Holding

The cause of action was complete when the employer refused to allow the workmen to resume work, so the applications filed beyond two years were barred by limitation.

Summary

The employer (Raja Ram Maize Products) directed workmen to resume duties after a strike, but refused to let them work. The workmen filed applications under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act seeking a direction to be allowed to resume work and claim wages. The employer contended that the cause of action arose on 1 March 1986 when the Labour Court declared the strike illegal, and that the applications filed in 1988 were barred by the two‑year limitation period in Section 62. The Labour Court held the cause of action was recurring and allowed the applications; the Industrial Court and High Court set aside that view, holding the cause of action was complete when the employer refused work. The Supreme Court affirmed that the cause of action became complete on the date of refusal, that a recurring cause of action does not arise, and therefore the applications were filed out of time. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the workmen’s applications dismissed.

Issues considered

The applicability of the two‑year limitation period under Section 62 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act to the workmen’s applications.
Whether the cause of action in a dispute where an employer refuses to allow workmen to resume duties is a 'recurring' cause of action or is complete at the time of refusal.
The correct date from which the limitation period should be calculated.

Legislation cited

Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960s. 31(3), s. 34, s. 61, s. 62

Subjects

limitation periodcause of actionindustrial disputestrikeSection 62Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Actrecurring cause of actionlabour court

Judgment

~ RAJA RAM MAIZE PRODUCTS A
~ v.
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF M.P. AND ORS.

MARCH 21, 2001

[S. RAJENDRABABU AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.] B
s
j. Labour Laws :

M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960: Section 62.

Limitation-Cause of action-Arising of-Labour Cou11 directed work- c
men not to continue Strike and to resume their duties-But employer did not
allow the workmen lo do so-Application filed beyond two years from date of
award for a direction that the workmen be allowed to resume their duties-
Application allowed-Industrial Cou11 dismissed the application as barred by
limitation-High Cou11 set aside Industrial Cou11's order-Correctness of- D
Held : Cause of action is complete when workmen not allowed to resume
work-Question ofdemanding work even on refusal does not stand to reason-
Hence, application barred by limitation-17zerefore, High Court erred in set-
ting aside Industripl Cou11's order.

E
-+ The Labour Court directed the respondents-workmen not to con-
tinue strike and to resume their duties. But the appellant-employer did not
allow the workmen to resume their duties. However, the respondents con-
tinued demanding work.

Thereafter, the respondents filed applications before the Labour F
Court for a direction to allow the respondents to resume their duties. The
~ -t appellant contended that the cause of action arose on the date of award by
the Labour Court and the applications filed beyond the period of two
years were barred hy limitation under Section 62 of the M.P. Industrial
Relations Act, 1960.
G
The Labour Court held that the respondents were making efforts to
come back for duty and thus there was a recurring cause of action and,
). therefore, the applications were within the period oflimitation. The Indus-
trial Court set aside the Labour Court's award. But the High Court
allowed the appeal filed by the respondents. Hence this appeal. H
545
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeal, the Court
_;.
HELD : 1. Even taking that two years period from the date of the
dispute either taking the date on which when the respondents were refused
work when they made a demand that they should be allowed to do work or
when they made a demand after the order made by the Labour Court on
B an interim application directing them to resume work or calling off the
strike, the applications tiled are beyond the period of limitation prescribed II
under Section 62 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960. (551-A-B] ,.._
2. When the workers demanded that they should be allowed to
resume work and they were not allowed to resume work, the cause of
c action was complete. In such a case the workers going on demanding each
day to resume work would not arise at all. The question of demanding to
allow to do work even on refusal does not stand to reason. [551-C-D]

Balakris/ma Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj y
D Sansthan, AIR (1959) SC 798, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 89-90 of
1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.9.97 and 7.11,.97 of the Madhya

E
Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 339/97 and Misc. Civil Case No. 912 of
1997. ...
WITH

Civil Appeal Nos. 92-93/99, 100-101/99, 94-99/99, 91/99, SLP (C)
Nos. 14115/2000 and 14l16/2000.
F P.P. Rao, ''Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Tapas Ray, Yogeshwar Prasad, Sushi!
Kumar Jain, M.L. Bhachawat, AP. Dharnija, Pradeep Aggarwal, Prakash
Shrivastava, Ravi Prakash Gupta, Ms. Rasbmi Jain and T. Raja for the
t·
appearing parties.

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered :
G
RAJENDRA BABU, J. Three applications under Section 31(3) read
with Sections 34 and 61 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act,
1960 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'] were filed either on 12.4.1988 or .,(
21.6.1988 by the workers as per the list enclosed to the applications. It is
H pleaded therein that the appellant is not allowing them to do their job and
RAJA RAM MAIZE PRODUCTS'· INDUSTRIAL COURf OF M.P. [RAlENDRA BABU. I.] 547
the same should be held to be illegal, mala fide and unjustified aud direct A
... the appellant to allow them to do their job forthwith and pay their wages for
the period they were not allowed to do their duty. In the applications, it was
alleged that on 22.8.1986 the appellant had filed a case [No.35/MPIR/1986]
before the Labour Court, Durg praying that the strike resorted to by the
workers with effect from 12.2.1986 may be held to be illegal and the workers
B
may be directed to resume their duties. By an order made on 1.3 .1986, the
Labour Court directed the workmen, who were applicants in the applications,
to resume their duties. However, the appellant was not allowing them to join
duty though the workmen had reported for duty, and was also not paying any
wages. It was alleged that the appellant had not issued charge sheet nor passed
any order of termination of their services. Thus the action of the appellant c
in not allowing the workmen to resume their duties is wholly illegal, mala
fide and unjustified, which amounts to unfair labour practice and the same
is also in contravention of the Standing Orders and the Act. A written
statement was filed in which preliminary objections were raised to the effect
that the applications filed by the workmen are barred by limitation. It was
D
asserted that the cause of action for the dispute, if at all, had arisen on
1.3.1986 when the Labour Court had directed the workmen not to continue
the strike and to resume the work and the workmen sought to resume work
but the same having '.>een refused, an application is filed in the year 1988.
The said application having been filed beyond two years from 1.3.1986 is
... clearly barred by limitation and deserves to be dismissed on that ground
alone. On merits also, several pleas were raised with which we are not
E

- concerned for the present.

The appellant examined IO witnesses to support its case. None of the
workmen who were applicants before the Labour Court examined themselves.
F
However, they examined only witness WW-I Bhimrao Bagde whose services
had been terminated long back. Evidence of non-applicant witness No.3,
... --t
Shamboo Dayal Gupta was taken note of by the Labour Court to the effect
that "it is correct to say that the workmen standing outside the factory were
asking to take Dushyant Kumar who had been placed under suspension from
duty and only then they would come for work only along with Dushyant G
Kurnar". The said witness also stated that the said Dushyant Kumar was found
sleeping in the Mill during working hours and after issuing a charge sheet
was prevented from coming to duty. The Labour Court found that on
> 12.2.1986 charge sheet was issued to Dushyant Kumar and was prevented
from joining duty, which was the cause of dispute. For about a month from H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 2 S.C.R.
A 12.2.1986, the workmen were coming daily to the factory gate shouting
slogans and preventing the other workers from coming to duty. The Labour
Court found that the cause of action for the dispute arose from the time a
show cause notice has been issued on 12.2.1986 to a workman, namely,
Dushyant Kumar, who was prevented from entering the factory under the oral
orders of the Factory Manager. Thereafter, it was found that the workmen had
B
the legal status to come to the factory and demand allowing of the said
Dushyant Kun1ar to enter the factory and not having permitted them the cause
of action for this matter arose yet again. From 12.2.1986 for about one month,
the workmen had been coming daily at the factory gate and shouting slogans
and had been preventing the other workmen coming for duty. Thus even as
c late as April, 1989 they were making efforts to come back for duty and thus
there was a recurring cause of action for them to resume duty and, therefore,
the time prescribed under the Act neither started and nor ended and thus the
application filed by the workmen was within the period of limitation. The
Labour Court after consideration of the merits of the matter, by a common
D award made on 1.6.1995, allowed partly the application filed by the worlcmen
and directed the appellant to allow 155 workmen to be allowed to resume
duty or if the workmen do not want to join duty, to pay a compensation of
Rs.17,500 to each workman besides costs@ Rs.500 per workman however,
without back wages.

••
E Appeals were preferred to the Industrial Court by the appellant and by
workmen to the extent of denying back wages. The Industrial Court took the
view that though the workmen used to come to the gate of the mill they were
still not willing to do the work. The Industrial Court proceeded to hold that
the cause of action had arisen on 1.3.1986, the date on which the Labour
Court declared the strike to be illegal vide its order in petition No. 35/MPIR/
F 1986 on 1.3.1986, when the workmen had a duty to resume the work and
taking that date for filing the appeal, it was clearly barred by limitation under
Section 62 of the Act and on that basis, the Industrial Court allowed the t--'
appeal, set aside the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the applications
of workmen.
G The matter was carried further to the High Court. The High Court found
that the workmen were insisting on their right to work and had resorted to
,
strike demanding !hat allhough Dushyant Kuniar had been served with a A
charge sheet, he should be allowed with !he olher workmen to enter the ";(_
factory premises, while !he stand of !he employer was that but for Dushyant
H Kumar all other eniployees would be allowed to join !heir work and duties
RAJA RAM MAIZE PRODUCTS v. INDUSTRIAL COURT OF MP. [RAlENDRA BABU. I.] 549

~
and the strike be ended. Proceeding on that basis, the High Court is of the A
view that the recurring cause of action arose because as and when employees
~ reported for duty they were prevented from entering the factory. The High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the workmen and set aside the order made
by the Industrial Court and restored that of the Labour Court. Hence these
appeals by special leave.
B
Two special leave petitions have been filed - one by the workmen who
have been appointed during the pendency of the proceedings before the courts
and are fresh recruits while there is another special leave petition filed by
the workmen who have been reinstated pursuant to the order made by the
Labour Court since they have been appointed in the factory, they should be c
continued in service.

Mr. P.P Rao, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant
in C.A.Nos.89-90/99, submitted that the view taken by the High Court on the
question of limitation is erroneous. He submitted that the starting point for
limitation is when Labour Court allowed an application and gave interim D
directions holding that the strike to be prima facie illegal and asked the
workmen to withdraw the same and report for duty. The period within which
the application should have been filed at any rate would have been two years
from that date as provided under Section 62 of the Act. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan,
the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant in C.A.Nos.92-93/
E
-t 99 and C.A.Nos.100-101/99, also supported him on this aspect of the matter
and in particular pointed out that the concept of recurring cause of action
would not arise in a case where the cause is complete on the date when the
action is commenced in a court as in the present case. When the employer
refused work to the employees the cause of action was complete and question
of workmen going on demanding work again and again did not arise. On that F

.... basis, he contended that the view taken by the Labour Court and the High
Court is erroneous. Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, the learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the respondents, submitted that in this case the Labour Court
and the High Court have correctly held that there is no bar of limitation and
the period of limitation had not commenced at all when the action was G
instituted by the workmen particularly when examined in the light of the fact
that there was no order of termination of the services of the workmen nor
, was there any abandonment of work by the workmen from any particular
•)t date.

In our view, the Labour Court, the Industrial Court and the High Court H
i

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A have proceeded on a misapprehension of facts. As noticed earlier, the whole
case put forth on behalf of the workmen before the courts below is that the
appellant is not taking the workmen to duty though they have been reporting
for duty. The action of the appellant in not allowing the workmen to resume
their duty gives rise to the dispute in respect of which application before the
Labour Court is filed. It is to redress this grievance the workmen had
B
approached the Labour Court. Even as noticed by the Labour Court, the
dispute in this regard between the parties started from the time when the
charge sheet was issued on 12.2.1986 to Dushyant Kumar as to why he should
not be suspended at 8 a.m. and from 12.2.1986 when he was prevented from
entering the factory under the oral orders of the Factory Manager while the
c workmen asserted that they along with Dushyant Kumar should have been
permitted to join duty. This aspect was commented upon by the Industrial
Court as not amounting to any willingness on the part of the workmen to do
their work. There is some dispute as to whether the order made by the Labour
Court on 1.3.1986 is binding on all the parties, as to that application only
29 persons had been impleaded as parties though the words "all other
D
workmen" were also added. In the relief portion also, the prayer is confined
only to 29 workmen. However, that aspect of the matter need not detain us
because even according to the workmen, as indicated in their application filed
by them, it is clear that they understood the order of the Labour Court to be
one made in respect of all the workmen. It appears that thereafter they started
E demanding that they should be given work. Otherwise, the period when the
workmen had been refused work goes back to the date when they deemed
to resume work with Dushyant Kumar who was prevented from resuming
work. It is only tl1ereafter they were also not allowed to join duty. When the
workmen themselves understood the order of the Labour Court dated 1.3.1986
F as directing them to resume their duties and thereafter though they have
reported for duty, they have not been allowed to join their duty, the appli-
cation filed in each of these cases is beyond the period of two years
mentioned in Section 62 of the Act from 1.3.1986.

The aspects considered by the courts below whether there was aban-
G donrnent of work by the workmen or termination of the services of the
workmen are not all germane to the main issue at all. The courts have
unnecessarily travelled at a tangent missing the essence of the matter.

Now we have to see as to whether the case put forth before the courts
falls under which of the clauses provided under Section 62 of the Act. The
H largest period of limitation prescribed therein is two years and in cases of
RAJA RAM MAIZE PRODUCTS '·INDUSTRIAL COURT OP M.P. [RAJENDRA BABU. 1.) 55]
termination of services and other incidental matters lesser period of limitation A
has been prescribed. Therefore, even taking that two years period from the
date of the dispute either taking the date on which when they were refused
work when they made a demand that they should be allowed to do work with
Dushyant Kumar or when they made a demand after the order made by the
Labour Court on an interim application directing them to resume work or
B
calling off the strike, the applications filed are beyond the period of limitation
prescribed under Section 62 of the Act.

The concept of recurring cause of action arising in a matter of this
nature is difficult to comprehend. In Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare
& Ors. v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Ors., AIR (1959) SC 798, c
it was noticed that a cause of action which is complete cannot be recurring
cause of action as in the present case. When the workers demanded that they
should be allowed to resume work and they were not allowed to resume work,
the cause of actiou was complete. Iu such a case the workers going on
demanding each day to resume work would not arise at all. The question of
demanding to allow to do work even on refusal does not stand to reason. D

In that view of the matter, we think that the High Court and the Labour
Court fell into an error in analyzing and understanding the matter. In this
view, we think the view taken by the ludustrial Court to the extent that the
cause of action had commenced at any rate on 1.3.1986 is correct. Reckoning E
from that date, the period of limitation of two years had been over by the
time the applications were filed.

However, Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad sought to put forth an argument that
under Section 61 of the Act the powers of the Labour Court are set out which
enable the Labour Court to deal with aspects of the matter to give various F
reliefs to the parties and one of them is to require any employee to withdraw
a strike which is held to be illegal and for that particular relief there is no
prescription of period of limitation. He submitted that in fact the workers had
gone on strike and they had to withdraw the same after holding it to be illegal
and, therefore, they had a cause of action. We are afraid this submission is
G
plainly misconceived. The workmen cannot seek for a relief against them-
selves for withdrawal of strike by asking the Labour Court to hold it to be
illegal and direction for resumption of duty. On the other hand, the case
clearly put forth by the workmen in the application is that the cause of action
is that the employer is not allowing the workmen to resume duty. Thus we
are of the view that this contention is untenable. H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A Variom other aspects of the matter were addressed before us and
several decisions were referred to in support of their respective contentions,
but in our view reference to any one of them is unnecessary in the view we
have taken.

C.A.Nos.89-90/99, C.A.No.92:93/99 and C.A.Nos.100-101/99, there-
B fore, stand allowed and the order made by the High Court setting aside the
order of the Industrial Court and restoring that of the Labour Court and the
application filed by the workmen before the Labour Court, shall stand
dismissed. Consequentially, C.A.Nos. 91/99 and 94- 99199 shall stand dis-
missed and the question of entertaining the special leave petitions or giving
C any reliefs in those cases will not arise in these proceedings. SLP (C) Nos.
14115/2000 and 14116/2000 shall stand disposed of as they have become
unnecessary. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own
costs.

v.s.s. C.A. Nos. 89-90/99,
D C.A. No. 92-93/99,
C.A. No. 100-101/99 allowed.
C.A. No. 91/99 dismissed.
C.A. No. 94-99 dismissed
SLP (C) Nos. 14115/2000 and
14116/2000 disposed of.