Supreme Court of India
R.S. SUJATHAversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 832
- Decided
- 29 November 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
Criminal contempt proceedings must be initiated only in exceptional circumstances with clear evidence of deliberate falsehood and must strictly follow the statutory procedure; the Tribunal’s contempt order was therefore set aside.
Summary
The appellant, an IAS officer, challenged disciplinary proceedings by filing an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) seeking quash of a charge memo dated 30‑11‑1999, asserting she received it only on 19‑6‑2002 and thus was within the limitation period. The respondents contended the memo was served on 2‑12‑1999 by registered post. Instead of deciding the limitation issue, the Tribunal held the appellant had made a false statement, found her guilty of perjury and criminal contempt, issued a show‑cause notice and sentenced her to imprisonment till the court rose and a fine of Rs 2,000. The High Court dismissed her writ petition; the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that criminal contempt proceedings may be initiated only in exceptional circumstances with clear evidence of deliberate falsehood, must follow the procedural safeguards of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the 1992 Rules, and that the presumption of receipt of registered post is rebuttable. Consequently, the Tribunal’s contempt order was set aside.
Issues considered
- The Tribunal was authorized to initiate criminal contempt proceedings on the basis of the pleadings without a proper evidentiary basis.
- Whether the procedural requirements under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Contempt of Courts Rules, 1992 were complied.
- Whether the presumption of receipt of a document sent by registered post can be rebutted and whether the appellant was given a fair opportunity to do so.
- Whether the Tribunal should have framed and decided the issue of limitation before proceeding with contempt proceedings.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 340
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(c)
- Contempt of Courts Rules, 1992s. 13, s. 15, s. 7
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 27
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 191, s. 193, s. 197
Subjects
criminal contemptperjurylimitation periodadministrative tribunalprocedural fairnesspresumption of servicequasi‑criminal proceedingsnatural justice
Judgment
[2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 227
R.S. SUJATHA A
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 9579 of 2003)
NOVEMBER 29, 2010
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: s. 2(c) - Criminal contempt
- Employee filed an OA before Tribunal for quashing the
disciplinary proceedings initiated against her - Opposite party C
raised issue of limitation on the ground that the employee was
served charge memo at earlier stage and averment made by
her in that regard was false - Tribunal instead of deciding the
case on merits or on limitation, held that the appellant was
guilty of perjury, as well as of criminal contempt of the Tribunal o
- Propriety of the order of Tribunal - Held: The Tribunal ought
to have framed an issue on limitation and asked the parties
to lead evidence and decide it on merits - It was totally
unwarranted and uncalled for to initiate criminal contempt
proceedings merely on the basis of the pleadings taken by E
the opposite parties - Tribunal failed to appreciate that
criminal contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature
and any action on the part of a party by mistake, inadvertence
or by misunderstanding does not amount to contempt -
Tribunal ought not to have initiated the criminal contempt
F
proceedings at such a pre-mature stage making reference to
the provisions of ss.191, 193 and 197, /PC - Penal Code,
1860- ss. 191, 193 and 197- Natural justice- Evidence Act,
1872 - fllustration (f).
Contempt of Courts Rules, 1992: rr. 7, 13, 15 - Criminal G
contempt - Power of court/tribunal to initiate criminal contempt
proceedings - Scope of - Held: In contempt proceedings, the
court/tribunal is the accuser as well as judge of the accusation
227 H
I
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A - Therefore, court/tribunal is required to act with great
circumspection - The proceedings being quasi-criminal in,
nature, burden and standard of proof required is the same as
required in criminal cases - The charges have to be framed
as per the statutory rules framed for the purpose and proved
s beyond reasonable doubt - The inquiry/contempt
proceedings should be initiated by the court in exceptional
circumstances where the court is of the opinion that perjury
has been committed by a party deliberately to gain some
beneficial order from the. court - In the instant case, criminal
c contempt case was neither registered nor numbered
separately - Charge was not framed by the Tribunal -
Therefore, the contempt proceeding was not conducted in
conformity with the rules at all - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
- Natural justice.
D Evidence Act, 1872: s. 114, Illustration (f) - Held: Any
document sent by Registered Post is presumed to have been
received by the addressee in view of the provisions of s.27 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Illustration (f) of s. 114 of
the Act, but the presumption is rebuttable - Contempt of
E Courts Act, 1971 - General Clauses Act, 1897 - s.27.
Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
appellant for committing certain irregularities. The
appellant filed an O.A. before the Central Administrative
F Tribunal on 5.8.2002 for quashing the charge memo dated
30.11.1999 and the subsequent proceedings. She also
filed an application for condonation of delay. In the O.A.,
the appellant made a specific averment that the charge
memo dated 30.11.1999 was received by her only on
19.6.2002 when the copy of the same was furnished to
G her by the Enquiry Officer. The respondent replied that
the order dated 30.11.1999 was issued to the appellant
on 2.12.1999 by registered post with acknowledgement
due. The Tribunal instead of deciding the case on merits
H
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 229
I '
or on the i~sue of limitati.on held that the appellant had A
committed criminal con~empt, and issued show cause
notice dated 15.11.2002 to her. The appellant submitted
a reply to the ~how cau~'e notice contending that she had
not made any1false statement for the purpose of securing
the order of condonation of delay and, in fact, the charge B
memo dated130.11.19.99
I •
was served upon her for the first
time on 19.•. 2002. She also made a request to summon
certain gov,ernme'lt records to substantiate her case. The
Tribunal dlrected;the respondent authorities to produce
the dogumen~s, i.e. Inward Register, Postal c
Acknow~edgem~nt Due and other relevant documents.
On 12.12.2002, the respondent authorities produced
certai.n photoc.opies, but they did not produce the
reql!ired docu'ments. The case was adjourned to
19.12.2002. The .Tribunal passed the impugned order on 0
19.12.2002 holding that the appellant was guilty of perjury,
as well as of criminal contempt of the Tribunal. The
appellant files:! a writ petition before the High Court which
was dismissed. Th_e instant appeal was filed challenging
the order of the High Court.
E
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Tribunal did not adjudicate upon the
case filed by the appellant at all. The appellant had
approached t.he Tribunal for quashing of the disciplinary F
proceedings initiated against her, and the opposite party
had raised the issue of limitation pointing out that she had
been served the charge memo at an earlier stage and the
averments made by the appellant in that regard was false.
The Tribunal ought to have framed an issue on limitation G
and asked the parties to lead evidence and decide it on
merits. It was totally unwarranted and uncalled for to
initiate criminal contempt proceedings merely on the
basis of the pleadings taken by the opposite parties.
Before the Tribunal, the case was at a preliminary stage,
H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A and it ought not to have initiated the criminal contempt
proceedings at such a pre-mature stage making
reference to the provisions of Sections 191, 193 and 197,
IPC. [Paras 6, 8) [235-F-H; 230-F-G]
8 Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam & Anr. AIR 1971 SC
1367; Chandrapal Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj Singh & Anr. AIR
1982 SC 1238; Pritish v. State of Maharasht'ra & Ors. AIR
2002 SC 236, relied on.
I
T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A. P. &·Ors. (2001) 1 SCC
C 516; Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC
421 - referred to. '
1.2. The inquiry/contempt proceedings should be
initiated by the court in exceptional circumstances where
o the court is of the opinion that perjury has been
committed by a party deliberately to have some beneficial
order from the court. There must be grounds of a nature
higher than mere surmise or suspicion for initiating $uch
proceedings. There must be distinct evidence of
E commission of an offence by such a person, as mere
suspicion cannot bring home the charge of perjury. More
so, the court has also to determine as on facts, whether
it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the
offence which appears to have been committed. In the
instant case, all the documents summoned by the
F Tribunal were not produced before it. More so, any
document sent by Registered Post is presumed to have
been received by the addressee in view of the provisions
of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and
Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act,
G 1872, but every presumption is rebuttable. In such a fact-
situation, the appellant ought to have been given time to
rebut this presumption and lead evidence to prove that
she did not receive the said document as alleged by the
opposite parties. The Tribunal proceeded in great haste,
H as the show cause notice was issued by it on 15.11.2002
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 231
for initiating the said proceedings; it fixed the date for A
12.12.2002 and disposed of the matter on 19.12.2002. The
Tribunal failed to appreciate that criminal contempt
proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and any action
on the part of a party by mistake, inadvertence or by
misunderstanding does not amount to contempt. In B
contempt proceedings, the court is the accuser as well
as judge of the accusation. Therefore, the Tribunal was
required to act with great circumspection as far as
possible, making all allowances for errors of judgment.
The proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, burden c
and standard of proof required is the same as required
in criminal cases. The charges have to be framed as per
the statutory rules framed for the purpose and proved
beyond reasonable doubt keeping in mind that the
alleged contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Law
0
does not permit imposing any punishment in contempt
proceedings on mere probabilities. The court cannot
punish the alleged contemnor without any foundation
merely on conjeGtures and surmises. [Paras 12-15) (238-
G-H; 239-A-H; 240-A-C]
E
Harihar Banerji1 v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102;
Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sugoma/ Postani
AIR 1989 SC 1433; Shim/a Development Authority & Ors. v.
Santosh Sharma (Smt.) & Anr. (1997) 2 SCC 637; Dr. Sunil
Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra F
JT 2010 (12) SC 287; Sahdeo alias Sahdeo Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors: (2010) 3 SCC 705; L.P. Misra (Dr.)
v. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 3337; Three Cheers
Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. C.E.S.C. Ltd. AIR 2009 SC 735 -
relied on. G
2. In the instant case, admittedly, the procedure
prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Rules, 1992
was not followed. A criminal contempt case was neither
registered nor numbered separately. No charge was ever
H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A framed by the Tribunal, as was mandatorily required
under the rules. Thus, the question of furnishing a copy
of the same to the appellant did not arise. Therefore, the
contempt proceedings were not concluded in conformity
with the said rules at all. [Para 19) [242-D-E)
B
Case Law Reference:
(2001) 1 sec 516 referred to Para 3
(1995) 1 sec 421 referred to Para 7
c AIR 1971 SC 1367 relied on Para 9
AIR 1982 SC 1238 relied on Para 10
AIR 2002 SC 236 relied on Para 11
AIR 1918 PC 102 relied on Para 13
D
AIR 1989 SC 1433 relied on Para 13
(1997) 2 sec 637 relied on Para 13
JT 2010 (12) SC 287 relied on Para 13
E
(201 O) 3 sec 105 relied on Para 15
AIR 1998 SC 3337 relied on Para 16
AIR 2009 SC 735 relied on Para 17
F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICT!ON : Civil Appeal No.
9579 of 2003.
From the Judgment & Order dated 19.12.2002 of the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, Bangalore
G in 0.A.No. 715 of 2002.
Rajesh Mahale for the Appellant.
Sanjay R. Hegde for the Respondents.
H
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 233
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed
against the judgment and order of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Bangalore Bench (hereinafter called as the 'Tribunal')
dated 19.12.2002 in Original Application No. 715 of 2002. B
2. (A) Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are
that the State of Karnataka vide order dated 24.1.2001 initiated
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, an Indian
Administrative Service Officer of Karnataka cadre, on the
allegation that she had committed certain irregularities in the C
allotment of wheat under a special programme called the State
Funded Wheat Based Nutrition Programme of the Government
of India at public distribution system rates to a supplier called
Mis Nandi Agro Industries Ltd. The said regular enquiry stood
initiated on the basis of the preliminary enquiry report dated D
31.3.1997.
(B) The appellant filed O.A. No.715 of 2002 before the
Tribunal on 5.8.2002 for quashing the Articles of charge dated
30.11.1999 and subsequent proceedings on diverse grounds. E
In the said Original Application (hereinafter referred to as
'O.A. '), the appellant had made a specific averment that the
charge memo dated 30.11.1999 was received by her only on
19 6.2002, as the copy of the same was furnished to her by
the 3rd respondent i.e. the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, it had
F
been contended by the appellant that she had approached the
Tribunal within limitation. However, taking abundant caution, she
had also filed an application for condonation of delay.
(C) The reply to the said application was filed by the
respondents therein on 18.10.2002, wherein it was contended G
that the order dated 30.11.1999 had been issued to the
appellant on 2.12.1999 by Registered Post with AD.
(D) The Tribunal instead of proceeding with the matter on
merit or deciding the issue of limitation, passed an order dated H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 15.11.2002 stating that the appellant had made a false
statement in the O.A. regarding limitation which was intentional
and deliberate. Therefore, prima facie, the Tribunal was of the
view that the appellant had committed criminal contempt and
a show cause notice dated 15.11.2002 was issued to the
B appellant calling upon her "to appear in person before the
Tribunal on 29.11.2002 at 10.30 a.m. to answer the said show
cause notice on which day the matter would be listed for ·
hearing".
(E) The appellant not only appeared in response to the
C said notice personally, but submitted a reply to the show cause
notice contending that she had not made any false statement
for the purpose of securing the order of condonation of delay
and in fact the charge memo dated 30.11.1999 had been
served upon her first time on 19.6.2002. She also made a
D request to summon certain government records to substantiate
her case.
(F) The Tribunal directed the respondent authorities to
produce the documents, i.e. Inward Register, Postal
E Acknowledge Due and original letter dated 23.12.1999 and
other relevant documents, if any, which would have bearing on
the matter by the next date and the matter was directed to be
listed on 12.12.2002.
(G) On 12.12.2002 though learned counsel for the
F respondent authorities did not produce any of the required
documents, but he produced the photocopies of letter dated
23.12.1999 and the Inward Register. The Tribunal adjourned the
case to 19.12.2002. The Tribunal passed the impugned order
dated 19.12.2002 holding that the appellant was guilty of
G perjury, as well as of criminal contempt of the Tribunal and
imposed the punishment of imprisonment till rising of the court
and a fine of Rs.2,000/-.
3. Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the High
H Court by filing a writ petition which was ultimately dismissed
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 235
[DR. B:S. CHAUHAN, J.]
vide orqe'r dated 2.9.2003~ observing that the High Court had A
no jurisdiction to entertain ·,~he matter placing relianc~ on the
judgment of this Court in T Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P.
& Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 516, ·wherein it had been hel.d that
against the order under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971,
passed l>Y the Tribunal, the party aggrieved has to approach B
this Court. Hence, this appeal. '
•\
4. Shri Rajesh Mahala, learne~ counsel appearing for the
appellant has submitted that the order impugned had been
passed in1 flagrant violation of not only the principles of natural C
justice, but also the statutory rules ,known as The Contempt of
Courts (C.A.T.) Rules, 1992 (hereinafl;~r called as 1992 Rules)
and the appellant had not been given due,9pportunity to defend
herself. The Tribunal did not decide the or.i.§inal application filed
by the appellant. The Tribunal pJc~ked up one of the pleadings
taken by the appellant treating it to be false and initiated the D
criminal contempt proceedings which is not permissible in law.
Therefore, ttie order impugned is liable to be set aside.
5. The~e ,,is none to oppose the appeal. We have
considered the ~;ubmissions made by learned counsel for the i=
appellant.
' '
6. The facts rnentioned hereinabove make it clear that the
Tribunal has not adjudicated upon the case filed by the appellant
at all. The appellant 1'1ad approached the Tribunal for quashing
of the disciplinary r;m'Jceedings initiated against her and the F
opposite party had ra,ised the issue of limitation pointing out
that she had been seNed the Articles of Charges at an earlier
stage and the averme,it made by the appellant in this regard
was false. The Tribuna11 ought to have framed an issue on
limitation, asked the partl,es to lead evidence and decide it on G
merit. It was totally unwarranted and uncalled for to initiate
criminal contempt proceedings merely on the basis of the
pleadings taken by the opposite parties therein. Criminal
contempt has been defin!3d under Section 2(c) of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971, which re·ads as under: H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20tb] 14 (ADDL.YS.C.R.
f
A "(c) "Criminal Contempt" means the publicatioP (iihether
I
by words, spoken or writt~n. or by signs, by !Visible
representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing
of any other act whatsoeV~r which; -
B
to
(i) scandalize or tehds scandalize or lowers 01'tends to
lower the authority of ariy court; or
(ii) prejudices, ·or interferes or tends to interfere with, the
due course of any judicial proceedings; or
c (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or o:'5tructs or
tends to obstruct, the administration of justice h any other
manner."
It has been submitted by learned counsel for he appellant
that none of the above referred to provisions wa~ attracted in
D the facts of this case.
7. The learned Tribunal proceeded on the' basis that this
Court in Chandra Sh~shi v. Ani/ Kumar Verm3, (1995) 1 SCC
421, held that nobody. should be permitted to hdulge in immoral
E acts like perjury, prevarication and motivatef falsehoods in the
judicial proceedings and if someone does ;o, it must be dealt
with appropriately. In case the recourse to.i false plea is taken
with an oblique motive, it would definitey hinder, hamper or
impede the flow of justice and pre¢nt \the courts from
F performing their legal duties.
'
8. B~fore the Tribunal, the case f!ld been at a preliminary
stage, thus, the Tribunal ought not to 1ave initiated the criminal
contempt proceedings at such a ~e-mature stage making
reference to the provisions of Sedons 191, 193 and 197 of
G the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (her-inafter called as the IPC).
Section 191 IPC deals with givingfalse evidence; Section 193
provides for punishment for givin! 1alse evidence; and Section
197 deals with issuing or signi~g ~false certificate.
H 9. In Chajoo Ram v. Ridhey'Shyam & Anr., AIR 1971
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNA1AKA AND ORS. 237
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
SC 1367, this Court while dealing with a similar issue·held as A
under:
" ............ No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false
affidavit~ is an evil which must be effectively curbed with
a stronglhand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily
B
and too frequently without due care and caution and on
inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very
purpose. Prosecutior1 should be ordered when it is
considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish
the delinquent and ndt merely\because there is some C
inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or
immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate
falsehood on a matter of substance and the Court should
be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the
charge ..... "
D
10. In Chandrapal Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj Singh & Anr.,
AIR 1982 SC 1238, this Court while dealing with a case of a
false statement for the purposes of Sedtions 193 and '199 IPC
held as under:
E
" ........ When it is alleged that a false statement has been
made in a declaration which is receivable as evidence in
any Court of Justice or before any public servant or other
person, the statement alleged to be false has to be set out
and its alleged falsity with referen'ce·to the truth found in
F
some document has to be referred to pointing out that the
two situations cannot co-exist, both being attributable to
the same person and, therefore, one to his knowledge
must be false. Rival contentions set out in affidavits
accepted or rejected by courts with reference to onus
probandi do not furnish foundation for a charge under G
Section 199 /PC. .. ....... Acce·ptance or rejection of
evidence by itself is not a sufficient yardstick to dub the
one rejected as false. Falsity can ~e alleged when truth
stands out glaringly and to the 1knowledge of the 'person
who is making the false statement. Day in and day out in H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A courts averments made by one set of witnesses are
accepted and the counter-averments are rejected. If in all
such cases complaints under Section 199 IPC are to be
filed not only there will open up floodgates of litigation but
it would unquestionably be an abuse of the process of
B the court ..... "
(Emphasis added)
11. In Pritish v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2002
SC 236, this Court dealt with the provision of Section 340 of
C the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 extensively, in a case
where admittedly fo'rged document had been filed in a
reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
for getting a higher amount of compensation. The court
observed as under:-
D
"Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub of
this provision is formation of an opinion by the court (before
which proceedin~1s were to be held) that it is expedient in
the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into
an offence which appears to have been
E
committed ............ But once the court decides to do so,
then the court should make a finding to the effect that on
the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that
the offence should further be probed into ...... It should
again be remembered that the preliminary. inquiry
F contemplated in the sub-section is not for finding whether
any particular person is guilty or not. Far from that, the
purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court opts to
conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the
interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears
G to have been co~mitted."
12. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the inquiry/
contempt proceedings should be initiated by the court in
exceptional circumstances whereJhe court is of the opinion that
H perjury has been committed by a party deliberately to have
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 239
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
some beneficial order from the court. There must be grounds A
of a nature higher than mere surmise or suspicion for initiating
such proceedings. There must be distinct evidence of the
commission of an offence by such a person as mere suspicion
cannot bring home the charge of perjury. More so, the court has
also to determine as on facts, whether it is expedient in the B
interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to
have been committed.
13. In the instant case, all the documents summoned by
the Tribunal had not been produced before the Tribunal. More C
so, any document sent by Registered Post is presumed to have
been received by the addressee in view of the provisions of
Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Illustration
(f) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but every
presumption is rebuttable. (Vide: Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi
Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102; Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. D
Atmaram Sugomal Postani, AIR 1989 SC 1433; Shim/a
Development Authority & Ors. v. Santosh Sharma (Smt.) &
Anr., (1997) 2 SCC 637; and Dr. Sunil Kumar Sambhudaya/
Gupta & 1 Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, JT 2010 (12) SC 287).
E
14. In such a fact-situation, the appellant ought to have
been give'n time to rebut this presumption and lead evidence
to prove that she did not receive the said document as alleged
by the opposite parties, and it was necessary to do so for the
reasons we record later. F
15. The Tribunal proceeded in great haste as the show
cause notice was issued by the Tribunal on 15.11.2002 for
initiating the said proceedings, fixed the date for 12.12.2002
and disposed of the matter on 19.12.2002. The Tribunal failed
to appreciate that criminal contempt proceedings are quasi G
criminal in nature and any action on the part of a party by
mistake, inadvertence or by misunderstanding does not amount
to contempt. In contempt proceedings, the court is the accuser
as well as judge of the accusation. Therefore, it behoves the
Tribunal to act with great circumspectiorl-: as far as possible, H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (f-.DDL.) S.C.R.
A making all allowances for errors of judgment. Any action taken
in unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other
measures and therefore is totally unwarranted and should not
be encouraged. The proceedings being quasi criminal in
nature, burden and standard of proof required is the same as
s required in criminal cases. The charges have to be framed as
per the statutory rules framed for the purpose and proved
beyond reasonable doubt keeping in mind that the alleged
. contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Law does not
permit imposing any punishment in contempt proceedings on
c mere probabilities. The court cannot punish the alleged
contemnor without any foundation merely on conjectures and
surmises. (See Sahdeo alias Sahdeo Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 705).
16. Needless to say, the contempt proceedings being
D quasi criminal in nature require strict adherence to the
procedure prescribed under the rules applicable in such
proceedings. In LP. Misra (Dr.) v. State of UP., AIR 1998 SC
3337, this court while dealing with the issue of observance of
the statutory rules held as under: '
E
"......... we are of the opinion that the Court while passing
the impugned order had not followed the procedure
prescribed by law. It is true that the High Court can invoke
powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the
F Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has to be
exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed
bylaw."
(Emphasis supplied)
G 17. In Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. C.E.S.C.
Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 735, and Sahdeo (supra), this Court
reiterated a similar view observing that in contempt
proceedings the court must conclude the trial and complete the
proceedings "in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law".
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 241
[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
18. The instant case has to be dealt with under the 1992 A
Rules. The aforesaid rules provide the following procedure:
"Rule 7. Initiation of proceedings: -
(i) ............................ .
B
(ii) Every petition for 'Criminal Contempt' made in
accordance with these rules and every information other
than a petition, for initiating action for criminal contempt
under the Act on being scrutinized by the Registrar shall
first be placed on the administrative side before the c
Chairman in the case of the principal Bench and the
concerned Vice Chairman in the case of other Benches
or such other Member as may be designated by him for
this purpose and if he considers it expedient and proper
to take action under the Act, the said petition or information · D
shall be registered and numbered in the Registry and
placed before the Bench for preliminary hearing.
(iii) When suo motu action is taken, the statement of facts
constituting the alleged contempt and copy of the draft
charges shall be prepared. and signed by the Registrar E
before placing t/Jem for preliminary hearing.
Rule 13. Hearing of the case and trial:-
(a) ······ ................... . F
(b) .......................... .
(c) The respondent shall be furnished with a copy of the
charge framed, which shall be read over and explained
to the respondent. The Tribunal shall then record his plea, G
if any.
(d) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... . .,.,
(e) ........................ .
H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (AOOL.) S.C.R.
A Rule 15. Procedure for trial:-
(i) Except as otherwise provided in the Act and these rules,
the procedure prescribed for summary trials under
Chapter XX/ of the Code shall as far as practicable be
followed in the trial of case for contempt.
B
(ii) ........................ ..
(111) .......................... .
(iv) ......................... .
c
(v) ........................ .
(Emphasis added)
19. In the instant case, admittedly, the procedure
0
prescribed hereinabove under the 1992 Rules has not been
followed. A criminal contempt case has neither been registered
nor numbered separately. No charge (s) had ever been framed
by the Tribunal as mandatorily required under the rules. Thus
E question of furnishing the copy of the same to the appellant did
not arise. Therefore, the contempt proceedings had not been
concluded in conformity with the aforesaid rules at all. This
Court in Sahdeo (supra) while dealing with a similar situation
held as under:
F "Every statutory provision requires strict adherence, for the
reason that the Statute creates rights in favour of persons
concerned. The impugned judgment suffered from non-
observance of the principles of natural justice and not
ensuring the compliance of Statutory Rules, 1952. Thus,
G the trial itself suffered from material procedural defect and
stood vitiated. The impugned judgment and order, so far
as the conviction of the appellants in Contempt
proceedings are concerned, is liable to be set aside."
(Emphasis added)
H
R.S. SUJATHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 243
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
20. The ratio of the judgment in Sahdeo (supra) applies A
to this case in entirety. The instant case, is squarely covered
by the aforesaid judgment. In view of the above, the impugned
judgment and order dated 1~.12.2002 in O.A. No. 715 of 2002
passed by the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. The appeal is
allowed. The judgment and order of the Tribunal is set aside. B
No costs.
D.G. Appeal allowed.
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