Holding

Unexplained delay in disposing a detenu's representation, however short, vitiates the preventive detention and mandates the release of the detainee.

Summary

The appellant, Rajammal, was detained under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1982. She filed a representation on 13 January 1998, which reached the Secretary on 5 February 1998, but the Minister rejected it only on 14 February 1998. The High Court dismissed her habeas corpus petition, holding there was no unlawful delay. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the unexplained delay in disposing the representation violated Article 22(5) and vitiated the detention. The Court held that any unexplained delay, irrespective of its length, renders continued detention illegal, and the Minister’s absence could not justify the five‑day lapse. Consequently, the Court set aside the detention order and ordered the appellant’s release. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the delay in considering the detenu's representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution vitiates the preventive detention order.
Whether the Minister's absence and the five‑day interval constitute a valid explanation for the delay.
Whether unexplained delay, irrespective of its duration, renders further detention illegal.

Legislation cited

Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug‑Offenders, Forest‑Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum‑grabbers Act, 1982s. 3(1)

Subjects

preventive detentionrepresentationdelayArticle 22(5)Article 21vitiated detentionhabeas corpusTamil Nadu Act

Judgment

RAJAMMAL A
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR

DECEMBER 14, 1998

[K.T. THOMAS, D.P. WADHWA AND B
SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.]

Preventive detention-Representation by detenu to the Government-
Delay in disposal of such representation-Detention, if vitiated-Held, yes-
Absence of the Minister concerned al the Headquarters not sufficient to C
justifY the delay-The duration or range of delay not material-Tamil Nadu
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest
Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982,
Section 3(I)-Conslilution of India, Articles 22(5) and 21.

Words and Phrases- "as soon as may be"-Meaning of-In the context
D
of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

The appellant was kept under detention under Section 3(1) of the Tamil
Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders,
Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers E
Act, 1982 passed by the State Government on 18.12.1997. A representation
forwarded by her on 13. 1.1998 was rejected by the Government. She filed a
habeas corpus petition before the High Court challenging her detention,
inter alia, on the ground that there was delay in considering the representation
submitted by her. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Hence this
appeal F
It was contended by the appellant that her representation dated
13.1.1998 reached the Secretary to the Government on 5.2.1998. The Mini.ster
concerned rejected the representation on 14.2.1998, and the delay is the
interval between the aforesaid two dates and there was no valid justification
thereto and hence the detention must be treated as vitiated. G
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1.1. It is a constitutional obligation of the Government to consider
the representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay. Though no
551 I-I
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to be
taken on the representation, the words "as soon as may be" in clause (5)
of Article 22 convey the massage that the representation should be considered
and disposed of at the earliest. But that do41s not mean that the authority is
pre-empted from explaining any delay which would have occasioned in the ·-
.B disposal of the representation. The Court can certainly consider whet~er the
delay was occasioned due to permissible reasons or unavoidable causes.
(555-E-F)

1.2. If delay was caused on account of any indifference or lapse in
' .
-
considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further,
C detention of the prisoner. In other words, it is for the authority concerned
to explain the delay, if any, in disposing of the representation. It is not enough
to say that. the delay was very short. Even longer delay can as well be
explained. So the test is not the duration or range of delay, but how it is
explained by the authority concerned. [556-D)

D 1.3. In the present case the representation was sent by the detenu on
13.1.1998 which reached the Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu on
5.2.1998. The Government which received remarks from different authorities
submitted the relevant file before the Under Secretary for processing it on
the next day. The Under Secretary forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary on
the next working day. Thereafter the file was submitted before the Minister
E who received it while he was on tour. The Minister passed the order only on
14.2.1998. Though there is explanation for delay till 9.2.1998, there is no
explanation whatsoever for the delay which occurred thereafter. Merely stating
that the Minister was on tour and hence he could pass orders only on
14.2.1998, is not a justifiable explanation when the liberty of a citizen
F guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is involved. Absence of the
Minister at the Headquarters is not sufficient to justify the delay since the
file could have reached the Minister with utmost promptitude in cases
involving the vitally important fundamental right of the citizen. [556-E-G)

1.4. The delay from 9.2.1998 to 14.2.98 remains unexplained and such
G unexplained delay has vitiated further detention of the detenu, and she must
be set at large forthwith. [557-E)

Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Beed, (1987) 4 SCC 58; Raghavendra
Singh v. Superintendent, [1986) 1SCC650; Rumana Begum v. State ofA.P.,
(1993) Suppl. 2 SCC 341; Kundanbhai Dulabhai Sheikh v. Dstrict Magistrate,
H Ahmedabad, [1996) 3 SCC 194: JT (1996) 2 SC 532 and KM Abdulla
RAJAMMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [THOMAS, J.) 553
Kunhi v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SWCC 476, relied on and A
U. Vijaya/akshmi v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1994) SC 165,
distinguished.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1289of1998. B
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.4.98 of the Madras High Court
in H.C. P. No. 53 of 1998.

K.K. Mani for the Appellant.

V.R. Reddy and V.G. Pragasam for the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
D
Smt. Rajammal, a thirty two year old lady is kept under detention
dubbing her as a "bootlegger", as per the detention order passed under
Section 3(1) of the Tamil N adu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982) (hereinafter
referred to as the TN Act). The aforesaid order was passed by the Government E
of Tamil Nadu on 18.12.1997 and she continues to be in detention. A
representation forwarded by her on 13 .1.1998, was rejected by the Government
of Tamil Nadu. She filed a habeas corpus petition before the High Court of
Madras in which the detention order was challenged mainly on three grounds.
First is that there was delay in considering the representation submitted on F
her behalf. Second is that her family members were not informed about the
place of detention nor even about the detention. The third is that report of
the Advisory Board was not submitted within the statutory period of seven
days as contemplated under Section 11 of the TN Act. A Division Bench of
the Madras High Court has repelled all the aforesaid three contentions and
dismissed her petition. This appeal has, therefore, been filed by special leave G
challenging the judgment of the High Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, confined the challenge
to the first ground aforementioned, namely, there was delay in considering the
representation submitted on behalf of the detenu. The factual position is the
following: H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The representation was sent by her on 13.1.1998 which after passing
through the prescribed route reached the Secretary to the Government of
Tamil Nadu (Prohibition and Excise Department) on 5.2.1998. The Minister
concerned rejected the representation on 14.2.1998. According to the learned
counsel, the delay is the interval between the aforesaid two dates and there
B is no valid justification thereto and hence the detention must be treated as
vitiated. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the decision of this
Court in Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Beed, [1987] 4 SCC 58.

In the affidavit sworn to by Sri R. Poornalingam, IAS, Secretary to the
Government (Prohibition and Excise Department) in answer to the contentions
C of the appellant in the Special Leave Petition the delay is sought to be
explained in the following lines:

"The remarks were submitted with the relevant files before the Under
Secretary of the concerned Department on 6.2.1998. The file was
considered by the Under Secretary on 9.2.1998 as 7.2.1998 and 8.2.1998
D were holidays in view of Saturday and Sunday and sent to Deputy
Secretary on 9.2.1998 itself. Thereafter the file was considered by the
Deputy Secretary who in turn sent the same to the Minister for Law
for approval. The representation was considered and rejected by the
Minister for Law on 14.2.1998 as he was away on camp from
Headquarter on the dates in between. Thus the file was not
E unnecessarily held up at any level but moved from level to level
promptly."

According to the learned counsel it is no explanation that the Minister
concerned was away on camp from the Headquarters, particularly since a
F similar stand was disapproved in Mohinnuddin 's case (supra). A two Judge
Bench in the said decision declined to accept the explanation that "the Chief
Minister was preoccupied with very important matters of the State which
involved tours as well as two Cabinet meetings at Pune on October 28 and
29, 1986 and at Aurangabad on November 11and12, 1986." Learned Judges
further observed that "in view of the wholly unexplained and unduly Jong
G delay in the disposal of the representation by the State Government, the
further detention of the appellant must be held illegal and he must be set at
liberty forthwith."

Learned counsel also cited an earlier two Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Raghavendra Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur, [ 1986]
H I sec 650, in which similar delay of a few days in considering the representation
RAJAMMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [THOMAS, J.] 555
was found to have vitiated the detention. That is a case where delay was held A
to be "wholly unexplained". A three Judge Bench of this Court in Rumana
Begum v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1993] Supp. 2 SCC 341, disapproved the
delay in considering the representation on the mere ground that the
representation was not addressed to the Chief Secretary. That was a case
where representation was sent to the Governor. Hence it was found that there B
was unexplained and unreasonable delay and consequently the detention was
held vitiated. We are reminded of the following observations made by this
Court in Kundanbhai Dulabhai Sheikh v. District Magistrate, Ahmedabad,
JT (1996) 2 sc 532 = [1996] 3 sec 194:

"In spite of law laid down above by this Court repeatedly over the C
past three decades, the Executive, namely, the State Government and
its officers continue to behave in their old, lethargic fashion and like
all other files rusting in the secretariat for various reasons including
red tapism, the representation made by a person deprived of his
liberty, continues to be dealt with in the same fashion. The government
and its officers will not give up their habit of maintaining a consistent D
attitude of lethargy. So also, this Court will not hesitate in quashing
the order of detention to restore the 'liberty and freedom' to the
person who3e detention is allowed to become bad by the government.
itself on account of his representation not being disposed of at the
earliest."
E
It is a constitutional obligation of the Government to consider the
representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay. Though no period
is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to be taken
on the representation the words "as soon as may be" in clause (5) of Article
22 convey the message that the representation should be considered and F
disposed of at the earliest. But that does not mean that the authority is pre-
empted from explaining any delay which would have occasioned in the disposal
of the representation. The Court can certainly consider whether the delay was
occasioned due to permissible reasons or unavoidable causes. This position
has been well delineated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in K. M
Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India and others, (1991) G
I SC 476. The following observations of the Bench can profitably be extracted
here:

"It is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority
to whom the detenu submits his representation to consider the
representation and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The words "as soon as may be" occurring in clause (5) of Article 22
reflects the concern of the Framers that the representation should be
expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency
without an avoidable delay. However, there can be no hard and fast
rule in this regard. It depends upon the fact,s and circumstances of
each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution
B or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation
should be dealt with. The requirement, however, is that there should
n'ot be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering
the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of
representation would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and
c it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal."

The position, therefore, now is that if delay was caused on account of
any indifference or lapse in considering the representation such delay will
adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. In other words, it is for the
authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing the representation.
D It is not enough to say that the delay was very short. Even longer delay can
as well be explained. So the test is not the duration or range of delay, but how
it is explained by the authority concerned.

What happened in this case was that the Government which received
E remarks from different authorities submitted the relevant files before the
Under Secretary for processing it on the next day. The Under Secretary
forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary on the next working day. Thus there is
some explanation for the delay till 9.2.1998. Thereafter the file was submitted
before the Minister who received it while he was on tour. The Minister passed
the order only on 14.2.1998. Though there is explanation for the delay till
F 9.2.1998, we are unable to find out any explanation whatsoever as for the
delay which occurred thereafter. Merely stating that the Minister was on tour
and hence he could pass orders only on 14.2.1998 is not a justifiable
explanation, when the liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution is involved. Absence of the Minister at the Headquarters is not
G sufficient to justify the delay, since the file could be reached the Minister with
utmost promptitude in cases involving the vitally important fundamental right
of a citizen.

Mr. V.R. Reddy, learned senior counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu
referred to a decision of this Court in Mrs. U. Vijayalakshmi v. State o/Tamil
H Nadu and another, AIR (1994) SC 165 to contend that it could not be said

-
RAJAMMAL v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [THOMAS, J.] 557
that there was any delay in considering the representation from 9.2.1998 to A
14.2.1998. In that case also the detention was under Section 3(1) of the Act.
The detenu made representation against the detention which was received by
the State Government which conveyed the rejection of the representation on
23.6.1992. The detenu received the rejection order on 26.6.1992. It was submitted
that there was an inordinate long delay in dealing with the representation and B
that the detenu was entitled to have the detention order quashed. This Court
noticed that in the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary to the State
Government the manner in which the representation was dealt with after its
receipt on 18.5.1992 had been stated in detail. The Court then observed:

"We have perused the stages through which the file containing the C
representation was dealt with promptly and there was no indifference
-1 lethargy or negligence in dealing with the same. The file was not
unnecessarily held up at any level but moved from level to level
promptly. We are, therefore, satisfied that the explanation tendered by
the Deputy Secretary in this behalf is acceptable and does not betray
any lack of sense or urgency in dealing with the representation. We, D
therefore, do not see any merit. in the first contention."

In the present case, however, there is no explanation forthcoming as to why
the representation could not be dealt with by the Minister concerned from
9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998.
E
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the delay from 9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998
remains unexplained and such unexplained delay has vitiated further detention
of the detenu. The corollary thereof is that further detention must necessarily
be disallowed. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment. We direct the appellant-detenu to be set at large forthwith.
F
RK.S. Appeal allowed.