Holding

The Court held that the accused did not establish the requisite grave apprehension for lethal private defence and therefore should be convicted under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC.

Summary

The appellants, Raj Pal and others, assaulted a deceased and several witnesses with lathis over a property dispute, resulting in the deceased's death. They claimed the assault was in private defence of their person and property, asserting that they had suffered injuries themselves. The trial court convicted them under Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to ten years rigorous imprisonment, a decision affirmed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the presence of injuries on the accused does not automatically establish a right of private defence, and the appellants failed to demonstrate the grave apprehension required to justify lethal force. Consequently, the Court reduced the conviction to Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC and altered the sentence to seven years rigorous imprisonment.

Issues considered

The applicability of the right of private defence under Sections 97, 99, 100, 101, 102 and 105 IPC to the facts.
Whether injuries sustained by the accused can be used to infer a claim of private defence.
The appropriate charge: Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC versus Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC.
The burden of proof on the accused to establish a private‑defence claim extending to causing death.
Whether the conduct amounts to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 100, s. 101, s. 102, s. 105, s. 299, s. 300, s. 304 Part I, s. 304 Part II, s. 323, s. 325, s. 34, s. 97, s. 99
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958s. 4

Subjects

private defenceculpable homicidemurderSection 304 IPCSection 34 IPCburden of proofinjury evidencecommon intentionconviction reduction

Judgment

A RAJ PAL AND ORS.
11.

THESTATEOFHARYANA

APRIL 19, 2006

B [ARIJIT PASA YAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.)

Penal Code, 1860-Sections 34, 97, 299, 300, 304, 323 and 325-
Dispute over proper~Accused dealt lathi blows to deceased and others--
C Plea of right of private defence raised by the accused on basis of injuries
sustained by them-Trial Court rejected the plea, convicted the accused
under section 304 Part I /PC and sentenced them to ten years rigorous
imprisonment-High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded
by the trial court---Correctness of-Held, exercise of right of private defence
to the extent of causing death cannot be presumed on the basis of injuries
D on the accused--Dn facts, no evidence was adduced that the accused were
under grave apprehension about the safety of their life and property~-Hence, ..
plea of right ofprivate defence is rejected-On the basis of the whole evidence,
accused are convicted under section 304 Part II !PC and sentenced to seven
years rigorous imprisonment.
E
Deceased was repairing an iron gate of his house with the help of PW
6. Appellants and one other person, armed with lathis, desisted the deceased
and PW 6 from repairing the gate, asserting that they had also a share in the
property. The deceased told them that they had no right over the property as
he had got it in a partition. The appellants abused the deceased and gave lathi
F blows on the body of the deceased. PW 6 and PW 7 also received lathi blows
from the appellants. The deceased died next day in a hospital.

The appellants contended before trial court that the deceased, with help
of some prosecution witnesses, was raising construction on disputed plot
G claiming his share in the plot; that when they objected, the deceased assaulted
the appellants; and that they had acted in self defence of person and property.
The Trial Court, on consideration of evidence on record, held that the
appellants had no intention to commit murder since they did not repeat blows
on the head of the deceased. The Trial Court convicted the appellants for
H offence punishable under section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC and

74
· RAJPALv. THESTATEOFHARYANA 75
they.were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonmentfor ten years and a· A
fine of Rs. 2000/-. The appellants were also convicted for offences punishable
under section 325 and 323 read with section 34 IPC and were sentenced to
undergcr rigorous.imprisonnient for 2 years and six inonths respectively and
a fine of RS.'500/- Appeal before High Court by the appellants was dismissed.

In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that th.e Trial Court · B
and High Court did not take note.of the fact that the appellants had suffered
serious injuries in the incident in exercise of the right of private defence;
and that when the trial court held that the appellants had no intention to cause
homicidal death, it should not have convicted them under section 304 Part I
WC C
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The number of injuries is not always a safe criterion for.
derterming who t,he aggressor was. It cannot be stated as a universal rule
that whenever the injuries are on the body of the accused persons, a D
presumption must necessarily be raised that the accused persons had caused
injuries in exercise of the right of private defence. The defence has to further
establish that the injuries so caused on the accused probabilies the version
of the right of private defence. Non-explanation of the injuries sustained by
the accused at about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is ·
a very important circumstance. But mere non-explanation of the injuries by
E
the prosecution niay not affect the prosecution case in all cases. This principle
applies to cases where the injuries sustained by the acc~sed are minor and
superficial or wh·ere the evidence is so clear and cogent; so independent and
disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs
the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. F ·
.. 179-B, C, DJ

1.2. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and
speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available
to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe
and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private G
defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with
care and viewed in its proper setting. (79-EI

1.3. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing
of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to H
reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of
private defence which extended to causing of death. (79-G, H; 80-Al

1.4. Merely because there was a quarrel and some of the accused
persons sustained injuries, that does not confer a right of private defence
extending to the extent of causing death as in this case. Though such right
B cannot be weighed in golden scales, it has to be established that the accused
persons were under such grave apprehension about the safety of their life
and property that retaliation to the extent done was absolutely necessary. No
evidence much less cogent and credible was adduced in this regard. The right
of private defence as claimed by the accused persons have been rightly
C discarded. (80-D-EI

Lakshmi Singh v. Stale of Bihar, AIR (1976) SC 2263; Jai Dev v. Stale
of Punjab, AIR (1963) SC 612; Rizan and Anr. v. State ofChhattisgarh through
the Chief Secretary, Government of Chhallisgarh, Raipur, Chhaltisgarh,
(2003[ 2 SCC 661 and Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2003( 7
D sec 643, referred to.
2.1. Taking the totality of the evidence into consideration, it would be
appropriate to convict the accused persons in terms of Section 304 Part II
read with Section 34 IPC instead of Section 304 Part I read with Section 34
E IPC. Custodial sentence of 7 years would meet the ends of justice. (85-G J

Rajwani Singh v. State of Kera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874; Virsa Singh v.
State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465; State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnaya,
(197614 SCC 382 and Abdul Waheed Khan alias Waheed and Ors. v. State of
A.P., [200217 SCC 175 referred to.
F CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 466 of
2006.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 15.7.2005 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Cr. A.No. 177-SB/92.
G
U.U. Lalit and Ms. Sunita Sharma for the Appellants.

Rajeev Gaur Naseem and T.V. George for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.
RAJPALv. THE STATE OF HARYANA[PASAYAT,J.] 77
· ·~ Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of learned Single Judge of A
the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the appeals filed by the
appellants. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon had convicted the
appellants and one Dharam Singh for offence punishable under Section 304
Part I read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). They
were also convicted for offence punishable under Section 325 read with B
Section 34 IPC as well as Section 323 read with Section 34 !PC. They were
sentenced to undergo RI for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000; in default
of payme.nt of fine they were directed to undergo RI for six months for the
first named offence. They were further sentenced to undergo RI for two years
and. six months respectively for other two offences. Fine of Rs. 500 with
default stipulation was imposed. Two other accused persons, namely, Vijay C
Singh and Rattan Singh were released on probation for a period of two years
under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (in short 'Probation
Act') in respect of their conviction under Section 323 IPC. Accused Vijay
Singh died on 22.5.1992.

Accused Raj Pal, Bir Singh and Chhater Pal question their conviction D
and sentences imposed.

The factual background in a nutshell is as follows:-

The appellants are sons of one Bhanwar Singh, and grandson of one
Ariya alias Arimal. The complainant and party are their collateral. Arimal had E
another son Hira Singh. Sube Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') and
Pirthi Singh (PW-7) are sons of Hira Singh. Said Hira Singh had two more
sons, namely, Suraj Bhan and Om Parkash. Sanjay (PW-6) is son of Pirthi
Singh (PW-7).

,·
The betrothal ceremony of Ajit son of deceased Sube Singh was to take F
place·on 27.2.1990. On 24.2.1990; Sanjay (PW-6) went to the house of his
uncle, the deceased to help him in making preparations for the occasion. An
iron gate fixed in the boundary wall of the house of Su be Singh (deceased)
had got dislocated. They were re-fixing it by applying cement. The time was
about IO a.m. Appellants - Raj Pal, Bir Singh, Chhatter Pal and Dharam Singh G
(since deceased) came there armed with lathis and jellies. They desisted
...- Sanjay and deceased from repairing the gate asserting that they had also a
share in the property. Deceased told them that they had no right over the
property and they had got their property in the partition. The appellants and
Dharam Singh abused deceased. In a fit of anger, Raj Pal gave a lathi blow
G
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006[ SUPP. I S.C.R.

A on the head of deceased. Chhatter Pal also gave a lathi blow on his head. Bir f '
Singh gave a jelli blow on the left leg of the deceased. Sanjay (PW-6)
intervened to rescue the deceased. Bir Singh gave Jelli blow on the right wrist
ofSanjay; Dharam Singh gave a lathi blow on the left hip ofSanjay. Thereafter,
Rattan Singh and Vijay Singh appellants also came there armed with jelli and
lathi, respectively and joined the fray. Vijay Singh gave a lathi blow on the
B right side of the jaw of Sanjay, Rattan Singh gave jelli blow on his right thigh.
Pirthi Singh (PW-7) father of Sanjay along with Randhir Singh cousin of
Sanjay came there on hearing the alarm raised by Sanjay. Raj Pal gave lathi
blow on the head of Pirthi Singh (PW-7); Chhatter Pal gave a lathi blow on
his right shoulder. Bir Singh gave a jelli blow on the head of Randhir Singh.
C Tej Pal and Mahender Singh arrived at the place of occurrence and rescued
the victims from the attack of the accused persons. The injured persons were
taken to the hospital. Deceased breathed his last on 25.2.1990 at about 8.40
p.m. at the Safdarjung Hospital.

After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. As accused
D persons pleaded innocence and denied the charges, trial was held.
Fifteen witnesses were examined. The statements of the accused were
recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
'Cr.P.C.'). As noted above, the accused persons pleaded innocence. It was
their plea that the deceased with the help of some PWs was raising construction
E on the disputed plot claiming his share in the plot. When they objected, the
deceased who wanted to grab their share assaulted the accused persons
along with others. They acted in self defence of person and property. The
Trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record directed the conviction
and imposed sentence as aforementioned. Appeal filed before the High Court
p was dismissed. The Trial Court noted that there was no intention to commit
murder and the accused persons did not repeat the blows on the head of the
deceased. But knowledge can be clearly attributed to them that by giving
blow on the head of the deceased death was only consequence. As the
accused persons acted in furtherance of the common intention they were
punishable under Section 304 ( 1) IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The High
G Court did not accept the plea of exercise of right of private defence and also
did not accept the plea that death was not intended. The appeal filed by the
accused persons was dismissed; so was the appeal filed by the complainant
for alteration of conviction.

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
H
RAJPALv. THE STATE OF HARYANA[PASAYAT,J.] ·79
that the Trial Court and the High Court did not take note of the fact that the A
accused persons had suffered serious injuries. In any event, the Trial Court
having noted that there was no intention to cause homicidal death should not
have convicted the accused in terms of Section 304 Part I, IPC.

Learned counsel for the respondent-State supported the judgments of.
the trial Court and the High Court. B
·The number of injuries is not always a safe criterion for determining
who the aggressor was. It cannot be stated as a universal rule that whenever
the injuries are on .the body of the accused persons, a presumption must
necessarily be raised that the accused persons had caused injuries in exercise C
of the right of private defence. The defence has to further establish that the
injuries so caused on the accused probabilises the version of the right of
private defence. Non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at
about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important
circumstance. But mere non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution
may not affect the prosecution case in all cases. This principle applies to D
cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial
or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested,
so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of
the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. (See:
Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR (1976) SC 2263). A plea of right of
private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While E
considering whether the right of private defence is available to an accused,
it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal
injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence
is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and
viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 deals with the subject-matter of right F
of private defence. The plea of right comprises the qody or property (i) of the
person .exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and .the right may be
exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in the case of
offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and .attempts at such
offences in relation to property. Section 99 lays down .the limits of the right
of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against G
certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and I 00
to 106 is controlled by Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending
to voluntary causing of death, the accused must. show that there were
circumstances.giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either
death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused . H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of f
death. Sections 100 and IOI, !PC define the limit and extent of right of private
defence.

Sections I 02 and I05, !PC deal with commencement and continuance of
the right of private defence of body and property respectively. The right
B commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body
arises from an attempt, or threat. or commit the offence. although the offence
may not have been committed but not until that there is that reasonable
apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the
danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab, AIR (1963) SC
C 612), it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension
disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route,
there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence.

The above position was highlighted in Ri:::an and Anr. v. State of
Chhattisgarh, through the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, Raipur,
0 Chhattisgarh, [2003] 2 SCC 661, and Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab.
[2003J 7 sec 643.

Merely because there was a quarrel and some of the accused persons
sustained injuries, that does not confer a right of private defence extending
to the extent of causing death as in this case. Though such right cannot be
E weighed in golden scales, it has to be established that the accused person~
were under such grave apprehension about the safety of their life and property
that retaliation to the extent done was absolutely necessary. No evidence
much less cogent and credible was adduced in this regard. The right of
private defence as claimed by the accused persons have been rightly discarded.

F This brings us to the crucial question as to which was the appropriate
provision to be applied. In the scheme of !PC "culpable homicide" is the
genus and "murder", its specie. All "murder" is "culpable homicide" but not
vice versa. Speaking generally. ·'culpable homicide'' sans .. special characteristics
of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose
CJ of fixing punishment. proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, lPC
practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what
may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". This is the gravest form
of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as .. murder". The
second may be termed as ··culpable homicide of the second degree". This is
punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then. there is "culpable
H
RAJPALv. THE STATE OF HARYANA[PASAYAT,J.] 81

homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable homicide A
and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments
provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable
under the second part of Section 304.

The academic distinction between "murder" and "culpable homicide not
amounting to murder" has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused, B
if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the
legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute
abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application
of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the
various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will C
be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:

Section 299 Section 300

A person commits Subject to certain exceptions
culpable homicide if the act by culpable homicide is murder if the D
the death is caused is act by which the death is caused
done. - is done. -

INTENTION E
(a) with the intention of causing (I) with the intention of causing
death; or death; or

(b) with the intention (2) with the intention of causing
of causing such such bodily injury as the F
bodily injury as is offender knows to be likely to
likely to cause death; or cause the death of the person
to whom the harm is caused; or

(3) with the intention of causing
G
bodily injury to any person
and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient
in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death; or
H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 SUPP. I S.C.R.

A
KNOWLEDGE '
(c) with the (4) with the knowledge that the
knowledge that act is so imminently
the act is likely to dangerous that it must in all
B cause death. probability cause death or
such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death, and commits
such act without any
excuse for incurring the
c risk of causing death
or such injury as is mentioned above.
Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of
Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause
(2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim
D being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm
caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm
would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a
person in normal health or condition. lt is noteworthy that the "'intention to
cause death" is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention
of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the
E likelihood of sur.h injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient
to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2)
is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.

Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on
the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section
F 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given
knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen
or dise;;sed heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular
person as a result or the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the
heart, as the case may be. If the as~ailant had no such knowledge about the
G disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or
bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the
offenc.: will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was
intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words "'likely
to cause death" occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the
words "suffici.:nt in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously,
H the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily
RAJPALv. THE STATE OF HARYANA(PASAYAT,J.] 83

injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction A
is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The
difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is
one of degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury.
To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which detennines
whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree.
The word "likely" in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probability B
as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ... sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the
"most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of
nature.

For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender
c
intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional
bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. Rajwani Singh v. State of Kera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874 is an apt
illustration of this point.
D
In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465 Vivian Bose, J.
speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3). It was
observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can
bring a case under Section 300 "thirdly". First, it must establish quite
objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury
must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be E
proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to
say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of
injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of
the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was F
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the
enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the
intention of the offender.

The ingredients of clause "thirdly" of Section 300 !PC were brought out
by the illustrious Judge in his terse language as follows : G
"12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts
before it can bring a case under Section 300 'thirdly';

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;
H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely f
A
objective investigations.

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
B
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry
proceeds further and,

Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described
made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause
.
C death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is
purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the
intention of the offender."

The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words
(at page 468):
D
"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious
injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that
is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the
totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course,
the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is
E nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it,
the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether
he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is
neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is
concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of
a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict
F the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved
the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the
circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion."

These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The
G test laid down by Virsa Singh case (supra) for the applicability of clause
"thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule
of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder,
if both the following conditions are satisfied i.e. (a) that the act which causes
death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention
of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is
H sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved
RAJPALv. THE STATE OF HARYANA[PASAYAT,J.] 85
that there was an intention tci inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the A
ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury
found to be preS'ent was the injury that was intended to be iriflicted.

Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case (supra) even
if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury
sufficient to cause death in the'ordinary course of nature, and did·not extend B
to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration
(c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

·Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require
knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for C
the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these
corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section
300 would be applicable where the knowledge ·of the offender as to the
probability 'Of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from
a particular person or. persons~being caused from his imminently dangerous
act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the ])
offender must be of the. highest degree of probability, the act having been
committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid .

. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In
m.ost cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes E
the facts are so .intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped
into each, that it may not be convenient to give a separate and clear cut
treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.

The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State of F
A.P.· v. Ray;varapu Punnayya, [1976]" 4 SCC 382 and Abdul Waheed Khan.
ahas' Waheed and Ors. v. State of A.P., (2002]7 SCC 175. .

· · Taking the totality of ihe evidence Into consideration and the special
features noticed, it would' be appropriate to convict the accused persons in
terms of Section 304 Part H read with Section 34 IPC instead of Section 304 G
Part I read with Section 34 IPC. Custodial sentence of 7 years would meet the
en~s o_f j~stice. ,

Tlie ~ppeal is partly allowed to the extent in'dicated.

B.S. Appeal partly alowed. H