RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATIONversusBHARAT SINGH JHALA (DEAD) SON OF SHRI NATHU SINGH, THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS & ANR.

276                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    7 S.C.R. 276               [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A       RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
                                        v.
         BHARAT SINGH JHALA (DEAD) SON OF SHRI NATHU
             SINGH, THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS & ANR.
B                        (Civil Appeal No. 6942 of 2022)
                             SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
               [M. R. SHAH AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
             Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – ss.10, 33(2)(b) – Termination
      – Departmental Enquiry against workman-conductor (since
C
      deceased) for not issuing the tickets even after collecting the amount
      of tickets – Terminated in 2001 – Order of termination approved in
      2015 by Industrial Tribunal – After a period of approximately
      19 years from the date of passing the order of termination, the
      workman again raised the Industrial Dispute, Labour Court set aside
D     the order of termination and passed order awarding 50% back wages
      from the date of termination till his death in 2018 – Confirmed by
      High Court – On appeal, held : Once the order of termination was
      approved by the Industrial Tribunal and the management was
      permitted to lead the evidence and prove the misconduct before the
      Court and on appreciation of evidence the order of termination
E
      was approved, thereafter fresh reference u/s.10 challenging the order
      of termination was not permissible – 2015 order passed by the
      Industrial Tribunal which as such is a higher forum than the Labour
      Court had attained finality – Though the aforesaid fact was pointed
      out before the High Court, it did not consider the same – Findings
F     recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were binding between the parties
      – No contrary view could have been taken by the Labour Court
      contrary to the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal – Award
      passed by the Labour Court confirmed by High Court set aside.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
G           HELD: The workman was subjected to departmental
      enquiry and the charge against the deceased workman was not
      issuing the tickets to 10 passengers though he collected the fare.
      On conclusion of the departmental enquiry his services were
      terminated. The termination was the subject matter of the
H     approval application before the Industrial Tribunal in an
                                      276
 RSRTC v. BHARAT SINGH JHALA (DEAD) SON OF SHRI NATHU                 277
              SINGH, THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS

application under Section 337(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. In the said      A
proceedings the management was permitted to lead the evidence
and prove the charge/misconduct before the Tribunal. In the said
application the parties led the evidence, both, oral as well as
documentary. Thereafter on appreciation of evidence on record,
the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015 approved the
                                                                      B
order of termination. That thereafter the workman raised the
Industrial Dispute challenging the order of termination which as
such was proved by the Industrial Tribunal by order dated
21.07.2015. Therefore, once the order of termination was
approved by the Industrial Tribunal and the management was
permitted to lead the evidence and prove the misconduct before        C
the Court and thereafter on appreciation of evidence the order
of termination was approved, thereafter the fresh reference under
Section 10 of the I.D. Act challenging the order of termination
was not permissible. It is required to be noted that the order
dated 21.07.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal which as such
                                                                      D
is a higher forum than the Labour Court had attained the finality.
Though the aforesaid fact was pointed out before the High Court,
the High Court has not at all considered and/or appreciated the
same and has confirmed the judgment and award passed by the
Labour Court for setting aside the order of termination which as
such was approved by the Industrial Tribunal. In the present case     E
by specific order the Industrial Tribunal permitted the
management to lead the evidence and prove the misconduct
before the Court which as such was permissible.That thereafter
the Industrial Tribunal approved the order of termination. Once
the order of termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal
                                                                      F
on appreciation of evidence led before it, thereafter the findings
recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were binding between the
parties. No contrary view could have been taken by the Labour
Court contrary to the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal.
The judgment and award passed by the Labour Court confirmed
by the High Court is unsustainable. The High Court has                G
committed a very serious error in dismissing the writ petition/
writ appeal confirming the judgment and award passed by the
Labour Court setting aside the order of termination. The
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
confirming the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court
                                                                      H
278              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     setting aside the order of termination and the judgment and award
      passed by the Labour Court setting aside the order of termination
      are hereby quashed and set aside [Paras 5.1, 5.2, 6 and 7][280-F-
      H; 281-A-H; 282-A]
               John D’Souza v. Karnataka State Road Transport
B              Corporation (2019) 14 Scale 57 – held inapplicable
                                Case Law Reference
      (2019) 14 Scale 57             held inapplicable                Para 4.1
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6942
      of 2022.
C
            From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2021 of the High Court
      of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in D.B. Special Appeal Writ
      No. 645 of 2020.
               Dr. Ritu Bhardwaj, Sachin Mittal, Advs. for the Appellant.
D           H. D. Thanvi, Achal Singh Bule, Nikhil Kumar Singh, Rishi
      Matoliya, Advs. for the Respondents.
               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
               M. R. SHAH, J.
            1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
E     and order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the Division Bench of the High
      Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur passed in D.B. Civil Special
      Appeal (Writ) No.645 of 2020 by which the Division Bench of the High
      Court has dismissed the said appeal challenging the order passed by the
      learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant
F     confirming the order passed by the Labour Court setting aside the order
      of termination passed against the workman, the Rajasthan State Road
      Transport Corporation has preferred the present appeal.
               2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as
      under:
G            2.1 The workman was serving on the post of Conductor. A
      departmental enquiry was initiated against him alleging not issuing the
      tickets to 10 passengers though he collected the amount of tickets. In the
      department inquiry he was found guilty for the misconduct alleged. The
      employer – Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation terminated his
      services vide Order dated 31.07.2001.
H
  RSRTC v. BHARAT SINGH JHALA (DEAD) SON OF SHRI NATHU                          279
       SINGH, THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

        2.2 An application for approval of punishment order under Section       A
33(2)(b) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as “the
I.D. Act”) was submitted before the Industrial Tribunal on 31.07.2001.
The Industrial Tribunal held the enquiry bad. However, the Industrial
Tribunal vide Order dated 12.12.2012 allowed the appellant – Corporation
to prove the charges before the Tribunal. Both the parties led the evidence
                                                                                B
before the Tribunal on the charges alleged. The appellants led, both, oral
as well as documentary evidences. That on appreciation of entire
evidence on record and considering the submissions made on behalf of
both the parties, the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 21.07.2015 allowed
the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act and granted the
approval of the order of termination. That thereafter and after a period        C
of approximately 19 years from the date of passing the order of
termination, the workman again raised the Industrial Dispute challenging
the order of termination of 2001. By Judgment and Award dated
19.11.2019 the Labour Court, Jaipur allowed the said reference and set
aside the order of termination. As in the meantime the workman died
                                                                                D
and the dispute was raised after a period of 19 years, the Labour Court
passed an order awarding 50% back wages from the date of termination
till his death i.e. 10.12.2018. The Judgment and Award passed by the
Labour Court was challenged before the learned Single Judge of the
High Court. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Against
the award passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition       E
the appellant preferred the appeal before the Division Bench. By
impugned judgment and order the High Court has dismissed the said
appeal which has given rise to the present appeal.
       3. Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted
that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Hon’ble High Court          F
has committed a serious error in dismissing the writ appeal/writ petition
confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Court.
       3.1 It is submitted that once in an application under Section 33(2)(b)
of the I.D. Act and pursuant to the earlier order passed by the Industrial
Tribunal, the appellant was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the        G
charge/misconduct and thereafter when the order of termination was
approved by the Industrial Tribunal, thereafter it was not open for the
workman to again raise the Industrial Dispute that too after a period of
19 years. It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court has materially
erred in confirming the judgment and award passed by the learned Labour
                                                                                H
280            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     Court quashing and setting aside the order of termination which as
      such was approved by the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015.
            3.2 Making above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present
      appeal.
            4. Present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri H.D. Thanvi,
B     learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
             4.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of John
      D’Souza vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, (2019)
      14 Scale 57, it is vehemently submitted that as observed and held by
      this Hon’ble Court the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) and Section
C     10 of the I.D. Act are distinct and different. It is submitted that as
      observed and held by this Hon’ble Court in the aforesaid decision the
      proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act are summary in
      nature and findings recorded while deciding the application under Section
      33(2)(b) of the Act shall not affect the substantive right in a reference
D     under Section 10 of the I.D. Act.
            4.2 It is submitted that therefore, the Labour Court did not commit
      any error in considering the validity of the order of termination and
      thereafter quashing and setting aside the same and ordering 50% back
      wages.
E           4.3 It is submitted that considering the fact that the workman has
      died and his heir - widow is awarded 50% back wages only, the same
      may not be interfered by this Court in exercise of powers under Article
      136 of the Constitution of India.
             5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
F     at length.
             5.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the workman was
      subjected to departmental enquiry and the charge against the deceased
      workman was not issuing the tickets to 10 passengers though he collected
      the fare. On conclusion of the departmental enquiry his services were
G     terminated. The termination was the subject matter of the approval
      application before the Industrial Tribunal in an application under Section
      33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. In the said proceedings the management was
      permitted to lead the evidence and prove the charge/misconduct before
      the Tribunal. In the said application the parties led the evidence, both,
      oral as well as documentary. Thereafter on appreciation of evidence on
H
  RSRTC v. BHARAT SINGH JHALA (DEAD) SON OF SHRI NATHU                        281
       SINGH, THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

record, the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015 approved the        A
order of termination. That thereafter the workman raised the Industrial
Dispute challenging the order of termination which as such was proved
by the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015. Therefore, once
the order of termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal and the
management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the
                                                                              B
misconduct before the Court and thereafter on appreciation of evidence
the order of termination was approved, thereafter the fresh reference
under Section 10 of the I.D. Act challenging the order of termination
was not permissible. It is required to be noted that the order dated
21.07.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal which as such is a higher
forum than the Labour Court had attained the finality. Though the             C
aforesaid fact was pointed out before the High Court, the High Court
has not at all considered and/or appreciated the same and has confirmed
the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court for setting aside
the order of termination which as such was approved by the Industrial
Tribunal.
                                                                              D
      5.2 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of
this Court in the case of John D’Souza (supra) by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent is concerned, on facts the said
decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the
present case by specific order the Industrial Tribunal permitted the
management to lead the evidence and prove the misconduct before the           E
Court which as such was permissible. That thereafter the Industrial
Tribunal approved the order of termination. Once the order of termination
was approved by the Industrial Tribunal on appreciation of evidence led
before it, thereafter the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were
binding between the parties. No contrary view could have been taken           F
by the Labour Court contrary to the findings recorded by the Industrial
Tribunal.
      6. In view of the above, the judgment and award passed by the
Labour Court confirmed by the High Court is unsustainable. The High
Court has committed a very serious error in dismissing the writ petition/     G
writ appeal confirming the judgment and award passed by the Labour
Court setting aside the order of termination.
      7. In view of the above and for the reason stated above the present
appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court confirming the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court            H
282              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     setting aside the order of termination and the judgment and award passed
      by the Labour Court setting aside the order of termination are hereby
      quashed and set aside.
             The Present Appeal is Allowed to the aforesaid extent. However,
      in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to
B     costs.

      Divya Pandey                                               Appeal allowed.
      (Assisted by: Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)


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