and find it difficult to
support the decision, it would be open to him/her to resign. So the price of the
acceptance of Cabinet office is the assumption of the responsibility to support
Cabinet decisions. The burden of that responsibility is shared by all.
Equally every member is entitled to insist that whatever his own contribution
c
was to the making of the decision, whether favourable or unfavourable, every other
member will keep it secret. Maintenance of secrecy of an individual's contribution
to discussion, or vote in the Cabinet·guarantees most favourable and conducive
atmosphere to express views formally. To reveal the view. or vote, of a member
of the Cabinet, expressed or given in Cabinet, is not only to disappoint an
D expectation on which that member was entitled to rely, but also to reduce the
security of the continuing guarantee, and above all, to undermine the principle of
collective responsibility. Joint responsibility supersede individual responsibility;
in accepting responsibility for joint decision, each member is entitled to an
assurance that he will be held responsible not only for his own, but also as member
of the whole Cabinet which made it; that he will be held responsible for
E maintaining secrecy of any different view which the others may have expressed.
The obvious and basic fact is that as part of the machinery of the government,
Cabinet secrecy is an essential part of the structure of the government. Confiden-
tiality ·and collective responsibility in that scenario are twins to effectuate the
object of frank and open debate to augment efficiency of public service or
effectivity of collective decision to elongate public interest. To hamper and impair
F them without any compelling or at least strong reasons, would be detrimental to
the efficacy of public administration. It would tantamount to wanton rejection of
the fruits 9f democratic governance, and abdication of an office of responsibility
and dependability. Maintaining of top secrecy of new taxation policies is a must
but leaking budget proposals a day before presentation of the budget may be an
G exceptional occurrence as an instance.
Above compulsive constraints would give rise to an immediate question
. -whether the minister is required to disclose in the affidavit the reasons or grounds
for public in.terest immunity of disclosure and the oath of secrecy is thereby
H whether breached or whether it would be a shield for non-production of unpub-
I
I
R.K. JAIN"· UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY. J.]
837
lished state documents or an escape rout<l to· acts impugned as fondly pleaded and A
-- fervently argued by Attorney General. It is already held that on issuance of rule nisi
or "discovery order nisi" every organ of the State or the authority or a person is
enjoined to act in aid of this court and pursuant thereto shall be required to produce
the summoned documents. But when a claim for public interest immunity has been
laid for non-disclosure of the state documents, it is the Minister's "due discharge
of duty" to state on oath in his affidavit the grounds on which and the reasons for B
which he has been persuaded to claim public interest immunity from disclosure of
the state papers and produce them. The oath of secrecy the Minister had taken does
not absolve him from filing the affidavit. It is his due discharge of constitutional
duty to state in the affidavit of the grounds or reasons in support of public interest
immunity from producing the state documents before the Court, In Attorney
General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. [1976] Queen's Bench, 752, Lord Widgery, CJ.,
c
repelled the contention that publication of the diaries maintained by the Minister
would be in breach of oath of secrecy. In support of the plea of secrecy reliance was
placed on the debates on cabinet secrecy, that took place on December 1, 1932 irl
the House of LordS. An extract from the official report of House of Lords, at
Column 520 Lord Hailsham's speech emphasised the imperative to maintain D
secrecx and the limitation which rigidly hedged around the position of a Cabinet
Minister thus : "having heard that oath read your Lordships will appreciate what
a complete misconception it is. to suppose, as some people seem inclined to
suppose, that the only obligation that rests upon a Cabinet Minister is not to
disclose what are described as the Cabinet's minutes. He is sworn to keep secret
all matters committed and revealed unto him or that shall be treated secretrly in E
council". He we~t on to point out that:-
"I have stressed that because, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hals bury
suggested and the noble Marquis, Lord Salisbury, confirmed, Cabinet
conclusions did not exist until 16 years ago. The old practice is set out in a
book which bears the name of the noble Earl's father, Halsbury's Laws of
F
England, with which I have had the honour to be associated in the present
ed.ition."
.. Then in column 532 of the speech Lord Hailsham, stated that the oath of
secrecy should be maintained. "Upon matters on which it is their shorn duty to
express. tht;!ir. opinions. with c_omp~ete ·frankness and to give all information,
without any haunting fear that what happens may hereafter by publication create
difficulties for themselves or, what is far more grave, may create complications for
G
- the king and country that they are trying to serve. For those reasons I hope that the
inflexible rule which has hitherto prevailed will be maintained in its integrity, and
tharif there has been any relaxation or misunderstanding, of which I say nothing, H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
..
A the debate in this House will have done something to clarify the position and restate
the old rule in all its rigour and all its intlexibmty."
As a Council of Minister, his duty is to maintain the sanctity of oath and to
keep discussions and information he had during its course as secret. Lord Widgery
after considering the evidence of a former Minister examined in that case who did
B not support the view of Lord Hailsham, held thus: "that degree of protection,
afforded to cabinet papers and discussions cannot be determined by single rule of
thumb. Some secrets require a high standard of protection for short time, other
requires protection till a new political generation has taken over. In the Present
action against the literary executors, "the perpetual injunction against them
restraining from their publication was not proper". It was further held that the
c
draconian remedy when public interest demands it would be relaxed.
In Sankey v. Whit/an [1979) 53 Australian Law Journal Reports, 11, while
considering the same question, Gibbs, A.,C.J., at p.23, held that the fact that
members of the Executive Council are required to take a binding oath of secrecy
D dors not assist the argument that the production of State papers cannot be
compelled. The plea of privilege was negatived and the Cabinet papers were
directed to be produced. The contention that the Minister is precluded to disclose
in his affidavit the grounds or the reasons as to how he dealt with the matter as a
part of the claim for public interest immunity is devoid of substance.
E
It is already held that it is the duty of the Minister to file an affidavit stating
the grounds or the reasons in support of the claim from public interest immunity:
He takes grave risk on insistence of oath of secrecy to avoid filing an affidavit or
production of State documents and the court may be constrained to draw such
inference as are available at law. Accordingly we hold that the oath of office of
F secrecy adumberated in Article 75(4) and Schedule III of the Constitution does not
absolve the Minister either to state the reasons in support of the public interest
immunity to produce the state documents or as to how the matter was dealt with
or for their production when discovery order nisi or rule nisi was issued. On the
-
other hand it is his due discharge of the duty as a Minister to obey rule nisi or
discovery order nisi and act in aid of the court.
G
The next limb of the argument is that the Cabinet Sub-committee's decision
is a class document and the contents of state documents required to be kept in
confidence for efficient functioning of public service including candid and
objective expression of the views on the opinion by the Ministers or bureaucrats
H etc. The prospects of later disclosure at.a at a litigation would hamper and dampen
l R.K. JAIN,._ UNION OFINDIA [RAMASWAMY. J.]
839
candour causing serious incursion into the efficacy of public service and result in A
deterioration in proper functioning of the public service. This blanket shielding of
disclosure was disfavoured right from Robinson v. State of South Australia [1931]
Appeal Cases, (P .C.), p. 704 Lord Warrington speaking for the Board held that the
privilege is a narrow, one and must sparingly be exercised. This court in Raj
Narain 's case considering green book, i.e., guidelines for protecting VVIPs on
tour, though held to be confidential document and be wihheld from production, B
though part of its contents were already revealed, yet it was held that confidenti-
ality itself is not a head of privilege.
In S.P. Gupta's case, Bhagwati, J ., speaking per majority, reviewing the case
law and the privilege against disclosure of correspondence exchanged between the C
Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister
of the Union concerning extension of term or appointment of Addi. Judges of the
Delhi High Court, which was not dissented, (but explained by Fazal Ali,J.) held
that in a democracy, citizens are to know what their Govt. is doing. No democratic
Govt. can survive without accountability and the basic postulate of accountability
is that the people should have information about the functioning of the Govt. It is. D
only if the people know how the Govt. is functioning and that they can fulfil their
own democratic rights given to them and make the democracy a really effective
participatory democracy. There can be little doubt that exposure to public scrutiny
is one of the surest means of running a clean and healthy administration.
Disclosure of if1formation in regard to the functioning of the Govt. must be E
the rule and secrecy can be exceptionally justified only where strict requirement
of public information was assumed. The approach of the court must be to alleviate
the area of secrecy as much as possible constantly with the requirement of public
interest bearing in mind all the time that the disclosure also serves an important
aspect of public interest. In that case the correspondence between the constitu-
F
tional functionaries was inspected by this court and disclosed to the opposite
parties to formulate their contentions.
In Conway's case, tl.1e speech of Lord Reid is the sole votery to support the
plea of confidentiality emphasising that, "the business of Govt. is difficult enough
as it is no Govt. could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the Govt. G
machine being exposed to the gazes of those ready to criticise without adequate
knowledge of the background. and perhaps with some axe to grind". Other Law .
Lords negated it. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest referred it as "being doubtful .
validity". Lord Hodson thought it "impossible to justify the doctrine in its widest ,
term''. Lord Pearce considered that "a general blanket protection of wide classes · H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 3 S.C.R.
A led to a complete lack of common sense". Lord Upjohn found it difficult to justify
the doctrine "when those in other walks oflife which give rise to equally important
matters of confidence in relation to security and personal matters as in the public
service can claim no such privilege". In Burmah Oil Co's. case House of Lords
dealing with the cabinet discussion laid that the claim for blanket immunity "must
now be treated as having little weight, if any''. It was further stated that the notion
B that "any competent and conscientious public servant would be inhibited at all in
the candour of his writings by consideration of the off-chance that they might have
to be produced in a litigation as grotesque". The plea of impairment of public
service was also held not available stating, '·nowadays the state in multifarious
manifestations impinges closely upon the lives and activities of individual
citizens. Where this was involved a citizen in litigation with the state or one of its
c agencies, the candour argument is an u!lerly insubstantial ground for denying his
access to relevant document". The candour doctrine stands in a difterent catl!gory
from that aspect of public interest which in appropriate circumstances may require
that the "sources and nature of information confidentially tendered" should be
withheld from disclosure. In Reg v. Lewes Justices, Ex Pa rte Secretary ofStatefor
D the Home Department (1973] A.C. 388 and D. V. Natio11al Socie0· for the
Preve11tio11ofCrue/0·10 Children (1978] A.C. 171, are cases in point on that matter
and needs no reiteration.
It would, therefore, be concluded that it would be going too far to lay down
that no document in any particular class or one of the categories of cabinet papers
E or decisions-Or contents thereof should never, in any circumstances, be ordered to
be produced. Lord Keith in Burmah Oil's case considered that it would be going
too far to lay down a total protection to cabinet minutes. The learned Law Lord at
p. 1134 stated that "something must tum upon the subject matter, the persons who
dealt with it, and the manner in which they did so. In so far as a matter of
government policy is concerned, it may be relevant to know the ex\ent to which
F
the policy remains unfulfilled, so that its success might be prejudiced by disclosurl!
of the considerations which led to it. In that context the time element enters into
the equation. Details of an affair which is stale and no longer of topical significance
. might be capable of disclosure without risk of damage to the public interest. .... The
nature of the litigation and the apparent importance to it of the documents in
G question may in extreme cases demand production even of the most sensitive
communications to the highest level.,. Lord Scarman also objected total immunity
to Cabinet documents on the plea of candour. In Air Canada's case, Lord Fraser
lifted Cabinet.minutes from the total immunity to disclose, although same were
H "entitled to a high degree of protection ..... "
l 841
In lonarhan Cape Lid. 's case, it was held that, "it seems that the degree of A
protection afforded to Cabinet papers and discussions cannot be determined by a
single rule of thumb. Some secrets require a high standard of protection for a short
time. Others require protection until new political generation has taken over. Lord
Redcliff Committee, appointed pursuant to this decision, recommended time gap
of 15 years to. withhold disclosure of the cabinet proceedings and the Govt.
accepted the same. Shanfc)"S case ratio too discounted total immunity to the B
Cabinet document as a class and the plea of hampering, freedom and candid advice
or exchange of vi.ews and opinions was also rejectyd. It was held that the need for
protection depends on the facts in each case. The object of the protection is to
ensure the proper working of the Goyt. and not to shield the Ministers and servants
of the crown from criticism, however, intemperate and unfairly based. Pincus J. in
Harbour Corp. ofQueenslandv. Vessey Chemicals Pry Ltd. [1986] 67 ALR 100; c
Wilcox J. in Manthal Australia Pty Ltd. v. Minister for indusrry, Technology and
commerce [ 1987) 71 ALR 109; Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen [1988] and 92 FLR
104 took the same view. In Australia, the recognised rule thus is that the blanket
immunity of all Cabinet documents was given a go-bye. In United States v.
Richard M. Nixon [1974) 418 US 683 = 41 Lawyers Ed., 2nd Ed., 1039, a grand D
jury of the Unite·J States District.Court for the District of Columbia indicted named
individuals, charging them with various offences, including conspiracy to defraud
the United States and to obstruct justice; and Mr Nixon, the President of United
States was also named as an unindicted coconspirator. The special prosecutor
issued a third party subpoena duces tecum, directing the President to produce at
the trial. certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with E
aides avi advisors known as Watergate rapes. The President's executive privilege
against disclosure of confidential communications was negatived holding that the
right lO the production of all evidence at a crinlinal trial has constitutional
dir~~nsions under sixth amendment. The fifth amendment guarantees that no
pLrson shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It was, therefore,
t,cld that it is the manifest duty of the court to vindicate those guarantees, and to F
accomplish that, it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be
produced. Though the court must weigh the importance of the general privilege of
confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of his responsibili-
ties, it is an inroad on the fair administration of criminal justice. In balancing
between the President's generalised interest in confidentiality and the need for
relevant evidence in the litigation, civil or criminal and though the interest in G
preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed "and entitled to great respect."
Allowing privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a
criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process oflaw and gravely
impair the basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for H
A
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1993] 3 S.C.R.
confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas
J
constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding
is specific, and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the
administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a crimipal prosecution
may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of
communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
B conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal
cases. If the privilege is based on! y on the generalized interest in confidentiality,
it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administrati-0n of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must
yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
c Exemptions were engrafted only to the evidence ·relating to "the security of the
State, diplomatic relations and defence". It was held that "the importance of this
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well
--
temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interest to the
detriment of the decision-making process. Whatever the nature of the privilege of
D confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers,
the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its
own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow
from the nature of enumerated powers, the protection of the· confi.dentiality of
Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings. However,
neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high
E -level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presi- ·
dential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The
President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great
deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the
broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such
conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim ofneed to
F protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it
difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confiden-
tiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production
of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court
will be obliged to provide.
G
In a clash of public interest thatharm shall be done to the nation or the public
service by disclosure of certain documents and the administration of justice shall
not be frustrated by withholding the document which must be produced if justice .
is to be done, it is the courts duty to balance the competing interests by weighing
I in scales, the effect of disclosure on the public interest or injury to administration
R.K.JAINv. UNION OF INDIA jR,\~1ASWAMY.JJ 843
of justice, ~hich would do greater harm. Some of the important considerations in A
the balancing act are thus: "in the interest of national security some information
which is so secret that it cannot be disclosed except to a very few for instance the
state or its own spies or agents just as other counters have. Their very lives may
be endangered if there is the slighest hint of what they are doing. In Mark
Hosenball. R. v. Home SecretarJ. ex parte Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766, in the
interest of national security Lord Denning, M.R. did not permit disclosure of the B
- information furnished by the s~curity service to the Home Secretary holding it
highly corifiden9al. The public interest in the security of the realm was held so
great that' the sources of the information must not be di.sclosed nor should the
nature of the information itself be disclosed.
c
There is a naturil.l .temptation for people in executive position to regard the
interest of the department as paramount forgetting that there is yet another greater
interest to be considered, namely, the interest of justice itself. Inconvenience and
justice are often not on speaking terms. No one can suppose that the executive will
never be guilty of the sins c.ommon to all people. Sometimes they may do things
which they ought not to do or will not do things they ought to do. The court must D
be alive to that possibility of the executive commiting illegality in its process,
exercising its powers, reaching a decision which no reasonable authority would
have reached or otherwise abuse its powers, etc. If and.when such wrongs are
suffered or encountered injustice by an individual what would be the remedy? Just
as shawl is not suitable for winning the cold, so also mere remedy of writ of
mandamus, certiorari, etc. or such action as is warranted are not enough, unless E
necess·ary foundation with factual material, in support thereof, are laid. Judicial
review aims to protect a citizen from such breaches of power, non-exercise of
power or lack of power etc. The functionary must b~ guided by relevant and
germane considerations. If the proceeding, decision or order is influenced by
extraneous considerations which ought not to have been taken into account, it
cannot stand and needs correction, no inatter of the nature of the statutory body or
F
status or stature of the constitutional functionary though might have acted in good
faith. Here the court in its judicial review, is not concerned wi.th the merits of the
decisions, but its legality. It is, therefore, the function of the court to see that lawful
authority is not abused. Every communication that passes between different
departments of the Govt. or between the members of the same department inter- G
se and. every order made by a Minister or Head of the Department cannot,
therefore, be deemed to relate to the affairs of the state, unless it related to a matter
of vital importance, the disclosure of which is likely to prejudice the interest of the
state.
Confidentiality, candour and efficient public service often bear common H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A mask. Lord Keath in Bunnah Oil's case, observed that the notion that any"
competent or conscientious public servant would be inhibited in the candour of his
writings by consideration of the off-chance that they might have to be_ produced
in litigation is grotesque. The possibility that it impairs the public service was also
nailed. This court in S.P. Gupta's case also rejected the plea of hampering candid
expression of views or opinion by constitutional functionaries and bureaucrats. In
B Whit lam v. Australian Consolidated Press [1985} 60 ALR p. 7, the Supreme Court
of Australia Capital territory in a suit for damages for defamation, the plaintiff, the
former Prime Minister of Australia was called upon to answer certain interroga-
tories to disclose discussions and words uttered at the meeting of the Cabinet or
9f the Executive Council at which the plaintiff had been present. The common-
wealth intervened and claimed privilege prohibiting the plaintiffto disclose by
c answering those interrogatories. The claim was based on two grounds: (i) the oath
taken by the plaintiff as a member of the Executive Council; and also immunity
from disclosing of the Cabinet meetings and both were public policies. It was also
contended that it would be in breach of the principle of collective Cabinet
responsibility. The court held that the oath taken by the plaintiff did not in itself
D provide a reason for refusing to answer the interrogatories whether immunity from
diss;losure would be granted depends upon the balancing of two competing
aspects, both of public policy, on the one hand the need to protect a public interest
which might be endangered by disclosure, and on the other the need to ensure that
the private rights of individual litigants are not unduly restricted. The disclosure
of the meeting of the Cabinet or of the Executive Council would not be a breach
E of the principle of other two responsibilities. Bagehot stated, protection from
disclosure is not for the purpose of shielding them from criticism, but of preventing
the attribution to them of personal responsibility. It was stated that "I am not
required to lay down a precise test of when an individual opinion expressed in
Cabinet becomes of merely historical interest". The Cabinet minutes and minutes
of discussion are a class. They might in very special circumstances be examined.
F Public interest in maintaining Cabinet secrecy easily outweighs the contrary
public interest in ensuring that the defendant has proper facilities for conducting
its case, principally because of the enormous importance of Cabinet secrecy by
comparison with the private rights of an individual and also because of the relative
unimportance of these answers to the defendant's case. Answers to interrogatories
87 (vii); (viii) and (ix) were restrained to be disclosed which relates to the members
G
of the Council who expressed doubts as to whether the borrowing was wholly for
temporary purpose and to identify such purpose. In Jonathan Cape Ltd. case, Lord
Widgery CJ. held that publication of the Cabinet discussion after certain lapse of
time would not inhibit free discussion.in the Cabinet of today, even though the
individuals involved are the same, and the national problems have a distressing
H similarity with those ofa decade ago. It is difficult to say at what point the material
R.K. JAIN 1·. 1·:-;101\ OI' l'.\l>IA IRAMASW;\\1Y . .I.I
845
-=- hises its confidential dmracter. on the ground that publication will no longer
undermine the doctrine of joint Cabinet responsibility. The doctrine of joint
Cabinet responsibility is nc;' undermined su long as the publication would not
A
.. inhibit free discussion in the Cabinet and the court decides the issue·. In Minister
for Arts Heritage and Environment and Ors. v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd. and Ors.
(1987 J75 ALR 218, Federal Court of Australia - General Division, the respondent
had mining lease under the existing law. In I 986 the Cabinet decided that portion n
of the same land covered by KNP Kakadu National Park in the Northern Territory
(Stage 2) was earmarked for inclusion in the World Heritage List (tne List) which
had been established under the World Heritage Convention (the Convention) and
to submit to Parliament a plan of management for the national park which differed
from a previous plan .. which enabled exploration and mining to take place outside
c
- pre-existing leases with the approval of the Governor-General''. Under the
Convention on listing cuuld be made without the ··consent"' of the State party
concerned. The respondents laid the proceedings to restrain the appellants from
taking further steps to have Stage 2 nominated for inclusion on the list on the basis
that Cabinet was bound by the rules ofnatural justice to afford them an opportunity
to be heard and that it failed to de~- The Single Judge declared the action as void. D
Thereafter the National Park and Wildlife rnnservation Amendment Act, 1987
came into force adding sub-s. (lA) to s. 10 of that Act which provides that "No
operations for the recovery of minerals shall be carried on in Kakadu National
Park''. While allowing the appeal. the full court held that the Executive action was
not immune from judicial review merely because it was carried out in pursuance
of a power derived from the prerogative rather than a statutory source. The decision E
taken for the prerogative of the Cabinet is subject to judicial review: In Common-
wealthof Australia v. Northern Land Council and Anr. [1991] 103 ALR p.267, in
a suit for injunction for Northern Land Council (NLC) against the Commonwealth
,., sought production of certain documents including 126 Cabinet notebooks. A
Judge of the Federal Court ordered the Commonwealth to produce the notebooks
for confidential inspection on behalf of NLC. On appeal it was held that informa- F
tion which may either directly or indirectly enable the party requiring them either
to advance his own case or to damage the case of his advisory are necessary. The
class of Cabinet papers do not afford absolute protection against disclosure and is
not a basis for otherwise unqualified immunity from production. The Common-
wealth cannot claim any immunity for public interest immunity from production.
G
The court should decide at the threshold balancing of the public interest in the
administration of justice. The court does not have to be. satisfied that. as a matter
or likelihood rather than mere speculation. the materials would contain evidence
for tender at trial.
846 J l lJ9l J ~ S.C.R.
A In a uemocracy it is inherelllly diflicuh 10 function at high governmemal
level with1Jut some degree of se1.:recy. No Minister, n1Jr a Senior Oflicer \vnuld
effectively discharge his oflicial responsibilities if every d11cument prepared to
formulate sensitive policy decisions or to make assessml!lll of character rolls of co-
. ordinate llfficers at that level if they were to be made public. Generally asscssmem
of honesty and integrity is a high responsibility. At high co-ordinate level it would
8 be a delegate one which would further get compounded when it is not hacked up
with material. Seluom material will be available in sensitive areas. Reputation
gathered by an officer around him would form the base. If the reports are maue
k11own, or if the disclosure is routine, public interest griernusly woulu suffer. On
the other hand, confidentiality would augment honest assessment to impro,·e
efficiency and integrity in the officers.
c
......
'
The bu.siness of the Govt., when transacted by bureaucrats, even in personal
level, it would be difficult to have equanimity if the inner working of the Govt.
machinery is needlessly exposed to the public. On such sensitive issues it w1rnld
hamper the expression of frank and forthright views or opinions. Therefore, it may
D be that at that level the deliberations and in exceptional cases that class or category
of documents get protection,,in parricular, on policy matters. Therefore. the court
would be willing hJ respond to the executive public interest immunity to disclose
certain documents where national security or high policy, high sensitivity is
involved.
E In Asiatic Perrole11111 v. An3lo-Persia11Oil19 l~K.B. 822, the court refused
production or the letter concerning the Govt. plans relating to Middle Eastern
campaigns of the First World was. as claimed by the Board of Admiralty.
Similarly, in D1111ca11 v. Cammell Lain~l 942 A.C. 624, the House of Lords refused
disclosure of the design of sub-marine. The national defence as a class needs
protection in the interest ofsecurity of the State. Similarly to keep good diplomatic
-
F
relations the state documents or l)ftkial or confidential documents between the
Govt. and its agencies need immunity from production.
In Co1111cil of Civil Sen•ice Unio11 v. Min~~rerfor Civil Se1i'ici;; 1985 A.C.
374. the Govt. Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) functions were to ensure
<; the security of military and official corrununications and to provide the Go\'t. \Vi th ;
signals intelligence. They have to handle secret information vital to national
security. The staff of GCHQ was permitted to be members of the trade union, but
later on instructions were issued, with11ut prior consultation, amending the staff
rules and directed them to dissociate from the trade union activities. The previous
H pra~·tke of pri,1r consultation before amenument was not followed. Judicial review
.-·---
~- R.K . .li\IN 1·. llNION OF 1:\1 >IA (RAMASWAMY. J.I
X47
was sought of tile amended rules ple<H.ling that failure to consull the union before A
amendment amounts to unfair act and summoned the records relating to it. An
affida\'ic of the Cabin1·t Secretary was filed explaining the disruptive activities, the
national securicy ~and the union actions designed to damage Govt. agencies.
Explaining the risk of participation by the members in further disruption, the
House held that e"Xecutive action was not immune from judicial review merely
because it was carried out in pursuance of a power derived from a common law. B
or prerogative, 1·dther than a statutory source, and a minister acting under a
prerogative power might, depending upon its subject matter, whether under the
same duty to act fairly as in the case of action under a statutory power. But,
however, certain'information, on consideration of national security, was withheld
and the failure of prior consultation of the trade union or its members before issue
the amended instruction or amending the rules was held not infracted.
c
ln Burmah Oil Co's. case. at an action by the Oil Company against the Bank
for declaration that the sale of units in British Petroleum held by the company at
2.30 Pounds per unit was unconscionable and inequitable. The oil company sought
production of the cabinet decision and 62 documents in possession and control of D
the bank. The state claimed privilege on the basis of the certificate issued by the
Minister. House of Lords per majority directed to disclose certain documents
which were necessary to dispose of the case fairly. Lord Scarman laid .that they
were relevant, but their significance was not such as to override the public interest
objections to their production. Lords Wilberforce dissented and held that public
interest demands protection of them. E
In The Australian Co11111111nis1 Party & Ors. v. Commonwealth & Ors. [I 950-
51] 83 C .LR. p. l, at p.179, Dixon, J. while considering the claim of secrecy and
non-availability of the proclamation or declaration of the Governor General in
Council based on the advice tendered hy the Minister rejected the privilege and
F
held that the court would go into the question whether the satisfaction reached by
the Governor General in Council was justified. The court has gone into the
question of competence to dissolve a voluntary or corporate association i.e.
Communist Party as unlawful within the meaning of Sec. 5(2) of the Constitutional
Law of the Commonwealth. In The Queen v. Toohey [ 1982-83] 15 I C.L.R. 170,
the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act, l 978 provides appl1intment of an G
Administrator to exercise and perform the functions conferred under the Act. The
Town Planning Act, 1979 regulates the area of land to be treated as tl)Wns. The
Commissioner exercising powers under the' Act held that part of the peninsula
specified in the schedule was not available for town Planning Act. When it was
challenged. there was a change in the law and the Minister filed an affidavit H
848 Sl_!PREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A claiming the pri\'ilcge of certain documents stating that with a view to preserve the
land to the original, the Govt. ha\'c decided to treat that the land will continue to
be held by or on behalf of the originals. Gibbs, C.J. held that under modem
conditions, a responsible Govt., Parliament could not always be relied on to check
excesses of power by the Crown or its Ministers. The court could ensure that the
statutory power is exercised only for the purpose it is granted. The secrecy of the
8 counsel of the Crown is by no means complete and if evidence is available to show
that the Crown acted for an ulterior purpose, it is difficult to see why it should not
be acted upon. It was concluded thus: "In my opinion no convincing reason can be
suggested for limiting the ordinary power of the courts to inquire whether there has
. ---
been a proper exercise of a statutory power by giving to the Crown a special
immunity from review. If the statutory power is granted to the Crown for one
c purpose, it is clear that it is not lawfully exercised if it is used for another. The
courts ha\'e the power and duty to ensure that statutory powers are exercised only
in accordance with law".
The factors.to decide the "public interest immunity would include" (a) where
D the contents of the documents are relied upon, the interests affected by their
disclosure; (b) where the class of documents is invoked, where the public interest
immunity for the class is said to protect; (c) the extent to which th.e interests
referred to have become attenuated by the passage of time or the occurrence of
intervening events since.the matters contained in the documents themselves came
into existence; (d) the seriousness of the issues in relation to which production is
E sought; (e) the likelihood that production of the documents will affect the outcome
of the case; (f) the likelihood of injustice if the documents are not produced. In
President Nixon's case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it is the
court's duty to construe and delineate claims arising under express powers, to
interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers
of the Constitution. In deciding whether the matter has in any measure been
F
committed by the Constitution to another branch of goven-i""ment, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is the responsibility of the
court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Neither the doctrine of separation
of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high level communications, without
G more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances. The separation of powers given in the
Constitution were not intended to operate with absolute independence when
essential criminal statute would upset the constitutional balance of ··a workable
government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. Ill. The very
H - integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full
R.K. JAIN I'. llN!ON OI' l:-ID!A [RM\'IASWAMY. J.J
849
-
disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure A
that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory
process he available for the production of needed evidence.
The afore discussion lead to the following conclusions. The President while
exercising the Executive power under Art.73 read with Art. 53, discharges such of
those powers which arc exclusively conferred to his individual discretion like B
appointing the Prime Minister under Art. 75 which are not open to judicial review.
The President exercises his power with the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head under Art. 74 ( 1). They exercise the
power not as his delegates but as officers subordinate to him by constitutional
mechanism envisaged under Art. 77 and express in the name of President as per c
Rules of Business made under Art.77(3). They bear two different facets (i) the
President exercise his power on the aid and advice; (ii) the individual minister or
Council or Minister with the Prime Minister at the head discharge the functions
without reference to the President. Undoubtedly the Prime Minister is enjoined
under Art. 78 to communicate to the President all decisions of the Council of
Minister relating to the administration of the affairs of the Union and proposals for D
legislation and to furnish such information relating to the administration or
reconsideration by the Council of Ministers if the President so requires and submit
its decisions thereafter to the President. That by itself is not conclusive and does
not get blanket public interest immunity from disclosure. The Council of Ministers
though shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People, their acts are
subject to the Constitution; Rule of law and judicial review are parts of the scheme E
of the Constitution as basic structure and judicial review is entrusted to this Court
(High Court under Art.226). When public interest immunity against disclosure of
the state documents in the transaction of business by Council of Ministers of the
affairs of State is made, in the clash of those interests, it is the right and duty of the
court to weigh the balance in the scales that the harm shall not be done to the nation
- or the public service and equally oflhe administfation of justice. Each case must
be considered on it~ backdrop. The PresidenJ has no implied authority under the
Constitution to withhold the documents. On the other hand it is his solenm
constitutional duty to act in aid of the court to effectuate judicial review. The
F
.Cabinet as a narrow centre of the national affairs must be in a possession of all
relevant information which is secret or confidential. At the cost of repetition it is G
reiterated that information relating to national security, diplomatic relations,
internal security or sensitive diplomatic correspondence per se are class docu-
ments and that public interest demands total immunity from disclosure. Even the
slightest divulgence would endanger the lives of the personnel engaged in the
services etc. The maxim Salus Popules Cast Supreme Lax which means that regard H
850 Sl.1PREME COURT REPORTS (1993(3S.C.R. ~-
A for public we.lfare is the highest Jaw, is the basic postulate for this immunity.
Political decisions like declaration of emergency under An. 356 im:: n1Jt open to
judicial review but it is for the electorate at the polls to decidi.: thi.: executive
wisdom. In other' areas every communication which preceded from one officer of
the State to another or the officers inter se does not necessarily per-se relate. to the
affairs of the State. Whether they so relate has got to be determined by reference
n to the nature of the consideration, the level at which it was considered, the contents
of the document or c_lass to which it relates to and their indelihle impact on public
administration or public service and administration of justice itself. Article 74(2)
is not a total bar for production of the records. Only the actual advice tendered by
the Ministeror Council or Ministers to the President and the question whether any,
and if so. what advice was tendered by the Minister or Council of Ministers to the
c President. shall not be enquired into by the court. In other words the bar of judicial
review is confined to the factum of advice. its extent, ambit and scope but not the
record i.e. the material on which the advice is founded. In S.P. Gupta's case this
court held that only the actual advice tendered to the President is immuncd from
enquiry arid the immunity does not extend to other documents or records which
D form part of the advice tendered to the President.
there is discernible modern trends towards more open government than was
prevalent in the past. ln its judicial review the court would adopt in camera
procedure to inspect the record and evaluate the balancing act between the
competing public interest and administration of justice. It is equally the paramount
E consideration that justice should not only be done but also would be publicly
recognised as having been done. Under m1idern conditions of responsible go\'ern-
ment, Parliament should not always be relied on a5 a check on excess of power by
F
the Council of Ministers or Minister. Though the court would not substitute its
views to that of the executive on matters of policy, it is its undoubted power and
duty to see that the executive exercises its power only for the purpose for which
it is granted. Secrecy of the ad\'iCe or opinion is by no means conclusive. Candour.
-
frankness and confidentiality though arc integral facets of the conunon genus i.e.
efficient governmental fuctioning. per se by no means conclusive but be kept in
view in weighing the balancing act. Decided cases show that power often wa<;
exercised in excess thereof or for an ulterior purpose etc. Sometimes the public
G ser\'ice reasons will be decisive of the issue, but they should never prevent the
court from weighing them against the injury which would be suffered in the
administration of justice if the documents was not to be disclosed, and the like! y
injury to the cause of justice must also be assessed and weighed. Its weight will
very according to the nature of the proceedings in which disclosure is sought, level
H at which the matter was c1msidcred; the subject matter of consideration; the
_ R.K . .IAI\ 1·. t\10\ <ll· 1\DIA IRAMAS\\'i\MY . .I.I 851
rclc\·ancc Ill° the cl11cuments ancl the degree oflikelihood that the document will ;~e A
pf imp1irtance in the litigation. In striking the halarn.:e. the court may always. if it
thinks it necessary. itself inspect the clocuments. It is. therefore the constitutional.
legitimate and lawful power and duty of this court to ensure that powers,
constitutional, statutory or executive are exercised in accordance with the consti-
tutiun and the law. This may demand, though no doubt only in limited numherof
- cases. yet the inner workings of government may be expllsed to public gaze. The B
contcnth1ns of Atti>rncy <icneral and Solicitor General that the inner wmkings of
the gO\·ernmcnt wlluld he exposed to public gaze. and that some one who would
rcga;J this as an nccasion with1rnt sufficient material to ill-informed criticism is
nil hmger rclenmt. Criticism calculated to improve the nature of that \>;\)rking as
affecting the indi\'idual citizen is welcome.
c
In so far as unpublished go\'ernmcnt policy is concerned, it may be rele\'ant
- tu knuw the extent to which the policy remains unfulfilled, so that its success might
he prejudiced by disclosure Mt he considerations which led to it. ln that context the
time clement becomes relernnts, Details of affairs which are stale and no longer
M significance might be capable of disclosure without risk of damage to the public 1J
interest. But depending on the nature of the litigation and the apparent importance
tn it or the dw.;uments in question may in extreme case demand production even
llf the most sensitive c11mmunications at the highest level for in camera inspection.
Ead1 case must be considered on its backdrop. President has no implied authority
to withhold the document. On the other hand it is his solemn constitutilmal duty
to act in aid l)f the court to effectuate judicial review. The Cabinet as a narrow E
centre of the national affairs must be in possession of all relevant information
which is secret ur confidential. Decided cases on comparable jurisdiction referred
lll earlier did held th<it the executive has no blanket immunity to withhold cabinet
pmcccdings or decisions. We. therefore. hold that the communication decisions
1Jr policy to the President under Art. 74( I) gives only protection by An. 74(2) of
F
-
Judichtl review of the actual advice tendered to the President of India. The rest 1if
the file and all the records funning part thereof are open to in camera inspection
by this court. Each case must he considered on its llwn facts and surrounding
scenario and decision taken thereon.
In .f)·oti Prakash Mitter,._ Chief.I 11.l'lire Calcutta High Court [ 1965] 2 SCR G
53. the question was whether the President exercised the powers under Art. 217<3)
or the Constitutilm was his discretionary one or acts with the aid and ad\'ice of
Council or Ministers. The Constitution Bench held that the dispute as he decided
by the Presitknt. The satisfaction on the correctness of the age is that of the
President. Thcrcli.>re. !he matter has to be placed before the President. The . H
852 Sl'l'Rl.'.\ff COliRT REPORTS {1993] 1 S.C.R.
A President has to give an oppnrlunily to the Judge lo place his version. hcfon: the
Piesidelll considers and decides the age or the Judge. Accordingly il wou Id he lhe
personal satisfaclilln or the President am! not that llr the Counci I or Ministers. In
the latter judgment sequential ll> this judgment in Union cf India v . .fyo1i Prakash
1197I13 SCR 483], it was held that the mere fact that the President was assisted
hy the machinery or I 101111: Affairs Ministry in serving notices llr receiving
B communications addressed tll lhe learned Judge cannut lead to an inference that
he was guided h_Y the Ministry in arriving al his decisilln. Tht.}nrcler thllugh was
suhject to judicial review. this C1)Urt upheld the decisinn ur the President. In this
c1111lext it was held that the orders or the President, even thuugh made l1nal can he
-
set aside hy the Cnurt in an apprnpriate case though the Court will nut sit in appeal
nver order ancl will nnt suhstitutc its nwn 1>1)ini1rn to that or the President h.v
c weighing the evidence placed before the President.
The third categury of case. namely the dedsiL'n taken at the level l)f the
Ministery nr hy the auth1>ris(•d Secretary at the Secretarial level though expressed
...
in the name or the President is lll't immunecl rrnm judicial scrutiny and arc to he
D pnidm:cd and inspected hy lhc ci>urt. Ir puhlic interest immunity under Art. 74(2)
11r Sec. 123 of I :vidence Act is claimed. the cuurt would tirst consider il in camera
and decide the issue as indicated atiove. The immun~y must 11\1~ be claimed nn
aclministrative niutc and it must he fur valid. rell'vant and strnng grounds or
reasons stated in the affidavit filecl in that behalf. Having perused the me and given
uur anxious considcratinns. we arc 1)f the view that 11n the facts of the case and in
E the light l)f the view we have taken. it is nut necessary l\l disclnsc the C\llltems of
the records to the petitioner or his counsel.
The first schedule 11f the business rules provide constitution llf Cahinet
Standing rnmmittces with the function specified therein. Item 2 is ··cahinct
Committee on appnintmcnts ... which is empowered Ill consider in item I all
recommendations and to take decisiuns on appointments specified in the Annexurc
to the First Schedule. Therein underthc residuary heading 'all other appointments"
itcm 4 prnvicles that all nther appuintments wl1ich are made by the (ill\"l. of India
11r whkh required the appruval nf the (iuvt. pf India carrying a salary cxl"luding
all1 iwances or a maxi mum salary cxclucling allowances. llf rhJt less than Rs.5,3t l( l
<_; require the apJml\·;il of tire Cabinet Sutt-Committee. As per item 37 nr the Third
Schedule reacl with Ruic x.,Jf the husincss Rules it shall he submitted h> the Prime
Minister ror appointment.
Mr. I larish <'hander was app11intcd as .Judicial l'vlcmher1m Oct_oher 2'J. 1982.
H I k \\'as. later 1111. app1 1 int~d 1m January I:'. I '>'JI as Seniur Vice President ,,f
l R.K. JAIN 1·. UNI01''0I' l\"1 >I.\ IRAllL\SWA\IY . .I.I
-
853
<'EGAT. Arter the uirections were issued hy this Cllurt, he was appointed as the A
!'resident. Mr. Jain assailed the ''alidity llf his appointment on diverse grounds. It
was pleaued and Sri Thakur, his learned seninr rnunscl, argued that as per the
c1Hl\-cnUon, a sitting or a retired judge or the I ligh C1)urt should have heen
appointed as President of the CEGAT in consultation with the Chief Justice of
India and Barish Chander lrns hcen appoinleu in uisrcgaru oflhe express direction~
or this Court. It was, therefore, C(Jnlended that it was in hreach of the judicial order n
passed hy this Court under Art.32. Secondly it was contended that hefore the Act
was made. a posili\'C rnmmitment was made lime and again by the Govt. on the
lluur tJf the! louse that juuidal indepemlence of CEGAT is sine q11a 11011 to sustain
the nmfiucnce u( the litigant puhlic. The appllintment of any person nther than
silting or a retired judge llf the High Cnurt as President would be in its hreach. ln
its supp1irt it was dteu lhe instance 11f l\'1r. Kalyansunuaram as being the senillr c
must memher. his claim should ha\'e heen rnnsiclered hefore Harish Chander was
appninted. Sri Thakur further argued that when recommendations of Harish
<'hander fl1r appointment as a Judge of the Delhi HighCnurt was turned down by
the ( 'hicf Justice of India d.lluhting his integrity, the appointment of such person
nf d1rnhtful integrity as President \V1rnld ernde the independence of the judiciary D
and undermine the cnnlldcnce uf the litigant puhlic in the efficacy of judicial
adjudication. cvcn thnugh the rules may permit such an appuintment. The rules arc
11/rra 1·ires of the hash: structure, namely, independence uf the judiciary. Sri
Thakur, to elahnrale these conditions. sought permission to peruse the reCt)rd.
Sri Venugopal. the learned Senior Counsel for Harish Chander argued that E
his client being the senior Vice President was validly appointed as President oflhe
CEGET. Harish Chander has an excellent and impeccable record of service
without any adverse remarks. His recommendation for appllintment as a judge uf
the Delhi I ligh C\1un, was "apparently drupped" which would not be construed to
he ad\'erse tu Harish Chanderc On behalf 1)f Central Govt. ii was admitted in the
ct1umer affidavit that since rules dl1 11l1t envisage.._ consultation with the Chief F
Justice,. c1rnsultatio11 was nut dune. lt was argued that the Govt. have prerogative
(
tn appuint any member. 1J1·· Vice Chairman or Senior Vice President as President
nf CEGA T. Harish Chander heing the senior Vice-President, his case was
cll!lsidcred and was rcrnru1111.·.ndctl.hy llw Cabinet suh Commiltee for appoint-
ment. Accordingly he \Vas appointed.
G
Under section 129 uf the Customs Act 52 of 1962 for short 'the Act'. the
Central G11\'l. shall constitute the CECiAT consisting of as many judicial and
technical memhers as it thinks lit to exercise the powers and discharge the
functitm~ L'l111ferrcd hy lllL' Act. Subjet.'t t11 making the statement llf the case fllr 11
854 St'PRE~IE COl_'RT REPORTS 11'1'1~( 3 S.C.R. J
A dedsion on any question 11r law arising out of 1mlcrs ill' the Cl:( iAT hy the High
Court under secthin 130: t11 resol\'e conllicl of uecisions hy this Court unckr
section I 30A. the 11rdcrs or t11c <'EGAT. by opcratil1n of sub-secthm (4) of Section
I 29B ... shall he linar·. Tile PrcsidentofCEGAT is the c1mtrolling auth1)rity as well
as Presiding authority llf the tribunals constituted at different places. Constitution
of the CEGA T came to be made pursuant lo the 5th Schedule of the Finance Act
B 2 of 1980 with effect rmm Octl ihcr 11. 1982. The President of India exercising the
power under prn\'is11 H' Ari. 309 of the Constituli1m made the Rules~ Ruic 2fc)
defined .. member.. means a member of the Tribunal and unless the context
otherwise requires. includes the President, the Seni11r Vice President. a Vice
President. a judidal memher and a technical mcmbt:r: 2f d) ddint:s .. President ..
means the President of the Trihunal. Ruh.: 6 prescribes Mcthlld 11f Recruitment.
c I Jnder Sub-rule (I) thereof for the purp11se of reauitment to the p11st of member.
there shall be a Selectinn Cnmmiuee consisting of - (i) a judge nf the Supreme
Court of India as nominated by the Chief Justice uf India to preside over as
Chairman; (ii) the Secretary to the G1J\'t. of India in the Ministry 11f finance ....
<Department ofRe\'enue); (iii) the Secretary t11 the Go\'t. of India in the Ministry
D of Law (Department nf Legal Affairs): (iv) the President: (v) such 11ther persons.
not exceeding two. as the Central Govt. may nominate.
Sub-Ruic (4) - Subject Ill the pro\'isions of Section IO, the Central Govt.
shall, after taking into considerarion the recommendatim1s of the Selection
Committee, make a list of pers1rns selected for appointment as memhl.!rs. Ruic I 0
E provides thus : (I) The Cemra/ Gm·/. shall appoim one cf tile members to be the
Pres idem.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule (1, a sitting or retired judge
of a High Cnurt may also he appointed hy the Central Go\'ernment as a memhcr
and President simultaneously.
F
(3) Where a memher (other than a sitting or retired judge of a High C11urt)
is appointed as President, he shall hold the office l)f the President for a perind of
three years or till he attains the age of 62 years, whichever is earlier.
G (4) Where a ser\'ing judge of a 1ligh Cl1urt is appointl.!d as a member and
President. he shall hold office as President for a period 11f three yl.!ars from the date
,>f his appointment or till he attains thl.! age of 62 years. whichever is earlier.
a
Prcwi(1ed that where a retired judge of I ligh Court above the age of 62 years
H is appointed as President. he shall h11ld office for such period not exceeding three
R.K. JAi'\; r. 1.'.\"fO:\ 01' l:\llf..\ !RAMASWAMY . .I.I 855
years as may he determined by the Central Govt. At _the time of appointment or re- A
/ appointment. The Jha Commiuee in its report in para 16(22) recommended to
constitute an independent Tribunal for excise or customs taking away the appellate
powers from the Board. The Administrative Inquiry Committee in its report 1958-
59 in para 4.15 also recommended that every effort should be made to enhance the
prestige of the appellate tribunal in the eyes of the public which could be achieved
by the appointment of a High Court Judge as the President. They, therefore, B
--- recommended to appoint the serving or retired High Court Judge as President of
the Tribunal for a fixed tenure. In Union of India v. Pares laminates Pvt. Ltd.
[1990)49 ELT 322 (Supreme Court), this Court held thatGEGATis a judicial body
0
and functions as court within the limits of its jurisdiction. As a fact the Minister
time and again during the debates when the Bill was under discussion assured both
...... the Houses of Parliament that the CEGAT would be a judicial body presided over
c
by a High Court Judge. In Kesltwanand Bharti v. Union ofIndia [1973) Supp. SCR
I, Mathew and Chandrachud, JJ. held that rule of law and judicial review are basic
features of the Constitution. It was reiterated in Waman Rao v. Union of India
[ 1980) 3 SCC 587, As per directions therein the Constitution Bench reiterated in
Sri Ragltunat/Jrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India [1993) I SCALE 363. In Krishna D
Swami v. Union ofIndia [1992) 4 SCC 605 at 649 para 66 one ofus (K.R.S.,J .) held
that judicial review is the touchstone and repository of the supreme law of the land.
Rule oflaw as basic feature permeates .the entire constitutional structure Indepen-
dence of Judiciary is sine quo non for the efficacy of the rule of law. This court is
the final arbiter of the interpretation of the constitution and the law.
E
In S.P. Sampat Kumarv. Union o,fIndia & Ors. [1987) l SCR435. this Court
held that the primary duty of the judiciary is to interpret the Constitution and the
laws and· this would preeminently be a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, as
judiciary alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly the
constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory,
}<'
if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own action. The
Constitution ha5, therefore created an independent machinery i.e. judiciary to
resolve the disputes which is vested with the powerof judicialreview to determine
the legality of the legislative and executive actions and to ensure compliance with
the requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This
func;lion is discharged by tl}e juqiciary by exercising the power of judicial review G
which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for maintenance of the
rule of law. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional
system and without it, there will be no government of laws and the rule of law
- would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. The judicial review,
therefore. is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993J 3 S.C.R.
A abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. The basic and
essential feature ofjudicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within
the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution and to provide alternative
institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review. provided it is no less
efficacious than the High Court. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in the
constitutional scheme that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court
B under Arts. 226 and 227 permissible under it, must not leave a void but it must set
up another effective institutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of
judicial review in it which must be equally effective apd efficacious in exercising
the power of judicial review. The Tribunal set up under the Administrative
-
Tribunal Act, 1985 was required to interpret and apply Arts. 14, 15, 16 and 311 in
quite an large number of cases. Therefore, the personnel manning the administra-
c tive tribunal in their determinations not only require judicial approach but.also
knowledge and expertise in that particular branch of constitutional and adminis-
trative law. The eflicacy of the administrative tribunal and the legal input would
undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input and not giving it
sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the
D Administrative Tribunal. Therefore. it was held that the appropriate rule should be
made tu recruit the members; and consult the Chief Justice of India in recommend- . /
ing appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Tribunal
and to constitute a committee presided over by judge of the Supreme Court to
recruit the members for appointment. In M.B. Majwndar v. Union of India [ l 990]
3 SCR 946, when the members of CAT claimed parity of pay and superannuation
E as is available lo the Judges of the High Court. this court held that they are not on
par with the judges but a separate mechanism created for their appointment
pursuant to Art. 323-A of the Constitution. Therefore, what wa'i meant by this court
in Sampath Kum!lf·s ration is that the Tribunals when exercise the power and
function, the Act created institutional alternative mechanism or authority to
adjudicate the service disputations. It must be effective and efficacious to exercise
1< the power of judicial review. This court did not appear to have meant that the
Tribunals are substitutes of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the
Constitution. J.B. dwpra v. Union ofIndia [1987] l SCC 422. merely followed the
ratio of Sampath Kumar.
G The Tribunals set up under Arts. 323A and 3238 of the Constitution or under
an Act of legislature are creatures of the Statute and in no case can claim the status
as Judges of the High Court or parity or as substitutes. However, the personnel
-
appointed to hold those offices under the State are called upon to discharge judicial
H or quasi-judicial powers. So they must have judicial approach and also knowledge
.._ R.K . .IA!."' 1·. I INION OF INDIA !RAMASWAMY . .I.)
and expertise in thal particular branch of constitutional, administrative and tax
857
A
laws. The legal input would undcniabl y be more important and sacrificing the legal
input and not giving it sufficient weightage and teeth would definitely impair the
efficacy and effectiveness of the judicial adjudication. It is, therefore, necessary
that those who adjudicate upon these matters should have legal expertise, judicial
experience and modicum of legal training as on many an occasion different and
complex questions oflaw which baffle the minds of even trained judges in the High B
Court and Supreme Court would arise for discussion and decision.
In Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr. [I 978] I SCR 423
at 442, this court at p. 463 laid emphasis that, "independence of the judiciary is a
fighting faith of our Constitution. Fearless justice is the cardinal creed of our C
founding document. It is indeed a part of our ancient tradition which has produced
great judges in the past. In England too, judicial independence is prized as a basic
value and so natural and inevitable it has come to be regarded and so ingrained it
has become in the life and thought of the people that it would be regarded an act
of insanity for any one to think otherwise.'' At page 47 I it was further held that if
the beacon of the judiciary is to remain bright, court must be above reproach, free D
from coercion and from political influence. At page 491 it was held that the
independence of the judiciary is itself a necessitous desiderat11111 of public interest
and so interference with it is impermissible except where other considerations of
public interest are so strong, and so exercised as not to militate seriously against
the free flow of public justice. Such a balanced blend is the happy solution of a
delicate, complex, subtle, yet challenging issue which bears on human rights and E
human justice. The nature of the judicial process is such that under coercive winds
the flame of justice flickers, faints and fades. The true judge is one who should be
beyond purchase by threat or temptation, popularity or prospects. To float with the
tide is easy. to counter the counterfeit current is uneasy and yet the Judge must be
ready for it. By ordinary obligation for written reasoning, by the moral fibre of hi~
peers and elevating tradition of his profession, the judge develops a stream of
tendency to function 'without fear or favour, affection or ill-will', taking care, of
course, to outgrow his prejudices and weaknesses, to read the eternal verities and
enduring values and to project and promote the economic, political and social
philosophy of the Constitution to uphold which his oath enjoins him. In
Krislmaswami's case in para67 at p. 650, it was observed that "to keep the stream G
of justice clean and pure the judge must be endowed with sterling character,
impeccable integrity and upright behaviour. Erosion thereof would undermine the
efficacy of rule of law and the working of the constitution itself.
In Krishna Sahai & Ors. v. Stateof U.P. & Ors. [1990] 2 SCC 673, this court H
858 St'PRE~1E COl 'RT REPORTS 1199~13 S.C.R.
A emphasised its need in constituting the U.P. Service Tribunal that... it would he
appropriate for the State of I.1ttar Pradesh to change it manning and a suflicient
number of people qualified in law should be on the Tribunal to ensurl! adequate
dispensation of justice and to maintain judicial temper in the functioning of the
Tri~unal''. In Rajendra Singh Yadav & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ 19901 2 SCC
7<'3, it was further reiterated that the Services Tribunal mostly consist of Admin- .
n istrati\"C Officers and the judicial element in the manning part of the Tribunal is
very small. The disputes require juuicial handling and the adjudication being
essentially judicial in character it is necessary that adequate numbcrofjudges of
the appropriate level should man the Ser\"ices Tribunals. This would create
appropriate temper and generate the atmosphere suitable in an adjudicatory
Tribunals and the institution as well would command the requisite confidence of
c the di~putants. In S/Jri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India & Ors. 11992.1 2
SCC 428. this court emphasised that, "Needless to say that the independence.
efficiency and integrity of the judiciary can only he maintained by sclec.ting thi::
best persons in accordance with the procedure provided under the Constitution.
The objectives enshrined in the constitution cannot be achieved unless the
D functionaries accountable for making appl)intments act with meticulous care and
utmost responsibility".
In a democracy governed by rule oflaw surely the only acceptable repository
of absolute discretion should he the couns. Judicial is the basic and essential
feature of the Indian constitutional scheme entrusted to the judiciary. It cannot be
E dispensed with by creating tribunal under An.323Aand323B of the Constitution.
Any institutional mechanism or authority in negation of judicial review is
destructive of basic structure. So long as the alternative institutional mechanism
or authority set up by an Act is not less effective than the High court, it is consistent
\Vith constitutional scheme. The faith of the people is the bed-rock on which the
edifice of judicial review and efl1cacy of the adjudication are founded. The
F
alternative arrangement must, therefore, be effective and efficient. For inspiring
confidence and trust in the litigant public they must have an assurance that the
person deciding their causes is totally and completely free from the intluence or
pressure from the Govt. To maintain independence and imperativity it is necessary
that the personnel should have at least modicum of legal training. learning and
G experience. Selection of competent and proper people instill people's faith and
trust in the office and help to build up reputation and acceptability. Judicial
independence which is essential and imperative is secured and independent and
impartial administration of justice is assured. Absence thereof only may get both
law and procedure wronged and wrong headed views of the facts and may likely
H to give rise to nursing grievance of injustil:c. Therefore. functional fitness,
;~ ~< J,\I'.\ '"I \10\ Ol l'llL\ IR.-\\1.-\S\\'A\IY ..I.I_
859
experience at thl! Bar and aptiludinal ~1pproach lift! lundamcntal for eflicient A
judicial adjuJil:ati1111. Tht!n 1mly as a repL1silory of thl! c1mfidence. as its duty. the
tribunal w1ll1ld properly and eflicil!ntly interpret the law and apply the law to the .
given set of facts. Absence thereof would be repugnant or derogatory to the
constitution.
The daily practice in the courts not only gives training to Advocates to H
iiMITT!'<'t the rules hut alsn ad11pt the conventions of courts. In built experience
wnuld play vital n1le in the administration of justice arid strengthen and develop
the qualities, or intellect and character, f1)rbearance and patience, temper and
resilience which life very important in the practicl! of law. Practising Advocates
from the Bar generally do endow with those qualities to discharge judicial C
functions. Spedalised nature of work gives them added advantage and gives
benefit to broaden the perspectives. "Juclges" by David Pannick ( 1987 Edition),
at page 50. stated that...we would not allow a man to perform a surgical operation
without a thomugh training and certitication of fitness. Why not require as much
of a trial judge who daily operates on the lives and fortunes of others". This could
b-.:o sccureu with the initial training given at the Bar and later experience in judicial D
adjudication. Nn-one should expect expertise in such a vast range of subjects. but
familiarity with the basic terminology and concept coupled with knowledge of
trends is essential. A premature approach would hinder the effective performance
of judicial functions. Law is a serious matter to be left exclusivt!ly to the judges.
because judges necessarily have an important role tu play in making and applying
the law There is every reason fi:>r ensuring that their selection, training and E
workir..'! practice facilitate them to render their ability to decide the cases wisely
on behalf of the community. If judges acts in injudicious manner. it would often
lead ~v miscarriage of justice and a brooding sense of injustice rankles in an
agr,~1eved person.
• F
The CEGA Tis a creature of the statute. yet intendco to have all the !lavour
ofjudktial dispensation hy independent members and President. Sri Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud. Chief Justice of India. in his letter dated October 5. 1982 stated that
"Govt. had Created a healthy convention of providing that the Tribunals will be
headed by a President who will be a silting or a retired judge of the High Court.
Added to that is the fact that selection of the members of the Tribunal is made by G
a Committee headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court... I am sure that the Tribunal
will acquire higher reputation in the matter of its decision and that the litigants
would look upon it as an independent forum to which they can turn in trust and
confidence". This coun to chmgatc the above objective directed the Govt. to show
whl.!ther the convention is heing followed in appointment of the President of H
860 Sl.'PRBIE cot:1rr REPORTS I 1993] 1 S.C.R. j
A CEGAT and further directed to consider appointment of a. Sr. Judge or a retired
Chid.lustil:e llf thc l ligh <'ourt as its !'resident. Admittedly. Chief Justice of India
was not consulted before appointing Sri Barish Chander as President. Several
affidavits tiled on behalf of the Govt. do not also hear out whether the directions
issued hy this court were eYen brought to the notice of the Hon 'ble Prime Minister
before finalising the appointment or Sri Barish Cham1er. The solemn assurance
B given to the Parliament that the Tribunal bears a judicious hlcnd hy appointrnent
01· a High Court Judge as President was given a go-bye. While making statutllry
rules the executive appears to ha\'e made the appoilllment of a sitting or retired
High CourtJudge as President unattractive arid directory frustrating the legislative
animation. A sitting Judge when is entitled to continut; in his office upto 62 years
would he be willing to llpt to serve as President, if his superannuation as President
c is conterminous with 62 years. He would he attracted only if he is given extended
three years more tenure after his superannuation. But Rule I 0(3) says that the total
period of the tenure of the President by a sitting orretired judge is .. a period of three
years or ti II he attains the age of 62 years, whichever is earl id', i.e. coterminus with
superannuation as a Judge uf the High Court. The proviso is only discretionary at
D the whim of the executive depleting independence and as an exception to the rul_e.
Thereby practically the spirit of the Act, the solemn assurance given by the Govt.
to the Parliament kindling hupe in the litigant public to have a sitting or a retired
judge appointed as President has been frustrated deflecting the appointment of a
judicially trained judge to exercise judicial review. We are constrained lo observe
that the rules, though statutory, were so made as to defeat the object of the Act. The
E question then is: can and if yes, whether this court would interfere with the
appointment made of Harish Chander as President following the existing rules.
Judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed of
qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to
he made or the procedure adopted whether fair, just and reasonable. Exercise of
F
judicial review is to protect the citizen from the abuse of the power etc. by an
appropriate Govt. or department etc. In our considered view granitic the compli-
ance of the above power or appointment was conferred on the executive and
confided to be exercised wisely. When a candidate was found qualified and
eligible and was accordingly appointed by the executive to hold an office ~s a
G Memberor Vice-President or President of a Tribunal. we cannot sit over the choice
of the selection, but it be left to the executive to select the personnel as per law or
procedure in this behalf. In Sri Kumar .l'rtt\<11/\ casl' K.N. Srivastava, M.J.S.,
Legal Remembrance. Secretary to Law and Justice. Ciovt. of Mozoram did not
possess the requisite qualifications for appointment as a Judge of the High Court
prescribed under Art. 217 or the Constitution, namely, that he was not a District
H Judge for 10 years in State Higher Judicial Service. which is a mandatory
R.K. JAIN v. UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY . .I.]
861
requirement for a valid appointment. Therefore, this Court declared that he was not A
qualified to be appointed as aJ udge of the High Court and quashed his appointment
according! y. The facts therein are clearly glaring and so the ratio is distinguishable.
Sri Harish Chander, admittedly was the Sr. Vice President at the relevant
time. The contention of Sri Thakur of the need to evaluate the comparative merits
uf Mr. Harish Chander and Mr. Kalyansundaram a senior most Member for
appointment as President would not be gone into in a public interest litigation.
Only in a proceedings initiated by an aggrieved person it may be open to be
considered. This writ petition is also not a writ of quo-warranto. In service
jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved person i.e. non-appointee
to assail the legality of the offending action. Third party has no locus stand ii to c
canvass the legalityorcorrectnessoftheaction. Only public law declaration would
be made at the behest of the petitioner. a public spirited person.
But this conclusion does not give quietus at the journey's end. There are
persistent allegations against mal-functioning of the CEGA T and against Harish
Chander himself. Though we exercised self-restraint to assume the role of an D
Investigator to charter out the ills surfaced, suffice to say that the union Govt.
cannot turn a blind eye to the persistent public demands and we direct to swing into
action, an indepth enquiry made expeditiously by an officer or team of officers to
control the mal-functioning of the institution. It is expedient that the Govt. should
immediately take action in the matter and have fresh look. It is also expedient to
have a sitting or retired senior Judge or retired Chief Justice of a High Court to be E
the President. The rules need amendment immediately. A report on tbe actions
taken in this behalf be submitted to this court.
Before parting with the case it is necessary to express our anguish over the
ineffectivity of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial reviews. The F
Judicial review and remedy are fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensa-
tion of justice by the tribunals is much to be desired. We are not doubting the ability
of the members or Vice-Chairmen (non-Judges) who may be experts in their
regular service. But judicial adjudication is a special process and would efficiently
be administered by advocate Judges. The remedy of appeal by special leave under
Art. 136 to this Court also proves to be costly and prohibitive and far-flung distance G
too is working as constant constraint to litigant public who could ill afford to reach
this court. An appeal to a Bench of two Judges of the respective High Courts over
the orders of the tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction on questions of law
would as usage a growing feeling ofinjustice of those who can ill effort to approach
the Supreme Court. Equally the need for recruitment of members of the Bar to man H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.
A the Tribunals as well as the working system by the tribunals need fresh look and
regular monitoring is necessary. An expert body like the Law Commission of
India would make an in depth study in this behalf including the desirability to bring
CEGAT under the control of Law and Justice Department in line with Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal and to make appropriate urgent recotrim.endations to the Govt.
oflndia who shq__uld take remedial steps by an appropriate legislation to overcome
B the handicaps and difficulties and make the tribunals effective and efficient
instruments for making Judicial review efficacious, inexpensive and satisfactory.
The writ petitions are disposed of with the above direction, but in the
circumstances with no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Petitions disposed of.
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