Supreme Court of India
RAJ NATHversusSTATE OF U.P.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 36
- Decided
- 16 January 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the trial and High Courts correctly relied on the eye‑witness and forensic evidence and that the circumstances fulfilled Section 149 IPC, justifying the convictions of the appellants.
Summary
The appellant Raj Nath, his two sons and three others were charged with murder, attempted murder and rioting under Sections 302, 307, 148, 141 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution proved that the accused opened fire on the informant and his companions, causing four deaths and injuries, based on eye‑witness testimony, medical reports and forensic analysis. The trial court convicted five of the six accused and sentenced them to life imprisonment; the High Court affirmed the judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the reliability of the eye‑witness evidence and the applicability of Section 149 IPC, emphasizing that a common object, not a prior concerted intention, suffices for liability in an unlawful assembly of five or more persons. The Court held that the evidence was reliable and the facts satisfied the requirements of Section 149, thereby upholding the convictions. The appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the eye‑witness testimony of PW‑1 and PW‑2 is reliable and sufficient to support conviction.
- Whether the facts of the case satisfy the criteria of Section 149 IPC, i.e., an unlawful assembly with a common object, to hold each accused liable for the murders and injuries.
- Whether the prosecution must prove the specific act of each accused or if mere participation in the unlawful assembly suffices under Section 149.
- Whether the convictions under Sections 302, 307, 148 read with Section 149 are legally sustainable.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 141, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307
Subjects
Section 149 IPCunlawful assemblycommon objecteye-witness testimonyforensic evidencemurderlife imprisonmentappeal
Judgment
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 336
A RAJ NATH
V.
.. .
STATE OF U.P.
(Criminal Appeal No.76 of 2009)
",..__
JANUARY 16, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
c
ss.3021149, 3071149, 147 and 148 - Accused fired at
victims with gun and country made pistols - Resulting in death ·
of four and injuries to one witness - Conviction and sentence
of life imprisonment awarded by trial court, affirmed by High
D Court - Held: There is nothing infirm in the conclusions of trial
court and the High Court in placing reliance on tl]e testimony ).- .
of eye-witnesses - Medical evidence and forensic report
corroborating ocular testimony - s. 149 has clear application
to the facts of the case - Conviction justified.
E ss. 141 and 149 - 'Common object' - Connotation of-
Explained.
The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 2009, his
two sons and three others were prosecuted for
F commission of offences punishable ulss.147, 148, 3021149
and 307/149 IPC. The prosecution case was that the
accused had animosity with the informant as he had
helped their rival 'RD' to their loss in a civil litigation, 'RD'
sold some land to PW2, the nephew of the informant, this
G led to further ill will between the parties. On the fateful day
at about 6.00 p.m. when the informant, his sons 'N' and
'M' accompanied by PW2 and 'S' were returning from the
village of the appellant after attending a 'Bhagwat', all the
six accused waylaid them. The appellant fired at them with
H 336
RAJ NATH v. STATE OF U.P. 337
. "
his gun and the others by country made pistols resulting
in injuries to PW-2, death of one of the victims at the spot,
A
•
and another on his way to hospital, the third one died in
the hospital the following day and the fourth one four
days after the incident. The medical evidence and the
forensic report corroborated the ocular testimony. The B
trial court acquitted one of the accused and convicted
five of them of the offences charged, and sentenced all
of them, inter alia, to imprisonment for life. The High Court
having affirmed the conviction and sentence, the accused
filed the appeals. c
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. So far as the reliability of evidence of the
eye witnesses PWs 1 and 2 is concerned, their evidence
... has been analysed in great detail by the trial court and
the High Court. PW-2 was one of the injured persons.
D
Therefore, there is nothing infirm in the conclusions of
the trial court and the High Court placing reliance on their
evidence. It is to be noted that one of the deceased
persons received nearly 30 injuries which is consistent E
with the prosecution case that the accused persons were
holding country made pistols. [Paras 6 and 7] [343-8-C]
2.1. As regards the applicability of s.149 IPC, the
emphasis is on the common object and not on common
F
intention. 'Common object' is different from a 'common
intention' as it does not require a prior concert and a
common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough
if each has the same object in view and their number is
five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve
that object. The 'common object' of an assembly is to be G
ascertained from the acts and language of the"lllembers
composing it, and from consideration of all the
surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the
course of conduct adopted by the members of the
assembly. For determination of the common object of the H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A unlawful assembly, the conduct of each of the members
of the unlawful assembly, before, at the time of attack and
thereafter, as also motive for the crime, are some of the
relevant considerations. [Para 8 and 9] [343-D-E; 344-F-H]
2.2. Section 149, IPC consists of two parts. The first
8
part of the section means that the offence to be
committed in prosecution of the common object must be
one which is committed with a view to accomplish the
common object. In order that the offence may fall within
C the first part, the offence must be connected immediately
with the common object of the unlawful assembly of
which the accused was member. Even if the offence
committed is not in direct prosecution of the common
object of the assembly, it may yet fall u/s 141, if it can be
held that the offence was such as the members knew was
D likely to be committed and this is what is required in the
second part of the section. The purpose for which the
members of the assembly set out or desired to achieve
is the object. If the object desired by all the members is
the same, the knowledge that is the object which is being
E pursued is shared by all the members and they are in
general agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that
is now the common object of the assembly. The
distinction between the two parts of s.149 cannot be
ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue
F to be determined, whether the offence committed falls
within the first part or it was an offence such as the
members of the assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of the common object and falls
within the second part. However, there may be cases
G which would be within first part, but offences committed
in prosecution of the common object would be generally,
if not always, within the second part, namely, offences
which the parties knew to be likely committed in the
prosecution of the common object. [Para 10) [345-E-H;
H 346-A-F]
RAJ NATH v. STATE OF U.P. 339
)c
Chikkarange Gowda and others v. State of Mysore AIR A
1956 SC 731; State of UP. v. Dan Singh and Ors. (1997) 3
SCC 747; Lalji v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437; Gangadhar
_, Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa (2002) 8 SCC 381 and
Shivjee Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar (2008) 11 SCR 548,
referred to. B
2.3 Section 149 IPC has clear application to the facts
t of the case. Thjrefore, the trial court and the High Court
were justified in convicting the appellants. [Para 13) [347-
CJ
c
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1956 SC 731 referred to Para 10
(1997) 3 sec 747 referred to Para 11
'--" D
(1989) 1 sec 437 referred to Para 11
(2002) 8 sec 381 referred to Para 12
(2008) 11 SCR 548 referred to Para 12
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal E
Nos. 76 of 2009.
From the Judgment dated 14.05.2007 of the High Court
'( of Judicature of Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 3023 of
1981. F
WITH
Crl. No. 77 of 2009.
T.S. Doabia, Jaswant Persoya, Jagjit Singh Chhabra and G
Satish Vig for the Appellant.
~
Shail Kumar Dwivedi, AAG., Ratnakar Dash, Sahdev
Singh and Anuvrat Sharma for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of ,a
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the
appeal filed by the five appellants before the High Court. The
present appellants, his two sons Yatindra and Surendra
8
alongwith Ram Kripal, Gajendra and Govind were tried by
learned llnd Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri for alleged
commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148,
302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section
149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The
C trial Court acquitted accused Govind but rest of the five
accused were convicted for offences punishable under Section
302 read with Section 149 IPC, 307 read with Section 149 and
Section 148 IPC. Life sentence, five years rigorous
imprisonment and two years rigorous imprisonment
D respectively were imposed.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The informant Vijay Bahadur is a resident of village
E Sakaragarhi, P.S. Kishni, district Mainpuri. There was a
litigation between Smt. Rama Devi and appellant Raj Nath
resident of Nagla Tara in which Raj Nath lost in the litigation
before court. In the said litigation, informant Vijay Bahadur had
helped Smt. Rama Devi. Four months prior to the incident
Rama Devi had sold 16 bighas of her land to Lokeshwar Nath
F (PW-2) nephew of informant which sale was not relished by the
appellant Raj Nath and his sons and they started nurturing
animosity for the informant. On 18.5.1978 appellant Raj Nath
and others plucked Jackfruits from trees standing over the land
purchased by Lokeshwar Nath regarding which a first
G information report was lodged by him.
On the date of the incident i.e. 5.6.1978 at 6.00 P.M. Vijay
Bahadur along with his sons Narendra Nath and Mahendra
accompanied by Lokeshwar Nath and Shrawan Kumar had
H gone to the house of his cousin Ram Prakash in village Nagla
RAJ NATH v. STATE OF U.P. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 341
. >
Tara, also the village of the accused, for hearing Bhagwat and A
to participate in the feast thereafter. After taking meal they
were returning to their village along with Murari Lal and Mitthu
Lal Gadaria. When they reached near the house of Kalka
Prasad at 6 p.m. the accused appellants Raj Nath, his sons
Satyendra and Surendra, Gajendra, Ram Kripal and Govind 8
came there from the south western corner of the brick wall and
threatened that they will teach a lesson to Lokeshwar Nath for
purchasing the land and immediately thereafter appellant Raj
Nath with his licensed gun and rest of the appellants with their
country made pistols opened fire at the prosecution party. Lalit c
Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased no.1 ')
sustained gunshot injury and died instantaneously. Narendra
Nath and Shrawan Kumar sustained firearm injuries and fell
down at a short distance. Lokeshwar Nath and Mahendra Nath
also sustained firearm injuries. Gun fire attracted Prem Narayan
D
and many others to the place of the incident. When the injured
--- were being transported to the hospital in the bullock cart by the
informant, injured Narendra Nath (hereinafter referred to as
deceased no.2) lost his life in the way. Shrawan Kumar,
Mahendra and Lokeshwar Nath were dispatched to the District
Hospital, Mainpuri. Informant got the FIR (Ex.Ka-7) of the said E
incident scribed through one Arun Kumar and lodged it at police
station Kishni on the same day at 10.30 p.m. covering a
distance of 8 miles south. Lajja Ram PW-4 Constable clerk
"' prepared the chik Fir Ex. Ka-6 and G.D. entry Ex.Ka-7 and the
investigation was immediately engineered by Mahendra F
Prasad Singh S.O. PW-10.
Investigating Officer proceeded to the village Kusmara
where the corpse of Narendra was lying and there he conducted
the inquest on his dead body as Ex.Ka-38. Thereafter, he came G
to the place of the incident in village Nagla Tara near the dead
•, "" body of Lalit Kumar and conducted the inquest. Thereafter he
conducted spot inspection and prepared site plan Ex. Ka-47
collected blood stained and plain earth Ex. Ka-48. He also
recovered empty cartridges (material Ex.1 to 3) from the roof H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A of Kalka Prasad and prepared its recovery memo Ex.Ka-49. . .
He thereafter arrested appellant Ram Kripal and recovered
country made pistol and three cartridges from him. On 5.6.1978
he recorded the statement of the informant and thereafter in the
-
morning he prepared the inquest report of Narendra Nath
B deceased who had expired in the hospital at 5.20 a.m. next day.
Thereafter he was transferred. Shrawan Kumar also lost his life
after four days in the hospital because of the sustained injuries
in the incident. The post mortem examination on the dead
bodies of Shrawan Kumar, Lalit Kumar, Narendra Nath and
Mahendra Nath was held and various gunshot injuries and ante
c mortem injuries were found on their bodies.
The report of Forensic Science Laboratory, Lucknow, U.P.
dated 31.7.1978 brought out the fact the cartridges E.C.-3 was
fired from countrymade pistol marked as 1/79. ...,I
D ~·
After investigation charge sheet was filed and charges
were framed against all the six accused persons. Since the
accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held. PWs 1 and
2 were stated to be the eye witnesses. Placing reliance on the
E evidence of the eye witnesses the trial Court found the
prosecution case to have been established and recorded
conviction as noted above.
Before the High Court the stand was that there was no .,,,
recovery of gun and no injury is relatable to any act purported
F to have been done by the appellants. The High Court did not
accept this plea and held that because of application of Section
149 IPC the prosecution case has been fully established.
4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
G appellants submitted that the Forensic Science Laboratory
report clearly shows that no injury could be inflicted with the
JI _..
weapon held by the appellants.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
hand submitted that four persons lost their lives because of acts
H
RAJ NATH v. STATE OF U.P. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) 343
- " of the accused persons. The role of the present appellants has A
been clearly established. Therefore, the High Court's judgment
does not suffer from any infirmity.
6. So far as the reliability of evidence of the eye witnesses
PWs 1 and 2 is concerned their evidence has been analysed
B
in great detail by the trial Court and the High Court. PW-2 was
one of the injured persons. Therefore, there is nothing infirm in
+ the conclusions of the trial Court and the High Court placing
reliance on their evidence.
7. It is to be noted that one of the deceased persons c
received nearly 30 injuries which is consistent with the
prosecution case that the accused persons were holding
country made pistols.
--. 8. A plea which was emphasized by the appellant relates D
to the question whether Section 149, IPC has any application
for fastening the constructive liability which is the sine qua non
for its operation. The emphasis is on the common object and
not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful
assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a
E
common object and he was actuated by that common object
and that object is one of those set out in Section 141. Where
,..._ common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the
,... accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section
149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly
consisted of five or more persons and whether the said F
persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as
specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a general
proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a
person, who is alleged to be a member of unlawful assembly,
it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only G
thing required is that he should have understood that the
assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts
which fall within the purview of Section 141. The word 'object'
means the purpose or design and, in order to make it
'common', it must be shared by all. In other words, the object H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly,
that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A
common object may be formed by express agreement after
.,
-
mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may
be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the
B assembly and the other members, may just join and adopt it.
Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be
modified oraltered or abandonecj at any stage. The expression
'in prosecution of common objecfas appearing in Section 149 +
have to be strictly construed as equivalent to 'in order to attain
c the common object'. It must be immediately connected with the .
common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must
be community of object and the object may exist only up to a
particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful
assembly may have community of object up to certain point
beyond which they may differ in their objects and the
D
knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be
,.
committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not
only according to the information at his command, but also
according to the extent to which he shares the community of
object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149,
E IPC may be different on different members of the same
assembly.
9. 'Common object' is different from a 'common intention'
as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting 't
F of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same
object in view and their number is five or more and that they ,___
act as an assembly to achieve that object. The 'common object'
of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language
of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all
the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the
G
course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly.
For determination of the common object of the unlawful
assembly, the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful
~ .
assembly, before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the
motive for the crime, are some of the relevant considerations.
H
RAJ NATH v. STATE OF U.P. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 345
" What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a A
!It particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact
~
to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly,
the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the
members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary
under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful B
common object, the same must be translated into action or be
successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly
which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may
subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary that the
intention or the purpose, which is necessary to render an c
assembly an unlawful one comes into existence at the outset.
The time of forming an unlawful intent is not material. An
assembly which, at its commencement or even for some time
thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become unlawful. In other
-~
words it can develop during the course of incident at the spot D
co instanti.
10. Section 149, IPC consists of two parts. The first part
of the section means that the offence to be committed in
prosecution of the common object must be one which is
committed with a view to accomplish the common object. In E
order that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence
must be connected immediately with the common object of the
unlawful assembly of which the accused was member. Even if
the offence committed is not in direct prosecution .of the
common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section F
141, if it can be held that the offence was such as the members
knew was likely to be committed and this is what is required in
the second part of the section. The purpose for which the
members of the assembly set out or desired to achieve is the
object. If the object desired by all the members is the same, G
the knowledge that is the object which is being pursued is
shared by all the members and they are in general agreement
as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the common
object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the human
mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A can be available and, like intention, has generally to be
gathered from the act which the person commits and the result
therefrom. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down under
the circumstances from which the common object can be called
out, it may reasonably be collected from the nature of the
B assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at or before or after
the scene of incident. The word 'knew' used in the second
branch of the section implies something more than a possibility
and it cannot be made to bear the sense of 'might have been
known'. Positive knowledge is necessary. When an offence is
c committed in prosecution of the common object, it would
generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful
assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of
the common object. That, however, does not make the converse
proposition true; there may be cases which would come within
the second part but not within the first part. The distinction
0
between the two parts of Section 149 cannot be ignored or
obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined,
whether the offence committed falls within the first part or it was
an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be
E likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and
falls within the second part. However, there may be cases which
would be within first part, but offences committed in prosecution
of the common object would be generally, if not always, be within
the second part, namely, offences which the parties knew to be
likely committed in the prosecution of the common object. (See
F Chikkarange Gowda and others v. State of Mysore : Al R 1956
SC 731.)
11. In State of U.P. v. Dan Singh and Ors. (1997 (3) SCC
747) it was observed that it is not necessary for the prosecution
G to prove which of the members of the unlawful assembly did
which or what act. Reference was made to Lalji v. State of U.P.
(1989 (1) sec 437) where it was observed that:
"while overt act and active participation may indicate
common intention of the person perpetrating the crime, the
H
RAJ NATH v. STATE OF U.P. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 347
mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten A
vicariously criminal liability under Section 149".
12. This position has been elaborately stated by this Court
in Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa (2002 (8)
SCC 381 and Shivjee Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar (SLP B
(Crl.) No.1494/2004 disposed of on 30.7.2008).
,.. 13. Section 149 IPC has clear application to the facts of
the case. Therefore, the trial Court and the High Court were
justified in convicting the appellants. The appeals are
dismissed. C
R.P. Appeals dismissed.
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