Holding

The conviction of the mother‑in‑law under Sections 306 and 498A IPC was set aside because the presumption under Section 113‑A could not be raised on the basis of the dying declaration and the letter, and there was no direct evidence of her involvement.

Summary

The deceased Shanti Bai set herself on fire in 1988 and, in her dying declaration, exonerated all members of her matrimonial home. The trial court convicted her husband and mother‑in‑law under IPC sections 306 (abetment of suicide) and 498A (cruelty) based largely on the dying declaration and a letter she had written, while acquitting the father‑in‑law. The High Court upheld the convictions. On appeal, the husband died, rendering his appeal abated, and the Supreme Court examined whether the mother‑in‑law could be convicted on such slender evidence. The Court held that the presumption under Section 113‑A of the Evidence Act could not be invoked without direct proof of cruelty or abetment, and that the letter and dying declaration did not incriminate the mother‑in‑law. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and she was acquitted, with the appeal allowed insofar as she was concerned.

Issues considered

The applicability of the presumption under Section 113‑A of the Evidence Act when only a dying declaration and a letter are available as evidence.
Whether the alleged conduct of the mother‑in‑law amounts to cruelty under Section 498A IPC.
Whether the mother‑in‑law can be held liable for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-A
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 306, s. 498A

Subjects

suicideabetmentcrueltySection 306 IPCSection 498A IPCSection 113-A Evidence Actdying declarationpresumptionbenefit of doubt

Judgment

[2008] 11 S.C.R. 270

A RAJBABU & ANR.
v. r
STATE OF M.P.
(Criminal Appeal No. 895 of 2003)

B JULY 24, 2008
[R.V~ RAVEENDRAN ANO DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]

Penal Code, .1860 - ss. 306 and 498-A - . Prosecution
c under - Of husband, mother-in-.Jaw and father-in-law - Sui-
cide committed within seven years of marriage - No direct
evidence - In dying declaration deceased exculpating all the
accused - Trial Court convicting husband and mother-in-law
on the basis of a letter written by the deceased on the date of
D the occurrence and acquitting father-in-Jaw - Order upheld by I
l
High Court - On appeal, held: On account of death of hus-
band, his appeal abated - Conviction of Mother-in-Jaw not jus- ~._.,.

tified - She was entitled to benefit of doubt - The Jetter or the
evidence of the mother and sister-in-:.faw of the deceased, do
not disclose any act or incident to make out a case of abet-
t
E
mentor cruelty - In view of the evidence presumption u/s 113-
A of Evidence Act cannot be invoked to find the guilt uls 306 -
Evidence Act, 1872-s. 113-A.
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 113-A - Presumption under -
F /nvocability -'- Held: Such presumption to be raised keeping
t-
into consideration nature of cruelty having regard to meaning
~
of 'cruelty' ins. 498-A /PC- Mere fact that woman committed
suicide within seven years of marriage and was subjected to
cruelty by her husband or his relative does not automatically
G give rise to such presumption.
Prosecution was initiated against 3 accused u/s 306
and 498-A. Prosecution case was that the deceased was
.
\..-

f
)... All
married to accused No.1-husband two years prior to the Y--

occurrence. At the time of occurrence, none of the accused
H 270
RAJBABU & ANR. v. STATE OF M.P. 271
....
were at home. On getting the news that his wife had set A
herself on fire, accused-husband came home and then
reported the matter to the police. He took the deceased
to railway station in order to take her to the hospital. There
her dying declaration was recorded by Police Station
lncharge whereby she exculpated all the accused. Imme- B
diately thereafter she died. Trial Court acquitted accused
father-in-law and convicted accused-husband and ac-
cused mother-in-law. High Court upheld the order of trial
court. Hence the present appeal. During the pendency of
the appeal accused-husband died rendering the appeal c
by him abated and infructuous.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The conviction under Sections 306 and
498-A IPC passed against the appellant No.2 -accused D
(mother-in-law) is set aside and acquittal is ordered grant'"
-·i
ing her benefit of doubt. [Para 20] [285-B]
1.2 The only evidence that has been produced and
was used for levelling accusations against the appellant
was the dying declaration and the contents of Ex. P.1 E
which is stated to be a letter written by the deceased. Some
of the witnesses like PW 1 and PW 3, the family members
of the parental home of the deceased have stated in their
deposition about the alleged ill-treatment meted out to the
deceased by the in-laws family. (Para 6] (277-D,E] F

'
. J
1.3 A perusal of the said dying declaration would
prove and establish that there is nothing incriminating in
the said statement against the appellant and, therefore,
the said dying declaration, which was exculpatory in na·
ture, so far as the prosecution is concerned is of no rel- G
evance and would rather help the accused appellants.
-4
(Para 8] (278-B,C]
1.4 The conviction cannot be based against the ap-
pellant No. 2 on the basis of the letter (Exbt. P-1) alone. In H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
.. ..
A ' her statement PW 1 had, of course, brought in some alle-
gations· about the mother-in-law but only from that state-
meht it cannot be said that she had directly a·ny hana in
the act of commission of suicide. So far as the evidence
of PW 1 and PW 3 are concerned, there is only evidence
-B to the extent· that at times the deceased was not treated
lo.
well by the appellant. There is no direct evidence to es-
tablish that the· appellant either aided or instigated· the
deceased to commit suicide or -entered into an·y con-
spiracy to aid her in committing'suicide. [Paras·10, 13 and
c 15] [279-B, 280-0,E, 281-A] .
2.1 Section 113-A of Evidence Act gives a discretion
to the court to raise such· a presumption as· provided un-
;.der the provision having regard, to au the other circum-
~-stances of the case, which· m,eans that whe~e the alleg.a-
D tion is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to
which the woman was subjected, having regard to the t;-
meaning of the word 'cruelty' in Section 498-A IPC. The
court has to consider whether the alleged cruelty was of
such"'nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit
E suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
·health . of the woman. The mere. fact that a woman com-
'mitted suicide within seven 'years of her marriage and that t-
she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband or any I-

relative of her husband, does not automatically give rise
F to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by ~
her husband or any relative of her husband. [Para.15] [281- ..
t:::
C,D,E,F].
t
Ramesh Kumar v. State of'-Chhattisgarh 2001 (9) SCC
618; State of W B. v. ·Ori/al Jaiswal 1994 (1 )SCC 73:_ relied on.
G
, . 2.2 In the instant case, the evidence on .record .dis- ~

closes that the deceased wanted to be married in a liter-
ate family. She was not happy with the fact that her hus- >-
band was illiterate and also with the status and condition
·.H of the family of her husband. She·was also required 'to do
RAJ BABU & ANR. v. STATE OF M.P. 273
... ...
some domestic work as the family was poor, for which A
she was not happy.· The deceased was of the view point
that her. life has been spoiled by marrying appellant No.
1. The letter reflects the attitude of the in-laws of the de-
ceased towards the deceased. In the said letter there was
no reference of any act or incident whereby the appel- B
,J
lants were alleged to have committed any willful act or
omission or intentionally aided or instigated the deceased
to commit suicide. On such slender evidence, the pre-
sumption u/s 113-A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked
to find th~ appellant guilty of the offence u/s 306 IPC. c
[Paras 16 and 17] [283-G, 284-A,B,C]
3.1 No offence is made out even under section 498A
of IPC. Though the letter mentions the fact that the atti-
tude of the family was not good towards the deceased
and she was not treated well but there is no mention about D
- > any of such incident. PW1 and PW3 in their statements
have emphasized that the mother-in-law of the deceased
used to ask the deceased to run hand driven flourmill to
which she was not habitual. In the year 1988 when the
incident occurred, the hand driven flourmills were gener- E
ally used by women in the poor families in the villages
and even till today one may find use of the same in some
villages in the country. Thus asking one to run the same
at that point of time may not amount to an act of cruelty.

- )
[Para· 18] [284-C,D,E,F]
3.2 In the said statements there is also a mention of
an incident where the deceased had been beaten by her ·
husband. The mother-in-law (appellant No. 2) cannot be
held liable for the said act; rather there is evidence on
F

record of PW3 who had stated that appellant No. 2 had G
once restrained her son. Though in the statement of PW
-~! 1 there is mention of one or two incident when the present
appellant had beaten the deceased but there appears to
be possibility of embellishment. The father of the de-
ceased (PW2), in his statement has not made any state- H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 11 S.C.R.

A ment regarding c:ruelty being committed on his da·ughter
in her in-laws house. [Para 19] [284-F,G, 285-A]
Case Law Reference
2001 (9) SCC 618 Relied on Para 15
B
1994 (1 )SCC .73 Relied on Para 15
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 895 of 2003
C From the Judgment and Order dated 23.9.2002 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Crl. Appeal No. 618 of
1989
Shiv Sagar Tiwari for the Appellants.
Vibha Datta Makhija for the Respondent.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. By this Judgment
and order we propose to dispose of the appeal filed by the
appellants against the judgment and order dated 23-9-2002 of
E the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur whereby the
Learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the appel-
lants against the judgment and order dated 17-6-1989 of the
Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khurai, convicting the
appellants under the provisions of Sections 306 and 498A of
F the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the IPC') and sentencing each
of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years on
each count.
2. The deceased, Shanti Bai, daughter of Janak Rani
(PW.1) and Gyan Das (PW.2) was married to Rajbabu-appel-
I-
G lantNo.1 twoyearspriortothedateofoccurrence. On 17.7.1988 t-

Shanti Bai set herself on fire in her matrimonial home and she
died because of burn injuries received by her. At the time when
the occurrence took place the Appellant No.2, Smt. Munnibai
(mother-in-law of the deceased) had gone to fetch water from
H the well. The husband of Appellant No.2, Shri Jagat Bandhu
RAJBABU & ANR. v. STATE OF M.P. 275
[DR MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
,; I'
(father-in-law of the deceased), who was acquitted by the trial A
court, was away to some other place, whereas Appellant No.1
had gone for cutting wood from the forest. Appellant No.1 im-
mediately coming to know about the incident came back and
lodged the first information report at police station Bhangarh
which was recorded by the Head Constable Narbada Prasad, 8
~ who was examined as PW.9 during the trial. The said report
which was lodged by the appellant No.1 was exhibited during
the trial and was marked as Ex. P.16. The deceased was car-
ried to the railway station Karonda for being taken to the Gov-
ernment Hospital at Bina for treatment. The police station c
lncharge, Mr. Ashok Chourasia (PW.8), also arrived at the rail-
way station and recorded the dying declaration, wherein it was
noted that Shanti Bai died in the accidental fire while cooking
food in the house. In the said dying declaration the deceased
exculpated all the members of her matrimonial home. lmmedi- D
ately thereafter she died at the railway station itself. The police
·- J thereafter sent the body for post mortem examination which was
conducted and exhibited as Ex. P.20 during the trial. According
to the said post mortem report the deceased suffered 90% burns
which were found to be ante mortem. The police thereafter
E
started investigation and on completion thereof, submitted a
charge-sheet against Rajbabu-appellant No.1, Smt. Munnibai-
appellant No. 2, who is mother of appellant No.1 and Jagat
Sandhu, father of the appellant No.1 under Sections 306 and
498A of the IPC. On the basis of the aforesaid charge-sheet,
charges were framed against all the three accused-appellants F
- .A under Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC for treating the de-
ceased with cruelty and abetting her to commit suicide as a
result of which allegedly she committed suicide.
3. During the course of the trial, altogether eight witnesses G
were examined in order to prove the charges against the ac-
cused persons. Trial court after hearing the arguments and on
..... appreciation of the evidence on record acquitted accused No.3,
the father of the Appellant No.1, whereas an order was passed
convicting appellant No.1 and appellant No.2 under Sections
H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A
. .._
306 and 498A of the IPC after holding· that offences agaii1st I
\..
both of them are proved b~yond reasonable doubt: The learned
trial court thereafter passed an order of sentence, sentencing
both the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three
years on each count. Both the sentences were to run concur-
B rently. No fine was imposed. Against the aforesaid judgment
both the appellants filed an appealbefore the High Court which
was dismissed by its judgment on 23rd September, 2002. Be-
ing aggrieved by the said judgment this appeal has been filed
by the appellants. During the course of the trial they were granted
c bail. In the present appeal order was passed by this Court en-
larging them on bail.
4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants. However, counsel for the respondent~State did not
appear in the hearing of the appeal although her name was
D shown in the daily cause list. Counsel appearing for the appei-.
lants at the very outset brought to qur notice thatAppeliantNo.1,
namely, Rajbabu son of Jagat Sandhu had died on 27th Sep- .\ -
tember, 200_5 at village Sabgah. The said appellant h~ving _died,
the appeal filed by him stands disposed off having been abafed.
E and therefore having been rendered infructuo.us. This ·appeal,
therefore, survives only so far as accused/appellant No.2, Ilo
namely, Smt. Munni Bai is concerned.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Smt
Munni Bai submitted that the deceased had died of burn inj(1-
F
ries received by her while she was cooking food in the kitchen
in her matrimonial home and that it is clearly established from .I.. ...
the records that all the other members of the family, at the time
of occurrence were not present. It was also submitted that the
prosecution case itself indicates that appellant No. 2 had gone
G out of the house for fetching water and, therefore, she could not
have been held guilty for an offen~e either under Section 306 or
498A of the IPC. He further submitted that the· only incriminating
;,....
evidence that could be s_aid to be available against her is the
letter which was allegedly written by the deceased and was
H exhibited as Ex. P.1 and a dying declaration which was recorded
RAJBABU & ANR. v. STATE OF M.P. 277
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
• ~
by Shri Ashok Choursia, the investigating officer who was ex- A
amined as PW 8. It was submitted by him that none of the afore-
said documents pin point the guilt of the appellant in the act of
commission of suicide by the deceased.

6. We have considered the aforesaid submissions in the
B
light of the record including the evidence adduced on behalf of
the prosecution. There is no eye witness to the occurrence of
the act of suicide committed by the deceased who was the
daughter-in-law as she was the only person available at the rel-
evant time in the matrimonial home. At that point of time she
was cooking food for all the members of the family who had
c
gone out of the house. Her husband, appellant No.1 had gone
to the forest for collecting wood whereas her father-in-law, who
was original accused No.3 had gone out of the house for some
other work and whereas the sole appellant before us, had gone
out of the house to fetch water. The only evidence that has been D
.... ~
produced and was used for leveling accusations against the
present appellant was the dying declaration and the contents of
Ex. P.1 which is stated to be a letter written by the deceased.
Some of the witnesses like PW 1 and PW 3, the family mem-
bers of the parental home of the deceased have stated in their E
deposition about the alleged ill-treatment meted out to the de-
ceased by the in-laws family. Let us therefore analyse and ap-
preciate the said pieces of evidence as available on record.

7. The dying declaration was recorded on 17.7.1988 at
F
about 12.45 hrs. by the investigating officer, PW 8 at the rail-
,,. J way station from where the deceased was to be taken to the
hospital for medical treatment. The incident had taken place at
about 10.30 AM. Deceased had stated in the said dying decla-
ration which was recorded in the presence of some of the vii-
lagers that while pouring kerosene oil, one end of her sari caught G
fire as she was cooking food and that in the aforesaid manner
she got burnt. It is also stated by her in the said dying declara-
.......
tion that she did not set fire on her own and no body set fire on
her and that while preparing meal her sari caught fire acciden-
tally. She has categorically stated in the said dying declaration H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
~ -<.

A that no quarrel had taken place and that there was no problem
in her matrimonial home. The said statement was read over to
her and her thumb impression was put as she could not sign
because of the burn injuries received by her.
8. The courts below have questioned the evidentiary value
B
of the said dying declaration. A perusal of the said dying decla-
ration would prove and establish that there is nothing incrimi-
nating in the said statement against the appellant and, there-
fore, the said dying declaration, which was exculpatory in na-
ture, so far as the prosecution is concerned is of no relevance
c and would rather help the accused appellants. As there is noth-
ing incriminating in the said document against the appellants,
neither are we inclined nor are we required to go into the ques-
tion of evidentiary value of the said document.

D 9. The other incriminating document against the accused
appellants is the undated letter exhibited as exhibit P.1. The
said letter appears to have been written by the deceased, ad-
dressing to father, mother and the younger brothers of the hus-
.\ -
band. In the said statement the deceased has stated that she is
unable to tolerate the atmosphere in the family in her matrimo-
E
nial home. She also stated that she prefer to live in. hell be-
cause in-laws have done such acts with her which are of no use
to mention. She has also stated that whatever has been done
was all-right. In her letter she has stated that she had always
considered her father-in-law and mother-in-law more than her
F parents and that even then they have treated her in such a man-
~ ;
ner which she never expected. It is mentioned therein that the
matrimonial house was ruined after her arrival and that she was
treated like an enemy. She has stated that her mother-in-law
had told that if she (Shanti Bai) is kept in their house then noth-
G ing will remain. In that view of the matter she did not want to
become burden on herself nor on her in-laws and that moment
was the last time of her life. Of course, in the letter there is no )>--
date written but towards the end of the letter it was mentioned
that it was the last day of her life. She also stated that she had a
H long life but-the hard words had made her life incomplete and
RAJBABU & ANR. v. STATE OF M.. P. 279
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

she has no further time to write further. The said letter appears A
to have been written on the date of occurrence and in the said
letter she had given vent to all her expressions, feelings and
contempt for the family. The said letter was found in the box
seized from the room where the incident occurred.
B
10. The issue, therefore, that falls for our consideration is
whether the conviction can be based against the appellant No.
2 on the basis of the said letter alone.

11. The prosecution has examined the mother of the de-
ceased as PW 1. She had stated in her deposition that her C
daughter told her that in her in-laws house, her mother-in-law
used to ask her to run hand flourmill. She also stated that her
son-in-law Rajbabu also used to quarrel with her daughter and
used to beat her. She has also stated that her daughter told her
that her mother-in-law used to use filthy language for her father D
and brothers. It is further stated by her that once her husband
had gone to bring Shanti Bai, at that time her mother-in-law did
not send her rather she was beaten by her in his presence for
not cleaning the utensils. Thereafter her husband came back. In
her cross examination she stated that her daughter wanted to E
become educated and wanted to _go for employment. Her
daughter told her after coming back from the matrimonial home
that her husband is not educated and the family is poor for which
she had expressed pain. Her daughter told her that her life would
be spoiled in that house and on that issue she was very un- F
happy. It was also stated by her that her daughter never sent
any letter from her in-laws house. She further replied in her cross-
examination that the deceased never told anything to her rela-
tives and members of the society regarding her troubles be-
cause she never wanted to make her life public.
G
12. We have also on record the deposition of the sister-
in-law of the deceased Smt. Kamla Rani who was examined
as PW 3. She has also deposed that when Shanti Bai came
back from her in-laws house for the first time she told her that
her husband and mother-in-law are troubling her very much. She H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A is forced to run hand driven flourmill which she was not habitual
and when she was not able to run the flourmill, her mother-in-.
law and husband used to beat her. It has also been stated in her
deposition that after coming back from her in-laws house Shanti
Bai told her that once there had been a quarrel between her
B and her mother-in-law and on the said issue her husband wanted
to burn her but at that moment her mother-in·-law stopped her
husband not to do so at that time. It Was further stated in- her
deposition that Shanti Bai told her not to narrate this story to
any of her brothers: The contents of exhibit P.1 were approved
c by PW 3, stating that the said letter was written by the deceased
Shanti Bai.
13. It appears from the statement of PW 1 and also cor-
roborated by the statement of PW 3 (sister-in-law of the de-
ceased) that the deceased studied upto XI standard and wanted
D to study further and wanted to be employed but since her.hus-
band was not literate and since the family was poor, they could
not make arrangements for her further studies and they could
not have even allowed her to go for employment, for which she
was upset. In her statement PW 1 had, of course, brought in some
E allegations about the mother-in-law but only from that statement
it cannot be said that she had directly any hand in the act of com-
mission of suicide. So far as the evidence of PW 1 and PW 3
are concerned, there is only evidence to the extent that at times
the deceased was not treated well by the appellant.
F 14. Of course, reliance is placed by the learned courts
below on the provisions of Section 113A of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (for short 'the Evidence Act'). Any person who abets
the commission of suicide is liable to be punished under Sec-
tion 306 IPC. Section 107 IPC lays down the ingredients of
G abetment which includes instigating any person to do a thing or
engaging with one or more persons in any conspiracy for the
doing of a thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pur-
suance of that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing,
or intentional aid by any act or illegal omission to the doing of
H that thing.
RAJBABU & ANR. v. STATE. OF M.P. 281
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
; ,.
15. In the instant case there is no direct evidence to es- A
tablish that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased
to commit suicide or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in
committing suicide. In the absence of direct evidence the pros-
ecution has relied upon- Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, un-
der which the court may presume on proof of circumstances B
enumerated therein, and having regard to all the other circum-
stances of the case, that the suicide had been abetted by the
accused. The explanation to Section 113-A further clarifies that
cruelty shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the
IPC. Under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution c
has first to establish that the woman concerned committed sui-
cide within a period of seven years from the date of her mar-
riage and that her husband or any relative of her husband had
subjected her to cruelty. Section 113-A gives a discretion to the
court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the other D
circumstances of the case, which means that where the allega-
.,_ ,_ tion is of cruelty it must consider the nature of cruelty to which
the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the
word "cruelty" in Section 498-A IPC. The mere fact that a woman
committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that
E
she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband or any rela-
tive of her husband, does not automatically give rise to the pre-
sumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband or
any relative of her husband. The court is required to look into all.
the other Circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances
F
which has to be considered by the court is whether the alleged
.J cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health of the woman. The law has been succinctly stated in
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2001) 9
SCC 618 wherein this Court observed: G

"12. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law
(Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-
1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof
where helpless married women were eliminated by being
H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and
incriminating evidence was usually available within the
four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not
available to anyone outside the occupants of the house.
However, still it cannot be lost sight-of that the presumption
B is intended to operate against the accused in the field of
criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the
foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section
113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A,
it must be shown that (1) the woman has committed suicide,
c (i1) such suicide has been committed within a period of
seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband
or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to
cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid
circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide
D had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of
her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of
caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is
only permissive as the employment of expression 'may
presume' suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability
of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a
E
formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the
presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have
regard to 'all the other circumstances of the case'. A
consideration of all the other circumstances of the case
may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the
F conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the
presumption. The expression - 'the other circumstances
of the case' used in Section 113-A suggests the need to
reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty
and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption.
G Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable
one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the
evidence adduced in defence or the facts and
circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy
the presumption. The phrase 'may presume' used in
H Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act,
RAJBABU & ANR. v. STATE OF M.P. 283
. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
" which says- 'Whenever it is provided by this Act that the A
court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact
as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for
proof of it.' "
In State ofWB. v. Ori/al Jaiswal reported in (1994) 1 SCC
B
-' 73 this Court observed:
"15. We are not oblivious that in a criminal trial the degree
of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil
proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be
facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made c
against the accused must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot
lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498- D
..... >- A IPC and Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that
the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable
doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of
the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there
E
is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the
question whether the charges made against the accused
have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must
depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and
the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the
F
--'
materials placed on record. Lord Denning in Baterv. Bater
(1950) 2 All ER 458 (All ER at p. 459) has observed that
the doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard
adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable
and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the
particular subject-matter." G

........_ 16. Having regard to the principles aforesaid, we may now
advert to the fact of the present case. Here is a case where the
evidence on record discloses that the deceased wanted to be
married in a literate family. She was not happy with the fact that
H
I--

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2008] 11 S.C.R.
...
A her husband was illiterate and also with the status and condi-
tion of the family of her husband. She was also re.quired to do
some do.mestic work as the family was poor, for which she was
not happy. The deceased was of the view point that h_er.life has
been spoiled by marrying Appellant No. 1. The letter reflects lo-
>--
B the attitude of the in-laws of the deceased towards the de-
ceased. In the said letter there was no reference of any act or )..._

incident whereby the appellants were alleged t9 have commit-
ted any willful act or omission or intentionally
. aided or instigated
.
the deceased to commit suicide.
c ·17. On such'slender evidence, therefore, we are not per-
suaded to invoke the presumption under Section 113-A of the
Evidence Act to find ·the appellant· guilty of the offence under
Section 306 IPC.

D 18. The next question which remains for our consideration
is whether an offence is made out under section 498A of IPC. ,._ __
Though, the letter allegedly written by the deceased mentions
the fact that the attitude of the family was no't good towa_rds the ~

deceased and she was.not treated well but there is no men-
tior.ed about any of such incident. PW1 'and PW3 in their state-
E
rnents have emphasized that themother~in-law of the deceased
used to ask the deceased to run hand driven flourmill to which
she was not habitual. In the.year 1988 when the abovementioned
,• . : 'r

incident occurred, the haqd driven flourmills.were ~e~erally used
by women in the poor families in the villages and even till today I
~

F one may find use of the sa'me in some villages in ~he country.
Thus asking one to run the same al that point of time may not ....
amount to an act of cruelty.
19. In the said statements there is also a mention of an
G incidents were the deceased had been beaten by her husband.
The mother-in-law (appellant No. 2) cannot be held Jiable for
the said act; rather there is evidence on record of PW3 who
had stated that appellant.No. 2. had C'n~e restrained h~r son.
Though in the statement of PW 1 there is mention of one or t~o
incident when the present appellant had beaten
. the .deceased
H ' .
-f

RAJBABU & ANR. v. STATE OF M.P. 285
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

but there appears to be possibility of embellishment. The father A
of the deceased (PW2), in his statement has not made any
statement regarding cruelty being committed on his daughter
in her in-laws house. After analyzing the said evidence and the
statements made by PW1 and PW3 we are of the opinion that
the benefit of doubt should be granted to appellant No. 2. B
20. We, therefore, set aside the conviction under Sections
306 and 498A of the IPC passed against the appellant No. 2
and acquit her granting her benefit of doubt. The appeal is al-
lowed in so far as appellant No. 2 is concerned. The appeal
has abated in so far as appellant No. 1 is concerned. The ap- C
pellant No. 2 is already on bail. She is released from the terms
of her bail bonds. ·
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.