Holding

The Kamal Vihar Township Development Scheme is ultra vires the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Thatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 and violates the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments, rendering it invalid.

Summary

The appellants, landowners in five villages of Raipur district, challenged the Kamal Vihar Township Development Scheme (KVTDS) prepared by the Raipur Development Authority (RDA) under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Thatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973. They alleged that the scheme was formulated without the required zonal plan, ignored the District Planning Committee’s reports, and violated Sections 14, 17 and 50 of the Act, as well as the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments on local self‑government. The Court examined whether the RDA had authority to prepare the scheme, whether the scheme complied with statutory procedures for land acquisition, reconstitution of plots, and environmental clearance, and whether the 35% land return to owners was constitutionally permissible. It held that the KVTDS was ultra vires, lacked a valid zonal plan, was tainted by bias and non‑application of mind, and failed to obtain proper environmental clearance. Consequently, the scheme was set aside and the land acquisition orders were quashed.

Issues considered

Whether the KVTDS authorises the Director of RDA to formulate a Town Development Scheme and contravenes the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments.
Whether the scheme was prepared in accordance with Section 50(1) of the 1973 Act and whether subsequent alteration of land is lawful.
Whether a Town Development Scheme can be validly framed in the absence of a zonal plan.
Whether the Act of 1973 permits the RDA to reconstitute plots and change land use beyond public utility.
Whether returning only 35% of the acquired land to owners is constitutionally permissible.
Whether the scheme complied with mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) clearance procedures.

Legislation cited

Chhattisgarh Zila Yojana Samiti Act, 1995
Companies Act, 1956s. 289
Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976s. 45(1), s. 52, s. 81
Madhya Pradesh Nagar Thatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973s. 14, s. 17, s. 20, s. 21, s. 23A, s. 2(u), s. 38(1), s. 38(2), s. 49, s. 50(1), s. 50(4), s. 50(5), s. 50(6), s. 50(8), s. 52(1)(b)
Madhya Pradesh Zila Yojana Samiti Adhiniyam, 1995
Maharashtra Act, 1966s. 65(1), s. 72(3)(xiii)
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966s. 65(1)

Subjects

Town Development SchemeLocal Self‑Government73rd Amendment74th AmendmentZonal PlanLand AcquisitionReconstitution of PlotsEnvironmental ClearanceNatural JusticeBiasProcedural Fairness

Judgment

[2015] 11 S.C.R. 723

RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA & ORS. ETC. A
v.
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH &OR$. ETC.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 5769-5770 of 2015)
B
JULY29, 2015
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]

Madhya Pradesh Nagar Thatha Gram Nivesh
Adhiniyam, 1973: c
ss.14, 17, 38(1) - Town Planning Scheme - Kamal
Vihar Township Development Scheme (KVTDS) -
Formulation of scheme by the Director of respondent No. 2-.
RDA - Whether the KVTDS provide the authority to the
0
Director of respondent No.2-RDA, to formulate Town
Development Scheme and is it in contravention to the 73ro
and 74 1h Amendments to the Constitution - Held: Once the
Constitution provides for democratically elected bodies for
local self-government, a nominated body like Respondent E
No. 2-RDA cannot assume the role of an elected body and
consequently usurp the.power of the local authority in framing
development schemes and subsequently altering the size
and use of land in the KVTDS - s. 17 mandates the
requirement of taking into consideration the Annual F
Development Plan of the District prepared under the
Adhiniyam of 1995 - However, in the case in hand, there is
no evidence to show that Respondent No. 2-RDA had taken
into consideration any repo1t'prepared under the Adhiniyam
of 1995- s.14 confers·the power upon the Director of Town G
and Country Planning appointed under the Act, to prepare
development plans - However, this power conferred upon
the Dir/3ctor has to be read along with s. 17 which mandates
the Director to take into consideration, any draft Five Year
Plan and Annual Development Plan of a district prepared H
723
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A under the Adhiniyam of 1995- There is no evidence to prove
that the Director had taken into account any report made
under the Adhiniyam of 1995 - On the other hand, the
evidence clearly shows that the Development Plan has been
altered to suit the requirement of KVTDS - This action by
B the Director is impermissible and unlawful - Thi~refore,
KVTDS, having formulated solely by Respondent No. 2-
RDA without taking into consideration the reports of the local
authority, violates the Act of 1973 as well as 73rd and 74th
Amendments to the Constitution - Madhya Pradesh Zila
C Yojana Samiti Adhiniyam 1995 - Constitution of India, 1950
- Part IX and IX-A; Schedule seventh; List II, Entry 5 -
Chhattisgarh Zilla Yojna Samiti Act, 1995- s. 3 - Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966- s. 65(1) Gujarat Town
Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976- s.45(1).
0
s. 50(1) - Preparation of Town Development Scheme -
Whether KVTDS is formulated as per the provision
mentioned in s.50(1) of the Act of 1973-Held: s.50(1) vests
the jurisdiction on the Authority to declare its intention for
E preparing the Town Development Scheme which in this case
is respondent no.2-RDA - s.49 provides that a Town
Development Scheme can be proposed for the purpose of
town expansion, for rebuilding and regenerating areas which
F have degenerated into slums, acquire and development land
for public, commercial and industrial purpose and also for
other work which would bring about environmental
improvement which shall also be taken up with the prior
approval of the State Government- Respondent No. 2-RDA
G has not put any document on record, either before the High
Court or this Court to show any assessment of "need" or
"requirement" for town expansion conducted by it prior to
proposing the KVTDS - Even though KVTDS has allegedly
been introduced for a population of 16,000 per 40 Hect. of
H land, there is no document !survey report to show how the
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 725
CHHATTISGARH

said figure was arrived at by the RDA - Further; fre.quent A
changes in the extent of land acquired for the KVTDS by the
RDA is a very strong indicator of the fact that there is no
rationale behind the proposal of the said Scheme - There is
clear non-application of mind on the part of the State
Government be'hind the increase in the sanctioned area of B
KVTDS from 416.93 acres of land to 2300 acres of land-
Therefore, the Scheme has not been formulated as per
s.50(1).

s. 50 - Whether the subsequent alteration of land C
acquired, is in consonance with the provisions of the Act -
Held: s.2(u) of the Act of 1973 defines a Town Development
Scheme as a scheme formulated to implement the
developmental plan - In the instant case, the development
plan is the Master Plan of Raipur planning area - The very D
definition clearly states that unless master plan allows use
of a particular area as 'residential', it is not open for
Respondent No.2-RDA to propose a township or a town
development scheme whose land use is at variance with the
one provided in the development plan - Till such time as E
the lands in question is notified for residential use,
Respondent No. 2-RDA cannot propose a Town
Development scheme for the said land - Respondent No. 2-
RDA is entrusted with a duty to implement the master plan u/ F
s.38(2) of the Act of 1973- Respondent No. 2-RDA, without
any resolution of the Board, on its own motion, addressed a
letter dated 31.7. 2006 and approached the State
Government for change of land use because it had to propose.
the township in Tikrapara, Devpuri and Boriakhurd villages .G
- Thereafter, KVTDS was also proposed, published, finalised
and approved before the land use was changed by the State
Government- Under the provisions of the Act of 1973, the
development plan/Raipur Master Plan Revised 2021 that is
prevailing, Respondent No. 2- ROA as well as th.e State H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.

A Government gave primacy to KVTDS and sought changes
in the master plan to suit K\/TDS - This is impermissible in
/aw-Accordingly, KVTDS is ultra vires to the Act of 1973.

ss.17, 21 and 49 - Whether the Town Development
B Scheme framed in the present case by respondent No.2-
RDA. in the absence of a zonal plan, is iegal and valid -
Held: Framing of a Zonal Plan by local authority in laying
out a detailed plan of land u0e with sufficient particulars is a
sine qua non under the provisions of the Act- In tl?e case in
C hand, the KVTDS has been prepared in the absence of a
Zonal Plan - It is not possible to define the utilization of land
under the Town Development Scheme unless the Zonal Plan
formulated by the local authority describes with sufficient
particularity the details for which the broadly indicated use of
D land in the Development Plan may be put - Respondent
No. 2- RDA is not permitted to either usurp or bypass the
power vested with the local authorities for preparing town
development scheme in the absence of zoning plan merely
on the ground that the local authority did not exercise its
E constitutional power in preparing the zonal plan following the
direction of Respondent No. 1-State Government uls.20 of
the Act of 1973.

s.50(5), (6) - Whether the Act of 1973 authorises the
F Town Planning and Development Authority to reconstitute
the plots and change the land use apart from public utility-
Held: Reconstitution of plot for the purpose of town
development scheme is permissible for public purpose only
and that too by following the legal procedure of publication
G ·by the authority in gazette about its intent to acquire land- In
the absence of the same, and also when the purpose for
reconstitution of land is not for public purpose, such
reconstitution of land is impermissible under the Act.

H s.50 (6)(vi)- Whether. the proposal of the RDA to return
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 727
CHHATTISGARH

35% of the area of the land taken away from the land owners A
is legally permissible - Held: In view of decision of
Kesavananda Bharathi case, returning 35% of land in lieu
of acquisition is constitutionally impermissible - In the
absence of any reasonable procedure arrived at by the
Respondents, taking 65% of the area of the plot as B
development contribution is wholly unfair and arbitrary,· and
is also impermissible as per s.50 (6)(vi) of the 1973 Act -
Respondents were not justified in. returning only 35% of
reconstituted plots and retaining 65% for different purposes C
mentionljJd by them.
s. 50(8) - While planning the KVTDS, whether the
respondents ensured compliance with EIA clearance
procedure from the competent authority- Held: Due to the
change in the scope of the project, Respondent No. 2- RDA D
was required to ·seek sanction for the project from the Central
. Government - The same was not done - Therefore, the
KVTDS scheme also failed to obtain the environmental
clearance requirement which is the mandatory requirement
in law for initiating any project qy the RDA - A faulty town E
development scheme prepared through incompetent
authorities with blatant violation of legal and environmental
procedure cannot be the reason for deprivation of
constitutional rights of the appellants.
F
Words and Phrases: 'at any time' - Connotation of, in
the context of s. 50( 1) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Thatha
Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973.

Allowing the appeals, the Court
G
HELD: Point no.1. Whether the KVTDS provide
the authority to the Director of respondent No.2-RDA, to
formulate Town Development Scheme and is it in
contravention to the 73'd and 741h Amendments to the
Constitution of India? [Para 8] [752"E-F] H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 11 S.C.R.

A 1.1. As per Part IX and Part IX-A of the Constitution,
a zonal plan has to be framed by democratic institutions
as prescribed under its provisions. However, in the
instant case, Respondent No. 2-RDA, framed the Town
Development Scheme without consulting or taking into
B account the views of the Panchayat and the District
Planning Committee which are constitutionally
authorized to undertake the task of framing Scheme. The
73'" and 7 4 1" Amer:idments were inserted in the
ConstitutiOn of India with the avowed object and
C intention of strengthening the local self-governance
both at the village and District level. The Constitution, •
initi~lly did not vest with power on villages or
communities as units. It rather vested power on
individual as units of the society. It was proposed by Dr.
0
B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee of
the Constitution, that the administration of India should
not be carried out at village level since they are ignorant
units of communities immune from the progress of the
E city and are also influenced by social biases and
prejudices. With this biases and prejudices, it was
apprehended that India, at the time during the drafting
of the Constitution, were not suited to be ruled at village
and panchayat level. On the other hand, Dr. Ambedkar
F proposed that there should be a strong Centre governed
by the Rule of Law for the administration of the country.
Formal inclusion of the panchayats in the constitutional
system was deferred for a later time since the framers of
the Constitution deemed it fit to introduce social reforms
G in the village prior to conferring upon them the power of
self-governance, in the light of the constraints faced by
the new republic of India. Article 40, therefore, was
inserted in the Constitution in the form of Directive
Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution
H so as to move towards the vision of introducing local
RAJENQRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA :v STATE OF 729
CHHATTISGARH

governance when the time :;eems fit. [Para 9, 1O] [753-C- A
E; 754-A-B, F-G; 755-A-C]

1.2. Entry 5 in the List-II to the Vllth Schedule of the·
Constitution enables the State Legislature to make laws
pertaining to local government which also include the B
powers to be vested on the Municipal Corporations,
Improvement Trusts, Authorities, Mining Settlement
Authorities, District Boards and other local authorities
for the purpose of village administration and the local
self-governance. The constitutional amendment in 1992- C
93 through the 73'd and 74'h Amendment Act provided
for uniformity in the structure in' terms of three-tier local
governments at the District (Zila Parishads- ZPs), Block
(Panchayat Samitis-PS) and Village levels (Gram
Panchayats-GPs). With the constitutional amendment, D
the panchayats are constitutionally expected to move
away from their traditional role of simply executing the
programs handed down to them by higher levels of
government. They are on the other hand, expected to
impl.ement their own programs of economic E
development and social justice. The amendments further
confer power upon the States in the form of Schedule XI
to enlarge the domain of panchayats and to include
functions with distributional consequences. This F
schedule includes key functions such as agriculture,
drinking water, education, irrigation, poverty alleviation,
primary, secondary and adult education, roads and rural
electrification and maintenance of community assets.·
[para 11] [755-G-H; 756-A-E] G

1.3. In the present case, the District Planning
Committee (DPC) has been constituted under Section 3
of the Chhattisgarh Zila Vojna Samiti Act, 1995 with an
intention to demc;>cratize the town planning process to H .
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A give effect to the legislative intendment. The Constitution
under Article 243ZD directs setting up of a DPC to
consolidate the plans prepared by Panchayats and
Municipalities in the Districts and to prepare a draft
development plan for district as a whole and the Director
B of every DPC shall forward such development plans as
recommended by the Committee to the government of
the State. After the insertion of Part IX-A in the
Constitution, development plan for a District can only
be drawn by the democratically elected representative
C body i.e. DPC, by taking into account the factors
mentioned in Clause (3)(a) (i), (ii) of Article 243ZD. As per
Clause (4) of Article 243ZD, the Chairman of other DPC
shall forward the development plan as recommended by
D the committee to the Government of the State. [Paras 13,
14] [758-G-H; 759-A-D]

1.4. Respondent No.2-RDA was constituted under
Section 38 of the Act of 1973. The Town Development
Scheme framed by Respondent No. 2-RDA, however,
E has to be read in the-light of Section 50(4) which provides
for the approval of the Town Development Scheme by
appropriate authority. Further, an amendment was made
for the State of Chhattisgarh only, with respect to
F constitution of committee for evaluating reconstitution
of plots for the purpose of the Town Development
Scheme. Therefore, in the light of these provisions if read
in harmonious c.mstruction, the Chief Executive Officer
of Respondent No. 2-RDA is not permitted to unilaterally
G prepare a development scheme resulting reconstitution
of land without taking into consideration the opinion and
suggestions of the democratically elected bodies. such
as the District Planning Committee and Officer of the
Town and Country Planning Department, as mentioned
H in the Act of 1973. [Para 15] [764-8-E]
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 731
CHHATIISGARH

1.5. The Master Plan (Revised) 2021 so prepared is A
in clear contravention of Section 14 of the Act of 1973
read along with Section 17 of the same Act. Section 17
of the Act mandates the requirement of taking into
consideration the Annual Development Plan of the
District prepared under the Madhya Pradesh Zila Yojana · B
Samiti Adhiniyam 1995. However, in the case in hand,
there is no evidence to show that Respondent No. 2- RDA
had taken into consideration any report prepared under
the Act of 1995. On the other hand, there is
cor.respondence on record to prove that the Respondent c
No. 2- RDA, on its own, without taking into consideration
any report, revised the Master Plan 2021 to suit it to the
requirement of the KVTDS. Therefore, the Master Plan
(Revised) 2021 requires reconsideration. [Para 16] [765-
0
B-E]
1.6. The contention urged on behalf of the
respondents that the committee is authorised to modify
or alter the Development Plan under Sections 14 and 17
read with Section 23 of the Act of 1973 is not tenable. E
Section 14 of the Act confers the power upon the Director
of Town and Country Planning appointed under the Act,
to prepare development plans. However, this power
conferred upon the Director has to be read along with
Section 17 of the Act. In the case in hand, there is no F
evidence to prove that the Director had taken into
account an}' report made under the 1995 Adhiniyam. On
the· other hand, the evidence clearly shows that the
Development Plan has been altered to suit the requisites
of KVTDS. This action by the Director is impermissible G
and unlawful. Therefore, KVTDS, having formulated
solely by Respondent No. 2-RDA without taking into
consideration the reports of the local authority, violates
the Act of 1973 as well as Part IX and IX-A of the
H
Constitution. [Paras 23, 24, 25] [771-C-H]
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A 1.7. The Development Plan and its modification has
not been made in accordance with the constitutional
mandate and the Act of 1973. It was contended on behalf
of the appellants that the decision of Respondent No.2-
RDA to add 1900 ac:res of land at different stages, and
B also change of land use, was sullied by bias of Sri S.S.
Bajaj, who acted in different capacities in relation to the
same transaction wherein each authority was expected
to apply its mind independently of each other. The said
contention was well founded. As per the evidence
C produced on 20.07.2009, one Sri S.S. Bajaj, served as
the CEO of the Respondent No. 2- RDA proposed
addition of 1900 acres of land in KVTDS. About 20 days
later, on 10.08.2009, the same Mr. S.S. Bajaj was serving
as Special Secretary, Department of Housing &
0
Environment, Chhattisgarh Government, which is
Respondent No.1 has approved the said addition of 1900
acres of land to the scheme which is a clear case of bias.
It is evident from the evidence that the same person was
E acting in two different capacities who proposed as well
as accepted the plan of addition of land at subsequent
stage. The said proposal was accepted within a span of
20 days only i.e. on 10.08.2009. In view of the said
undisputed facts, the said decision taken by Sri S.S. Bajaj
F as Special Secretary, Department of Housing and
Environment, Government of Chhattisgarh (Respondent
No. 1) in approving the proposal of RDA to include large
extent of land to the KVTDS is vitiated action in law as
the same is tainted with bias and non-application of mind
G on the part of the State Government-Respondent No.1
with regard to the proposal of the Respondent No. 2-
RDA to include large extent of land in the scheme. [Paras
26, 29] [772-A-E; 775-F-H]
H 1.8. The contention that there was no "Committee"
in place is correct. As per the Order issued by the
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 733
CHHATTISGARH

Revenue Branch of Respondent No. 2- RDA, the said A
Committee which was to review the scheme under
Section 50(5) of the Act of 1973, was constituted only on
or about 30.11.2009 but the decision to further extend
the land size into the Town Development Scheme can
be traced as early as 14.7.2009 with the report of Board B
Meeting. [Para 30] [777-F]
Charan v. State of Maharashtra 2012 (4) Born CR
40; Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure
Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC
c
705: 2007 (6 ) SCR 799; Connecticut Fire
Insurance Co. v. Kavanag (1892)A.C. 473, 480;
Gurcharan Singh v. Kam/a Singh (1976) 2 SCC
152: 1976 (1) SCR 739; VL.S. Finance Limited
v. Union of India & Ors. (2013) 6 SCC 278: 2013 D
(8) SCR 849; Greater Mohali Area Development
Authority & Ors. v. Manju Jain &Ors. (2010) 9 SCC
157: 2010 (10) SCR134; National Textile
Corporation Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar Badrikumar
Jagad (2011) 12 sec 695: 2012 (14) SCR 472; E
Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International
(1979) 4 SCC 176; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief
Election Commissioner(1978) 1SCC405: 1978
(2) SCR 272; A.K Kraipak &Ors. v. Union of India
& Ors. (1969) 2 sec 262: 1970 (1) SCR 457; · F
The State of Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdial Singh and
Ors. AIR 1980 SC 319: 1980 (1) SCR 1071; Ml
s. J. Mahapatra and Co. and Anr. v. State of Orissa
&Anr. AIR 1984 SC 1572: 1985 (1) SCR 322 ~
referred to. G
Point No. 2: Whether the Town Development
Scheme in the present case is formulated as per the .
provision mentioned in Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973?
Whether the subsequent alteration of land acquired, is . H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A in consonance with the provisions of the Act? [Para 8]
[752-F-G]
2.1. Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973 states that the
Town and Country Development Authority may at any
time declare its intention to prepare a Town Development
8
Scheme. ]"he phrase "at any time" under Section 50(1)
of the Act is not a charter for the exercise of an arbitrary
decision as and when a scheme has to be framed. The
words 'At any time" have no exemption from all forms of
c limitation for unexplained and undue delay. Such an
interpretation would not only result in destruction of
citizens rights but would also go contrary to the entire
context in which the power has been conferred upon
the authority. Also, a proviso added to Section 50(1) of
o the Act in the year 2012 states that a Development
Authority can declare its intention of preparing Town
Development Scheme only with the prior approval of the
State Government. [Paras 33, 34] [781-G-H; 782-A-B]
2.2. Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973 vests the
E
jurisdiction on the Town and Country Development
Authority to declare its intention for preparin!I a Town
Development Scheme, which in this case is Respondent
No. 2-RDA. Section 49 provides that a Town
F Development Scheme can be proposed for the purpose
of town expansion, for rebuilding and regenerating areas
which have degenerated into slums, acquire and
development land for public, commercial and industrial
purpose and also for other work which would bring
G about environmental improvement which shall also be
taken up with the prior approval of the State Government.
Respondent No. 2-RDA has not put any document on
record, either before the High Court or this Court which
shows any assessment of "need" or "requirement" for
H town expansion conducted by it prior to proposing the
RA.IENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 735
CHHATIISGARH

KVTDS. Even though KVTDS has allegedly been A
a
introduced for population of 16,000 per 40 Hect. of land,
there is no document /survey report to show how the
said figure was arrived at by the RDA. The requirement
of such assessment was all the more necessary because
already a new capital called 'Naya Raipur' has been built B
near Raipur. Further, frequent changes in the extent of
land acquired for the KVTDS by the RDA is a very strong
indicator of the fact that there is no rationale behind the
proposal of the said Scheme. Respondent No.2- RDA
had proposed the area of KVTDS to be 900 acres on C
31.7.2006, .1100 acres on 14.11.2006, 394 acres on
3.6.2008 and eventually 2300 acres on 20.7.2009, without
assigning reasons for coming to such conclusions in
expanding the area to the scheme. In view of the above,
0
there is clear non-application of mind on the part of the
State Government behind the incre.ase in the sanctioned
area of KVTDS. In fact, in letter dated 27.8.2008 to the
Joint Director, Town and Country Planning Authority, it
has been specifically noted that physical survey of the E
area must be carried out. However, the proposal to have
KVTDS as well as sanction for the same by Respondent
No. 1-State Government, was not preceded by a survey
of the area, which renders the exercise of its power of
ex post facto survey into an empty formality which action F
of it is wholly unsustainable in law. Further, the proposal
of the KVTDS is only with the purpose of curbing illegal
plotting which can be served by regulating development
work by exercise of statutory power vested in
Respondent No. 2-RDA under.the Act of 1973. On the G
pretext of regulating development or stopping illegal
construction/ plotting, Respondent No.2-RDA cannot
take away the land of the appellants in exercise of the ·
power of eminent domain by the State Government.
[Paras 35, 36, 37] [783-B-H; 784-A-F] H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A 2.3. Section 2 (u) of the Act of 1973 defines a Town
Development Scheme as a scheme formulated to
implement the developmental plan. In the instant case,
the development plan is the Master Plan of Raipur
planning area. Therefore, the very definition clearly states
B that unless master plan allows use of a particular area
as 'residential', it is not open for Respondent No.2- RDA
to propose a township or a town development scheme
whose land use is at variance with the one provided in
the development plan. Till such time as the lands in
C question is notified for residential use, Respondent No.
2-RDA cannot propose a Town Development scheme for
the said land. Respondent No.2-RDA is entrusted with a
duty to implemenfthe master plan. Resolution dated
D 5.11.2009 passed by Respondent No. 2-RDA proposing
to the State government to get the land use changed
under Section 23A of tre Act in order to implement its
township project either by itself or the CEO, on their own
or in a manner that is inconsistent with the text as well
E the provisions of the Act of 1973. As per the factual
averments of this case, Respondent No. 2- RDA, without
any resolution of the Board, on its own motion,
addressed a letter dated 31.7.2006 and approached the
State Government for change of land use because it had
F to propose the township in Tikrapara, Devpuri and
Boriakhurd villages. Thereafter, KVTDS was also
proposed, published, finalised and approved before the
land use was changed by the State Government. Under
the provisions of the Act of 1973, the development plan/
G Raipur Master Prevised 2021 that is prevailing,
Respondent No. 2- RDA as well as the State Government
gave primacy to KVTDS and sought changes in the
master plan to suit KVTDS. This is impermissible in law.
The finding recorded by the High Court that no finality
H can be attached to the master plan is an erroneous
RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 737
CHHATTISGARH

finding. Accordingly, KVTDS was not prepared in A
accordance with Section 50 of the Act of 197;3 and
KVTDS is ultra vires to the Act of 1973. [Paras 137, 38]
[787-E-H; 788-A; 789-D-H]
Bondu' Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Oevelopm~nt
Authority (2010)7 SCC 129: 2010 (6) SCR 19;
·s
Bangalore Medical Trust v.B.S. Muddappa (1991)
4 SCC 54: 1991 (3) SCR 102 - referred to.
Point no.3 Whether the Town Devel~pment
Scheme framed in the present case by respond1rit No.2- · c
RDA, in the absence of a zonal plan, is legal and valid?
[Para 8] [752-G-H]

3.1. The town development scheme is always
subservient to the master plan as well as the zonal plan, D
as provided under Section 17 of the Act of 1973. Master
plan falls within the category of broad development plans
and is p_repared by only after taking into account the
Annual · Development Reports prepared by
constitutionally elected bodies of local panchayats and E
municipalities etc. A zonal plan is mandated to be
prepared only after the publication of the Development
Plan. Thus, it is evident from the language of Sections
20 and 21 of the Act, that a Zonal Plan can be prepared
only _in adherence to the Development Plan which in the· F
· present case is the Raipur Master Plan of 2021. Next,
Section 49 of the Act which provides for the provisions
for which a Town Development Scheme can be prepared,
has to be read along with Section 21 of the Act, which
clearly mentions that the land required for acquisition G
by the Town and Country Development Authority for the
purpose of any development scheme has to be laid down
in the Zonal Plan. Therefore, a combined reading of
Sections 17, 21 and 49 lays down that the Development
Plan is the umbrella under which a zonal plan is made H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORIS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A for the city. The zonal plan in turn, allocates the land
which could be acquired for town development
schemes. In the absence of a zonal plan in place, .
Respondent No. 2-RDA has skipped the legal mandate
in place for preparation of a Town Development Scheme.
B [Para 39] [790-C-D; E-F; 791-B-E, HJ

3.2. The importance of zonal planning lies in its
distinguished characteristic which lays down with
sufficient particularity the use to which a particular piece
C of land could be put. The object and purpose of the 1973
Act itself foresees that zonal plan is necessary for
implementation of a Town Development Scheme. The
preamble of the Act clearly discloses that a Town
Development Scheme is at best a vehicle to implement
D the Development Plan and Zonal Plan. The provisions
of Sections 49 and 50 of the Act of 1973 categorically
provide for "Development Plan" to mean "master plan"
as well as "Zonal Plan". In the case in hand, the KVTDS
has been prepared in the absence of a Zonal Plan.
E Respondent No. 2- RDA is not permitted to either usurp
or bypass the power vested with the local authorities
for preparing town development scheme in the absence
of zoning plan merely on the ground that the local
F authority did not exercise its constitutional power in
preparing the zonal plan following the direction of
Respondent No. 1-State Government under Section 20
of the Act of 1973. A mere glance at the Master Plan would
clearly go to show that it does not set out the detailed
G land use with sufficient particulars. Therefore, the
framing of a Zonal Plan by local authority in laying out a
detailed plan of land use with sufficient particulars is a
sine qua non under the provisions of the Act. [Paras 40,
41, 42] [792-A-B, F-G; 793-A-C]
H Point No.4: Whether the Act of 1973 authorises the
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 739
CHHATTISGARH

Town Planning and Development Authority to A
reconstitute the plots and change the land use apart
from public utility? [Para 8] [752-H; 753-A]
.4.1. Section 50(5) of the Act of 1973, read with
Section 50(6) of the Act of 1973, provides for constitution
8
of a committee which shall determine the various aspects
of a Town Development Scheme such as its viability, cost
effect etc. Section 50(6) of the Act provides that a
committee constituted under section 50(5) of the Act shall
consider the objections and suggestions and give c
hearing to any person desirous of being heard.·
Thereafter, the committee shall submit its report to the
Town and Country Development Authority and, is
required to submit its proposal on these aspects: define
and demarcate areas allotted or reserved for public D
purpose; demarcate the reconstituted plots; Evaluate
value of original plots and reconstituted plots; determine
whether the areas marked for public purpose are wholly
or partially beneficial to the residents; estimate the
compensation or contribution from beneficiaries of the E
scheme; evaluate increment in value of the reconstituted
plot for calculating incremental value; evaluate the
reduction in value and assess compensation payable
therefor. {Para 47] [798-A-G]
F
4.2. The committee, in the case, in hand, has
recorded in its report only on the first four aspects and
has held the last three aspects as not applicable to the
scheme without assigning any valid reasons. Therefore,
in providing this report, the committee has violated the G
mandatory provision of providing a complete report
before acquiring land from landowners which often
results in loss of livelihood for poor agriculturists. The
single judge of the High Court held that the aforesaid
three aspects are not applicable in the present case for H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A the reason that respondent No. 1-State government has
decided not to seek payment of incremental cost/
contribution cost from the land-holder on account of
development of area while prescribing the size of the
reconstituted plots for which respective landholders
B would be entitled. The said view of the single Judge has
been erroneously upheld by the Division Bench of the
High Court. The said view taken by both the single judge
and Division Bench of the High Court is contrary to the
provision of the Act of 1973, since the High Court has
C not noticed in arriving at the aforementioned conclusion
that the committee was not adhering to the mandatory
provisions with regard to development scheme.
Therefore, the scheme is vitiated in .law for lack of
compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1973. The
0
manner in which the computation of increment in the
value of the reconstituted plot has been arrived at, is
vague. [Paras 48, 49, 50] [798-H; 799-A-F]
4.3. Respondent No. 1-State Government granted
E permission to Respondent No. 2-RDA to publish its
intention under Section 50(2)of the Act of 1973, on
25.1.2008 for village Dunda alone. It publi"!>hed its
intention under the said provision for the villages of
Dunda as well as Tikrapara pursuant to the Board
F Resolution by circulations dated 12.5.2009 and 5.6.2009.
Afterwards Respondent No. 1-State Government
granted permission dated 10.8.2009 for increasing the
area of the Scheme to 2300 acres. The Board of the RDA
G issued another resolution by circulation dated 20.8.2009
for inclusion of three villages namely Boriakhurd,
Dumartarai and Devpuri. The Board Resolution is only
for publication of the scheme in the gazette and the same
was for KVTDS Scheme No. 5 and not KVTDS Scheme
H No.4. Pursuant to the Board Resolution dated
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 741
CHHATTISGARH

20.08.2009, a declaration of intention was published for A
amended scheme on 4.9.2009. The board resolution is
merely for publication of the scheme in the official
gazette. There is no pro)'ision under the 1973Actto issue
. declaration only in so far as amended portion is
concerned. Thus, the inclusion of village Tikrapara is not B
in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
Act and the entire process had to be commenced de
novo. [Para 53] [800-G-H; 801-A-D]

4.4. The provision under Section 49 of the Act of C
1973 only allows a Town Development Scheme to make
provision for reconstruction of plots for the purpose of
buildings, roads, drains, sewage lines and other similar
amenities. It may be noted that the Maharashtra Regional·
and Town Planning Act, 1966 and the Gujarat Town D
Planning and Urban DevelopmentAct, 1976 specifically
provide for reconstituted plots and the Acts also
provided the procedure to be followed for the same
under the respective statutes. Section 65(1) of the
Maharashtra Act and Section 45 (1) of the Gujarat Act are E
in pari materia. Further Section 49 (viii) of the Act of 1973
empowers RDA to make provision for reconstitution. The
board conferred power upon Respondent No. 2-RDA to
make provision for reconstitution and not for F
reconstruction per se. In any event, such power to make
provision for reconstitution is limited to _certain specified
public purposes, which does not include general
housing scheme. [paras 55, 56] [802-C-E; 803-A, D]

4.5. There is conspicuous absence of any G
empowering mechanism under the Act of 1973 for the
above purpose and no authority has been vested under
.the provision of the Act applicable to Chhattisgarh, to
adjust rights of parties in the land. In view of the said H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R

.A provision, mere prescription or the scope of the activity
in the Town Development Scheme under Section 49 of
the Act will not ipso facto confer the power upon
. Respondent No. 2- RDA to alter rights of landowners in
their properties. This unique anomaly under the Act may
B be contrasted with.the Gujarat Act and the Maharashtra
Act wherein the office of the Town Planning Officer has
been specifically created for the said purpose. Further,
under Section 52 of the Gujarat Act the town planning
officer carries out the task of reconstitution of lands. The
C Maharashtra Act of 1966 confer this right on an Arbitrator
appointed by the State Government. In the light of these
provisions, it is clear that under both the town planning
legislations for Gujarat and Maharashtra States, a specific
authority has been statutorily authorized to alter rights
0
in property and to reconstitute plots, whereas no such
authority has been so empowered under the
Chhattisgarh Town Planning Act, 1973. Therefore,
without an official amendment to the Chhattisgarh Act
E and without following the mandatory procedure, no
reconstitution of land under the Town Development
Scheme can take place. The functioning of the
Committee under Section 50(5) of the Act of 1973 is
dissatisfactory and required the process to be followed
F afresh. The committee constituted under the said Act to
hear objections of the desirous parties, was a mere eye
wash. The committee rejected the objections submitted
by the appellants without providing any reasons for the
same and not even providing any hearing opportunities
G to put forth their objections before the said Committee.
Therefore, the recommendations of the Committee did
not carry any weight. This action of the State Government
is vitiated in law and therefore liable to· be set aside.
(Paras 57, 58, 64] (803-E-H; 804-H; 805-C-D; 812-A-C]
H
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 743
CHHATTISGARH

4.6. The committee took decision to exclude A
agricultural land which was formally taken on 22.6.2010
after acceptance of the report of the Committee dated
8.6.2010. But even before this, vide letter dated 15.4.2010,
CEO of Respondent No. 2- RDA had made it clear to
Respondent No. 1-State Government that agricultural B
land will be excluded. The committee constituted under
Section 50(5) was headed by CEO of Respond~nt No. 2-
RDA who himself proposed inclusion of 1900 acres of
land vi de letter dated 20. 7.2009. This affects the rights of
the appellants. For this reason also, they did not receive C
fair hearing from the Committee. The recommendations
of the committee were considered by the Board of
Directors of Respondent No. 2-RQA on 21.6.2010. While
the committee was hearing the objections, there was no
0
freezing of land use and Respondent No. 2-RDA kept on
proposing change in land use. This affected the statutory
rights of the land owners who were entitled to fair hearing
against the acquisition of land. Therefore, in the light of
the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal E
principles laid down by this Court, reconstitution of plot
for the purpose of town development scheme is
permissible for public purpose only and that too by
following the legal procedure of publication by the
authority in gazette about its intent to acquire land. F
Therefore, respondent No.2-RDA could not have
reconstituted plot for any other purpose other than
public purpose. [Paras 66, 67) [812-F-H; 813-A-B; 814-
D-E, F]
Ahmeda.bad Municipal Corpn. · v. Ahmedabad G
Green Belt Khedut Manda (2014) 7 SCC 357;
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana
(2012) 1SCC792: 2011 (14) SCR 1113; Indore.
Development Authority v Madan Lal (1990) 2
H
sec 334 - referred to.
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.

A Point No.5: Whether the proposal of the RDA to
return 35% of the area of the land taken away from the
land owners/appellants is legally permissible? [Para 8]
[753-A-B]
. 5. Since compensation for acquisition of land need
8 to be reasonable and adequate in the interest of justice,
in view of the decision of Kesavananda Bharathi case,
returning 35% of land in lieu of acquisition is held to be
constitutionally impermissible. This is also because the
C 'development' which occurs due to the implementation
of the Town Development Scheme accrues the benefit
to everyone. In the same way, the appellants whose land
has been acquired and proposed to be developed, would
have gained from the development, if at all, as a member
0 of the community gaining from the town development
scheme and not in his individual capacity. When the
compensation for land acquisition is determined, the
price of the land on the date of the declaration of intention
of acquisition is taken into consideration and not
E subsequent development after acquisition since the
development is not connected to acquisition. In the same
manner, if the land is reconstituted in plc>ts for
distribution to the Economically Weaker Sections of the
community or other public purposes, the same cannot
F be done by arbitrarily depriving the land owners of their
Constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 300A of
the Constitution of India. They are entitled for the
compensation from the State Government. The State
Government on the other hand, cannot involuntarily
G acquire land and impose developmental charges in the
same breath. Further, 35% figure was arrived at by
Respondent No. 2-RDA while allocating reconstituted
land. to the appellants, without any valid form of
calculation arrived at by the respondents. This action of
H the respondents is arbitrary also be<;ause the percentage
RAJENDRA SHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 745
CHHATTISGARH

of reconstituted land to be returned to the land owners A
vary from 35% to 58% for large plot holders and small
plot holders. In the absence of any reasonable procedure
arrived at by the Respondents, taking 65% of the area of
the plot as development contribution is wholly unfair and
arbitrary, and is also impermissible as per Section 50 B
(6)(vi) of the 1973Act. [Paras 68, 69, 71] [816-A-G; 817-D-
E]
Point No.6: While planning the KVTDS, whether the
respondents ensured compliance with EIA clearance C
procedure from the competent authority?[Para 8] [753-
B-C]
6.1.As per the MoEF, EIAnotification dated 14.9.2006
was issued by which Townships and Area Development
Projects are put in Category-B1. The KVTDS Scheme D·
No.-04 falls in this category. As per general conditions
of 14.9.2006 notification, projects of "B1" category will
be considered as projects of category "A" if the same
falls in critically polluted areas. Then the Central
Government is the competent authority to grant E
clearance ·to such projects. Further, MoEF, issued a
circular dated 25.8.2009, which has noted that the Central
Pollution Control Board (CPCB) had identified critically
polluted areas. The Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC)
is appraising proposal of EC to the areas. Thereafter the F
concerned State Pollution Control Board will send its
representative with its comments. The circular pertained
to the procedure of grant of EC to development projects
in Critically Polluted Areas. The MoEF issued O.M. dated G
13.1.2010 listing out 'critically polluted' and 'severely
polluted' areas. Raipur falls in severely polluted area (S.
No. 63 with CEPl-65.45). Para 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of the said
O.M. puts a complete prohibition on grant of
environmental clearance to projects falling in 'critically H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A polluted areas' for 8 months and the said moratorium
was further extended by letter dated 31.10.2010. Para 4.2
of the said O.M provides that the procel:lure for grant of
environmental clearance to development projects in
'severely polluted' areas will be as per circular dated
B 25.8.2009, i.e. for critically polluted areas. Therefore, the
effect of O.M. is that the EC to the said projects will have
to be given by the Central Government. Respondent No.
2-RDA submitted its application on 17.6.2010 for EIA
approval for 2300 acres of township. On 25.1.2011, EC
C clearance/EIA approval was granted by the State Level
Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) to
Respondent No.2-RDA which is not the authority to give
such clearance as per O.M dated 13.1.2010 since the
same has to be granted by the MoEF. [Paras 73 to 76]
0
[818-B-H; 819-A-B]
6.2. The MoEF in its affidavit filed before the High
Court in Writ Petition (c) No.6040 of 2011, has stated that
general conditions of EIA Notification dated 14.9.2006
E were made inapplicable on the projects in item 8(b) vide
MoEF O.M. dated 24.5.2011. The High Court has relied
on the aforesaid affidavit and dismissed the contention
of the appellants with regard to the EC issue, thereby it
has erred in not appreciating the said O.M. issued after
F SEIAA had given EC to KVTDS-04. As on 25.1.2011, the
general conditions of EIA notification dated 14.9.2006
were applicable to category 'B' projects and Central
Government was the competent authority to grant EC to
G KVTDS-Scheme No. 04. Even assuming that the EIA
clearance granted by the SEIAA to RDA is valid, the RDA
has deviated mandatory conditions as prescribed under
the EC dated 25.1.2011. In the EC certificate, there is a
specific condition that 'the project proponent shall not
H deviate from the land use proposals in the scheme area
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 747
CHHATTISGARH

as provided under the said master plan'. On 31.1.2011, A
respondent no.1-State Government issued circular with
regard to change in land use· from agricultural to
residential purposes. The land use in the concerned
khasras was already notified as 'residential' under the
Master Plan. Notification dated 4.3.2011 was published B
in the official gazette of the State government with regard
· to change of the land use of khasras from Agricultural to
Residential purposes in the villages Dunda, Oevpur and
Dumartarai and also from Educational to Residential area
in village Tikrapara. As per condition (ii) in the said C
notification, 185 hectares of land has to be maintained.
The land use approved by the Board on 22.6.2010 only
provides for 129.42 hectares of land for green zone. On
25.1.2011, condition (v) of the General Conditions,
0
stipulated that if the scope of a project is changed, fresh
permission should be sought from the SEIAA. Scope of
KVTDS-04 was changed. On 17.6.2-010, i.e. the date of
application for EIA, RDA sought clearance for 2300 acres/
847.84 hectares but finally the scheme was published E
on 16.7 .201Ofor1600 acres. 4.3.2011: change in. land use
notified on 31.1.2011 published in official gazette.
17.8."2011: In .RDA Board Meeting, layout plan was
amended in view of G.O. dated 25.2.2011. This resulted
in change in scope of the project. Thus in view of the F
specific condition (ii) of the Environmental Clearance
dated 25.1.2011, fresh EC should have been sought and
obtained by the RDA but the same has not been obtained.
by it.. [Paras 77, 78, 79, 80) [819-C-H; 820-A-F]
G
6.3. Section 50(8) of the Act cannot be made
retrospectively applicable. In the absence of vesting of
land with. the ROA, layout is not complete and no
allotment can be done. Th~ aforesaid provision of the
Act was inserted by Ordinance dated 16.6.2010. H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.

A Therefore, the same cannot be made applicable
retrospectively to the Scheme as it was sanctioned by
the State Government on 25.1.2008 and 10.8.2009. The
Scheme was finalised on 26.5.2010, by which date, no
land had been acquired by Respondent No. 2- RDA nor
B any piece of land vested in it. Plots are being earmarked
only on paper and such 'on paper' allotment of plots
have been done by Respondent No. 2- RDA. Therefore,
due to the change in the scope of the project,
Respondent No. 2- RDA was required to seek sanction
C for the project from the Central Government. The same
has not been done. Therefore, the KVTDS scheme has
also failed to obtain the environmental clearance
requirement which is the mandatory requirement in law
D for initiating any project by the RDA: A faulty town
develo'pment scheme prepared through incompetent
authorities with blatant violation of legal and
environmental procedure cannot be the reason for
deprivation of constitutional rights of the appellants.
E [Para 81] [820-G-H; 821-A-D]
State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mangaldas and Ors. AIR
1969 SC 634: 1969 (3) SCR 341; His Holiness
Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kera/a (1973) 4 SCC
225:1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1 - referred to.
F
Case Law Reference
2012 (4) Born CR 40 referred to. Para 15
2007 (6) SCR 799 referred to. Para 16
G (1892)A.C.473,480 referred to. Para 21
1976 (1) SCR 739 referred to. Para 21
2013 (8) SCR 849 referred to. Para 21
referred to. Para 21
H 2010 (10) SCR 134
RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 749
CHHATTISGARH

2012 (14) SCR 472 referred to. Para 21 A
(1979) 4 sec 116 referred to. ·Para 22
1978 (2) SCR 272 referred to. Para 26
1970 (1) SCR 457 referred to. Para 26
B
1980 (1) SCR 1071 referred to. Para 30
1985 (1) SCR 322 referred to. Para 31
2010 (6) SCR 29 referred to. Para 37
1991 (3) SCR 102 referred to. Para 38 c
.•
(2014) 1 sec 357 referred to. Para 51
2011 (14) SCR 1113 referred to. Para 67
(1990) 2 sec 334 referred to. Para 67
D
1969 (3) SCR 341 referred to. Para 68
1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to. Para 68
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5769-5770 of 2015 E
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.06.2014 of the
· High Court of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in Writ Appeal Nos. 382
of 2013 and Writ Appeal No. 393 of 2013

WITH F

C.A. No. 5771-5775 OF 2015

Gopal Subramanium, HuzefaAhmadi,AmitAnand Tiwari,
Talha A. Rahman, Kushagra Pandey, Abhinandan Banerjee,
G
RohitShukla, Talha Rahman, NishitAgrawal, M. ShoebAlam
for the Appellants.

Pinky Anand, ASGPrashant Desai, D.N. Goburdhan,
Rajesh Ranjan, Sumesh B11jaj, Rutul Desai, Prabal Bagchi for
the Respondents. H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. The appellants-land owners have filed the present
group of appeals challenging the common impugned judgment
8
and ord,er dated 16.6.2014 passed by the Division Bencl:I of
the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in Writ Appeal
Nos.379, 380, 381, 382, 389 and 393 of 2013 wherein the
High Court upheld the order dated 15.4.2013 passed by the
C learned single Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh,
Bilaspur. upholding the validity of the Town Development
Scheme, namely, 'Kamal Vihar Township Development
Scheme No. 4' (for short 'the KVTDS').

3. The facts of the case are stated hereunder:-
D
The appellants herein are the landowners of portions of
land (with some construction thereon) situated in the villages
Dumartarai, Tikrapara, Boriya Khurd, Deopuri and Dunda of
Raipur District in Chhattisgarh State. The respondent No.2-
E Raipur Development Authority (RDA) was established under
Section 38(1) of the M.P. (C.G.) NagarThatha Gram Nivesh
Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short 'the Act of 1973'). The KVTDS was
planned by the respondent No.2 - RDA while discharging its
F functions under Section 38(2) of the Act of 1973. Though the
KVTDS. initially started as a small Town Development Scheme,
it subsequently included the aforesaid five villages in Raipur
within its Scheme.

4. As per the evidence on record produced before us,
G which are the written communications between the State
Government, respondent No.2-RDAand the Director of Town
and Country Planning, the KVTDS was initially planned and
proposed for an area of 416.93 acres only. The Chief Executive
H Officer of the respondent No.2-RDA had issued public
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHl,JKLA v. STATE OF 751
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

notification declaring its intention of coming up with an A
integrated township of 416.93 acres only. However, a month
after the publication of said notification, the Board of -
respondent No.2-RDA, increased the area of the integrated
Township Scheme from 416.93 acres to 2300 acres which
resulted in the inclusion of the lands of the appellants herein. B

At present, the said Scheme has a total project area of
647.84 Hect., out of which the area available for development
is 610.46 Hect. While 482.29 Hect. of the total land is private
land, 128.17 Hect. is government land. · C

5. According to the development plan, in the above area
of 647.84 Hect., further areas have been marked for
recreational land, roads and lanes and other miscellaneous
infrastructure like educational, hygienic and various public o
purpose amenities. The broad features of the Scheme would
show that there shall be 15 Sectors and the estimated cost of
development of infrastructure would be Rs.1085 crores. The
Government agreed to hand over its land to the respondent
No.2-RDA and the land belonging to the private owners were E
to be taken over by the consent or by acquisition under Section
56 of the Act of 1973.

6. The RDA planned to. develop the land and hand over
about 35% of the developed plot to the land owners without F
charging any contribution/incremental cost from them in return
for their acquired land for the development of the KVTDS under .
Section 56 of the Act of 1973. The remaining area of their
undeveloped plot would be retained and subsequently, may
go to the other land owners or may be utilized for constructing. G
other facilities under the development Scheme. According to
respondent No.2-RDA, 15% of the developed plots have also
been reserved for economically weaker sections which come
to about 32.15 Hect.
H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A 7. Out of the total 4969 private land owners, 39 land
owners did not agree to the Scheme/procedure adopted and
_preferred 23 writ petitions on various grounds which were
dismissed by the learned single Judge of the High Court of
Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur. Aggrieved by the same, six WritAppeals
B were filed by 13 land owners. The Division Bench of the High
Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, after considering the facts,
circumstances and evidence on record of the cases, upheld
the validity of the KVTDS planned by the RDA and dismissed
the appeals on the ground that the same were devoid of merit.
C Hence, the present appeals.

8. We have heard the learned senior counsel for both
the parties. On the basis of the factual circumstance and
evidence on record produced before us and also in the light of
D the rival legal contentions raised by the learned senior counsel
for both the parties, we have broadly framed the following points
which require our attention. The main legal issues which arise
in this case are:-

E ( 1) Whether the KVTDS provide the authority to the
Director of the respondent No.2-RDA, to fqrmulate
Town Development Scheme and Is it in
contravention to the 73rd and 74 1" Amendments to
the Constitution of India?
F (2) Whether the Town Development Scheme in the
present case is formulated as per the provision
mentioned in Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973?
Whether the subsequent alteration of land acquired,
is in consonance with the provisions of the Act?
G
(3) Whether the Town Development Scheme framed
in the present case by the respondent No.2-RDA,
in the absence of a zonal plan, is legal and valid?
(4) Whether the Act of 1973 authorises the Town
H
Planning and DevelopmentAuthorityto reconstitute
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 753
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALAGOWDA, J]

the plots and change the land use apart from public A
utility?
(5) Whether the proposal of the RDA to return 35% of
the area of the land taken away from the land
owners/appellants is legally permissible?
B
(6) While planning the KVTDS, whether the
respondents ensured compliance with ElA
clearance procedure from the competent authority?

Answer to Point No. 1
c
9. As per Part IX and Part IX-A of the Constitution, a
. zonal plan has to be framed by democratic institutions as
prescribed under its provisions. On the other hand, the
Respo_ndent No. 2- RDA, has framed the Town Development D
Scheme without consulting or taking into account the views of
the Panchayat and the District Planning Committee which are
constitutionally authorized to undertake the task of framing
Scheme. It was argued by Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, learned
senior counsel on behalf of the appellants that the Respondent E
No. 2- RDA had assumed the role of town planning authority
by proposing and framing KVTDS with land use which is
different from the one prescribed in the Raipur Master, Plan
(Revised) 2021. In fact, the proposal made by Respondent
No. 2- RDA defined spaces that are meant for business F
Districts, public use, schools, house and parks etc. This task
taken up by the Respondent No. 2- RDA of allocation of spaces
is. by statute vested with the 'local authority' under its power to
make zonal plans. It was further contended by the learned
senior counsel that the Raipur Master Plan (Revised) 202~, G
on the basis of which the KVTDS claims to be implementing
the Scheme has also amended the same without the
participation of the District Planning Committee which is the
constitutionally empowered body to carry out social and
economic planning for a District. H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A 1O. The 73rct and 74th Amendments were inserted in the
Constitution of India with the avowed object and intention of
strengthening the local self-governance both at the village and
District level. It was argued by the learned senior c;ounsel Mr.
Gopal Subramaniam that self-governance was very much a
B partof the Indian society historically. In support of his contention,
he relied upon the words of Sir Charles Metcalfe, the Acting
Governor General of India from 1835 to 1836, on the functioning
of the village panchayats made during the 19th century which
are recorded as under:
c
"The village communities are little republics, having nearly
everything they can want within themselves, and most
independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last
where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles
D down; revolution succeeds after revolution; but the village
community remains the same. The union of the village
communities, each one forming a separate little state, in
itself, has I conceive, contributed more than any other
cause to the preservation of the people of India, through
E all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered,
and is in a high degree conducive to their enjoyment of a
great portion of freedom and independence"'

It is imperative to note here that the Constitution, initially did
F not vest with power on villages or communities as units. It rather
vested power on individual as units of the society. It was
proposed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of.the Drafting
Committee of the Constitution, that the administration of India
should not be carried out at village level since they are ignorant
G units of communities immune from the progress of the city and
are also influenced by social biases and prejudices. With this
biases and prejudices, it was apprehended that India, at the
1
Report of the Select Committee of House of Commons. 1832 Vol. Ill p. 331 as quoted
H in T.N. Srivastava, Local ·self' Governance and the Constitution, EPW July 27, 2002 at
p 3190- 3191
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 755
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

time during the drafting of the Constitution, were not suited to A
be ruled at village and panchayat level. On the other hand, Dr.
Ambedkar proposed that there should be a strong Centre
governed by the Rule of Law for the administration of the
country. Formal inclusion of the panchayats in the constitutional
system was deferred for a later time since the framers of the · B
Constitution deemed it fit to introduce social reforms in the
village prior to conferring upon them the power of self-
governance, in the light of the constraints faced by the new
republic of India. Article 40, therefore, was inserted in the
Constitution in the form of Directive Principles of State Policy C
in Part IV of the Constitution so as to move towards the vision
of introducing local governance when the time seems fit.
Though, this was the decision taken at the time of the drafting
of the Constitution, most of the framers in the Constituent
0
Assembly reposed their faith on the potential of village
panchayats and were of the opinion that self-governance at
local level is the only way forward to realize Swaraj for our
cour:itry. Shri Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, the member of the
Constituent Assembly, presented his opinion on village E
panchayats before the Assembly which is recorded as under:
"But who are these republics? They have to be brought
into existence ..... Therefore, I would advise that in the
directives, a clause must be added, which would insist
upon the various governments that may come into ·F
existence in future to establish village panchayats, give
them political autonomy also economic independence
in. their own way to manage their own affairs."2

11. It is further to be noted that Entry 5 in the list-II to the G
Vllth Schedule of the Constitution enables the State Legislature
to make laws pertaining to local government which also include
the powers to be vested on the Municipal corporations,

'constituent Assembly Debates. Vol. VII at p. 352 on November 9th, 1949 H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Improvement Trusts.Authorities, Mining SettlementAuthorities,
District Boards and other local authorities for the purpose of
village administration and the local self-governance. The
constitutional amendment in 1992-93 through the 73'd and 74 111
Amendment Act provided for uniformity in the structure in terms
B of three-tier local governments at the District (Zila Parishads-
ZPs}, Block (Panchayat Sa111itis-PS) and Village levels (Gram
Panchayats-GPs). With the constitutional amendment, the
panchayats are constitutionally expected to move away from
their traditional role of simply executing the programs handed
C down to them by higher levels of government. They are on the
other hand, expected to implement their own programs of
economic development and social justice. The amendments
further confer power upon the States in the form of Schedule
D XI to enlarge the domain of panchayats and to include functions
with distributional consequences. This schedule includes key
functions such as agriculture, drinking water, education,
irrigation, poverty alleviation, primary, secondary and adult
education, roads and rural electrification and maintenance of
E community assets.

12. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel,
Mr. Gopal Subramaniam that as perArticle 243 G(1}, the
authority to prepare plans for economic development and
F social justice has been vested with the Gram Panchayat.
·Articles 243W and 243ZF have also been inserted to vest the
local authority with the power to prepare plans for economic
development. The 12th Schedule inserted into the Constitution
specifically lists "urban planning including town planning" as
G an entry on which local authorities have full power under Article
243Wofthe Constitution.

Further, Article 243ZD was inserted into the Constitution
wherein the power to prepare a draft development plan is
H vested with the District Planning Committee (DPC). The above
mentioned provision of the Constitution is extracted hereunder:
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 757
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

"243ZD. (1) There shall be constituted in every State at A
the district level a District Planning Committee to
consolidate the plans prepared by the Panchayats and
the Municipalities in the district and to prepare a draft
.development plan for the district as a whole.
B
(2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision
with respect to-
(a) the composition of the District Planning Committees;
(b) the manner in which the seats in such Committees
shall be filled: Provided that not less than four-fifths of C
the total number of members of such Committee shall·
be elected by, and from amongst, the elected members
of the Panchayat at the district level and of the
Municipalities in the district in proportion to the ratio 0
between the population of the rural areas arid of the urban
areas in the district;
(c) the functions relating to district planning which may
be assigned to such Committees;
E
(d) the manner in which the Chairpersons of such
Committees shall be chosen.
'
(3) Every District Planning Committee shall, in preparing
the draft development plan,-
F
(a) have regard to- (i) matters of common interest
between the Panchayats and the Municipalities including
spatial planning, sharing of water and other physical and
natural resources, the integrated development of
infrastructure and environmental conservation; G
(ii) the extent and type of available resources whether
financial or otherwise;
(b) consult such institutions and organisations as the
Governor may, by order, specify.
H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A (4) The Chairperson of every District Planning
Committee shall forward the development plan, as
recommended by such Committee, to the Government
of the State."

8 Also, under Article 243 ZF, any law inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution will be held void. Article 243 ZF
reads as under:

"243 ZF. Continuance of existing laws and
municipalities.- Notwithstanding anything in this Part,
c any provision of any law relating to Municipalities in force
in a State immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992,
which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall
continue. to be in force until amended or repealed by a
D
competent Legislature or other competent authority or
until the expiration of one year from such
commencement, whichever is earlier: Provided that all
the Municipalities existing immediately before the
E commencement shall continue till th!' expiration of their
duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed
to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of that State or,
in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, by
each House of the Legislative of that State."
F
Similar provision exists for the Gram Panchayats under
Article 243 N of the Constitution ..

13. In the present case, the District Planning Committee
(DPC) has been constituted under Section :3 of the
G Chhattisgarh Zila Yojna Samiti Act, 1995 (for short 'the Act of
1995') with an intention to democratize the town planning
process to give effect to the legislative intend men!. Section 7
of the Act of 1995 provides for functions of the DPC as has
been prescribed by the Constitution. The Constitution under
H
'
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 759
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A level in every State a Committee. known as District
Planning Committee. It's purpose is to consolidate the
plans prepared by.the Panchayats and the Municipalities
in Districts and to prepare a draft development plan for
district as a whole. Article 243P defines Municipalities.
B Definition of District in Articles 243P and 243, as also
definition of Panchayat in both the Articles is, identical.
The purpose of Article 243ZD therefore. appears to have
a committee to effectively amalgate together separate
plans prepared by the Panchayats and Municipalities,
c and on its basis to prepare a cir.aft development plan for
District as a whole. That Article may also mean that DP.C
can consolidate these plans and also in addition.
independently prepare a draft development plan for
district as a whole. As per Article 243-ZD[2J, the State
D
Legislature has to provide for composition of DPC and
filling in of the seats. 4/5th of the total number of members
of such committee need to be elected by and from
amongst the elected members of the Panchayat at
E district level and of the municipalities in districts. The law
made by the State Legislature may assign to such
committees function relating to district planning. Article
243-ZD [3] obliges the DPC to prepare a draft
development plan having regard to the matters of
F common interest between the Panchavats and
Municipalities, including spatial planning, sharing of water
and other physical and natural resources, integrated
development of infrastructure and environment
conservation. For that purpose, extent and type of
G resources needs to be looked into and such resources
may include finance or other resources. The·Legislature
of State has been empowered to make law requiring the
DPC to discharge functions relating to district planning
as may be assigned to it. Under Sub-Article (4) the
H Chairperson of every District Planning Committee has
RAJENDRA SHJ.\NKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 761
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
p

to forward the development plan recommended by such A
committee to Government of State. Obviously, it is the
draft development plan referred to in earlier part Perusal
of Eleventh Schedule shows 29 entries, which include
Agriculture, Land improvement, Animal Husbandry,
. Social Forestry, Rural housing, Drinking water, Poverty B
alleviation, Education, Libraries, Market and fairs, Health.
and Sanitation, Family welfare, Women and Child
Development etc. Entry no.13 therein deals with Roads,
· Culverts, Bridges, Ferries, Waterways and other means
of communication. Article 243W casts similar power and C
obligation upon the Municipalities. Schedule relevant
therein is Twelfth Schedule and Roads and Bridges is
entry no.4 in it Article 243N specifies that any law relating
to Panchayat in force, immediately before the D
commen·cement of the Constitution [73rd Amendment]
Act, 1992 which is inconsistent with the provision of this
part IX of the Constitution, shall continue to be in force
until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or
.until the expiration of one year from its commencement, E
whichever is earlier. Thus, these new provision added to ..
Constitution for strengthening the Panchayat Raj must
operate after 1 year, if State Legislature had any
inconsistent law with provision in said part and if that
Legislature does not bring it in consonance with said part F
within said period of one year.
23. These Constitutional provision no where show the
intention of Parliament to deprive the Panchayats or
Municipalities of their powers or to dilute their f1,1nction
as institutions of self-government On the contrary, subject G
to provision of Constitution, the Legislature of State has
been permitted to confer necessary powers and authority
. upon these bodies to enable them to function effectively.
Article 243ZD which makes a provision for DPC, is one H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A such provision. It requires the Legislature to make a law
and stipulates that purpose of DPC is to consolidate the
plan prepared by the Panchayats and Municipalities in
Districts and to prepare a draft development plan for
District as a whole. T~e provision noted by us above show
B relevance of matters of common interest. asJm?cified in
Article 243 ZD [3JlaJ for said purpose. A Panchayat or
Municipality can function only in area over which it has
jurisdiction. Schemes prepared by it, therefore may not
have any extra territoria_I application though pqssibility of
c its such impact or extending its benefit to outsiders cannot
be ruled out. The water reservoir or other physical/natural
resources, in jurisdiction of such institution of local self
government can be conveniently exploited for larger area
of two or more Panchayats or then Panchayats and
D
municipalities at same cost or by saving public revenue.
To facilitate such exploitation, the Parliament has thought
it fit to create a District Planning Committee [DPC] which
can consolidate the otherwise separate plans pi-epared
E by the Panchayats and Municipalities and prepare a draft
development plan for entire District as a whole. It is
therefore obvious that when such consolidation of
development plans which are otherwise separate,
becomes necessary or is found essential in larger public
F interest, DPC has been constituted to undertake that
exercise. It has been given power to prepare a draft
development plan for district as a whole also. Thus idea
seems to be maximum utilization of resources at
minimum costs by larger number of people spread over
G under different local bodies in a district. Article 243ZD
does not confer any executable status on such plans and
the same need to be sent to Government of the State.
Thus, if development is restricted to area of only one
authority and has no extraterritorial potential, the right of
H concerned local authority to proceed with it, is normally
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 763
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

not prejudiced in any way." A

. (emphasis supplied by this Court)

As has been mentioned supra, the Respondent No.2-RDA was
constituted under Section 38 of the Act of 1973. The Town
Development Scheme framed by Respondent No. 2-RDA, B
however, has to be read in the light of Section 50(4) which
provides for the approval of the Town Development Scheme
by appropriate authority which reads as under:

"(4) The Town and Country Development Authority shall c
consider all the objections and suggestions as may be
received within the period specified in the notice under
sub section (3) and shall, after giving a reasonable
opportunity to such persons affected thereby as are
desirous of being heard, or after considering the report D
of the committee constituted under Sub section (5)
approve the draft scheme shall be deemed to have
lapsed.)"

Further, an amendment was madeforthe State ofChhattisgarh E
only, with respect to constitution of co.mmittee for evaluating
reconstitution of plots for the purpose of the Town Development
Scheme. The amendment came into force w.e.f. 6.9.2010
which reads as under:
F
"[(5) Where the town development scheme relates to
reconstitution of plots, the Town and Country
Development Authority shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in Sub- section (4), constitute a committee
consisting of the Chief Executive Officer of the said G
Authoritv and to other members of whom one shall be
re1:1resentative of the District Collector, not below the rank
of De1:1ut',' Collector and the other shall be an officer of
the Town and Countrv Planning DeQartment not below
the rank of DeQUt',' Director nominated b',' the Director of H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Town & Country Planning for the purpose of hearing
objection and suggestions received under sub- section
(3).]" .•
(emphasis supplied by the Court)

B Therefore, in the light of the provisions mentioned above if read
in harmonious construction, the Chief Executive Officer of
Respondent No. 2-RDA is not permitted to unilaterally prepare
a development scheme resulting reconstitution of land without
taking into consideration the opinion and suggestions of the
c democratically elected bodies such as the District Planning
Committee and Officer of the Town and Country Planning
Department, as mentioned in the Act of 1973. However, in the
present case, as per the evidence on record put before us,
the Chief Executive Officer of Respondent No. 2- RDA,
D formulated the Town Development Scheme without taking the
opinion of the local committees which are constitutionally
authorized to make suggestions in the matter of Town
Development Scheme under the amended provisions of
Section 50(5) of the Act of 1973.
E
In addition to this, it.has been contended by the learned
senior counsel on behalf of the appellants that the present
master plan, of which the development authority wants to
implement, has been prepared by the Chief Executive Officer
F without regard to the District Planning Committee's power
under the constitutional provisions which provisions are
incorporated in the State Act. Therefore, it has been argued
. by the learned senior counsel that the revised master plan itself
is opposed to the constitutional and statutory provisions and
G therefore, it is a nullity in the eyes of law. Following the same,
the KVTDS framed and purported in compliance with the Raipur
Master Plan (Revised) 2021, is also nullity in the eyes of law.

16. The above said argum~nt is raised by the learned
H sehior counsel on behalf of the appellants drawing our attention
RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 765
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

to the case of Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure A
lndustria.f Coke & Chemicals Ltd. 4 which will be discussed
in the appropriate place of this judgment. It was held in that
case that both development plan and master plan are one and
the same thing described by different names in different states.
It has been admitted by the Respondent No. 2- RDA that they B
have prepared the Master Plan (Revised) 2021. We are of the
opinion that the Master Plan so prepared is in clear
contravention of Section 14 of the Act of 1973 read along with
Sectio(l 17 of the same Act. Section 17 of the Act mandates
the requirement of taking into consideration the Annual c
Development Plan of the District prepared under the Madhya
Pradesh Zila Yojana Samiti Adhiniyam 1995. However, in the
case in hand, there is no evidente to show that the Respondent
No. 2- RDA had taken into consideration any report prepared D
under the Act of 1995. On the other hand, there is
correspondence on record to prove that the Respondent No.
2- RDA, on its own, without taking into consideration any report,
revised the Master Plan 2021 to suit it to the requirement of
the KVTDS. Therefore, we are of the opinion thatthe Master E
Plan (Revised) 2021 requires reconsideration and should be
.prepared in accordance with the legal procedure.

17. Next, it is relevant for us to examine Entry 5 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which empowers F
the local government to elect members to municipal
corporations, improvement trusts, District boards, Mining
settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose
of local self-government or village administration. Also, under
Entries 1 and 3 of Twelfth Schedule, Urban planning includes G
town planning and planning for economic and social
development respectively. In the light of the above entries, it is
contended by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
appellants, Mr. Gopal Subramaniam and Mr. HuzefaAhmadi
' (2001) s sec 10s H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A that the Act of 1973 in the present case has been read by the
respondents without taking into account the subsequent
amendments made to the Act in adherence to the constitutional
amendment provision. As a consequence, the power vested
on the Director of the Planning Authority has been read by the
B respondent No.2-RDA in isolation to the subsequent
amendments made in the Act thereby violating the present
constitutional scheme of self governance.

18. It was further argued by the learned senior counsel
C on behalf of the appellants that under Article 243 N and Article
243 ZF, the Act of 1973 was required to be amended to make
it adherent to the provisions of 73rd and 74'h Constitutional
amendments. The learned sertior counsel further argued that
disobedience to the constitutional mandate amounts to
D breaking down of the federal polity leading to constitutional
impasse. The amended provisions of the Act of 1973 clearly
provides for a role of local authorities in the planning process.
The same cannot be abrogated. It is also contended that the
role and functions of the District Planning Committee were
E notified once Chhattisgarh was notified out of Madhya Pradesh.
This was further supplemented by the District Planning
Committee. Therefore, in the presence of a notified District
Planning Committee, it was argued by the learned senior
F counsel, that planning for districts as a conglomeration of
panchayats cannot be done by Respondent No. 2-RDA.

19. We are in agreement with the legal contentions rais~d
by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants. Once
the Constitution provides for democratically elected bodies
G for local self-government, a nominated body like Respondent
No. 2- RDA cannot assume the role of an elected body and
consequently usurp the power of the local authority in framing
development schemes and subsequently altering the size and
use of land in the KVTDS.
H
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 767
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

20. On the other hand, it was argued by Mrs. Pinky Anand A
and Mr. Prashant Desai, the learned senior counsel on behalf
of the respondents that most of the submissions made by the.
learned senior counsel of the appellants, were not raised
before the courts below and have been raised for the first time
before this Court on the ground of violation of the 73ro and 74 1h B
amendment of the Constitution. Further, it was argued that there
has been full complian.ce of 73'" and 74th Constitutional
Amendment and the committee as contemplated by the said
amendment, is also responsible for the modification or revision
of the development plan under Section 23 read with Sections C
14 to 18 of the Act of 1973.

21. We are not able to agree with the contention of the
respondent that a ground raised before this Court for the first
time is not maintainable because it has been raised before us D
for the first time and has not been raised before the courts
below. Though the said legal plea is raised for the first time iA
these proceedings, the learned senior counsel on behalf of
the appellants placed reliance upon the judgment of the Privy
Council In Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh 5 E
wherein, Lord Watson has observed as under:

"when a question of law is raised for the first time in a
court of last resort, upon the construction of a document,
or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond F
controversy, it is not only competent but expedient, in the
interests of justice, to entertain the plea."

The aforesaid views of the Court of Appeal have been relied
upon by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. Kam/a Singh6• The G
above mentioned aspect of Article 243ZD, although is being
raised before this Court
. for the first time, we are of the view.
·that the same is based on admitted fatts. The legal submission
5 . • .
[(1892) A.C. 473, 480 (Privy Council)
'(1976) 2 sec 1s2 H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.·

A made on behalf of the appellants under Article 243ZD of the
Constitution has to be accepted by this Court in view of the
similar view that a new ground raising a pure question of law
can be raised at any stage before this Court as laid down by
this Court in II.LS. Finance Limited v. Union oflndia & Ors. 7,
B which reads thus:-

"7. Mr Shankaranarayanan has taken an extreme stand
before this Court and contends that the Company Law
Board has no jurisdiction to compound an offence
c punishable under Section 211(7) of the Act as the
punishment provided is imprisonment also. Mr Bhushan,
however, submits that imprisonment is not a mandatory
punishment under Section 211 (7) of the Act and, hence,
the Company Law Board has the authority to compound
D the same. He also points out that this submission was
not at all advanced before the Company Law Board and,
therefore, the appellant cannot be permitted to raise this
question forthe first time before this Court. We are not in
agreement with Mr Bhushan in regard to his plea that
E this question cannot be gone into by this Court at the first
instance. In our opinion, in a case in which the facts
pleaded give rise to a pure question of law going to the
root of the matter, this Court possesses discretion to go
into that. The position would have been different had the
F appellant for the first time prayed before this Court for
adjudication on an issue offact and then to apply the law
and hold that the Company Law Board had no jurisdiction
to compound the offence."

G Further, this Court in Greater Mohali Area Development
Authority & Ors. v. Manju Jain & Ors. 8 held as under:..:
"26. Respondent 1 raised the plea of non-receipt of the
letter of allotment first time before the High Court. Even if
H 1
(2013) e sec 21a
a (2010) g sec 157
RAJENDRA ::>HANKARSHUKLA v. STATE OF 769
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

it is assumed that it is correct, the question does arise A
as to whether such a new plea on facts could be agitated
before the writ court. It is settled legal proposition that
pure question of Jaw can be raised at any time of the
proceedings but a question of fact which requires
investigation and inquiry, and for which no factual B
foundation has been laid by a party before the court or
'tribunal below, cannot be allowed to be agitated in the·
writ petition. If the writ court for some compelling
circumstances desires to entertain a new factual plea
the court must give due opportunity to the opposite party C
to controvert the same and adduce the evidence to
substantiate its pleadings. Thus, it is not permissible for
the High Court to consider a new case on facts or mixed
question of fact and Jaw which was not the case of the
0
parties before the court or tribunal below. [Vide State of
U.P v. Or. Anup,am Gupta, Ram Kumar Agarwal v.
ThawarDas, Vasantha Viswanathanv. VK. Elayalwar,
. An up Kumar Kundu. v. Sudip Charan Chakrabor:ty,
Tirupati Jute Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of WB. and E
Sanghvi Reconditioners (P) Ltd. v. Union of India.] .

27. In the instant case, as the new plea on fact has been •
raised first time before the High Court it could not have
been entertained, particula.rly in the manner the High
Court has dealt with as no opportunity of C"ontroverting F
the same had been given to the· appellants. More so, the
High Court, instead of examining the case in the correct
perspective, proceeded in haste, which itself amounts
to arbitrariness. (Vide Fuljit Kaurv, Sia/e of Punjab.)" G
. In National Textile Corpot:ation Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar
Badrikumar JagacP, it was held as under:-

"19. There is no quarrel to the settled legal proposition
'(2011) 12 sec 695
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.

A that a new plea cannot be taken in respect of any factual
controversy whatsoever, however, a new ground raising
a pure legal issue for which no inquiry/proof is required
can be permitted to be raised by the court at any stage
of the proceedings. (See Sanghvi Reconditioners (P)
B Ltd. v. Union of India and Greater Mohali Area
Development Authority v. Manju Jain.]"
22. Further, this Court has frowned upon the practice of
the Government to raise technical pleas to defeat the rights of
c the citizens in Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu
lnternationa/10 wherein it was opined that it is about time that
g0vernments and public authorities adopt the practice of not
relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating
legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the
D citizens. Para 2 from the said case reads thus:-

"2. We do not think that this is a fit case where we should
proceed to determine whether the claim of the
respondent was barred by Section 110 of the Madras
E Port Trust Act (II of 1905). The plea of limitation based
on this section is one which the court always looks upon
with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public authority
like the Port Trust should, in all morality and justice, take
up such a plea to defeat a ju.st claim of the citizen. It is
F high time that governments and public authorities adopt
the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the
purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and
do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a
government or a public authority takes up a technical plea,
G the Court has to decide it.and if the plea is well-founded,
it has to be upheld by the court, but what we feel is that
such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by ·a
government or a public authority, •unless of course the
claim is not well-founded and by reason of delay in filing
H "(1979) 4 sec 176
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 771
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

it, the evidence for the. purpose of resisting such a claim A
has become unavailable. Here, it js obvious that the claim
of the respondent was a just claim supported as it was
by the recommendation of the Assistant Collector of
Customs and hence in the exercise of our discretion
under Article 136 of the Constitution, we do not see any B
reason why we should proceed to hear this appeal and
adjudicate upon the plea of the appellant based on
Section 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act (II of 1905)."
,I 23. We are also not inclined to accept the contention c
urged by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
respondents that the committee is authorised to modify or alter
the Development Plan under Sections 14 and 17 read with
Section 23 of the Act of 1973.
'
24. As has been mentioned earlier, section 14 of the Act D
confers the power upon the Director of Town and Country
Planning appointed under the Act, to prepare development
plans. However, this power conferred upon the Director has to
be read along with Section 17 of the Act, which mandates the E
Director to take into consideration, any draft Five Year Plan
and Annual Development Plan of a district prepared under the
Madhya Pradesh Zila Yojana Samiti Adhiniyam, 1995. In the
case in hand, there is no evidence to prove that the Director
had taken into account any report made under the 1995 F
Adhiniyam. On the other hand, the evidence on record
produced before us clearly shows that the Development Plan
has been altered to suit the requisites of KVTDS. This action
by the Directqr is impermissible and unlawful.
25. Therefore, we are inclined to accept the contention G
raised by the learned senior counsel on behalf of.the appellants
and hold ·that KVTDS, having formulated solely by the
Respondent No. 2- RDA without taking into consideration the
reports of the local authority, violates the Act of 1973 as well
as Part IX and IX-A of the Constitution. H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R. ·

A 26. We are inclined to agree with the fact that the
Development Plan and its modification has not been made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate and the Act of
1973. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel on
behalf of the appellants that in the backdrop of the aforesaid
B Constitutional morality and the fact situation of the cases in
hand, the decision of the Respondent No.2- RDA to add 1900
acres of land at different stages, and also change of land use,
is sullied by bias of Sri S.S. Bajaj, who acted in different
capacities in relation to the same transaction wherein each
C authority was expected to apply its mind independently of each
other. The said contention by the learned senior counsel on
behalf of the appellants is well founded and the same must be
accepted by this Court. There is strong substance and evidence
in the submissions of the learned senior counsel of the
D
appellants. As per the evidence produced before us, on
20.07.2009, one Sri S.S. Bajaj, served as the CEO of the
Respondent No. 2- RDA proposed addition of 1900 acres of
land in KVTDS. About 20 days later, on 10.08.2009, the same
E Mr. S.S. Bajaj was serving as Special Secretary, Department
of Housing & Environment, Chhattisgarh Government, which
is Respondent No.1 before us has approved the said addition
of 1900 acres of land to the scheme which is a clear case of
bias. This Court has on many occasions, mentioned the bare
F minimum requirement of trust and fairness by the state that
should ensure its people in running of the government. In the
case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner", this Court held as under:
•
"3. The moral may be stated with telling terseness in the
G
words of William Pitt: 'Where laws end, tyranny begins'.
Embracing both these mandates and emphasizing their
combined effect is the elemental law and politics or
Power best expressed by Benjamin Dizreeli:
11
H (1978) 1 sec 405
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 773
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.)

I repeat. .. that all power is a trust-that we are accountable A
for its exercise-that, from the people and for the people,
all springs, and all must exist."
(Vivien Grey, BK. VI. Ch. 7)
Aside from these is yet another, beari_ngs on the play of B
natural justice, its nuances, non-applications, contours,
colour and content. Natural Justice is no mystic testament
of judge made juristic but the pragmatic, yet principled,
requirement of fairplay in action as the norm of a civilised
justice-system and minimum of good government- c
crystallised clearly in our jurisprudence by a catena of
cases here and elsewhere .... "

It has also been held by this Court that principles of natural
justice are applicable to administrative enquiries as well, and
D
that no person can be a judge in his own cause. It was held in
the case of A.K Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 12

"20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure
justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of
justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered E
by any law validly made. In other words they do not
supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept
of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change
in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included
just two rules namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his F
own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and
(2) no decision shall be given against a party without
affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alterarri
partem). Very soon there- after a third rule was envisaged
an9 that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in G
good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or
unreasonably. But in the course of years many more
subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural
12
· jYstice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts H.
(1969) 2 sec 262 .
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A that unless the authority concerned was required by the
law under which it functioned to act judicially there was
no room for the application of the rules of natural justice.
The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the
purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent
B miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules
should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.
Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates
administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries.
Enquiries which were considered administrative ·at one
c time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in
character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both
quasi- judicial enquiries as well as administrative
enquiries."

D For the above reason alone as rightly contended by the learned
senior counsel on behalf of the appellants, the enhancement
of land in the KVTDS is vitiated due to Jack of objectivity and
non-application of mind.

E 27. The initial intention to prepare the KVTDS of 416.93
acres was published in the Gazette on 05.06.2009. Thereafter,
on 14.07.2009, Sri S.S. Bajaj serving as CEO of Respondent
No. 2- RDA presided over the meeting of the Board of Directors
of the RDA wherein the decision to add 1900 acres of land of
F villages including Dumartarai Village to KVTDS was taken.
Pursuant to the said Board Resolution, the CEO-RDA sent a
proposal dated 20.07.2009to the State Government seeking
addition of an area of 1900 acres to the KVTDS. It is clear
from the minutes of the Board meeting on 14.7.2009 as well
G as the said proposal dated 20.7.2009 that no prior survey or
assessment of the need for addition of land to the area of the
scheme was undertaken by the RD~.

28. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel
H
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 775
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

on behalf of the appellants, a proposal for the Town A
Development Scheme required to be submitted to the State
Government in accordance with the Government Order dated
18.11.1999 and it is the obligation of the Respondent No. 1-
State Government to independently consider such a proposal
and exercise its mind as to whether the same is proper and if B
it raises concerns of public interest when such inclusion of the
land use is made under the Town Development Scheme.
Independently, it is evident from the fact that on 20'h July, 2009,
a proposal was sent by the Respondent No. 2- RDA to the
Respondent No. 1- State Government and the same was C
approved by Sri S.S. Bajaj, who at that point of time was acting
as Special Secretary, Department of Housing and
Environment, Government of Chhattisgarh who had also
proposed the addition of 1900 acres to be included in the D
scheme when .he was acting as the CEO of the RDA. It is
evident from the evidence put on record before us that the
same person was acting in two different capacities who
proposed as well as accepted the plan of addition of land at
subsequent stage. The said proposal was accepted within a E
span of 20 days only i.e. on 10.08.2009 .

. 29. In view of the aforesaid undisputed facts as pointed
out by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants,
the aforesaid decision taken by Sri S.S. Bajaj as Special
Secretary, Department of Housing and Environment, F
Government of Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 1) in approving
the proposal of RDA to include large extent of land to the
KVTDS is vitiated action in law as the same is tainted with
bias and non-application of mind on the part of the State G
Government-Respondent No. 1 with regard to the proposal of
the Respondent No. 2- RDA to include large extent of land in
the scheme. The Respondent No . 2- RDA released an affidavit
. dated 23.11.2010 on the ground of challenge by stating that:
"all decisions and actions have been taken by the H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Authority and not by any individual. Even otherwise
the communications done by the officer for the
answering respondent was not his individual
communication but was on behalf of the Committee as
well as Board of Directors and therefore could not be
B said to have in his individual capacity. Likewise, whole
corresponding on behalf of the State Government and
on behalf of His Excellency the Governor and in his
individual capacity "
c 30. However on the basis of the evidence on record
produced before us, we are unable to concede with the
affidavits so released by Respondent No. 2- RDA since the
evidence of bias and self-interest is evident. This Court in one
occasion, in the case of The State of Punjab and Anr. v.
D Gurdial Singh and Ors. 13 opined with respect to ma/a fide in
jurisprudence of power, as under:-

"9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in the
jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish unless
E juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept
of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith.which invalidates
the exercise of power sometimes called colourable
exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps
motives, passions and satisfactions is the attainment of
F ends beyond the sanctioned purposes" of power by
a
simulation or pretension of gaining legitimate goal. If
the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate
object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not
legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to
G reach an end different from the one for which the power
is entrusted, goaded by extranepus considerations, good
or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustmerit. When the
custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by
considerations outside those for promotion of which the
13
H AIR 1980 SC 319
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 777
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

power is vested ttie court calls it a colourable exercise A
and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad. blurred sense,
Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in Law when
he stated: "I repeat that all power is a trust that we are
accountable for its exercise that, from the people, and
for the people, all springs, and all must exist". Fraud on B ·
power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for
the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to
moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the
action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond
the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be C
malices-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt
the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the
scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter
the verdict or impel the action mala fides or fraud on D
power, vitiates the acquisition or other official act."
In the case in hand, we are convinced that the action taken by
Respondent No. 2- RDA as mentioned in the affidavit issued
by it, meets different ends than the reason for which power
had been assigned to it. It is contended by the learned senior E
counsel on behalf of the appellants that there was no
"Committee" in place. We are in agreement with this contention
raised by the learned senior counsel. As per the Order issued
by the Revenue Branch of Respondent No. 2- RDA, the said
Committee which was to review the scheme under Section F
50(5) of the Act of 1973, was constituted only on or about
30.11.2009 but the decision to further extend the land size into
the.Town Development Scheme can be traced as early as
14.7.2009 with the report of Board Meeting No. 03/09.
G
31. Apart from the said contravention made by the
Respondent No. 2- RDA, its proposal to have township of 2300
acres of land was examined by a Committee constituted under
Section 5"0(5) of the Act of 1973, which prepared its report
dated 8.6.2010. The same was accepted by Shri S.S. Bajaj, H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Chairman of Respondent No. 2-RDA in the Board meeting
held on 21.6.2010 and 22.6.2010. Therefore, the entire
exercise made by RDA under Section 50 (5) of the Act has
been rendered otiose and an empty formality in the light of the
decisions of this Court mentioned supra and in view of the
B · aforesaid undisputed facts in relation to the action taken by
the Respondent No. 1-State Government, to give permission
only after applying its mind independently on the materials
submitted by the Respondent No. 2-RDA which is not done by
the State Government and therefore, the power exercised by
C the State Government in sanctioning the proposed scheme of
Respondent .No. 2- RDA has rendered otiose. It is a well
established principle in the Indian jurisprudence that no one
can be a judge in his own case. The fact has been establislied
D by various decisions of this Court. It was held in the case of Ml
s. J. Mahapatra and Co. and Anr. v. State of Orissa & Anr. 14
as under:

"12. There is, however, a.n exception to the above rule
that no men shall be a judge in his own cause, namely,
E the doctrine of necessity. An adjudicator, who is subject
to disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the
matter which ha has to decide, may be required to
adjudicate ifthere is no other person who is competent
or authorized to adjudicate or if a quorum cannot be
F formed without him or if no other competent tribunal can
be constitutefl. In such cases the principle of natural justice
would have to give way to necessity for otherwise there
would be no means of deciding the matter and the
machinery of justice or administration would break down.
G
Thus, in The Judges v. Attorney-General for
Saskatchewan 53 TLR 464, the Judges of the Court of
Appeal were held competent to decide the question
whether Judges of the Court of Appeal, of the Court of
H "AIR 1984 SC 1572
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 779.
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

King's Bench and of the District Courts of the Province A
of Saskatchewan were subject to taxation under the
Income-tax Act, 1932, of Saskatchewan on the ground
that they were bound to act ex necessitate. The doctrine
of necessity applies not only to judicial matters but also
to quasi-judicial and administrative matters. The High B
Court, however, wrongly applied this doctrine to the
author-members of the Assessment Sub-Committee. It
is true, the members of this Sub-Committee were
appointed by a Government Resolution and some of them
were appointed by virtue of the official position they were C
holding, such as, the Secretary, Education Department
of the Government of Orissa, and the Director, Higher
Education, etc. There was, however, nothing to prevent
those whose books were submitted for selection from D
Jointing out this fact to the State Government so that it
could amend its Resolution by appointing a substitute or
substitutes, as the case may be. There was equally
nothing to prevent such nonofficial author-members from
resigning from the committee on the ground of their E
interest in the matter."

Therefore, in the light of the reasons mentioned by us above,
we are of the considered view that there is total lack of
application of mind by the Respondent No. 1- State
Government in not taking into consideration all the relevant F
aspects while declaring the KVTDS as well as the finance
Scheme proposed by the Respondent No. 2- RDA. The
Respondent No. 1- State Government could not have
sanctioned the aforesaid Scheme as the same is in G
contravention to the procedure laid down comprehensively in
Section 50 of the Act of 1973. The initial approval of the
Scheme was on 25.1.2008 and approval to add 1900 acres
of land to KVTDS dated 10.08.2009 was granted by the State
· Government without any application of mind and objective H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.

A consideration by the Respondent No. 1-State Government
which fact is expressly clear as the said proposed scheme
was neither in accordance with the Development Plan nor did
any Zonal Plan which existed at the material point of time.
Therefore, for the reasons mentioned by us, we answer this
B point in favour of the appellants.

Answer to Point No. 2

32. It is contended by the learned senior counsel on
C behalf of the appellants that the Town Development Scheme
KVTDS prepared in the case in hand, is in contravention to
the provisions laid down in Section 50 of the Act.

Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973 reads thus:

D "Preparation of Town Development Schemes-

(1) The Town and Country DevelopmentAuthority may,
at any time, declare its intention to prepare a Town
Development Scheme:
E. [Provided that no such declaration of intent shall
be made without the prior approval of the State
Government).
"

FReliance has been placed upon the phrase "at any time" in
Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973 by the learned senior counsel
on behalf of the appellants contending that it is not a source of
arbitrary and unbridled power/discretion to exercise its power
G arbitrarily but requires study, survey and assessment of need/
requirement of plots for the residents of the area before the
intention of the RDA can be declared by the Town and Country
Development Authority.

33. In this regard, the learned senior counsel on behalf
H of the appellants have rightly placed reliance upon the
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 781
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

judgment of this Court in the case of Chairman, Indore Vikas A
Pradhikaran (supra), wherein it was held as under:

"80. Section 50(1) of the Act provide for declaration of
this intention to prepare town development scheme "at
any time". The words "at any time" do not confer upon B
any statutory authority an unfettered discretion to frame
the town development scheme whenever it so pleases ..
The words "at any time" are not charter for the exercise
of an arbitrary decision as and when a scheme has to
be framed. The.words "at any time" have no exemption c
from all forms of limitation for unexplained and undue
delay. Such an interpretation would not only result in the
destruction of citizens' rights but would also go contrary
to the entire context in which the power has been given
to the authority. D
81. The words "at any time" have to be interpreted in the
context in which they are used. Since a town development
scheme in the context of the Act is intended to implement
the development plan, the declaration of intention to E
prepare a scheme can only be in the context of a
development plan. The starting point of the declaration.
of the intention has to be upon the notification of
development plan and the outer limit for the authority to
frame such a scheme upon lapsing of the plan. That is F.
the plausible interpretation of the words "at any time" used
in Section 50(1) oftheAct. (See State of H.P. v. Rajkumar
Brijender Singh·" ·

The phrase "at anytime" under Section 50(1) of the Act is not
a charter for the exercise of an arbitrary decision as and when G
a scheme has to be framed. The words 'At any time" have no
exemption from all forms of limitation for unexplained and undue
delay. Such an interpretation would not only result in
destruction of citizens rights but would also go contrary to the H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A entire context in which the power has been conferred upon the
authority.

34. Also, a proviso added to Section 50(1) of the Act in
the year 2012 states that a Development Authority can declare
B its intention of preparing Town Development Scheme only with
the prior approval of the State Government.

35. Section 49 of the Act of 1973 provides forthe matters
for which a Town Development Scheme can be prepared.
c Section 49 of the Act reads thus:
"49. Town Development Scheme-A Town Development
Scheme may make provision for any of the following
matters:-
(i) acquisition, development and sale or leasing of land
D
for the purpose of town expansion;
(ii) acquisition, relaying out of, rebuilding, or relocating
areas which have been badly laid out or which has
developed or degenerated into a slum;
E (iii) acquisition and development of land for public
purposes such as housing dev"'lopment, development
of shopping centres, cultural centres, administrative
centres;

F (iv) acquisition and development of areas for commercial
and industrial purposes;
(v) undertaking of such building or construction work as
may be necessary to provide housing, shopping,
commercial and other facilities;
G
(vi) acquisition of land and its development for the
purpose of laying out or remodelling of road and street
patterns;
(vii) acquisition and development of land for playgrounds,
H parks, recreation centres and stadia;
RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 783
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

(viii) re-construction of plots for the purpose of buildings,· A
. roads, drains, sewage lines and other similar amenities;
(ix) any other work of a nature such as would bring about
environmental improvements which may be taken up by
the authority with prior approval of the State Government:"
8
Section 50(1) of the Act of 1973 vests the jurisdiction on the
Town and Country DevelopmentAuthority to declare its intention
for preparing a Town Development Scheme, which in this case
is the Respondent No. 2-RDA. Section 49 provides that a Town
Development Scheme can be proposed for the purpose of C
town expansion, for rebuilding and regenerating areas which
have degenerated into slums, acquire and development land
for public, commercial and industrial purpose and also for other
work which would bring about environmental improvement
which shall also be taken up with the prior approval of the State D
Government. It may be noted that Respondent No. 2- RDA
has not put any document on record, either before the High
Court or this Court which shows any assessment of "need" or
"requirement" for town expansion conducted by it prior to E
proposing the KVTDS. Even though KVTDS has allegedly
been introduced for a population of 16,000 per 40 Hect. of
land there is no document /survey report on record to show
how the said figure was arrived at by the RDA. The
requirement of such assessment was all the more necessary F
because already a new capital called 'Naya Raipur' has been
built near Raipur. .

36. Further, frequent changes in the extent of land
acquired for the KVTDS by the RDA is a very strong indicator G
of the fact that there is no rationale behind the proposal of the
said Scheme. The RespondenfNo.2- RDA had proposed the
area of KVTDS to be 900 acres on 31.7.2006, 1100 acres on
14. 11.2006, 394 acres on 3.6.2008 and eventually 2300 acres
on 20. 7.2009, without assigning reasons for coming to such H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A conclusions in expanding the area to the scheme. In view of
the above, there is clear non-application of mind on the part of
the State Government behind the increase in the sanctioned
area of KVTDS from 416.93 acres of land to 2300 acres of
land. In fact, in the letter dated 27.8.2008 to the Joint Director,
B Town and Country Planning Authority, it has been specifically
noted that physical survey of the area must be carried out. It is
contended by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
appellants that even the letter dated 20. 7 .2009 addressed by
Respondent No. 2- RDA to the Respondent No. 1- State
C Government admits that survey of the area is being carried
out in respect of previous 416.93 acres of land. In the instant
case, the proposal to have KVTDS as well as sanction forthe
same by the Respondent No. 1- State Government, is not
D preceded by a survey of the area, which renders the exercise
of its power of ex post facto survey into an empty formality
which action of it is wholly unsustainable in law.

37. Further, the purpose of the KVTDS as has been cited
by the Respondent No. 2- RDA, is only with the purpose of
E curbing illegal plotting which can be served by regulating
development work by exercise of statutory power vested in
the Respondent No. 2- RDA under the Act of 1973. On the
pretext of regulating development or stopping illegal
F construction/ plotting, the Respondent No.2- RDA cannot take
away the land of the appellants in exercise of the power of
eminent domain by the State Government. The Town
Development Scheme envisaged under Section 49 of the Act
is for the purpose of acquisition, development and sale or
G leasing of land for the purpose of town expansion. Under
Section 49 (i) and (ii) of the Act, the Respondent No. 2- RDA
has power only to provide for housing and not for plotting.
Reconstruction of plot under Section 49 clause (viii) of the Act,
is confined only for the limited purpose of buildings, roads,
H drains, sewage, sewage lines and other similar amenities.
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA V. STATE OF 785
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

Reliance was also placed by the learned senior counsel on A
behalf of the appellants, on the decision of this Court in the
case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development
Authority15 to show that this Court had already expressed its
concern about the lackadaisical manner in which the land is
acquired by the State Government in favour of the Bangalore B
DevelopmentAuthorityfor housing scheme in the metropolitan
area without conducting proper enquiry about the need of the·
residents of the area and plights of the land owners. It was
held in the case as under:
c
"150. Frequent complaints and grievances in regard to
the following five areas, with reference to the prevailing
S¥stem of acquisitions governed by Land Acquisition Act,
1894, requires the urgent attention of the state
governments and development authorities: D
(i) absence of proper or adequate survey and planning
before embarking upon acquisition;
(ii) indiscriminate use of emergency provisions in Section
17 of the LAAct; E
(iii) notification of areas far larger than what is actually
required, for acquisition, and then making arbitrary
deletions and withdrawals from the acquisitions;
(iv) offer of very low amount as compensation by Land F
Acquisition Collectors, necessitating references to court
in almost all cases;
(v) inordinate delay in payment of compensation; and
(vi) absence of any rehabilitatory measures. G
While the plight of project oustees and landlosers
affected by acquisition for industries has been frequently
highlighted in the media, there has been very little effort

" (2010) 7 sec 129 H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A to draw attention to the plight of farmers affected by
frequent acquisitions for urban development."

156. When BOA prepares a development scheme it is
B required to conduct an initial survey about the availability
and suitability of the lands to be acquired. While acquiring
16 villages at a stretch, if in respect of any of the .villages,
about 30% area of the village is not included in the
notification under Section 4(1) though available for
c acquisition, and out of the remaining 70% area which is
notified, more than half (that is, about 40% of the village
area) is deleted when final notification is issued, and the
acquisition is only of 30% area which is non-contiguous,
it means that there was no proper survey or application
D of mind when formulating the development scheme or
that the deletions were for extraneous or arbitrary reasons.
157. Inclusion of the land of a person in an acquisition
notification, is a traumatic experience for the landowner,
E particularly if he was eking. out his livelihood from that
land. If large areas are notified and then large extents
are to be deleted, it breeds corruption and nepotism
among officials. It also creates hostility, mutual distrust
and disharmony among the villagers, dividing them on
F the lines of "those who can influence and get their lands
deleted" and "those who cannot". Touts and middlemen
flaunting political connections flourish, extracting money
for getting lands deleted. Why subject a large number of
citizens to such traumatic experience? Why not plan
G properly before embarking upon acquisition process?
In this case, out of the four villages included at the final
stages of finalising the development scheme,
irregularities have been found at least in regard to three
villages, thereby emphasising the need for proper
H planning and survey before embarking upon acquisition.
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 787
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

158. Where arbitrary and unexplained deletions and A
exclusions from acquisition, of large extents of notified
lands, render the acquisitions meaningless, or totally
unworkable, the court will have no alternative but to quash
the entire acquisition. But where many land losers have
accepted the acquisition and received the compensation, B
and where possession of considerable portions of
. acquired lands has already been taken, and development
activities have been carried out by laying plots and even
making provisional or actual allotments, those factors C
have to be taken note of, while granting relief. The
Division Bench has made an effort to protect the interests
of all parties, on the facts and circumstances, by issuing
detailed directions. But implementation of these
directions may lead to further litigations and D
complications."

Section 2 (u) of the Act of 1973 defines a Town Development
Scheme as a scheme formulated to implement the
developmental plan. In the instant case, the development plan
is the Master Plan of Raipur planning area. Therefore, the very E
definition clearly states that unless master plan allows use of a
particular area as 'residential', it is not open for the Respondent
No.2- RDA to propose a township or a town development
scheme whose land use is at variance with the one provided
in the development plan. Till such time as the lands in question F
is notified for residential use, the Respondent No. 2- RDA
cannot propose a Town Development scheme forthe said land.

38. Respondent No.2- RDA is entrusted with a duty to.
implement the master plan under Section 38(2) of the Act of G
1973. The resolution dated 5.11.2009 passed by the
Respondent No. 2-RDA proposing to the State government to
get the land use changed under Section 23A of the Act in order
to implement its township project either by itself or the CEO,
on their own or in a manner that is inconsistent with the text as H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A well the provisions of the Act of 1973. In this regard, this Court
has already laid down the legal principle in the case of
Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa 16, which reads
as under:

B "49 ...... There is no Section either in the Act nor any rule
was placed to demonstrate that the Chairman alone, as
such, could exercise the power of the Authority. There is
no whisper nor there is any record to establish that any
meeting oftheAuthoritywas held regarding alteration of
c the scheme. In any case the power does not vest in the
State Government or the Chief Minister of the State. The
exercise of power is further hedged by use of the
expression, if 'it appears to the Authority'. In legal
terminology it visualises prior consideration and objective
D decision. And all this must have resulted in conclusion
that the alteration would have been improvement. Not
even one was followed. The Chairman could not have
acted on his own. Yet without calling any meeting of the
authority or any committee he sent the letter for converting
E the site. How did it appear to him that it was necessary,
is mentioned in the letter dated 21stApril, because the.
Chief Minister desired so. The purpose of the Authority
taking such a decision is their knowledge of local
conditions and what was better for them. That is why
F participatory exercise is contemplated. If any alteration
in Scheme could be done by the Chairman and the Chief
Minister then Sub-section (4) of Section 19 is rendered
otiose. There is no provision in the Act for alteration in a
scheme by converting one site to another, except, of
G
course if it appeared to be improvement. But even that
p9wer vested in the Authority not the Government. What
should have happened was that the Authority should have
applied its mind and must have come to the conclusion
H •• (1991) 4 sec 54
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 789
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

that conversion of the site reserved for public park into a A
private nursing home amounted to an improvement then
only it could have exercised the power. But what
happened in fact was that the application for allotment of
the site was accepted first and the procedural
requirements were attempted to be gone through later B
and that too by the State Govt. which was not authorised
to do so. Not only that the Authority did not apply its mind
and take any decision if there was any necessity to alter
the Scheme but even if it is assumed that the State Govt.
could have any role to play, the entire exercise instead of C
proceeding from below, that is, from the BOA to State
Government proceeded in reverse direction, that, from
the State Government to the BOA. ..... "

As per the factual averments of this case, the Respondent No. · D
2- RDA, without any resolution of the Board, on its own motion,
addressed a letter dated 31.7.2006 and approached the State
Government for change of land use because it had to propose
the township in Tikrapara, Devpuri and Boriakhurd villages.
Thereafter, KVTDS was also proposed, published, finalised E
and approved before the land use was changed by the State
· Government. Under the provisions of the Act of 1973, the
development plan/ Raipur Master Prevised 2021 that is
prevailing, the Respondent No. 2- RDA as well as the State
Government gave primacy to KVTDS and sought changes in F
the master plan to suit KVTDS. This is impermissible in law.
The finding recorded by the High Court of Chhattisgarh,
Bilaspur, in its judgment in this regard that no finality can be
attached to the master plan is an erroneous finding. G
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Town Development
Scheme which is KVTDS in the present case, was not
prepared in accordance with Section 50 of the Act of 1973
and we hold that KVTDS is ultra vires to the Act of 1973.
H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.

A Answer to Point No. 3

39. Though we have answered point no. 2 in favour of
the appellant,.we intend to mention other grounds too, which
render KVTDS as illegal. The learned senior counsel on behalf
B of the appellants contended that in the absence of a zonal plan,
a Town Development Scheme cannot be framed by
Respondent No. 2- RDA, and therefore, the acquisition
proceedings of the land of the appellants cannot be allowed to
sustain.
c
The town development scheme is always subservient to
the master plan as well as the zonal plan, as provided under
Section 17 of the Act of 1973, which reads as under:-

"Section 17: Contents of development plal"). A
D development plan shall take into account any draft five
year and Annual Development plan of the district
prepared under the Madhya Pradesh Zila Yojana Samiti
Adhiniyam, 1995 (No. 19of1995) in which the planning
area is situated ...... "
E
Master plan falls within the category of broad development
plans and is prepared by only after taking into account the
Annual Development Reports prepared by constitutionally
elected bodies of local panchayats and municipalities etc. A
F zonal plan is mandated to be prepared only afterthe publication
of the Development Plan. Section 20 of the Act reads thus:

"20. Preparation of Zonal Plans- The Local Authority
may on its own motion at any time after the publication of
G the development plan, or thereafter if so required by the
State Government shall, within the next six months of such
requisition, prepare a Zoning Plan"
Further, Section 21 of the Act reads thus:
H Section 21: Contents of zoning plan. The zoning plan
RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 791
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

shall "enlarge" the details of the land use as indicated in A
the development plan ....
.. (emphasis laid by the Court)

Thus, it is evident from the language of Sections 20 and
21 of the Act, that a Zonal Plan can be prepared only in B
adherence to the Development Plan which in the present case
is the Raipur Master Plan of 2021.

Next, Section 49 of the Act which provides for the
provisions for which a Town Development Scheme can be C
prepared, has to be read along with Section 21 of the Act,
which clearly mentions that the land required for acquisition by
the Town and Country Development Authority for the purpose
of any development scheme has to be laid down in the Zonal
Plan. D

Therefore, a combined reading of Sections 17, 21 and
49 lays down that the Development Plan is the umbrella under
which a zonal plan is made for the city. The zonal plan in turn,
allocates the land which could be acquired for town E
developm~nt schemes. The Respondent No. 2- RDA on the
other hand, has taken the following stand in their common
counter affidavit dated 23.11.2011 filed in the writ petition
proceedings:
F
''That, thus, earlier the Master Plan, 2021 is modified as
per scheme under Section 23A or the scheme is modified
as per Master Plan under Section 52( 1) (b) of the Act,
the net results remains that there is no violation of Master
Plan, 2021 and therefore, the allegations of the petitioner G
that the scheme has been formulated and finalised in
violation of the Master Plan, 2021 is incorrect"

Therefore, in the absence of a zonal plan in place, the
Respondent No. 2-RDA has skipped the legal mandate in H
place for preparation of a Town Development Scheme.
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R..

A 40. The importance of zonal planning lies in its
distinguished characteristic which lays down with sufficient
particularity the use to which a particular piece of iand could
be put. The object and purpose.of the 1973Act itself foresees
that zonal plan is necessary for implementation of a Town
l3 Development Scheme. The preamble of the Act clearly
discloses that a Town Development Scheme is at best a vehicle
to implement the Development Plan and Zonal Plan. The object
and purpose of the Act reads thus:

c "An Act to make provision for planning and development
and use of land; to make better provision for the
preparation of development plans and zoning plans with
a view to ensuring town planning schemes are made in
a proper manner and their execution is made effective
D to, ..... "
(emphasis laid by this Court)

Therefore, the Object and Purpose of the Act also provides
that a Town Development Scheme can be prepared in the
E presence of a Zonal Plan which in turn has to be prepared for
the implementation of the Development Plan.

41. In fact, Section 2(g) of the Act of 1973 defines
"development plan" as including "a zonal plan". Therefore,
F unless a Zonal Plan and also a development plan is prepared,
a Town Development Scheme cannoi be proposed .. The
provisions of Sections 49 and 50 of the Act of 1973
categorically provide for "Development Plan" to mean "master
· plan" as well as "Zonal Plan".
G
42. In the case in hand, the KVTDS has been prepared
in the absence of a Zonal Plan. It is not possible to define the
utilization of land under the Town Development Scheme unless
the Zonal Plan formulated by the local authority describes with
H sufficient particularity the details for which the broadly indicqted
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 793
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

use of land in the Development Plan may be put. Respondent A
No. 2- RDA is not permitted to either usurp or bypass the power
vested with the local authorities for preparing town
developmentscheme in the absence of zoning plan merely on
the ground that the local authority did not exercise its
constitutional power in preparing the zonal plan following the B
direction of Respondent No. 1- State Government under
Section 20 of the Act of 1973. A mere glance at the Master.
Plan would clearly go to show that it does not set out the
detailed land use with sufficient particulars. Therefore, the
framing of a Zonal Plan by local authority in laying out a detailed C
plan of land use with sufficient particulars is a sine qua non
under the provisions of the Act.

43. The legal contention urged on behalf of the
respondents that a Town Developmen.t Scheme can be framed D
pursuant to the Development Plan without there being a zonal
plan, is not sustainable. The learned senior counsel Mrs. Pinky
Anand and Mr. Prashant Desai on behalf of the respondents
relied upon the Act pari materia for the State of Gujarat where
the Town PlanningAct does not contemplate a Zonal Plan, and E
which contemplates "DP-TP".

44. The letter of Respondent No. 2-RDA dated
20.07.2009 addressed to Respondent No. 1- State
Government seeking permission.for the Town Development F
Scheme in the enhanced area itself highlights the importance
of planning at Zonal level to stop illegal development. Having
regard to the provisions of Sections 17, 19, 20, 21 and 49 of
the Act of 1973, the relationship between the scope of
Development Plan, Zoning Plan and Town Development G
Scheme can be well understood and in view of the aforesaid
provisions and the factual position in relation to the KVTDS,
unless a Zoning Plan exists, it is not possible for the Planning
Authority to ascertain as to which area is to be used for which H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A purpose. A development authority under Section 38(2) of the
1973 Act cannot, in the name of planning and implementing a
Town Development Scheme, usurp the power of the local
authorities and define the land use under the Town
Development Scheme and subsequently, seek changes in the
B Master Plan to bring it in conformity with the KVTDS. In support
of this contention, reliance has been placed upon by the
learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants on the
judgment of this Court in Chairman, Indore Vikas
Pradhikaran case mentioned supra, the relevant portion of
C which is quoted hereunder:

"37. When a planning area is defined, the same
envisages preparation of development plan and the
manner in which the existing land use is to be
D implemented. A development plan in some statutes is
also known as a master plan. It lays down the broad
objectives and parameters wherewith the development
plan is to deal with. It also lays down the geogrnphical
splitting giving rise to preparation and finalization of zonal
E plans. The zonal plans contain more detailed and specific·
maters than the master plan or the development plan.
Town planning scheme or lay-out plan contains further
details on plot-wise basis. It may provide for the manner
in which each plot shall be dealt with as also the matter
F relating to regulations of development.
xxx xxx xxx
72. Land use, development plan and zonal plan provided
for the plan at macro level whereas the town planning
G scheme is at a micro level and, thus, would be subject to
development plan. It is, therefore, difficult to comprehend
that broad based macro level planning may not at all be
in place when a town planning scheme is prepared.

H xxx xxx xxx
RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 795
CHHATTlSGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

75. lhe purpose of declaring the intent under Section A
50( 1) of the Act is to implement a development plan.
Section 53 of the Act freezing any other development is
an incidence arising consequent to the purpose, which
purpose is to implement a development plan: If the
purpose of declaring such an intention is merely to bring B
into play Section 53, and thereby freeze all development,
it would amount to exercise of the power of Section 50(1)
for a collateral purpose, i.e., freezing of development
rather than implementation of a development plan. The
collateral pu~pose also will be to indirectly get over the C
fact that an owner of land pending finalization of a
development plan has all attendant rights of ownership
subject to the restraints under Section 16. If the
declaration of intent to formulate a town development
0
scheme is to get over Section 16 and freeze
development activities under Section 53, it would amount
to exercise of power for a collateral purpose.
76. A bare perusal of Sections 17 and 49 would show
that it is the development plan which determines the E
manner of usage of the land and the town development
scheme enumerates the manner in which such proposed
usage can be implemented. It would follow that until the
usage ls determined through a development plan, the
stage of manner of implementation of such proposed F
usage cannot be brought about. It would also therefore
follow that what is contemplated is the final development
plan and not a draft development plan, since until the
development plan is finalized it would have no statutory
or legal force and the land use as existing prior thereto G
with the rights of usage of the land arising therefrom would
continue.
77. To accept that it is open to the town development
authority to declare an intention to formulate a town H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A development scheme even without a development plan
and ipso facto bring into play a freeze on usage of the
land under Section 53 would lead to complete misuse of
powers and arbitrary exercise thereof depriving the
citizen of his right to use the land subject to the permitted
B land use and laws relating to the manner of usage thereof.
This would be an unlawful deprivation of the citizen's right
to property which right includes within it the right to use
the property in accordance with the law as it stands at
such time. To illustrate the absurdity to which such an
c interpretation could lead it would the{l become open to
the town development authority to notify an intent to
formulate a town development scheme even in the
absence of a development plan, freeze all usage of the
property by a owner thereof by virtue of Section 53 of the
D
Act, and should no development plan be finalized within
3 years, such scheme would lapse and the authority
thereupon would merely notify a fresh intent to formulate
a town development scheme and once again freeze the.
E usage of the l~nd for another three years and continue
the same ad infinitum thereby in effect completely
depriving the citizen of the right to use his property which
was in a manner otherwise permitted under law as it
stands.
F 78. The essence of planning in the Act is the existence
of a development plan. It is a development plan, which
under Section 17 will indicate the areas and zones, the
users, the open spaces, the institutions and offices, the
special purposes, etc. Town planning would be based
G on the contents of the development plan. It is only when
the development plan is in existence, can a town planning
scheme be framed. In fact, unless it is known as to what
the contents of a possible town planning scheme would
be, or alternatively, whether in terms of the development
H
RAJENDRA SHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 797
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOV\(DA, J]

plan such a scheme at all is required, the intention to A
frame the scheme cannot be notified.
xxx xxx xxx
87. An area conceived of under the Act, as noticed
hereinbefore, consists of both plan area and non-plan
8
area. Development of plan area may be in phases. A
master plan may be followed by a zonal plan and a zonal
plan may be followed by a town development scheme." ·

45. Further, the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
appellants have rightly placed reliance upon the principle of C
.Constitutional morality as explained by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar to
the Constituent Assembly on 4th November 1948. The relevant
portion of which is extracted hereunder:

"While everybody recognizes the necessity of the D
diffusion of Constitutional morality for the peaceful
working of a democratic Constitution, there are two things
interconnected with it which are not, unfortunately,
generally recognized. One is that the form of·
administration has a close connection with the form of E
the Constitution. The form of the administration must be
appropriate to and in the same sense as the form of the
Constitution. The other is that it is perfectly possible to
pervert the Constitution, without changing its form by
merely. changing the form of the administration and to F
make it inconsistent and opposed to the spirit of the
Constitution."

46. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case,
the legal contentions urged before us, the provisions of the G
Act and also in the light of the legal principles already laid down
by this Court, we are of the opinion that Respondent No. 2-
RDA could not have formulated KVTDS-for Raipur without a
Zoning Plan there in place. Accordingly, we answer this point
in favour of the appellants. H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Answer to Point No. 4

47. Section 50 (5) of the Act of 1973, read with Section
50 (6) of the Act of 1973, provides for constitution of a
committee which shall determine the various aspects of a Town
B Development Scheme such as its viability, cost effect etc.
Section 50(6) of the Act provides that a committee constituted
under section 50(5) of the Act shall consider the objections
and suggestions and give hearing to any person desirous of
being heard. Thereafter, the committee shall submit its report
C to the Town and Country Development Authority and, is required
to submit its proposal on these aspects:

i. Define and demarcate areas allotted or reserved
for public purpose;
D
ii. Demarcate the reconstituted plots;

iii. Evaluate value of original plots and reconstituted
plots;

E iv. Determine whether the areas marked for public
purpose are wholly or partially beneficial to the
residents;

v. Estimate the compensation or contribution from
F beneficiaries of the scheme;

vi. Evaluate increment in value of the reconstituted plot
for calculating incremental value;

vii. Evaluate the reduction in value and assess
G compensation payable therefor;

48. The committee, in the case, in hand, has recorded in
its report only on the first four aspects and has held the last
three aspects as not applicable to the scheme without assigning
H any valid reasons. Therefore, in providing this report, the
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 799
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

committee has violated the mandatorY provision of providing A
a complete report before acquiring land from landowners which
often results in loss of livelihood for poor agriculturists. This
aspect of loss of livelihood has been noted by this Court in the
case of Bo'!du Ramaswamy mentioned supra.
B
49. The learned single judge of the High Court of
Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, in his judgment, has held that the
aforesaid three aspects are not applicable in the present case
. for the reason that the Respondent No. 1- State government
has decided not to .seek payment of incremental cost/ C
contribution cost from the land-holder on account of
development of area while prescribing the size of the
reconstituted plots for which respective landholders would be
entitled.
D
50. The said view of the learned single Judge has been.
erroneously upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur. The said view taken by both the learned
single judge and Division Bench of the High Court of
Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, is contrary to the provision of the Act of E
1973, since the High Court has not noticed in arriving at the
aforementioned conclusion that the committee was not
adhering to the mandatory provisions with regard to
development scheme. Therefore, the scheme is vitiated in law
for lack of compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1973. F
The manner in which the computation of increment in the value
of the reconstituted plot has been arrived at, is vague.

51. The affidav.it of RDA dated 23.11.2011 byway of its
reply to the writ petitions, has taken the following stand: G

"However, finally the Committee came to the conclusion
that as the scheme is to be made in participation with,
the general public, therefore, neither any charge would
be levied on the public under any head nor any H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A compensation would be payable to any of the members
of public on account of reduction of his plot size or value ...
However, while finally making its recommendation the
committ~e on internal page No. 114 and 115 of the
Annexure categorically recommendeEI that the
B provisions of sub-section (v) (vi) and (vii) of the Section
50 (6) would not be applicable on the scheme."

From the above averments of the Respondent No. 2·- RDA in
its affidavit by way of reply, it is evident that it has unilaterally
c decided to make the mandatory provisions of Section 50(6)
(v) (vi) and (vii) of the Act of 1973, inapplicable to the scheme
without providing any reason for the same. It could not have
, stated so, as this aspect is no more res integra. This court has
already taken the view that the provisions of Section 50 are
D mandatory in nature in the case of Ahmedabad Municipal
. Corpn. v. Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut Manda/17, which
will be discussed at appropriate place in this judgment.

52. Further, there is no board resolution for the village
E Dumartarai, and in any event, Board resolution of Respondent
No. 2- RDA does not amount to intention to declare under
Section 50 (1) to develop a town development scheme in
terms of the Government Order dated 18.11.1999. The
Respondent No. 2- RDA, on the other hand, is required to seek
F permission from Respondent No. 1- State Government to
publish the intention in the official gazette. The RDA under the
aforesaid provision was required to declare its intention to the
public at large.

G 53. In the instant case, the Respondent No. 1- State
Government granted permission to Respondent No. 2- RDA
to publish its intention under Section 50(2)of the Act of 1973,
on 25.1.2008 for village Dunda alone. It published its intention
under the aforesaid provision for the villages of Dunda as well
H "(2014) 7 sec 357
RAJENDRA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 801
;. CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

as Tikrapara pursuant to the Board Resolution by circulations A
dated 12.5.2009 and 5.6.2009. Afterwards the Respondent
No. 1- State Government granted permission dated 10.8.2009
for increasing the area of the Scheme to 2300 acres. The
Board of the RDA issued another resolution by circulation
dated 20.8.2009 for inclusion of three villages namely B
Boriakhurd, Dumartarai and Devpuri. The Board Resolution
is only for publication of the scheme in the gazette and the
same was for KVTDS Scheme No. 5 and not KVTDS Scheme
No.4. Pursuant to the Board Resolution dated 20.08.2009, a
declaration of intention was published for amended scheme c
on 4.9.2009. The board resolution is merely for publication of
the scheme in the official gazette. There is no provision under
the 1973 Act to issue declaration only in so far as amended
portion is concerned. Thus, the inclusion of village Tikrapara
D
is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
Act and the entire process had to be commenced de nova.

54. The learned senior counsel for the appellants have
rightly pointed out the procedure of passing a resolution, by
placing reliance upon the provisions of Section 289 of the E
Company's Act, 1956 which specifically_ allows resolution by
circulation in the following terms:

"289. Passing of resolutions by circulation. No resolution
shall be deemed to have been duly passed by the Board F
or by a committee thereof by circulation, unless the
resolution has been circulated in draft, together with the
necessary papers, if any, to all the directors, or to all the
members of the committee, then in India (not being less
in number than the quorum fixed for a meeting of the G
Board or committee, as the case may be), and to all other
directors or members at their usual address in India, and
has been approved by such of the directors as are then
in India, or by a majority of such of them, as are entitled
to vote on the Resolution." H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Thus, since there is no declaration of intent preceding
publication in the gazette, Board Resolutions which are not
declared to the public in the matter prescribed under the Act
of 1973, and same do not amount to declaration.

B The Act does not empower the Respondent No. 2- RDA
to reconstitute plots. Even if any authority can be read into it, it
has to be limited to public utilities.

55. The provision under Section 49 of the Act of 1973
c only allows a Town Development Scheme to make provision
for reconstruction of plots for the purpose of buildings, roads,
drains; sewage lines and other similar amenities. It may be
noted that the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 and the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development
D Act, 1976 specifically provide for reconstituted plots and the
Acts also provided the procedure to be followed for the same
under the respective statutes. Section 65 (1) of the
Maharashtra Act and Section 45 (1) of the Gujarat Act are in
pari material, which are reproduced hereunder:
E
"Section 65 (1) of the Maharashtra Act: In the draft
scheme, the size and shape of every reconstituted plot
shall be determined, so far as may be, to render it suitable
for building purposes, and where a plot is already built
F upon, to ensure that the buildings as far as possible
comply with the provisions of the scheme as regards open
spaces."
Section 45 (1) of GujaratAct: In the draft scheme referred
to in Section 44, the size and shape of every plot shall
G be determined, so far as may be, to render it suitable for
building purposes and where the plot is already built
upon, to ensure that the building, as far as possible,
complies with the provisions of the scheme as regards
open spaces"
H
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 803
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

Further Section 49 (viii) of the Act of 1973 empowers A
RDA to make provision for reconstitution, which reads
as under:
"49. Town Development Scheme-A town development
scheme may make provision for any of the following
8
matters: ·

(viii) Re-constitution of plots for the purpose of buildings,
road, drains, sewage lines and other similar amenities ... ," C

56. From a careful reading of the aforesaid conclusions,
it is evident that the board conferred power upon the
Respondent No. 2-RDA to make provision for reconstitution
and not for reconstruction per se. In any event, such power to
make provision for reconstitution is limited to certain specified D
public purposes, which does not include general housing
scheme.

57. There .is conspicuous absence of any empowering
mechanism under the Act of 1973 for the above purpose and E
no authority has been vested under the provision of the Act
applicable to Chhattisgarh, to adjust rights of parties in the
land. In view of the aforesaid provision, mere prescription or
the scope of the activity in the Town Development Scheme
under Section 49 of the Act will not ipso facto confer the power F
upon Respondent No. 2- RDA to alter rights of landowners in
their properties. This unique anomaly under the Act may be
contrasted with the Gujarat Act and the Maharashtra Act
wherein the office of the Town Planning Officer has been.
specifically created for the said purpose. G

Further, under Section 52 of the GujaratAct the town planning
officer carries out the task of reconstitution of lands. The
provision reads as under:
H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A "52(1) In a preliminary scheme, the Town Planning Officer
shall:-
(i) After giving notice in the prescribed manner and in
the prescribed form to the persons affected by the
scheme, define and demarcate the areas allotted to, or
B reserved for, any public purpose, or for the purpose of
the appropriate authority and the final plots;
(ii) After giving notice as aforesaid, determine in a case
in which a final plot is to be allotted to persons in
c ownership in common, the share of such persons;
(iii) Provide for the total or the partial transfer of any right
in an original plot to a final plot or provide for the transfer
of any right in an original plot in accordance with the
provisions of Section 81;
D (iv) Determine a period within which works provided in
the scheme shall be completed by the appropriate
authority."
Also, Section 81 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
E Development Act reads as under:

"Any right in an original plot which in the·opinion of the
Town Planning Officer is capable of being transferred
wholly or in part, without prejudice to the making of a town
planning scheme, to a final plot shall be transferred and
F
any right in an original plot which in the opinion of the
Town Planning Officer is not capable of being so
transferred shall be extinguished:
Provided that an agricultural lease shall not be transferred
G from an original plot to final plot without the consent of all
the parties to such lease."

The Maharashtra Act of 1966 confer this right on an Arbitrator
appointed by the State Government. Section 72 (3) (xiii) of the
H Act reads as under:
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 805
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J]

"72 (3)in accordance with prescribed procedure, every A
Arbitrator shall,-

(xiii) provide for the total or partial transfer of any right in
the original plot to a final plot or provide for the execution B
of any right in an original plot in accordance with the
provisions contained in section 101 ;"

58. In the light of the provisions above mentioned, it is
clear that under both the town planning legislations for Gujarat C
and Maharashtra States, a specific authority has been statutorily
authorized to alter rights in property and to reconstitute plots,
whereas no such authority has been so empowered under the
Chhattisgarh Town Planning Act, 1973. Therefore, without an
official amendment to the Chhattisgarh Act and without following · o
the mandatory procedure, no reconstitution of land under the
Town Development Scheme can take place.

59. To further establish this point, reliance has been
placed by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants E
on the following judgment of this Court in Ahmedabad
Municipal Corpn. v, Ahmedabad Green Belt Khedut
Manda/ (supra), wh·erein it was held as under:

"27. The aforesaid provisions read conjointly give a clear
picture that the scheme is just like the consolidation F
proceedings as the land, belonging to various persons,
covered by the scheme first be put into a pool and then
the land be allocated for different purposes and, in such
a way, after having all deductions for the purpose of either
by way of acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition G
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1894 Act") or
the land taken under the provisions of Section 40(3){jj)(a)
of the 1976 Act, the loss and profit of individual tenure-
holder is to be calculated. After assessing the market H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A value on the date of declaration of the intention to frame
a scheme and the value of the property after making all
these deductions, adjustments, improvements, etc. and,
therefore, if a person has suffered any loss, his loss is to
be made good from the funds of the scheme and if a
B person has gained an amount equivalent to net gain, is
to be recovered from him.

The case mentioned supra, further reads:
"40. As we have explained hereinabove that the town
c planning scheme provides for pooling the entire land
covered by the scheme and thereafter reshuffling and
reconstituting of plots, the market value of the original
plots and final plots is to be assessed and the authority
has to determine as to whether a landowner has suffered
D
some injury or has gained from such process.
Reconstitution of plots is permissible as provided under
the scheme of the Act as is evident from cogent reading
of Sections 45(2)(a), (b), (c) and Section 52(1 )(iii) in
E accordance with Section 81 of the 1976 Act. By
reconstitution of the plots, if anybody suffers injury, the
statutory provisions provide for compensation under
Section 67(b) read with Section 80 of the 1976Act. By
this reconstitution and readjustment of plots, there is no
F vesting of land in the local authority and therefore, the
Act provides for payment of non-monetary
compensation and such a mode has been approved by
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Shanti/a/
Mangaldas, wherein this Court has held that when the
G scheme comes into force all rights in the original plots
are extinguished, and simultaneously therewith
ownership springs in the reconstituted plots. It does not
predicate ownership of the plots in the local authority,
and no pro~ess-actual or notional-of transfer is
H contemplated in that appropriation. Under clause (a) of
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 807
CHHATTIS.GARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.)

Section 53, vesting of land in local authority takes place A
only on commencement of scheme into force. The
concept that lands vest in a local authority when the
intention to make a scheme is notified, is against the
plain intendment of the Act. Even steps taken by the State
do not involve application of the doctrine of eminent B
domain."

60. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel
on behalf of the appellants that apart fr~m this, the allotment of
reconstituted plots to the original land owners is being done in c
an arbitrary and discriminatory manner and therefore the same
is wholly unsustainable in law. It was further contended that the
Respondent No.1-State government arbitrarily excluded and
included lands in the scheme without any rational basis or
explanation for initial proposal of the Town Development D
Scheme on land measuring 416.93 acres and there is neither
rational explanation or basis for subsequent addition of another·
1900 acres of land included pursuant to RDA's Resolution
dated 20.7.2009. Barring one acre land of Jalaram
Cooperative Housing Society, which was originally included E
in the earlier sanctioned area of 416.93 acres, the entire land
of the appellants have been affected by the enhancement of
acquisition of area to about 2300 acres of land. The villages
of Tikrapara and Dumartarai were not originally included in
the first phase of development in the Raipur Master Plan F
(Revised) 2021.

61. The location of the land of the appellants which is
also shown in the map/plan annexed to the Convenience
Compilation is produced by the appellants, stating that- G

a) The total 22 acres of land of which about 11 acres.
of land is of Rajendra Shankar Shukla and family
of Village Dumartarai is an island, separated by
distance of 1.5 kms from the main site. Thus, this H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 11 S.C.R.

A piece of 11 acres of land is separate from the rest
of land parcel being developed, and there is no
reason for its inclusion except malice in law.
b) Land of petitioner's Chinmay Builders and Jalaram
Cooperative Housing Society of village Tikrapara
B
is on the fringe of their existing colonies, and is
therefore, sufficiently developed.
c) Land of petitioner's Chhatri Family and petitioner
Vijay Rajani and family is on the main orad and is
c sufficiently developed on account of proximity to the
main road.
d) Only a piece of land jointly owned by Vijay Rajani,
Rakesh Amrani and Pradeep Prithwani
admeasuring about 1 acres is in the centre of the
D
township.
62. It was further argued that draft Scheme was
published on 20.11.2009 which included vast tracts of
agricultural land as well as abadi areas. However, the final
E scheme published on 16.07.2010 was for 1600 acres. It is
submitted by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
appellants that firstly the inclusion of 1900 acres of land was
approved on 10.08.2009 without following the procedure and
F conducting the survey. But after harassing the land owners,
the Respondent No. 2- RDA excluded 700 acres of land, which
were as under:
(a) Land notified for agricultural use under the Master
Plan (Revised) 2021
G
(b) Land carrying construction over them, and
(c) Land of private colonizers whose layout had been ·
approved irrespective of whether construction has
been carried out or not in the permission dated
H 25.01.2008, the State Government had itself
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 809
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

directed that lands with trees and construction will A
not be included, and therefore, the question of
having such a huge area including constructed land
did not arise for its consideration.
As a consequence of the above said exclusion, portions of 8
land belonging to the appellants in Civil Appeal arising out of
SLP (C) No. 30942 of 2014 measuring about 11 acres was
separated from the main proposed township by a distance of
about 1.5 kms. Between these two chunks of land, there lies a
densely populated area. Apparently, there are no means to c
provide services to the separated land other than by spending·
disproportionate costs on separate infrastructural faCilities
such as sub-station, sewerage treatment plant, water pumping
station, separate water pipeline, separate sewerage plant etc.
Therefore, it is contended that there will be no adverse D
implication for the proposed township if lands belonging to
the appellants in the above mentioned appeal are excluded
from the KVTDS.

63. Further, the lands of other appellants namely, Vijay E
Rajani and family, Jalaram Cooperative Housing Society,
Bulamal Chhatri and Chinmay Developers are also on the
fringe of the township and as such there is no adverse
implication for the proposed township if the said land of the
appellants is excluded. In support of the aforesaid reasons, F
the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants has rightly
placed reliance upon the foilowing decisions 9f this Court in
Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority,
(supra) wherein it"was held as under:
G
"134. Therefore, if a development authority having
acquired a large tract of land withdraws or deletes huge
chunks, the development by the development authority
will resemble haphazard developments by unscrupulous
private developers rather than being a planned and H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A orderly development expected from a Development
Authority. therefore when a large layout is being planned,
the development authorities should exercise c'are and
caution in deleting large number of pockets/chunks of
land in the middle of the proposed layout. There is no
B point in proposing a planned layout but then deleting
various portions of land in the middle merely on the
ground that there is a small structure of 100 sq.ft or 200
sq.ft. which may be authorized or unauthorized. Such
deletions make a mockery of development. Further such
c deletions/exclusions encourage corruption and
favouritism and bring discontent among those who are
not favourably treated.
135. The complaint by appellants is that in the proposed
D Arkavathi layout, rich and powerful with "connections" and
"money power" were able to get their lands, (even vacant
lands) released, by showing some imaginary structure
or by putting up some unauthorised structure overnight.
Though we do not propose to go into motives, the
E concurrent finding by the learned Single Judge and
Division Bench is that there are arbitrary unexplained
deletions. While we may not comment on policy, it is
obvious that deletion from proposed acquisition should
be only in regard to areas which are already well
F developed in a planned manner.
136. Sporadic small unauthorised constructions in
unauthorised colonies/ layouts, are not to be deleted as
the very purpose of acquisition for planned development
G is to avoid such unauthorised development. If hardship
is the reason for such deletion, the appropriate course
is to give preference to the land/plot owners in making
allotments and help them to resettle and not to continue
the illegal and haphazard pockets merely on the ground
H that some temporary structure or a dilapidated structure
RAJ END RA SHAN KAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 811
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

existed therein. A development authority should either A
provide orderly development or should stay away from
development. It cannot act like unscrupulous private
developers//colonisers attempting development of small
bits of land with only profit motive. When we refer to
private developers/colonisers by way of comparison, our B
intention is not to deprecate all private developers/
colonisers. We are aware that several private
developers/colonisers provide la_rgECwell planned
authorized developments, some of which are even better
than developments by development authoriti~s. What is C
discouraged and deprecated is small unauthorized
layouts without any basic amenities. Be that as it may.
137. What do we say about a 'development', where with
reference to the total extent of a village, one-third is not D
notified at all, and more than half is deleted from proposed
acquisition of the remaining two-third and only the
remaining about 20% to 30% area is acquired, that too
not contiguously, but in different parcels and pockets.
What can be done with such acquisition? Can it be used E
for orderly development? Can it avoid haphazard and
irregular growth? The power of deletion and withdrawal
unless exercised with responsibility and fairly and
reasonably, will play havoc with orderly development, will
add to haphazard and irregular growth and create F
discontent among sections of society who were not
fortunate to have their lanas deleted:"

The above decision holds true in the present case in the light
of the fact that vast amount of tracts have been deleted G
subsequently without the respondents assigning any reason
for the same. As a. consequence, KVTDS has turned into
disconnected pockets of acquired land and land deleted
subsequently after acquisition.
H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 11 S.C.R.

A 64. The functioning of the Committee under Section
50(5) of the Act of 1973 is dissatisfactory and required the
process to be followed afresh. The committee constituted
under the aforesaid Act to hear objections of the desirous
parties, was a mere eye wash. The committee rejected the
B objections submitted by the appellants without providing any
reasons for the same and not even. providing any hearing
opportunities to put forth their objections before the said
Committee. Therefore, the recommengations of the Committee
did not carry any weight. This action of the State Government
C is vitiated in law and therefore liable to be set aside.

65. It can be asserted from the evidence on-record
produced before us that the Committee constituted under
Section 50(5) oftheAct, heard objections of the land owners
D from 25.01.2010 to 2.6.2010. At the same time, the
Respondent No. 2- RDA proposed change of land. use on
15.4.2010 and 20.5.2010 and even the lay-out plan was also
prepared and approved on 26.5.2010. This shows that the
hearing and consideration ofth'e land owner's objections was
E only a sham. The committee had pre-decided about the plan
and was hearing objections of the land owners only as a
formality procedure. Clearly, when the land plan was prepared
and approved on 26.5.2010, the hearing of objections till
F 2 .6.2010 was immaterial.

66. The committee took decision to exclude agricultural
land which was formally taken on 22.6.2010 after acceptance
of the report of the Committee dated 8.6.2010. But even before
this, vide letter dated 15.4.2010, CEO of the Respondent No.
G 2- RDA had made it clear to the Respondent No. 1- State
Government that agricultural land will be excluded. The
committee constituted under Section 50(5) was headed by
CEO of Respondent No. 2- RDA who hims~lf proposed
inclusion of 1900 acres of land vide letter dated 20.7.2009.
H
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 813
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

This affects the rights of the appellants. For this reason also, A
they did not receive fair hearing from the Committee. The
. recommendations of the committee were considered by the
Board of Directors of Respondent No. 2- RDA on 21.6.20-10.
While the committee was hearing the objections, there was
no freezing of land use and Respondent No. 2- RDA kept on B
proposing change in land use. This affected the statutory rights
of the land owners who were entitled to fair hearing .against
the acquisition of land.

67. lnthecaseofRaghbirSinghSehrawatv. State of C
Haryana 18 , held as under:
..
"40. Though it is neither possible nor desirable to make·
a list of the grounds on which the landowner can persuade
the Collector to make recommendations against the D
proposed acquisition of land, but what is important is
that the Collectorshould_give a fair opportunity of hearing
to the objector and objectively consider his plea against
the acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he should make
recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why E
the particular piece of land should or should not be
acquired and whether or not the plea put forward by the
objector merits acceptance. In other words, the
recommendations made by the Collector must reflect
objective application of mind to the objections filed by F
the landowners and other interested persons.

Further, in the case of Indore Development Authority
v. Madan La/19 , it was held as under:
• 10. We do not think that the DevelopmentAuthority was G
justified in following a short cut in this case. The
procedure followed ·under the Trust Act could not be
sufficient to dispense with all the requirements of Section
" (2012) 1 sec 792
·" (1990) 2 sec 334 H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A 50 of the Adhiniyam. As earlier noticed that Section 50
of the Adhiniyam provides procedure for preparation and
approval of scheme for development. After preparing a
draft scheme, the Development Authority must invite
objections and suggestions from the public. There must
B be due consideration of the objections and suggestions
received in the light of the Master Plan of Indore. Indeed,
the public must also have an opportunity to examine the
scheme and file objections in the light of the Master Plan
ifthe Development Authority wants to adopt the scheme.
c Since the scheme in question was not an approved
scheme under the Trust Act, the Development Authority
could not have dispensed with the procedure prescribed
under Section 50 of the Adhiniyam."
D Therefore, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the
case and the legal principles laid down by this Court, we are
of the opinion that reconstitution of plot for the purpose of town
development scheme is permissible for public purpose only
and that too by following the legal procedure of publication by
E the authority in gazette about its intent to acquire land. In the
absence of the same, and also when .the purpose for
reconstitution of land is not for public purpose, such
reconstitution of land is impermissible under the Act. Therefore,
we answer this point in favour of the appellants that the
F respondent No.2-RDA could not have reconstituted plot for any
other purpose other than public purpose.

Answer to Point No. 5

G 68. It has been argued by the learned senior counse:I on
behalf of the appellants that taking away land located in prime
·location and giving away land anywhere as per the discretion
of Respondent No. 2- RDA, thattoo, to the extent of mere 35%
of the area, is constitutionally impermissible. Against this
H contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 815
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

·appellants, the learned senior counsel for the the Respondent A
No. 1- State Government as well as the High Court of
Chhattisgarh, relied upon the decision of this Court in the case
of State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mangaldas and Ors. 20 , to
hold that taking away land and giving back 35% developed
land in return, is in accordance with the Constitution. On this B
aspect, we are inclined to rely upon the decision of this court
in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala2'
which laid down the subsequent development on the
· jurisprudence of compensation and overruled the decision of
Shanti/al in the process. It was held in the case of C
Kesavananda Bharati v.. State of Kera/a as under:
"584. The later decisions had continued to uphold the
concept of "compensation" i.e. just equivalent of the value
of the property acquired in spite of the amendments o
made in 1955. In State ofGujaratv. Shanti/al Mangaldas
and Others the decision in Metal Corporation of India,
was overruled which itself was virtually overruled by R. C.
Cooper v. Union of India. According to the Advocate-
General of Maharashtr?, if Shanti/al Mangaldas case, E
had not been overruled by R. C. CooperlJ. Union of India,·
.there would have been no necessity of amending Article
31(2).

1744. In the Bank Nationalisation case, the majority F
decision virtually overruled .the decision in Gujarat v.
Shanti/al. The majority was of the view that even after
the Fourth Amendment 'compensation' meant "the
equivalent in terms of money of the property compulsorily
acquired" according to "relevant principles" which G
. principles must be appropriate to the determination or
compensation for the particular class of property sought
to be acquired."
20
AIR 1969 SC 634
H
" (1973) 4sec 22s
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Since compensation for acquisition of land need to be
reasonable and adequate in the interest of justice, we rely upon
the decision of Kesavananda Bharathi case (supra) to hold
that returning 35% of land in lieu of acquisition is constitutionally
impermissible. This is also because the 'development' which
B occurs due to the implementation of the Town Development
Scheme accrues the benefit to everyone. In the same way, the
appellants whose land has been acquired and proposed to
be developed, would have gained from the development, if at
all, as a member of the community gaining from the town
C development scheme and not in his individual capacity. When
the compensation for land acquisition is determined, the price
of the land on the date of the declaration of intention of
acquisition is taken into consideration and not subsequent
D development after acquisition since the development is not
connected to acquisition. In the same manner, if the land is
reconstituted in plots for distribution to the Economically
Weaker Sections of the community or other public purposes,
the same cannot be done by arbitrarily depriving the land
E owners of their Constitutional rights guaranteed under Article
300 A of the Constitution of India. They are entitled for the
compensation fFOm the State Government. The State
Government on the other hand, cannot involuntarily acquire land
and impose developmental charges in the same breath.
F
69. We come to this conclusion further on the ground that
35% figure was_ arrived at by Respondent No. 2- RDA while
allocating reconstituted land to the appellants, without any valid
form of calculation arrived at by the respondents. This action
G of the respondents is arbitrary also because the percentage
of reconstituted land to be returned to the land owners vary
from 35% to 58% for large plot holders and small plot holders.
Also, from the letter dated 20.7.2009, it is evident that
Respondent No. 2- RDA had already taken a decision that not
H more than 40% of land will be returned to the land owners.
RAJENDRA SHANKA'R SHUKLA v. STATE OF 817
CHHATTISGARH [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.)

This decision is arrived at without taking into consideration A
the value of each portion of land on the basis of their
geographical locations.

70. It is further submitted by the iearned senior counsel
on behalf of the appellants that taking land under "Development B
Contribution" to the extent of 65% is not contemplated under
Section 50(6) of the Act. Section 50(6)(vi) of the Act of 1973
reads as under:
" ...... (vi)evaluate.the increment in the value of each C
reconstituted plot and assess the development
contribution leviable on each plot holder:
Provided that the contribution shall not exceed half the
accrued increment in value."
71. Even under Section 40(3)(jj)(a) of the GujaratAct, the D
maximum permissible contribution of land by land owner cannot
exceed 50%. Therefore, in the absence of any reasonable
procedure arrived at by the Respondents, taking 65% of the
area of the plot as development contribution is wholly unfair
and arbitrary, and is also impermissible as per Section 50 E
(6}(vi) of the 1973 Act. We hold that the respondents were not
justified in returning only 35% of reconstituted plots and
retaining 65% for different purposes mentioned b.y them.

Answer to Point No. 6 F

72. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants
urged that the Respondent No. 2- RDA's application for
Environmental lmpactAssessment clearance dated 17.6.2010,
was prior to the date of approval of KVTDS by the Board of G
RDA, the same being accorded on 22.6.2010 and published
on 16. 7.2010 ..Therefore, the application of the Respondent
No.2- RDA was initially for EIA clearance for 2300 acres,
whereas the final scheme was only for 1600 acres of land. As
per the condition (v) of the General Condition of the H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Environmental Clearance (EC) dated 25.1.2011, if the RDA
has changed the scope of the i:iroject, it has to take a fresh
EC. The EC was sought for considerably more than the area
. for which the final scheme was notified i.e. 1600 acres.

B 73. As per the MoEF, EIA notification dated 14.9.2006
was issued by which Townships and Area Development
Projects are put in Category-B1. The KVTDS Scheme No.-
04 falls in this category. As per general conditions of 14.9.2006
notification, projects of "B1'' category will be considered as
C projects. of category "A" if the same falls in critically polluted
areas. Then the Central Government is the .competent authority
to grant clearance to such projects.

74. Further, MoEF, issued a circular dated 25.8.2009,
D which has noted that the Central Pollution Control Board
(CPCB) had identified critically polluted areas. The Expert
Appraisal Committee (EAC) is appraising proposal of EC to
the areas. Thereafter the concerned State Pollution Control
Board will send its representative with its comments. The
E circular pertained to the procedure of grant of EC to
development projects in Critically Polluted Areas.

75. Th·e MoEF issued O.M. dated 13.1.2010 listing out
'critically polluted' and 'severely polluted' areas. Raipur falls in
F severely polluted area (S. No. 63 with CEPl-65.45). Para 4.1.1
and 4.1.2 ofthe said O.M. puts a complete prohibition on grant
of environmental clearance to projects falling in 'critically
polluted areas' for 8 months and the said moratorium was
further extended by letter dated 31.10.2010. Para 4.2 of the
· G said O.M provides thatthe procedure for grant of environmental
clearance to development projects in 'severely polluted' areas
will be as per circular dated 25.8.2009, i.e. for critically polluted
areas. Therefore, the effect of O.M. referred to supra is that
that the EC to the said projects will have to be given by the
H Central Government.
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 819
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALAGOWDA, J.)

76. The Respondent No. 2-RDA submitted its application A
on 17 .6.201 O for EIA approval for 2300 acres of township. On
25.1.2011, EC clearance/EIA approval was granted by the
Stat~ Level Environment lmpactAssessmentAuthority (SEIAA)
to Respondent No.2-RDA which is not the authority to give
such clearance as per O.M dated 13.1.201 O since the same B ..
has to be granted by the MoEF

77. The MoEF in its affidavit filed before the High Court
in Writ Petition (c) No.6040 of 2011, has stated that9eneral
conditions of EIA Notification dated 14.9.2006 were made C
inapplicable on the projects in item 8(b) vide MoEF O.M. dated
24.5.2011. The High Court has relied on the aforesaid affidavit
and dismissed the contention of the appellants with regard to
the EC issue, thereby it has erred in not appreciating the said ·
O.M. issued after SEIAA had given EC to KVTDS-04. As on D
25.1.2011, the general conditions of EIA notification dated
14.9.2006 were applicable to category 'B' projects and Central
Government was the competent authority to grant EC to
KVTDS-Scheme No. 04. ~
E
78. Even assuming that the EIA clearance granted by the
SEIAA to RDA is valid, the RDA has deviated mandatory
conditions as prescribed under the EC dated 25.1.2011. In
the EC certificate, there is a specific condition that 'the project
proponent shall not deviate from the ·/and use proposals in F
the scheme area as provided under the said master plan'.
On 31.1.2011, the respondent no. 1- The State Government
·issued circular with regard to change in land use from
agricultural to residential purposes. The land use in the
concerned khasras was already notified as 'residential' under.
G .
the Master Plan. The notification dated 4.3.2011 was published
in the official gazette of the State government with regard to
change of the land use of khasras from Agricultural to
Residential purposes in the villages Dunda, Devpur and H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.

A Dumartarai and also from Educational to Residential area in
village Tikrapara.

79. As per condition (ii) in the aforesaid notification, 185
hectares of land has to be maintained. The land use approved
B by the Board on 22.6.2010 only provides for 129.42 ~ectares
of land for green zone.

80. On 25.1.2011, condition (v) of the General
Conditions, stipulated that if the scope .of a project is changed,
c fresh permission should be sought from the SEIAA. Scope of
KVTDS-04 was changed as hereunder:

* On 17.6.2010, i.e. the date of application for EIA,
RDA sought clearance for 2300 acres/847.84
hectares but finally the scheme was published on
D
16.7.2010 for 1600 acres.

* 4.3.2011: change in land use notified on 31.1.201·1
published in official gazette

E * 17.8.2011: In RDA Board Meeting, layout plan was
amended in view of G.O. dated 25.2.2011.

This resulted in change in scope of the project. Thus in view of
the specific condition (ii) of the Environmental Clearance dated
F 25.1.2011, fresh EC should have been sought and obtained
by the RDA but the same has not been obtained by it.

81. Section 50(8) of the Act cannot be made
retrospectively applicable. In the absence of vesting of land
.G with the RDA, layout is not complete and no allotment can be
done. The aforesaid provision of the Act was inserted. by
Ordinance dated 16.6.2010. Therefore, the same cannot be
made applicable retrospectively to the Scheme as it was
sanctioned by the State Government on 25 .1 .2008 and
H 10.8.2009.
RAJENDRASHANKAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF 821
CHHATTISGARH [V GOPALAGOWDA, J,]

The Scheme was finalised on 26.5.2010, by which date, no A
land had been acquired by Respondent No. 2- RDA nor any
piece of land vested in it. Plots are being earmarked only on
paper and such 'on paper' allotment of plots have been done
by Respondent No. 2- RDA. Therefore, we are of the opinion
that due to the change in the scope of the project, Respondent B
No. 2- RDA was required to seek sanction for the project from
the Central Government. The same has not been done.
Therefore, the KVTDS scheme has also failed to obtain the
environmental clearance requirement which is the mandatory
requirement in law for initiating any project by the RDA. A faulty C
town development scheme prepared through incompetent
authorities with blatant violation of legal and environmental
procedure cannot be the reason for deprivation of constitutional
rights of the appellants.
D
82. Since we answered all the points framed in these
cases in favour of the appellants, we allow these appeals by.
setting aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by
the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in writ appeals and
writ petitions of the appellants and further allow the prayer of E
the appellants by quashing the acquisition of their land of the
villages which were included subsequently in the KVTDS in
their respective writ petitions. The appeals are allowed. No
costs.
F
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.