Holding

A marginal deviation from the prescribed standard constitutes adulteration, the appellant waived his right to a second sample analysis, and the court cannot use Sections 433 of the CrPC or Article 142 to override the statutory minimum sentence, so the conviction stands.

Summary

The appellant was convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling milk whose Milk Solid Non‑Fat (MSNF) content was 7.7%, below the statutory standard of 8.5%. He argued that the delay in analysis caused a marginal shortfall, that he was denied the right under Section 13(2) to have a second sample tested at the Central Food Laboratory, and that the sentence should be reduced under Section 433 of the CrPC or Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court held that no evidence supported the delay claim, the appellant voluntarily waived his right to a second analysis, and any marginal deviation from the prescribed standard constitutes adulteration. It further ruled that the power to commute sentences under Section 433 lies solely with the appropriate Government and that Article 142 cannot be used to contravene the statutory minimum sentence of six months under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, the conviction upheld, bail bonds cancelled and the appellant directed to surrender and serve the remaining sentence.

Issues considered

Whether a marginal shortfall in MSNF below the prescribed standard can be ignored due to alleged delay in analysis.
Whether the appellant was denied his statutory right under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 to have a second sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory.
Whether the conviction for adulteration can be set aside on the ground of marginal deviation from standards.
Whether the court can exercise power under Section 433 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to commute the sentence.
Whether the court can invoke Article 142 of the Constitution to reduce the sentence below the minimum prescribed under Section 16(1)(a) of the PFA Act.
Whether the appellant’s illiteracy affects the validity of his signature on the sample.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 433
Constitution of Indias. 142
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 13(2), s. 16(1)(a)

Subjects

Food adulterationMinimum sentencingSection 13(2) rightMarginal deviationCriminal Procedure Code 433Article 142Standard complianceConviction upheld

Judgment

[2019] 13 S.C.R. 949 949

RAJ KUMAR A
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1541 of 2019)
OCTOBER 04, 2019 B
[DEEPAK GUPTA AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: s.13(2) – Non-
compliance of – Sample of milk – Milk Solid Non Fat (MSNF) –
7.7% of MSNF found in sample of milk against the prescribed
C
standard of 8.5% – Option given by Magistrate to the appellant to
send sample to CFL – Appellant waived his right by not applying to
Magistrate for sending second sample for analysis to CFL –
Appellant cannot raise grievance of non-compliance of s.13(2) of
the Act.
D
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: Even marginal
deviation from the prescribed standard cannot be ignored – In cases
of food coming under the Act, it is not required to prove that article
of food was injurious to health – If an article of food fails to comply
with the standards then it will have to be treated as an adulterated
article even if it is not rendered injurious to health – If the standards E
are not complied with, the Court is not justified in acquitting the
accused charged with adulteration only on the ground that the
deficiency is marginal.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.433 – Scope of –
Commutation of sentence – Held: The powers under s.433 can only F
be exercised by the appropriate Government – This power of the
appropriate Government cannot be usurped by the courts and the
Government cannot be directed to pass ‘formal compliance order’.
Constitution of India: Art.142 – The power under Art.142
cannot be exercised against the specific provision of law – s.16(1)(a) G
of the PFA Act lays down a minimum sentence of six months –
Considering the bane of adulteration and the deleterious effect of
adulteration and sub-standard food on the health of the citizens
(especially children when milk is involved), the Legislature provided
a minimum sentence of six months – Passage of time can be no
H
949
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 13 S.C.R.

A excuse to award a sentence lower than the minimum – Furthermore,
the power under Art.142 cannot be used in total violation of the
law – When a minimum sentence is prescribed by law, this Court
cannot, in exercise of its power under Art. 142, pass an order totally
contrary to law – If such power could be used in a food adulteration
case to impose a sentence lower than the minimum prescribed, then
B
even in cases of murder and rape, this Court applying the same
principles could impose a sentence less than the minimum – This, is
not the purpose of Art.142 – The powers under Art.142 cannot be
exercised in such a manner that they make a mockery of the law
itself – Administration of justice – Prevention of Food Adulteration
C Act, 1954.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Plea of the appellant was that there was delay in
analysing the sample and, therefore, marginal shortfall in MSNF
should be overlooked, since it would have been caused by the
D delay in testing the sample. This contention is not accepted
because there is no material on record to support this assertion.
The appellant did not even deem it fit to summon the Public
Analyst for cross-examination for this purpose. Since the sample
had been preserved by using formalin the accused cannot get
E any benefit. [Para 3][954-D-E]
Shambhu Dayal v. State of U. P. (1979) 1 SCC 202 :
[1979] 2 SCR 341 – referred to.
2. The second contention raised was that the provisions of
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
F were not complied with in as much as the appellant was not given
an opportunity to send his second sample to the Central Food
Laboratory (CFL) for analysis. This argument is also without
any merit. All the courts have given a finding of fact that notice
under Section 13(2) of the Act was sent to the appellant on
G 18.02.1996. The appellant did not choose to exercise his option
to get his sample analysed by the CFL. The appellant urges that
this option was given to him three months after the sample had
been taken and the second sample would have obviously become
unfit for analysis. It is also contended that the complaint filed on
15.02.1996 was defective and the defects were removed only on
H
RAJ KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 951

27.06.1996 and, thereafter, no option under Section 13(2) of the A
Act was given. This argument is totally without any merit. The
appellant was given an option to have the second sample sent to
the CFL when the Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint.
The complaint may not have been complete in the sense that the
list of witnesses was not filed but this, in any way, did not impact
B
the right given to the appellant to get the second sample analysed
from CFL. If the appellant had exercised his option and the
Magistrate had not sent the second sample to the CFL, or if the
CFL had reported that the sample is not fit for analysis, then
alone the appellant could have got some benefit. The appellant
waived his right by not applying to the Magistrate for sending C
the second sample for analysis to the CFL, and he cannot have
any grievance in this behalf. [Para 4][954-F; 955-A-D]
Dattappa v. Buldana Municipality AIR (38) 1951
Nagpur 191; Duli Chand v. State of U.P. 1987
All.L.J.971; Karunan v. Food Inspector 1985 D
KLT.523; Ram Kumar vs. The State of Punjab 1982 (I)
F.A.C. 68; Hans Raj v. The State of Punjab 1980 (II)
F.A.C. 396; Ujagar Singh v. The State of Punjab 1980
(I) F.A.C. 432; Food Inspector, Palghat Muncipality v.
Karingarappully Co-op. Milk Society Ltd. & Ors. 1986
K.L.J. 29; State of Punjab v. Ramesh Kumar 1984 Crl.L. E
J. 381; State of Punjab v. Teja Singh 1976 Crl.L.J.
1648 – referred to.
3. Once standards are laid down by the Legislature then
those standards have to be followed. In items like milk which is
a primary food, under the Act, it is not necessary to also prove F
that the food item had become unfit for human consumption or
injurious to health. In cases of food coming under the Act, it is
not required to prove that article of food was injurious to health.
In this case, the only question to be determined is whether the
article complies with the standards laid down or not. If it fails to G
comply with the standards then it will have to be treated as an
adulterated article even if it is not rendered injurious to health.
Even marginal deviation from the prescribed standard cannot be
ignored. If the standards are not complied with, the Court is not
justified in acquitting the accused charged with adulteration only
H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 13 S.C.R.

A on the ground that the deficiency is marginal. [Para 8, 11][956-E;
958-F]
4. A bare perusal of Section 433 of Cr.PC shows that the
powers under Section 433 can only be exercised by the appropriate
Government. These powers cannot be exercised by any court
B including this Court. At best, the court can recommend to the
State Government that such power may be exercised but the
power of the appropriate Government cannot be usurped by the
courts and the Government cannot be directed to pass ‘formal
compliance order’. Therefore, a similar order cannot be passed
by this Court because that is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
C [Para 13][959-E]
5. The power under Article 142 cannot be exercised against
the specific provision of law. Section 16(1)(a) of the Act lays down
a minimum sentence of six months. Considering the bane of
adulteration and the deleterious effect of adulteration and sub-
D standard food on the health of the citizens (especially children
when milk is involved), the Legislature provided a minimum
sentence of six months. Passage of time can be no excuse to
award a sentence lower than the minimum. Furthermore, the
power under Article 142 cannot be used in total violation of the
E law. When a minimum sentence is prescribed by law, this Court
cannot, in exercise of its power under Article 142, pass an order
totally contrary to law. If such power could be used in a food
adulteration case to impose a sentence lower than the minimum
prescribed, then even in cases of murder and rape, this Court
applying the same principles could impose a sentence less than
F the minimum. This, is not the purpose of Article 142. The powers
under Article 142 cannot be exercised in such a manner that they
make a mockery of the law itself. [Paras 14, 15][959-G-H; 960-
A-B]
State of Kerala v. Parameswaran Pillai Vasudevan Nair
G 1975 Crl. L.J. 97 – approved.
Santosh Kumar v. Municipal Corporation and Anr.
(2000) 9 SCC 151; N. Sukumaran Nair v. Food
Inspector, Mavelikara (1997) 9 SCC 101 – per
incuriam.
H
RAJ KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 953

M.V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi and Anr. AIR (48) 1961 SC A
1494; Malwa Co-operative Milk Union Ltd., Indore &
Ors. v. Bihari Lal & Anr. 1973 F.A.C. 375; Municipal
Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh (1975) 1 SCC 794
– referred to.
Case Law Reference B
[1979] 2 SCR 341 referred to Para 3
AIR (38) 1951 Nagpur 191 referred to Para 6
1987 All.L.J.971 referred to Para 6
1985 KLT.523 referred to Para 6 C
1982 (I) F.A.C. 68 referred to Para 6
1980 (II) F.A.C. 396 referred to Para 6
1980 (I) F.A.C. 432 referred to Para 6
1986 K.L.J. 29 referred to Para 7 D

1984 Crl.L. J. 381 referred to Para 7
1976 Crl.L.J. 1648 referred to Para 7
AIR (48) 1961 SC 1494 referred to Para 9
E
1973 F.A.C. 375 referred to Para 10
(1975) 1 SCC 794 referred to Para 10
1975 Crl. L.J. 97 approved Para 10
(2000) 9 SCC 151 per incuriam Para 12
F
(1997) 9 SCC 101 per incuriam Para 12
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1541 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 2331 of 1999. G
Shantanu Bansal, Adv. for the Appellant.
Ajay Kumar Mishra, Sr. Adv., Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad and
Sanjay Maurya, Advs. for the Respondent.
H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 13 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. On 30.10.1995 a sample of milk was collected from the appellant
B by the Food Inspector. The same was sent to the Public Analyst who
received the same on 02.11.1995. The sample was analysed and Milk
Fat (MF for short) was found to be 4.6% and Milk Solid Non-Fat (MSNF
for short) was 7.7%, against the prescribed standard of 8.5%. The
appellant was prosecuted after obtaining consent of the Chief Medical
Officer, and was convicted by trial court, which conviction was upheld
C by the Sessions Court and the High Court.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant raised number of issues. The
first was that there was delay in analysing the sample and, therefore,
marginal shortfall in MSNF should be overlooked, since it would have
been caused by the delay in testing the sample. We cannot accept this
D contention because there is no material on record to support this assertion.
The appellant did not even deem it fit to summon the Public Analyst for
cross-examination for this purpose. In similar circumstances where the
delay in testing the samples was of 44 days, this Court in Shambhu
Dayal vs. State of U. P.1 held that since the sample had been preserved
E by using formalin, as in the present case, the accused cannot get any
benefit.
4. The second contention raised was that the provisions of Section
2
13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) were not complied with in as much as the appellant
F was not given an opportunity to send his second sample to the Central
Food Laboratory (CFL for short) for analysis. This argument is also

1
(1979) 1 SCC 202
2
13.Report of public analyst.- (1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-section (1) to the effect
that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution
G of prosecution against the persons from whom the sample of the article of food was taken
and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under
section 14A, forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the
result of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person
or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the
court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get
the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the
H Central Food Laboratory.
RAJ KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 955
[DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

without any merit. All the courts have given a finding of fact that notice A
under Section 13(2) of the Act was sent to the appellant on 18.02.1996.
The appellant did not choose to exercise his option to get his sample
analysed by the CFL. Learned counsel for the appellant urges that this
option was given to him three months after the sample had been taken
and the second sample would have obviously become unfit for analysis.
B
It is also contended that the complaint filed on 15.02.1996 was defective
and the defects were removed only on 27.06.1996 and, thereafter, no
option under Section 13(2) of the Act was given. This argument is totally
without any merit. The appellant was given an option to have the second
sample sent to the CFL when the Magistrate took cognizance of the
complaint. The complaint may not have been complete in the sense that C
the list of witnesses was not filed but this, in any way, did not impact the
right given to the appellant to get the second sample analysed from CFL.
If the appellant had exercised his option and the Magistrate had not sent
the second sample to the CFL, or if the CFL had reported that the sample
is not fit for analysis, then alone the appellant could have got some benefit.
D
The appellant waived his right by not applying to the Magistrate for
sending the second sample for analysis to the CFL, and he cannot have
any grievance in this behalf.
5. Another ground raised by the appellant is that he is illiterate and
cannot sign, but the Food Inspector has obtained signatures. All the courts
have given a finding that the signatures are of the appellant and this E
cannot be gone into in these proceedings.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant quoted a large number of
judgments of various High Courts viz., Dattappa vs.Buldana
Municipality3; Duli Chand vs. State of U.P4; Karunanv s . F o o d
Inspector5; Ram Kumar vs. The State of Punjab6; Hans Raj v s . F
The State of Punjab7 and Ujagar Singh vs. The State of Punjab8, to
submit that when there is a marginal variation from the standards
prescribed, the courts should give benefit of doubt to the accused. It is
contended that the quality of milk depends not only on the quality of food
given to the cattle but also on the health of the cattle and marginal G
3
AIR (38) 1951 Nagpur 191
4
1987 All.L.J.971
5
1985 KLT.523
6
1982 (I) F.A.C. 68
7
1980(II) F.A.C. 396
8
1980 (I) F.A.C. 432 H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 13 S.C.R.

A deficiencies can be caused due to natural causes beyond control of
humans.
7. We are constrained to point out that out of the judgments cited
by the learned counsel above, several have been overruled. Referring to
the case of Karunan (supra), a Division Bench of the Kerala High
B Court in Food Inspector, Palghat Municipality vs. Karingarappully
Co-op. Milk Society Ltd. & Ors.9 has stated that the proposition laid
down in Karunan’s case is not good in law. The appellant has also
placed reliance on Ujagar Singh’s case (supra) as well as Ram
Kumar’s case (supra). Ram Kumar’s case (supra) relied upon Ujagar
Singh’s case (supra) to conclude that the accused in that case is not
C guilty of adulteration. However, a Division Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court, in the case of State of Punjab vs. Ramesh
Kumar10 relying on a Full Bench judgment of the High Court in State of
Punjab vs. Teja Singh11 has held that Ujagar Singh’s case (supra) is
no longer good in law. It is unfortunate that at the Supreme Court level
D counsel cite judgments which have been overruled.
8. We are of the considered view that once standards are laid
down by the Legislature then those standards have to be followed.In
items like milk which is a primary food, under the Act, it is not necessary
to also prove that the food item had become unfit for human consumption
E or injurious to health. In cases of food coming under the Act, it is not
required to prove that article of food was injurious to health. In this case,
the only question to be determined is whether the article complies with
the standards laid down or not? If it fails to comply with the standards
then it will have to be treated as an adulterated article

F 9. We may point out that this Court in M.V. Joshi vs. M.U. Shimpi
and Anr.12 held as follows :-
“7. …Therefore, if the quality or purity of butter falls below the
standard prescribed by the said rule or its constituents are in excess
of the prescribed limits of variability, it shall be deemed to be
G adulterated within the meaning of S. 2 of the Act. If the prescribed
standard is not attained, the statute treats such butter, by fiction,
as an adulterated food, though in fact it is not adulterated. To put
9
1986 K.L.J. 29
10
1984 Cri. L.J. 381
11
1976 Cri. L.J. 1648
12
H AIR (48) 1961 SC 1494
RAJ KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 957
[DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

it in other words, by reason of the fiction, it is not permissible for A
an accused to prove that, though the standard prescribed is not
attained, the article of food is in fact not adulterated. The
non-conformity with the standard prescribed makes such butter
an adulterated food. Section 7 of the Act prohibits the manufacture,
sale, storage or distribution of such food.…”
B
10. There were some observations in the judgment of this Court
in Malwa Co-operative Milk Union Ltd., Indore & Ors. vs. Bihari
Lal & Anr.13 decided on 14.08.1967, which were interpreted by some
High Courts to mean that acquittal was justified in case there were
marginal deficiencies in meeting the requirements. Dealing with the
Malwa Co-operative case (supra) this Court held as follows in C
Municipal Committee, Amritsar vs. Hazara Singh14:-
“4. …Indeed, this Court’s decision cited above discloses that
Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) was not laying down the law
that minimal deficiencies in the milk components justified acquittal
in food adulteration cases.…” D

Further, this Court quoted with approval, the judgment of the Full
Bench of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala vs. Parameswaran
Pillai Vasudevan Nair15, which held as follows:-
“13. The Act is a piece of consumer legislation. It regulates to E
some extent the consumer-supplier relations. Consumerists
demand enforcement of discipline among the producers or
manufacturers of food to ensure safety in the realm of food. The
consumer’s legitimate ignorance and his almost total dependence
on the fairness and competence of those who supply his daily
needs have made him a ready target for exploitation. The Act is F
intended to protect him against outright frauds.
14. The Act does not make a distinction between cases coming
under it on the basis of the degree of adulteration. It does not
provide for aggravation of offence based on the extent of
contamination. The offence and punishment are the same whether G
the adulteration is great or small. Food pollution, even if it be only
to the slightest extent, if continued in practice, would adversely
13
1973 F.A.C. 375
14
(1975) 1 SCC 794
15
1975 Cri. L.J. 97 H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 13 S.C.R.

A affect the health of every man, woman and child in the country.
Hence even marginal or border line variations of the prescribed
standards under the Act are matters of serious concern for all
and as public interests are involved in them, the maxim, De Minimis
Non Curat Lex. law does not concern itself about trifles, does not
apply to them.
B
15. The standard fixed under the Act is one that is certain. If it is
varied to any extent the certainty of a general standard would be
replaced by the vagaries of a fluctuating standard. The
disadvantages of the resulting unpredictability, uncertainty and
impossibility of arriving at fair and consistent decisions, are great.
C
16. The Act does not provide for exemption of marginal or border
line variations of the standard from the operation of the Act. In
such circumstances to condone such variations on the ground that
they are negligible is virtually to alter the standard itself fixed
under the Act.
D
17. The standards of qualities of the articles have been fixed by
the Government under the provisions of the Act after due
deliberation and after consulting a committee of competent men.
It is for them to give due allowance for probable errors before
fixing a standard. They may have done it also. There is no reason
E to assume otherwise. Therefore the conclusion is that for an article
of food when a standard has been fixed under the Act it has to be
observed in every detail.”
11. In view of the above settled law, we hold that if the standards
are not complied with, the Court is not justified in acquitting the accused
F charged with adulteration only on the ground that the deficiency is
marginal.
12. The last submission of the counsel was that this Court may
follow what was done in Santosh Kumar vs. Municipal Corporation
and Anr.16, where under similar circumstances the sentence of six months
G imprisonment was commuted and the State Government was directed
to pass formal orders of commutation. It appears that the Bench in
Santosh Kumar’s case (supra) followed the judgment in N. Sukumaran
Nair vs. Food Inspector, Mavelikara17, and we find that in both these
16
(2000) 9 SCC 151
17
H (1997) 9 SCC 101
RAJ KUMAR v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 959
[DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

cases there is no discussion of scope and ambit of Section 433 of the A
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the Cr.PC). We are, therefore,
of the view that these judgments are per incuriam and do not lay down
any legal proposition that provisions of Section 433 of Cr.PC can be
invoked in such cases.
13. Section 433 of Cr.PC reads as follows :- B
“433. Power to commute sentence.–The appropriate
Government may, without the consent of the person sentenced
commute-
(a) a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); C

(b) a sentence of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for a
term not exceeding fourteen years or for fine;
(c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for simple imprisonment
for any term to which that person might have been sentenced, or D
for fine;
(d) a sentence of simple imprisonment, for fine.”
A bare perusal of Section 433 of Cr.PC shows that the powers
under Section 433 can only be exercised by the appropriate Government.
These powers cannot be exercised by any court including this Court. At E
best, the court can recommend to the State Government that such power
may be exercised but the power of the appropriate Government cannot
be usurped by the courts and the Government cannot be directed to pass
‘formal compliance order’. We are, therefore, not inclined to pass a
similar order because that is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
F
14. It was also urged that we may exercise powers under Article
142 of the Constitution of India because the occurrence took place more
than twenty years back. We are clearly of the view that the power
under Article 142 cannot be exercised against the specific provision of
law. Section 16(1)(a) of the Act lays down a minimum sentence of six
months. Considering the bane of adulteration and the deleterious effect G
of adulteration and sub- standard food on the health of the citizens
(especially children when milk is involved), the Legislature provided a
minimum sentence of six months. Passage of time can be no excuse to
award a sentence lower than the minimum.
H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 13 S.C.R.

A 15. Furthermore, the power under Article 142, in our considered
view, cannot be used in total violation of the law. When a minimum
sentence is prescribed by law, this Court cannot, in exercise of its power
under Article 142, pass an order totally contrary to law. If such power
could be used in a food adulteration case to impose a sentence lower
than the minimum prescribed, then even in cases of murder and rape,
B
this Court applying the same principles could impose a sentence less
than the minimum. This, in our opinion, is not the purpose of Article 142.
We have no doubt in our mind that powers under Article 142 cannot be
exercised in such a manner that they make a mockery of the law itself.
16. In view of the above discussion we find no merit in the case
C and the same is dismissed. Application(s), if any, shall also stand
dismissed. The bail bonds of the accused-appellant are cancelled and he
is directed to surrender within four weeks and undergo the remaining
part of the sentence. A copy of this judgment be forwarded to the trial
court so that if the appellant does not surrender, appropriate action be
D taken against him.

Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.

E

F

G

H