Holding

The Madras High Court's Rules 14A‑14D, which allow the High Court to debar advocates for professional misconduct, are ultra vires of Section 34 of the Advocates Act and cannot be upheld.

Summary

The petition filed by advocate R. Muthukrishnan challenged the validity of the Madras High Court's amended Rules 14A‑14D, which purported to empower the High Court to debar advocates for various forms of professional misconduct. The core issue was whether Section 34 of the Advocates Act, 1961 authorises a High Court to frame disciplinary rules that effectively suspend or revoke an advocate's licence, a power traditionally vested in the Bar Councils. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the Advocates Act, the constitutional guarantees of equality and freedom of profession, and the distinct jurisdictions of courts (under the Contempt of Courts Act) and Bar Councils (under Sections 35, 36, etc.). It held that Section 34 only allows the High Court to prescribe conditions for practising before it, not to impose disciplinary sanctions, and that the impugned rules usurped the exclusive disciplinary authority of the Bar Councils, thereby violating Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). Consequently, the Court struck down Rules 14A‑14D as ultra vires and allowed the writ petition.

Issues considered

Whether Section 34 of the Advocates Act empowers a High Court to frame rules that debar an advocate for professional misconduct.
Whether the amended Rules 14A‑14D of the Madras High Court are ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Whether a court can impose suspension of an advocate's licence as part of contempt of court punishment.
Whether the disciplinary jurisdiction over advocates is exclusively vested in the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 30, s. 34, s. 35, s. 36, s. 36A, s. 36B, s. 37, s. 38, s. 42, s. 49(1)(c)
Constitution of Indias. Article 129, s. Article 14, s. Article 142, s. Article 145, s. Article 19(1)(g)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Subjects

independent bardisciplinary jurisdictionAdvocates Actcontempt of courtdebarmenthigh court rulesjudicial independenceprofessional misconduct

Judgment

[2019] 1 S.C.R. 589 589

R. MUTHUKRISHNAN A
v.
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
(Writ Petition (C) No. 612 of 2016) B
JANUARY 28, 2019
[ARUN MISHRA AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970:
C
rr. 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D (as inserted by amendment in
2016) – Empowerment of High Court to debar an advocate from
practicing – Validity of – Held: High Court Rules have been framed
in exercise of powers conferred u/s. 34 of Advocates Act – Section
34 does not confer power to frame rules to debar a lawyer for
professional misconduct – It is apparent from the provisions and D
the scheme of the Advocates Act that the Act never intended to confer
disciplinary powers upon the High Court or Supreme Court except
to the extent dealing with an appeal u/s. 38 of Advocates Act – It is
the Bar Councils of States and Bar Council of India which have the
power to discipline the lawyers and maintain nobility of the
profession under Advocates Act – The High Court has the power to E
debar the advocate under the Contempt of Courts Act – Even when
the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council is not as effective as
it should be, the very purpose of disciplinary control by Bar Council
cannot be permitted to be frustrated – Such failure on the part of
Bar Council can be supervised by the Court – Therefore, the F
impugned rules could not have been framed u/s. 34 of Advocates
Act – The impugned rules clearly impinge upon the independence
of the Bar – Exercise of disciplinary control by the High Court, by
inserting the impugned rules would amount to usurpation of the
power of Bar Council conferred under Advocates Act – Advocates
Act, 1961 – s.34 – Constitution of India – Arts. 14 and 19. G

Allowing the petition, the Court
HELD: 1. The Advocates Act, 1961 has been enacted to
amend and consolidate the law relating to the legal practitioners
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590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A and to provide for the constitution of the Bar Council and an All
India Bar. The independence of the Bar and autonomy of the Bar
Council has been ensured statutorily in order to preserve the
very democracy itself and to ensure that judiciary remains strong.
There cannot be existence of a strong judicial system without an
independent Bar. [Paras 13, 14] [604-C, D, E]
B
2. It is basically the lawyers who bring the cause to the
Court, are supposed to protect the rights of individuals of equality
and freedom as constitutionally envisaged and to ensure that the
country is governed by the rule of law. Considering the
significance of the Bar in maintaining the rule of law, right to be
C treated equally and enforcement of various other fundamental
rights, and to ensure that various institutions work within their
parameters, its independence becomes imperative and cannot
be compromised. [Para 16][604-G-H; 605-A]
3. The Bar is an integral part of the judicial administration.
D In order to ensure that judiciary remains an effective tool, it is
absolutely necessary that Bar and Bench maintain dignity and
decorum of each other. The mutual reverence is absolutely
necessary. It is the joint responsibility of the Bar and the Bench
to ensure that equal justice is imparted to all. Independent Bar
E and independent Bench form the backbone of the democracy.
Equal and even-handed justice is the hallmark of the judicial
system. The protection of the basic structure of the Constitution
and of rights is possible by the firmness of Bar and Bench and by
proper discharge of their duties and responsibilities. [Paras 18,
19 and 21][605-D-F, H; 606-B]
F
4. For a value-driven framework, it is necessary that
perspective is corrected in an ethical and morally sound
perspective. The perception of ambulance chasers, money
guzzlers and black sheep should not be presumptive. Such public
perception about the lawyers undermines the credibility of the
G legal profession, all the evils from the system have to be totally
weeded out. [Para 27][607-E-F]
5. The legislature has reposed faith in the autonomy of the
Bar while enacting Advocates Act and it provides for autonomous
Bar Councils at the State and Central level. The ethical standard
H of the legal profession and legal education has been assigned to
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the Bar Council. It has to maintain the dignity of the legal A
profession and independence of Bar. The disciplinary control
has been assigned to the Disciplinary Committees of the Bar
Councils of various States and Bar Council of India and an appeal
lies to this Court under section 38 of the Act. The Bar Association
must be self-governing is globally recognised. [Paras 31, 32][608-
B
E-G]
6. A bar association is generally deemed to be independent
when it is mostly free from external influence and can withstand
pressure from external sources on matters such as the regulation
of the profession, disbarment proceedings and the right of lawyers
to join the association. Judicial independence ensures that C
lawyers are able to carry out their duties in a free and secure
environment and an independent judiciary also acts as a check
on the independence of lawyers and vice versa. [Para 36][616-
B-C]
7. The Bar Council has the power to discipline lawyers and D
maintain nobility of profession and that power imposes great
responsibility. The Court has the power of contempt and that
lethal power too accompanies with greater responsibility.
Contempt is a weapon like Brahmasatra to be used sparingly to
remain effective. At the same time, a Judge has to guard the E
dignity of the Court and take action in contempt and in case of
necessity to impose appropriate exemplary punishment too. A
lawyer is supposed to be governed by professional ethics,
professional etiquette and professional ethos which are a habitual
mode of conduct. He has to perform himself with elegance,
dignity, and decency. He has to bear himself at all times and F
observe himself in a manner befitting as an officer of the Court.
He is a privileged member of the community and a gentleman.
He has to be honest, courageous, eloquent, industrious, witty
and judgmental. [Para 40][618-G-H; 619-A-B]
8. It is apparent from the provisions and scheme of the G
Advocates Act that the Act has never intended to confer the
disciplinary powers upon the High Court or upon this Court
except to the extent dealing with an appeal under Section 38 of
Advocates Act. Section 34 of Advocates Act clearly enables the
High Courts to prescribe conditions to practice. There can be H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A certain conditions on right to practice and appear in a case which
can be imposed by the High Court under Section 34 such as filing
fresh vakalatnama, superseding the previous one that has to be
done as per the High Court Rules, if any such provision has been
made by the High Court. Section 34 contained in chapter IV of
the Act intends to regulate the practice of the advocate in the
B
High Court and subordinate courts. It does not empower it to
frame the rules for disciplinary control. Within the purview of
section 34 of the Act, a dress can also be prescribed for an
appearance in the Court. The High Court is free to frame the
rules for designation of the Senior Advocates and also the rules
C on similar pattern as framed by this Court for Advocates on
Record. [Paras 44, 45 and 51][627-G; 622-F-H; 623-A-B]
9. There is no room for taking out the procession in the
Court premises, slogan raising in the Courts, use of
loudspeakers, use of intemperate language with the Judges or
D to create any kind of disturbance in the peaceful, respectful and
dignified functioning of the Court. The instances of abject
misbehavior of the advocates in the premises of the High Court
of Madras resulting into requisitioning of CISF to maintain safety
and majesty of the Court and rule of law. The acts complained of
are not only contemptuous but also tantamount to gross
E professional misconduct. In case such state of affairs continue
and Bar Councils fail to discharge duties the Court shall have to
supervise its functioning and to pass appropriate permissible
orders. Independence of Bar and Bench both are supreme, there
has to be balance inter se. [Paras 28, 29][608-A-B, C-D, E-G]
F 10. The grave situation created in the High Court of Madras
as well as at its Madurai Bench, which compelled the High Court
to take action on the judicial side to ensure the modicum of
security. The High Court had to order the security of the Court
to be undertaken by CISF. In this regard, orders were passed in
G Suo Moto Writ Petition by the High Court of Madras. There is no
doubt about it that the incidents pointed out were grim and stern
action was required against the erring advocates as they belied
the entire nobility of the lawyer’s profession. The High Court
could have taken action under Contempt of Courts Act for
aforesaid misconduct. [Paras 66, 70][664-F-G; 666-F; 665-B]
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11. The High Court has overstretched and exceeded its A
power even in the situation which was so grim which appears to
have compelled it to take such a measure. In fact, its powers are
much more in Contempt of Courts Act to deal with such situation
court need not look for Bar Council to act. It can take action,
punish for Contempt of Courts Act in case it involves misconduct
B
done in Court/proceedings. Circumstances may be grim, but the
autonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken
over by the Courts. It has other more efficient tools to maintain
the decorum of Court. In case power is given to the Court even
if complaints lodged by a lawyer to the higher administrative
authorities as to the behaviour of the Judges may be correct then C
also he may be punished by initiating disciplinary proceedings as
permitted to be done in impugned Rules 14 A to D that would be
making the Bar too sycophant and fearful which would not be
conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticism of
judgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers’ fearlessness
D
in court, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the
virtues which cannot be sacrificed. [Para 77][669-H; 670-A-C]
12. It is also true that the disciplinary committee of the Bar
Councils has failed to deliver the good. It is seen that the
disciplinary control of the Bar Council is not as effective as it
should be. It is high time that the Bar Council, as well as various E
State Bar Councils should take stock of the situation and improve
the functioning of the disciplinary side. It is absolutely necessary
to maintain the independence of the Bar and if the cleaning
process is not done by the Bar itself, its independence is in danger.
The corrupt, unwanted, unethical element has no place in Bar. If F
nobility of the profession is destroyed, Bar can never remain
independent. Independence is constituted by the observance of
certain ideals and if those ideals are lost, the independence would
only remain on paper, not in real sense. [Para 71][666-G-H; 667-
A-B]
G
13. If the repository of the faith in the Bar fails to discharge
their statutory duties effectively, no doubt about it that the same
can be and has to be supervised by the Courts. The obligatory
duties of Bar Council have found statutory expression in
Advocates Act and the rules framed thereunder with respect to
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A disciplinary control and cannot be permitted to become statutory
mockery, such non-performance or delayed performance of such
duties is impermissible. The Bar Council is duty bound to protect
Bar itself by taking steps against black sheeps and cannot bely
expectation of Bar in general and spoil its image. The very
purpose of disciplinary control by Bar Council cannot be permitted
B
to be frustrated. In such an exigency, in a case where the Bar
Council is not taking appropriate action against the advocate, it
would be open to the High Court to entertain the writ petition
and to issue appropriate directions to the Bar Council to take
action in accordance with the law in the discharge of duties
C enjoined upon it. But at the same time, the High Court and even
this Court cannot take upon itself the disciplinary control as
envisaged under the Advocates Act. [Para 72][667-C-E]
14. Contempt of court is a weapon which has to be used
sparingly as more is power, same requires more responsibility
D but it does not mean that the court has fear of taking action and
its repercussions. The hallmark of the court is to provide equal
and even-handed justice and to give an opportunity to each of
the system to ensure that it improves upon. Unfortunately, some
advocates feel that they are above the Bar Council due to its
inaction and they are the only champion of the causes. The hunger
E for cheap publicity is increasing which is not permitted by the
noble ideals cherished by the great doyens of the bar, they have
set by their conduct what should be in fact the professional
etiquettes and ethics which are not capable of being defined in a
narrow compass. [Para 74][668-C-D]
F 15. It has become very common to the members of the Bar
to go to the press/media to criticize the judges in person and to
commit sheer contempt by attributing political colours to the
judgments. It is nothing less than an act of contempt of gravest
form. Whenever any political matter comes to the Court and is
G decided, either way, political insinuations are attributed by
unscrupulous persons/advocates. Such acts are nothing, but an
act of denigrating the judiciary itself and destroys the faith of the
common man which he reposes in the judicial system. In case of
genuine grievance against any judge, the appropriate process is
to lodge a complaint to the concerned higher authorities who can
H
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

take care of the situation and it is impermissible to malign the A
system itself by attributing political motives and by making false
allegations against the judicial system and its functionaries.
Judges who are attacked are not supposed to go to press or media
to ventilate their point of view. [Para 73][667-G-H; 668-A-B]
16. The statutory rules prohibit advocates from advertising B
and in fact to cater to the press/media, distorted versions of the
court proceedings is sheer misconduct and contempt of court
which has become very common. It is making it more difficult to
render justice in a fair, impartial and fearless manner though the
situation is demoralizing that something has to be done by all
concerned to revamp the image of Bar. It is not open to wash C
dirty linen in public and enter in accusation/debates, which tactics
are being adopted by unscrupulous elements to influence the
judgments and even to deny justice with ulterior motives. It is
for the Bar Council and the senior members of the Bar who have
never forgotten their responsibility to rise to the occasion to D
maintain the independence of the Bar which is so supreme and is
absolutely necessary for the welfare of this country and the vibrant
democracy. [Para 74][668-E-G]
17. The separation of powers made by the forefathers, who
framed the Constitution, ensured independent functioning. If E
things are permitted to be settled by resorting to the
unscrupulous means and institution is maligned by creating
pressure of any kind, the very independence of the system would
be endangered. Cases cannot be decided by media trial. Bar and
Bench in order to protect independence have their own inbuilt
machinery for redressal of grievance if any and they are supposed F
to settle their grievances in accordance therewith only. No
outside interference is permissible. Considering the nobility,
independence, dignity which is enjoined and the faith which is
reposed by the common man of the country in the judiciary, it is
absolutely necessary that there is no maligning of the system. G
Mutual respect and reverence are the only way out. For the
protection of democratic values and to ensure that the rule of law
prevails in the country, no one can be permitted to destroy the
independence of the system from within or from outside. [Para
75][668-G-H; 669-A-C]
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A 18. Soul searching is absolutely necessary and the blame
game and maligning must stop forthwith. Confidence and
reverence and positive thinking is the only way. It is pious hope
that the Bar Council would improve upon the function of its
disciplinary committees so as to make the system more
accountable, publish performance audit on the disciplinary side
B
of various bar councils. The same should be made public. It is
basically not for the Court to control the Bar. It is the statutory
duty of Bar to make it more noble and also to protect the Judges
and the legal system, not to destroy the Bar itself by inaction and
the system which is important pillar of democracy. [Para 76][669-
C E-F, G]
19. By amending the High Court Rules, 1970, the High
Court of Madras has inserted impugned Rules 14(A) to 14(D).
The rules have been framed in exercise of the power conferred
under Section 34 of the Advocates Act. Section 34 of the Act
D does not confer such a power to frame rules to debar lawyer for
professional misconduct. The amendment made by providing Rule
14(A)(vii) to (xii) is not authorized under the Advocate Act. The
High Court has no power to exercise the disciplinary control. It
would amount to usurpation of the power of Bar Council conferred
under Advocates Act. However, the High Court may punish
E advocate for contempt and then debar him from practicing for
such specified period as may be permissible in accordance with
law, but without exercising contempt jurisdiction by way of
disciplinary control no punishment can be imposed. As such
impugned rules could not have been framed within the purview
F of Section 34. Provisions clearly impinge upon the independence
of the Bar and encroach upon the exclusive power conferred upon
the Bar Council of the State and the Bar Council of India under
the Advocates Act. The amendment made to the Rules 14(A) to
14(D) have to be held to be ultra vires the power of the High
Court. [Para 52][627-H; 628-A-D]
G
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India &
Anr (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795; Bar Council
of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors. (1975) 2
SCC 702 : [1976] 1 SCR 306 – followed

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Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC A
45 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 186; Mahipal Singh Rana v.
State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335 – distinguished.
R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC
106 : [2009] 11 SCR 1026 – relied on.
Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali (2001) 8 SCC 650 : B
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 675; Bar Council of India v.
High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 : [2004] 1
Suppl. SCR 649; Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate, In re,
(2017) 16 SCC 78 : [2017] 8 SCR 764; In reference:
Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCC 584 : [1995] C
2 SCR 638; Bar Council of India v. High Court of
Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 649
– referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1998] 2 SCR 795 followed Para 4 D
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 675 referred to Para 5
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 186 distinguished Para 6
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 649 referred to Para 6
[2017] 8 SCR 764 referred to Para 8 E

(2016) 8 SCC 335 distinguished Para 9
[1995] 2 SCR 638 referred to Para 53
[1976] 1 SCR 306 followed Para 54
F
[2009) 11 SCR 1026 relied on Para 60
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
612 of 2016.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Petitioner-in-person. G

Mohan Parasaran, Sr. Adv., Nikhil Nayyar, N. Sai Vinod,
Dhananjay Baijal, Divyanshu Rai Naveen Hegde, Advs. for the
Respondent.

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598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. The petitioner, who is an Advocate, has
filed the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, questioning
the vires of amended Rules 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D of the Rules of
High Court of Madras, 1970 made by the High Court of Madras under
B section 34(1) of the Advocates’ Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as,
‘the Advocates’ Act’).
2. The High Court has inserted Rule 14A in the Rules of High
Court of Madras, 1970 empowering the High Court to debar an Advocate
from practicing. The High Court has been empowered to take action
C under Rule 14-B where any misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is
committed by an Advocate before the High Court then the High Court
can debar him from appearing before the High Court and all subordinate
courts. Under Rule 14-B(v) the Principal District Judge has been
empowered to initiate action against the Advocate concerned and debar
him from appearing before any court within such District. In case
D misconduct is committed before any subordinate court, the concerned
court shall submit a report to the Principal District Judge and in that
case, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to take appropriate
action. The procedure to be followed has been provided in the newly
inserted Rule 14-C and pending inquiry, there is power conferred by
E way of Rule 14-D to pass an interim order prohibiting the Advocate
concerned from appearing before the High Court or the subordinate
courts. The amended provisions of Rule 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D are
extracted hereunder:
“14-A: Power to Debar:
F (vii) An Advocate who is found to have accepted money in the
name of a Judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or
(viii) An Advocate who is found to have tampered with the Court
record or Court order; or
(ix) An Advocate who browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or Judicial
G
Officer; or
(x) An Advocate who is found to have sent or spread unfounded
and unsubstantiated allegations/petitions against a Judicial Officer
or a Judge to the Superior Court; or
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(xi) An Advocate who actively participates in a procession inside A
the Court campus and/or involves in gherao inside the Court Hall
or holds placard inside the Court Hall; or
(xii) An Advocate who appears in the Court under the influence
of liquor;
shall be debarred from appearing before the High Court or B
Subordinate Courts permanently or for such period as the Court
may think fit and the Registrar 28 General shall thereupon report
the said fact to the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu.
14-B: Power to take action:-
C
(iv) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is
committed by an Advocate before the High Court, the High Court
shall have the power to initiate action against the Advocate
concerned and debar him from appearing before the High Court
and all Subordinate Courts.
D
(v) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is
committed by an Advocate before the Court of Principal District
Judge, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to initiate
action against the Advocate concerned and debar him from
appearing before any Court within such District.
E
(vi) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is
committed by an Advocate before any subordinate court, the Court
concerned shall submit a report to the Principal District Court
within whose jurisdiction it is situate and on receipt of such report,
the Principal District Judge shall have the power to initiate action
against the Advocate concerned and debar him from appearing F
before any Court within such District.
14-C: Procedure to be followed:-
The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge, as the
case may be, shall, before making an order under Rule 14-A,
issue to such Advocate a summon returnable before it, requiring G
the Advocate to appear and show cause against the matters
alleged in the summons and the summons shall if practicable, be
served personally upon him.

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A 14-D: Power to pass Interim Order:-
The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge may, before
making the Final Order under Rule 14-C, pass an interim order
prohibiting the Advocate concerned from appearing before the
High Court or Subordinate Courts, as the case may be, in
B appropriate cases, as it may deem fit, pending inquiry.”
3. Rule 14-A provides that an Advocate who is found to have
accepted money in the name of a Judge or on the pretext of influencing
him; or who has tampered with the court record or court order; or
browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or judicial officer; or is responsible for
C sending or spreading unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations/petitions
against a judicial officer or a Judge to the superior court; or actively
participates in a procession inside the court campus and/or involves in
gherao inside the court hall, or holds placard inside the court hall or
appears in the court under the influence of liquor, the courts have been
empowered to pass an interim order of suspension pending enquiry, and
D ultimately to debar him from appearing in the High Court and all other
subordinate courts, as the case may be.
4. The aforesaid amended Rule 14-A to 14-D came into force
with effect from the date of its publication in the Gazette on 25.5.2016.
Petitioner has questioned the vires of amended Rules 14A to D on the
E ground of being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
of India, as also sections 30, 34(1), 35 and 49(1)(c) of the Advocates’
Act, as the power to debar for such misconduct has been conferred
upon the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry and the High Court
could not have framed such rules within ken of section 34(1) of the
F Advocates Act. The High Court could have framed rules as to the
‘conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice
in the High Court and the courts subordinate thereto’. Debarment by
way of disciplinary measure is outside the purview of section 34(1) of
the Act. The Bar Council enrolls Advocates and the power to debar for
misconduct lies with the Bar Council. The effort is to confer the unbridled
G power of control over the Advocates which is against the rule of law.
Misconduct has been defined under section 35 of the Advocates Act.
Reliance has been placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court
in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) 4
SCC 409.
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5. The High Court of Judicature at Madras in its counter affidavit A
has pointed out that the rules are kept in abeyance for the time being and
the Review Committee is yet to take a decision in the matter of reviewing
the rules. In the reply filed the High Court has justified the amendment
made to the rules on the ground that they have been framed in compliance
with the directions issued by this Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar,
B
Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106 in which this Court has directed
the High Courts to frame rules under section 34 of the Advocates Act
and to frame the rules for having Advocates-on-Record based on the
pattern of this Court. It has been further pointed out that the conduct
and appearance of an advocate inside the court premises are within the
jurisdiction of a court to regulate. The High Court has relied upon the C
decision in Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali (2001) 8 SCC 650 in
which vires of similar rule was upheld as such the rules framed debarring
the advocates for misconduct in court are thus permissible.
6. The High Court has also relied upon the decision in Ex-Capt.
Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45 to contend that court D
has the power to debar advocates on being found guilty of contempt
and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from appearing before
the courts. The High Court has referred to the decision in Bar Council
of India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311.
7. The High Court has contended that the rules have been framed E
within the framework of the directions issued by this Court and in exercise
of the power conferred under section 34(1) of the Advocates Act.
Pursuant to the directions issued in R.K. Anand’s case (supra), the matter
was placed before the High Court’s Rule Committee on 17.3.2010. The
Committee consisting of Judges, Members of the Bar Council and
members of the Bar was formed, and the minutes were approved by the F
Full Court on 23.9.2010. Thereafter the Chief Justice of the High Court
of Madras on 2.9.2014 constituted a Committee consisting of two Judges,
the Chairman of Bar Council of Tamil Nadu & Puducherry, Advocate
General of the High Court, President, Madras Bar Association, President,
Madras High Court Advocates’ Association, and the President of Women G
Lawyers’ Association to finalise the Rules.
8. The High Court has further contended in the reply that the
Director, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs vide
communication dated 31.5.2007 enclosed a copy of the ‘Guidelines’ and
informed the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments to review and H
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A strengthen the security arrangements for the High Courts and District/
subordinate courts in the country to avoid any untoward incident. The
High Court has further contended that there have been numerous
instances of abject misbehaviour by the advocates within the premises
of the High Court of Madras in the year 2015. The advocates have
rendered the functioning of the court utterly impossible by resorting to
B
activities like holding protests and waving placards inside the court halls,
raising slogans and marching down the corridors of the court. Some
advocates had resorted to using hand-held microphones to disrupt the
proceedings of the Madurai Bench and even invaded the chambers of
the Judges. There were two incidents when there were bomb hoaxes
C where clock-like devices were smuggled into the court premises and
placed in certain areas. The Judges of the High Court were feeling
totally insecure. Even CISF had to be employed. Thus, there was an
urgent need to maintain the safety and majesty of the court and rule of
law. After various meetings, the Rules were framed and notified. Order
4 Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is similar to Rules which
D
have been framed. In Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate, In re, (2017) 16
SCC 78, this Court had suspended the contemnor from practicing as an
Advocate on Record for a period of one month.
9. In Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335,
the court has observed that the Bar Council of India might require
E restructuring on the lines of other regulatory professional bodies, and
had requested the Law Commission to prepare a report. An Advisory
Committee was constituted by the Bar Council of India. A Sub-Committee
on ‘Strikes, Boycotts & Abstaining from Court Works’ was also
constituted. Law Commission had finalized and published Report No.266
F dated 23.3.2017 and has taken note of the rules framed by the Madras
High Court. Court has a right to regulate the conduct of the advocates
and the appearance inside the court. As such it is not a fit case to exercise
extraordinary jurisdiction and a prayer has been made to dismiss the
writ petition.
G 10. The petitioner in person has urged that rules are ultra vires
and impermissible to be framed within scope of section 34(1) of the
Advocates Act. They take away the independence of the Bar and run
contrary to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Supreme
Court Bar Association v. Union of India (supra).

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned senior counsel appearing on A
behalf of the High Court, has contended that the rules have been framed
within the ambit of section 34(1) and in tune with the directions issued
by this Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (supra).
He has also referred to various other decisions. It was submitted that
under section 34 of the Advocates Act, the High Court is empowered to
B
frame rules to debar the advocate in case of unprofessional and/or
unbecoming conduct of an advocate. Advocates have no right to go on
strike or give a call of boycott, not even on a token strike, as has been
observed in Ex.-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra). It was also observed that
the court may now have to frame specific rules debarring advocates,
guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from C
appearing before the courts. Advocates appear in court subject to such
conditions as are laid down by the court, and practice outside court shall
be subject to the conditions laid down by the Bar Council of India. He
has also relied upon Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala
(2004) 6 SCC 311 in which the validity of Rule 11 of the Rules framed
D
by the High Court of Kerala came up for consideration. Learned senior
counsel has also referred to the provisions contained in Order IV Rule
10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 framed by this Court with respect
to debarring an Advocate on Record who is guilty of misconduct or of
conduct unbecoming of an Advocate-on-Record, an order may be passed
to remove his name from the register of Advocates on Record either E
permanently or for such period as the court may think fit. This Court has
punished an advocate on record and has debarred him for a period of
one month in the case of Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate (supra). The
High Court has framed the rules to preserve the dignity of the court and
protect rule of law. Considering the prevailing situation, it was necessary
F
to bring order in the premises of the High Court. Thus framing of rules
became necessary. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Council
have failed to fulfil the duties enjoined upon them. Therefore, it became
incumbent upon the High Court to act as observed in Mahipal Singh
Rana (supra) by this Court.
12. This Court has issued a notice on the petition on 9.10.2017 G
and on 4.9.2018. The Court observed that prima facie the rules framed
by the High Court appear to be encroaching on the disciplinary power of
the Bar Council. As the time was prayed by the High Court to submit
the report of the Review Committee, time was granted. In spite of the
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A same, the Review Committee has not considered the matter, considering
the importance of the matter and the stand taken justifying the rules. We
have heard the same on merits and have also taken into consideration
the detailed written submissions filed on behalf of the High Court.
13. The Advocates Act has been enacted pursuant to the
B recommendations of the All India Bar Committee made in 1953 after
taking into account the recommendations of the Law Commission on
the subject of the reforms of judicial administration. The main features
of the Bill for the enactment of the Act include the creation of autonomous
Bar Council, one for the whole of India and one for each State. The Act
has been enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to the legal
C practitioners and to provide for the constitution of the Bar Council and
an All India Bar.
14. The legal profession cannot be equated with any other
traditional professions. It is not commercial in nature and is a noble one
considering the nature of duties to be performed and its impact on the
D society.The independence of the Bar and autonomy of the Bar Council
has been ensured statutorily in order to preserve the very democracy
itself and to ensure that judiciary remains strong. Where Bar has not
performed the duty independently and has become a sycophant that
ultimately results in the denigrating of the judicial system and judiciary
E itself. There cannot be existence of a strong judicial system without an
independent Bar.
15. It cannot be gainsaid that lawyers have contributed in the
struggle for independence of the nation. They have helped in the framing
of the Constitution of India and have helped the Courts in evolving
F jurisprudence by doing hard labor and research work. The nobility of
the legal system is to be ensured at all costs so that the Constitution
remains vibrant and to expand its interpretation so as to meet new
challenges.
16. It is basically the lawyers who bring the cause to the Court
G are supposed to protect the rights of individuals of equality and freedom
as constitutionally envisaged and to ensure the country is governed by
the rule of law. Considering the significance of the Bar in maintaining
the rule of law, right to be treated equally and enforcement of various
other fundamental rights, and to ensure that various institutions work
within their parameters, its independence becomes imperative and cannot
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

be compromised. The lawyers are supposed to be fearless and A
independent in the protection of rights of litigants. What lawyers are
supposed to protect, is the legal system and procedure of law of deciding
the cases.
17. Role of Bar in the legal system is significant. The bar is
supposed to be the spokesperson for the judiciary as Judges do not speak. B
People listen to the great lawyers and people are inspired by their thoughts.
They are remembered and quoted with reverence. It is the duty of the
Bar to protect honest judges and not to ruin their reputation and at the
same time to ensure that corrupt judges are not spared. However,
lawyers cannot go to the streets or go on strike except when democracy
itself is in danger and the entire judicial system is at stake. In order to C
improve the system, they have to take recourse to the legally available
methods by lodging complaint against corrupt judges to the appropriate
administrative authorities and not to level such allegation in the public.
The corruption is intolerable in the judiciary.
18. The Bar is an integral part of the judicial administration. In D
order to ensure that judiciary remains an effective tool, it is absolutely
necessary that Bar and Bench maintain dignity and decorum of each
other. The mutual reverence is absolutely necessary. The Judges are to
be respected by the Bar, they have in-turn equally to respect the Bar,
observance of mutual dignity, decorum of both is necessary and above E
all they have to maintain self-respect too.
19. It is the joint responsibility of the Bar and the Bench to ensure
that equal justice is imparted to all and that nobody is deprived of justice
due to economic reasons or social backwardness. The judgment rendered
by a Judge is based upon the dint of hard work and quality of the arguments F
that are advanced before him by the lawyers. There is no room for
arrogance either for a lawyer or for a Judge.
20. There is a fine balance between the Bar and the Bench that
has to be maintained as the independence of the Judges and judiciary is
supreme. The independence of the Bar is on equal footing, it cannot be G
ignored and compromised and if lawyers have the fear of the judiciary
or from elsewhere, that is not conducive to the effectiveness of judiciary
itself, that would be self-destructive.
21. Independent Bar and independent Bench form the backbone
of the democracy. In order to preserve the very independence, the
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A observance of constitutional values, mutual reverence and self-respect
are absolutely necessary. Bar and Bench are complementary to each
other. Without active cooperation of the Bar and the Bench, it is not
possible to preserve the rule of law and its dignity. Equal and even-
handed justice is the hallmark of the judicial system. The protection of
the basic structure of the Constitution and of rights is possible by the
B
firmness of Bar and Bench and by proper discharge of their duties and
responsibilities. We cannot live in a jungle raj.
22. Bar is the mother of judiciary and consists of great jurists.
The Bar has produced great Judges, they have adorned the judiciary
and rendered the real justice, which is essential for the society.
C
23. The role of Lawyer is indispensable in the system of delivery
of justice. He is bound by the professional ethics and to maintain the
high standard. His duty is to the court to his own client, to the opposite
side, and to maintain the respect of opposite party counsel also. What
may be proper to others in the society, may be improper for him to do as
D he belongs to a respected intellectual class of the society and a member
of the noble profession, the expectation from him is higher. Advocates
are treated with respect in society. People repose immense faith in the
judiciary and judicial system and the first person who deals with them is
a lawyer. Litigants repose faith in a lawyer and share with them privileged
E information. They put their signatures wherever asked by a Lawyer.
An advocate is supposed to protect their rights and to ensure that untainted
justice delivered to his cause.
24. The high values of the noble profession have to be protected
by all concerned at all costs and in all the circumstances cannot be
F forgotten even by the youngsters in the fight of survival in formative
years. The nobility of legal profession requires an Advocate to remember
that he is not over attached to any case as Advocate does not win or
lose a case, real recipient of justice is behind the curtain, who is at the
receiving end. As a matter of fact, we do not give to a litigant anything
except recognizing his rights. A litigant has a right to be impartially advised
G by a lawyer. Advocates are not supposed to be money guzzlers or
ambulance chasers. A Lawyer should not expect any favour from the
Judge and should not involve by any means in influencing the fair decision-
making process. It is his duty to master the facts and the law and submit
the same precisely in the Court, his duty is not to waste the Courts’ time.
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25. It is said by Alexander Cockburn that “the weapon of the A
advocate is the sword of a soldier, not the dagger of the assassin”. It is
the ethical duty of lawyers not to expect any favour from a Judge. He
must rely on the precedents, read them carefully and avoid corruption
and collusion of any kind, not to make false pleadings and avoid twisting
of facts. In a profession, everything cannot be said to be fair even in the
B
struggle for survival. The ethical standard is uncompromisable. Honesty,
dedication and hard work is the only source towards perfection. An
Advocate conduct is supposed to be exemplary. In case an Advocate
causes disrepute of the Judges or his colleagues or involves himself in
misconduct, that is the most sinister and damaging act which can be
done to the entire legal system. Such a person is definitely deadwood C
and deserves to be chopped off.
26. Francis Bacon has said about the Judges that Judges ought to
be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more
advised than confident. Above all thingst, integrity is their portion and
proper virtue. Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of D
justice, and an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.
27. The balancing of values, reverence between the Bar and the
Bench is the edifice of the independent judicial system. Time has come
to restore the glory and cherish the time-testedenduring ideals and
principles. For a value-driven framework, it is necessary that perspective E
is corrected in an ethical and morally sound perspective. The perception
of ambulance chasers, money guzzlers and black sheep should not be
presumptive. Such public perception as to lawyers undermines the
credibility of the legal profession, all the evils from the system have to be
totally weeded out. No human institution is ever perfect. In order to
drive towards more perfection, one has to just learn from the mistakes F
of the past and build upon the present days’ good work so as to make out
a better tomorrow.
28. The background as to what has happened in the High Court at
Madras as projected in reply of the High Court, has prompted us to
make the aforesaid observations. While deciding the case, we have G
pointed out the importance of the Bar just to remind it of its responsibilities
and significance in a democratic setup. The atmosphere that had been
created in Madras as projected in the counter affidavit filed by the High
Court, would have prompted us also to take a stern view of the matter
by invoking Contempt of Courts Act, but for the time gap and things H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A have settled by now due to herculean effort of the High Court. It is not
for this court much less for the High Court to tolerate such intemperate
behavior of the lawyers as projected in the counter affidavit of the High
Court. The acts complained of are not only contemptuous but also
tantamount to gross professional misconduct.
B 29. There is no room for taking out the procession in the Court
premises, slogan raising in the Courts, use of loudspeakers, use of
intemperate language with the Judges or to create any kind of disturbance
in the peaceful, respectful and dignified functioning of the Court. Its
sanctity is not less than that of a holy place reserved for noble souls. We
are shocked to note that the instances of abject misbehavior of the
C advocates in the premises of the High Court of Madras resulting into
requisitioning of CISF to maintain safety and majesty of the Court and
rule of law. It has been observed by this Court in Mahipal Singh Rana
(supra) that Bar Council has failed to discharge its duties on the
disciplinary side. In our opinion, in case such state of affairs continues
D and Bar Council fail to discharge duties the Court shall have to supervise
its functioning and to pass appropriate permissible orders. Independence
of Bar and Bench both are supreme, there has to be balance inter se.
30. We now advert to main question whether disciplinary power
vested in the Bar Council can be taken away by the Court and the
E international scenario in this regard.
31. The legislature has reposed faith in the autonomy of the Bar
while enacting Advocates Act and it provides for autonomous Bar
Councils at the State and Central level. The ethical standard of the legal
profession and legal education has been assigned to the Bar Council. It
F has to maintain the dignity of the legal profession and independence of
Bar. The disciplinary control has been assigned to the Disciplinary
Committees of the Bar Councils of various States and Bar Council of
India and an appeal lies to this Court under section 38 of the Act.
32. The bar association must be self-governing is globally
G recognised. Same is a resolution of the United Nations also. Even Special
Rapporteur on the independence of Judges and lawyers finds that bar
associations play a vital role in safeguarding the independence and
integrity of the legal profession and its members. The UN’s basic
principles on the role of lawyers published in 1990 noted that such
institutions must possess independence and its self-governing nature.
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

The bar association has a crucial role to play in a democratic society to A
ensure the protection of human rights in particular due process and fair-
trial guarantees. Following is the extract of the report of the United
Nations:
“Mandate
In the report, Special Rapporteur Diego García-Sayán finds that B
associations should be independent and self-governing because
they hold a general mandate to protect the independence of the
legal profession and the interests of its members.
They should also be recognized under the law, the UN says.
C
“Bar associations have a crucial role to play in a democratic society
to enable the free and independent exercise of the legal profession,
and to ensure access to justice and the protection of human rights,
in particular, due process and fair trial guarantees,” UN Secretary-
General António Guterres says.
D
Self-governing
The UN’s Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (published in
1990) recognize that lawyers, like other citizens, have the right to
freedom of association and assembly, which includes the right to
form and join self-governing professional associations to represent
E
their interests. Since its publication, this universal document has
been referenced in wrangles between lawyers and governments.
Requirements
Existing legal standards do not provide a definition of what
constitutes a professional association of lawyers. They simply focus F
on the necessary requirements that such institutions must possess,
such as independence and a self-governing nature.
The report recommends that: “In order to ensure the integrity of
the entire profession and the quality of legal services, it is preferable
to establish a single professional association regulating the legal G
profession.”
Elected by peers
Another principle of the UN report is that: “In order to guarantee
the independence of the legal profession, the majority of members
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610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A of the executive body of the bar association should be lawyers
elected by their peers.”
It says that state control of bar associations or governing bodies is
“incompatible with the principle of the independence of the legal
profession”.”
B (emphasis supplied)
33. In the conference of Presidents of Law Association in Asia,
Law Council of Australia held 20th March, 2005 at Queensland, Australia,
Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG presented his papers on ‘Independence
of the Legal Profession: Global and Regional Challenges’ and pointed
C out the importance of the independence of the bar in his papers thus:
“One of the features of the law that tends to irritate other sources
of power is the demand of the law’s practitioners - judges and
lawyers - for independence. The irritation is often true of
politicians, wealthy and powerful people, government officials and
D media editors and their columnists. Those who are used to being
obeyed and feared commonly find it intensely annoying that there
is a source of power that they cannot control or buy the law and
the courts. Yet the essence of a modern democracy is observance
of the rule of law. The rule of law will not prevail without assuring
E the law’s principal actors - judges and practicing lawyers and also
legal academics - a very high measure of independence of mind
and action.
An independent legal profession also requires that lawyers be
free to carry out their work without interference or fear of reprisal.
F Lawyers have a duty, within the law, to advance the interests of
their clients fearlessly and to assist the courts in upholding the
law. To enable them to perform these duties it is necessary that
lawyers enjoy professional independence. Challenges to such
independence may arise where lawyers are not able to form
independent professional organizations; are limited in the clients
G whom they may represent; are threatened with disciplinary action,
prosecution or sanctions for undertaking their professional duties;
are in any other way intimidated or harassed because of their
clients or the work that they undertake; or are subjected to
unreasonable interference in the way they perform their duties.
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Independence is not provided for the benefit or protection of judges A
or lawyers as such. Nor is it intended to shield them from being
held accountable in the performance of their professional duties
and to the general law. Instead, its purpose is the protection of the
people, affording them an independent legal profession as “... the
bulwark of a free and democratic society.”
B
(emphasis supplied)
Justice Kirby also pointed out in his papers that principle of
independence of the legal profession is recognized internationally. The
pursuit of the independence of the Judges and the lawyers are not,
therefore, merely an aspirational principle. It is a central tenet of C
international human rights law of great practical importance. He has
further observed thus:
“…If all people are entitled to equal protection under the law,
without exception, lawyers must be able to represent unpopular
clients fearlessly and to advocate on behalf of unpopular causes, D
so as to uphold legal rights. To ensure the supremacy of the law
over the arbitrary exercise of power a strong and independent
legal profession is therefore essential.
In this way, an independent legal profession is an essential
guardian of human and other rights. By ensuring that no person is E
beyond the reach of the law, the legal profession can operate as a
check upon the arbitrary or excessive exercise of power by the
government and its agents or by other powerful parties.”
(emphasis supplied)
He also emphasized in his papers to promote access to law, reform F
of the law and its rules and the engagement of lawyers with ordinary
people and litigants to whom, ultimately, the law clearly belongs.
34. The independence of the Bar came to be discussed in 28th
Annual Convention Banquet of the National Lawyers Guild held at San
Francisco, California on 13th November 1965 in which Robert F. Drinan, G
S.J., Dean, Boston College Law School, Brighton, Massachusetts pointed
out the independence of the Bar and its facets. He has pointed out that
lawyers have to be loyal to their client’s interests and faithful to the
maintenance of the integrity and independence of the courts. It requires
a commitment to many moral and spiritual values. Lawyers boldly
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612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A challenge the inequality in every form. He also pointed out that
independence of mind and heart is necessary. The Bar cannot be a
prisoner of passions and prejudices and independence of judgment need
to be construed and from an unreasonable fear of the power of the
judiciary is necessary and has observed that lawyer should feel free to
criticize judicial decisions of every Tribunal. At the same time, he said to
B
impugn the motives to Judges undermine the very essence of every
civilized society. A lawyer has to be detached from financial
considerations. If lawyers are appreciated and embraced with these
sentiments, we would witness the full flowering of the indispensable
element of a truly free society – an independent Bench and an independent
C Bar. He has observed:
“Members of the legal profession under the Anglo-American
system of justice have been entrusted with dual and conflicting
loyalties. They must be simultaneously both loyal to their client’s
interests and faithful to the maintenance of the integrity and
D independence of the courts of which they are officers. The
complex dualism inherent in being both an advocate and an officer
of the Court requires that the lawyer have a unique independence,
- a detachment from any excessive adherence to his client’s
interests as well as a freedom from being inordinately attached to
the rulings and interests of the judicial system.
E
The independence of the bar does not mean, let us make it clear
immediately, a state of non-commitment to truths or values. Indeed
the independence of the bar presupposes and requires a
commitment to many moral and spiritual values which must be
served in whole or in part by America’s legal institutions. The
F spiritual value indispensable for an independent bar to which the:
National Lawyers’ Guild in a particular way has lent its power
and prestige is the basic injustice of permitting false accusations
to be made by public bodies in the name of patriotism or loyalty to
the nation.
G The lawyer whose mind is independent of the passions and
prejudices of his own generation or his own century transcends
the collective compromises of his own age and boldly challenges
inequality in every form. The lawyers who formed and fashioned
the American Republic had the independence of mind and heart
H unparalleled by any subsequent generation of attorneys in America;
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN v. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE 613
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their vision and their courage are the legacies of every lawyer in A
America. So few members of the bar recognize that legacy
because, being the prisoners of the passions and prejudices of
their own age, they have lost that independence of judgment
without which a lawyer cannot really identify himself or the noble
profession of which he is a member.
B
II. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BAR FROM JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT AND FROM FEAR OF THE JUDICIARY
If a lawyer cannot really fulfill his self-identity or carry out his
moral mission unless he is independent of the prejudices and
passions of his age he is similarly impeded unless he can discover C
and maintain an attitude of respectful independence from the
judiciary. This independence from the judiciary should prompt
lawyers to feel free to criticize judicial decisions consistently and
courageously. This criticism should not be confined to the higher
courts but should be applicable to every tribunal whose opinions
are deficient in inherent logic and a clear consistency. D

Does constitutionally protected freedom of speech or freedom of
the press give immunity for slander and public defamation of the
nation’s highest tribunal? And by what principle can an independent
bar justify its inaction towards those who, by calumny and libel,
impugn the motives of judges and undermine the very essence of E
every civilized society - the rule of law?
The bench generally speaking cannot be expected to rise above
the level of the bar. A bar that is subservient and servile to the
bench will tend to corrupt both the bench and the bar.
F
The independence of the legal profession, therefore, requires that
lawyers attain such an attitude of detachment both from their
duties as advocates and their role as officers of the court that
they can act objectively and dispassionately, - as neither solely
the servants of their clients nor as exclusively the ministers of the
courts.” G
(emphasis supplied)

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614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A 35. In an article ‘the Importance of an Independent Bar’ by
Stephen A. Salzburg published in Scholarly Commons, GW Law Faculty
Publications and other works, referring to the Shakespeare it was pointed
out that when Dick the Butcher met to discuss the plan of attack and
how they should go about gaining the political control of England. It is
during this meeting that the sentence involving “kill all the lawyers”
B
occurred. The exact sentence in the play was “The first thing we do,
let’s kill all the lawyers”. Governments need fear lawyers and Judges
only when they fear the truth. This is true here and it is true throughout
the world. The relevant portion of the article is extracted hereunder:
“Attack on lawyers
C
It is from this perspective that I wish to express my concern as to
recent attacks on the legal profession that have occurred here in
the United States and elsewhere in the world. Attacks on the
private bar often are accompanied by attacks on the independence
of the judiciary, and these attacks are a frontal assault on the very
D notion of the rule of law.
One law journal that views the play as I do concisely summarize
it as follows:
.…Before the plan was executed, Cade and his followers,
E among whom was Dick the Butcher, met to discuss the plan of
attack and how they should go about gaining the political control
of England. It is during this meeting that the sentence involving
“kill all the lawyers” occurs. The exact sentence in the play
was, “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” We see,
then, that this sentence was uttered by a riotous anarchist whose
F intent was to overthrow the lawful government of England.
Shakespeare knew that lawyers were the primary guardians
of individual liberty in democratic England. Shakespeare also
knew that an anarchical uprising from within was doomed to
fail unless the country’s lawyers were killed.
G The government has strained to keep lawyers away from
Guantanamo as much as possible because it knows that their
presence means challenges to unfair proceedings, to secret
evidence, and to prolonged detentions. Lawyers have volunteered
to represent the detainees, but their ability to do so is greatly
restricted by the congressional elimination of both habeas corpus
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and the right of detainees to bring actions challenging their A
detentions or the conditions of their detentions.
I regret deeply what has happened in Guantanamo. After all,
governments need fear lawyers and judges only when they fear
the truth. This is true here and it is true throughout the world.
…..These lawyers and judges remind us that preserving the rule B
of law is something never to be taken for granted. It often is a
challenge requiring self-sacrifice and risk-taking.
The Supreme Court of Canada wrote eloquently in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2
S.C.R. 307 at 335-36: C

The independence of the Bar from the state in all of its
pervasive manifestations is one of the hallmarks of a free
society. Consequently, regulation of these members of the law
profession by the state must, so far as by human ingenuity it
can be so designed, be free from state interference, in the D
political sense, with the delivery of services to the individual
citizens in the state, particularly in fields of public and criminal
law. The public interest in a free society knows no area more
sensitive than the independence, impartiality, and availability to
the general public of the members of the Bar and through those E
members, legal advice and services generally.
In another Canadian case, Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at pp. 187-88: Justice McIntyre
wrote:
“I would observe that in the absence of an independent legal F
profession, skilled and qualified to play its part in the
administration of justice and the judicial process, the whole
legal system would be in a parlous state. In the performance
of what may be called his or her private function, that is, in
advising on legal matters and in representing clients before the
G
courts and other tribunals, the lawyer is accorded great powers
not permitted to other professionals…... By any standard, these
powers and duties are vital to the maintenance of order in our
society and the due administration of the law in the interest of
the whole community.”
(emphasis supplied) H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A 36. The International Bar Associations Presidential Task Force
was constituted to examine the question of independence of the legal
profession. In the report while discussing the indicators of independence,
it has been pointed out that a bar association is generally deemed to be
independent when it is mostly free from external influence and can
withstand pressure from external sources on matters such as the regulation
B
of the profession, disbarment proceedings and the right of lawyers to
join the association. Judicial independence ensures that lawyers are
able to carry out their duties in a free and secure environment and an
independent judiciary also acts as a check on the independence of lawyers
and vice versa. The relevant portion of the report of task force is extracted
C hereunder:
“Judicial independence ensures that lawyers are able to carry out
their duties in a free and secure environment, where they are able
to ensure access to justice and provide their clients with intelligent,
impartial and objective advice. An impartial and independent
D judiciary is more likely to be tolerant and responsive to criticism,
which means that lawyers are able to freely criticize the judiciary,
without fear of retaliation, whether in the form of prosecution by
the government or unfavorable judicial decisions. An independent
judiciary also acts as a check on the independence of lawyers
and vice versa. Thus, the relationship between judicial independence
E and the independence of lawyers is one of mutual reliance and
co-dependence.”
There have to be clear and transparent rules on admission to the
Bar, disciplinary proceedings and disbarment. In this regard, the following
observation has been made by the IBA Task Force:
F
“4.2.2.2. Clear and transparent rules on admission to the Bar,
disciplinary proceedings and disbarment Clear and transparent
rules on admission, disciplinary proceedings and disbarment refers
to rules that are comprehensible and accessible, so that those
who are subject to the rules are able to easily access them,
G understand their meaning and appreciate the implications of
violating them. The existence of comprehensible, clear and
transparent rules on admission to the Bar ensures that those
seeking admission are well-informed of the requirements and are
assessed on the basis of objective criteria that apply equally to all
H candidates. Clear and transparent rules reduce the risk of arbitrary
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN v. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE 617
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disciplinary proceedings and disbarment and also guarantee that A
lawyers are held accountable and responsible for their actions.
Lawyers, those they represent and the general public should have
access to efficient, fair and functional mechanisms that allow for
the resolution of disputes between the profession and the public,
an imposition of disciplinary measures (where appropriate) and
B
an effective appeals system. This ensures that the rights of all
parties are protected in accordance with the rule of law.”
(emphasis supplied)
37. Complete lack of self-regulation can have a negative effect
on the independence of the lawyers and lawyers have to be free from C
fear of prosecution in controversial or unpopular cases. Political, societal
and, in some circumstances, media pressure in times of war, terror, and
emergency can have a profound impact on the independence of the
profession. They can be attacked by unscrupulous persons for
discharging their duties in a fearless manner. That is why independence
of the bar is imperative. There is a need to organize seminars, training D
sessions on the current development of law so as to maintain
independence. It has also been observed in the report of IBA Task
Force that public often associates lawyers with corruption, lying, deceit,
excessive wealth and a lavish lifestyle. The report has concluded thus:
“There is no greater issue affecting the legal profession worldwide E
than the manifold threats to its independence. Without
independence, lawyers are left exposed to disciplinary proceedings,
arbitrary disbarment, physical violence, persecution, and even
death. Lawyers around the world have been targeted by
governments and by private actors simply for acting in the public F
interest or for undertaking cases or causes that some, including
the government, find objectionable.”
38. The emphasis on the disciplinary control by the independent
bodies so as to maintain the purity, efficacy, and intellect of the judicial
system itself. The resolution of IBA standards for the independence of G
the legal profession with respect to disciplinary proceedings is extracted
hereunder:
“Disciplinary proceedings
21. Lawyers’ associations shall adopt and enforce a code of
professional conduct of lawyers. H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A 22. There shall be established rules for the commencement and
conduct of disciplinary proceedings that incorporate the rules of
natural justice.
23. The appropriate lawyers’ association will be responsible for
or be entitled to participate in the conduct of disciplinary
B proceedings.
24. Disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in the first instance
before a disciplinary committee of the appropriate lawyers’
association. The lawyer shall have the right to appeal from the
disciplinary committee to an appropriate and independent appellate
C body.”
(emphasis supplied)
The IBA resolution emphasises on the disciplinary committee of
the Bar is necessary so as to maintain the independence of the Bar.

D 39. The members of the Bar are recognized as intellectual of the
society. They enjoy respect in the society being the protector of law as
they fight for equality. The advocate has to fearlessly uphold the interests
of his clients by all fair and honourable means without regard to any
unpleasant consequences to himself or any other. An advocate is
supposed to find a solution to the very real problem as ‘justice hurried is
E justice buried’ and ‘slow justice is no justice’. It has become professionally
embarrassing and personally demoralizing for an advocate to give an
answer to his client as to the outcome of the matter and why it is pending
and when it is to come up for hearing. When a member of Bar is elevated
to bench first relief which is felt is of answerability to the client on
F aforesaid aspects which is in fact too inconvenient and embarrassing
but still problem subsists and is writ large, it has to be solved every day.
In such circumstances too, the tool of adjournment is used to kill justice.
Adjournment poses a question mark whether such kind of advocacy is
acceptable?
40. The Bar Council has the power to discipline lawyers and
G
maintain nobility of profession and that power imposes great responsibility.
The Court has the power of contempt and that lethal power too
accompanies with greater responsibility. Contempt is a weapon like
Brahmasatra to be used sparingly to remain effective. At the same
time, a Judge has to guard the dignity of the Court and take action in
H
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN v. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE 619
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

contempt and in case of necessity to impose appropriate exemplary A
punishment too. A lawyer is supposed to be governed by professional
ethics, professional etiquette and professional ethos which are a habitual
mode of conduct. He has to perform himself with elegance, dignity, and
decency. He has to bear himself at all times and observe himself in a
manner befitting as an officer of the Court. He is a privileged member
B
of the community and a gentleman. He has to mainsail with honesty and
sail with the oar of hard work, then his boat is bound to reach to the
bank. He has to be honest, courageous, eloquent, industrious, witty and
judgmental.
41. In a keynote address to the 1992 Conference of the English,
Scottish and Australian Bar Association held in London on 4 th July, 1992 C
on the ‘Independence of the Bench; the Independence of the Bar and
the Bar’s Role in the Judicial System’, Sir Anthony Mason, AC, KBE,
Chief Justice of Australia has pointed out that for its independence the
Court should be responsible for its own administration and the expenditure
of funds appropriated to it by Parliament. He has also referred to one of D
the recommendations made by an economist that financial incentives
should be offered to judges to expedite the disposition of cases, in that
regard he has observed that incentive-based remuneration, no matter
how well adapted it is to the football stadium and the production line has
no place in the courtroom. Judicial independence is a privilege of and
protection for the people. The appointment of the judges should be from E
the dedicated advocates. With respect to the independence of the Bar,
he has mentioned that lawyers stand between the subject and the Crown,
and between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak. It is
necessary that while the Bar occupies an essential part in the
administration of justice, the lawyer should be completely independent F
and work entirely as an individual, drawing on his own resources of
learning, ability, and intelligence. Next, he has referred to Sir Owen
Dixon when he became the Chief Justice of Australia, said:
“Because it is the duty of the barrister to stand between the subject
and the Crown, and between the rich and the poor, the powerful G
and the weak, it is necessary that, while the Bar occupies an
essential part in the administration of justice, the barrister should
be completely independent and work entirely as an individual,
drawing on his own resources of learning, ability, and intelligence.”
(emphasis supplied) H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A A lawyer has to balance between the duty to the court and interests
of his clients. A lawyer has to be independent. He has observed thus:
“An important element in the relationship between the court and
the barrister is the special duty which the barrister owes to the
court over and above the duty which the barrister owes to the
B client. The performance of that duty contributes to the efficient
disposition of litigation. In the performance of that duty the
independence of the barrister, allied to his familiarity with the
judicial process, gives him a particular advantage. In balancing
his duty to the court and that owed to the client, the barrister is
free from the allegiances and interests and the closer and continuing
C association which the solicitor has with the client. The significance
of the barrister’s special duty to the court and the expectation
that it will be performed played a part in the recognition of the
common law’s immunity of the barrister from in-court liability for
negligence. That immunity is founded partly on the existence of
D the duty and its performance with beneficial consequences for
the curial process. So much is clear from the speeches in the
House of Lords in Rondel v Worsley and Saif Ali v. Sydney
Mitchell & Co. and the majority judgments in the High Court of
Australia in Gianarelli v. Wraith.
E The Bar’s best response to the new challenge which confronts it
is to re-affirm its traditional professional ideals and aspire to
excellence. The professional ideal is not the pursuit of wealth but
public service. That is the vital difference between professionalism
and commercialism.

F It is timely to repeat what O’Connor J (with whom Rehnquist
CJ and Scalia J agreed) said in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association :
One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike other
occupations that may be equally respectable, is that membership
G entails an ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit of
economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could
not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of the
market. There are sound reasons to continue pursuing the goal
that is implicit in the traditional view of processional life. Both the
special privileges incident to membership in the professional and
H
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN v. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE 621
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

the advantages those privileges give in the necessary task of earning A
a living are means to a goal that transcends the accumulation of
wealth.
Unless the Bar dedicates itself to the ideal of public service, it
forfeits its claim to treatment as a profession in the true sense of
the term. Dedication to public service demands not only attainment B
of a high standard of professional skill but also faithful performance
of duty to client and court and a willingness to make the
professional service available to the public.”
42. Before dilating further on the issue, we take note of the
provisions contained in the Advocates Act. Section 9 provides for the C
constitution of Disciplinary Committee by the Bar Council. A Disciplinary
Committee consists of three members, two of them are elected members
of the Bar Council and the third member has to be co-opted by the
Council amongst Advocates. Section 9 is reproduced hereunder:
“9. Disciplinary Committees.- (1) A Bar Council shall constitute D
one or more disciplinary committees, each of which shall consist
of three persons of whom two shall be persons elected by the
Council from amongst its members and the other shall be person
co-opted by the Council from amongst advocates who possess
the qualifications specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) of
section 3 and who are not members of the Council, and the E
seniormost advocate amongst the members of a disciplinary
committee shall be the Chairman thereof.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), any
disciplinary committee constituted prior to the commencement of
the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1964 may dispose of the F
proceedings pending before it as if this section had not been
amended by the said Act.”
43. Section 15 confers the power on the Bar Council to make
rules for carrying out the purposes of the Chapter II inter alia relating
to disciplinary committees. Chapter III deals with the provisions regarding G
enrolment of advocates contained in Sections 16 to 28. Right to practice
is conferred in Section 29, which provides that advocates be the only
recognized class of persons entitled to practice law. Section 30 of the
Advocates Act gives right of advocates to practice throughout the territory
in all Courts including the Supreme Court before any Tribunal or person
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622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A legally authorize to take evidence and before any other authority or person
before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in
force entitled to practice. Now with the enforcement of Section 30 on
June 15, 2011, after five decades, right to practice is available as provided
under Section 30. Section 32 contains a non-obstante clause that any
Court, authority or person may permit any person, not enrolled as an
B
advocate to appear before it or him in any particular case. The advocate
has to enroll himself with the State Bar Council in order to practice law
as provided in Section 33 of the Advocates Act.
44. Section 34 empowers the High Court to frame rules and provide
conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in
C the High Court and the courts subordinate thereto. Section 34 is extracted
hereunder:
“34. Power of High Courts to make rules.—
(1) The High Court may make rules laying down the conditions
D subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the
High Court and the courts subordinate thereto.
(1A) The High Court shall make rules for fixing and regulating by
taxation or otherwise the fees payable as costs by any party in
respect of the fees of his adversary’s advocate upon all
E proceedings in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section
(1), the High Court at Calcutta may make rules providing for the
holding of the Intermediate and the Financial examinations for
articled clerks to be passed by the persons referred to in section
F 58AG for the purpose of being admitted as advocates on the State
roll and any other matter connected therewith.”
Section 34 clearly enables the High Courts to prescribe conditions
to practice. The provisions contained in Section 34(1A) empowers the
High Court to make rules regarding the fees payable as costs.
G 45. There can be certain conditions on right to practice and appear
in a case which can be imposed by the High Court under Section 34
such as filing fresh vakalatnama, superseding the previous one that has
to be done as per the High Court rules, if any such provision has been
made by the High Court. Section 34 contained in chapter IV of the Act
intends to regulate the practice of the advocate in the High Court and
H
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

subordinate courts. It does not empower it to frame the rules for A
disciplinary control. Within the purview of section 34 of the Act, a
dresscan also be prescribed for an appearance in the Court. The High
Court is free to frame the rules for designation of the Senior Advocates
and also the rules on similar pattern as framed by this Court for Advocates
on Record.
B
46. Chapter V deals with the conduct of advocates and disciplinary
control. Section 35 deals with the punishment of advocates for
misconduct. Section 35 is extracted hereunder:
“35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct.—(1) Where on
receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason C
to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of
professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal
to its disciplinary committee.
(1A) The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on
application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a D
proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct
the inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that
State Bar Council.
(2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a
date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof E
to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General
of the State.
(3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving
the advocate concerned and the Advocate-General an opportunity
of being heard may make any of the following orders, namely:— F
(a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated
at the instance of the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings
be filed;
(b) reprimand the advocate;
(c) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may G
deem fit;
(d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of
advocates.

H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A (4) Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause
(c) of sub-section (3), he shall, during the period of suspension, be
debarred from practicing in any court or before any authority or
person in India.
(5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General under
B sub-section (2), the Advocate-General may appear before the
disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council either in person
or through any advocate appearing on his behalf.
[Explanation.—In this section, [section 37 and section 38], the
expressions “Advocate-General” and Advocate-General of the
C State” shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the
Additional Solicitor General of India.]”
47. Section 36 deals with disciplinary powers of Bar Council of
India. Where a lawyer whose name is not on any State roll and a complaint
is received that he is guilty of professional misconduct, the Bar Council
D of India shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
Bar Council of India can withdraw any pending inquiry before itself and
decide it. Section 36 is extracted hereunder:
“36. Disciplinary powers of Bar Council of India.—(1) Where on
receipt of a complaint or otherwise the Bar Council of India has
E reason to believe that any advocate whose name is not entered
on any State roll has been guilty of professional or other
misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary
committee.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, the
F disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may, either of
its own motion or on a report by any State Bar Council or on an
application made to it by any person interested, withdraw for inquiry
before itself any proceedings for disciplinary action against any
advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of any State
Bar Council and dispose of the same.
G
(3) The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, in
disposing of any case under this section, shall observe, so far as
may be, the procedure laid down in section 35, the references to
the Advocate-General in that section being construed as references
to the Attorney-General of India.
H
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

(4) In disposing of any proceedings under this section the A
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may make any
order which the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council
can make under sub-section (3) of section 35, and where any
proceedings have been withdrawn for inquiry before the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India the State Bar
B
Council concerned shall give effect to any such order.”
48. Section 36A provides for the procedure on the change in the
constitution of disciplinary committees. In case of change, the succeeding
committee may continue the proceedings from the stage at which the
proceedings were so left by its predecessor committee. Section 36B of
the Advocates Act deals with disposal of the disciplinary committee. A C
disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council has to decide the case
within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint
or the date of institution of proceedings failing which the proceedings
shall stand transferred to the Bar Council of India. Section 37 of the Act
provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary D
committee of the State Bar Council may prefer an appeal to the Bar
Council of India. Section 38 provides for an appeal to the Supreme
Court against the order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council of India.
49. Section 42 deals with powers of the disciplinary committee. E
The Presiding Officer of the Court can be summoned with permission
of the High Court to prove misconduct against advocate and proceedings
are deemed to be judicial one as provided in Section 42(2), which is
extracted hereunder:
“42. Powers of disciplinary committee.— (1) The disciplinary F
committee of a Bar Council shall have the same powers as vested
in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect
of the following matters, namely:—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath; G
(b) requiring discovery and production of any documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any
court or office;
H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A (e) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or
documents;
(f) any other matter which may be prescribed:
Provided that no such disciplinary committee have the right to
require the attendance of—
B
(a) any presiding officer of a Court except with the previous
sanction of the High Court to which such court is subordinate; (b)
any officer of a revenue court except with the previous sanction
of the State Government.

C (2) All proceedings before a disciplinary committee of a Bar Council
shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of
sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and every such
disciplinary committee shall be deemed to be a civil court for the
purposes of sections 480, 482 and 485 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898.
D
(3) For the purposes of exercising any of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1), a disciplinary committee may send to any civil
court in the territories to which this Act extends, any summons or
other process, for the committee or any commission which it
desires to issue, and the civil court shall cause such process to be
E served or such commission to be issued, as the case may be, and
may enforce any such process as if it were a process for
attendance or production before itself.
(4) Notwithstanding the absence of the Chairman or any member
of a disciplinary committee on a date fixed for the hearing of a
F case before it, the disciplinary committee may, if it so thinks fit,
hold or continue the proceedings on the date so fixed and no such
proceedings and no order made by the disciplinary committee in
any such proceedings shall be invalid merely by reason of the
absence of the Chairman or member thereof on any such date:
G Provided that no final orders of the nature referred to in sub-
section (3) of section 35 shall be made in any proceeding unless
the Chairman and other members of the disciplinary committee
are present.

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

(5) Where no final orders of the nature referred to in sub-section A
(3) of section 35 can be made in any proceedings in accordance
with the opinion of the Chairman and the members of a disciplinary
committee either for want of majority opinion amongst themselves
or otherwise, the case, with their opinion thereon, shall be laid
before the Chairman of the Bar Council concerned or if the
B
Chairman of the Bar Council is acting as the Chairman or a member
of the disciplinary committee, before the Vice-Chairman of the
Bar Council, as the case may be, after such hearing as he thinks
fit, shall deliver his opinion and the final order of the disciplinary
committee shall follow such opinion.”
50. The order of the cost of proceedings before the Disciplinary C
Committee is executable as provided in Section 43. Section 44 deals
with the review of orders of the disciplinary committee. Sections 43 and
44 are extracted hereunder:
“43. Cost of proceedings before a disciplinary committee.— The
disciplinary committee of a Bar Council may make such order as D
to the cost of any proceedings before it as it may deem fit and any
such order shall be executable as if it were an order—
(a) in the case of an order of the disciplinary committee of the
Bar Council of India, of the Supreme Court;
E
(b) in the case of an order of the disciplinary committee of a State
Bar Council, of the High Court.
44. Review of orders of disciplinary committee.—The disciplinary
committee of a Bar Council may of its own motion or otherwise
review any order within sixty days of the date of that order passed F
by it under this Chapter.
Provided that no such order of review of the disciplinary committee
of a State Bar Council shall have effect unless it has been approved
by the Bar Council of India.”
51. It is apparent from the aforesaid provisions and scheme of the G
Act that Advocates Act has never intended to confer the disciplinary
powers upon the High Court or upon this Court except to the extent
dealing with an appeal under Section 38.
52. By amending the High Court Rules, 1970, the High Court of
Madras has inserted impugned Rules 14(A) to 14(D). The rules have H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A been framed in exercise of the power conferred under Section 34 of the
Advocates Act. Section 34 of the Act does not confer such a power to
frame rules to debar lawyer for professional misconduct. The amendment
made by providing Rule 14(A)(vii) to (xii) is not authorized under the
Advocate Act. The High Court has no power to exercise the disciplinary
control. It would amount to usurpation of the power of Bar Council
B
conferred under Advocates Act. However, the High Court may punish
advocate for contempt and then debar him from practicing for such
specified period as may be permissible in accordance with law, but without
exercising contempt jurisdiction by way of disciplinary control no
punishment can be imposed. As such impugned rules could not have
C been framed within the purview of Section 34. Provisions clearly impinge
upon the independence of the Bar and encroach upon the exclusive
power conferred upon the Bar Council of the State and the Bar Council
of India under the Advocates Act. The amendment made to the Rules
14(A) to 14(D) have to be held to be ultra vires of the power of the High
Court.
D
53. We now analyze the proposition laid down by this Court in
various decisions relating to the aforesaid aspect. In reference: Vinay
Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584, this Court rejected the argument
that the powers of suspending and removing the advocate from practice
is vested exclusively in the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council
E and the Bar Council of India and the Supreme Court is denuded of its
power to impose such punishment both under Articles 129 and 142. The
Court observed that the power of the Supreme Court under Article 129
cannot be trammeled in any way by any statutory provision including the
provisions of the Advocates Act or the Contempt of Courts Act. This
F Court imposed the punishment on the then Chairman of the Bar Council
suspended sentence of imprisonment for a period of six weeks. The
sentence was suspended for four years which may be activated in case
the contemnor is convicted for any other offense of contempt of court
within the said period. The contemnor was also suspended from
practicing as an advocate for a period of three years with the consequence
G that all elective and nominated offices/posts held by him in his capacity
as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him forthwith.
54. However, the decision was held not to be laying down a good
law in a writ petition filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association v.
Union of India and another, (supra). Supreme Court Bar Association
H
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filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India aggrieved by A
the direction in V.C. Mishra’s case that the contemnor shall stand
suspended from practicing as an advocate for a period of three years
issued by this Court while invoking powers under Articles 129 and 142
of the Constitution. A prayer was made to hold that the disciplinary
committee of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act alone
B
have exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into and suspend or debar an
advocate from practicing law for professional or other misconduct. The
question posed for consideration in Supreme Court Bar Association v.
Union of India (supra) before this Court is extracted hereunder:
“5. The only question which we are called upon to decide in this
petition is whether the punishment for established contempt of C
court committed by an advocate can include punishment to debar
the advocates concerned from practice by suspending his license
(sanad) for a specified period, in exercise of its power under Article
129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”
The Constitution Bench of Court has observed: D

37. The nature and types of punishment which a court of record
can impose, in a case of established contempt, under the common
law have now been specifically incorporated in the contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 in so far as the High Courts are concerned and
therefore to the extent the contempt of Courts Act 1971 identifies E
the nature of types of punishments which can be awarded in the
case of established contempt, it does not impinge upon the inherent
powers of the High Court under Article 215 either. No new type
of punishment can be created or assumed.
39. Suspending the license to practice of any professional like a F
lawyer, doctor, chartered accountant etc. When such a professional
is found guilty of committing contempt of court, for any specified
period, is not a recognized or accepted punishment which a court
of record either under the common law or under the statutory law
can impose, on a contemner, in addition to any of the other G
recognized punishments.
40. The suspension of an Advocate from practice and his removal
from the State roll of advocates are both punishments specifically
provided for under the Advocates Act, 1961, for proven
“professional misconduct’ of an advocate. While exercising its
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630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A contempt jurisdiction under Article 129, the only cause or matter
before this Court is regarding commission of contempt of court.
There is no cause of professional misconduct, properly so called,
pending before the Court. This Court, therefore, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 129 cannot take over the jurisdiction of
the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State or the
B
Bar Council of India to punish an advocate by suspending his
licence, which punishment can only be imposed after a finding of
‘professional misconduct’ is recorded in the manner prescribed
under the Advocates Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
41. When this Court is seized of a matter of contempt of court by
C an advocate, there is no “case, cause or matter” before the
Supreme Court regarding his “professional misconduct” even
though, in a given case, the contempt committed by an advocate
may also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocate
by virtue of the license to practice law but no issue relating to his
D suspension from practice is the subject matter of the case. The
powers of this Court, under Article 129 read with Article 142 of
the Constitution, being supplementary powers have “to be used in
exercise of its jurisdiction” in the case under consideration by this
Court. Moreover, a case of contempt of court is not stricto sensu
a cause or a matter between the parties inter se. It is a matter
E between the court and the contemner. It is not, strictly speaking,
tried as an adversarial litigation. The party, which brings the
contumacious conduct of the contemner to the notice of the court,
whether a private person or the subordinate court, is only an
informant and does not have the status of a litigant in the contempt
F of Court case.
42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised
sparingly and with caution, whenever an act adversely effects
the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course
or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions. This
G jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of
adversely effects the Majesty of Law or dignity of the courts.
The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and
dignity of the Courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction
combining “the jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is so
because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim between
H litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN v. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE 631
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dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration of A
justice from being maligned. In the general interest of the
community, it is imperative that the authority of courts should not
be imperiled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in
the administration of justice. It is a matter between the court and
the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is exercised
B
in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the
majesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be
permitted which may have the tendency to shake the public
confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of
justice.
43. The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of C
court, though quite wide, is yet limited and cannot be expanded to
include the power to determine whether an advocate is also guilty
of “Professional misconduct” in a summary manner, giving a go
bye to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act. The
power to do complete justice under Article 142 is in a way, D
corrective power, which gives preference to equity over law but
it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due
process contained in the Advocates Act 1961 by suspending his
license to practice in a summary manner, while dealing with a
case of contempt of court.
E
44. In Re, V.C. Mishra case, while imposing the punishment of
suspended simple imprisonment, the Bench, as already noticed,
punished the contemner also by suspending his license to practice
as an advocate for a specified period. The Bench dealing with
that aspect opined: (SCC p.624, para 51)
F
“It is not disputed that suspension of the advocate from practice
and his removal from the State roll of advocates are both
punishments. There is no restriction or limitation on the nature
of punishment that this Court may award while exercising its
contempt jurisdiction and the said punishments can be the
punishments the Court may impose while exercising the said G
jurisdiction.”
45. In taking this view, the Bench relied upon Articles 129 and
142 of the Constitution besides Section 38 of the Advocates Act,
1961. The Bench observed: (SCC p.624, paras 49-50)
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A “Secondly, it would also mean that for any act of contempt of
court, if it also happens to be an act of professional misconduct
under the Bar Council of India Rules, the courts including this
Court, will have no power to take action since the Advocates
Act confers exclusive power for taking action for such conduct
on the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Council and
B
the Bar Council of India, as the case may be. Such a proposition
of law on the face of it observes rejection for the simple reason
that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar council and
the Bar Council of India to take action for professional
misconduct is different from the jurisdiction of the Courts to
C take action against the advocates for the contempt of Court.
The said jurisdiction co-exist independently of each other. The
action taken under one jurisdiction does not bar an action under
the other jurisdiction.”
The contention is also misplaced for yet another and equally, if
D not more, important reason. In the matter of disciplinary
jurisdiction under the Advocates Act, this Court is constituted
as the final Appellate authority under Section 38 of the act as
pointed out earlier. In that capacity, this court can impose any
of the punishments mentioned in Section 35(3) of the Act
including that of removal of the name of the Advocate from
E the State roll and of suspending him from practice. If that be
so, there is no reason why this court while exercising its
contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 read with Article 142
cannot impose any of the said punishments. The punishment
so imposed will not only be not against the provisions of any
F statute but in conformity with the substantive provisions of the
advocates Act and for conduct which is both a professional
misconduct as well as the contempt of Court. The argument
has, therefore, to be rejected.”
46. These observations, as we shall presently demonstrate and
G we say so with utmost respect, are too widely stated and do not
bear closer scrutiny. After recognising that the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India
to take action for professional misconduct is different from the
jurisdiction of the courts to take action against the advocates for
the contempt of court, how could the court invest itself with the
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council to A
punish the advocate concerned for “professional misconduct” in
addition to imposing the punishment of suspended sentence of
imprisonment for committing contempt of court.
57. In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing
contempt of court may also be guilty of committing “professional B
misconduct” depending upon the gravity or nature of his
contumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate and
distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate
and distinct procedures. The power to punish an Advocate, by
suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll of
the State Bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vests C
exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates
Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing
contempt of court vests exclusively in the courts.
58. After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961,
exclusive power for punishing an advocate for “professional D
misconduct “has been conferred on the State Bar Council
concerned and the Bar Council of India. That Act contains a
detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking the
license of an advocate for his “professional misconduct’. Since,
the suspension or revocation of license of an advocate has not E
only civil consequences but also penal consequences, the
punishment being in the nature of penalty, the provisions have to
be strictly construed. Punishment by way of suspending the license
of an advocate can only be imposed by the competent statutory
body after the charge is established against the Advocate in a
manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. F

70. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors.,
(1975) 2 SCC 702, a Seven Judge Bench of this Court analyzed
the scheme of the Advocates Act 1961 and inter alia observed:
(SCC p.709, para 24)
G
“24. The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicate that
the Constitution of State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India
is for one of the principal purposes to see that the standards of
professional conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Council
of India are observed and preserved. The Bar Councils,
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634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A therefore, entertain cases of misconduct against advocates.
The Bar Councils are to safeguard the rights, privilege, and
interests of advocates. The Bar Council is a body corporate.
The disciplinary committees are constituted by the Bar Council.
The Bar Council is not the same body as its disciplinary
committee. One of the principal functions of the Bar Council
B
in regard to standards of professional conduct and etiquette of
advocates is to receive complaints against advocates and if
the Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate has
been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer
the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. The Bar
C Councils of a State may also of its own motion if it has reason
to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or
other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its
disciplinary committee. It is apparent that a state Bar Council
not only receives a complaint but is required to apply its mind
to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any
D
advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct.
The Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned belief. The
Bar Council has a very important part to play, first in the
reception of complaints, second, informing reasonable belief
of guilt of professional or other misconduct and finally in making
E reference of the case to its disciplinary committee. The initiation
of the proceeding before the disciplinary committee is by the
Bar Council of a State. A most significant feature is that no
litigant and no member of the public can straightway commence
disciplinary proceedings against an advocate. It is the Bar
Council of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.
F
71. Thus, after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961
with effect from 19-5-1961, matters connected with the enrolment
of advocates as also their punishment for professional misconduct
is governed by the provisions of that Act only. Since, the jurisdiction
to grant license to a law graduate to practice as an advocate vest
G exclusively in the Bar Councils of the State concerned, the
jurisdiction to suspend his license for a specified term or to revoke
it also vests in the same body.
72. The letters patent of the Chartered High Courts as well of the
other High Courts earlier did vest power in those High Courts to
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

admit an advocate to practice. The power of suspending from A
practice being incidental to that of admitting to practice also vested
in the High Courts. However, by virtue of Section 50 of the
Advocates Act, with effect from the date when a State Bar Council
is constituted under the Act, the provisions of the Letters patent
of any High Court and “of any other law” in so far as they relate
B
to the admission and enrolment of a legal practitioner or confer on
the legal practitioner the right to practice in any court or before
any authority or a person as also the provisions relating to the
“suspension or removal” of legal practitioners, whether under the
letters patent of any High Court or of any other law. have been
repealed. These powers now vest exclusively, under the Advocates C
Act, in the Bar Council of the State concerned. Even in England,
the courts of justice are now relieved from disbarring advocates
from practice after the power of calling to the Bar has been
delegated to the Inns of Court. The power to disbar the advocate
also now vests exclusively in the Inns of Court and a detailed
D
procedure has been laid therefor.
76. This Court is indeed the final appellate authority under Section
38 of the Act but we are not persuaded to agree with the view
that this Court can in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, under
Section 38 of the Act, impose one of the punishments, prescribed
under that Act, while punishing a contemner advocate in a contempt E
case. ‘Professional misconduct’ of the advocate concerned is not
a matter directly in issue in the contempt of court case. While
dealing with the contempt of court case, this court is obliged to
examine whether the conduct complained of amounts to contempt
of court and if the answer is in the affirmative, then to sentence F
the contemner for contempt of court by imposing any of the
recognised and accepted punishments for committing contempt
of court. Keeping in view the elaborate procedure prescribed under
the Advocates Act 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder it follows
that a complaint of professional misconduct is required to be tried
by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council, like the trial of a G
criminal case by a court of law and an advocate may be punished
on the basis of evidence led before the disciplinary committee of
the Bar Council after being afforded an opportunity of hearing.
The delinquent advocate may be suspended from practice for a
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636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A specified period or even removed from the rolls of the advocates
or imposed any other punishment as provided under the Act. The
inquiry is a detailed and elaborate one and is not of a summary
nature. It is, therefore, not permissible for this court to punish an
advocate for “professional misconduct” in exercise of the appellate
jurisdiction by converting itself as the statutory body exercising
B
“original jurisdiction”. Indeed, if in a given case the Bar Council
concerned on being apprised of the contumacious and
blameworthy conduct of the advocate by the High Court or this
Court does not take any action against the said advocate, this
court may well have the jurisdiction in exercise of its appellate
C powers under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the
Constitution to proceed suo moto and send for the records from
the Bar Council and pass appropriate orders against the advocate
concerned. In an appropriate case, this Court may consider the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction even suo moto provided there is
some cause pending before the Bar Council concerned, and the
D
Bar Council does “not act” or fails to act, by sending for the
record of that cause and pass appropriate orders.
77. However, the exercise of powers under the contempt
jurisdiction cannot be confused with the appellate jurisdiction under
Section 38 of the Act. The two jurisdictions are separate and
E distinct. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to
subscribe to the contrary view expressed by the Bench in V.C.
Mishra case because in that case, the Bar Council had not declined
to deal with the matter and take appropriate action against the
advocate concerned. Since there was no cause pending before
F the Bar Council, this court could not exercise its appellate
jurisdiction in respect of a matter which was never under
consideration of the Bar Council.
78. Thus, to conclude we are of the opinion that this Court cannot
in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 read with Article
G 129 of the Constitution, while punishing a contemner for committing
contempt of court, also impose a punishment of suspending his
license to practice, where the contemner happens to be an
Advocate. Such a punishment cannot even be imposed by taking
recourse to the appellate powers under Section 38 of the Act
while dealing with a case of contempt of court (and not an appeal
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

relating to professional misconduct as such). To that extent, the A
law laid down in Vinay Chandra Mishra, Re is not good law and
we overrule it.
79. An Advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court may
also, as already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct in a
given case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council B
of India to punish that Advocate by either debarring him from
practice or suspending his license, as may be warranted, in the
facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Solicitor
General informed us that there have been cases where the Bar
Council of India taking note of the contumacious and objectionable
conduct of an advocate, had initiated disciplinary proceedings C
against him and even punished him for “professional misconduct”,
on the basis of his having been found guilty of committing contempt
of court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of
the State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be when apprised
of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate by the D
High Court or by this Court, would rise to the occasion, and take
appropriate action against such an advocate. Under Article 144
of the Constitution “all authorities civil and judicial, in the territory
of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court”. The Bar Council
which performs a public duty and is charged with the obligation to
protect the dignity of the profession and maintain professional E
standards and etiquette is also obliged to act “in aid of the Supreme
Court”. It must, whenever, facts warrant rise to the occasion and
discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemner
advocate. It must act in accordance with the prescribed procedure,
whenever its attention is drawn by this Court to the contumacious F
and unbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the tendency
to interfere with due administration of justice. It is possible for the
High Courts also to draw the attention of the Bar Council of the
State to a case of professional misconduct of a contemner
advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the manner
prescribed by the Act and the rules framed thereunder. There is G
no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not rise to
the occasion, as they are equally responsible to uphold the dignity
of the courts and the majesty of law and prevent any interference
in the administration of justice. Learned counsel for the parties
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638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A present before us do not dispute and rightly so that whenever a
court of record, records its findings about the conduct of an
Advocate while finding him guilty of committing contempt of court
and desires or refers the matter to be considered by the Bar Council
concerned, appropriate action should be initiated by the Bar Council
concerned in accordance with law with a view to maintain the
B
dignity of the courts and to uphold the majesty of law and
professional standards and etiquette. Nothing is more destructive
of public confidence in the administration of justice than incivility,
rudeness or disrespectful conduct on the part of a counsel towards
the court or disregard by the court of the privileges of the bar. In
C case the Bar Council, even after receiving ‘reference’ from the
court, fails to take action against the advocate concerned, this
court might consider invoking its powers under Section 38 of the
Act by sending for the record of the proceedings from the Bar
Council and passing appropriate orders. Of Course, the appellate
powers under Section 38 would be available to this Court only
D
and not to the High Courts. We, however, hope that such a situation
would not arise.
80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High
Court, the prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it till
he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from
E suspending or revoking his license or debarring him to practice as
an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious,
unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record,
this court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules
itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-an-
F Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the
power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or
suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not
amount to suspending or revoking his license to practice as an
advocate in other courts or Tribunals.”
G (emphasis supplied)
The Court has observed that in a given case an Advocate found
guilty of committing contempt of court may at the same time be guilty of
committing “professional misconduct” but the two jurisdictions are
separate, distinct and exercisable by different forums by following
H different procedures. Exclusive power for punishing an Advocate for
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN v. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE 639
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

professional misconduct is with Bar Councils. Punishment for suspending A
the license of an Advocate can only be imposed by a competent statutory
body. Relying upon the Seven-Judges Bench decision in Bar Council
of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors. (supra) that under
Advocates Act the power to grant licenses is with Bar Council, the
jurisdiction to suspend the licence or to debar him vests in the same
B
body. Though appeal lies to this Court under Section 38, it cannot convert
it to statutory body exercising “original jurisdiction”. This Court, in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 142 and 129 while punishing in the
contempt of court, cannot suspend a licence to practice. The Court
further held that it is possible for this Court or the High Court to prevent
contemnor Advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of contempt C
but that is different from suspending or revoking his licence to practice
or debarring him from practice for misconduct. This Court also held in
case of Advocate on Record that the Supreme Court possesses
jurisdiction under its rules to withdraw the privilege to practice as
Advocate on record as that privilege is conferred by this Court. The
D
withdrawal of that privilege does not tantamount to suspending or revoking
the licence.
55. Shri Mohan Parasaran learned senior counsel has relied on
the matter of Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr. (supra) in
which the question was whether an Advocate found guilty of contempt
of court can appear in court until and unless he purges himself of contempt, E
the court held that an Advocate found guilty of contempt of court must
purge himself before being permitted to appear. Rule 11 of the Rules
framed by the High Court of Kerala under section 34 (1) of Advocates
Act reads thus:
“11. No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court F
shall be permitted to appear, act or plead in any Court unless he
has purged himself of the contempt.”
This Court has relied upon in Supreme Court Bar Association v.
Union of India (supra) in Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr.
(supra) and observed thus: G
16. Rule 11 of the Rules is not a provision intended for the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State r the Bar
Council of India. It is a matter entirely concerning the dignity and
the orderly functioning of the courts. The right of the advocate to
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640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A practice envelopes a lot of acts to be performed by him in the
discharge of his professional duties. Apart form appearing in the
courts he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legal
opinion whenever sought for, he can draft instruments, pleadings,
affidavits or any other documents, he can participate in any
conference involving legal discussions etc. Rule 11 has nothing to
B
do with all the acts done by an advocate during his practice except
his performance insides the court. Conduct in court is a matter
concerning the court and hence the Bar Council cannot claim that
what should happen inside the court could also be regulated by
the Bar Council in exercise of its disciplinary powers. The right to
C practice, no doubt, is the genus of which the right to appear and
conduct cases in the court may be a specie. But the right to appear
and conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court
must have the major supervisory power. Hence the court cannot
be divested of the control or supervision of the court merely
because it may involve the right of an advocate.
D
17. When the rules stipulate that a person who committed contempt
of court cannot have the unreserved right to continue to appear
and plead and conduct cases in the courts without any qualm or
remorse, the Bar Council cannot overrule such a regulation
concerning the orderly conduct of court proceedings. Courts of
E law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect and
reverence for the majesty of law and justice. The machinery for
dispensation of justice according to law is operated by the court.
Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to be held in a
dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an advocate, who
F was found guilty of contempt of court on the previous hour, standing
in the court and arguing a case or cross-examining a witness on
the same day, unaffected by the contemptuous behavior he hurled
at the court, would erode the dignity of the court and even corrode
the majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the public in
the efficacy of the institution of the courts. This necessitates vesting
G of power with the High Court to formulate rules for regulating the
proceeding inside the court including the conduct of advocates
during such proceedings. That power should not be confused with
the right to practice law. While the Bar Council can exercise control
over the latter the High Court should be in control of the former.
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18. In the above context, it is useful to quote the following A
observations made by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court in Prayag Das vs. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr and ors. AIR
1974 All 133 : (AIR p.136, para 9)
“The High Court has a power to regulate the appearance of
advocates in courts. The right to practise and the right to appear B
in courts are not synonymous. An advocate may carry on
chamber practice or even practise in courts in various other
ways, e.g. drafting and filing of pleadings and Vakalatnama
for performing those acts. For that purpose, his physical
appearance in courts may not at all be necessary. For the
purpose of regulating his appearance in courts the High Court C
should be the appropriate authority to make rules and on a
proper construction of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act it
must be inferred that the High Court has the power to make
rules for regulating the appearance of Advocates and
proceedings inside the courts. Obviously, the High Court is the D
only appropriate authority to be entrusted with this
responsibility.”
19. In our view, the legal position has been correctly delineated in
the above statements made by the Allahabad High Court. The
context for making those statements was that an advocate E
questioned the powers of the High Court in making dress
regulations for the advocates while appearing in courts.
20. Lord Denning had observed as follows in Hadkinson vs.
Hadkinson 1952 (2) All ER 567: (All ER p.575B-C)
“…I am of the opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has F
disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being
heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues,
it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more
difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the
orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion G
refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good
reason is shown why it should not be removed.”
21. The observations can apply to the courts in India without any
doubt and at the same time without impeding the disciplinary
powers vested in the Bar Councils under the Advocate Act.
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642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A 35. It is still open to the respondent Advocate to purge himself of
the contempt in the manner indicated above. But until that process
is completed respondent Advocate cannot act or plead in any court
situated within the domain of the Kerala High Court, including the
subordinate courts thereunder. The Registrar of the High Court
of Kerala shall intimate all the courts about this interdict as against
B
the respondent-advocates.”
(emphasis supplied)
56. The decision in Pravin C. Shah (supra) operates when an
Advocate is found guilty of committing contempt of court and then he
C can be debarred from appearing in court until he purges himself of
contempt as per guidelines laid down therein, however, the power to
suspend enrolment and debarring from appearance are different from
each other. In case of debarment, enrolment continues but a person
cannot appear in court once he is guilty of contempt of court until he
purges himself as provided in the rule. Debarment due to having been
D found guilty of contempt of court is not punishment of suspending the
license for a specified period or permanently removing him from the roll
of Advocates. While guilty of contempt his name still continuous on the
roll of concerned Bar Council unless removed or suspended by Bar
Council by taking appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The observations
E made by Lord Denning in Hadkinson v. Hadkindon (supra) was also a
case of disobedience of court order and the Court may refuse to hear
him until impediment is removed or good reason to remove impediment
exist.
57. In Ex- Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India & Anr. (supra)
F while holding that advocates have no right to go on ‘strike’, the Court
observed:
“20. Thus the law is already well settled. It is the duty of every
Advocate who has accepted a brief to attend the trial, even though
it may go on day to day and for a prolonged period. It is also
G settled law that a lawyer who has accepted a brief cannot refuse
to attend Court because a boycott call is given by the Bar
Association. It is settled law that it is unprofessional as well as
unbecoming for a lawyer who has accepted a brief to refuse to
attend Court even in pursuance of a call for strike or boycott by
the Bar Association or the Bar Council. It is settled law that Courts
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

are under an obligation to hear and decide cases brought before A
them and cannot adjourn matters merely because lawyers are on
strike. The law is that it is the duty and obligation of Courts to go
on with matters or otherwise it would tantamount to becoming
privy to the strike. It is also settled law that if a resolution is passed
by Bar Associations expressing want of confidence in judicial
B
officers, it would amount to scandalizing the Courts to undermine
its authority and thereby the advocates will have committed
contempt of Court. Lawyers have known, at least since Mahabir
Singh case (supra) that if they participate in a boycott or a strike,
their action is ex-facie bad in view of the declaration of law by
this Court. A lawyer’s duty is to boldly ignore a call for strike or C
boycott of Court/s. Lawyers have also known, at least since
Ramon Services case, that the advocates would be answerable
for the consequences suffered by their clients if the non-
appearance was solely on grounds of a strike call.
22. It was expected that having known the well-settled law and D
having seen that repeated strikes and boycotts have shaken the
confidence of the public in the legal profession and affected the
administration of justice, there would be self-regulation. The
abovementioned interim order was passed in the hope that with
self-restraint and self-regulation the lawyers would retrieve their
profession from lost social respect. The hope has not fructified. E
Unfortunately, strikes and boycott calls are becoming a frequent
spectacle. Strikes, boycott calls, and even unruly and unbecoming
conduct are becoming a frequent spectacle. On the slightest
pretense strikes and/or boycott calls are resorted to. The judicial
system is being held to ransom. Administration of law and justice F
is threatened. The rule of law is undermined.
33. The only exception to the general rule set out above appears
to be the item (III). We accept that in such cases a strong protest
must be lodged. We remain of the view that strikes are illegal and
that courts must now take a very serious view of strikes and calls G
for boycott. However, as stated above, lawyers are part and parcel
of the system of administration of justice. A protest on an issue
involving dignity, integrity, and independence of the Bar and
judiciary, provided it does not exceed one day, may be overlooked
by courts, who may turn a blind eye for that one day.
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A 34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of
appearance in courts is still within the control and jurisdiction of
courts. Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not been brought into
force and rightly so. Control of conduct in Court can only be within
the domain of courts. Thus Article 145 of the Constitution of India
gives to the Supreme Court and Section 34 of the Advocates Act
B
gives to the High Court power to frame rules including rules
regarding condition on which a person (including an advocate)
can practice in the Supreme Court and/or in the High Court and
courts subordinate thereto. Many courts have framed rules in this
behalf. Such a rule would be valid and binding on all. Let the Bar
C take note that unless self-restraint is exercised, courts may now
have to consider framing specific rules debarring advocates, guilty
of contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from
appearing before the courts. Such a rule if framed would not have
anything to do with the disciplinary jurisdiction of Bar Councils. It
would be concerning the dignity and orderly functioning of the
D
courts. The right of the advocate to practice envelopes a lot of
acts to be performed by him in the discharge of his professional
duties. Apart from appearing in the courts he can be consulted by
his clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for, he
can draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other documents,
E he can participate in any conference involving legal discussions,
he can work in any office or firm as a legal officer, he can appear
for clients before an arbitrator or arbitrators etc. Such a rule
would have nothing to do with all the acts done by an advocate
during his practice. He may even file vakalat on behalf of a client
even though his appearance inside the court is not permitted.
F
Conduct in court is a matter concerning the court and hence the
Bar Council cannot claim that what should happen inside the court
could also be regulated by them in the exercise of their disciplinary
powers. The right to practice, no doubt, is the genus of which the
right to appear and conduct cases in the court may be a specie.
G But the right to appear and conduct cases in the court is a matter
on which the court must and does have major supervisory and
controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested
of control or supervision of conduct in court merely because it
may involve the right of an advocate. A rule can stipulate that a
person who has committed contempt of court or has behaved
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

unprofessionally and in an unbecoming manner will not have the A
right to continue to appear and plead and conduct cases in courts.
The Bar Councils cannot overrule such a regulation concerning
the orderly conduct of court proceedings. On the contrary, it will
be their duty to see that such a rule is strictly abided by. Courts of
law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect and
B
reverence to the majesty of law and justice. The machinery for
dispensation of justice according to the law is operated by the
court. Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to be
held in a dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an
advocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or
unprofessional conduct, standing in the court would erode the C
dignity of the court and even corrode its majesty besides impairing
the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the
courts.The power to frame such rules should not be confused
with the right to practice law. While the Bar Council can exercise
control over the latter, the courts are in control of the former. This
D
distinction is clearly brought out by the difference in language in
Section 49 of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Article 145
of the Constitution of India and Section 34(1) of the Advocates
Act on the other. Section 49 merely empowers the Bar Council to
frame rules laying down conditions subject to which an advocate
shall have a right to practise i.e. do all the other acts set out above. E
However, Article 145 of the Constitution of India empowers the
Supreme Court to make rules for regulating this practice and
procedure of the court including inter-alia rules as to persons
practicing before this Court. Similarly, Section 34 of the Advocates
Act empowers High Courts to frame rules, inter-alia to lay down
F
conditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in
courts. Article 145 of the Constitution of India and Section 34 of
the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to
an advocate to appear in a court. An advocate appears in a court
subject to such conditions as are laid down by the court. It must
be remembered that Section 30 has not been brought into force G
and this also shows that there is no absolute right to appear in a
court. Even if Section 30 were to be brought into force control of
proceedings in Court will always remain with the Court. Thus
even then the right to appear in Court will be subject to complying
with conditions laid down by Courts just as practice outside Courts
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A would be subject to conditions laid down by the Bar Council of
India. There is thus no conflict or clash between other provisions
of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Section 34 or Article
145 of the Constitution of India on the other.
45. Further, appropriate rules are required to be framed by the
B High Courts under Section 34 of the Advocates Act by making it
clear that strike by advocate/advocates would be considered
interference with the administration of justice and advocate/
advocates concerned may be barred from practicing before courts
in a district or in the High Court.”
C (emphasis supplied)
The question involved in the aforesaid case was as to strike and
boycott of Courts by Lawyers. In that context argument was raised that
such an act tantamounts to contempt of court and the court must punish
the party coercing others also to desist from appearance. The Court
D cannot be privy to boycott or strike. The decision in Supreme Court
Bar Association v. Union of India (supra) has been reiterated. The
Court pointed out that let bar take notice of the fact that unless self-
restraint is exercised, the court may have to frame rules under Section
34 of the Advocates Act debarring advocates guilty of contempt of court/
unprofessional or unbecoming conduct from appearing in Courts. The
E Court observed that in case of Bar Council fail to act, Court may be
compelled to frame appropriate Rules under Section 34 of the Act. The
Court has observed about the rules that may be framed but not on the
validity of rules that actually have been framed and takes away disciplinary
control of Bar Council. The power to debar due to contempt of court is
F a different aspect than suspension of enrolment or debarment by way of
disciplinary measure. This Court did not observe that decision in Supreme
Court Bar Association v. Union of India (supra) is bad in law for any
reason at the same time Court has relied upon the same in Ex-Capt.
Harish Uppal (supra), and laid down that Bar Council can exercise
control on right to practice. The Court also observed that power to
G control proceedings within the Court cannot be affected by enforcement
of Section 30.
58. In our opinion, the decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v.
Union of India & Anr. (supra) does not lend support to vires of Rule
14A to 14D as amended by the High Court of Madras. The decision
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follows the logic of the Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of A
India as contempt of court may involve professional misconduct if
committed inside Court Room and takes it further with respect to the
debarring appearance in Court, which power is distinct from suspending
enrolment that lies with Bar Council as observed in Ex-Capt. Harish
Uppal (supra) also in aforesaid para 34, the decision is of no utility to
B
sustain the vires of impugned rules.
59. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (supra)
vires of Rule 11 of the rules framed by the High Court of Kerala under
section 34(1) of Advocates Act came to be impinged which debarred
Advocate found guilty of contempt of court from appearing, acting or
pleading in court till he got purged himself of the contempt. The court C
considered the Contempt of Courts Act, Advocates Act, Code of Criminal
Procedure, and significantly distinction between Contempt of Court and
misconduct by an Advocate and observed:
“29. Punishment for commission of contempt and punishment
for misconduct, professional or other misconduct, stand on different D
footings. A person does not have a fundamental right to practice
in any court. Such a right is conferred upon him under the provisions
of the Advocates Act which necessarily would mean that the
conditions laid down therein would be applicable in relation thereto.
Section 30 of the Act uses the expressions “subject to”, which E
would include Section 34 of the Act.
30. In Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.
(2004) 3 SCC 1 this Court noticed:
“Subject to” is an expression whereby limitation is expressed.
The order is conclusive for all purposes.” F
31. This Court further noticed the dictionary meaning of “subject
to” stating (SCC p. 38, paras 92-93):
“92. Furthermore, the expression ‘subject to’ must be given
effect to.
G
93. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition at page 1278 the
expression “subject to” has been defined as under :
‘Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to;
governed or affected by; provided that; provided, answerable
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648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A for. (Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo. 650,
136 SW 2d 289, 302)’”
Case-law
32. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Supreme Court Bar
Assn.,(1998) 4 SCC 409 no doubt overruled its earlier decision in
B Vinay Chandra Mishra, Re (1995) 2 SCC 584 so as to hold that
this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India is only empowered to proceed suo motu
against an advocate for his misconduct and send for the records
and pass an appropriate orders against the advocate concerned.
C 33. But it is one thing to say that the court can take suo motu
cognizance of professional or other misconduct and direct the
Bar Council of India to proceed against the advocate but it is
another thing to say that it may not allow an advocate to practice
in his court unless he purges himself of contempt.
D 34. Although in a case of professional misconduct, this Court cannot
punish an advocate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 129
of the Constitution of India which can be imposed on a finding of
professional misconduct recorded in the manner prescribed under
the Advocates Act and the rules framed thereunder but as has
E been noticed in the Supreme Court Bar Assn. professional
misconduct of the advocate concerned is not a matter directly in
issue in the matter of contempt case.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Court referred to the observation in Supreme Court Bar
F Association v. Union of India, Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra) and
held that in a case of professional misconduct Court cannot punish an
advocate under Article 129 which has to be done under Advocates Act
by the Bar Council. In Contempt of Court Act, misconduct is directly
not in issue. After considering principles of natural justice the court
observed that it cannot be stretched too far and Rule 11 cannot be said
G
to be violative of provisions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
60. In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (supra) relied
on by the respondents, the witnesses were tampered with by the appellant.
A sting operation was conducted by the T.V. Channel in connection with
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BMW hit and run case. Advocate - R.K. Anand was found to be guilty A
of contempt of Court. He was debarred from appearing in Court for a
certain period. The Court also dealt with a motivated application filed
for recusal. The Court expressed concern and sharp deprecation of
such tendencies and practices of Members of Bar and held that such
prayer for recusal ordinarily should be viewed as interference in the due
B
course of justice leading to penal consequences. The submission was
raised that professional misconduct is dealt with under Advocates Act.
The Delhi High Court Rules do not provide that Advocate on conviction
for Contempt of Court would be barred from appearing in Court. This
Court noted decisions in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of
India (supra), upheld the order of the High Court and directed the High C
Courts to frame the Rules under Section 34 without further delay. This
Court has observed:
“237. In both Pravin C. Shahv. K.A. Mohammed Ali, (2001) 8
SCC 650 and Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003)
2 SCC 45, the earlier Constitution Bench decision in Supreme D
Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 was
extensively considered. The decision in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal
was later followed in a three-judge Bench decision in Bar Council
of India v. The High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311.
238. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. the direction prohibiting an E
advocate from appearing in court for a specified period was viewed
as a total and complete denial of his right to practice law and the
bar was considered as a punishment inflicted on him. In Ex. Capt.
Harish Uppal it was seen not as punishment for professional
misconduct but as a measure necessary to regulate the court’s
proceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning of F
the courts. We may respectfully add that in a given case a direction
disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contempt
from appearing in court may not only be a measure to maintain
the dignity and orderly functioning of the courts but may become
necessary for the self-protection of the court and for preservation G
of the purity of court proceedings. Let us, for example, take the
case where an advocate is shown to have accepted money in the
name of a judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or where an
advocate is found tampering with the court’s record; or where an
advocate is found actively taking part in faking court orders (fake
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650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A bail orders are not unknown in several High Courts!); or where
an advocate has made it into a practice to browbeat and abuse
judges and on that basis has earned the reputation to get a case
transferred from an “inconvenient” court; or where an advocate
is found to be in the habit of sending unfounded and unsubstantiated
allegation petitions against judicial officers and judges to the
B
superior courts. Unfortunately, these examples are not from
imagination. These things are happening more frequently than we
care to acknowledge.
239. We may also add that these illustrations are not exhaustive
but there may be other ways in which a malefactor’s conduct and
C actions may pose a real and imminent threat to the purity of court
proceedings, cardinal to any court’s functioning, apart from
constituting a substantive offense and contempt of court and
professional misconduct. In such a situation the court does not
only have the right but it also has the obligation cast upon it to
D protect itself and save the purity of its proceedings from being
polluted in any way and to that end bar the malefactor from
appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.
240. It is already explained in Ex. Captain Harish Uppal that a
direction of this kind by the Court cannot be equated with
E punishment for professional misconduct. Further, the prohibition
against appearance in courts does not affect the right of the lawyer
concerned to carry on his legal practice in other ways as indicated
in the decision. We respectfully submit that the decision in Ex-
Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India places the issue in correct
perspective and must be followed to answer the question at issue
F before us.
242. Ideally, every High Court should have rules framed under
Section 34 of the Advocates Act in order to meet with such
eventualities but even in the absence of the rules, the High Court
cannot be held to be helpless against such threats. In a matter as
G fundamental and grave as preserving the purity of judicial
proceedings, the High Court would be free to exercise the powers
vested in it under Section 34 of the Advocates Act notwithstanding
the fact that Rules prescribing the manner of exercise of power
have not been framed. But in the absence of statutory Rules
H providing for such a course an advocate facing the charge of
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contempt would normally think of only the punishments specified A
under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. He may not
even imagine that at the end of the proceeding he might end up
being debarred from appearing before the court. The rules of
natural justice, therefore, demand that before passing an order
debarring an advocate from appearing in courts he must be clearly
B
told that his alleged conduct or actions are such that if found guilty
he might be debarred from appearing in courts for a specific period.
The warning may be given in the initial notice of contempt issued
under Section 14 or Section 17 (as the case may be) of the
Contempt of Courts Act. Or such a notice may be given after the
proceedee is held guilty of criminal contempt before dealing with C
the question of punishment.
243. In order to avoid any such controversies in future, all the
High Courts that have so far not framed rules under Section 34 of
the Advocates Act are directed to frame the rules without any
further delay. It is earnestly hoped that all the High Courts shall D
frame the rules within four months from today. The High Courts
may also consider framing rules for having Advocates on Record
on the pattern of the Supreme Court of India.”
(emphasis supplied)
61. The decision in R.K. Anand (supra) is not a departure from E
aforesaid other decisions but rather affirms them. It was a case of
debarring advocate for a particular period from the appearance on being
found guilty of contempt of court, not a case of suspension of enrolment
by way of disciplinary proceedings which power lies with the Bar Council.
62. The provisions contained in Order IV Rule 10 of the Supreme F
Court Rules have been pressed into service so as to sustain the amended
rules. Rule 10 reads as follows:
“10. When, on the complaint of any person or otherwise, the
Court is of the opinion that an advocate-on record has been guilty
of misconduct or of conduct unbecoming of an advocate-on-record, G
the Court may make an order removing his name from the register
of Advocates on record either permanently or for such period as
the Court may think fit and the Registrar shall thereupon report
the said fact to the Bar Council of India and to State Bar Council
concerned:
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652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A Provided that the Court shall, before making such order, issue to
such advocate-on-record a summons returnable before the Court
or before a Special Bench to be constituted by the Chief Justice,
requiring the Advocate-on-Record to show cause against the
matters alleged in the summons, and the summons shall, if
practicable, be served personally upon him with copies of any
B
affidavit or statement before the Court at the time of the issue of
the summons.
Explanation: - For the purpose of these Rules, misconduct or
conduct unbecoming of an Advocate on Record shall include -
C a) Mere name lending by an Advocate-on-Record without any
further participation in the proceedings of the case;
b) Absence of the Advocate-on-Record from the Court without
any justifiable cause when the case is taken up for hearing;
and;
D
c) Failure to submit appearance slip duly signed by the
Advocate-on-Record of actual appearances in the Court.”
The aforesaid rule has been considered in Supreme Court Bar
Association v. Union of India (supra) and it is observed that as this
Court enrolls Advocate on Record it has the power to remove his name
E
from the register of Advocate on Record either permanently or for a
specific period. That does not tantamount to the suspension of enrolment
made by Bar Council under Advocates Act which can be ordered by
Bar Council only.
63. The decision in Mohit Chowdhary, Advocate, IN RE, (supra)
F
has also been relied upon in which this Court considered Rule 10 and
debarred advocate to practice as Advocate on Record for a period of
one month from the date of order. At the same time, this Court has
observed that lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall detract
from the dignity of the Court. Contempt jurisdiction is for the purpose of
G upholding honor or dignity of the court, to avoid sharp or unfair practices.
An Advocate shall not to be immersed in a blind quest of relief for his
client. “Law is not trade, briefs no merchandise”. His duty is to
legitimately present his side of the case to assist in the administration of
justice. The Judges are selected from Bar and purity of Bench depends
on the purity of the Bar. Degraded Bar result degraded bench. The
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Court has referred to Articles and standard of processional conduct and A
etiquettes thus:
20. Warvelle’s Legal Ethics, 2nd Edn. at p.182 sets out the
obligation of a lawyer as:
“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall detract
from the dignity of the court, of which he is himself a sworn B
officer and assistant. He should at all times pay deferential
respect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe the decorum of
the courtroom”.
21. The contempt jurisdiction is not only to protect the reputation
of the Judge concerned so that he can administer justice fearlessly C
and fairly but also to protect “the fair name of the judiciary”. The
protection in a manner of speaking, extends even to the Registry
in the performance of its task and false and unfair allegations
which seek to impede the working of the Registry and thus the
administration of justice, made with oblique motives cannot be D
tolerated. In such a situation in order to uphold the honor and
dignity of the institution, the Court has to perform the painful duties
which we are faced with in the present proceedings. Not to do so
in the words of P.B. Sawant, J. in Ministry of Information &
Broadcasting, In re, (1995) 3 SCC 619 would: (SCC p.635, para
20) - E

“20. …. The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a
stage when the system will be found wrecked from within
before it is wrecked from outside. It is for the members of the
profession to introspect and take the corrective steps in time
and also spare the courts the unpleasant duty. We say no more.” F
22. Now turning to the “Standards of Professional Conduct and
Etiquette” of the Bar Council of India Rules contained in Section
I of Chapter II, Part VI, the duties of an advocate towards the
Court have been specified. We extract the 4th duty set out as
under: G
“4. An advocate shall use his best efforts to restrain and prevent
his client from resorting to sharp or unfair practices or from
doing anything in relation to the court, opposing counsel or
parties which the advocate himself ought not to do. An advocate
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654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A shall refuse to represent the client who persists in such improper
conduct. He shall not consider himself a mere mouthpiece of
the client, and shall exercise his own judgment in the use of
restrained language in correspondence, avoiding scurrilous
attacks in pleadings, and using intemperate language during
arguments in court.”
B
23. In the aforesaid context the aforesaid principle in different
words was set out by Crampton, J. in R. v. O’ Connell, 7 Irish
Law Reports 313 as under:
“The advocate is a representative but not a delegate. He gives
C to his client the benefit of his learning, his talents and his
judgment; but all through he never forgets what he owes to
himself and to others. He will not knowingly misstate the law,
he will not willfully misstate the facts, though it be to gain the
case for his client. He will ever bear in mind that if he be an
advocate of an individual and retained and remunerated often
D inadequately, for valuable services, yet he has a prior and
perpetual retainer on behalf of truth and justice and there is no
Crown or other licenses which in any case or for any party or
purpose can discharge him from that primary and paramount
retainer.”
E 24. The fundamentals of the profession thus require an advocate
not to be immersed in a blind quest of relief for his client. The
dignity of the institution cannot be violated in this quest as “law is
no trade, briefs no merchandise” as per Krishna Iyer, J in Bar
Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar (1976) 2 SCC 291.
F 25. It is also pertinent to note at this point, the illuminating words
of Vivian Bose, J. in ‘G’ a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court,
In re AIR 1954 SC 557, who elucidated:
“10. …To use the language of the Army, an Advocate of this
Court is expected at all times to comport himself in a manner
G befitting his status as an “officer and a gentleman”.
26. It is as far back as in 1925 that an Article titled ‘The Lawyer
as an Officer of the Court’ Virginia Law Review, Vol.11, No.4
(Feb 1925) pp.263-77 published in the Virginia Law Review, lucidly
set down what is expected from the lawyer which is best set out
H in its own words:
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“The duties of the lawyer to the Court spring directly from the A
relation that he sustains to the Court as an officer in the
administration of justice. The law is not a mere private calling but
is a profession which has the distinction of being an integral part
of the State’s judicial system. As an officer of the Court the lawyer
is, therefore, bound to uphold the dignity and integrity of the Court;
B
to exercise at all times respect for the Court in both words and
actions; to present all matters relating to his client’s case openly,
being careful to avoid any attempt to exert private influence upon
either the judge or the jury; and to be frank and candid in all
dealings with the Court, “using no deceit, imposition or evasion,”
as by misreciting witnesses or misquoting precedents. “It must C
always be understood,” says Mr. Christian Doerfler, in an address
before the Milwaukee County Bar Association, in December, 1911,
“that the profession of law is instituted among men for the purpose
of aiding the administration of justice. A proper administration of
justice does not mean that a lawyer should succeed in winning a
D
lawsuit. It means that he should properly bring to the attention of
the Court everything by way of fact and law that is available and
legitimate for the purpose of properly presenting his client’s case.
His duty as far as his client is concerned is simply to legitimately
present his side of the case. His duty as far as the public is
concerned and as far as he is an officer of the Court is to aid and E
assist in the administration of justice.”
In this connection, the timely words of Mr. Warvelle may also
well be remembered:
“But the lawyer is not alone a gentleman; he is a sworn minister F
of justice. His office imposes high moral duties and grave
responsibilities, and he is held to a strict fulfillment of all that
these matters imply. Interests of vast magnitude are entrusted
to him; confidence is imposed in him; life, liberty, and property
are committed to his care. He must be equal to the
responsibilities which they create, and if he betrays his trust, G
neglects his duties, practices deceit, or panders to vice, then
the most severe penalty should be inflicted and his name stricken
from the roll.”
That the lawyer owes a high duty to his profession and to his
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656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A fellow members of the Bar is an obvious truth. His profession
should be his pride, and to preserve its honor pure and unsullied
should be among his chief concerns. “Nothing should be higher in
the estimation of the advocate,” declares Mr. Alexander H.
Robbins, “next after those sacred relations of home and country
than his profession. She should be to him the ‘fairest of ten
B
thousand’ among the institutions of the earth. He must stand for
her in all places and resent any attack on her honor - as he would
if the same attack were to be made against his own fair name and
reputation. He should enthrone her in the sacred places of his
heart, and to her, he should offer the incense of constant devotion.
C For she is a jealous mistress.
Again, it is to be borne in mind that the judges are selected
from the ranks of lawyers. The purity of the Bench depends upon
the purity of the Bar.
“The very fact, then, that one of the co-ordinate departments
D of the Government is administered by men selected only from
one profession gives to that profession a certain pre-eminence
which calls for a high standard of morals as well as intellectual
attainments. The integrity of the judiciary is the safeguard of the
nation, but the character of the judges is practically but the
E character of the lawyers. Like begets like. A degraded Bar will
inevitably produce a degraded Bench, and just as certainly may
we expect to find the highest excellence in a judiciary drawn from
the ranks of an enlightened, learned and moral Bar.”
27. He ends his Article in the following words:
F “No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any
cause civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive,
nor should any lawyer render, any service or advice involving
disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of
the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption
G of any person or persons exercising a public office or private
trust, or deception or betrayal of the public. When rendering
any such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites and
merits stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, he
advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of
his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to
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impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance A
with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe
and advise his client to observe the statute law, though until a
statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent
adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity
and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning
B
and extent. But, above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in
a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public
duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.”
28. On examination of the legal principles, an important issue
emerges: what should be the end of what the contemnor had started
but has culminated in an impassioned plea of Mr. K.K. Venugopal, C
learned senior advocate supported by the representatives of the
Bar present in Court, marking their appearance for the contemnor.
We are inclined to give due consideration to such a plea but are
unable to persuade ourselves to let the contemnor go scot-free,
without any consequences. We are thus not inclined to proceed D
further in the contempt jurisdiction except to caution the contemnor
that this should be the first and the last time of such a misadventure.
But the matter cannot rest only at that.
30. We are of the view that the privilege of being an Advocate-
on-Record under the Rules has clearly been abused by the E
contemnor. The conduct was not becoming of an advocate much
less an Advocate-on-Record in the Supreme Court.
32. The aforesaid Rule makes it clear, that whether on the complaint
of any person or otherwise, in case of misconduct or a conduct
unbecoming of an Advocate-on-Record, the Court may make an F
order removing his name from the register of Advocate-on-Record
permanently, or for a specified period. We are not referring to the
right to practice as an advocate, and the name entered on the rolls
of any State Bar Council, which is a necessary requirement before
a person takes the examination of Advocate-on-Record. The
present case is clearly one where this Court is of the opinion that G
the conduct of the contemnor is unbecoming of an Advocate-on-
Record. The pre-requisites of the proviso are met by the reason
of the Bench being constituted itself by the Chief Justice, and the
contemnor being aware of the far more serious consequences,
which could have flowed to him. The learned Senior Counsel H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A representing the petitioner has thrown him at the mercy of the
Court. We have substantively accepted the request but lesser
consequences have been imposed on the contemnor.”
64. Reliance was placed on the decision Mahipal Singh Rana v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (supra) by the respondents. This Court dealt
B with the question when advocate has been convicted for criminal
contempt as to the sanctions/punishment that may be imposed in addition
to punishments that may be imposed for criminal contempt under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Court held that regulation of right
of appearance in courts is within jurisdiction of courts and not Bar Councils,
thus, Court can bar Advocate convicted for contempt from appearing/
C pleading before any court for an appropriate period of time, till convicted
advocate purges himself of the contempt, even in absence of suspension
or termination of enrolment/right to practice/licence to practice. Secondly,
this Court also held that bar on appearance/ pleadings in any court till
contempt is purged can be imposed by the Court in terms of the High
D Court Rules framed under Section 34 of the Advocates Act, if such
Rules exist. However, even if there is no such rule framed under said
Section 34, unless convicted advocate purges himself of contempt or is
permitted by Court, Court may debar an Advocate as conviction results
in debarring such advocate from appearing/pleading in court, even in
absence of suspension or termination of enrolment/right to practise/licence
E to practise. This Court held thus:
“4.1. (i) Whether a case has been made out for interference with
the order passed by the High Court convicting the appellant for
criminal contempt and sentencing him to simple imprisonment for
two months with a fine of Rs 2000 and further imprisonment for
F two weeks in default and debarring him from appearing in courts
in Judgeship at Etah; and
4.2. (ii) Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant
can be allowed to practice.

G 32. In Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650,
this Court held that an advocate found guilty of contempt cannot
be allowed to act or plead in any court until he purges himself of
contempt. This direction was issued having regard to Rule 11 of
the Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala under Section 34(1)
of the Advocates Act and also referring to the observations in
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para 80 of the judgment of this Court in Supreme Court Bar A
Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409. It was explained
that debarring a person from appearing in court was within the
purview of the jurisdiction of the Court and was different from
suspending or terminating the license which could be done by the
Bar Council and on the failure of the Bar Council, in exercise of
B
appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The observations are: (Pravin
C. Shah case, SCC pp. 658-62, paras 16-18, 24 & 27-28)
“16. Rule 11 of the Rules is not a provision intended for the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State or the
Bar Council of India. It is a matter entirely concerning the
dignity and the orderly functioning of the courts. The right of C
the advocate to practice envelops a lot of acts to be performed
by him in the discharge of his professional duties. Apart from
appearing in the courts, he can be consulted by his clients, he
can give his legal opinion whenever sought for, he can draft
instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other documents, he D
can participate in any conference involving legal discussions,
etc. Rule 11 has nothing to do with all the acts done by an
advocate during his practice except his performance inside
the court. Conduct in court is a matter concerning the court
and hence the Bar Council cannot claim that what should happen
inside the court could also be regulated by the Bar Council in E
exercise of its disciplinary powers. The right to practice, no
doubt, is the genus of which the right to appear and conduct
cases in the court may be a specie. But the right to appear and
conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court must
have the major supervisory power. Hence the court cannot be F
divested of the control or supervision of the court merely because
it may involve the right of an advocate.
17. When the Rules stipulate that a person who committed
contempt of court cannot have the unreserved right to continue
to appear and plead and conduct cases in the courts without G
any qualm or remorse, the Bar Council cannot overrule such a
regulation concerning the orderly conduct of court proceedings.
Courts of law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect
and reverence for the majesty of law and justice. The machinery
for the dispensation of justice according to law is operated by
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660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A the court. Proceedings inside the courts are always expected
to be held in a dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of
an advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of court on the
previous hour, standing in the court and arguing a case or cross-
examining a witness on the same day, unaffected by the
contemptuous behaviour he hurled at the court, would erode
B
the dignity of the court and even corrode the majesty of it
besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy
of the institution of the courts. This necessitates vesting of
power with the High Court to formulate rules for regulating
the proceedings inside the court including the conduct of
C advocates during such proceedings. That power should not be
confused with the right to practice law. While the Bar Council
can exercise control over the latter, the High Court should be
in control of the former.
18. In the above context it is useful to quote the following
D observations made by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court in Prayag Das v. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, AIR 1974
All 133 (AIR p. 136, para 9)
‘[T]he High Court has the power to regulate the appearance
of advocates in courts. The right to practice and the right to
E appear in courts are not synonymous. An advocate may carry
on chamber practice or even practice in courts in various other
ways e.g. drafting and filing of pleadings and vakalatnama for
performing those acts. For that purpose, his physical appearance
in courts may not at all be necessary. For the purpose of
regulating his appearance in courts the High Court should be
F the appropriate authority to make rules and on a proper
construction of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act it must be
inferred that the High Court has the power to make rules for
regulating the appearance of advocates and proceedings inside
the courts. Obviously, the High Court is the only appropriate
G authority to be entrusted with this responsibility.’
* * *
24. Purging is a process by which an undesirable element is
expelled either from one’s own self or from society. It is a
cleaning process. Purge is a word which acquired implications
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first in theological connotations. In the case of a sin, purging of A
such sin is made through the expression of sincere remorse
coupled with doing the penance required. In the case of a guilt,
purging means to get himself cleared of the guilt. The concept
of purgatory was evolved from the word “purge”, which is a
state of suffering after this life in which those souls, who depart
B
this life with their deadly sins, are purified and rendered fit to
enter into heaven where nothing defiled enters (vide Words
and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p. 307). In Black’s
Law Dictionary the word “purge” is given the following
meaning: ‘To cleanse; to clear. To clear or exonerate from
some charge or imputation of guilt, or from a contempt.’ It is C
preposterous to suggest that if the convicted person undergoes
punishment or if he tenders the fine amount imposed on him
the purge would be completed.
* * *
27. We cannot, therefore, approve the view that merely D
undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is sufficient to
complete the process of purging himself of the contempt,
particularly in a case where the contemnor is convicted of
criminal contempt. The danger in giving accord to the said
view of the learned Single Judge in the aforecited decision is E
that if a contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can immediately
pay it and continue to commit contempt in the same court, and
then again pay the fine and persist with his contemptuous
conduct. There must be something more to be done to get
oneself purged of the contempt when it is a case of criminal
contempt. F

28. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
highlighted the absence of any mode of purging oneself of the
guilt in any of the Rules as a reason for not following the interdict
contained in Rule 11. Merely because the Rules did not
prescribe the mode of purging oneself of the guilt it does not G
mean that one cannot purge the guilt at all. The first thing to be
done in that direction when a contemnor is found guilty of
criminal contempt is to implant or infuse in his own mind real
remorse about his conduct which the court found to have
amounted to contempt of court. Next step is to seek pardon H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A from the court concerned for what he did on the ground that
he really and genuinely repented and that he has resolved not
to commit any such act in future. It is not enough that he tenders
an apology. The apology tendered should impress the court to
be genuine and sincere. If the court, on being impressed of his
genuineness, accepts the apology then it could be said that the
B
contemnor has purged himself of the guilt.”
33. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (2004) 6
SCC 311, constitutionality of Rule 11 of the Rules framed by the
High Court of Kerala for barring a lawyer from appearing in any
court till he got himself purged of contempt by an appropriate
C order of the court, was examined. This Court held that the rule
did not violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution nor
amounted to usurpation of power of adjudication and punishment
conferred on the Bar Councils and the result intended by the
application of the Rule was automatic. It was further held that the
D Rule was not in conflict with the law laid down in Supreme Court
Bar Assn. judgment. Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment
in Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45, it was
held that regulation of right of appearance in courts was within
the jurisdiction of the courts. It was observed, following Pravin
C. Shah, that the court must have major supervisory power on
E the right to appear and conduct in the court. The observations
are: (Bar Council of India case, SCC p. 323, para 46)
“46. Before a contemnor is punished for contempt, the court
is bound to give an opportunity of hearing to him. Even such an
opportunity of hearing is necessary in a proceeding under
F Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But if a law
which is otherwise valid provides for the consequences of such
a finding, the same by itself would not be violative of Article 14
of the Constitution of India inasmuch as only because another
opportunity of hearing to a person, where a penalty is provided
G for as a logical consequence thereof, has been provided for.
Even under the penal laws, some offenses carry minimum
sentence. The gravity of such offenses, thus, is recognized by
the legislature. The courts do not have any role to play in such
a matter.”

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35. In R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 it A
was held that even if there was no rule framed under Section 34
of the Advocates Act disallowing an advocate who is convicted
of criminal contempt, is not only a measure to maintain dignity
and orderly function of courts, it may become necessary for the
protection of the court and for preservation of the purity of court
B
proceedings. Thus, the court not only has a right but also an
obligation to protect itself and save the purity of its proceedings
from being polluted, by barring the advocate concerned from
appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.
This Court noticed the observations about the decline of ethical
and professional standards of the Bar, and the need to arrest such C
trend in the interests of administration of justice. It was observed
that in the absence of unqualified trust and confidence of people
in the Bar, the judicial system could not work satisfactorily. Further
observations are that the performance of the Bar Councils in
maintaining professional standards and enforcing discipline did not
D
match its achievements in other areas. This Court expressed hope
and expected that the Bar Council will take appropriate action for
the restoration of high professional standards among the lawyers,
working of their position in the judicial system and the society.
42. We may also refer to certain articles on the subject. In “Raising
the Bar for the Legal Profession”, published in The Hindu E
newspaper dated 15-9-2012, Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon wrote:
“… Being a private monopoly, the profession is organised like
a pyramid in which the top 20 per cent command 80 per cent
of paying work, the middle 30 per cent managing to survive by
catering to the needs of the middle class and government F
litigation, while the bottom 50 percent barely survive with legal
aid cases and cases managed through undesirable and
exploitative methods! Given the poor quality of legal education
in the majority of the so-called law colleges (over a thousand
of them working in small towns and panchayats without G
infrastructure and competent faculty), what happened with
uncontrolled expansion was the overcrowding of ill-equipped
lawyers in the bottom 50 per cent of the profession fighting for
a piece of the cake. In the process, being too numerous, the
middle and the bottom segments got elected to professional
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A bodies which controlled the management of the entire
profession. The so-called leaders of the profession who have
abundant work, unlimited money, respect, and influence did
not bother to look into what was happening to the profession
and allowed it to go its way—of inefficiency, strikes, boycotts,
and public ridicule. This is the tragedy of the Indian Bar today
B
which had otherwise a noble tradition of being in the forefront
of the freedom struggle and maintaining the rule of law and
civil liberties even in difficult times.”
54. Further, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 38
of the Advocates Act, we direct that the license of the appellant
C will stand suspended for a further period of five years. He will
also remain debarred from appearing in any court in District Etah
even after five years unless he purges himself of contempt in the
manner laid down by this Court in Bar Council of India and
R.K. Anandand as directed by the High Court. Question (ii) stands
D decided accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
65. In Mahipal Singh Rana (supra) the advocate was found
guilty of criminal contempt as such punishment for debarring from the
Courtwas first passed and reliance has been placed for that purpose on
E the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in Supreme Court Bar
Association (supra). Thus, the decision has no application to sustain
vires of Rules 14(A) to 14(D) as amended by the High Court of Madras.
66. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned senior counsel supported the
Rules pointing out that grave situation has been created in the High
F Court of Madras as well as at its Madurai Bench, which compelled the
Court to take action on the judicial side to ensure the modicum of security.
The High Court had to order the security of the Court to be undertaken
by CISF. In this regard, orders were passed in Suo Moto Writ Petition
No.29197 of 2015 by the High Court of Madras on 14.9.2015, 12.10.2015
G and 30.10.2015. The following incidents were noticed in the judicial
orders:
i. Holding protests and waving placards within the Court premises;
ii. Raising slogans and marching down the corridors of the Court.
iii. The use of hand-held microphones to disrupt Court proceedings.
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iv. Attempting to and in some cases successfully entering the A
Chambers of the Puisne Judges of the Madurai Bench of the
High Court.
v. Two instances of hoax bombs in the form of broken mechanical
clocks being placed at areas in the Court to ensure disruptions.
The High Court, in our opinion, could have taken action under B
Contempt of Courts Act for aforesaid misconduct.
67. Rule 14A provides for power to debar an advocate from
appearing before the High Court and the subordinate courts in case an
advocate who is found to have accepted money in the name of a Judge
or on the pretext of influencing him; or an advocate who is found to C
have tampered with the Court record or Court order; or an advocate
who browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or Judicial Officer; or an advocate
who is found to have sent or spread unfounded and unsubstantiated
allegations/petitions against a judicial officer or a Judge to the Superior
Court; or an advocate who actively participates in a procession inside D
the Court campus and/or involves in gherao inside the Court Hall or
holds placard inside the Court Hall; or an advocate who appears in the
Court under the influence of liquor may be debarred by Court. However,
it is not provided that Court would do so in exercising Contempt
Jurisdiction. The debarment is sought to be done by way of disciplinary
control, which is not permissible. E

68. Rule 14-B as amended provides for power to take action.
Rule 14-B(iv) states that where any such misconduct referred to under
Rule 14-A is committed by an advocate before the High Court, the High
Court shall have the power to initiate action against the advocate
concerned and debar him from appearing before the High Court and all F
subordinate courts; or where any such misconduct is committed before
the Court of Principal District Judge, the Principal District Judge shall
have the power to initiate action against the advocate concerned and
debar him from appearing before any Court within such district; or where
any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is committed before G
any subordinate court, the Court concerned shall submit a report to the
Principal District Court and the Principal District Judge shall have the
power to initiate action against the advocate concerned and debar him
from appearing before any Court within such district. Rule 14-C
prescribes the procedure to be followed and Rule 14-D authorizes the
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666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A High Court or Principal District Judge to pass an interim order prohibiting
the advocate concerned from appearing before the High Court or
subordinate Courts, as the case may be, pending inquiry.
69. The High Court is not authorized by the provisions of the
Advocates Act to frame such rules. Section 34 does not confer such
B power of debarment by way of disciplinary methods or disciplinary inquiry
as against an advocate as that has to be dealt with by the Bar Council as
provided in other sections in a different chapter of the Act. It is only
when the advocate is found guilty of contempt of court, as provided in
Rule 14 as existed in the Madras High Court Rules, 1970 takes care of
situation until and unless an advocate who has committed contempt of
C court purges himself of contempt shall not be entitled to appear or act or
plead in the Court.
Rule 14 is extracted hereunder:
“14. No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court
D shall be permitted to appear, Act or plead in any Court unless he
has purged himself of contempt.”
70. The debarment cannot be ordered by the High Court until and
unless advocate is prosecuted under the Contempt of Courts Act. It
cannot be resorted to by undertaking disciplinary proceedings as
E contemplated under the Rules 14-A to 14-D as amended in 2016. That
is a clear usurpation of the power of the Bar Council and is wholly
impermissible in view of the decision of this Court in Supreme Court
Bar Association vs. Union of India (supra) that has been followed in
all the subsequent decisions as already discussed. There is no doubt
about it that the incidents pointed out were grim and stern action was
F required against the erring advocates as they belied the entire nobility of
the lawyer’s profession.
71. It is also true that the disciplinary committee of the Bar Councils,
as observed by this Court in Mahipal Singh Rana and Mohit
Chowdhary (supra), has failed to deliver the good. It is seen that the
G disciplinary control of the Bar Council is not as effective as it should be.
The cases are kept pending for a long time, then after one year they
stand transferred to the Bar Council of India, as provided under the
Advocates Act and thereafter again the matters are kept pending for
years together. It is high time that the Bar Council, as well as the various
State Bar Councils, should take stock of the situation and improve the
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functioning of the disciplinary side. It is absolutely necessary to maintain A
the independence of the Bar and if the cleaning process is not done by
the Bar itself, its independence is in danger. The corrupt, unwanted,
unethical element has no place in Bar. If nobility of the profession is
destroyed, Bar can never remain independent. Independence is
constituted by the observance of certain ideals and if those ideals are
B
lost, the independence would only remain on paper, not in real sense.
72. The situation is really frustrating if the repository of the faith
in the Bar fails to discharge their statutory duties effectively, no doubt
about it that the same can be and has to be supervised by the Courts.
The obligatory duties of Bar Council have found statutory expression in
Advocates Act and the rules framed thereunder with respect to C
disciplinary control and cannot be permitted to become statutory mockery,
such non-performance or delayed performance of such duties is
impermissible. The Bar Council is duty bound to protect Bar itself by
taking steps against black sheeps and cannot bely expectation of Bar in
general and spoil its image. The very purpose of disciplinary control by D
Bar Council cannot be permitted to be frustrated. In such an exigency,
in a case where the Bar Council is not taking appropriate action against
the advocate, it would be open to the High Court to entertain the writ
petition and to issue appropriate directions to the Bar Council to take
action in accordance with the law in the discharge of duties enjoined
upon it. But at the same time, the High Court and even this Court E
cannot take upon itself the disciplinary control as envisaged under the
Advocates Act. No doubt about it that the Court has the duty to maintain
its decorum within the Court premises, but that can be achieved by taking
appropriate steps under Contempt of Courts Act in accordance with law
as permitted under the decisions of this Court and even by rule making F
power under Section 34 of the Advocates Act. An advocate can be
debarred from practicing in the Court until and unless he purges himself
of contempt.
73. It has been seen from time to time that various attacks have
been made on the judicial system. It has become very common to the G
members of the Bar to go to the press/media to criticize the judges in
person and to commit sheer contempt by attributing political colours to
the judgments. It is nothing less than an act of contempt of gravest
form. Whenever any political matter comes to the Court and is decided,
either way, political insinuations are attributed by unscrupulous persons/
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668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A advocates. Such acts are nothing, but an act of denigrating the judiciary
itself and destroys the faith of the common man which he reposes in the
judicial system. In case of genuine grievance against any judge, the
appropriate process is to lodge a complaint to the concerned higher
authorities who can take care of the situation and it is impermissible to
malign the system itself by attributing political motives and by making
B
false allegations against the judicial system and its functionaries. Judges
who are attacked are not supposed to go to press or media to ventilate
their point of view.
74. Contempt of court is a weapon which has to be used sparingly
as more is power, same requires more responsibility but it does not mean
C that the court has fear of taking action and its repercussions. The hallmark
of the court is to provide equal and even-handed justice and to give an
opportunity to each of the system to ensure that it improves upon.
Unfortunately, some advocates feel that they are above the Bar Council
due to its inaction and they are the only champion of the causes. The
D hunger for cheap publicity is increasing which is not permitted by the
noble ideals cherished by the great doyens of the bar, they have set by
their conduct what should be in fact the professional etiquettes and ethics
which are not capable of being defined in a narrow compass. The statutory
rules prohibit advocates from advertising and in fact to cater to the press/
media, distorted versions of the court proceedings is sheer misconduct
E and contempt of court which has become very common. It is making it
more difficult to render justice in a fair, impartial and fearless manner
though the situation is demoralizing that something has to be done by all
concerned to revamp the image of Bar. It is not open to wash dirty linen
in public and enter in accusation/debates, which tactics are being adopted
F by unscrupulous elements to influence the judgments and even to deny
justice with ulterior motives. It is for the Bar Council and the senior
members of the Bar who have never forgotten their responsibility to rise
to the occasion to maintain the independence of the Bar which is so
supreme and is absolutely necessary for the welfare of this country and
the vibrant democracy.
G
75. The separation of powers made by the forefathers, who framed
the Constitution, ensured independent functioning. It is unfortunate without
any rationale basis the independence of the system is being sought to be
protected by those who should keep aloof from it. Independence of
each system is to come from within. If things are permitted to be settled
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by resorting to the unscrupulous means and institution is maligned by A
creating pressure of any kind, the very independence of the system would
be endangered. Cases cannot be decided by media trial. Bar and Bench
in order to protect independence have their own inbuilt machinery for
redressal of grievance if any and they are supposed to settle their
grievances in accordance therewith only. No outside interference is
B
permissible. Considering the nobility, independence, dignity which is
enjoined and the faith which is reposed by the common man of the country
in the judiciary, it is absolutely necessary that there is no maligning of the
system. Mutual respect and reverence are the only way out. A lot of
sacrifices are made to serve the judiciary for which one cannot regret
as it is with a purpose and to serve judiciary is not less than call of C
military service. For the protection of democratic values and to ensure
that the rule of law prevails in the country, no one can be permitted to
destroy the independence of the system from within or from outside.
We have to watch on Bar independence. Let each of us ensure our own
institution is not jeopardized by the blame game and make an endeavor
D
to improve upon its own functioning and independence and how
individually and collectively we can deliver the good to the citizen of this
great country and deal with every tear in the eye of poor and down-
trodden as per constitutional obligation enjoined on us.
76. Soul searching is absolutely necessary and the blame game
and maligning must stop forthwith. Confidence and reverence and positive E
thinking is the only way. It is pious hope that the Bar Council would
improve upon the function of its disciplinary committees so as to make
the system more accountable, publish performance audit on the disciplinary
side of various bar councils. The same should be made public. The Bar
Council of India under its supervisory control can implement good ideas F
as always done by it and would not lag behind in cleaning process so
badly required. It is to make the profession more noble and it is absolutely
necessary to remove the black sheeps from the profession to preserve
the rich ideals of Bar and on which it struggled for the values of freedom.
It is basically not for the Court to control the Bar. It is the statutory duty
of Bar to make it more noble and also to protect the Judges and the legal G
system, not to destroy the Bar itself by inaction and the system which is
important pillar of democracy.
77. We have no hesitation to hold that the High Court has
overstretched and exceeded its power even in the situation which was
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A so grim which appears to have compelled it to take such a measure. In
fact, its powers are much more in Contempt of Courts Act to deal with
such situation court need not look for Bar Council to act. It can take
action, punish for Contempt of Courts Act in case it involves misconduct
done in Court/proceedings. Circumstances may be grim, but the
autonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken over by
B
the Courts. It has other more efficient tools to maintain the decorum of
Court. In case power is given to the Court even if complaints lodged by
a lawyer to the higher administrative authorities as to the behaviour of
the Judges may be correct then also he may be punished by initiating
disciplinary proceedings as permitted to be done in impugned Rules 14 A
C to D that would be making the Bar too sycophant and fearful which
would not be conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticism
of judgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers’ fearlessness in
court, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the virtues which
cannot be sacrificed. It is duty of the lawyer to lodge appropriate
complaint to the concerned authorities as observed by this Court in Vinay
D
Chandra Mishra (supra), which right cannot be totally curtailed,
however, making such allegation publicly tantamounts to contempt of
court and may also be a professional misconduct that can be taken care
of either by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act and by the Court
under the Contempt of Courts Act. The misconduct as specified in
E Rule 14-A may also in appropriate cases tantamount to contempt of
court and can be taken care of by the High Court in its contempt
jurisdiction.
78. Resultantly, we have no hesitation to strike down impugned
Rules 14-A to 14-D as framed in May, 2016 by the High Court of Madras
F as they are ultra vires to Section 34 of the Advocates Act and are
hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Writ Petition allowed.

G

H