RAJENDER SINGH AND ORS.versusTHE STATE OF BIHAR
- Citation
- 2000 INSC 202
- Decided
- 7 April 2000
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- G B PATTANAIK
Holding
Non‑explanation of a grievous injury is not fatal; the former statement was not proved under Section 145; Exception 4 to Section 300 does not apply; Triloki Singh is not liable under Section 34; convictions were altered accordingly.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the murder of Kameshwar Singh, where appellants Rajendra Singh and Triloki Singh were convicted under Sections 302/34, 307 and 324 of the IPC. The appellants challenged the conviction on five grounds: (1) the prosecution’s failure to explain a grievous injury sustained by Rajendra Singh; (2) a purported contradiction between the informant’s former statement (Exhibit B) and his trial testimony; (3) the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (sudden fight without pre‑meditation); (4) whether Triloki Singh could be held liable under Section 34 (common intention) for the murder; and (5) the existence of an unlawful assembly under Section 149. The Court held that non‑explanation of a grievous injury is not fatal to a sound prosecution, that Exhibit B was not properly proved nor complied with Section 145 of the Evidence Act and therefore could not be used to contradict the witness, and that the facts did not satisfy the ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300. It further found no common intention between Rajendra and Triloki Singh, setting aside the conviction of Triloki under Section 34 and substituting it with Section 324, and altering Rajendra’s conviction to simple murder under Section 302. The appeal was partly allowed.
Issues considered
- The failure to explain a grievous injury to an accused – whether it vitiates the prosecution case.
- The admissibility and effect of a former statement of a witness that was not complied with Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether the facts constitute a ‘sudden fight’ falling under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
- Whether the appellant Triloki Singh can be held liable under Section 34 (common intention) for the murder.
- Whether an unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC existed.
Legislation cited
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 145
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 133, s. 134, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 300, s. 302, s. 307, s. 324, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
RAJENDER SINGH AND ORS. A
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR
APRIL 7, 2000
[G.B. PATTANAIK, R.P. SETHI AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.] B
Indian Penal Code, 1860 :
Section 302-Conviction under-No unlawful assembly or any common
object to cause assault or murder ofdeceased-Hence conviction altered to one
u/s. 302.
c
Sections 302134 & 324-Conviction under-Of one of the appellants-
The circumstances under which appellant has been ascribed to have given a
blow on the deceased, it cannot be held that he also shared the common
intention with other accused-Therefore conviction u/s. 302134 cannot be D
sustained-Hence, convicted Ills. 324.
Section 300, Exception 4-Held, in the facts of the case, not proved.
Section 34-Common intention and Similar intention-Distinction be-
tween-If the distinction is overlooked, it may lead to miscarriage o.fjustice. E
Criminal Trial :
- Injury on accused-Non-explanation-Consequence of-Though pros-
ecution not obliged to explain each and every injury on the accused-But
failure to explain grievous injury creates suspicion on the ground that true F
version is concealed by prosecution-In the present case prosecution witnesses
held to be trustworthy-Non-explanation of grievous injury on accused-
Whether would render the prosecution case untrustworthy-Held, No.
Contradictory Statement-Reliability on-Contradiction informer state-
G
ment and the statement during trial-Former statement not legally proved-
And not confronted during trial-Held, prosecution case not fatal c;n the
ground of contradiction.
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Section 145-Contradiction in statement of
witness-Between former statement and the statement during trial-Fonner H
I 1073
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS c200012·s.c.R.
A statement not confronted by defence during trial-:Held, the provision has not
been complied with.
Nine accused were alleged to have committed murder of the de-
ceased and having caused injury. to others including the eyewitnesses. <
Appellants/Accused 'R' and 'P' were charged under sections 302 and 307
B of IPC. Appellant/Accused 'T' was charged under Section 302. All the
nine accused including the appl'.llants were charged under Section 302/149
of IPC. There were also charges u/s s.148, 147, 324 & 323 of IPC.
Prosecution case is that when PW 8, the informant was ploughing
C his field, accused came to his field and asked him to stop ploughing, when
the informant protested he was assaulted by A-1 & A-2 and the deceased
was assaulted first by A-1 and thereafter by all the accused.
The injured witnesses and the accused were medically examined.
Grievous injury was found on the body of the accused 'R'. Statement of
D the informant/PW-8 was recorded by the Magistrate in the hospital. There
were 4 ey~witnesses to the incident.
The defence case was that the prosecution party was the aggressor,
as the iitcident took place on plot No. 4514, belonging to the accused, and
thus tht; accused party was entitled to right of private defem:e of property
E
and person.
-
I
During trial, the statement of the informant (PW 8) disclosed that
when he was on his plot No. 4513 appellants 'R' and 'P' & accused 'RD'
reached there. There was altercation between the accused party and the
F informant party. In the course of the occurrence appellant 'R' sustained
grievous injury. The deceased was armed with farsa, while the accused
'RD', 'S', 'K', 'RS' were armed with lathis and when 'R' gave lalkara,
they assaulted PW 8. As per the evidence of PW-2 appellant 'T' had not
given any blow to the deceased. PWs 4 & 8 stated that 'T' had given blow
on the leg of the deceased, while PW-7 said that all the three appellants
G
had assaulted the deceased but he did not ascribe any particular role to
any of them. The Magistrate who had recorded the statement of PW-8,
was also examined during trial. In his cross-examination, he had categori-
-
·~-
cally admitted that the statement Exbt. B did not bear the signature and
seal either of his office or of the office of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. In
H his examination-in-chief also he did not state as to who identified PW-8 in
RAJENDRA SINGH v. STATE 1075
the hospital. A
Trial court concluded that the occurrence took place on plot No.
4513 which admittedly belonged to the informant, therefore plea of self
defence was not acceptable, and on the basis of the ocular evidence of the
>
four eye witnesses and the evidence of the doctor, convicted the appellants
u/s. 302/34, 307 & 324 IPC. Trial court also concluded that the necessary B
ingredients for formation of unlawful assembly having the common object
of causing murder of the deceased was not fulfilled as at no point of time
five accused persons had come together and therefore the constructive
liability of all the accused does not arise. The trial court also positively
found that only the appellants had made overt act by assaulting the de- c
ceased, and the other six accused were acquitted.
High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence and found that
non.explanation of injury on the person of one of the accused was not
fatal.
D
In appeal to this court, it was contended by the appellant that the
prosecution case was not sustainable on the grounds that grievous injur~
on the person of the accused 'R' was not explained by the prosecution and
there was contradiction between the former statement of the informant,
made before the magistrate and his statement during trial; that the case
E
fell under exception 4 to section 300 as the same was not pre-meditated;
-
and that accused 'T' cannot be held liable by attracting section 34 as there
r--- is no material to indicate that 'R' assaulted the deceased in furtherance of
common intention shared by him and 'T'. The respondent-State con-
tended that non-explanation of injury cannot be held fatal, when the oral
testimony of the four eye witnesses has been found to be trustworthy; that F
the former statement of PW-8 cannot be relied upon, since during trial his
former statement was not confronted and thus the provisions of Section
145 of Evidence Act has not been complied with; that Exception 4 to
_,~
Section 300 IPC is not applicable; and that 'T' also must be held liable by
applicability of Section 34. G
Partly allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1.1. The contention of the appellant that failure to explain
injury on the person of accused 'R' is fatal cannot be accepted as there is
no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 2 S.C.R.
A prosecution witnesses are trustworthy and, therefore, non-explanation of
injury in question be held to be fatal. [1083-E-F]
Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai v. State of Bihar, [1968) 3 SCR 525;
Lakshmi Singh v. State ofBihar, [1976] 4 SCC Crl. 671; Vijqyee Singh v. State
of U.P., [1990) 3 SCC 190; Ram Sunder Yadav v. State of Bihar, [1998) 7 SCC
B 365 and BhabaNanda Shanna 'f' State ofAssam, [1977) 4 1SCC 39(), referred
~ \ .
1.2. Ordinarily the prosecution is not obliged to explain each injury
on an accused even though the injuries might have been caused in course
c of the occurrence, if the injuries are minor in nature, but at the same time
if the prosecution fails to explain a grievous injury on one of the accused
person which is established to have been caused in course of the same
occurrence then certainly the court looks at the prosecution case with little
suspicion on the ground that the prosecution has suppressed the true
version of the incident. [1082-D-E]
D
2.1. The contention that the prosecution case fails on account of
contradiction in the statements of PW-8 i.e. the statement made before the
Magistrate and that made during trial. Under the circumstances that
Exbt. B did not bear the seal and signature of Chief Judicial Magistrate or
his office and that in his examination-in-Chief he had not stated to have
E identified PW-8 before recording his statement, it is difficult to hold that
Exhibit-B has been legally proved to be the former statement of PW-8.
Then again on scrutiny of the evidence of PW·8 it is crystal dear that the
witness has not been confronted with that part of his alleged former
statement which the defence wanted him to contradict. The witness has
F merely been asked as to whether he stated hefore the Magistrate that
accused 'S' has assaulted deceased to which he had replied he does not
recall as to what he stated hefore the Magistrate. In these circumstances it
cannot be held that the provision of Section 145 of the Evidence Act has
been complied with in the case in hand. So far as accused 'R' is concerned,
there has been no variance in his so-called former statement Exhibit B and
G
his statement in the Court when he was examined as PW-8 clearly assert-
ing that 'R' assaulted the deceased by means of Bhala. [1085-C-F]
2.2. During trial it is open for a party to make use of the forme,r
statement for such purpose as the law provides. Bot if the witness during
H trial is intend~d to be contradicted by his former statement then his atten-
RAJENDRA SINGH v. STATE 1077
tion has to be drawn to those parts of the statement which are required to A
be used for the purpose of contradicting him before the said statement in
question can be proved as provided under Section 145 of the Evidence
Act. [1084-A-B]
Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1952) SCR 812; Tahsildar
Singh and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1959) Supp. 2 SCR 875 B
and Binay Kumar Singh & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Bihar; (1997) 1 SCR 283,
referred to.
3. On scrutinising the evidence of four eye-witnesses PWs 2, 4, 7 and
8 who have depicted the entire scenario, the contention that in the present
case Exception 4 to Section 300 would be applicable, cannot be accepted.
c
From the evidence on record it is established that while the prosecution
party was on their land it is accused who protested and prevented them
from continuing with ploughing but when they did not stop accused per·
sons rushed to the nearby plot which is their land and got weapons in their
hands and assaulted the prosecution party ultimately injuring several D
members of the prosecution party and causing the death of one of them
while they were fully unarmed.
Conviction u/s. 302/34 of appellant-accused 'T' is set aside and is
convicted under Section 324 and conviction of appellant-accused 'R' is
E
altered to one under Section 302 instead of 302/34. The circumstances
under which 'T' has been ascribed to have given a blow on the leg of the
deceased, it is difficult to hold that he also shared the common intention
with 'R' for causing murder of the deceased which developed at the spur
of the moment and his conviction under Section 302/34 cannot be sus-
tained. Though the prosecution had made out the case that nine accused in F
all formed and unlawful assembly the common object of which assembly
was to murder but the Sessions Judge on appreciation of the evidence
came to the conclusion that there had been no unlawful assembly nor
there was any common object to cause assault or murder of deceased.
(1086-B-C; 1087-C-F) G
. . 5. There lies a distinction between the common intention and similar
--- intention and question whether there exists common intention in all the
persons who made some overt act resulting in the death of some of the
persons of other party is a question of fact and can be inferred only from
the circumstances. The distinction between common intention and similar H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A intention may be fine, but is nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may
lead to miscarriage of justice. [1087-D-E]
Dukhmochan Pandey and Others Etc. v. State of Bihar, [1997) 8 SCC
405, referred to.
B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1183
of 1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.5.97 of the Patna High Court
in Cd.A. No. 146 of 1985.
C R.K. Jain, P.S. Mishra, Akhilesh Kumar Pandey, S.K. Sinha, Chandra
Shekhar, Vishnu Sharma, Upengra Mishra, Ramjee Prasad and B.B. Singh for
the appearing pai:!!es.._:- ·---
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D PATTANAIK, J. The two appellants, Rajendra Singh and Triloki
Singh have assailed their conviction and sentence passed by the First
Additional Sessions Judge, Saran in Sessions Trial No. 189 of 1981, which
has been upheld in Appeal by the High Comt of Patna in Criminal Appeal
No. 146 of 1985. Before the learned Trial Judge in all there were nine
E accused persons but six of them were acquitted and only two appellants
alongwith one Prabhmiath Singh were convicted but said Prabhunath died
during the pendency of appeal in the High Court~ and as such, there are two
appellants in this Comt. The prosecution case in nutshell is; that on 4th July,
1977 an incident occurred in village Jaidpur Tola Pilui in the district of Saran
and one Kameshwar Singh was murdered. Satyanarain PW 8 gave the First
F
Inf01mation Report at 6.00 p.m. at Sadar Hospital, Chapra where he was
lying injured, alleging therein that at 11.45 a.m. while the informant was
getting his field ploughed by a tractor which he had hired from PW 5 these
appellants and others came and as]ced the inf01mant party not to plough the
field but when the informant protested he was abused and then accused No.
G 1 assaulted him by means of Bhala on his abdomen whereas accused No. 2
assaulted him on his chest. Deceased Kameshwar who was the nephew of
the informant was assaulted by accused no. 1 in his abdomen and thereafter
all the accused persons assaulted him. The prosecution also further alleged that
brotl1er of the informant Banwari Singh had also been assaulted by accused
-
H nos. 7, I and 2 and the acquitted persons assaulted him by means of lathi. It
RAJENDRA SINGH v. STATE [PATTANAIK, J.] 1079
is also the further case of the prosecution that PW 7 who is the nephew of the A
informant had also been assaulted. On the basis of the aforesaid First
Information Report Sub Inspector of Police PW 9 registered a case and started
investigation. The Investigating Officer went to the village and held the
inquest over the dead body at 9.45 p.m. and prepared an Inquest Report
Exhibit -7. The dead body was sent for autopsy which was conducted by
B
doctor PW 3. The said doctor had also examined the injuries on the person
of the informant on the requisition of the Investigating Officer. Finally
Chargesheet was submitted as against 9 accused persons, as already stated,
against Rajender Singh, Prabhunath Singh and Triloki under Section 302 for
the murder of Karneshwar and against all the nine accused persons including
the six acquitted under Section 302/149 for being members of an unlawful c
assembly in prosecution of the common object of which assembly Rajender
and others assaulted the deceased and then murdered. Rajender Singh and
Prabhunath Singh were further charged under Section 307 and there were
charges under Section 148 and 147 and also under Sections 324 and 323 of
Indian Penal Code. From the evidence of doctor- PW 3 who conducted the
D
post mortem on the dead body of Kameshwar it is crystal clear that the death
was homicidal and the said conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge has been
affirmed by the High Court in appeal and had not been assailed before lis.
To bring home the charges against the accused persons the prosecution relied
upon four eye witnesses, namely, PWs 2, 4, 7 and 8. The defence also
examined the Magistrate as DW 1 who is alleged to have recorded the E
statement of informant PW 8 at the hospital on the date of occurrence while
he was lying in injured condition. The said statement has been marked as
'Exhibit B '. From the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, the
defence case appears to be that the occurrence in fact took place on Plot No.
4514 belonging to the accused lying contiguous south of plot no. 4513 while F
the accused persons were on their field and, therefore, it is the prosecution
party who are the aggressors and the accused persons are entitled to right of
private defence of property as "'ell as person. On a thorough analysis of the
entire evidence on record the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion
that the occmTence took place on plot no. 4513 which admittedly belongs
to the infonnant and, therefore, the plea of tl1e accused that they were G
exercising their right of private defence of property as well as person on their
• land is not acceptable. This conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge has
been re-affumed in appeal by the High Court and Mr. P.S.Mishra, learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellants also fairly did not assail the same.
Tue learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellants on the basis of the H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A ocular evidence of four eye witnesses, namely, PWs. 2, 4, 7 and 8 of whom
PWs 7 and 8 had been injured. He had also relied upon the evidence of the
doctor-PW3 who was posted at Sadar Hospital, Chapra and who had
conducted the autopsy on the dead body of deceased Kameshwar and had
submitted the post mortem report Exhibit 2 and who had also examined the
injured persons. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellants under Section
B
302/34 IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. They were also
convicted by the Sessions Judge under Section 307 and sentenced to
imprisonment for 7 years and for their conviction under Section 324 they
were sentenced to undergo RI for one year. The High Court in appeal has
affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellants on all three counts.
C It may be stated at this stage that since 9 accused persons stood their trial
facing a charge under Section 302/149 IPC the Sessions Judge discussed the
evidence of the prosecution witness, more particularly, PWs 2 and 7 and
came to the conclusion that at no point of time five accused persons had
come together and, therefore, the necessary ingredients for formation of
D unlawful assembly having the common object to cause murder of Kameshwar
is not satisfied. Consequently the question of-constructive liability of all the
accused persons does not arise. It also positively found that it is only
Rajendemath, Prabhunath and Trifoki who had made overt act by assaulting
the deceased. According to the doctor PW3 the deceased had the following
three antimortem injuries:
E
"(i) Penstrating injury 1" x 1/2 X 1-112". in the chest cavity
arising first above, left nipple and one inch 1" lateral to the nipple
pieroring in 4th intercostal space. On further examination, the left
alura was found punctured at the said site and thereby punctured the
;
left lung to its upper portions 1/3" x 112". The left side of chest
F cavity was having about 8 ones of altered blood.
On further disection, both lun~s were found pale, right side of
chest was having blood in its chambers. Left side was found empty.
On desoretion of abdomen liver was sound pale. The stomach
G contained about 10 ones of rice mixed food materials. The bladder
was empty.
(ii) There was penetrating injury in the posterior aspect of upper
part of right leg 112" x 3/4 x 1-114" and ruptuned the popliteal blood
vessels. On further examination about 3/4 once of altered blood
H came out.
RAJENDRA SINGH v. STATE [PATTANAIK, J.] 1081
(iii) Incised wound on the back in fourth theorasic vertabral A
-4
column 1/3" x 114" x 115". "
In the opinion of the doctor death was due to shock and hemorrhage and injury
no. I was sufficient to calJSe death in the ordinary course of nature.
Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants raised
B
the following contentions:-
(i) The serious injury on accused Rajender not having been
explained tl1e prosecution case must be held to be untrue and,
therefore, the conviction and sentence cannot be sustained.
(ii) In view of tlie statement of Satyanarain recorded by the c
Magistrate on 4tll July, 1977 which has been exhibited as
Exhibit- B clearly giving out a different prosecution story than
tlle one which was presented in the Court during trial the entire
prosecution case must fail.
(iii) In any view of tlle matter and taking into consideration tl1e
D
narration of events as unfolded through the prosecution wit-
nesses there being no pre-meditation and on account of a
sudden quarrel in course of sudden fight, tl1e accused persons
having assaulted the deceased in heat of passion exception 4
to Section 300 Indian Penal Code can apply and, therefore, the E
offence will be not under Section 302 but under Section 304
.. Part I Indian Penal Code .
(iv) Even taking the prosecution case in toto accused Triloki
cannot be held liable by attracting Section 34 in view of tlle
fact tliat tl1ere is no material to indicate that Rajender assaulted F
the deceased in furtherance of common intention shared by
him and Triloki.
Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the State on the other hand
contended, tllat in the facts and circumstances of the case non-explanation
of injury on Rajender cannot be held to be fatal, more so, when tl1e oral G
testimony of tlle four eye witnesses has been found to be trustwortlly. He
further contended that the former statement of Satyanarain has not been
confronted to him while he was exruillned as PW 8, and therefore, the
provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act has not been complied witll,
and in this view of tlie matter the said document cannot be relied upon. He H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A has also contended that even in the said statement Rajender assaulted
deceased Kameshwar with Bhala had been stated, and therefore, the entire
prosecution case cannot be said to be a concocted one. According to Mr.
Singh the very fact that accused persons went to their adjacent land brought
out the weapon of offence and assaulted the deceased, would negate the
contention of the defence that there was no pre-meditation. That apart,
B common intention developed at the spur of the moment when both Rajender
and Triloki came armed and assaulted deceased and, therefore, the question
of applicability of exception 4 to Section 300 does not arise.
He has lastly contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case
c Triloki also must be held liable by applicability of Section 34 and no error
has been committed in convicting both the appellants in Section 34 of Indian
Penal Code.
I
I
So far as the question whether non-explanation of the injuries on
accused Rajender ipso facto can be held to be fatal to the prosecution case,
D it is too well settled that ordinarily the prosecution is not obliged to explain
each injury on an accused even though the injuries might have been caused
in course of the occurrence, if the injuries are minor in nature, but at the same
time if the prosecution fails to explain a grievous injury on one of the
accused person which is established to have been caused il_l course of the
same occurrence then certainly the Court looks at the prosecution case with
E
little suspicion on the ground that the prosecution has suppressed the true
version of the incident. In the case in hand accused appellant Rajender had
one penetrating wound, three incised wound and one lacerated wound and
of these injuries the penetrating wound on the left axillary area in the 5th
inter costal space 112" x 1/3" x 3/4" was grevious in nature as per the
F evidence of doctor - PW-3 who had examined him. On the basis of the
evidence of PW-3 as well as PW-11 the Courts have come to the conclusion
that there is no room for doubt that the appellants and their men had injuries
on their person on the date of occurrence. The question, therefore, remains
to be considered is whether non-explanation of said injuries on accused
appellant Rajender can form the basis of a conclusion that the prosecution
G
version is untrue. In Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai v. State of Bihar, [1968])
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - 525, this Court had held that the failure
of the prosecution to offer any explanation regarding the injuries found on
the accused shows that the evidence of the prosecution witness relating to
the incident is not true or at any rate not wholly true and further those injuries
H probabilise plea taken by the accused persons. But in Lakshmi Singh v. State
RAJENDRA SINGH v. STATE [PATTANAIK, J.] 1083
- of Bihar, [1976] 4 Supreme Court Cases (Crl.) 671, this Comt considered
Mohar Rai (Supra) and came to hold that non-explanation of the injuries on
the accused by the prosecution may affect the prosecution case and such non-
A
explanation may assume greater importance where the evidence consists of
interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which
competes in probability with that of the prosecution. The question was
B
considered by a three Judge Bench of this Comt in the case of Vijayee Singh
v. State of U.P., [1990) 3 Supreme Court Cases 190, and this Court held that
if the prosecution evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy and the Court
can distinguish the trnth from the falsehood the mere fact that the injuries
are not explained by the prosecution cannot by itself be a sole basis to reject
such evidence and consequently the whole case and much depends on the c
-... facts and circumstances of each case. In Vijayee Singh's case (supra) the
Court held that non-explanation of injury on the accused person does not
J affect the prosecution case as a whole.
This question again came up before a three Judge Bench recently in case
of Ram Sunder Yadav and Others v. State of Bihar, [1998) 7 Supreme Court D
Case 365, where this Court re-affirmed the statement of law made by the
earlier three Judge Bench in Vijayee Singh's case (supra) and also relied upon
another three Judge Bench decision of the Court in Bhaba Nanda Shanna and
Others v. State of Assam, [1977) 4 Supreme Court Cases 396, and as such
accepted the principle that if the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy E
then non-explanation of the injury on the accused ipso facto cannot be a basis
to discard the entire prosecution case. The High Court in the impugned
judgment has relied upon the aforesaid principle and examined the evidence
of the four eye witnesses and agreeing with the learned Sessions Judge came
to the conclusion that the prosecution witnesses are trustworthy and, there-
fore, non- explanation of injury in question cannot be held to be fatal, and F
we see no infirmity with the said conclusion in view of the law laid down
by this Court, as held earlier. We, therefore, are not persuaded to accept the
first submission of Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the
accused appellants.
So far the second contention of Mr. Mishra is concerned, it is no doubt
G
true that on 4th July, 1977 Satyanarain who has been examined as PW-8 in
course of trial had been examined by a Magistrate as he had been seriously
injured and that state~ent has been exhibited as Exhibit-B and in fact the
Magistrate who had recorded the statement has been examined by the
defence as DW-1. This statement of Satyanarain recorded by the Magistrate H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A may be a former statement by Satyanarain relating to the same fact at about
a time when the fight took place and when said Satyanarain was examined
as PW-8 during trial it would be open for a party to make use of the former
-
statement for such purpose as the law provides. But if the witness during trial
is intended to be contradicted by his former statement then his attention has
to be drawn to those parts of the statement which are required to be used
B
for the purpose of contradicting him before the said statement in question can
be proved as provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Mr. Mishra
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant relying upon the decision
of this Court in Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1952] Supreme
Court Reports 812, .contended before us that if there has been substantial
c compliance of Section 145 of the Evidence Act and if the necessary
particulars of the former statement has been put to the witness in cross-
exatiJ.ination then notwithstanding the fact that the provisions of Section 145
of the Evidence Act is not complied with in letter i.e. by not drawing the
attention of the witness to that part of the former statement yet the statement
D could be utili&ed and the verasity of the witness could be impeached.
According to Mr. Mishra the former statement of PW-8 which has been
exhibited as Exhibit B was to the effect that Kameshwar was assaulted with
Bhala by Rajender and Surender and he did not see whether any other person
had been assaulted or not, whereas in course of trial the substantive evidence
of the witness is that it is Rajender and Triloki who assaulted the deceased
E and, therefore, it belies the entire prosecution case. The question of contra-
dicting evidence and the requirements of compliance of Section 145 of the
Evidence Act has been considered by this Court in the Constitution Bench
decision in the case of Tahsildar Singh and Another v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 Supreme Court Reports 875. The Court in the
p aforesaid case was examining the question as to when an omission in the
former statement can be held to be a contradiction and it has also been
indicated as to how a witness can be contradicted in respect of his former (
statement by drawing particular atten~on to that portion of the former
statement. This question has been recently considered in the case of Binay
Kumar Singh & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Bihar, [1997] 1 Supreme Court Cases
G 283, and the Court has taken note of the earlier decision in Bhagwan Singh
(Supra) and explained away the same with the observation that on the facts
of that case there cannot be dispute with the proposition laid down therein. But
in elaborating the second limb of Section 145 of the Evidence Act it was held
that if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must be
H called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose for contradicting
RAJENDRA SINGH v. STATE [PATTANAIK, J.] 1085
him. It has been further held that if the witness disowns to have made any A
statement which is inconsistent with his present stand, h!~ testimony in Court
on that score would not be vitiated until the cross-examiner proceeds to
comply with the procedure prescribed in the second limb of Section 145 of - _
the Evidence Act. Bearing in mind the 'aforesaid proposition and on scrutinis-
ing the evidence of DW-1, we find that the Magistrate who is supposed to have
B
exhibited the document in his cross- examination categorically admitted that
neither any signature nor seal of either of the Chief Judicial Magistrate or of
his office on the statement Exhibit B. 1f according to the Magistrate on
recording the statement of Satyanarain he had sent the same to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, it is inconceivable as to how the document would not bear
the signature nor seal of either of the Chief Judicial Magistrate or of his office. c
The Magistrate in his examination-in-chief also does not state as to who
identified Satyanarain in the hospital before recording his statement. It is under
these circumstances it is difficult to hold that Exhibit-B has been legally
proved to be the former statement of Satyanarain who has been examined as
PW-8. Then again on scrutiny of the evidence PW-8 it is crystal clear that the
D
witness has not been confronted with that part of his alleged former statement
which the defence want him to be contradicted. The witness has merely been
asked as to whether he stated before the Magistrate that accused Surendra has
assaulted Kameshwar to which he had replied he does not recall as to what
he stated before the Magistrate. In this state of affairs it is difficult for us td
hold that the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act has been complied E
with in the case in hand. Then again, so far as accused Rajender is concerned,
there has been no variance in his so-called former statement Exhibit B and his
statement in the Court when he was examined as PW- 8 clearly asserting that
Rajender assaulted the deceased Kameshwar by means of Bhala. In the
aforesaid premises, we are unable to accept the second submission of Mr. p
Mishra and the same accordingly stands rejected.
So far as the third contention of Mr. Mishra is concerned, the question
·for consideration would be as to whether the ingredients of Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been satisfied? The
necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 are : G
(a) a sudden fight;
(b) absence of pre-meditation
(c) no undue advantage or cruelty,
H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 2 S.C.R.
A but the occasion must be sudden and not as a cloak for pre existing malice.
It is only an un-preme'ditated assault committed in the heat of passion upon
a sudden quarrel which would come within Exception 4 and it is necessary
that all the three ingredients must be found. From the evidence on record it
is established that while the prosecution party was on their land it is accused
who protested and prevented them from continuing with ploughing but when
B
they did not stop accused persons rushed to the nearby plot which is their
land and got weapons in their hands and assaulted the prosecution party
ultimately injuring several members of the prosecution party and causing the
death of one of them while they were fully unarmed. In this view of the
matter on scrutinising the evidence of four eye witnesses PW s 2, 4, 7 and
C 8 who have depicted the entire scenario it is not possible for us to agree with
the submission of Mr. Mishra, learne~ senior counsel appearing for the
appellants that the case is one where exception 4 to Section 300 would be
applicable. We, therefore, reject the said submission of the learned counsel.
The only contention that survives for our consideration is whether
D
Triloki could be held liable by application of Section 34. From the injuries
on t:Qe deceased as found by the doctor PW-3 it is crystal clear that the injury
no. 1 was found to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature and said injury is attributable to the assault given by accused Rajender
on the chest of the deceased. So far as Triloki is concerned, as per the
E evidence of PW-2 he has given a blow on Satyanarain PW-8 and Banwari,
the other injured who has n:ot been examined and he had not inflicted any
injury on the deceased. According to PW-4 Triloki had given a blow on the
leg of Kameshwar. According to PW-7 Kameshwar was assaulted by
Rajender, Triloki and Prabhunath but he has not ascribed as to which accused
assaulted which part of the body of the deceased and narration is one of
F
general_ nature.. .So far as the evidence of injured PW-8 is concerned Triloki
Singh hit Kameshwar on his leg. Leaving aside the contradiction amongst
each other with regard to the assault by Triloki and taking into account the
entire scenario it is difficult for us to hold that Triloki also shared the
common intention with Rajender when Rajender gave a fatal blow on the
G deceased. It may be noticed at this stage that though the prosecution had
made out the case that nine accused in all formed an unlawful assembly the
common object of which assembly was to murder deceased Kameshwar but
the learned Sessions Judge on appreciation of the evidence came to the
conclusion that there had been no unlawful assembly nor there was any
H1 common object to cause assault or murder of deceased Kameshwar. From the
RAJENDRA SINGH v. STATE [PATTANAIK, J.] 1087
evidence of PW-8 it is apparent that while he was on Plot No. 4513 Rajender A
Singh. Prabhu Nath and Ramdev reached near PW-8 and told him not to
plough the field at that point of time the accused persons had no arms with
them. It is further apparent that there was altercations between the prosecu-
tion party, more particularly PW-8 and the accused persons and that the
accused persons picked up some weapon and assaulted Kameshwar as well
B
as other persons injured. It is further established that in cour.se of the
occurrence accused Rajender sustained a grievous injury. The said evidence
of PW-8 also indicates that Kameshwar himself was armed with a Farsa
while Ramdeo Singh, Surender, Kishun Pandit and Rudal Singh were armed
with lathis and when Rajender Singh gave a lalkara Prabhunath Jagnarain and
....
Kishun Pandit assaulted PW-8. It is under these circumstances when Triloki c
Singh has been ascribed to give a blow on the leg of the deceased. It is difficult
to hold that he also shared the common intention with Rajender for causing
murder of the deceased which developed at the spur of the moment. In the case
of Dukhmochan Pandey and Others etc. v. State of Bihar, [1997] 8 Supreme
Court Cases 405 , this Court has held that there lies a distinction between the D
common intention and similar intention and question whether there exists
common intention in all the persons who made some overt act resulting in the
death of some of the persm;is of other party is a question of fact and can be
inferred only from the circumstances. This Court had held that the distinction
between a common intention and the similar intention may be fine, but is
nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice. E
Following the ratio in the aforesaid case and applying to the facts and
circumstances of the present case, as unfolded through the eye witnesses, it
is not possible for us to hold that Triloki also shared the common intention
with accused Rajender and his conviction under Section 302/34 cannot be
sustained. We accordingly set aside the same and instead convict him under F
Section 324 Indian Penal Code and sentence him to imprisonment for a period
of two years.
Conviction of appellant Rajender is altered to one under Section 302
Indian Penal Code instead of 302/34 Indian Penal Code and sentence of
imprisonment for life is atTrrmed. All other conviction and sentence of the G
two appellants remain unaltered. Appeal is thus partly allowed.
K.K.T. Appeal partly allowed.
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