Supreme Court of India
R. NAGARAJ (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ANOTHERversusRAJMANI AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 478
- Decided
- 9 April 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
The High Court was not justified to remand the case; under Section 100 CPC it must decide the substantial question of law itself, and the trial court's finding that the suit was barred by limitation stands.
Summary
The appellants challenged a High Court order that remanded a suit to the trial court for a fresh trial on the issue of limitation, despite both the trial court and the first appellate court having held the suit hopelessly barred by limitation. The dispute arose from a family property that had been sold and subsequently litigated, with the respondents filing a suit 17 years after the original decree. The High Court, invoking Section 100 CPC, formulated additional substantial questions of law and sent the matter back to the trial court without deciding the original substantial question. The Supreme Court held that under Section 100 CPC the High Court must decide the substantial question of law itself and cannot remand the case, especially when the lower courts had already adjudicated the limitation issue. Consequently, the High Court's remand was set aside and the trial court's decree dismissing the suit was restored. The appeal was allowed and each party bore its own costs.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter to the trial court for a fresh trial on the limitation issue despite the presence of concurrent findings and the provisions of Section 100 CPC.
- Whether the question of limitation in the present case constitutes a substantial question of law that the High Court must decide directly.
- Whether the failure of the trial court and the first appellate court to frame a separate issue of limitation is fatal to their judgments.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 3, s. 59
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter to the trial Court for a fresh trial on the issue of limitation, despite the existence of concurrent findings, when section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 empowered the High Court to decide Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.3 and Art.59 – Both the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, after detailed analysis of the oral and documentary evidence let-in by the parties, categorically held that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation
Subjects
Second appealSubstantial question of lawRemanding the matter to Trial CourtFraming additional issues in respect of limitationBarred by limitationSection 100 CPCViolation of procedural lawConcurrent findingsObject of framing an issue
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 734 : 2025 INSC 478
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another
v.
Rajmani and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 5131 of 2025)
09 April 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter to
the trial Court for a fresh trial on the issue of limitation, despite the
existence of concurrent findings, when section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 empowered the High Court to decide the matter.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Limitation Act, 1963 –
s.3 and Art.59 – Both the trial Court and the First Appellate
Court, after detailed analysis of the oral and documentary
evidence let-in by the parties, categorically held that the suit
was hopelessly barred by limitation – However, the High Court
observed that both the Courts failed to frame any issue in
respect of the limitation – Thereafter, the High Court remanded
the matter to the trial Court for fresh trial solely with respect
to the issue of limitation – Correctness:
Held: Judgment of High Court unsustainable – U/s.100 CPC, the
High Court possesses the authority to entertain second appeals
strictly on substantial questions of law – Upon admitting such an
appeal, the High Court is empowered to frame substantial questions
and adjudicate them directly, without the necessity of remanding the
matter to the trial court – This approach ensures judicial efficiency
and prevents unnecessary prolongation of litigation – In the instant
case, without deciding the substantial question of law involved in
the second appeal, the High Court only considered the additional
substantial question of law, observing that both the Courts failed
to frame any issue in respect of the limitation, though held that the
suit was barred by limitation – The failure of the trial Court and the
First Appellate Court to formulate a separate issue, is not fatal to
the judgment rendered by them and has not caused any prejudice
to the parties – Further, the trial Court, in the performance of its
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 735
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
duty, mandated u/s.3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has taken up the
question of limitation and upon perusal of the overall pleadings
and evidence, has rightly decided the same – It is a general rule
that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of
the Courts below – In the present case, both the trial Court and
the First Appellate Court, after detailed analysis of the oral and
documentary evidence let-in by the parties, categorically held
that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation – Respondent
nos.1 to 3, have knowingly slept over their right to challenge the
sale and allowed further rights to flow, cannot later question the
sale of larger extent of share in an un-partitioned property – Any
plausible reasons for delay not found – Limitation is a matter of
statute and must be strictly enforced, more so when the earlier
transaction or sale is well within the knowledge of the parties – This
principle assumes greater significance in the present case, where
the delay extends to seventeen years for filing the suit, despite
the fact that they were arrayed as respondents/Judgment Debtors
in the execution proceedings – Furthermore, protection of bona
fide purchasers for value is a significant consideration, and any
disturbance to their rights or titles after such a long period, would
create uncertainty in property transactions and undermine the
sanctity of court sale – Therefore, the High Court was not justified
in remanding the matter to the trial Court for fresh trial solely with
respect to the issue of limitation; and that, the Courts below have
rightly held that the suit was barred by limitation and respondent
nos.1 to 3 are not entitled for any relief – Impugned judgment
is set aside – Judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing
the suit, as affirmed by the First Appellate Court, are restored.
[Paras 12.1, 17, 22, 23]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Second appeal – Legal
position – Discussed. [Para 12]
Framing of issues – Determination of the material point of
disputes – Mixed question of facts and issues – Discussed.
[Para 18]
Limitation Act, 1963 – Object of – Discussed. [Para 18]
Limitation – Mixed question of fact and law – No hard and
fast rule that every question of limitation is to be treated as
a mixed question of fact and law – Discussed. [Para 20]
Procedural Laws – Violation of – Discussed. [Para 21.1]
736 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs.
[2001] 1 SCR 948 : (2001) 3 SCC 179; Surat Singh (Dead) v.
Siri Bhagwan & Ors. [2018] 1 SCR 1063 : (2018) 4 SCC 562;
Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Ahsanul Ghani
[2019] 2 SCR 169 : (2019) 19 SCC 413 : AIR 2019 SC 1178;
Ramakrishnan Kadinhipally & Ors. v. P.T. Karunakaran Nambiar,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 323; Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. and
Another v. Employees State Insurance Corporation [1972] 1 SCR
867 : AIR 1972 SC 1935; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
[1998] Supp. 1 SCR 403 : (1998) 7 SCC 123; V.M. Salgaocar
and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and Another
[2005] 3 SCR 27 : (2005) 4 SCC 613; Sardar Amarjit Singh
Kalra (Dead) by L.Rs. & Others v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead)
by L.Rs. and Others [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 350 : (2003) 3 SCC
272; Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. [2005] 3 SCR 289 : (2005) 4
SCC 480 – relied on.
Vaish Aggarwal Panchayat v. Inder Kumar & Ors. [2015] 9 SCR
637 : (2020) 12 SCC 809; Ramesh B. Desai & Ors. v. Bipin Vadilal
Mehta & Ors. [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 414 : (2006) 5 SCC 638; Vijay
Arjun Bhagat and Ors. v. Nana Laxman Tapkire and Ors. [2018] 4
SCR 452 : (2018) 6 SCC 727; Sugandhi (Dead) by LRs & Others v.
P. Rajkumar (2020) 10 SCC 706 – referred to.
List of Acts
Limitation Act, 1963; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords
Second appeal; Substantial question of law; Remanding the matter
to Trial Court; Framing additional issues in respect of limitation;
Barred by limitation; Section 100 CPC; Violation of procedural law;
Concurrent findings; Object of framing an issue.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5131
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in SA No. 406 of 1998
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 737
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
M. Yogesh Kanna, Miss Meha Ashok Aggarwal, Vasu Kalra,
Ms. Monica Saini.
Advs. for the Respondents:
S. Nandakumar, Sr. Adv., Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Viresh Kumar
Bhawra, Sandhya Dutt, Aakash Elango, Naresh Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated
17.02.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras1 in
Second Appeal No.406 of 1998. By the impugned judgment, the
High Court allowed the second appeal, thereby setting aside the
judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, and remitting
the matter to the trial Court for framing additional issues in respect
of limitation. The trial Court was further directed to conduct the trial
afresh on the aspect of whether the suit was barred by limitation,
and to complete it within a period of six months.
3. The genesis of the litigation traces back to a joint Hindu family
consisting of Rangappa Gowdar and his sons, Dasappa Gowdar
and Samiappan. Originally, the suit bearing O.S.No.851 of 19652
had been filed by the wife and daughter of the said Samiappan viz.,
Sunderammal and Vennila, who are Respondent Nos.6 and 7 herein,
seeking maintenance against the said Samiappan and his father
Rangappa Gowdar and brother Dasappa Gowdar. The suit came
to be decreed on 26.08.1965 and the suit properties were attached
for the maintenance amount in the execution proceedings initiated
by the plaintiffs. During the pendency of the execution proceedings,
the said Rangappa Gowdar and Dasappa Gowdar died and their
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the first suit”
738 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
legal heirs were brought on record. Through court auction, the suit
‘A’ schedule property was purchased by one Karivarada Gowdar and
the sale was confirmed by issuing certificate dated 25.09.1970 in
E.P.No.424 of 1969 in O.S.No.851 of 1965 by the Court of District
Munsif, Coimbatore. Since the said Samiappan tried to encroach the
suit ‘A’ schedule property, the said Karivarada Gowdar filed a suit viz.,
O.S.No.1978 of 1972 for permanent injunction and the same came
to be decreed on 11.06.1973. Subsequently, the suit ‘A’ schedule
property was purchased by Respondent Nos.8 to 10 from the said
Karivarada Gowdar and they also filed a suit in O.S.No.3390 of
1981 seeking permanent injunction, which came to be decreed on
24.07.1982. Thereafter, the suit ‘A’ schedule property was purchased
by Respondent No.11 and later-on, by Appellant Nos.1 and 2.
4. In the above background, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 who are the
daughters and wife of Dasappa Gowdar, instituted a suit bearing
O.S.No.257 of 1982 3 before the II Additional District Munsif,
Coimbatore4, to set aside the decree passed by the Court of District
Munsif, Coimbatore in O.S.No.851 of 1965 and to partition the suit
‘A’ and ‘C’ schedule properties by metes and bounds in 12 equal
parts and to allot the 5/12 shares to the plaintiffs and for permanent
injunction restraining the subsequent purchasers from in any manner
disturbing with the peaceful possession of the suit properties by the
plaintiffs.
5. After trial, the suit was dismissed, by judgment dated 08.09.1994,
against which, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 filed Appeal Suit bearing
No.207 of 1994 before the Additional District Judge, Coimbatore5. By
judgment dated 28.01.1997, the appeal suit came to be dismissed.
Challenging the same, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 went on further appeal
viz., S.A.No.406 of 1998, which was allowed by the High Court, by
judgment dated 17.02.2020. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants,
who are the subsequent purchasers of the suit ‘A’ schedule property,
have preferred this appeal before us.
6. On 25.01.2021, when the matter was taken up for consideration,
this Court passed the following order:
3 Hereinafter referred to as “the second suit”
4 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
5 Hereinafter referred to as “the First Appellate Court”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 739
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
“Exemption from filing O.T. and c/c of the impugned order
is granted.
Issue notice.
In the meantime, further proceedings in pursuance of the
order dated 17.02.2020 passed by the High Court shall
remain stayed.”
7. During the pendency of this appeal, Respondent Nos.1 and 2 have
passed away, and their legal representatives have been brought on
record and accordingly, the cause title has been amended. Vide order
dated 21.10.2022 passed in Interlocutory Application No. 101397/2022,
Respondent Nos. 4, 8, 9, 11, 14 and 18 to 21 have been deleted from
the array of parties, since they are proforma parties, and they do
not have any surviving interest in the suit property. Vide order dated
21.10.2022 passed in Interlocutory Application No.101402/2022, the
appellants have been exempted from the requirement of substituting
the legal representatives of deceased Respondent Nos.10 and 12.
Despite the service of notice, none appeared on behalf of the other
proforma respondents viz., Respondent Nos.5 to 7, 13, 15, 16 and
17. Thus, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are the only contesting parties.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel
for the contesting Respondent Nos.1 to 3 and also perused the
materials available on record.
9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that
Respondent Nos.1 to 3 had been arrayed as respondents / judgment
debtors in the execution proceedings initiated in O.S.No.851 of 1965
and hence, they had the knowledge of the proceedings even prior
to filing of the suit in O.S.No.257 of 1982. Since the second suit
was filed after a period of 17 years, it was hopelessly barred by
limitation. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have
allowed the second appeal and remitted the matter to the trial Court
for conducting trial afresh, on the aspect of limitation.
9.1 It is further submitted that the suit ‘A’ schedule property could
no longer remain as joint family property, when the same was
brought into court auction and the sale was confirmed and
possession was also handed over to the auction purchaser.
However, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 did not take any steps to set
aside the said sale, but they conveniently filed the second suit
740 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
bearing O.S. No. 257 of 1982 to set aside the decree dated
26.08.1965 passed in the first suit bearing O.S. No. 851 of 1965
without any subsisting legal right. Further, the documentary
evidence clearly proved that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were
aware of the execution proceedings and that, the courts below
discussed the limitation point in detail before dismissing the
suit / appeal suit filed by Respondent Nos.1 to 3, and therefore,
the necessity to frame an issue on limitation does not arise.
9.2 The learned counsel also pointed out that the suit was not
dismissed solely on the ground of limitation, but on merits as well,
observing that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein are not entitled
to any relief, since they had knowledge about the earlier suit.
9.3 It is further submitted that after admitting the second appeal, the
High Court ought to have decided the question of law relating
to limitation, instead of remitting the case to the trial Court,
specially, after more than two decades from the inception of
the Second Appeal. Further, according to the learned counsel,
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein, failed to approach the Court
with clean hands and abused the process of law by filing such
frivolous suit.
9.4 Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the suit was rightly
dismissed by the trial Court as time-barred and the same was
affirmed by the First Appellate Court. As such, the decision of
the High Court to remand the matter for framing the issue of
limitation and conducting trial afresh, is unwarranted and is
liable to be set aside.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 3 submitted
that the High Court rightly allowed the second appeal filed by
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and remitted the matter to the trial Court for
fresh trial, after framing the issue of limitation. According to the learned
counsel, the said issue is a mixed question of fact and law; to decide
the maintainability of the suit and without framing such question, the
trial Court and the First Appellate Court ought not to have come to
the conclusion that Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are not entitled to the
relief to set aside the decree passed in the first suit viz., O.S. No.
851 of 1965 and to partition the suit ‘A’ and ‘C’ schedule properties
by metes and bounds in 12 equal parts and to allot the 5/12 shares
to Respondent Nos.1 to 3, and for a permanent injunction. In this
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 741
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Vaish
Aggarwal Panchayat v. Inder Kumar & Others6.
10.1 The learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court as
well as the First Appellate Court without framing any issue,
any pleadings, and without leading any evidence, rejected the
relief sought by Respondent Nos.1 to 3 as barred by limitation.
Therefore, the High Court rightly remanded the matter to the
trial Court to frame a specific issue with regard to limitation
and decide the matter afresh. Reliance was made to the
decision of this court in Ramesh B. Desai & Ors. v. Bipin
Vadilal Mehta & Others7.
10.2 It is also submitted that the decree obtained in O.S. No. 851
of 1965 is an asseveration of fraud and collusion.
10.3 With these submissions, the learned counsel prayed for
dismissal of this appeal filed by the appellants.
11. Upon considering the rival submissions, the only question that arises
for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in
remanding the matter to the trial Court for a fresh trial on the issue
of limitation, despite the existence of concurrent findings, when
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19088 empowered the
High Court to decide the matter.
12. It is a well settled legal position that Section 100 CPC confers
jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain a second appeal, only
when it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of
law. For better appreciation, the said provision is extracted below:
“ 9[100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly
provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for
the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High
Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court
subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied
that the case involves a substantial question of law.
6 (2020) 12 SCC 809
7 (2006) 5 SCC 638
8 For short, “CPC”
9 Substituted by Act 104 of 1976, sec.37, for section 100 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977)
742 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate
decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of
appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law
involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial
question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate
that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated
and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal,
be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such
question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed
to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for
reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial
question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that
the case involves such question.]”
Thus, sub-section (1) of Section 100 says that the second appeal would
be entertained by the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied
that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (3)
makes it obligatory upon the appellant to precisely state in memo of
appeal the “substantial question of law” involved in the appeal. Sub-
section (4) provides that where the High Court is satisfied that any
substantial question of law is involved in the case, it shall formulate
that question. In other words, once the High Court is satisfied after
hearing the appellant or his counsel, as the case may be, that the
appeal involves a substantial question of law, it has to formulate that
question and then direct issuance of notice to the respondent of the
memo of appeal along with the question of law framed by the High
Court. Sub-section (5) provides that the appeal shall be heard only
on the question formulated by the High Court under sub-section
(4). In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the
second appeal is confined only to the question framed by the High
Court under sub-section (4). The respondent, however, at the time
of hearing of the appeal is given a right under sub-section (5) to
raise an objection that the question framed by the High Court under
sub-section (4) does not involve in the appeal. The reason for giving
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 743
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
this right to the respondent for raising such objection at the time of
hearing is because the High Court frames the question at the stage
of admission, which is prior to issuance of the notice of appeal to
the respondent. In other words, the question is framed ex parte and,
therefore, sub-section (5) enables him to raise such objection at the
time of hearing that the question framed does not arise in the appeal.
The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also recognizes the power of
the High Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial question
of law which was not initially framed by the High Court under sub-
section (4). However, this power can be exercised by the High Court
only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question
of law at the time of hearing of the appeal [See: Surat Singh (Dead)
v. Siri Bhagwan & Others (2018) 4 SCC 562].
12.1 Furthermore, this Court has consistently underscored that
under Section 100 CPC, the High Court possesses the authority
to entertain second appeals strictly on substantial questions
of law. Upon admitting such an appeal, the High Court is
empowered to frame substantial questions and adjudicate
them directly, without the necessity of remanding the matter
to the trial court. This approach ensures judicial efficiency
and prevents unnecessary prolongation of litigation. A few
decisions are outlined below:
(i) Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by
LRs10
“16. Reverting to the facts of the case at hand,
prima facie we find the first appellate Court did
not discharge the duty cast on it as a Court of first
appeal. The High Court having noticed failure on
the part of the appellant in not discharging the
statutory obligation cast on him by sub-section
(3) of Section 100 of the Code, on account of the
substantial question of law involved in the appeal
having not been stated, much less precisely, in
the memorandum of second appeal, ordinarily
an opportunity to frame such question should
10 (2001) 3 SCC 179
744 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
have been afforded to the appellant unless
the deficiency was brought to the notice of the
appellant previously by the High Court Registry
or the court and yet the appellant had persisted
in his default. That was not done. In our opinion,
the following substantial question of law does
arise as involved in the case and worth being
heard by the High Court:-
“Whether on the pleadings and the material
brought on record by the defendant, the first
appellate Court was right in holding that the
case of adverse possession was made out by
the defendant and the suit filed by the plaintiff
was liable to be dismissed as barred by time
under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, more
so when such finding was arrived at in reversal
of the findings of the trial Court?”
17. The appeal is allowed. The case is remitted
back to the High Court for hearing and deciding
the second appeal afresh.
18. We make it clear that we have not expressed
any opinion either way on any of the issues
arising for decision in the case. We also make
it clear that our framing the question of law
involved in the appeal shall not take away the
jurisdiction of the High Court vesting in it under
proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the
C.P.C. to formulate any other question of law
involved in the case The second appeal shall
be decided by the High Court uninfluenced by
any of the observations made hereinabove
which have been made solely to support our
opinion that the appeal did not merit a summary
dismissal by the High Court.”
(ii) Surat Singh (supra)
“29. The scheme of Section 100 is that once the
High Court is satisfied that the appeal involves
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 745
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
a substantial question of law, such question
shall have to be framed under sub-section (4)
of Section 100. It is the framing of the question
which empowers the High Court to finally decide
the appeal in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under sub-section (5). Both the
requirements prescribed in sub-sections (4)
and (5) are, therefore, mandatory and have to
be followed in the manner prescribed therein.
Indeed, as mentioned supra, the jurisdiction to
decide the second appeal finally arises only
after the substantial question of law is framed
under sub-section (4). There may be a case and
indeed there are cases where even after framing
a substantial question of law, the same can be
answered against the appellant. It is, however,
done only after hearing the respondents under
sub-section (5).”
(iii) Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) Through Lrs. V. Ahsanul
Ghani11
“21. As per Section 100 CPC, the appeal would
lie to the High Court from the decree passed
in appeal by any Court subordinate only if the
High Court is satisfied that the case involves
a substantial question of law; such question is
required to be stated in the Memorandum of
Appeal; the High Court is required to formulate
the question on being satisfied that the same is
involved in the case; the appeal is to be heard
on the question so formulated; and at the time of
hearing, the respondent could urge that the case
does not involve such a question. The proviso
to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC makes it
clear that the Court could hear the appeal on any
other substantial question of law not formulated
by it, but only after recording the reasons that the
11 (2019) 19 SCC 413 : AIR 2019 SC 1178
746 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
case involves such a question. In Surat Singh
(Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan and others (2018) 4 SCC
562 this Court has pointed out the contours of
the powers of High Court under the proviso to
sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC as under:-
“21……… The proviso to sub-section (5),
however, also recognises the power of the High
Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial
question of law which was not initially framed by
the High Court under sub-section (4). However,
this power can be exercised by the High Court
only after assigning the reasons for framing
such additional question of law at the time of
hearing of the appeal”.
22. We are clearly of the view that the proviso
to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC is not
intended to annul the other requirements of
Section 100 and it cannot be laid down as a
matter of rule that irrespective of the question(s)
formulated, hearing of the second appeal is open
for any other substantial question of law, even
if not formulated earlier…”
(iv) This Court pointing out the principle laid down in Surat
Singh case, set aside the judgment of the High Court on
the ground of violation of mandatory procedure prescribed
under section 100 CPC, and remanded the matter to the
High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits in
accordance with law [Refer: Vijay Arjun Bhagat and others v.
Nana Laxman Tapkire and others, (2018) 6 SCC 727].
(v) This Court in Ramakrishnan Kadinhipally & Ors. v.
P.T. Karunakaran Nambiar12 criticized the High Court
for remanding a case to the trial court without proper
justification, especially when concurrent findings of
fact existed. It reiterated that in second appeals under
Section 100 CPC, the High Court should not interfere with
12 2023 SCC OnLine SC 323
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 747
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
concurrent findings unless there is a substantial question
of law. The relevant paragraphs read as under:
“7. By the impugned judgment and order and
without answering anything on the substantial
questions of law framed/formulated, absolutely
in a casual manner, the High Court has allowed
the Second Appeal and has set aside the
concurrent findings recorded by both the courts
below and thereafter has remanded the matter
to the learned trial Court permitting the original
plaintiff to amend the plaint and pray for fixation
of the boundary.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the
respective parties and having gone through the
impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court, we are constrained to observe that
the manner in which the High Court has dealt
with the Second Appeal under Section 100 of
the CPC is not appreciable at all. From the
impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court, it appears that the High Court has
exercised the powers as if the High Court was
deciding the Writ Petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The High Court has
not appreciated at all that the High Court was
deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100
of the CPC and that too against the concurrent
findings of fact by both the courts below, which
were, as such, on appreciation of evidence on
record. Under the circumstances, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court
is unsustainable.
11. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that
the High Court was dealing with the Second
Appeal under Section 100 CPC and the
concurrent findings recorded by both the courts
below which were on appreciation of evidence
on record. Neither at the stage of deciding the
748 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
suit nor even before the first Appellate Court
even such a prayer was made to amend the
plaint, which is now permitted by the High Court,
despite the fact that earlier in the suit during
the course of trial, the plaint was amended.
Under the circumstances also, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court
is unsustainable.
12. Even for remand, a specific case is to be
made out as per Order 41 Rule 23, 23A and
25 of the CPC. No findings are recorded by the
High Court that the case falls within Order 41
Rule 23, 23A and 25 of the CPC and the matter
is required to be remanded to the learned trial
Court on setting aside the concurrent findings
of fact recorded by both the courts below. The
High Court has mechanically remanded the suit,
which is wholly impermissible.
13. Even the substantial questions of law
framed by the High Court, while admitting the
second appeal, which are reproduced herein
above cannot be said to be as such substantial
questions of law at all. The same are on
questions of fact. Under the circumstances,
the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court quashing and setting aside
the concurrent findings recorded by both the
courts below, while exercising the powers under
Section 100 CPC, is unsustainable.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons
stated above, the present Appeal succeeds. The
impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court is hereby quashed and set aside.
The judgment and decree passed by the learned
trial Court confirmed by the first Appellate Court
is, hereby, ordered to be restored.”
13. In the present case, evidently, the first suit viz., O.S.No.851 of 1965
seeking maintenance was decreed on 26.08.1965 in favour of the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 749
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
plaintiffs / Respondent Nos.6 and 7 herein. Consequently, the suit
properties were attached for realizing the maintenance amount.
In the court auction, the suit ‘A’ schedule property was purchased
by Karivarada Gowdar and the sale was confirmed vide certificate
(Ex.B1) dated 25.09.1970 and possession was also handed over
to him on 22.12.1970. Patta book (Ex.B5) was also issued in his
favour. Subsequently, the suit ‘A’ schedule property was purchased
by Respondent Nos.8 to 10 and thereafter, by Respondent No.11 and
thereafter, by the appellants herein. It is also to be noted here that
the subsequent purchasers filed two separate suits for permanent
injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with
their possession of the suit ‘A’ schedule property and the same
also came to be decreed, in their favour. It is significant to point out
at this juncture that though the father of Respondent Nos.1 and 2
and the husband of Respondent No.3 viz., Dasappa Gowdar was
party to the said suit, he did not contest the suit effectively. After his
death, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were duly impleaded in the execution
proceedings and a court guardian was also appointed for the minor
daughter of the said Dasappa Gowdar. However, they did not take
any immediate steps to set aside the decree passed in the first suit.
It was only in 1982, approximately seventeen years after the first suit
that Respondent Nos.1 to 3 filed the second suit viz., O.S.No.257 of
1982 seeking to set aside the decree in O.S.No.851/1965, partition
of the suit ‘A’ and ‘C’ schedule properties, permanent injunction, etc.
As such, it cannot be contended that Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were
unaware of the first suit and upon becoming aware of it, they filed
the second suit after a period of 17 years. Further, in the second suit,
Respondent Nos.1 to 3 did not specify when they became aware of
the decree passed in the first suit.
14. In the second suit viz., O.S.No. 257 of 1982, Respondent Nos.1 to 3
predicated their case on allegations of fraud and collusion between
the defendants, claiming a lack of knowledge about the earlier
proceedings. They further asserted that Respondent No.3 was in
mental distress following her husband’s death and that they were
in continuous possession of the suit properties.
15. The trial court, after a comprehensive examination of the evidence,
both oral and documentary, concluded that Respondent Nos.1 to
3 are not entitled to any relief in the suit. On the pivotal issue of
limitation, the trial court was of the view that the action has to be
750 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
taken to set aside the decree within a period of three years, as per
Article 59 of the Limitation Act, whereas the suit was filed after a
period of seventeen years and hence, the relief sought by Respondent
Nos.1 to 3 to set aside the decree passed in the first suit was hit by
the doctrine of limitation. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment
passed by the trial Court are reproduced below for ready reference:
“12. From the date of Ex.A1 about 17 years later, the relief
which is sought for, to set aside the above said decree
is hit by limitation is contended on the defendant’s side.
The defendants did not mention specifically in the written
statement filed by them. If as per law a case is to filed
within the stipulated period this court has the power to
dismiss the case, and even though the counter argument
is not made in this regard, the court has the power to
dismiss the suit, as mentioned in the proviso of Section 3
of Limitation Act was appointed out by the Learned Counsel
for the defendants. Therefore, considering the proviso of
Section 3 of the above said Act, it is necessary to peruse
whether the relief sought for by the plaintiff to set aside
the order passed in O.S.No.851 of 1985 is made within
the stipulated period, in this case.
13. As mentioned in the Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
the action has to be taken to set aside the Ex.A 1 decree,
within a period of three years. That is within three years
from the date of Ex.A1 the plaintiffs would have taken
action for setting aside the above said decree. I find that
it is pertinent to mention the clause on page 634 of The
Limitation Act, by B.B. Mitra. It is as follows:
12. Burden of proof. If a suit is prima facie within the
time allowed by the Article then if the defendant takes a
plea that the suit is barred by limitation then it is for the
defendant to prove it. Where, however, on the averments
of the plaint the suit seems to barred it is for plaintiff to
make out the circumstances to prove that the suit is not
barred by limitation. Mere assertion in the plaint that the
plaintiff acquired knowledge on particular date does not by
itself establish that fact and if on averments made in the
plaint it is found that the plaintiff had acquired knowledge
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 751
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
beyond the period prescribed by this Article then the suit
will be barred. If the suit is prima facie within the time but
the defendant takes plea that the plaintiff was aware of
the necessary facts to file the suit prior to the date when
he admits in the plaint such knowledge of facts then it is
for the defendant to allege and prove that the plaintiff had
such knowledge prior to the period from which the time
begins to run.
It is mentioned in the plaint that the 3rd plaintiff is not aware
of the Ex.Al decree and the proceedings after this. It is
not mentioned in the plaint as to when for the first time,
they knew about the Ex.A1 decree and the proceedings
initiated thereafter. In this connection, evidence was not
let in by P.A.l in this court. As already stated by me, this
suit has been filed about 17 years later from the date of
the date of decree. It is the onus of the plaintiff to prove
that the relief prayed for to set aside the decree was
filed within the stipulated time. Only through Dasappa
Gowdar, the plaintiffs claim the right over the suit A and
C schedule properties. As already stated by me the above
said Dasappa Gowdar is aware of the Ex.Al decree is
revealed through the copy of the order Ex.A2. Even the
above said Dasappa Gowdar did not take any action to
set aside the decree Ex.Al. Thereafter, after the demise
of Dasappa Gowdar, in the execution proceedings, these
plaintiffs were impleaded as legal heirs is revealed through
Ex.B1. Therefore, the averment that the 3rd plaintiff is not
aware of the above said Ex.Al decree and the proceedings
thereafter, as mentioned in the plaint is not proved. Per
contra, it is proved through the documents in this case,
that the plaintiffs are aware of the above said proceedings.
Therefore, I hold that the relief as prayed for by the Plaintiff
to set aside the exparte Decree Ex.Al is hit by the doctrine
of limitation…”
16. The First Appellate Court also, upon a thorough analysis, affirmed
the judgment of the trial Court. Especially, with respect to the
conclusion reached by the trial Court on the aspect of limitation, the
First Appellate Court was of the opinion that the plaintiffs had slept
over for 17 years and had chosen to come to the court violating the
752 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
mandate under Section 59 of the Limitation Act and therefore, the suit
was hopelessly barred by limitation as laid down by the trial Court.
The relevant paragraphs of the First Appellate Court’s judgment are
extracted below for ready reference:
“15.The 4th Defendant Sundarammal and her daughter
Vennila have instituted a suit against samiappan the 3rd
Defendant herein in O.S.851/65 for maintenance and also
for creating a charge over the suit properties. The decree
obtained by them in the above suit by the 4th Defendant
and 5th Defendant was marked as Ex.A1. Thereafter it is
found that the Defendants 4 and 5 took the Execution
Proceedings against Samiappan and in his presence
the sale of the A- schedule property was ordered by the
Court under Exs.A-2 and A-3. It will have to be noted
that the 3rd Defendant Samiappan had contested the
Execution Application filed by his wife and daughter. After
the demise of Rangan Gowder, the father of Samiappan,
Kempakkal the wife of Rangan Gowder and Subbammal
the daughter of Rangan Gowder were impleaded as legal
representatives of Rangan Gowder as found from Ex.A.4.
It would be pertinent to note that the said Kempakkal
is the 1 st defendant and the said Subbammal is the
2nd Defendant in this suit. It is not as if the Plaintiffs
were in the dark, while the proceedings for payment of
maintenance were taken by Sundarammal and Vennila
Madammal in the name of Thoddammal and Rajamani and
Santhamani, the Plaintiffs herein have been impleaded as
legal representatives of Dasappan on his demise in the
Execution Proceedings as found in Ex.B-1 to B-3 would
establish that the A-schedule property which was brought
for sale for 4th and 5th Defendants was knocked down by
one Kerivaratha Gounder.
17. Dasappan the husband of the 3rd Plaintiff has contested
the Execution Petition filed by Sundaramal and Vennila by
engaging a counsel for him. It is not as if that the parties
had remained ex parte throughout the proceedings as
contended by the Plaintiffs. Ex.B-1 would reveal that
Rajamani and Santhamani the minor children of Dasappan
were represented by a Court guardian appointed by the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 753
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
Court, Subbammal the 2nd Defendant also has been added
as a party to the Execution Proceedings on the demise of
Rangae Gowder apart from his wife 1st Defendant having
been impleaded as a party to the suit. The plaintiffs and
Defendants 1 to 3 were aware of the proceedings taken
by Sundarammal and Vennila.
19. D.W.2 in his cross-examination would state that in
their families the eldest female member would be called
as Thoddammal. No wonder Madammal being the oldest
female member in the family of Dasappan has been so-
called as Thoddammal. Further Ex.B-9 the returned cover
would show that the postman has made and endorsement
after enquiry that the addressee viz. Thoddammal, wife
of Dasappan was out of Station. If Thoddammal was not
the wife of Dasappan, the Postman would not have stated
that Thoddammal wife of Dasappan has gone out. Further
it is not the case of the Plaintiffs that any other wife was
there for Dasappan. Therefore, accepting the explanation
given by D.W.2 the Court comes to the conclusion that
Madammal was called as Thoddammal also and that,
therefore, it is false to say that Madammal was not aware
of the proceedings taken by Sundarammal. Further when
Rajamani and Santhamani were represented by Court
guardian the court guardian could not have acted affectively
unless Madammal gave proper instructions to contest the
Execution proceeding taken by sundrammal. It is highly
ridiculous to state that Madammal was totally out of picture.
21. The execution Court while executing the decree
obtained in O.S.No.851/65 has chosen to sell away the
A Schedule property to satisfy the maintenance decree
obtained by 4th and 5th Defendants through Court auction
in the presence of all the Defendants herein. When the
coparceners have not taken steps to partition the share
of Samiappan at the time of the Execution proceeding
taken by Defendants 4 and 5 the Execution Court did not
find the other way except bringing one of the schedule of
properties for sale to satisfy the maintenance decree. I do
not find any lacuna in the above execution proceedings.
The plaintiffs have not cared to mention when they came
754 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to know of the maintenance decree obtained by 4th and
5th Defendants and the sale of the A-schedule property
in Court auction. Nor have they stated anything about it
in their evidence. For about 17 years, the Plaintiffs have
slept over and have chosen to come to the court violating
the mandate found under Sec.59 of the limitation Act.
Therefore, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation as
laid down by the Trial Court…”
17. Thereafter, when the concurrent findings were sought to be
challenged by way of second appeal, the High Court at the time
of admission on 30.03.1998, formulated the following substantial
question of law:
“Whether the Court below was right in justifying the sale
of the entire A schedule properties, which were admittedly
joint family properties and in which the second respondent
has only 1/3rd share, which alone would be liable to satisfy
the decree for maintenance obtained by his wife and
daughters viz., respondents 3 and 4.”
Upon hearing the arguments of the counsel for both sides, the High
Court formulated the following additional substantial question of law:
“Whether the lower Court was right in its conclusion that the
suit is barred under Section 59 of the Limitation Act, when
the appellants had no knowledge of the sale proceedings
till 1981, when they published the notice under Ex.A.6?”
Without deciding the substantial question of law involved in the second
appeal, the High Court only considered the additional substantial
question of law, observing that both the Courts failed to frame any
issue in respect of the limitation, though held that the suit was barred
by limitation. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the second appeal
by setting aside the judgments passed by the Courts below and
remitted the matter to the trial Court for a fresh trial with a direction
to frame additional issue regarding limitation, let in evidence and
decide the matter after giving due opportunity to both sides, within
a period of six months. The relevant paragraphs of the High Court’s
judgment are extracted for ready reference:
“10. In this regard, it is relevant to extract the issues framed
by the trial Court as follows:
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 755
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief to the
Judgement in O.S.851/2005?
2) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to 5/12 Shares in suit
‘A’ and ‘C’ schedule properties?
3) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the relied of
permanent injunction as prayed in the plaint?
4) Whether the Plaintiffs have paid sufficient correct fees?
5) What other reliefs are the Plaintiffs entitled to?
Though, the trial Court discussed in respect of the above
issues and also about the question of limitation, dismissed
the suit as the suit itself barred by limitation.
11. The first appellate Court also framed the points for
consideration as follows:
“1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of
cancellation of the decree in O.S.No.851/65 on the file of
the District Munsif Court, Coimbatore?
2. Whether the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment
of the A schedule and consequently whether they are
entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for by them?”
The first appellate Court also discussed about the limitation
and concluded that the suit is filed after 17 years as such,
violation of provision under Section 59 of the Limitation
Act and the suit is hopelessly barred by Limitation Act
and dismissed.
12. Admittedly, both the Courts below did not frame any
issue in respect of the limitation. As rightly pointed out by
the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs,
both the Courts failed to frame any issue in respect of
limitation, though both the Court hold as the suit is barred
by limitation. The first appellate Court also confirmed the
judgment and decree passed by the trial Court without
framing point for limitation for determination in the first
appeal. Therefore this Court necessarily has to interfere
with the finding of the Courts below. Accordingly, this Court
answered only on the additional substantial question of
756 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
law formulated by this Court in favour of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants.
13. In fine, the second appeal stands allowed and the
judgment and decree passed by Courts below are set
aside. However considering the facts and circumstances,
the suit is remitted back to the trial Court for fresh trial
by framing additional issues in respect of limitation and
let in evidence on those aspects and decide the matter
after giving due opportunity to both sides in respect of
the issue. Further the trial Court is directed to complete
the trial within a period of six months from the date of
receipt of the entire bundle. It is made clear that the trial
court is directed to conduct the trial uninfluenced by the
observation made by this Court while deciding the case.
There is no order as to costs.”
18. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable,
applying the legal principles as stated above that once the High
Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of
law, such question shall have to be framed and finally decided on
merits in accordance with the procedure laid down under section 100
CPC. The High Court, has failed to decide the substantial framed
at the time of admission and went to decide, only the additional
substantial question of law, framed at the time of hearing. The first
suit was decreed on 26.08.1965 and the auction purchaser got the
suit ‘A’ schedule property on 22.12.1970 and thereafter, the appellants
herein purchased the same from the subsequent purchaser by
name R.S.Ramaswamy / Respondent No.11; despite the fact that
the decree and sale were within the knowledge of the Respondent
Nos. 1 to 3, they have thwarted the right of the purchasers over the
suit ‘A’ schedule property by filing second suit viz., O.S. No.257 of
1982, that too, after a period of 17 years and the decision of the High
Court remanding the matter to the trial Court for a fresh trial on the
limitation aspect, without deciding the same on merits, by holding
that a separate issue ought to have been framed is unsustainable
and will certainly prolong the litigation without any useful purpose.
19. The object of framing an issue is to determine the material point of
disputes between the parties, for the purpose of adjudication. Issues
can be framed on a question of law or fact or a mixed question of
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 757
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
law and fact. The decision on the issue settles the lis in favour of
either of the parties. A distinct issue is to be formed when a material
proposition of law or fact is affirmed by one party and denied by
another. Also, there is no necessity to frame an issue, when the
parties are not at dispute on a particular fact or law. At times, despite
pleadings, when a specific issue is not framed, but when both the
parties to the lis have let in evidence and rendered their arguments
on a point, the decision on which is intrinsically connected to the
main issue, then the Court is bound to render a finding on the point
of dispute before deciding the connected issue, one way or another.
In that case, it becomes the duty of the Court to analyze the evidence
before it and render a decision on all disputed questions of fact or
law, directly or indirectly in issue, so as to put an end to the lis. The
Limitation Act,1963 restricts the right of a litigant by prescribing a
time limit within which action must be initiated. Its object is to provide
a time or period, within which, the action has to be initiated. The
object of the Act is not to destroy a vested right available in law but
to prevent indefinite litigation and therefore, only prescribes a period
for initiation of the litigation. This Court has described the object of
the Limitation Act, 1963 in the following decisions:
(i) Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. and Another v. Employees
State Insurance Corporation13:
“7. …… The object of the Statutes of Limitations is
to compel a person to exercise his rights of action
within a reasonable time as also to discourage and
suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims. While
this is so, there are two aspects of the Statutes of
Limitation the one concerns the extinguishment of
the right if a claim or action is not commenced with
a particular time and the other merely bar the claim
without affecting the right which either remains merely
as a moral obligation or can be availed of to furnish
the consideration for a fresh enforceable obligation.
Where a statute prescribing the limitation extinguishes
the right, it affects substantive right while that which
purely pertains to the commencement of action
without touching the right is said to be procedural”.
13 AIR 1972 SC 1935
758 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(ii) N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy14
“that the Limitation Act is based upon public policy
which is used for fixing a life span of a legal remedy
for the purpose of general welfare. It has been pointed
out that the Law of Limitation are not only meant to
destroy the rights of the parties but are meant to look
to the parties who do not resort to the tactics but in
general to seek remedy. It fixes the life span for legal
injury suffered by the aggrieved person which has
been enshrined in the maxim ‘interest reipublicae ut
sit finis litium’ which means the Law of Limitation is
for general welfare and that the period is to be put
into litigation and not meant to destroy the rights of
the person or parties who are seeking remedy. The
idea with regards to this is that every legal remedy
must be alive for a legislatively fixed period of time”.
20. Limitation, as we generally know is a mixed question of fact and
law. However, there is no hard and fast rule that every question
of limitation is to be treated as a mixed question of fact and law.
In cases, where the action is initiated after several years after the
right to sue accrued, without any pleadings to explain the reasons
for delay or as to when the fraud was discovered, the question of
limitation is to be treated as a question of law. A recourse may be
had to Order VI Rules 4 and 10 CPC, which mandates that specific
particulars would have to be given in the pleadings. Once such a
plea is raised in the pleadings, then the burden lies on the person to
prove that the delay was due to any plausible reason and it is always
well within the knowledge of the other party to contend and prove
that the opposite party had prior knowledge about the disputed fact
and that his right to sue or defend had also accrued by that date.
Even in the absence of specific pleadings regarding the limitation
in the plaint or a plea of defense, there is a bounden duty on every
civil Court to ascertain as to whether the lis has been initiated within
the time prescribed under law, even if the parties to the lis had not
raised any objections. This right flows from the mandate of Section
3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. A useful reference may be had to the
14 (1998) 7 SCC 123
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 759
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
judgment of this Court on this aspect, in V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v.
Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another15, wherein, it
was held as follows:
“20. The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is
that it is the duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted
after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the
fact that limitation has not been set up as a defence. If a
suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation, a court has
no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant
intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation.
21. This Court in Manindra Land & Building Corpn. Ltd. v.
Bhutnath Banerjee [(1964) 3 SCR 495 : AIR 1964 SC1336]
held (AIR para 9):
“Section 3 of the Limitation Act enjoins a court to
dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred and
application made, after the period of limitation
prescribed therefor by Schedule I irrespective of the
fact whether the opponent had set up the plea of
limitation or not. It is the duty of the court not to proceed
with the application if it is made beyond the period of
limitation prescribed. The Court had no choice and if in
construing the necessary provision of the Limitation Act
or in determining which provision of the Limitation Act
applies, the subordinate court comes to an erroneous
decision, it is open to the court in revision to interfere
with that conclusion as that conclusion led the court to
assume or not to assume the jurisdiction to proceed
with the determination of that matter.”
In cases, where the pleadings are silent, then it becomes the duty of
the Court to ascertain from the evidence and the overall facts of the
case, as pleaded by either party, and to render a finding on limitation
where the question of limitation is to be treated as a question of law,
since the Court cannot entertain frivolous or stale claims. It is also
apropos to reiterate the settled position of law that a question of law
can be raised at any stage.
15 (2005) 4 SCC 613
760 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
21. We have in earlier paragraph discussed the object of framing the
issues. We also held that there could be several points directly or
indirectly connected with the main issue that has been framed. In
such cases, when the larger issue that has been framed is wide
enough to cover different points of disputes within it, there is no
necessity to frame a specific issue on that aspect. Further, when the
parties go to trial with the knowledge that a particular point is at lis,
had full opportunity to let in evidence, they cannot later turn back to
say that a specific issue was not framed. All that is required under
law, is for the Court to render a finding on the particular fact or law
in dispute, on the facts of the case. However, we make it clear that
such evidence, in the absence of pleadings, cannot permit either of
the parties to make out a new case. It is pertinent to mention here
that the Courts are vested with powers to go into the question of
law, touching upon either the limitation or the jurisdiction, even if
no plea is raised and not in cases, where facts have to be pleaded
and evidence has to be let in. The Civil Procedure Code and the
law of limitation, being procedural laws, meant to assist the Courts
in the process of rendering justice, cannot curtail the power of the
Courts to render justice. Procedural laws after all are handmaid of
justice. What is to be seen is whether any irregularity arising from
a failure to follow procedure has caused serious prejudice to the
parties. It is not to be forgotten that the process of adjudication is
to discern the truth.
21.1 It will be useful to refer to certain judgments of this Court on
violation of procedural law, which are as follows:
(i) Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by L.Rs. & Others v.
Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by L.Rs. and Others16:
“26. Laws of procedure are meant to regulate
effectively, assist and aid the object of doing
substantial and real justice and not to foreclose
even an adjudication on merits of substantial
rights of citizen under personal, property and
other laws. Procedure has always been viewed
as the handmaid of justice and not meant
16 MANU/SC/1214/2002 : (2003) 3 SCC 272 (Constitutional Bench)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 761
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
to hamper the cause of justice or sanctify
miscarriage of justice........”
(ii) Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors.17:
“28. All the Rules of procedure are the handmaid
of justice. The language employed by the
draftsman of processual law may be liberal or
stringent, but the fact remains that the object
of prescribing procedure is to advance the
cause of justice. In an adversarial system,
no party should ordinarily be denied the
opportunity of participating in the process of
justice dispensation. Unless compelled by
express and specific language of the statute,
the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure or
any other procedural enactment ought not to be
construed in a manner which would leave the
court helpless to meet extraordinary situations
in the ends of justice. The observations made
by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State
of Bihar [MANU/SC/0028/1975 : (1975) 1 SCC
774] are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, paras 5-6)
The mortality of justice at the hands of law
troubles a judge’s conscience and points an
angry interrogation at the law reformer.
The processual law so dominates in certain
systems as to overpower substantive rights
and substantial justice. The humanist Rule that
procedure should be the handmaid, not the
mistress, of legal justice compels consideration
of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex
debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise
would be wholly inequitable. ... Justice is the
goal of jurisprudence -- processual, as much
as substantive.
17 MANU/SC/0264/2005 : (2005) 4 SCC 480 (3 Judge Bench)
762 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
29. In State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari
[MANU/SC/0494/1975 : (1976) 1 SCC 719 :
1976 SCC (L&S) 118] the Court approved in no
unmistakable terms the approach of moderating
into wholesome directions what is regarded as
mandatory on the principle that: (SCC p. 720)
“Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a
servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice.
Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and
not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in
the administration of justice. In Ghanshyam Dass
v. Dominion of India [MANU/SC/0006/1984 :
(1984) 3 SCC 46] the Court reiterated the need
for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing
with procedure alone in such a manner as to
subserve and advance the cause of justice rather
than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are
based on this principle.”
(iii) Sugandhi (Dead) by LRs & Others v. P. Rajkumar18:
“9. It is often said that procedure is the handmaid
of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall
not be allowed to come in the way of the court
while doing substantial justice. If the procedural
violation does not seriously cause prejudice to
the adversary party, courts must lean towards
doing substantial justice rather than relying upon
procedural and technical violation. We should
not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but
a journey towards truth which is the foundation
of justice and the court is required to take
appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying
truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court
should take a lenient view when an application
is made for production of the documents under
Sub-rule (3).”
18 MANU/SC/0792/2020 : (2020) 10 SCC 706
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 763
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
22. In the present case, the trial Court though had not framed a
specific issue on “limitation”, the same could very well fall under
the broader issue. The question of limitation can be encompassed
within the larger question determined by the First Appellate Court for
determination. The failure of the trial Court and the First Appellate
Court to formulate a separate issue, in the view of this Court, is not
fatal to the judgment rendered by them and has not caused any
prejudice to the parties. Further, the trial Court, in the performance
of its duty, mandated under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has
taken up the question of limitation and upon perusal of the overall
pleadings and evidence, has rightly decided the same. Therefore,
we do not agree with the decision of the High Court in remanding
the matter to the trial Court, that too after this length of time, when
all materials were available before it.
23. As already indicated above, the concurrent findings of the Courts
below were sought to be challenged before the High Court. It is a
general rule that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent
findings of the Courts below. In the present case, both the trial
Court and the First Appellate Court, after detailed analysis of the
oral and documentary evidence let-in by the parties, categorically
held that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. We also find
that the evidence produced would abundantly make it clear that
Dasappa Gowdar and thereafter, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were well
aware of the earlier proceedings and the decree passed in the first
suit. The auction purchaser’s title was confirmed by court orders,
and subsequent transfers were properly registered and recorded.
Therefore, Respondent Nos.1 to 3, who have knowingly slept over their
right to challenge the sale and allowed further rights to flow, cannot
later question the sale of larger extent of share in an unpartitioned
property. We also do not find any plausible reasons for delay. It is
reiterated at this juncture that limitation is a matter of statute and
must be strictly enforced, more so when the earlier transaction
or sale is well within the knowledge of the parties. This principle
assumes greater significance in the present case, where the delay
extends to seventeen years for filing the suit, despite the fact that
they were arrayed as respondents/Judgment Debtors in the execution
proceedings. Furthermore, protection of bona fide purchasers for
value is a significant consideration, and any disturbance to their
rights or titles after such a long period, would create uncertainty
764 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in property transactions and undermine the sanctity of court sale.
Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified
in remanding the matter to the trial Court for fresh trial solely with
respect to the issue of limitation; and that, the Courts below have
rightly held that the suit was barred by limitation and Respondent
Nos.1 to 3 are not entitled for any relief.
24. In such view of the matter, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and decree
of the trial court dismissing the suit, as affirmed by the First Appellate
Court, are restored. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
25. Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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