Supreme Court of India
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI LTD.versusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 384
- Decided
- 1 July 2013
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The State Government was the appropriate Government for the acquisition because the purpose was a general public purpose, not an exclusive Union purpose.
Summary
The State of Rajasthan acquired 15.5 hectares of land to set up a North‑Western Railway Zone complex and staff quarters. The landowners challenged the acquisition, arguing that because the project was a railway (a Union subject) only the Central Government could be the "appropriate Government" under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and that the State’s action violated Article 300A. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "appropriate Government" in Section 3(ee) of the Act, noting that the purpose of acquisition can fall into three categories – Union purpose, State purpose, or a general public purpose – and that the railway project also benefitted the public of Rajasthan, making it a general public purpose. Consequently, the State Government was deemed the appropriate authority, and the acquisition was held to be in compliance with the statutory procedure and Article 300A. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the State’s acquisition.
Issues considered
- The meaning of "appropriate Government" under Section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the context of a railway project.
- Whether the acquisition for the North‑Western Railway Zone complex falls exclusively under a Union purpose, thereby requiring Central Government jurisdiction.
- Whether the State’s acquisition violated the constitutional guarantee under Article 300A.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 166, s. Article 258, s. Article 300A, s. Article 73, s. Article 77
- Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 3(8)(b)
- Government (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961
- Government (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 12, s. 13, s. 13A, s. 14, s. 16, s. 17, s. 31, s. 3(ee), s. 4, s. 40, s. 41, s. 49, s. 5, s. 50, s. 5A, s. 6, s. 7
Subjects
Land acquisitionAppropriate GovernmentPublic purposeArticle 300ARailway projectState vs Union jurisdictionLand Acquisition Act 1894
Judgment
[2013] 7 S.C.R. 192
A RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI
SAMITI LTD.
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4824 of 2013)
B JULY 01, 2013
[P. SATHASIVAM AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894:
c
ss. 4 and 6 - Acquisition of land by State Government
for setting up of Railway complex - 'Public purpose' - Held:
Under ss. 4 and 6, it is the "appropriate Government" which
is to be satisfied about the 'public purpose' for which the land
0 is to be acquired and which is vested with the responsibilities
contemplated u/ss. 4 and 6 - 'Public purpose' may be
relatable to (i) Union! Central Government, or (ii) State
Government or (iii) a "general public purpose", which is
neither exclusively relatable to Central Government nor fully
E relatable to State Government, but furlhers a common public
purpose relatable both to a Union and a State cause.
ss. 3(ee), 4, and 6 - "Appropriate Government" - Held: If
the purpose of acquisition is exclusively for the Union, then
Union/Central Government will have exclusive jurisdiction to
F acquire the land - If the purpose of acquisition is exclusively
for a State, or for "a general public purpose", then the State
Government concerned will have the exclusive jurisdiction to
acquire the land - In the instant case, though the land was
acquired for Railway complex, but additionally the purpose of
G acquisition would benefit the State generally, as better
transporlation facilities would meet the expectations of public
and private entities having a nexus with the State and, as
such, the purpose for acquisition can certainly be described
as "a general public purpose" - Therefore, the State
H 192
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN 193
SAHKARI SAMITI LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Government had jurisdiction to acquire the land because it A
duly satisfied the requirement of the term 'appropriate
Government' refe"ed to in ss. 4 and 6 - While acquiring the
land of appellants, State Government has proceeded in due
course of Jaw - As such, appellants cannot be stated to have
been deprived of their lands/property, without the authority of B
law and there has been no violation of appellants' right under
Art. 300A of the Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art.
300A..
The Railways requested the State Government of C
Rajasthan, to provide land "free of cost" for setting up
North-Western Railway Zone Complex at Jaipur. It was
emphasized by the Union Minister for Railways, that the
setting up of the new Railway Zone at Jaipur, would
improve train services to and within the State of
Rajasthan, and thereby, meet the expectations of public D
and private entities, of the area. Ultimately, the Secretary,
Transport Department, Government of Rajasthan issued
a notification u/s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
indicating the State Government's desire to acquire 15.50
hectares of land situated in the revenue estate of two E
villages of district Jaipur. The said notification u/s. 4, was
published on 6.9.1997. The State Government on
13.1.1999 notified its declaration u/s. 6 of the Acquisition
Act, which was published in the State Government
gazette dated 21.1.1999. On 21.3.2001, the Land F
Acquisition Officer passed an award, determining the
compens~tion payable to land owners. The instant
appeals arose out of the proceedings challenging the
acquisition by the State Government.
The sum and substance of the contentions raised on G
behalf of the appellants was that since the land was
acquired for setting up a new Railway Zone, the
"appropriate Government", as defined in s.3(ee) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was only the Central
Government which could have issued the s. 4 notification H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A dated 19.8.1997, as also the s. 6 declaration dated
13.1.1999, but the said notification and declaration were
issued by the Government of Rajasthan; that the
"appropriate Government" as contemplated u/ss. 16,
17(1), 17(2), 31(3), 40 and 49 could only have been the
B Central Government; and that the nomination of the
'Collector' for all purposes relating to the acquisition and
to carry out the functions contemplated u/ss ss. 5, 5-A,
7, 11, 12, 13, 13-A and 14 etc., could only have been
ordered by the Central Government and not by the State
c Government and, therefore, the nomination of the
Collector made by the State Government was clearly
beyond the jurisdiction of the State Government; and, as
such, the acquisition proceedings were vitiated.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1 It is the "appropriate Government" alone,
which is vested with the responsibilities contemplated u/
ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and which
is to be satisfied about the 'public purpose' for which the
E land is to be acquired. Accordingly, it is only the
"appropriate Government" which can issue the required
notification expressing the intention to acquire land, and
thereafter, the postulated declaration, after examining the
objections of the persons interested. [Para 19) [217-A-C]
F 1.2 'Public purpose', as has been held by this Court
in Ali Gulshan's* case, may be relatable to the Central
Government, alternatively, it may be relatable to the State
Government. Besides, there is also a third alternative,
namely, a situation wherein the purpose is "a general
G public purpose", which is neither exclusively relatable to
the Central Government nor fully relatable to the State
Government. The third alternative would be a situation,
wherein the cause in question furthers a common public
purpose and is relatable both to a Union and a State
H cause. [Para 23) [227-G-H; 228-A-B]
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN 195
SAHKARI SAMITI LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
*State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan 1955 SCR 867 =AIR A
-1955 SC 810 -relied on.
I
Balak & Ors. v. State of'.Uttar Pradesh & Anr. AIR 1962
Allahabad 208; Ramdas Thanu Oes_sai & Ors. v. State of
Goa & Ors., 2009 (1) Mh.L.J. 241; Mis 1}nsukia Development 8
Corporation Ltd. v. State of Assam & Am. AIR 1961 Assam
133; Sudhansu Sekhar Maity & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal
& Ors., AIR 1972 Calcutta 320- referred to.
1.3 Statutory provisions enacted in terms of Lists I,
II and Ill of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India, C
regulate, not only the substance of the legislation, but
also modulate the procedure to administer the substance
of the legislation. By the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment) Act, 1956 (with effect from 1.11.1956), the
legislative competence on the subject of acquisition was D
jointly vested in Parliament, as well as, the State _,
Legislature through entry 42 (in list Ill of the Seventh
Schedule). Prior. to the amendment, through Entry 33 of
list I, the subject of acquisition of property " ... for the
purposes of the Union ... " was vested in the legislative E
domain of Parliament and as per Entry 36 in List II,
" ... except for the purposes of the Union ... ", State
-·Legislature had the exclusive jurisdiction to enact law for
acquisition of private lands. The said jurisdiction was,
after the amendment concurrently, shared with F
Parliament. The said jurisdiction was invoked by
Parliament when it enacted the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. It is not possible to read into entry 42 of list Ill of
the Seventh Schedule, the cumulative effect of erstwhile
Entries 31 and 36 (of Lists I and II, respectively, of the G
Seventh Schedule). Consequent upon the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the jurisdictional
limitations on the subject of acquisition would emerge
from a valid legislation made under entry 42 (in list Ill of
the Seventh Schedule). The validity of the Acquisition Act H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A has not been assailed by the appellants. [Para 32 and 37]
[249-B-C; 251-G-H; 252-A-B, 0-F, G-H]
1.4 Art. 73 of the Constitution vests in the Central
Government executive power, the jurisdiction whereof is
exactly the same aJ jurisdiction vested in Parliament to
8
make laws. The executive power of the Union, therefore,
extends over the subjects on which Parliament has the
power to legislate. Therefore, on a subject regulated by
legislation, executive power has to be exercised in
C consonance with the enacted legislation. The subject
matter under consideration is regulated by the
Acquisition Act, which demarcates the jurisdictional
areas between the Union and the States. Sections 4 and
6 lay down mandatory procedural provisions, which
require to be followed in letter and spirit, in matters
D pertaining to acquisition of private lands. [Para 33-35]
[249-C-D, F-G; 250-C, F-G]
1.5 In terms of ss. 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, the
authority to acquire land has been divided between the
E Central executive and the State executive. In situations
where an acquisition is entirely "for the purposes of the
Union", s. 3(ee) clearly postulates, that the Union
executive would have the exclusive jurisdiction to
acquire the land. The terminology engaged in s. 3(ee), for
F expressing the area of jurisdiction of the State executive
(in the matter of acquisition of land), is not analogous or
comparable with that engaged while spelling out the
jurisdiction of the Union executive. Noticeably, the words
engaged to express the jurisdiction of the State
executive, are extremely wide, so as to accommodate all
G acquisitions which are not entirely "for purposes of the
Union". This intention of the legislature has been
recorded by using the words " ... in relation to acquisition
of land for any other purposes ... " (i.e., other than " ... for
the purpose of the Union ... "). [Para 39] [254-A-E]
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN 197
SAHKARI SAMITI LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
1.6 An acquisition may not be exclusively for A
purposes relatable to the Union, or entirely for purposes
relatable to a State. The complex and multifarious public
activities which the executive has to cater to may not fall
in the exclusive domain of either the Union or the State.
Causes with duality of purpose, would also fall in the B
realm of the third purpose i.e., " ... a general public
purpose ... ". Whenever the exclusive Union or State
barrier is transgressed, the purpose could be described
as " ... a general public purpose ... ". In case of the first
contemplated purpose, the Union executive would have c
the absolute and unencumbered jurisdiction, as per the
definition of the expression "appropriate Government" in
s. 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act. For the remaining two
purposes, the State executive would have jurisdiction.
The executive domain of all acquisitions other than those 0
for purposes of the Union, fall in the realm of the State
Government concerned. Under s. 3(ee) of the Acquisition
Act, for all the residuary acquisitions, i.e. situations other
than exclusively " .. Jor the purpose of the Union ... ", have
been vested in the realm of the State Government
concerned. This is exactly the same position which was E
contemplated by the erstwhile entries 33 and 36 (from
Lists I and II respectively, of the Seventh Schedule). Thus,
the cause and effect of entries 33 of List I and 36 of List
II have b3en juxtaposed into the definition of "appropriate
Government" u/s 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act. Therefore, F
if the purpose of acquisition is exclusively for the Union,
then the Union/Central Government will have the
exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land. If the purpose
of acquisition is exclusively for a State, then the State
Government concerned will have the exclusive G
jurisdiction to acquire the land. And if the purpose of
acquisition is, "a general public purpose" (i.e., a purpose
which is neither exclusively relatable to the Central
Government and/or fully relatable to the State
Government), yet again, the concerned State Government H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 7 S.C.R.
A will have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land.
[Para 40-42] [254-F-G; 255-A-B; 255-G-H; 256-A-B, C-E, F-
G]
1.7 In the instant case, the desire for transfer of land
belonging to the State Government, and thereafter, the
8
desire to furnish land consequent upon its acquisition
"free of cost" to the Railways, leaves no room for any
doubt, that the Railways desired the State of Rajasthan
to contribute land, for the proposed project. In the letter
dated 30.12.1996 addressed by the Union Minister of
C Railways the fact that the setting up of the North-Western
Railways Zone Complex would improve train services in
Rajasthan, which in turn, would benefit the State of
Rajasthan, was particularly highlighted. From the material
on record, it is evident that setting up the North-Western
D Railway Zonal Complex at Jaipur, would lead to better
administration for the Railways, and in that sense it would
serve the purpose of the Union. Additionally, it would
improve train services in Rajasthan and would
accordingly meet the expectations of public and private
E entities of the area. This would serve the purpose of the
State. Therefore, the situation in hand can be described
as one wherein the public purpose is " ... a general public
purpose ... " which is neither exclusively relatable to the
Central Government nor fully relatable to the State
F Government; and, therefore, the State executive would
definitely have the jurisdiction to acquire the subject land.
This court affirms that the State Government had the
jurisdiction. to acquire the subject land, because it duly
satisfied the requirement of the term 'appropriate
G Government' referred to in ss. 4 and 6 of the Acquisition
Act. [Para 44-46] [258-F-H; 259-D-E, F-H; 260-A; 261-C;
262-C-D]
State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan 1955 SCR 867 =AIR
1955 SC 810 - relied on.
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN 199
SAHKARI SAMITI LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
1.8 No procedural lapse has been pointed out A
depicting any irregularity at the hands of the appropriate
authority, either in terms of taking possession of the
acquired land, or in terms of determination of the
compensation payable. This Court further affirms that
while acquiring the land of the appellants, the B
Government of Rajasthan, has proceed~d in due course
of law. As such, the appellants cannot be stated to have
been deprived of their lands/property, without the
authority of law. Therefore, it can not be said that the
acquisition of the appellants' land has violated the c
appellants' right under Art. 300A of the Constitution. [Para
48] [263-A-E-G]
State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Manohar, 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR
911 = (2005) 2 SCC 126; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chennai & Ors. 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR D
=
388 (2005) 7 SCC 627 Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram &
Ors. 2001 (2) SCR 980 = (2007) 10 sec 448; and
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. vs. Super Cassette
=
Industries Ltd. etc. etc. 2008 (9) SCR 165 (2008) 13 SCC
30 - referred to. E
2.1 The acquisition in the instant case was made by
the Government of Rajasthan, and therefore, there was
no justification for the consultation of the Department of
Land Resources of the Government of India. Thus, F
reliance on the provisions of the Government of India
(Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 and/or the
Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules,
1961 in order to assail the acquisition made in the facts
and circumstances of the case by the Government of G
Rajasthan, is wholly misconceived. [Para 53] [270-B-D]
MRF Limited etc. vs. Manohar Parrikar & Ors. 2010 (5)
=
SCR 1081 (2010) 11 SCC 37 4 - held inapplicable.
2. It is apparent that the land which was left out, and H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A which falls between the two blocks of land acquired, ·
cannot be stated to have been owned by influential
bureaucrats or police officers, at the time when the
acquisition in question was made. In this view of the
matter, it can not be said that the leaving out the land
B between the two blocks of acquired land, and further
that, the choice of acquisition of the appellants' land to
the exclusion of the land left out of acquisition, was
vitiated for reasons of fraud, mala tides, arbitrariness or
discrimination. [Para 55] [274-G-H; 275-A-B]
c Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 733; Col.
A. S. Iyer vs. V. Balasubramanyam, 1980 (1) SCR 1036 =
(1980) 1 SCC 634; E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu,
1974 (2) SCR 348 = (1974) 4 SCC 3; Menaka Gandhi v.
Union of India, 1978 (2) SCR 621 = (1978) 1 SCC 248;
D Ramana Dayaram Sheffy vs. International Airport Authority
of India, 1979 (3) SCR 1014 = (1979) 3 SCC 489; and Ajay
=
Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981 (2) SCR 79 (1981)
1 sec 722 - referred to.
E Case Law Reference:
AIR 1962 Allahabad 208 referred to para 25
2009 (1) Mh.L.J. 241 referred to para 25
AIR 1961 Assam 133 referred to para 25
F
AIR 1972 Calcutta 320 referred to para 25
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 911 referred to para 26
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 388 referred to para 26
G 2007 (2) SCR 980 referred to para 26
2008 (9) SCR 165 referred to para 26
(1964) 4 SCR 733 referred to para 54
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN 201
SAHKARI SAMITI LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
2010 (5) SCR 1081 held inapplicable para 52 A
1980 (1) SCR 1036 referred to para 54
1974 (2) SCR 348 referred to para 54
1978 (2) SCR 621 referred to para 54 B
1979 (3) SCR 1014 referred to para 54
1981 (2) SCR 79 referred to para 54
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4824 of 2013. C
From the Judgment and order dated 05.01.2012 in
SBCWP No. 384/2002, DBCSA No. 1876/2011 of the High
Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur.
WITH D
C.A. No. 4825 of 2013, 4829 of 2013,. 4826 of 2013, 4830
of 2013, 4827 of 2013, 4831 of 2013, 4828 of 2013.
A.S. Chandhiok, ASG, Rajeev Dhavan, Pramod Swarup,
Vikas Singh, J.S. Attri, Dr. Manish Singhvi, AAG, Rajendra E
Prasad, Yunus Malik, Naveen Chandra, Sanjeev Agarwal,
Bimlesh Kr. Singh, Pradeep Kr. Jaiswal, Suresh Sharma, Sunil
Malhotra, Abhishek Puri, Rajat Malhotra, Narender Mohan, P.N.
Puri, Mehmood Pracha, Sumit Babbar, Sneha Singh, Naresh
Kumar, Gupreet S. Parwanda, Monika Tyagi, Syed Tanveer F
Ahmad, S.K. Bajwa, Priyanka Bharihoke, S.N. Terdal, B.
Krishna Prasad, Amit Lubhaya, lrshad Ahmad, Pragati
Neekhra, Balraj Dewan for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. The instant common
order will dispose of the following matters:-
(i) Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari
Samiti Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil H
·202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 7 S.C.R.
A Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 4722 of 2012);
(ii) Yogesh Chand Arora vs. State of Rajasthan &
Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 4874
of 2012);
B (iii) Durga Devi Dharmarth Trust & Anr. vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP
(C) No. 5041 of 2012);
(iv) Naresh Chand Arora vs. State of Rajasthan &
c Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5089
of 2012);
(v) Madrampura Grih Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. &
Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP (C) No. 5206 of 2012);
D
(vi) Yashmeen Abrar vs. Union of India & Ors., Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 12072 of 2012);
(vii) Sunita Rathi & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,
E Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 21205 of
2012);
(viii) Arjun Nagar Vikas Samiti through its President
Vim/a Verma vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 21226 of 2012);
F
2. Leave granted in all the matters.
3. Insofar as the instant judgment is concerned, Rajendra
Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. vs. State of
G Rajasthan & Ors. (i.e., the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C)
No. 4 722 of 2012 shall be treated as the lead case. The factual
narration recorded herein, shall be based on the pleadings
thereof. However, in situations wherein, during the course of.
hearing, reference has been made to pleadings from other
cases, the same will also be adverted to.
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 203
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
4. The appellants herein are all land losers. Their lands A
were acquired for establishing a zonal office complex, and
residential quarters for Railway staff, for the North Western
Railway Zone, at Jaipur in the State of Rajasthan.
5. The sequence of facts commencing from the initiation,
8
and leading to the finalization of the acquisition proceedings,
are of pointed significance, in the present controversy. As such,
all the relevant factual details, are being narrated hereunder,
first of all.
6. On 15.11.1996, the Officer on Special Duty, North C
Western Railway, posted at Jaipur, addressed a
communication to the Commissioner, Jaipur Development
Authority, Jaipur, indicating that 26 bighas of Government land
was available in front of the Getor Jagatpura railway station. It
was pointed out, that the aforesaid land had been allotted to D
the Scouts & Guides Organization. It was submitted, that the
said land was ideally located, and could be effectively put to
use for establishing the required infrastructure for the North
Western Railway Zone complex, at Jaipur. It was accordingly
requested, that the said Government land be transferred to the E
Railways. A relevant extract of the aforesaid letter is reproduced
hereunder:-
"As you are aware, the new North-Western Railway Zone
has been set up with headquarters at Jaipur.
F
The actual requirements of land for setting up of the Zonal
office and Quarters at Jaipur is being worked out which
may take some time, but in any case adequate railway land
is not available at Jaipur for the purpose.
G
It is understood that 26 Bighas of land of the State
Government to allotted to Scouts & Guides Organization
is available in front of Getor Jagatpura Railway Station.
This is an ideal location for use by the North-Western
Railway and it .is requested that this land may be H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A transferred to Railway early for immediate use. Further
requirements of land will be indicated to the State
Government in due course."
(emphasis is ours)
B The first communication on the record of the case, relating to
the requirement of land for setting up the North Western Railway
Zone Complex, reveals the desire (of the Railways), that vacant
Government land be transferred by the State Government, to
the Railways. At this juncture, one would notice, that there is
C no thought about acquiring land for the Railways.
7. Following the aforesaid communication dated
15.11.1996, the Officer on Special Duty, Nortli Western
Railway, addressed another letter dated 12.12.1996 to the
D Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, depicting
the total requirements of the Railways for setting up the
aforesaid zonal headquarters. The text of the said letter is being
reproduced hereunder:-
"ln continuation of this office letter referred above the
E appropriate requirement of land for setting up of the zonal
office and staff quarters at Jaipur has been assessed and
about 87 acres of land is considered as necessary for this
purpose.
F It is proposed to have the land for the above purpose
at the locations at Getor Jagatpura. At least 40 acres of
land will be required including the 20 bigha for which a
request has already been made for transfer vide this office
letter referred above. For the reasoning 47 acr.es land
nearest to the Jaipur Railway Station in the Prithviraj Nagar
G
on Jaipur-Ajmer Road will be suitable.
It is therefore requested that 40 acres land including
20 bigha of State Government land now used by scouts
and guides at Getor Jagatpura and 47 acres land in
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH G.RAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 205
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Prithviraj Nagar scheme on Jaipur Ajmer Road nearest to A
Jaipur Railway Station may be acquired and transferred
to Railways.
Necessary plans of both the areas may kindly be made
available to Railways."
B
(emphasis is ours)
In its follow up action, the State Government was informed about
the extent of land required. The Railways sought governmental
land to satisfy its requirement. The process thus suggests, that
the Railways and the State Government, were jointly pursuing C
the objective. The State Government was requested to acquire
some more land, so as to make up the deficiency, and to
transfer the same to the Railways.
8. Mr: Ram Vilas Paswan, the then Union Minister for
0
.Railways addressed a letter dated 30.12.1996 to Mr. Bhairon
Singh Shekhawat, the then Chief Minister of the State of
Rajasthan, indicating the Union Government's desire, to set up
a zonal complex for the North Western Railways, at Jaipur. The
Railways requested the State Government, to provide the
required land "free of cost". It was emphasized by the Union E
Minister for Railways, that the setting up of the new Railway
Zone at Jaipur, would improve train services to and within the
State of Rajasthan, and thereby, meet the expectations of public
and private entities, of the area. Relevant extract of the aforesaid
letter is being reproduced hereunder:- F
"In order to improve the train services in Rajasthan. meet
the expectations of public and private more responsive
administration, the Railways have decided to create a new
Zone, North Western Railway with Zonal Hqrs. Office at G
Jaipur.
The setting up of the Railway Zonal Hqrs. Office.
would require office accommodation. housing for staff. and
other ancillary facilities. all of which need about 150 to 200
acres of land. H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
'A May I therefore request you to ask the concerned officials
to identify a suitable piece of land. about 150-200 acres
at Jaipur. and provide the same to the Railways free of
cost for setting up the Zone. This gesture of the State
Government would go a long way in enabling us to make
B the Zone functional early."
(emphasis is ours)
A perusal of the aforesaid letter reveals, that the Railway
Ministry's request was for about 150-200 acres of land. The
C land would be used for establishing zonal offices for the North
Western Railway Zone, and also, for raising residential quarters
for Railway staff. The letter indicated, that the gesture of the
State Government to provide land to the Railways "free of cosf',
would go a long way in making the zone functional. If the
D acquired land, was to exclusively serve the purpose of the
Railways, then financial contribution thereto by the State
Government, would be unthinkable. But strangely, the Union
Minister for Railways was expecting the State Government to
provide the required land, even after acquiring it, "free of cost".
E Logically, this would be acceptable, when the State (of
Rajasthan) was to be a joint beneficiary. The incidental benefit
to the State, is apparent from the opening words of the letter.
The Union Minister in his above letter emphasized, that the
proposed project would " ... improve the train services in
F Rajasthan, meet the expectations of public and private ... ;,.
9. On 28.2.1997, the Commissioner, Jaipur Development
Authority, pursuant to the correspondence with the Officer on
Special Duty, North Western Railway, pressed the Secretary,
Department of Transport, Government of Rajasthan, to initiate
G acquisition proceedings in respect of land identified at villages
Bindayaka and Todi Ramjanipura, in tehsil Sanganer of district
Jaipur. Relevant portion of the aforesaid letter is being
reproduced below:-
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 207
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
"Please peruse the letter dated 12.12.1996 by Officer, A
North Western Railway Zone, Jaipur. The Railway had
demanded land for Railway Zonal Office and staff quarters.
You have discussed in. this reference with the
Commissioner in the room of Chief Secretary. The land
village Bindayaka and Todi Ramjanipura, Tehsil Sanganer B
is required by Railway department being near to the
Jagatpura Getor Railway Station.
It would be relevant to acquire the required land by
Transport Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur. Therefore. the
proceedings of acquisition of 4-39 hectares of land of C
village Bindayaka and 9-91 hectares of Todi Ramjanipura,
Tehsil Sanganer. Jaipur is to be acquired. The description
of the land to be acquired. trace map and six copies of
land record are annexed with the prayer that the acquisition
proceedings be done at your department level for the D
Railway Department immediately."
(emphasis is ours)
10. On 29.3.1997, the Deputy Secretary, Transport E
Department, Government of Rajasthan, wrote a letter to the
District Collector, Jaipur, requiring him to furnish details of land,
as also, land records pertaining to villages Bindayaka and Todi
Ramjanipura, which was being considered for acquisition for
the North Western Railway Zonal complex. The text of the
aforesaid letter, is being reproduced hereunder:- F
"The Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur by
letter no. P9 (295) JDNAcqui. Off./Land Acqui./97/362
dated 20.2.1997 informed this office that Railway
Department vide letter dated 12.12.1996 placed a G
proposal for the land for Zonal Office in Jaipur and Staff
Quarters. As per proposal land of village Bindayaka and
Todi Ramjanipura. Tehsil Sanganer, Jaipur near Getor
Jagatpura Railway Station is to be acquired. In this
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A reference information regarding details of land. trace map
and land record alongwith the process of acquisition and
inspection report of the acquisition officer be sent to this
office."
(emphasis is ours)
B
11. On 9.5.1997, a communication was addressed by the
Officer on Special Duty, North Western Railway, to the Chief
Secretary, Government of Rajasthan, reminding him of the
request made by the Union Minister for Railways. Relevant
C extract of the said communication dated 9.5.1997, is being set
out hereunder:-
"It had been requested by Hon'ble Minister for Railways.
vide this D.O. letter referred above (copy enclosed). To the
D Chief Minister of Rajasthan. to identify a suitable piece of
land about 150-200 acres at Jaipur and to provide the
same to the railways. free of cost for setting up of new
Railway Zone at Jaipur. Action taken in the matter by the
State Government may please be advised, for taking
further necessary action accordingly.
E
The State Government officials required to be contacted
for pursuing the case may also please be advised so as
to enable me to instruct my officers for expediting the
process of acquisition of land for setting up of facilities for
F North Western Railway zone."
(emphasis is ours)
A perusal of the letter extracted above reveals, that officers of
the Railways establishment were in touch with highest levels of
G governmental functionaries in the State of Rajasthan, and were
seriously soliciting land "free of cost" for establishing the North
Western Railway Zone complex.
12. Pursuant to the aforesaid correspondence, the
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 209
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
Secretary, Transport Department, Government of Rajasthan A
issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as, the Acquisition Act),
indicating the State Government's desire to acquire 15.50
hectares of land situated in the revenue estate of villages
Bindayaka and Todi Ramjanipura, in tehsil Sanganer, of district B
Jaipur. The public purpose depicted therein was, that the
aforesaid land was required to establish a zonal office of the
North Western Railways and for raising residential quarters for
Railway staff. The aforesaid notification was duly published in
the State Government gazette. Importantly, the acquisition of c
land for the project under reference, was being made by the
Transport Department of the Government (of Rajasthan),
presumably because the setting up of the project was aimed
atimproving transport services to and within the State, for the
benefit of public and private entities. In terms of the mandatory D
requirements of the Acquisition Act, the aforesaid notification
under Section 4, was published on 6.9.1997 in the "Dainik
Navjyoti" and on 7.9.1997 in the "Rajasthan Patrika". The
pleadings of the case bear-out, that publication in the locality
was also made on 10.4.1998.
E
13. Yet again, the Deputy Chief Engineer, North Western
Railway addressed a communication dated 11.6.1998 to the
Deputy Secretary, Transport Department, Government of
Rajasthan intimating him, that even though permission had
been received to acquire 69 bighas (17.52 hectares) of land F
near Getor Jagatpura railway station, yet no further details had
been communicated by the State Government, in respect of the
action taken by it, for acquiring the aforesaid land for the
Railways, after the publication of the notification under Section
4 of the Acquisition Act. The aforesaid factual position, is G
evident from the letter dated 11.6.1998, which is reproduced
hereunder:-
"In the above subject it is submitted that there is no
information of further proceedings after notification under H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A Section 4 has been published on 19.8.1997. Please,
inform this office immediately after proper proceedings to
acquire land for Railway Zonal Office and staff quarters.
It is pertinent to mention that permission has been received
by this office from Railway Ministry to acquire 69 bighas
B
(17.52 hectare) land near Getor Jagatpura Railway Station.
Hence inform this office immediately regarding
proceedings to acquire of the above land."
The above communication reveals that the Railways, as well
C as, the State Government were proceeding in the matter in
complete tandem.
14. Objections were invited under Section 5A of the
Acquisition Act from persons interested in the land. Having
0 considered the objections raised by the persons interested, the
Land Acquisition Collector submitted a report to the
Government. Insofar as Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman
Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (appellant in the Civil Appeals arising out
of SLP (C) no. 4722 of 2012, which is hereinafter referred to
E as, the appellant Samiti) is concerned, the determination was
as under:-
"An application on 8.4.2009 was filed by Shrawan Singh
Khinchi, Hemant Goyal, Prabhu Lal Meena, Sharda
Purohit, Nirmala, Suresh Kumar Sharma, Yogesh Aroda,
F Naresh Chand Aroda, Ganga Sahay Meena, residents/
members of Madrampura Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti
planning Prakash Nagar and Gopalpura Grih Nirman
S_phakari Samiti planning Jagatppura first (Mayur Vihar)
siating that the tenants of Khasra no. 280, 282, 284 and
G 291 Girijadevi and ~ampal Das Swami sold and handed
over the possession of the land to Madrampura Grih
Nirman Sahakari Samiti and Gopalpura Grih Nirman
Sahakari Samiti in 1981 and received the entire sale
consideration. The societies have allotted the land to the
H plot holders/members from 1981 to 1983 and most of the
RAJENDRANAGARADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 211
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
members have constructed houses before the acquisition A
proceedings. The applicants have submitted that the
houses have been constructed before the acquisition
proceedings. Hence if the land is left out of acquisition
being on one side corner only, it will not affect the railway
scheme. The applicants submitted that the tenant Girija 8
Devi and Rampal Das Swami are not interested persons,
therefore, their objections should not be considered and
they should be given 15 days time to file objections.
Objections of the applicants were considered and the
applic.ation dated 8.4.1999 is filed which is after due date C
5.4.1999. Even then the claim is being decided on merits
in the interest of justice. The applicants have not produced
any documents or evidence in their favour. As it is
determined hereinabove that the society cannot get any
right only on the basis of agreement to sale and similarly D
the members cannot get any legal right on the basis of
allotment letter issued by society. This matter is purely a
matter between the Khatedar and society and its •
members. The plot holders cannot be considered as
interest persons to get compensation. They can get E
compensation from the Khatedars. Hence the objection is
rejected.
(emphasis is ours)
A perusal of the aforesaid determination reveals, that the F
appellant Samiti had not filed its objections within the
prescribed period of limitation, and as such, its objections
could have been rejected simply because the same were filed
belatedly. Yet the matter was examined on merits. The claims
of the appellant Samiti were found to be unsustainable because G
the appellant Samiti did not have any right to file objections. In
this behalf it was noticed, that the appellant Samiti had relied
on agreements to sell in respect of the acquired land.
Agreements to sell, it was felt, did not vest any legal right in
the appellant Samiti (on the date of issuance of the notification H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act).
15. On 19.8.1997, the State Government authorized the
OSD-11 i.e. the Collector, Jaipur, to enter into the land sought
to be acquired.
B 16. After having dealt with the objections of interested
persons including the appellant Samiti, on the subject of
compensation, it was observed as under:- '
It was considered as to who should be given the
c compensation of the acquired land. The objections filed
before this court makes it clear that certain Khatedar
tenants have transferred their land to the housing societies
or certain other persons and construction has also been
made by such persons. First of all, no such sale agreement
has been filed before this court. Secondly land cannot be
D
considered to be sold on the basis of agreement to sale.
According to Section 17 of the Registration Act, any
immoveable property of value more than Rs.100/- is
required to be registered compulsorily. Hence any transfer
of possession by unregistered document is not valid.
E Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court has confirmed this view in
Writ Petition no. 2027/92, 1017/92, 4102/91 by judgment
passed on 8.12.1992. Hence the transfer by way of
agreement to the housing society cannot be recognized.
And subsequent transfer of possession is illegal. It has
F been settled in the case of Banwari Lal Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors., 1986 (2) WLN 648, that such transfer
of land for non-agricultural purpose is useless. Transfer of
agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes is against the
provisions of Section 42A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act
G and Section 90A of the Land Revenue Act. Thus any
constructions made by persons other than Khatedars on
the land under acquisition ar.e illegal. Therefore
compensation for the illegal construction is not proper."
(emphasis is ours)
H
RAJENDRANAGARADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 213
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
17. Having rejected the objections raised by the persons A
interested (including all those at whose behest, the present
proceedings have been initiated before this Court), the State
Government notified its declaration under Section 6 of the
Acquisition Act, in the State Government gazette, expressing
its final determination for acquiring the land in question. The B
aforesaid declaration dated 13.1.1999 was published in the
State Government gazette dated 21.1.1999.
18. Thereafter, public notices were issued by the Land
Acquisition Officer, intimating all interested persons the intent C
of the State Government to take possession of the acquired
land. On 21.3.2001, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an
award, determining the compensation payable to land owners,
whose land was being acquired.
19. The first contention advanced at the hands of the D
learned counsel for the appellants was, that the instant
acquisition proceedings emerging out of the notification issued
under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act (dated 19.8.1997), and
the consequential declaration under Section 6 of the Acquisition
Act (dated 13.1.1999) could not have been issued by the State E
Government. In fact, it was the pointed submission of the
learned counsel for the appellants, that the State Government
had no jurisdiction to acquire the land in question. In this behalf
it was submitted, that the land was for the use and utility of the
Railways, namely, for establishing zonal offices for the North- F
Western Zone, as also, for raising residential quarters for the
staff to be posted there. Since Railways is a Union subject
(under entry 22 of the Union List, in the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution of India), it was submitted, that it is the Union
Government alone, which had the jurisdiction to acquire the land G
in questiol"!. In so far as the instant aspect of the matter is
concerned, learned counsel for the appellants invited our
attention to Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act. The
aforesaid provisions are being extracted herein:
H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A "4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of
officers thereupon-(1) Whenever it appears to the
appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed
or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a
company a notification to that effect shall be published in
B the Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers
circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in
the regional language] and the Collector shall cause public
notice of the substance of such notification to be given at
convenient places in the said locality the last of the dates
c of such publication and the giving of such public notice,
being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of
the notification.
(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either,
generally or specially authorised by such Government in
D this behalf, and for his servants and workmen, to enter
upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality;
to dig or bore in the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether
E
the land is adapted for such purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to
be taken and the intended line of the work (if any)
proposed to be made thereon;
F
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing
marks and cutting trenches,
and, where otherwise the survey cannot be
completed and the levels taken and the bo~d31ies
G and line marked, to cut down and clear away any
part of any standing crop, fence or jungle:
Provided that no person shall enter into any building
or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to
H a dwelling-house (unless with the consent of the
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 215
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
occupier thereof) without previously giving such A
occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his
intention to do so.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.- B
(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when
the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering
the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2),
that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or
for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect C
under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or
of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders an
different declarations may be made from time to time in
respect of different parcels of any land covered by the
same notification under section 4, sub-section (!), D
irrespective of whether one report or different reports has
or have been made (wherever required) under section 5-
A, sub-section (2):
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular
land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section E
{1),-
{i} published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition {Amendment and Validation) Ordinance; 1967
but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition F
(Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of
three years from the date of the publication of the
notification; or
{ii) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition {Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after G
the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of
the notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be
made unless the compensation to be awarded for H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly
or partly out of public revenues or some fund
controlled or managed by a local authority.
Explanation 1.-ln computing any of the periods
referred to in the first proviso, the period during
B
which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the notification issued under Section
4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court
shall be excluded.
c Explanation 2.-Where the compensation to be
awarded for such property is to be paid out of the
funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the
State, such compensation shall be deemed to be
compensation paid out of public revenues].
D
(2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official
Gazette, and in two daily newspapers circulating in the
locality in which the land is situate of which at least one
shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such declaration
E to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the
last of the date of such publication and the giving of such
public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of
publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall
state] the district or other territorial division in which the
F land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its
approximate area, and where a plan shall have been
made of the land, the place where such plan may be
inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that
G
the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company,
as the case may be; and, after making such declaration
the appropriate Government may acquire the land in
manner hereinafter appearing."
H (emphasis is ours)
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMIT! 217
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
A perusal of Sections 4 and 6 extracted above reveal, that it is A
the "appropriate Government" which is to be satisfied about the
public purpose for which the land in question is to be acquired.
And it is the "appropriate Government" alone, which is vested
with the responsibilities contemplated under the aforesaid
Sections 4 and 6. Accordingly, it is only the "appropriate B
Government" which can issue the required notifications
expressing the intention to acquire land, and thereafter, the
postulated declaration, after examining the objections of the
persons interested.
20. In order to substantiate the appellants' contention, that
c
jurisdiction to acquire land for the Railways, could have been
exercised only by the Central Government, and that the State
Government had no authority to acquire land for the Railways,
learned counsel placed reliance on Section 3(ee) of the
Acquisition Act. Section 3(ee) aforementioned is being D
reproduced below :
"3(ee) The expression "appropriate Government" means
in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the
Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to E
acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State
Government."
Relying on Section 3(ee) extracted above, it was the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, that in F
relation to acquisition of land for the Union, the Central
Government alone had the jurisdiction to acquire the land.
Accordingly, it was contended,_ that it was the Central
Government alone, which had the jurisdiction to issue the
prescribed notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, G
(expressing the intention of the Union Government to acquire,
the land). Having thereby, brought the "appropriate
Government's" intention to acquire the land to the notice of all
interested persons, and having considered the objections (if
any} filed at the behest of such interested persons, the Central
H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 7 S.C.R.
A Government alone could have issued the consequential ·
declaration under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act. Learned
Counsel for the appellants was emphatic, that the notification
to acquire land for the Railways could havelonly been issued
by the Central Government. ,
B '
21. Learned counsel for the appellai\ts ventured to
substantiate his above contention, by reading the definition of
the term 'appropriate Government' along with the said words
used in Sections 4, 5, 5A(2), 6, 7, the first and second proviso
C to Section 11 (1 ), Sections 12 to 14, 15A, 16, 17(1) and (2),
31 (3), 40, 41, 48, 49(2) and 50 of the Acquisition Act. The thrust
of the instant submission is being summarized hereunder:
Firstly, referring to Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, it was
the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, that
D the use of the term "appropriate Government" in Section 4(1)
of the Acquisition Act, with reference to the publication of the
intention to acquire land (by way of a notification) has to be
visualized with reference to the definition of the said term under
Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act. On such examination,
E according to the learned counsel, it would clearly emerge, that
it was only the Central Government which could have issued
the notification dated 19.8.1997. But in the present case, the
said notification has been issued by the Government of
Rajasthan.
F
Secondly, with reference to Section 5 of the Acquisition
Act, it was submitted, that the term "Collector" used therein,
must be viewed with referen~ to Section 3(c) of the Acquisition
Act. Section 3(c) is being extracted hereunder:
G "3(c) the expression "Collector'' means the Collector of a
district, and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any .
officer specially appointed by the Appropriate Government
to perform the functions of a Collector under this Act"
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 219
.· LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Based on the aforesaid definition of the term "Collector, it was A
the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the
nomination of the "Collector/Deputy Commissioner/Officer
specially appointed" has to be made by the "appropriate
Governmenf'. Since the "appropriate Government" in the facts
and circumstances of the present case is the Central B
Government, according to the learned counsel, the nomination
of the 'Collector' with reference to Section 5 of the Acquisition
Act, could only have been ordered by the Central Government;
whereas, it is apparent from the facts of this case, that the State
Government by an order dated 19.8.1997, authorized the SDO- c
II/Land Acquisition Officer/Collector, Jaipur, as "Collector'' for
. all purposes connected with the present acquisition. The
nomination of the Collector by the State Government, when the
land was being acquired for the benefit of the Railways,
according to the learned counsel, was clearly beyond the
0
jurisdiction of the State Government.
Thirdly. with reference to Section 5A(2) of the Acquisition
Act, it was submitted, that the objections under Section 5 of the
Acquisition Act are to be made to the Collector in writing. And,
it is the Collector who is to afford an opportunity of hearing to E
the persons concerned, before submitting a report to the
appropriate Government. Learned counsel vehemently
contended, that in interpreting Section 5A(2) of the Acquisition
Act, the term 'Collector' has to be interpreted in consonance
With the definition thereof under Section 3(c), and with reference F
to the term "appropriate Government" defined in Section 3(ee)
of the Acquisition Act. Thus viewed, it was the submission of
the learned counsel, that not only the "Collector'' to whom
objections were meant to be addressed, but the Collector who
had to consider and dispose of the said objections, ought to G
have been a person nominated by the Central Government.
Herein, according to the learned counsel, admittedly the State
Government had notified the "Collector'' for acquisition of the
land in question. The receipt of the objections, as also, the
determination thereof, must, therefore, be deemed to have H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A been rendered by an authority having no jurisdiction (either to
receive the objections or to submit a report to the appropriate
Government with reference to said objections), in the matter.
-
Fourthly, it was contended, that the declaration under
Section 6 of the Acquisition Act is to be made on the
8
satisfaction of the "appropriate Government". Herein also,
viewed with reference to the definition of the term 'appropriate
Government' in Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, it was
submitted, that it was the Central Government alone whose
satisfaction was material, whereupon, the Central Government
C could have issued the postulated declaration (contemplated
under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act). Herein, according to
the learned counsel, admittedly the declaration was made on
13.1.1999 by the State Government under Section 6 of the
Acquisition Act. As such, it was asserted that the same lacked
D any authority of law.
Fifthly, according to the learned counsel for the appellants,
under Section 7 of the Acquisition Act, after complying with the
procedure contemplated under Section 6, the "appropriate
E Government" (or some officer authorized by the "appropriate
Government") is to direct the Collector "to take order for the
acquisition of the land". The aforesaid procedure contemplated
under Section 7, according to learned counsel for the
appellants, has also been vested with the Central Government
F Insofar as the present acquisition proceedings are concerned, ·
it was the Central Government which had to direct the Collector
to take appropriate action contemplated under Section 7 of the·
Acquisition Act. Since in the facts of the instant case, it is the
Government of Rajasthan, which had issued the aforesaid
direction, according to learned counsel, the same violates the
G mandate of Section Tof the Acquisition Act.
Sixthly, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance
on the first and the second provisos to the Section 11 (1) of the
Acquisition Act, in order to contend, that while preparing the
H award with reference to the acquired land, and while
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMIT! 221
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
determining the true area of the acquired land, and the A
compensation payable therefor, as also, the appropriation of
such compensation amongst persons interested, the power and
authority therefor, is vested in the Collector (with the previous
approval of the "appropriate Government"). Yet again, it was
the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the B
provisos referred to hereinabove, were bound to be
appreciated with reference to the definition of the term
"Collector" in Section 3(c), and the term 'appropriate
Government' under Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act. In so
doing, according to learned counsel, the inevitable result would c
be, that the "appropriate Government" contemplated, is the
Central Government. And, accordingly, the Collector
contemplated therein, would be one nominated by the Central
Government. It was pointed out, that for the acquisition
proceedings under reference, the approval of the State 0
Government, and not the Central Government was sought by
the Collector. It was further pointed out, that the concerned
Collector had been nominated by the State Government. For
the aforesaid reasons (principally on the same basis, as noticed
in the foregoing contentions), it was submitted, that the instant E
action of acquisition, was in clear violation of the mandate of
the provisions of the Acquisition Act. According to learned
counsel, all the above actions, had to be taken by a Collector
nominated by the Central Government, and upon the previous
approval of the Central Government. Since the position in the
facts and circumstance of the present case is not so, it was F
submitted, that the instant process of acquisition, was in clear
violation of the mandate of the above-mentioned provisions of
the Acquisition Act.
Seventhly, with reference to Sections 12, 13, 13A and 14, G
it was submitted, that the term 'Collector' used therein, had to
be viewed with reference to Section 3(c} of the Acquisition Act,
inasmuch as, the Collector in the facts of the present case, had
to be nominated by the Central Government, and therefore, for
the procedure contemplated by the provisions referred to above, H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A was required to be executed by a Collector nominated by the
Central Government. In the present case, the State
Government, by its order dated 19.8.1997 authorized the SD0-
11/Land Acquisition Collector, Jaipur, to carry out the functions
contemplated under Sections 12, 13, 13A and 14 of the
B Acquisition Act. As such, according to learned counsel, the
aforesaid procedure having been carried out by a person
having no authority to do so, must be deemed to have been
carried out without jurisdiction, and in violation of the above
mentioned provisions of the Acquisition Act.
c Eighthly, the term 'appropriate Government' referred to in
Sections 16, 17(1), 17(2), 31(3), 40, 41 and 49(2), according
to the learned counsel, could only have meant the Central
Government, and not the State Government. It was submitted,
that in giving effect to the above provisions, the Central
D Governmeot had unquestionably remained out of reckoning,
and it was the Government of Rajasthan, which has shouldered
all the responsibilities contemplated under the said provisions.
For just the same reasons, as have been noticed above, it was
submitted that the scheme of the Acquisition Act very clearly
E ·defines the manner in which the provisions thereunder, were
to be given effect to. Since the land was being acquired for the
Railways, according to learned counsel representing the
appellants, the responsibilities ought to have been shouldered
by the Central Government, whereas, the entire action for the
F acquisition of the land in the present controversy, was dealt with
by the State Government.
22. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the issue
canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for the
G appellants, we are of the view that it is necessary in the first
instance to determine the subject of legislative competence. If
the determination of legislative competence so determined falls
in the realm of the Parliament, then the contemplated
appropriate Government would be the Central Government.
H Whereas, if the legislative competence falls in the realm of the
·'
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 223
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
State Legislatures, then the appropriate Government in the facts A
· and circumstances of the present case would be the State
Government. During the course of hearing, while examining the·
issue of legislative competence, our attention was invited to
entry 33 of the Union List, entry 36 of the State List and entry
42 of the Concurrent List (of the Seventh Schedule of the B
Constitution of India). All the aforesaid entries are being
extracted hereunder:
Entry 33 (in list I, of the Seventh Schedule)
"33. Acquisition or requisitioning of property for the C
purposes of the Union."
Entry 36 (in list II, of the Seventh Schedule)
"36. Acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the
purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 0
42 of List 111."
Entry 42 (in list 111, of the Seventh Schedule)
"42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property."
E
Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to point out that
entries 33 and 36 (in lists I and II respectively, of the Seventh
Schedule) were omitted by the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment) Act, 1956. And in place of the above two entries,
entry 42 (in list Ill, of the Seventh Schedule) was substituted F
(through the same constitutional amendment). Prior to above
substitution,_Entry 42 in List Ill read as under:
Entry 42 (in list Ill, of the Seventh Schedule), prior to its
substitution: ·
G
"42. Principles on which compensation for property
acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or
of a State or for any other public purpose is to be
determined, and the form and the manner in which such
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A compensation is to be given."
23. The scope and effect of aforesaid three entries, falling
in three different lists of the Seventh Schedule were examined
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Bombay v. Ali
B Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810. The question posed, and the
determination rendered thereon, are being extracted hereunder:
"2. On the hearing of the petition before Tendolkar, J., the
State succeeded on the ground that the purpose for which
the requisition was made was a "public purpose" within
C the meaning of the Act. But, on appeal, it was held that
though the requisition was for a public purpose. the
requisition order was invalid. as the public purpose must
be either a purpose of the Union. or a purpose of the State
and in this particular case the accommodation being
D required for housing a member of a foreign Consular staff
was a Union purpose. which was outside the scope of the
powers of the State.
xxx xxx xxx
E 5. The ultimate source of a authority to requisition or
acquire property is be found in article 31 of the
Constitution. The requisition or acquisition must be for a
public purpose and there must be compensation. This
article applies with equal force to Union legislation and
F State legislation. Items 33 and 36 of List I and List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empower
respectively Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact
laws with respect to them.
G 6. The reasoning by which the learned appellate Judges
of the Bombay High Court reached their conclusion is
shortly this. There can be no public purpose. which is not
a purpose of the Union or a purpose of the State. There
are only these two categories to consider under the statute.
as the words "any other purpose" in the particular context
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMIT! 225
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
should be read ejusdem generis with "the purpose of the A
State". The provision.of acconimodation for a member of
the foreign consulate staff is a "purpose of the Union" and
not a "purpose of the State".
7. We are unable to uphold this view as regards both the 8
standpoints. Item 33 in the Union Legislative List (List ll
refers to "acquisition or requisitioning of property for the
purposes of the Union". Item 36 in the State List (List Ill
relates to "acquisition or requisitioning of property. except
for the purposes of the Union. subject to the provisions of C
entrv 42 of List Ill". Item 42 of the Concurrent Legislative
List (List Ill) speaks of "the purpose of the Union or of a
State or for any other public purpose".
Reading the three items together. it is fairly obvious that
the categories of "purpose" contemplated are three in D
number. namely. Union purpose. State purpose. and any
other public purpose. Though every State purpose or
Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to think
of cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition
is neither the one nor the other but a public purpose. E
Acquisition of sites for the building of hospitals or
educational institutions by private benefactors will be a
public purpose, though it will not strictly be a State or Union
purpose.
When we speak of a State purpose or a Union purpose. F
we think of duties and obligations cast on the State or the
Union to do particular things for the benefit of the public
or a section of the public. Cases where the State acquires
or requisitions property to facilitate the coming into
existence of utilitarian institutions. or schemes having G
public welfare at heart. will fall within the third category
above-mentioned.
8. With great respect, we are constrained to say that the
ejusdem generis rule of construction, which found favour H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A in the court below for reaching the result that the words
"any other public purpose" are restricted to a public
purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely
any application. Apart from the fact that the rule must be
confined within narrow limits, and general or
B comprehensive words should receive their full and natural
meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their
intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct
genus, which must comprise more than one species,
before the rule can be applied.
c If the words "any other public purpose" in the Statute in
question have been used only to mean a State purpose,
they would become mere surplusage; Courts should lean
against such a construction as far as possible.
D 9. Even if it is conceded that the law contemplates only two
purposes, namely, State purpose and Union purpose, it is
difficult to see how finding accommodation for the staff of
a foreign consulate is a Union purpose and not a State
purpose. Item 11 in the Union list specifies "diplomatic, ·
E consular and trade representation" as one of the subjects
within the legislative competence of Parliament, and under
article 73 of the Constitution, the executive power of the
Union shall extend to all such matters.
It can hardly be said that securing a room for a member
F of the staff of a foreign consulate amounts to providing for
consular representation, and that therefore it is a purpose
of the Union for which the State cannot legislate. It was
conceded by Mr. Rajinder Narain, Counsel for the
Respondent, that there is no duty cast upon the Union ta_
G provide accommodation for the consulate staff, and this
must be so, when we remember that the routine duties of
a Consul in modern times are to protect the interests and
promote the commercial affairs of the State which he
represents, and that his powers, privileges and immunities
H
-RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 227
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
are not analogous to those of an ambassador. A-
The trade and commerce of the State which appoints him
with the State in which he is located are his primary
concern. The State of Bombay is primarily interested in its
own trade and commerce and in the efficient discharge of B
his duties by the foreign consul functioning within the State.
We are inclined to regard the purpose for which the
requisition was made in this case more as a State purpose
than as a Union purpose.
· 10. In any event, as already pointed out, "other public C
purpose" is a distinct category for which the State of
Bombay can legislate, as the acquisition or requisitioning
of property except for the purposes of the Union, is within
i~s competence under item 36 of the State List.
D
11. There is another way of looking at the question
involved. An undertaking may have three different facets
or aspects, and may serve the purpose of a State, the
purpose of the Union and a general public purpose. Even
if one may regard the requisition of a room for the E
accommodation of a member of a Consulate as one
appertaining to a Union purpose. it does not necessarily
cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose.
In this view also. the requisition in this case must be held
to have been validly made."
F
(emphasis is ours)
In its determination with reference to public purpose (relatable
to acquisition proceedings), this Court in the judgment referred
to hereinabove, clearly held, that public purpose may be G
relatable to the Central Government, alternatively, it may be
relatable to the State Government. Besides the aforesaid two
alternatives, there is also a third alternative, namely, a situation
wherein the public purpose is a general public purpose, which
is neither exclusively relatable to the Central Government and/ H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A or fully relatable to the State Government. The third alternative,
would be a situation, wherein the cause in question furthers a
common public purpose and is relatable both to a Union and
a State cause.
B 24. It would be relevant to mention, that the judgment
rendered by this Court in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan
(supra) was brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the
appellants. The purpose for doing so, was to enable us to
examine the matter in the correct perspective. For this, learned
counsel for the appellants pointed out, that the law declared by
C the above judgment, came to be negated by the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, which repealed entries 33
and 36 (in lists I and II respectively, of the Seventh Schedule)
and substituted entry 42 (in list Ill, of the Seventh Schedule).
D 25. Before recording any final determination, we may now
refer to the judgments cited at the behest of the appellants.
Reference was made to the decision rendered by the
Allahabad High Court in Balak & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
& Anr., AIR 1962 Allahabad 208. The facts in the afore-cited.
E judgment are almost similar to the controversy in hand. From
the cited judgment, our attention was drawn to the following
observations:
"6. Now I proceed to discuss the merits of the writ petition.
The main contention of Mr. S.C. Khare is that the
F acquisition proceedings are for a Union purpose. It was
not open to the State Government to initiate the acquisition
proceedings. The impugned notifications mention that land
is being acquired for construction of staff quarters in
connection with the North Eastern Railway Head-quarters
G Scheme. This is a Union purpose. But it has been urged
for the opposite parties that. the State Government has
authority to acquire land for the benefit of the Union.
)()()( )()()( )()()(
H
. RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 229
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
13. We have to consider whether the 1952 notification can A
be considered to be an order by the President of India,
although the notification purports to have been issued by
the Central Government. Under Article 53 of the
Constitution, the Executive power of the U~ion shall be
vested in the President and shall be exercised by him either B
directly Or through officers subordinate to him in
accordance with the Constitution. According to Clause (1)
of Article 77 of the Constitution, all executive action of the
Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the
name of the President. Under this Article, even if action is c
taken by the. Central Government, the relevant order ought
to be issued in the name of the President. I do not find in
the Constitution the converse proposition. There is no
provision to the effect that, orders to be issued by the
President might be issued in the name of the Central 0
Government. We have seen that under Clause (1) of Article
258 of the Constitution, it is the President who can
delegate his functions to the State Government. There is
nothing in the Constitution to suggest that the Central
Government may act on behalf of the President for E
purposes of Article 258. It is true that, under Article 74 of
the Constitution, the President is aided by a Council of
Ministers. It was open to the Council of Ministers to advise
the President for issuing an order under Article 258 of the
Constitution. But ultimately the order had to be issued by
the President, or in the name of the President. In the instant F
case the 1952 notification was issued by the Central
Government, and not by the President. I agree with Mr.·
Khare that the notification dated 29-3-1952 is not a valid
notification delegating powers under Article 258 of the
Constitution. The 1952 notification did not empower the G
State Government to take action under the Act on behalf
of the Union Government. In the absence of anv such
delegation of powers. action in the instant case ought to
have been taken by the appropriate Government Cthe
H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A Central Government>. It was not open to the State
Government to issue notifications under Sections 4 and 6
of the Act on behalf of the Union Government. The two
notifications dated 2-3-59 and 16-4-59 with reference to
the area of 113.78 acres are invalid. The authorities have
B tried to dispossess the petitioners on the strength of these
notifications. The petitioners are entitled to be restored to
possession, in case the authorities have already
dispossessed the petitioners. Since the petition partly
succeeds, the parties may be directed to bear their own
c costs.
(emphasis is ours)
It was the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants, that the Allahabad High Court had interpreted the
D provisions of the Acquisition Act, by appropriately referring to
the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India. Learned
counsel accordingly submitted, that the legal/constitutional
inferences recorded in the cited judgment would clearly
demonstrate, that only the Central Government had the
E jurisdiction, to issue the notification and declaration under
Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Acquisition Act, in the case
in hand.
(ii) Reference was also made to the paragraphs extracted
below from the decision rendered by the Bombay High Court
F in Ramdas Thanu Dessai & Ors. v. State of Goa & Ors., 2009
(1) Mh.L.J. 241. Herein also, the controversy before the High
Court was similar to the one in hand.
"5. As already seen above. once it is not in dispute that
G the acquisition is for the South Western Railways for the
purpose of construction of railway line and cargo handling
terminal at Shelvona. and the entire acquisition cost would
be borne by the respondent Nos. 2 and 5. it obviously
means ·that the acquisition is for the Union and. therefore.
H such acquisition has to be by the Central Government who
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 231
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
is the appropriate Government for initiating such action. A
)()()( )()()( )()()(
7. In our considered opinion. it is difficult to accept the
contention sought to be raised on behalf of the respondent
Nos. 1 and 4. The section 4 of the said Act clearly requires B
the appropriate Government to take initiative for
commencement of acquisition proceedings and section
3Cee) specifies as to who would be the appropriate
Government bearing in mind the purpose for which the
acquisition of land is contemplated. In the case in hand. C
as already seen above. the acquisition of land specified
in the Schedule annexed to the notification is for the
purpose of construction of railway line and cargo handling
terminal for South Western Railway. The arguments on
behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 relates to the D
benefits which may arise to the local residents out of
construction of such railway line and the terminal and not
to the purpose for which the land is sought to be acauired.
The resultant benefits which the residents of the affected
area in Goa may enjoy is not the purpose for which a E
particular land is sought to be acquired. If the argument on
behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 is to be accepted.
then even the land which is used for laying the railway line
and which undisputedly belong to the Union of India would
fall in the category of any other purpose. That is not the F
legislative intent behind defining the term "appropriate
Government" under section 3(ee).
8. The appropriate Government under section 4 read with
section 3Ceel is that Government which takes decision to
acquire the land for its purpose. In the case in hand. once G
it is not in dispute that pursuant to the proposal by,the
·State Government it was the decision of the Union and its
Department of Railways to acquire a particular land for
construction of the terminal to be constructed and
maintained by the respondent Nos. 2 and 5. it cannot. in H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R
A the same breath. be said that the acquisition is also for -
any other purpose. The purpose of acquisition is clearly
specified in the notification. Once a particular purpose is
specified in the said notification. it cannot be sought to be
stated by way of an affidavit that the real purpose is
B something different from the one disclosed in the
notification nor such additional benefits which may accrue
on account of acquisition of land to the residents of the
locality could be said to be the purpose for which the land
is sought to be acquired.
c 9. It is to be borne in mind that after issuance of notification
under section 4, the interested parties are entitled to object
to such notification and in that regard the Collector is
enjoined to hear the objections and make a report to the
appropriate Government and after considering such
0 reports, the appropriate Government is required to take
appropriate decision which should culminate in the form
of declaration under section 6. The sections 4. 5, 5A and
6 specifically refers to the appropriate Government and its
satisfaction for need to acquire the land. Once it is not in
E dispute that the proposed acquisition of land is for the
purpose of railway terminal. to be built by the respondent
Nos. 2 and 5 at their own cost and to be maintained by
them. and such terminal is to be used for the activities in
relation to the railways i.e .. for unloading of ore transported
F by the railways from Kamataka to Goa. it cannot be said
that the land is sought to be acquired for any other purpose.
It is to be held that the land is being sought to be acquired
for the Union purpose.
10. In spite of the fact that the land is sought to be acquired
G for the Union, it is undisputed fact that the St'ate
Government claims to be the appropriate Government in
respect of the acquisition proceedings in question.
Obviously. it is without any authority to be the appropriate
Government for the purpose of such acquisition. Therefore.
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 233
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the notification and the declaration are to be held as bad A
in law.
)()()( )()()( )()()(
12. When the statutory provisions comprised under
sections 4 and 6 read with section 3(ee) of the said Act B
clearly provide that in cases of acquisition for the purpose
of Union. the appropriate Government would be the Central
Government. the exercise of executive power cannot be
allowed to transgress the said statutory provisions
comprised under the said Act. The petitioners are justified C
in contending that the executive power is always
subservient to the legislative power. It is always subject to
legislative provision and has to yield to the legislative
power. Mere inclusion of the Entrv No. 42 in the concurrent
list. which speaks of the principles on which compensation D
for the property acquired and requisitioned for the purpose
of the Union and the State or for any other public purpose
is to be determined and the form and the manner in which
such compensation is to be given. by that itself would not
empower the executive to act in contravention of the E
provisions made in the Central Legislation. It cannot be
disputed that the said Act was enacted prior to the
independence of India. However, the same was adapted
in terms of the Adaptation Order of 1950 and, therefore,
is a law made by the Parliament within the meaning of the F
said expression under the proviso to Article 162 of the
Constitution oflndia.
)()()( )()()( )()()(
18. It is thus clear that in spite of the fact that the G
acquisition of the land is for the Union's purpose and at
the cost of the Central Government. the process of
acquisition was sought to be initiated by publication of
notification under section 4 of the said Act by the State
Government claiming to be the appropriate Government. H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A As the law stands. the acquisition for the Union's puroose
cannot be initiated by the State Government unless there
is specific delegation of power in that regard and in the
case in hand there has been no such delegation. "Hence.
as rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioners, the
B notification under section 4 and the declaration under
section 6 in relation to the land in $JUestion by the State
Government is bad in law and is liable to be struck down."
(emphasis is ours)
• C It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants, that the
issue has been correctly adjudicated even by the Bombay High
Court, and that, this Court should endorse the same, while
adjudicating the present controversy.
D (iii) Reliance was also placed on Messrs. Tinsukia
Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of Assam & Anr., AIR
1961 Assam 133, wherein a Full Bench of the Assam High
Court held as under :
"3. The submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that
E as the land was needed for construction of the food-grains
godown by the Government of India the purpose was a
Union purpose and the Central Government was the
appropriate Government. It is not disputed that the two
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were issued on behalf
F of the State Government. From a perusal of the notification
under Section 6 it is also clear thatit was the State
Government which was satisfied that the land was needed
for a public purpose before issuing a declaration under
Section 6.
G
4. The contention on behalf of the State is two-fold in reply
to the argument of the counsel for the petitioner. Firstly it
is urged that merely because the land is needed for
construction of a food-grains godown by the Central
Government. it does not necessarily follow that the puroose
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMIT! 235
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
is a Union purpose. The maintenance of proper supply of A
food-grains to the inhabitants of this State is as much the
responsibility of the State Government as that of the
Central Government. The benefit by the construction of the
food-grains godown will be derived by the public of this
State and as such it is a public purpose and not a purpose B
of the Union alone."
It would be relevant to mention, that the submission advanced
on behalf of the acquiring Government, was akin to the "third
alternative" expressed by the Constitution Bench of this Court C
in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra).
(iv) Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for
the appellants, on Sudhansu Sekhar Maity & Ors. vs. State of
· West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1972 Calcutta 320, and our attention
was drawn to the following:- D
"9. In dealing with this point it should first be noted that after
the seventh amendment to the Constitution both entries 33
& 36 respectively of the Union list and the State list have
now been deleted and entry 42 of the concurrent List has E
been appropriately amended to cover "acquisition and
requisitioning of property". On this amendment acquisition
is on the concurrent list and both the Union and the State
are equally authorised to legislate on the subject of
acquisition irrespective of purpose of such acquisition but
subject to the usual limitations otherwise imposed by the F
Constitution. Thus acquisition irrespective of whether it is
for the purpose of the State or the Union being within the
legislative competence of the State is also within its
executive powers. According to Baneriee. J. in the case
of Gadadhar v. State of West Bengal, (1963) 67 Cal WN G
~60 at p. 470, after such amendment it is wholly
inconsequential as to whether the acquisition is made for
a purpose of the Union or the State. To quote his words:
"the disclosure that acquisition of land was being H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2013] 7 s·.c.R.
A made for a purpose which was not the purpose of
the Union, in the notification and the declaration,
was possibly made under the time worn idea that
since the State could legislate in the matter of land
acquisition, for its own purpose only, every land
B acquisition by the State must be justified on that
ground. After t~e Constitution Seventh Amendment
Act, 1956 it was not necessary to make such a
statement in the notification or the declaration, even
if it was at all so necessary at a time when the
c Constitution had not been so amended".
This statement of the principle by Banerjee, J. can be well
supported so long - as is usually the case -- the State
Governments are duly authorised on delegation of powers
by the Union Government to acquire lands for a purpose
D of the Union. Because in the absence of such delegated
authority on the statutory provisions of Sections 4 and 6
of the said Act read with the definition of the term.
'appropriate Government' in Section 3(eel. the power of
acquisition would otherwise be limited to the State Or the
E Union Government respectively for purposes of the State
or the Union.
10. Now in the present case it appears from the affidavit
filed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 that by an appropriate
notification dated May 14, 1955 issued under Article
F
258(1) of the Constitution the State Government in West
Bengal was duly authorised by the Central Government to
acquire land for the purposes of the Union. This factum of
delegation is not disputed. If that is so, even if I assume
that the purpose of the disputed acquisition is a purpose
G
of the Union it would still be within the powers of the State
Government to acquire and the acquisition cannot be struck
down as beyond the competence of the State Government.
Mr. Sinha, however, contends that in the present case
neither the notifications under Section 4 nor the
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMIT! 237
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
declarations under Section 6 invoke the delegated powers A
nor are the notifications and declarations issued in
appropriate forms. In my view even if that be so, that would
not vitiate the notifications or declarations. It would be a
mere irregularity not affecting the substance which would
not vitiate the acquisition. If the authority has the power for B
any action taken, the act is competent and non recital or
wrong recital of the authority for the action would not make
the act incompetent or without jurisdiction. Reference may
be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Lekhraj v. Dy. Custodian, Bombay, AIR 1966 SC 334. c
11. That apart, in my view there is great substance in the ·
contention of Mr. Bose that simply because the acquisition
is for the purpose of setting up a subsidiary port, the
purpose of the acquisition does not necessarily become
solely a purpose of the Union. According to Mr. Bose it is D
a project which would not only be highly beneficial to the
general public in this State but would serve public
purposes in this State and as such the acquisition would
be well supported on the ground that it is for a public
purpose. It is clearly so when the acquisition is being made E
at the expense of the local authority. Mr. Bose rightly relies
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State
of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810, in
contending that there is no merit in the contention that
merely because the purpose involves establishment of a F
port it serves no pµblic purpose other than a purpose of
the Union. In my view the following observations of the
Supreme Court are clearly instructive, "that there is another
way of looking at the question involved. An undertaking
may have three different facets or aspects, and may serve G
the purpose of a State, the purpose of the Union and a
general public purpose. Even if one may regard the
requisition of a room for the accommodation of a member
of a consulate as one appertaining to a Union purpose, it
does not necessarily cease to be a .State purpose or a H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A general public purpose". Similar also was the view taken
by this Court in the case of (1963) 67 Cal WN 460 (supra).
Therefore. following the above view I must hold that when
establishment of a subsidiary port or a dock therein would
undoubtedly serve at least the general public purpose even
B if it otherwise involves a purpose of the Union. it would not
be beyond the authority of the State Government to acquire
lands in exercise of its own powers and irrespective of the
powers delegated by the Union Government in this respect.
In either view therefore this objection of Mr. Sinha must be
c overruled."
(emphasis is ours)
According to the learned counsel for the appellants, in the case
in hand, the purpose of acquisition was purely relatable to the
D Railways. And the Railways being exclusively a Union subject
(falling under entry 22 in list I, of the Seventh Schedule), the
process of acquisition must be deemed to fall in the exclusive
executive domain of the Union Government.
E 26. The second contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellants was based on the
constitutional right available to the appellants, under Article
300A of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the
'Constitution'). Article 300A is being extracted hereunder:-
F "300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by
authority of law - No person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law.'! . ·
Based on the aforesaid constitutional provision, it was
G emphatically asserted on behalf of the appellants, that an
individual could not be deprived of his property except in
accordance with law. It was submitted, that even if the lands of
the appellants were to be acquired for a public purpose, the
same could have been done only by following the procedure
H established by law. In the absence of following the prescribed
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMIT! 239
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
procedure, the acquisition itself must be deemed to have been A
made in violation of the constitutional rights vested in the
appellants under Article 300A of th~ Constitution.
27. In order to support the contention advanced at the
hands of the appellants (expressed in the foregoing paragraph),
8
learned counsel fCJt the appellants placed reliance on a number
·of judgments rendered by this Court. The same are being
individually referred to below.
(i) First of all, reliance was placed on the decision rendered
by this Court in State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Manohar, (2005) 2 C
sec 126. The following observations recorded therein were
highlighted, during the course of hearing:-
"6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants,
we are satisfied that the case projected before the Court 0
by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of
emanating from any State which professes the least regard
to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the
learned counsel that at this stage at least, the State should
be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay E
the compensation to the respondent, the State has taken
an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what
appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the
respondent.
7. Ours .is a constitutional democracy and the rights F
available t.o the citizens are declared by the Constitution.
Although Article ·19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300A has been
placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows:
G
"300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save
by authority of law - No person shall be deprived of
his property save by authority of law."
8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority
H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A for deprivation of the respondent's property by the
appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case
was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In
our view, the High Court was somewhat liberal in not
B imposing exemplary costs on the appellants. We would
have perhaps followed suit, but for the intransigence
displayed before us."
(ii) Reliance was then placed on the decision rendered by this
C Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Darius
Shapur Chennai & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 627. In order to
expound the nature of rights vested in the appellants under
Article 300A of the Constitution, reliance was placed on the
following observations recorded therein :
D "6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a
valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought
to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained
in Article 300A of ·the Constitution of India, the State in
exercise of its power o(iie'rniflent domain" may interfere
E with the right of property of a persori"by·acq!Jiring the same
but the same must be for a public purpose arid reasonable,
compensation therefor must be paid,
7. Indisputably, the definition. of public purpose is of wide
amplitude and takes within its sweep the acquisition of
F land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State, as
envisaged under sub-clause (iv) of Clause CO of Section 3
of the Act. But the same would not mean that the State is
the sole judge therefore and no judicial review shall lie. (See
Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and vs. State of Gujarat, 1995
G Supp (1) sec 596).
8. The conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of the Act
indisputably is attached to a need as also the purpose and
in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the court is
H limited but it is equally true that when an opportunity of
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 241
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
being' heard has expressly been conferred by a statute. the A
same must scrupulously be complied with. For the said
purpose. Sections 4. 5-A and 6 of the Act must be read
conjointly. The court in a case, where there has been total
non-compliance or substantial non-compliance of the
provisions of Section 5-A of the Act cannot fold its hands B
and refuse to grant a relief to the writ petitioner. Sub-
section (3) of Section 6 of the Act renders a declaration
to be a conclusive evidence. But when the decision
making process itself is in question, the power of judicial
review can he exercised by the court in the event the order c
impugned su.ffers from well-known principles, viz., illegality,
irrationality and procedural impropriety. Moreover, when a
statutory authority exercises such enormous power it must
be done in a fair and reasonable manner.
9. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an D
effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of
opinion as regard the public purpose as also suitability
thereof must be preceded by application of mind as
regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of'
irrelevant ones. The State in its decision making process E
· .· . must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in
dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable
important right and having regard to the provisions,
contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India has
been held to be akin to a fundamental right." F
(emphasis is ours)
(iii) In addition to the aforesaid, learned counsel for the
appellants placed reliance on Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram
& Ors., (2007) 10 sec 448, and invited our attention to the G
following observations made therein:-
"16. Despite such notice, the appellant was not impleaded
as a party. His right, therefore, to own and possess the suit
land could not have been taken away without giving him H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A an opportunity of hearing in a matter of this nature. To hold
property is a constitutional right in terms of Article 300A
of the Constitution of India. It is also a human right. Right
to hold property, therefore, cannot be taken away except
in accordance with the provisions of a statute. If a superior
B right to hold a property is claimed, the procedures therefore
must be complied with. The conditions precedent
therefore must be satisfied. Even otherwise, the right of
pre-emption is a very weak right, although it is a statutory
right. The Court, while granting a relief in favour of a pre-
C emptor, must bear it in mind about the character of the
right, vis-a-vis, the constitutional and human right of the
owner thereof."
(emphasis is ours)
D (iv) Finally learned counsel for the appellants, in order to
contend, that the acquisition made by the Government of
Rajasthan, in the case in hand, was not in conformity with the
procedure prescribed by law, placed reliance on Entertainment
Network (India) Ltd. vs. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. etc. etc.,
E (2008) 13 sec 30. From the instant judgment, learned counsel
placed reiiance on the following observations:-
"118. An owner of a copyright indisputably has a right akin
to the right of property. It is also a human right. Now, human
rights have started gaining a multifaceted approach.
F Property rights vis-a-vis individuals are also incorporated
within the "multiversity" of human rights. As, for example,
any claim of adverse possession has to be read in
consonance with human rights. The activist approach of the
European Court of Human Rights is quite visible from the
G judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. vs. Palmer, 2005
EWHC 817(Ch.), and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. vs. Graham,
(2002) 3 ALL ER 865.
119. This Court recognized need of incorporating the
H same principle for invoking the rule of strict construction
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 243
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
in such matters in P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy vs. A
Revamma, AIR 2007 SC 1753, stating:
Adverse possession is a right which comes into
play not just because someone loses his right to
reclaim the property out of continuous and wilful B
neglect but also on account of possessor's positive
intent to dispossess. Intention to possess can not
be substituted for intention to dispossess. Mere
possession for howsoever length of time does not
resultin converting the permissible possession into C
adverse possession.
120. Further, in Peter Smith vs. Kvaemer Cementation
Foundations Ltd., [2006) EWCA Civ 242, the Court
allowed the appellant to reopen the case despite a delay
of four years as he had been denied the right to which D
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
("the Convention") entitled him - to a fair hearing before
an independent and impartial tribunal.
121. But the right of property is no longer a fundamental E
right. It will be subject to reasonable restrictions. In terms
of Article 300A of the Constitution. it may be subject to the
conditions laid down therein. namely. it may be wholly or
in part acquired. in public interest and on payment of
reasonable compensation."
F
(emphasis is ours)
· Based on the ji.Jdgrnents cited above, it was asserted by
learned counsel representfng the appellants, that in the facts
of this case, it stood established, that even though the G
prescribed procedure, vested the authority of acquisition, with
the Union Government, it had unauthorizedly been acquired by
the State Government (of Rajasthan).
28. Viewed dispassionately, we are satisfied, that even the
second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A appellants, has trappings of the first contention. To succeed on
the basis of the second contention, it is critical for the appellants
to succeed on the first. Therefore, if the appellants succeed to ·
establish, that acquisition in the present case, could only have
been made by the Union Government, they would
B simultaneously be able to establish, that they had been
deprived of their property in violation of Article 300A of the
Constitution, i.e., without following the procedure established
bylaw.
29. The third contention advanced at the hands of the
C appellants was based on Article 73 of the Constitution. It was
submitted, that since "Railways" is a union subject (referable
to entry 22 in list I, of the Seventh Schedule), only the Union
Government, i.e., the Government of India had executive
powers to acquire the land for establishing a zonal office
D complex and residential quarters for Railway staff for the North
Western Railway zone, at Jaipur, in the State of Rajasthan.
Article 73 of the Constitution is being extracted hereunder:-
"73. Extent of executive power of the Union - (1) Subject
E to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power
of the Union shall extend-
(a) To the matters with respect to which Parliament
has power to make laws; .and
F· (b) To the exercise of such rights, authority and
jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government
of India by virtue of any treaty or agreement:
Provided that the executive power referred to in
sub-clause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided
G
in this Constitution or in any law made by
Parliament, extend in any State to matters with
respect to which the Legislature of the State has
also power to make laws.
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 245
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
(2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any A
officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything
in this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect
to which Parliament has power to make laws for that State
such executive power or functions as the State or officer ·
or authority thereof could exercise immediately before the B
commencement of this Constitution."
Based on Article 73 of the Constitution, it was the contention
of the learned counsel for the appellants, that "Railways" is a
Union subject (referable to entry 22 in list I, of the Seventh
Schedule). It was accordingly contended, that Parliament has C
the exclusive power to make laws relatable to matters
pertaining to the "Railways". As such, relying on Article 73, it
was submitted, that only the Union Government (the Government
of lndi~) could exercise executive power in matters pertaining
to the subject "Railways". Having made a reference to the D
notification dated 19.8.1997 (issued under Section 4 of the
Acquisition Act), and the declaration dated 13.1.1999 (issued
under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act) it was pointed out, that
the land under reference was acquired" ... in the public interest
for the purpose of Zonal office, North Western Railway by E
Central Government (Railways Administration) ... ". It was
accordingly submitted, that the matter under reference was
relatable to a subject with respect to which, only the Parliament
had power to make laws. Therefore, the executive power
relatable to the acquisition under reference, under the mandate F
of Article 73 of the Constitution, could only have been exercised
by the Cenlral Government. In this behalf it was sought to be
emphasized~ that all the executive power in the instant process
of acquisition, was exercised by the Government of Rajasthan.
It was accordingly submitted, that all the orders issued by the G
State Government, including the notification dated 19.8.1997
and the declaration dated 13.1.1999, were without jurisdiction,
and as such, void being ultra vires of Article 73 of the
Constitution of India.
H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A · 30. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the
appellants, that it is open to the President of India to delegate
executive functions vested in the Central Government to the
State Government. In this behalf, learned counsel for the
appellants placed reliance on Article 258 of the Constitution.
B Article 258 of the Constitution, is being extracted hereunder :
"258. Power of the Union to confer powers, etc, on States
in certain cases-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this
Constitution, the President may, with the consent of the
Governor of a State, entrust either conditionally or
c unconditionally to that Government or to its officers
functions in relation to any matter to which the executive
power of the Union extends
(2) A law made by Parliament which applies in any State
D may, notwithstanding that it relates to a matter with respect
to which the Legislature of the State has no power to make
laws, confer powers and impose duties, or authorise the
conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the
State or officers and authorities thereof
E
(3) Where by virtue of this article powers and duties have
been conferred or· imposed upon a State or officers or
authorities thereof, there shall be paid by the Government
of India to the State such sum as may be agreed, or, in
default of agreement, as may· be determined by an
F arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India, in respect
of any extra costs of administration incurred by the State
in connection with the exercise of those powers and
duties."
G Based on Article 258 of the Constitution, it was the submission
of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the President of
India in·the facts and circumstances of the instant case, cannot
be stated to have ever delegated the aforesaid executive
functions of the Union, to the Government of Rajasthan. The
H simple submission was, that no such stance, had been adopted
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 24 7
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
either by the Union, or by the acquiring State Government. A
Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, learned
counsel for the appellants, placed reliance on Section 3(8)(b)
of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3(8)(b)
aforementioned is extracted hereunder:
B
"3. Definitions.- In this Act, and in all Central Acts and
Regulations made after the commencement of this Act,
unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context,-
(1) to (7) ... c
(8) "Central Government" shall,--
(a) ...
(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the D·
commencement of the Constitution, mean the President;
and shall include,--
(i) in relatiol) to functions entrusted under clause (1)
of article 258 of the Constitution, to the Government E
of a State, the State Government acting within the
scope of the authority given to it under that clause;
(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State
befon:~ the commencement of the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act,· 1956, the Chief F
Cbmmissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the
·. Government of a neighbouring State or other
· authority acting within the scope of the authority
given to him or it under article 239 or article 243 of
the Constitution, as the case may be; and G
(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union
territory, the administrator thereof acting within the
scope of the authority given to him under article 239
of the Constitution." H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A It was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants,
that the onus rested on the Railways, and alternatively on the
Government of Rajasthan, to establish that the delegation of
power for acquiring the land under reference had actually been
ordered by the President of India. It was the submission of the
B learned counsel for the appellants, that since no such delegation
is shown to have been made by the President of India, to the
functionaries of the Government of Rajasthan, it was natural to
infer, that no such delegation was ever ordered. Since as
submitted by learned counsel, the instant executive function was
c solely vested in the Central Government, therefore, it could not
have been executed on behalf of the Central Government by
the Government of Rajasthan. In the instant view of the matter,
it was submitted, that the concerned acquisition, by the State
Government, was without any authority/sanction of law.
D 31. In our considered view, even the third submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants raises the
same foundational plea, as the first two contentions. In order
to succeed on the third contention it would be vital (as for the
earlier two contentions) for the appellar:its to establish, that the
E process of acquisition in this case, could only have been
carried out by the Union executive (i.e., the Government of
India), whereas, it had unauthorizedly been undertaken by the
State Government (i.e., the Government of Rajasthan). In view
of the first three submissions, therefore, we shall first of all
F endeavour to determine, whether the instant acquisition of land,
accomplished by the State Government, is sustainable in law.
32. Having given our thoughtful consideratiori to the matter
under consideration, we are of the view, thalreliarice on entry
G 33 (of list I of the Seventh Schedule), and on entry 36 (of list II
of the Seventh Schedule), and finally on entry 42 (of list Ill of
the Seventh Schedule), is only for the purpose of avoiding and
getting around, the real issue. Entries in list I, bring the listed
subjects within the legislative competence of the Parliament.
Entries in list II demarcate subjects falling within the legislative
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 249
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
competence of the State Legislatures. Entries in list Ill pertain A
to subjects on which joint legislative competence is vested with
the Parliament, as also, the State Legislatures. Needless to
mention, that the Constitution vests superiority in enactments
made by the Parliament, on subjects enumerated in list Ill, of
the Seventh Schedule (in case of conflict between the B
legislations enacted by the Parliament and the State
Legislatures). Statutory provisions enacted in the manner
expressed above, regulate, not only the substance of the
legislation, but also modulate the procedure to administer the
substance of the legislation. c
33. Article 73 of the Constitution vests in the Central
.. Government executive power, the jurisdiction whereof is exactly
the same as jurisdiction vested in the Parliament to make laws.
The executive power of the Union, therefore, extends over the
subjects on which the Parliament has the power to legislate. D
Arising out of the executive power referred to hereinabove,
emerges one fundamental and unambiguous understanding,
namely, executive power vested in the Central Government
cannot be exercised in violation of the constitutional provisions
referred to above, or as may be ordained by some express E
legislative enactment. The latter aspect (express legislative
enactment), emerges from the proviso under Article 73(1) of
the Constitution of India. Therefore, on a subject regulated by
legislation, executive power has to be exercised in consonance
with the enacted legislation. F
34. It is in the background of the conclusions recorded in
the aforegoing two paragraphs, that we must understand the
scope of executive authority vested in the Central Government
under Article 73 of the Constitution. There is no dispute G
whatsoever, that the subject matter under consideration is
regulated by the Acquisition Act. As such, the freedom of
executive power vested in the Central Government must be
., deemed to have been curtailed, so as to be exercised in
consonance with the provisions of the Acquisition Act. The
H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A preceding proposition is the natural consequence of giving
effect to the proviso under Article 73(1) of the Constitution of
India. Since the vires of the provisions of the Acquisition Act
relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have not
been assailed, we are inclined to unhesitatingly hold that the
B procedure contemplated under the Acquisition Act, is liable to
be followed in matters pertaining to governmental acquisitions,
of private land. In absence of compliance therewith, the
process of acquisition made thereunder, would be liable to be
set aside. We are of the view, that Sections 4 and 6 lay down
c mandatory procedural provisions, which require to be followed
in letter and spirit, in matters pertaining to acquisition of private
lands.
35. For the reasons recorded in the foregoing paragraphs,
we are of the view, that reliance on different entries in different
D lists of the Seventh Schedule, at the behest of the learned
counsel for the appellants, may turn out to be wholly
inconsequential, in so far as the present controversy is
concerned. It needs emphasis, that entries in different lists,
have been relied upon only to demarcate the executive domain.
E To impress upon us, that the jurisdiction to acquire land in the
facts of the present case, fell within the exclusive domain of the
Central Government, in a very subtle manner, the submission
has clearly changed over to a wrong track. Herein the substance
of law, as also, the procedure regulating acquisition, flows out
F of the Acquisition Act. The vires of the Acquisition Act is not
under challenge. Therefore, the Acquisition Act, which
demarcates the jurisdictional areas between the Un.ion and the
States will provide an answer to the issue of jurisdiction
canvassed, and not the entries in different lists of the Seventh
G Schedule of the Constitution of India. More so, because the
subject of acquisition is now placed in list Ill of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India (in entry 42), and as such,
the Parliament as also the State Legislatures, have concurrent
jurisdiction in respect thereof. As such, it would be fully justified
H for Parliament (as it has done through the Acquisition Act), to.
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 251
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
demonstrate the areas of jurisdiction. All the same, we shall A
endeavour to record the submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellants.
36. While bringing to our notice entry 33 in list I, entry 36
in list II and entry 42 in list Ill of the Seventh Schedule of the 8
Constitution, it was vehemently pointed out, by learned counsel
for the appellants, that the first two of the aforesaid entries came
to be omitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,
1956. Simultaneously, by the same amendment, entry 42 was
added to List Ill of the Seventh Schedule. Learned counsel for C
the appellants therefore submitted, that the earlier entry 33 of
list I and entry 36 of list II of the Seventh Schedule must be
deemed to have been merged into entry 42 of list Ill of the
Seventh Schedule. It was accordingly the vehement contention
of the learned counsel for the appellants, that while determining
legislative competence (and the resultant executive jurisdiction) D
consequent upon the merger of the aforesaid two entries into
the freshly amended/substituted entry 42 of list Ill, it was
imperative to keep in mind what the Parliament did away with,
and the resultant effect emerging from a collective interpretation
of the above three entries, prior to the Constitution (Seventh E
Amendment) Act, 1956. For the instant reason, it was also
sought to be suggested, that the judgment rendered by this
Court in State of Bombay v. Ali Gu/shan (supra) would not
constitute a valid basis for determination of the present
controversy. Learned counsel, in this behalf also pointed out, F
that the judgmentin the aforesaid matter was rendered in 1955,
i.e. before the Constitutional Amendment in 1956.
37. We shall now endeavour to determine the effect of the
submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel. G
Through entry 33 (in list I of the Seventh Schedule), the subject
of acquisition of property" ... for the purposes of the Union ... "
was vested in the legislative domain of the Parliament. And
through entry 36 (in list II of the Seventh Schedule), the subject
of acquisition of property " ... except for the purposes of the
H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A Union ... " was vested in the State Legislatures. Having done
away with the aforesaid entries from Lists I and 11 of the Seventh
Schedule, by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956
(with effect from 1.11.1956), the legislative competence on the
subject of acquisition was jointly vested in the Parliament, as
B well as, the State Legislature through entry 42 (in list Ill of the
Seventh Schedule). Within the scope of entry 42 (in list Ill of the
Seventh Schedule), it was open to the Parliament, as also, the
State Legislature to enact legislation on the subject of
acquisition. It is, therefore apparenf that the exclusive
c jurisdiction vested in the State Legislature to enact legislation
on the subject of acquisition "... except for the purposes of the
Union ... " was clearly taken away from the exclusive jurisdiction·
of the State legislation by the aforestated amendment to the .
Constitution. In other words, prior to the above amendment,
State Legislature had the exclusive jurisdiction to enact law for
0
acquisition of private lands, falling within the territorial
jurisdiction of the concerned State. The said jurisdiction was
now concurrently shared with the Parliament. The said
jurisdiction was invoked by the Parliament when it enacted the
E Acquisition Act. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis the
submission advanced by the learned counsel, would not serve
the purpose of the appellants herein, inasmuch as, it is not
possible for us to read into entry 42 of list Ill of the Seventh
Schedule, the cumulative effect of entries 31 and 36 (of lists I
and II respectively of the Seventh Schedule). Hithertobefore, the
F jurisdiction of Parliament (and consequ.eritly of the Union
executive), would extend only to acquisition oflaiid/properties
for purposes of the Union. We are satisfied to hold, that
consequent upon the Constitution (Seventh-Amendment) Act,
1956, the jurisdictional limitations on the subject of acquisition
G would emerge from a valid legislation made under entry 42 (in
list Ill of the Seventh Schedule). Since the validity of the
Acquisition Act has not been assailed by the appellants, we
shall accept the same to be a valid legislation enacted under
entry 42 (in list Ill of the Seventh Schedule). We must, therefore,
H now endeavour to determine the legitimacy of the submissions
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMIT! 253
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants, A
on the jurisdictional question, purely on the basis of the
Acquisition Act.
38. In order to determine the validity of the submission
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants, B
namely, that the acquisition in the facts and circumstances of
the present case, could have been made only by the Central
Government, and consequently, the acquisition made by the
Government of Rajasthan, was totally without jurisdiction, would
depend on the interpretation of Sections 4 and 6 of the C
Acquisition Act (read along with other provisions of the
Acquisition Act, relied upon by the learned counsel for the
parties). In this behalf, the submissions advanced on behalf of .
the appellants, have already been recorded in paragraph 21
above.
D
39. From the deliberations recorded above, there is no
room for any dispute, that the interpretation of the term
"appropriate Government" referred to in Sections 4 and 6 of
the Acquisition Act would lead to the correct determination of
the executive Government competent to acquire the land under E
reference. lnC1ubitably, the answer to the issue would emerge
from the definition of the term 'appropriate Government' in
Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, wherein, the expression
'appropriate Government' has been linked to the purpose of
acquisition. In such a contingency, the answer to the query, as F I
to which of the two Governments (Central Government, or the
concerned State Government) would satisfy the test of
"appropriate Govetriment", one will necessarily have to carefully
view the real effect· .of the words engaged to define the said
term in Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act. Section 3(ee)
G
aforementioned is being extracted hereunder:
"3(ee) the expression "appropriate Government" means in
relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union,
the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of
land for any other purposes, the State Government;" H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R. .
.
A A perusal of Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, leaves no
room for any doubt, that the authority to acquire land has been
divided between the Central executive and the State executive.
In situations where an acquisition is entirely" ... for the purposes
of the Union ... ". Section 3(ee) aforementioned clearly
B postulates, that the Union executive would have the exclusive
jurisdiction to acquire the land. The terminology engaged in
Section 3(e·e) of the Acquisition Act, for expressing the area
of jurisdiction of the State executive (in the matter of acquisition
of land), is not analogous or comparable with that engaged
c while spelling out the jurisdiction of the Union executive. Section
3(ee), it may be noted, does not express, that in matters of
acquisition which are entirely for purposes of a State, the
jurisdiction would vest with the concerned State executive.
Noticeably, the words engaged to express the jurisdiction of the
State executive, are extremely wide, so as to accommodate
0
all acquisitions which are not entirely "for purposes of the
Union". This intention of the legislature has been recorded by
using the words " ... in relation to acquisition of land for any other
purposes ... " (i.e., other than " ... for the purpose of the
E Union ... "), " ... the State Government".
40. Having had the benefit of understanding the different
purposes for which land may be acquired, from the Constitution
Bench judgment of this Court in State of Bombay vs. Ali
Gulshan (supra), we would unhesitatingly conclude, that the
F contemplated purposes would definitely be "... three in number,
namely, Union purpose, State purpose, and " ... a general public
purpose ... ". Our instant determination is based on the fact, that
an acquisition may not be exclusively for purposes relatable to
the Union, or entirely for purposes relatable to a State. The
G complex and multifarious public activities which the executive
has to cater to may not fall in the exclusive domain of either
the Union or the State. In our view, causes with duality of
purpose, would also fall in the realm of the third purpose
expressed by the Constitution Bench referred to above as " ... a
H general public purpose ... ".Whenever the exclusive Union or
RAJENDRANAGARADARSH GRAH NIRMANSAHKARI SAMIT! 255
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
State barrier is transgressed, the purpose could be described A
(as in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gu/shan (supra)) as " ... a
general public purpos~ ... ". In case of the first contemplated
purpose'9ferred to above, the Union executive would have the
absolute and unencumbered jurisdiction, as per the definition
of the expression "appropriate Government" in Section 3(ee) B
of the Acquisition Act. For the remaining two purposes, the
State executive would have jurisdiction. Therefore, to determine
the issue of jurisdiction in the instant case, the first step
essentially would be to determine the precise purpose for which
the instant acquisition was made. Based on such conclusion, c
it would be easy to determine the vesting of executive
jurisdiction, for acquisition of the land under reference.
41. The instant issue can be examined from another
perspective as well. When examined closely, Section 3(ee) of
the Acquisition Act, in fact and in substance, incorporates the D
erstwhile entries 33 and 36 (from Lists I and II respectively, of
the Seventh Schedule). For, it may be recalled, that entry 33
(in List I of the Seventh Schedule), had vested the subject of
acquisition of property" ... for the purposes of the Union ... " in
the Parliament. Therefore, the executive domain thereof fell in E
the realm of the Union/Central Government. Exactly in the same
manner, under Section 2(ee) of the Acquisition Act, for
situations where acquisition is exclusively" ... for the purposes
of the Union ... " the Union executive has been vested with
absolute jurisdiction to acquire the land. Likewise, jurisdiction F
for acquisition of land was vested in the State legislature vide
entry 36 (in List II of the Seventh Schedule). The authority of the
concerned.State legislature extended to acquisitions of land
other than" ... for the purposes of the Union ... ". Therefore, the
executive domain of all acquisitions other than those for G
purposes of the Union, fell in the realm of the concerned State
Government. In exactly the same manner Section 3(ee) of the
Acquisition Act, for all the residuary acquisitions, i.e. situations
other than exclusively " ... for the purpose of the Union ... ", have
been vested in the realm of the concerned State Government. H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A This is exactly the same position which was contemplated by
the erstwhile entries 33 and 36 {from Lists I and II respectively,
of the Seventh Schedule). The scope and. effect of the erstwhile
entries 33 and 36 was determined by a Constitution Bench of
this Court in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra), wherein
B this Court concluded that the acquisition may ·serve three
purposes i.e., the purpose of the Union, the purpose of a State,
and thirdly," ... a general public purpose ... ". Therefore, the logic,
the course of thought, the conclusions and the deductions made
in the Constitution Barich judgment aforementioned would
c completely and unqualifiedly be applicable, while interpreting
Section 3{ee) of the Acquisition Act. This is for the simple
reason, that the cause and effect of the aforesaid entries (33
of List I, and 36 of List II) have been juxtaposed into the
definition of the term "appropriate Government" in Section
3{ee) of the Acquisition Act. Therefore, it is only for the first of
0
the three purposes referred to hereinabove, wherein the term
'appropriate Governmenr would mean the Central Government.
For the other two exigencies/situations, the term 'appropriate
Government' would mean the concerned State Government.
E 42. We are of the view, that the determination on the first
issue canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel, would
inevitably depend on the purpose for which the land in question
came to be acquired. If the purpose of acquisition is exclusively
for the Union, then the Union/Central Government will have the
F exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land. If the purpose of
acquisition is exclusively for a State, then t~~ c;oncerned State
Government will have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the
land. And if the purpose of acquisition is, "a general public
purpose" {i.e., a purpose which is neither exclusively relatable
G to the Central Government and/or fully relatable to the State
Government), yet again, the concerned State Government will
have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land.
43. We have already referred to a series of
communications exchanged between the Union Government,
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 257
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
as also, the State Government on the subject of the land A
required for establishing the zonal office complex and
residential quarters for Railway staff (for the North-Western
Railway Zone), at Jaipur. From the tenor thereof, we shall
venture to determine whether the land in question was being
acquired exclusively for the purposes of the Union, or exclusively B
for the purpose of the State and/or for the third purpose
identified above, namely, to serve " ... a general public
purpose ... ". For this, we shall first refer to the letters exchanged
between the concerned parties. The first available
communication on the record of the case dated 15.11.1996, c
was addressed by the Officer on Special Duty, North-Western
Railway, to the Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority,
Jaipur, indicating the availability of 26 bighas of Government
land in front of the Getor Jagatpura Railway Station. Even
though the aforesaid letter mentions, that the land in question D
had already been allotted to the Scouts & Guides Organization,
yet it was pointed out, that the same could effectively be put to
use for setting up the required infrastructure for the North-
Western Railway Zone. It was accordingly requested, that the
said land may be transferred to the Railways, at an early date.
The aforesaid letter leaves no room for any doubt, that what was E
being sought through the communication dated 15.11.1996 was
the transfer of State Government land, to the Railways. The
aforesaid position came to be reiterated in another letter dated
15.11.1996. These two communications were then followed by
a letter da,ted.~0;~2.1996, addressed by Mr. Ram Vilas F
Paswan,the then Union Minister for Railways, to Mr. Bhairon
Singh Shekhawat, the then Chief Minister of the State of
Rajasthan, indicating the Union Government's desire to set up ·
the North-Western Railway Zone Complex, at Jaipur.
Interestingly, in the aforesaid letter the Railway's request to the G
State Government was to provide land "free of cost". The basis
of seeking the land free of cost, also emerges from the said
letter dated 30.12.1996, wherein it was emphasized, that
setting up of the Zonal Office would improve train services to
and within the State of Rajasthan, and would meet the H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A expectations of public and private entities in that area. In fact,
the emphasis in the aforesaid letter was, that such a gesture
of the State Government (to provide land free of cost) would
go a long way in enabling the Railways to make the Zonal Office
functional, at an early date. The instant emphasis makes out,
B that the State of Rajasthan (on account of transportation
facilities, which would become available to public and private
entities, having a nexus to the State) would benefit therefrom.
Consequent upon the receipt of the aforesaid communication,
the Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority, wrote a letter
c dated 28.2.1997 to the Secretary, Department of Transport,
Government of Rajasthan, for initiating acquisition proceedings
in respect of the land identified in villages Bindayaka and Todi
Ramjanipura in tehsil Sanganer of district Jaipur. The Deputy
Secretary, Department of Transport, Government of Rajasthan,
D responded to the same vide a letter dated 29.3.1997,
addressed to the District Collector, Jaipur, for effectuating the
desire expressed. Pursuant to the aforesaid correspondence
between the Railways and the functionaries of the Government
of Rajasthan, the State Government issued a notification dated
E 19.8.1997 under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, depicting its
intention to acquire land measuring 4-39 hectares in the
revenue estate of village Bindyaka, and 9-91 hectares in village
Todi Ramjanipura, tehsil Sanganer, district Jaipur, to establish
the North-Western Railway Zone Complex,
F 44. The correspondence between the ~Railways and the
Government of Rajasthan preceding the noJifiCation. under
Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, is the material correspondence
on the basis whereof a finding will have to be recorded, on the
issue in hand, ohe way or the other. The desire for transfer of
G land belonging to the State Government, and thereafter, the
desire to furnish land consequent upon its acquisition "free of
cost" to the Railways, leaves no room for any doubt, that the
Railways desired the State of Rajasthan to contribute land, for
the proposed project. Ordinarily this would be unthinkable,
H except when the project would directly or indirectly benefit the
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 259
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
State as well. Ordinarily, the setting up of a Zonal Office would A
mean better administration for the Railways establishment. It
is difficult to understand how, for the purpose of its own
administration, the Railways could repeatedly implore the
Government of Rajasthan, in the first instance to transfer land
under State ownership to the Railways, and thereafter, make B
an alternative request to the Government of Rajasthan, to
acquire land and to transfer the same to the Railways free of
cost. The only reason which one can infer for such an adjuration,
ascertainable from the letters referred to above is, that the
residents of the State of Rajasthan would also benefit from the c
establishment of the said Zonal Office. This issue was,
impressed upon by the Railways, by asserting that better
transportation facilities would become available to the public
and private entities having a nexus to the State. And therefore,
the Railways considered it appropriate to involve the State
0
Government's participation in the project, in the manner
indicated above. The letter addressed by the Union Minister of
Railways dated 30.12.1996 is a clear pointer to the above
inference. In the said letter, the Union Minister for Railways
particularly highlighted the fact that the setting up of the North-
Western Railways Zone Complex would improve train services E
in Rajasthan, which in turn, would benefit the State of Rajasthan.
It is, therefore, that in the ,fir5t instance, transfer of Government
land was sought by the Railways. When that did not ma(erialize,
the Government was asked to acquire land, and provide it free
of cost to the Railways. From the above deliberations, we may F
record our con(::lusions as follows. Setting up the North-Western
Railway ZonalComplex at Jaipu-r, would lead to better
administration for the Railways, and in that sense it would serve
the purpose of the Union. Additionally, it would improve train
services in Rajasthan and would accordingly meet the G
expectations of public and private entities of the area. This
would serve the purpose of the· State. We would therefore
unhesitatingly record, that the situation in hand can be
described.as one wherein the public purpose is" ... a general
public purpose ... " which is neither exclusively relatable to the H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A Central Government and/or fully relatable to the State
Government.
45. In State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra)
accommodation was required, for housing a staff member of
B a foreign Consulate in Bombay. In the challenge raised, the
primary contention was, that the subject under reference was
a Union purpose, and accordingly, the Union Government alone
had the jurisdiction in the matter. This submission would
naturally emerge from entry 11 (in List I, of the Seventh
Schedule), which reads, "Diplomatic, Consular and trade
c. ,representation'.'. The Bombay High Cqurt, while accepting the
challenge had concluded, that there were only two categories
for determining the executive Government which had the
jurisdiction to acquire land i.e., for a Union purpose the Union/
Central Government, and for the purpose of the State, the
D concerned State Government. The High Court had interpreted
the words "any other purpose" by applying the rule of ejusdem
generis, as flowing out of the purpose of the State. The
Constitution Bench of this Court while determining the
controversy, did not accept the view of the High Court. This
E Court held, that categories for the purpose of acquisition were
three, namely, Union purpose, State purpose, and "... a general
public purpose ... ". This was sought to be explained by
observing, that a State purpose or a Union purpose would have
a nexus to the duties and obligations cast on the State·or the
F Union, to do particular things for the benefit ,of the public or a
section of the public. Naturally these obligations would be
determined on the basis of the scheme of distribution of
subjects between the Union and the States iri the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Union purpose, would
G constitute the first category. The second category would be, for
fulfilling a State purpose. Besides the aforesaid clear
demarcation, constituting the fir:>.t two categories, situations
where a State acquires or requisitions property to facilitate the
coming into existence of allied objects having public welfare at
H heart, such like situations would fall within the third category.
RAJENDRANAGARADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 261
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
. The third category was described as one which contemplated A
" ... a general public purpose ... ", i.e., where the purpose is
neither exclusively relatable to the Central Government and/or
fully relatable to the State Government. In State of Bombay vs.
Ali Gu/shan (supra) it came to be held, that the acquisition/
requisition under reference therein, fell in the third category. The B
consideration and logic leading to the aforesaid determination
was, that trade and commerce is the primary cause of the State
which appoints foreign Consulate staff, to the State (in the cited
case, the State of Bombay) where he is appointed. The purpose
for acquisition/requisition, was accepted as trade and c
commerce. As such, it was concluded, that the State
Government had the jurisdiction to acquire/requisition the land.
In the aforesaid understanding of the matter, it is evident that
the situation in hand is one akin t6 the one referred to above
where the purpose of acquisition partly falls in the first category
0
i.e., for the benefit of the Union, and partly, falls in the third
category i.e., " ... a general public purpose. Just like in State of
Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra), and for exactly the same
reasons, we have no hesitation in concluding, that in the present
case as well, the purpose of acquisition would. benefit the State
generally, as better transportation facilities would meet the E
expectations of public and private entities having a nexus with
the State of Rajasthan. The purpose of the acquisition in hand
not being an exclusive Union purpose, and further because, the
purpose for acquisition can certainly be described as " ... a
general public purpose ... '', the State executive would definitely F
have the juris<;fict!cin to acquire the land under reference.
46: The ~ubmission advanced on behalf of the appellants,
against the conclusion drawn above was, that the judgment
rendered in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) could not G
be applied after the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,
1956. It was contended that, the basis on which the above
judgment was rendered no longer exists, and as such, the same
has lost all its relevance. We have already examined this aspect
of the matter. We have concluded that Section 2(ee) of the H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A Acquisition Act, reintroduces the three categories under which
jurisdiction for acquiring land has to be determined. The same
three categories of public purpose, which were deduced from
entries 33 and 36 (in lists I and II, respectively of the Seventh
Schedule) in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra), also
B emerge out of an analysis of Section 2(ee) of the Acquisition
Act. It is therefore not possible for us to accept, that the
Constitution Bench judgment in State of Bombay vs. Ali
Gulshan has lost its relevance. Accordingly, we find no merit
in the instant objection raised on behalf of the appellants. For
c the above reason, it is not possible for us to accept the first
contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for
the appellants. We hereby affirm, that the State Government had
the jurisdiction to acquire the land under reference, because it
duly satisfied the requirement of the term 'appropriate
Government' referred to in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition
0
Act.
47. The second contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellants was based on the
Constitutional right available to the appellants under Article
E 300A of the Constitution. The contention advanced at the hands
of the learned counsel for the appellants in this behalf was, that
the Government of Rajasthan had no jurisdiction to acquire the
land in question. Consequently it was contended, that the
procedure prescribed by law had not been adhered to. It was
F asserted that the Central Government alone could have
acquired the land in question, since the s~rlie was acquired
for a purpose which falls in the domain ofthe Uniqn (the
Railways). · ·· · ·..;
·,...,
48. It was not the contention of the learned counsel for the
G appellants before this Court, that there had been any other
procedural lapse besides the one indicated above. It was not
the case of the appellants, that the notifications and declaration
contemplated under the provisions of-the Acquisition Act were
not duly issued. It was also not the case of the appellants, that
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 263
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the land losers were not afforded an opportunity to file A
objections. Nor was it the qase of the appellants, that the
objections were not duly consl.dered. No lapse whatsoever had
been pointed out depicting any irregularity at the hands of the
appropriate authority, either in terms of taking possession of
the acquired land, or in terms of determination of the B
compensation payable. It is, therefore, apparent that in the
process of acquisition, no procedural lapse has been pointed
out. The only illegality pleaded and canvassed for the annulment
of the acquisition proceedings was, that the term 'appropriate
Government' used in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act C
was wrongly assumed, as the Government of Rajasthan. It was
submitted, that it ought to have been the Union/Central
Government. In the determination rendered by us, in respect of
the first contention canvassed on behalf of the appellants, we
have already concluded, that in the facts and circumstances of
this case, reference to the term 'appropriate Government' in D
Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act was rightfully relatable
to the Government of Rajasthan. Based. on the above
conclusion drawn by us, there can be no further room for the
appellants to contend, that the instant acquisition process, was
not in accordance with law. In the aforesaid view of the matter, E
we have no hesitation in affirming that while acquiring the land
of the appel!ants, the Government of Rajasthan, has proceeded
in due c9urse of law. As such, the appellants cannot be stated
to hav(been deprived of their lands/property, without the
authority of law: Accordingly, it is not possible for us to accept F
even the second contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel. for the appellants, namely, that the acquisition
of the ~ppeliarits' land has violated the appellants' Constitutional
right under Article 300A of the Constitution of lndi;:i.
G
49. We shall now advert to the third contention advanced
at the hands of th~ learned counsel for the appellants. It was
the pointed submission of the learned counsel for the
appellants, that the Central Government alone had jurisdiction
in the matter of acquisition of land for the Railways.
H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A Undoubtedly, the acquisition of the land in the facts and
circumstances of the present case was for establishing the
North-Western Railway Zone Complex. Despite the aforesaid.
we have already concluded hereinabove, that on the subject of
acquisition, the only relevant entry in the Seventh Schedule of
B the Constitution was entry 42 in list Ill, i.e., the Concurrent List.
Besides the aforesaid, no other entry can legitimately be
referred to, wherein the acquisition of land (even though for the
Railways) is the pointed subject of consideration. There was
no challenge to any of the provisions of the Acquisition Act. We
C have already drawn our conclusions on the basis of the
provisions of the Acquisition Act, framed by the Parliament
under entry 42 (in list Ill, of the Seventh Schedule). We have
interpreted the relevant provisions of the Acquisition Act, and
on the basis thereof have been persuaded to conclude, that the
Government of Rajasthan was the competent authority for
D acquiring the land under reference. In such view of the matter,
reliance on Articles 73 or 258 of the Constitution of India, by
the learned counsel for the appellants, was clearly
misconceived. The answer to the third contention, therefore,
clearly emerges from the conclusions drawn by us on the basis
E of the first contention advanced at the hands of the learned
counsel for the appellants. For the above reasons, we find no
merit even in the third contention advanced on behalf of the
appellants.
F 50. We shall now deal with the fourth issue canvassed at
the hands of the learned counsel for the appellarits. The instant
issue is unconnected with the previous issues~ From the
sequence of facts narrated hereinabove, it is apparent that the
instant acquisition of land was at the behest of the RaifWays,
G i.e., the Union Government. It was pointed ou( that on all
administrative issues, the functioning of the Central Government
is regulated by Rules of Business. In this behalf, our attention
was invited to the Government of India (Allocation of Business)
Rules, 1961 and the Government of India (Transaction of
H Business) Rules, 1961. It was the contention of the learned
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 265
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
counsel for the appellants, that the aforestated Rules of A
Business (framed under Article 77 of the Constitution of India)
have a binding and mandatory effect. Breach of the Rules of
Business, according to the learned counsel for the appellants,
would result in vitiation of the entire action. Insofar as the instant
case is concerned, it was sought to be canvassed, that the B
Union of India had breached the Rules of Business. And the
said breach, would vitiate the impugned acquisition
proceedings. In order to make good the aforesaid submission,
learned counsel for the appellants, invited our attention to Rules
3 and 4 of the Government of India (Transaction of Business) c
Rules, 1961. Rules 3 and 4 aforementioned are being extracted
hereunder:
"3. Disposal of Business by Ministries.- Subject to the
provisions of these Rules in regard to consultation with
other departments and submission of cases to the Prime D
Minister, the Cabinet and its Committees and the
President, all business allotted to a department under the
Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961,
shall be disposed of by, or under the general or special
directions of, the Minister-in-charge. E
4. Inter-Departmental Consultations.- (1) When the subject
· of a case concerns more than one department, no decision
be taken or order issued until all such departments have
concurred, or, failing such concurrence, a decision thereon F
has been !a~en by or under the authority of the Cabinet.
Explanatioil~Every case in which a decision, if taken i n
. , one bepartment, is likely to affect the transaction
of business allotted to another department, shall be
deemed to be a case the subject of which concerns G
more than cme department.
(2) Unless the case is fully covered by powers to
sanction expenditure or to appropriate or re-
appropriate funds, conferred by any general or H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 7 S.C.R.
A special orders made by the Ministry of Finance, no
department shall, without the previous concurrence
of the Ministry of Finance, issue any orders which
may-
(a) involve any abandonment of revenue or involve any
B
expenditure for which no provision has been made
in the appropriation act;
(b) involve any grant of land or assignment of revenue
or concession, grant, lease or licence of mineral or
c forest rights or a right to water power or any
easement or privilege in respect of such
concession;
(c) relate to the number or grade of posts, or to the
D strength of a service, or to the pay or allowances
of Government servants or to any other conditions
of their service having financial implications; or
(d) otherwise have a financial bearing whether
involving expenditure or not;
E
Provided that no orders of the nature specified in clause
(c) shall be issued in respect 9f the Ministry of Finance
without the previous concurrence of the Department of
Personnel and Training.
F
(3) .
..
The Ministry of Law shall be consulted
. ........
)
on-
(a) proposals for legislation;. ~- ;
(b) the making of rules and ord.~I'.$ of a~:~Emeral
G character in the exercise of a~statutory power
conferred on the Government; and
(c) the preparation of important contracts to be
entered into by the Government.
H (4) Unless the case is fully covered by a decision or
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 267
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
advice previously given by the Department 'f A ·
Personnel and Training that Department shall be
consulted on all matters involving-
(a) the determination of the methods of
recruitment and conditions of service of
8
general application to Government servants
in civil employment; and
(b) .the interpretation of the existing orders of
general application relating to such
recruitment or conditions of service. C
(5) Unless the case is fully covered by the instructions
issued or advice given by that Ministry, the Ministry
of External Affairs shall·be consulted on all matters
affecting India's external relations."
D
It was pointed out on the basis of the aforesaid Rules, that if
the subject under consideration pertained to. business of a
singular department, the determination thereof would be
rendered "... under the general or special directions of the
Minister in-charge ... ". As against the aforesaid, it was pointed E
out, that in situations where the subject concerned related to
more than one department, no final decision could be taken,
and no final order could be passed, unless all the concerned
departments were agreeable to the contemplated action. It was,
however, pointedout, that in case of non-concurrence of one F
or the other department, a final decision could still be taken,
and. a final orcl@r could still be passed, but only in consonance
with th~ .deteq11ination of the Cabinet.
~·
51. lns~f~r asthe present controversy is concerned, it was G
the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants, that the adminis!rative ministry relevant for the
setting up of the North~Western Railway Zonal Headquarter at
Jaipur was the Ministry of Railways, whereas, the Department
of land Resources was the concerned department to deal with
H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
. Athe matters pertaining to acquisition of land for purposes of the
Union. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned,
learned counsel invited our attention to the Second Schedule
under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules,
1961. Therein, under the Head 'B', the Department of Land
B Resources has been vested with the subject of administration
of the provisions of the Acquisition Act, and matters ~elating to
acquisition of land for purposes of the Union. It was the pointed
submission of the learned counsel
I
for the appellants, that there
was no material on the record of the case to indicate, that in
C the instant acquisition proceedings, the concurrence of the
Department of Land Resources was obtained. As such, it was
submitted, that the instant acquisition of land for the Railways
was liable to be set aside.
52. In order to further his contention that the Rules of
D Business have a binding and mandatory character, learned
counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a decision
rendered by this Court in MRF Limited etc. vs. Manohar
Parrikar & Ors., (2010) 11 SCC 374. Our attention was invited
to the following observations recorded therein :
E
"107. Thus from the foregoing, it is clear that a decision
to be the decision of the Government must satisfy the
requirements of the Business Rules framed by the State
Government under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the
Constitution of India. In the case on hand, as have been
F
noticed by us and the High Court, the .decisions leading
to the notifications do not comply with tt:ie requirements of
Business Rules framed by the Governme11fof Go(l: under
the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constif.Qtion arid the
Notifications are the result of the decision taken by the
G Power Minister at his level. The decision of the individual
Minister cannot be treated as the decision of the State
Government and the Notifications issued as a result of the
decision of the individual Minister which are in violation of
the Business Rules are void ab initio and all actions
H
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 269
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
consequent thereto are null and void. A
108. The appellants contended before this Court that
another Division Bench of the High Court in its earlier
judgment of 21.1.1999 had held that the Notification dated
1.8.1996 was clarificatory and that it did not create any B
extra financial liability on the State Government requiring
approval of the Cabinet in compliance with the Business
Rules before it was brought into force. In our opinion the
said Notification cannot be treated as mere c1 arificatory.
It is a notification issued purportedly in terms of a
Government decision. It was a decision finalized at the level C
of the Minister of Power alone and was taken in violation
of the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of
the Constitution of India. The decision cannot be called a
government decision as understood under Article 154 of
the Constitution, though it may satisfy the requirements of D
authentication. Nevertheless mere authentication as
required under Article 166(2) of the Constitution did not
make it a government decision in law nor would it validate
a decision which is void ab initio. The validity of the
notification will have to be tested with reference to the E
constitutional provisions and Business rules and not by
their form or substance. therefore, this contention of the
appellants is liable to be rejected."
No doubt, this CourUn MRF Limited's case {supra) has made F
a passing referenb~ to· the effect, that violation of Rules of
Business would render all actions taken as void ab initio. In
otherwords, breach of the Rules of Business would render the
entire action r1011 and void: .
53. We have duly considered the fourth submission G
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The
aforesaid determination· iri MRF Limited's case {supra), has
been rendered without examining the said proposition with
reference to Article 77 of the Constitution, as also, any other
legislative enactment. We would, therefore, refrain from H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A pointedly examining the issue (in a manner as would constitute
our conclusion a ratio decidendi on the said subject) since we
are of the view, that the same does not arise for consideration
in the facts and circumstances of this case. The acquisition in
the present controversy was made by the Government of
B Rajasthan, and therefore, there was hardly any justification for
the consultation of the Department of Land Resources of the
Government of India. It is only if the acquisition had been made
by the Railways, the question of consultation with the
Department of Land Resources would have arisen. In our view,
c reliance on the provisions of the Government of India (Allocation
of Business) Rules, 1961 and/or the Government of India
(Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961 in order to assail the
acquisition made in the facts and circumstances of the present
case by the Government of Rajasthan, is wholly misconceived.
D 54. The next contention, serially the fifth contention
advanced at the behest of the appellants was, that the choice
of the appellants' land for acquisition was vitiated by fraud, and
as such, was liable to be set aside. In this behalf, the contention
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants
E was, that the action of acquisition would have been legitimate,
if the Government of Rajasthan had acquired one block of land
for setting up of the North-Western ~ailway Zone Complex. It
was submitted, that the acquisition in question for the purpose
of establishing the Zonal Headquarter and staff quarters for
F North-Western Railways is in two blocks. lnJhis behalf, it is
pointed out, that there was motive:.arid.extraneous
consideration in leaving out of acquisition, the l~I)~ between the
two blocks. It was submitted, that-the left.out laricf(petween the
two blocks acquired) was owned by highly placed bureaucrats
G and police officers. It was also submitted, that the action of
acquiring the appellants' land by consciously leaving out land
in the ownership of highly placed influential persons would also
be hit by Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.
According to the learned .counsel, the impugned acquisition
H process was also liable to be described as arbitrary and
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 271
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
discriminatory. A
(i} On the issue of mala tides and fraud, learned counsel for
the appellants placed reliance on the decision rendered in
Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1964} 4 SCR 733 wherein
this Court held as under : B
"8. Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act
or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse
or a misuse by Government of its powers. While the
indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill-will
is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, C
it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man's mind,
for that it what the appellant has to establish in this case,
though this may· sometimes be done (See Edgington v.
t=itzmaurice [1855] 29 C.D. 459 .. The difficulty is not
lessened when one has to establish that a person in the D
position of a minister apparehtiy acting on the legitimate
exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the
sense of pursuing an illegitimate aim. We must, however,
demur to the suggestion that mala fide in the sense of
improper motive should. be established only by direct E
evidence that is that it must be discernible from the order
impugned or mustbe shown from the notings in the file
which preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the
order, the same. can, in our opinion, be deduced as a
reasonable ~~d)nescapable inference from proved facts." F
(ii) On the subjectofclassification and equality, learned counsel
for the appel!~nts placed. reliance on Col. A. s. Iyer vs. v.
Balasubram'tln.yam, ('1980}"1 $CC 634, and invited our
attention to the'to!loWin'g conclusions drawn therein :
G
"57. Sri Govindan Nair, with assertive argument, gave us
anxious moments when he pleaded for minimum justice to
the civilian elements. He said that the impugned rules were
so designed, or did so result in the working, that all
civilians, recruit or promotee, who came in with equal H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A expectations like his military analogue, would be so
outwitted at all higher levels that promotions, even in long
official careers would be hopes that sour into dupes and
promises that wither away as teasing illusions. In effect,
even if not in intent, if a rule produces indefensible
8 disparities, whatever the specious reasons for engrafting
service weightage of the army recruits, we may have had
to diagnose the malady of such frustrating inequality. After
all, civilian entrants are not expendable commodities,
especially when considerable civil developmental
c undertakings sustain the size of the service. And their
contentment through promotional avenues is a relevant
factor. The Survey of India is not a civil service 'sold' to
the military, stampeded by war psychosis. Nor does the
philosophy of Article 14 or Article 16 con-, template de jure
classification and de facto easteification in public services
D
based on some meretricious or plausible differentiation,
'Constitutional legalistics can never drown the fundamental
theses that, as the thrust of Thomas's case State of Kera/a
v. N.M. (1976) I LLJ 376 SC and the tail-piece of Triloki
Nath Khosa's case State of J & K v. Triloki Nath khoa
E (1974) I LLJ 121 SC bring out, equality clauses in our
constitutional ethic have an equalising message and
egalitarian meaning which cannot be subverted' by
discovering classification between groups and
perpetuating the inferior-superior complex by a neo-
F doctrine. Judges may interpret, even,nfakeviable, but not
whittle down or undo the essence.Cit the Article: This
tendency, in an elitist society with ~-.dischard casts
mentality, is a disservice to our·t'6uoding)a,ith,·even if
judicially sanctified. Subba Rao J. hit the nail on the head
G when he cautioned in Lachhman Da_s v. State of Punjab
[1963] 2 SCR 353 :
'The doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary
rule evolved by courts to give a practical content to
H the said doctrine. Overemphasis on the doctrine of
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 273
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
classification or an anxious and sustained attempt A
to discover some basic for classification may
gradually and imperceptibly deprive the Article of
its glorious content. That ptocess would inevitably
end in substituting the doctrine of classification for
the doctrine of equality; the fundamental right to B
equality before the law and the equal protection of
the laws may be replaced by the doctrine of
classification.'
The quintessence of the constitutional code of equality is C
brought out also by Bose, J. in Bidi Supply Co. case Bidi
Supply Co. v. The Union of India and Ors. [1956) 29 ITR
717 (SC) .
The truth is that it is impossible to be precise, for we are
dealing, with intangibles and though the results are clear D·
it is impossible to pin the thought down to any precise
analysis. Article 14 sets out, to my mind, an attitude of
mind, -a way of life, rather than a precise rule of law. It
embodies a general awareness in the consciousness of
the people at large of. something that exists and which is E
very real but which cannot be pinned down to any precise
analysis of fact save tO say in agiven case that it falls this
side of the line or that, and because of that decisions on
the same point will vary as conditions vary, one conclusion
in one part ofJhe country and another somewhere else; one F
decision tod~y, and another tomorrow when the basis of
society has ·il1tered and the structure of current social
·thinking· is·· different. It Js not the law that alters but the
changing conditions ofthe times and Article 14 narrows
down to a question o"f fact which must be (determined by G
the highest Judges in the land as each case arises."
(iii) In continuation of the aforesaid, learned counsel also placed
reliance on E.P. Roy;:Jppa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4
SCC 3; Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248;
Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 7 S.C.R.
A of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722.
55. We have examined the last contention advanced at the
hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. The instant
contention is based on a factual assertions, namely, that the
8
Government of Rajasthan acted arbitrarily and in a
discriminatory fashion, by deliberately and intentionally leaving
out of the acquisition process, land belonging to highly placed
influential persons. Before venturing to examine the instant
contention advanced at the behest of the appellants, it is
C necessary to determine, whether the factual position, at the time
of acquisition was, as is being alleged by the appellants.
Unfortunately, our determination on the instant aspect of the
matter is contrary to the assertions advanced at the hands of
the appellants. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is
D concerned, reference may be made to paragraph 11 of the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan,
wherein, it was asserted as under :
"It would be relevant to mention that the argument raised
E about certain lands of IAS & IPA officials being selectively
left-out is without any substance~ This argument would onfy
suffice if the land belonging to the IAS/IPS officials on the
date on of acquisition. This is apart'from the fact that
certain lands would be left out in acquisition proceedings.
F It is relevant to mention that no land ,b,elong~ to any IAS/
any
IPS official on the date of acquisition alld subsequent
purchase would not invalidate the acqui~ltion proceedings.••··.
Thus, the finding on this aspeqt doe~:not suffei\~~rri.any
legal infirmity." · ·· .. · ·' :·. · .· . />'-' ·. .
~.:... - '•:;.."c -~
G The aforesaid factual position has .not been.denied on behalf
of the appellants before this Court.·Thus viewed; it is apparent
that the land which was left out, ahdwhich falls between the two
blocks of land acquired, cannot be stated. to have been owned
by influential bureaucrats or police officers, at the time when
H the acquisition in question was made. In the aforesaid view of
RAJENDRA NAGAR ADARSH GRAH NIRMAN SAHKARI SAMITI 275
LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
the matter, it is not possible for us to conclude, that the leaving A
out the land between the two blocks of acquired land, and
further that, the choice of acquisition of the appellants' land to
the exclusion of the land left out of acquisition, was vitiated for
reasons of fraud, mala fides, arbitrariness or discrimination.
For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit even B
in the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned
counsel for the appellants.
56. It is necessary to record herein that the challenge
raised at the behest of the appellants, to the acquisition of land
made by the Government of Rajasthan, for the Railways, was C
vehemently opposed by the official respondents for a variety
of reasons. More particularly on the grounds of delay and
latches, as also, locus standi of the appellants to assail the
acquisition proceedings. Had we dealt with the objections
raised by the respondents and found merit therewith, it may not D
have been necessary for us to examine the merits of the claim
raised by the appellants before us. We may acknowledge, that
at the first blush, the objections raised by the official
respondents did not seem to be bereft of merit. Yet, since the
issues canvassed at the hands of the lea.r'ned counsel for the E
appellants raised important issues of law, we considered it just
and appropriate to deaf.with them in order to settle the legal
proposition canvassed.· Having recorded our conclusions on I
the issues canvas$e~ before us, we are of the view, that it is
np longer-ne'cess~i"fy,for us to deal with the objections/ F
submis_sions ca11vas~d on behalf of the official respondents.
, , F ·,. i'
57. Fof~he r~aso6$.recorded hereinabove, we find no
merit in these.Clppeals. The san1~ are accordingly dismissed.
R.P. Appeals dismissed. G
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