RAJENDRA BHAGWANJI UMRANIYAversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 413
- Decided
- 9 May 2024
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
Section 357 CrPC provides for victim compensation independent of the punitive sentence and cannot be used as a condition for reducing or diluting imprisonment.
Summary
The Sessions Court convicted two accused under Section 325 IPC, sentencing them to five years' rigorous imprisonment and fines. The Gujarat High Court reduced the term to four years and, invoking Section 357 of the CrPC, ordered each accused to deposit Rs 2.5 lakh as compensation to the victim, on the condition that payment would exempt them from serving the reduced sentence. The complainant challenged this order before the Supreme Court, arguing that victim compensation under Section 357 cannot be made a condition for sentence remission. The Court held that Section 357 is victim‑centric and provides a restitutive award independent of the punitive sentence, and therefore cannot be used to reduce imprisonment. While setting aside the High Court’s condition, the Court declined to reinstate the four‑year term because the accused had already paid the compensation and twelve years had elapsed, and instead directed an additional payment of Rs 5 lakh each, to be disbursed to the victim. The appeals were disposed of.
Issues considered
- Can the High Court condition remission of imprisonment on payment of compensation under Section 357 CrPC?
- Does Section 357 CrPC allow reduction or dilution of a sentence of imprisonment?
- Is the High Court's order in accordance with law?
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 698 : 2024 INSC 413
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya
v.
State of Gujarat
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2481-2482 of 2024)
09 May 2024
[J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Respondents herein were convicted by the Sessions Court for
offence punishable u/s. 325 IPC and were sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment of five years. However, the High Court
reduced the sentence of five years to four years and further
held that if an amount of Rs.2.50 lakh is paid by each of the two
respondents, then the respondents need not undergo even the four
years of sentence. The question falls for consideration is whether
the procedure adopted by the High Court could be said to be in
accordance with law.
Headnotes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 357 – Order to pay
compensation – The High Court upheld the conviction of
respondents for the offence punishable u/s. 325 IPC and
reduced the sentence from five years to four years – The
High Court further diluted the order of sentence by asking
the accused persons to pay compensation – Correctness:
Held: The provision of Section 357 is victim centric in nature – It
has nothing to do with the convict or the sentence passed – The
spotlight is on the victim only – The object of victim compensation
is to rehabilitate those who have suffered any loss or injury by
the offence which has been committed – Payment of victim
compensation cannot be a consideration or a ground for reducing
the sentence imposed upon the accused as victim compensation
is not a punitive measure and only restitutory in nature and thus,
has no bearing with the sentence that has been passed which
is punitive in nature – The words “any loss or injury” used in
Section 357 clearly indicates that the sole factor for deciding the
compensation to be paid is the victim’s loss or injury as a result
of the offence, and has nothing to do with the sentence that has
been passed – Section 357 is intended to reassure the victim
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 699
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat
that he/she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system – If
payment of compensation becomes a consideration for reducing
sentence, then the same will have a catastrophic effect on the
criminal justice administration – It will result in criminals with a
purse full of money to buy their way out of justice, defeating the
very purpose of criminal proceedings – Thus, the High Court
having once affirmed the conviction and awarded sentence of
four years could not have further in lieu of the same reduced it
by ordering compensation. [Paras 21, 23, 24, 26]
Compensation – Idea of victim compensation – Theory of
victimology:
Held: The idea of victim compensation is based on the theory
of victimology which recognizes the harsh reality that victims
are unfortunately the forgotten people in the criminal justice
delivery system – Victims are the worst sufferers – Victims’
family is ruined particularly in cases of death and grievous bodily
injuries – This is apart from the factors like loss of reputation,
humiliation, etc – Theory of Victimology seeks to redress the
same and underscores the importance for criminal justice
administration system to take into consideration the effect of the
offence on the victim’s family even though human life cannot be
restored but then monetary compensation will at least provide
some solace. [Para 22]
Case Law Cited
Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra [2013] 8 SCR
863 : (2013) 6 SCC 770; Maru Ram v. Union of India & Others
[1981] 1 SCR 1196 : (1981) 1 SCC 107; Hari Singh v. Sukhbir
Singh and Others [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 571 : (1988) 4 SCC
551 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Order to pay compensation; Victim compensation; Section 357
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Reduction of sentence;
Dilution of order of sentence by ordering compensation; Idea
of victim compensation; Theory of victimology; Criminal Justice
Administration; Monetary compensation.
700 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.
2481-2482 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.2015 of the High Court of
Judicature of Gujarat in CRLA Nos. 960 and 1330 of 2014
Appearances for Parties
Harin P Raval, Sr. Adv., Pradhuman Gohil, Purvish Jitendra Malkan,
Vikash Singh, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Rushabh
N. Kapadia, Mohit Prasad, Siddharth Singh, Ritvik Bhanot, Ms.
Shrestha Narayan, Ms. Urmi H Raval, Ms. Shreya Bhansal, Ms.
Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Ms. Srujana Suman Mund, Advs.
for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in both the captioned appeals are the same,
the parties are also the same and the challenge is also to the self-
same judgment and order passed by the High Court, those were
taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this
common order.
3. The appellant before this Court is the original first informant
(complainant). The appellant lodged a First Information Report No
I-179/2012 at the Surendranagar City Police Station for the offence
punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 427, 323, 325, 506(2),
384 of the Indian Penal Code1 and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police
Act. The FIR was lodged in all against five accused persons.
4. The respondents before this Court are the original accused Nos 1
and 2 respectively. Out of the five accused persons, two were named
in the FIR, whereas three were not named. The respondents herein
ultimately were put to trial for the offence punishable under Sections
147, 148, 149, 329, 384, 387, 427, 506(2), 323 and 325 respectively
of the IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.
1 “IPC”
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 701
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat
5. The respondents herein came to be convicted by the Sessions Court
for the offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC and were
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of five years with fine
of Rs 5,000/- each. The trial court also convicted the respondents for
the offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC and sentenced
them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and
for the offence punishable under Section 135 of the Gujarat Police
Act, they came to be sentenced with rigorous imprisonment of one
year with fine of Rs 1,000/-.
6. The original accused Nos 3, 4, and 5, who were not named in the
FIR came to be acquitted by the trial court.
7. Against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial
court, the respondents herein went in appeal before the High Court.
8. The two captioned appeals before this Court originate from Criminal
Appeal (For Enhancement) No 906 of 2014 and Criminal Appeal No
1330 of 2014 decided by the High Court.
9. These two appeals, i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos 906 of 2014 and 1330
of 2014 respectively came to be preferred by the appellant herein,
one for enhancement of sentence and the connected appeal against
the order of acquittal so far as the original accused Nos 3 to 5 are
concerned. It may not be out of place to state at this stage that the
respondents as original convicts also preferred Criminal Appeal
Nos 723 of 2014 and 733 of 2014 respectively against the order of
conviction and sentence.
10. The High Court heard in all five appeals, two filed by the appellant
herein, two filed by the respondents and the fifth appeal was filed
by the State of Gujarat. The acquittal appeal filed by the State of
Gujarat was against the original accused Nos 3 to 5. The High Court
disposed of all the five appeals by a common judgment. The operative
part of the judgment and order passed by the High Court reads thus:
“(a) The impugned judgment and order dated 31.05.2014
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surendranagar
in Sessions Case No.14/2013 is modified only to the
extent that sentence imposed upon both original
accused no.1 & 2 for conviction u/s.325 IPC is
reduced from Five Years to Four Years, without
disturbing the order regarding fine and default
702 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
sentence. Rest of the impugned judgment and order
remains unaltered.
(b) Considering the principle rendered by Apex Court in
Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, 2013
(6) SCC 770 and the request made by learned counsel
Mr. Hriday Buch that both Rs.2.50 lacs each, totalling
Rs.5.00 Lacs (Rupees Five Lacs only), to the victim
under the provisions of Section 357 Cr.P.C., we do
not find any reasons in the facts and circumstances
of the case for denying the said benefit in favour of
both accused no.1 & 2.
(c) Accordingly, while granting benefit of the judgment
rendered in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad’s case (supra)
to original accused no.1 & 2, it is directed that if both
accused no.1 & 2 deposit a sum of Rs.2.50 lacs each,
totalling Rs.5.00 Lacs (Rupees Five lacs only), before
the Registry of the concerned Sessions Court, within
a period of TEN WEEKS from today, which, in turn,
shall be paid as compensation to the victim, then
both accused no.1 & 2 are not required to undergo
the remainder sentence imposed upon them, which
has been modified by this Court as aforesaid. On
such deposit being made, the Registry of concerned
Sessions Court shall pay the entire amount to the
victim, after due verification. It is clarified that if any
one or both the accused persons fail to deposit the
amount as aforesaid, they shall surrender to custody
on expiry of the aforesaid period failing which the
investigating agency shall take necessary steps for
sending them to jail custody. The impugned judgment
and order stands modified accordingly.”
11. Thus, it appears that the sentence of five years’ imprisonment as
imposed by the trial court came to be reduced to four years. The High
Court further held that if an amount of Rs 2.50 lakh is paid by each of
the two respondents before it, then the respondents need not undergo
even the four years’ of sentence as reduced by the High Court.
12. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant (original
complainant) is before this Court with the present appeals.
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 703
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat
13. Mr Harin P Raval, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
complainant vehemently submitted that what has been done by
the High Court is something impermissible in law. The amount of
compensation which is awarded to the victim has nothing to do
with the substantive order of sentence which the court imposes
upon holding the accused guilty of the alleged offence. According
to Mr Raval, the High Court having reduced the sentence of five
years as imposed by the trial court to four years could not have
further modified the order of sentence on the premise that the
respondents are ready and willing to pay an amount of Rs 5 lakh
by way of compensation to the victim. He further submitted that the
reliance placed by the High Court on the decision of this Court in
the case of Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs State of Maharashtra2,
is completely misplaced.
14. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr Raval prayed that
the impugned judgment of the High Court be set aside and the
respondents be asked to undergo sentence of four years’ rigorous
imprisonment.
15. On the other hand, these appeals have been vehemently opposed by
Mr Purvish Malkan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
(original accused persons). He would submit that no error much
less an error of law could be said to have been committed by the
High Court in passing the impugned order. He also submitted that
it’s been now twelve years since the incident had occurred. He also
submitted that the amount of Rs 5 lakh has been deposited before
the trial court.
16. In such circumstances referred to above, he prayed that there being
no merit in these appeals, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the procedure adopted by the
High Court, as reflected in paragraph 19 of the operative part of the
order, could be said to be in accordance with law.
2 [2013] 8 SCR 863 : (2013) 6 SCC 770
704 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
18. Section 357of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads thus:
“357. Order to pay compensation.—(1) When a Court
imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a
sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court
may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part
of the fine recovered to be applied—
(a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in
the prosecution;
(b) in the payment to any person of compensation
for any loss or injury caused by the offence,
when compensation is, in the opinion of the
Court, recoverable by such person in a civil court;
(c) when any person is convicted of any offence for
having caused the death of another person or
of having abetted the commission of such an
offence, in paying compensation to the persons
who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855
(13 of 1855), entitled to recover damages from
the person sentenced for the loss resulting to
them from such death;
(d) when any person is convicted of any offence
which includes theft, criminal misappropriation,
criminal breach of trust, or cheating, or of having
dishonestly received or retained, or of having
voluntarily assisted in disposing of, stolen
property knowing or having reason to believe
the same to be stolen, in compensating any
bona fide purchaser of such property for the
loss of the same if such property is restored to
the possession of the person entitled thereto.
(2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to
appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period
allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an
appeal be presented, before the decision of the appeal.
(3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does
not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment,
order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation,
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 705
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat
such amount as may be specified in the order to the person
who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act
for which the accused person has been so sentenced.
(4) An order under this section may also be made by an
Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session
when exercising its powers of revision.
(5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent
civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take
into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation
under this section.”
19. Way back in 1981, this Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. in
Maru Ram vs Union of India & Others3, held that while social
responsibility of the criminal to restore the loss or heal the injury
is part of the punitive exercise; the length of the prison term is no
reparation to the crippled or bereaved and is futility compounded with
cruelty. Section 357 provides power to award compensation to victims
of the offence out of the sentence of fine imposed on accused. Time
and again this Court has reiterated that it is an important provision
but courts seldom invoke the same. It empowers the court to award
compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In
addition to conviction, the court may order the accused to pay some
amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the
action of accused.
20. In Hari Singh vs Sukhbir Singh and Others4, this Court held that
the power to award compensation under Section 357 of the CrPC
is not ancillary to other sentences, but it is in addition thereto. This
power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he
or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. As observed
in Hari Singh (supra), it is a measure of responding appropriately
to crime as well as of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is,
a constructive approach to crimes.
21. The High Court having upheld the conviction for the offence punishable
under Section 325 of the IPC so far as the two respondents herein
are concerned and having reduced the sentence from five years
3 [1981] 1 SCR 1196 : (1981) 1 SCC 107
4 [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 571 : (1988) 4 SCC 551
706 [2024] 6 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
rigorous imprisonment to four years rigorous imprisonment could not
have further diluted the order of sentence by asking the accused
persons to pay compensation. In other words, the High Court having
once affirmed the conviction and awarded sentence of four years
could not have further in lieu of the same reduced it by ordering
compensation. To this extent, we have no hesitation in holding that
the High Court fell into error.
22. The idea of victim compensation is based on the theory of victimology
which recognizes the harsh reality that victims are unfortunately the
forgotten people in the criminal justice delivery system. Victims are
the worst sufferers. Victims’ family is ruined particularly in cases of
death and grievous bodily injuries. This is apart from the factors
like loss of reputation, humiliation, etc. Theory of Victimology seeks
to redress the same and underscores the importance for criminal
justice administration system to take into consideration the effect of
the offence on the victim’s family even though human life cannot
be restored but then monetary compensation will at least provide
some solace.
23. The provision of Section 357 recognizes the aforesaid and is victim
centric in nature. It has nothing to do with the convict or the sentence
passed. The spotlight is on the victim only. The object of victim
compensation is to rehabilitate those who have suffered any loss or
injury by the offence which has been committed. Payment of victim
compensation cannot be a consideration or a ground for reducing
the sentence imposed upon the accused as victim compensation
is not a punitive measure and only restitutory in nature and thus,
has no bearing with the sentence that has been passed which is
punitive in nature.
24. The words “any loss or injury” used in Section 357 of the CrPC
clearly indicates that the sole factor for deciding the compensation
to be paid is the victim’s loss or injury as a result of the offence, and
has nothing to do with the sentence that has been passed. Section
357 of CrPC is intended to reassure the victim that he/she is not
forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a constructive approach
to crimes based on the premise that mere punishment of the offender
may not give solace to the victim or its family.
25. As such, when deciding the compensation which is to be paid to a
victim, the only factor that the court may take into consideration is
[2024] 6 S.C.R. 707
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya v. State of Gujarat
the convict’s capacity to pay the compensation and not the sentence
that has been imposed. In criminal proceedings the courts should
not conflate sentence with compensation to victims. Sentences
such as imprisonment and / or fine are imposed independently of
any victim compensation and thus, the two stand on a completely
different footing, either of them cannot vary the other. Where an
accused is directed to pay compensation to victims, the same is not
meant as punishment or atonement of the convict but rather as a
step towards reparation to the victims who have suffered from the
offence committed by the convict.
26. If payment of compensation becomes a consideration for reducing
sentence, then the same will have a catastrophic effect on the criminal
justice administration. It will result in criminals with a purse full of
money to buy their way out of justice, defeating the very purpose
of criminal proceedings.
27. Having held so as above, the last question that falls for our
consideration is how do we modify the order of the High Court.
According to Mr Raval that part of the High Court’s order be set
aside and the respondents be directed to undergo sentence of four
years’ rigorous imprisonment.
28. We could have easily done as submitted by Mr Raval, but in the facts
and circumstances of the case, more particularly, keeping in mind
that a period of twelve years has elapsed and when the respondents
(original convicts) have already deposited the amount of Rs 5 lakh,
we are not inclined to direct the respondents to undergo further
sentence of four years. However, having said so, we direct each
of the respondents to deposit a further sum of Rs 5 lakh, i.e. in all
Rs 10 lakh, in addition to what they have already deposited before
the trial court. This deposit shall be made within a period of eight
weeks from today. The trial court shall disburse the entire amount
of Rs 15 lakh to the appellant herein (original complainant) after
proper identification.
29. With the aforesaid, the appeals are disposed of.
30. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:
Appeals disposed of.
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