RAJENDRA YADAVversusSTATE OF M.P. & OTHERS
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 99
- Decided
- 13 February 2013
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- K S RADHAKRISHNAN
Holding
A disciplinary authority cannot impose a punishment that is disproportionate to the offence, and the dismissal of the appellant was set aside, ordering his reinstatement.
Summary
The appellant, a Head Constable, was dismissed for allegedly accepting a bribe in a police complaint, while a constable who actually demanded and received the money received a lighter penalty of reduction of increment. The Supreme Court examined whether the disciplinary authority’s punishment violated the doctrine of equality and the principle of parity among co‑delinquents. It held that the doctrine of equality applies to all persons equally placed, even if guilty, and that punishments must be proportionate to the role each played. Since the co‑delinquent’s offence was more serious yet he received a lighter sanction, the dismissal of the appellant was deemed disproportionate and unconstitutional. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal and ordered the appellant’s reinstatement with all accrued benefits. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the dismissal of the appellant constitutes a disproportionate punishment violating the doctrine of equality under Article 14.
- Whether parity in punishment must be maintained among co‑delinquents involved in the same incident.
- Whether the disciplinary authority’s order can be set aside and the appellant reinstated.
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 1029
RAJENDRA YADAV A
V.
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 1334 of 2013)
FEBRUARY 13, 2013
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN & DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
Service Law:
Disciplinary proceedings - Equality in punishment - c
Held: Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which
is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious
offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences -
Therefore, punishment of dismissal from service imposed on
appellant is set aside and it is ordered that he be reinstated 0
in service forthwith from the date on which the co-delinquent
was re-instated, and with the same consequent benefits -
Doctrine of equality.
A departmental inquiry was conducted against the
appellant, a Head Constable of Police, and two others E
namely, an ASI and another Head Constable, for
demanding and accepting illegal gratification for
registering a police complaint. The money was proved to
have been paid to the co-delinquent (a Constable) and as
far as the appellant was concerned, with regard to F
receiving money, his participation and tacit approval were
proved. The ASI was demoted for three years. The
appellant and the other Head Constable were dismissed
from service and the co-delinquent (the Constable) was
awarded the punishment of reduction of increment with G
cumulative effect for one year. The departmental appeal,
the writ petition and the writ appeal filed by the appellant
having been dismissed, he filed the appeal.
1029 H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The doctrine of equality applies to all who
are equally placed; even among persons who are found
guilty. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be
8 maintained when punishment is being imposed. The
Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which
is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious
offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences.
In the instant case, the charge levelled against the co-
C delinquent was more serious than the one against the
appellant. It was the co-delinquent who had demanded
and received the money; he was inflicted comparatively
a lighter punishment. At the same time, the appellant, who
had played a passive role, was inflicted with a more
serious punishment of dismissal from service, which
D cannot be sustained. Therefore, the punishment of
dismissal from service imposed on the appellant is set
aside and it is ordered that he be reinstated in service
forthwith from the date on which the co-delinquent was
re-instated and be given all consequent benefits as was
E given to the said co-delinquent. [para 11-12 and 14] [1034-
E-F, G-H; 1035-A-B; 1036-A-B]
Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedsgrowers' Union Ltd. V.
Shai/eshkumr Harshadbhai Shah 2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 370
F = (2006) 6 SCC 548; Director General of Police and Others
v. G. Dasayan (1998) 2 SCC 407 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 370 relied on para 9
G (1998) 2 sec 407 relied on para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1334 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 06.09.2011 of the High
H
RAJENDRA YADAV v. STATE OF M.P. 1031
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.A. No. 1135 of A
2007.
Rakesh Khanna, Udit Kumar, Bankey Bihari for the
Appellant.
Arjun Garg, Mishra Saurabh, B.S. Banthia for the B
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
c
2. Appellant, a Police Constable, while he was working in
the police station Rahatgarh, District Sagar along with AS.I.
Lakhan Tiwari and Head Constable Jagdish Prasad Tiwari
stated to have received an amount of Rs.3,000 for not
implicating certain persons involved in Crime No. 4 of 2002 D
charged under Sections 341, 294, 323, 506(B), 34 IPC. A
complaint to that effect was filed by one Kundan Rajak, a
resident of Village Sothia, PS Rahatgarh. Acting on that
complaint, the appellant was charge-sheeted, along with ·two
others, vide proceedings dated 6.5.2002 by the Superintendant E
of Police, Sagar. The following are the charges levelled against
the appellant:
(1) He demonstrated gross negligence and lack of
interest in discharge of his duty by not implicating
F
all the persons involved in the crime.
(2) He demonstrated misconduct by accepting
Rs.3,000 from the complainant Kundan Rajak for
lodging a report in the police station.
G
3. Appellant filed a detailed reply to the charge-sheet by
his letter dated NIL and denied all the allegations.
4. A detailed inquiry was conducted through the Additional
Superintendant of Police, Sagar against the appellant and other
H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 1 S.C.R.
A two persons - AS.I. Lakhan Tiwari and H.C. Jagdish Prasad
Yadav. During the course of the inquiry, the charge against
Lakhan Tiwari was found not proved, but his role was found to
be doubtful. So far as appellant Rajendra Prasad Yadav is
concerned, it was held that one of the charges could not be
B proved for want of evidence. The inquiry report dated 8.9.2004,
so far as the appellant is concerned, states as follows:
"Against the delinquent No. 2, H.C. 1104 Rajendra
Prasad, one of the charges imputed could not be proved
for want of evidence. During the course of departmental
c inquiry, the inquiry has noted that the charge No. 2 was
also not proved from the statement of prosecution witness
and documents of the prosecution but one cannot deny the
participation of the delinquent and his tacit approval."
D 5. The Superintendant of Police, Sagar, however, vide his
proceedings dated 26.3.2004, disagreed with the remarks of
the Inquiry Officer and held that the charge No. 2 as against
the appellant was found to be proved. Consequently, a
supplementary charge-sheet was also given to the appellant.
E Later, a final order was passed by the Deputy Inspector General
of Police, Sagar stating as follows:
"With respect to the delinquent HC No. 1104 Rajendra
Yadav, the Inquiry Officer has stated vide his said letter that
the delinquent HC was present in the police station during
F the report of the Crime No. 4/02. As per the evidence, the
money was demanded by Ct. Arjun Pathak. The report has
been recorded by HC 1104 Rajendra Yadav whereas
Rs.3,000/- was paid to Const. Arjun Pathak. Therefore,
with regard to receiving money, the participation of HC
G Rajendra Yadav and his tacit approval are proved with
respect to the charge No. 2. At the same time, he could
not exercise his control over his subordinate. The money
was demanded by Arjun Pathak and upon receipt of the
money by Arjun Pathak, HC 1104 Rajendra Yadav lodged
H the report. Therefore, I am in disagreement with the view
RAJENDRA YADAV v. STATE OF M.P. 1033
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
of the Inquiry Officer given in the inquiry report of the A
department inquiry that the charge is not proved against
the delinquent HC Rajendra Prasad Yadav. As per the
remark of the Inquiry Officer, the above mentioned charge
No. 2 imputed against HC No. 1104 Rajendra Prasad is
found to be proved." B
6. On the basis of the above finding, Lakhan Tiwari was
demoted for three years from the post of A.S.I. to Head
Constable. But the appellant and Jagdish Prasad Tiwari were
dismissed from service.
c
7. Aggrieved by the same, appellant preferred an appeal
before the Inspector General of Police (appellate authority), who
dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 9.12.2004.
8. Appellant then filed a Writ Petition No. 10696 of 2007 o
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench,
which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by his order
dated 3.5.2007, against which a Writ Appeal No. 11 of 2007
was also preferred, which was also dismissed by the Division
Bench vide its impugned judgment dated 6.9.2011. E
9. Mr. Rakesh Khanna, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, submitted that since both the charges levelled against
the appellant were not proved fully, the respondent Department
was not justified in dismissing him from the service, which is
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. Further, F
it was pointed out that there is nothing on the record to show
that the appellant had demanded or accepted the alleged sum
of Rs.3,000 and it was proved in the inquiry that it was
Constable Arjun Pathak who had demanded the above
mentioned amount and he was, even though, inflicted with the G
punishment of compulsory retirement was, later, reinstated by
imposing punishment of reduction of increment with cumulative
effect for one year. The inquiry has clearly established that it
was Arjun Pathak who had demand~d and accepted the illegal
gratification from the complainant, but he has been given a H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A lighter punishment while the appellant was imposed a harsher
punishment, which is clearly arbitrary and discriminatory.
Learned counsel placed considerable reliance on the judgment
of this Court in Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedsgrowers'
Union Ltd. V. Shaileshkumr Harshadbhai Shah (2006) 6 SCC
B 548 and claimed parity, if not fully exonerated.
10. Shri Arjun Garg, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent State, submitted that there is no illegality in the
views expressed by the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench calling for any interference. Further, it was pointed out
C that since the appellant, being a member of a disciplined force,
should not have involved in such an incident and his tacit
approval could not be brushed aside because it had taken place
in his presence.
D ·11. We have gone through the inquiry report placed before
us in respect of the appellant as well as Constable Arjun Pathak.
The inquiry clearly reveals the role of Arjun Pathak. It was Arjun
Pathak who had demanded and received the money, though
the tacit approval of the appellant was proved in the inquiry. The
E charge levelled against Arjun Pathak was more serious than
the one charged against the appellant. Both appellants and
other two persons as well as Arjun Pathak were involved in the
same incident. After having found that Arjun Pathak had a more
serious role and, in fact, it was he who had demanded and
F received the money, he was inflicted comparatively a lighter
punishment. At the same time, appellant who had played a
passive role was inflicted with a more serious punishment of
dismissal from service which, in our view, cannot be sustained.
12. The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally
G placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons
who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment,
if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment
when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among
co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is
H being imposed. Punishment should not .be disproportionate
RAJENDRA YADAV v. STATE OF M.P. 1035
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are A
parties to the same transaction or incident. The Disciplinary
Authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate,
i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent
punishment for lesser offences.
B
13. The principle stated above is seen applied in few
judgments of this Court. The earliest one is Director General
of Police and Others v. G. Dasayan (1998) 2 SCC 407,
wherein one Dasayan, a Police Constable, along with two other
constables and one Head Constable were charged for the same
acts of misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority exonerated two C
other constables, but imposed the punishment of dismissal
from service on Dasayan and that of compulsory retirement on
Head Constable. This Court, in order to meet the ends of
justice, substituted the order of compulsory retirement in place
of the order of dismissal from service on Dasayan, applying the D
principle of parity in punishment among co-delinquents. This
Court held that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah
case (supra), the workman was dismissed from service for
proved misconduct. However, few other workmen, against E
whom there were identical allegations, were allowed to avail
of the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme. In such
Circumstances, this Court directed that the workman also be
treated on the same footing and be given the benefit of
voluntary retirement from service from the month on which the F
others were given the benefit.
14. We are of the view the principle laid down in the above
mentioned judgments also would apply to the facts of the
present case. We have already indicated that the action of the G
Disciplinary Authority imposing a comparatively lighter
punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same
time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted
in law, since they were all involved in the same incident.
Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting
H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 1 S.C.R.
A aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the
appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith.
Appellant is, therefore, to be re-instated from the date on which
Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given all consequent
benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly.
8 However, there will be no order as to costs.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
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