Holding

The special BTC course is not a recognised qualification, the district‑wise merit list is arbitrary and unconstitutional, the 50% reservation for women is valid under Article 15(3), and the writ petitions are maintainable without estoppel.

Summary

The State of Uttar Pradesh, facing a severe shortage of primary school teachers, introduced a two‑month special Basic Teacher's Certificate (BTC) training programme for B.Ed/L.T. candidates, reserving 50% of seats for women and imposing a restriction that applications be made only for vacancies in the candidate's home district. The merit list for selection was initially to be prepared at the state level, then altered to a district‑wise basis, and later reverted, causing several applicants to be excluded. The applicants filed writ petitions challenging the arbitrariness of the district‑wise merit list, the validity of the special BTC course, and the reservation policy under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 350‑A of the Constitution. The High Court held that the special BTC course was not recognised by the National Council for Teacher Education, the district‑wise merit list was arbitrary and violative of Articles 15(1) and 16(2), while the 50% reservation for women was permissible under Article 15(3); it also dismissed estoppel arguments and found no violation of Article 350‑A. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, dismissing all appeals.

Issues considered

The special BTC training course was not recognised under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993.
Whether the 50% reservation for female candidates (and the 50% arts/science split) violates Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether preparation of the merit list at the district level, after an earlier state‑level decision, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 15(1) and 16(2).
Whether Article 350‑A is attracted in the present case.
Whether the applicants are estopped or can invoke promissory estoppel to challenge the selection process.
Whether the selection process contravenes the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 and the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 15, s. 16, s. 350-A
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993s. 16
U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972

Subjects

teacher recruitmentreservation for womenconstitutional lawArticle 14Article 15Article 16Article 350-Aspecial training courseNCTEmerit listestoppelservice rules

Judgment

---
l RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA AND ORS.
v.
A

STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

MAY 4, 2005

[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN AND B.N. SRIKRISHNA, JJ.] B

Service Law :

National Council for Teacher Education, 1993:

U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972:

- U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981-Rule 5"

Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 14, 15, 16 and 350-A:
D
Special Basic Teacher's Certificate training course-By State
Government-For Primary Schools-Training not recognized under 1993 Act-
Rules providing qualification and procedure for selection of candidates 50%
seats reserved for female candidates-Change made in preparation of merit
list from Statewise basis to Districtwise basis-Validity ofthe act ofthe State-
Held: The Special Training course was contrary to the provisions of the Basic E
Education Act, Rules and 1993 Act-Reservation for female candidates is not
arbitrary and hence not violative of Articles 14, 15 and 16--State 's act in
changing the criteria for preparation of merit list from Statewise basis to
Districtwise basis is arbitrary and violative of Article 15(1) and 16(2)-There
is no violation ofArticle 350-A as the case is not shown to be one oflinguistic F
minority.

In view of insufficient number of Teachers holding Basic Teacher's
Certificate (BTC), required for primary schools run by the Basic
Education Board, respondent-State decided to impart special training to
B.Ed./L.T. in order to employ them as Teachers in the primary schools. G
50% of the seats were reserved for female candidates. There was also a
'- restrictive condition for the candidates to make the applications only
against the vacancies available in their home district. Subsequently the
restrictive condition was modified and it was decided to prepare the merit
1171 H
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) 3 S.C.R.

A list at the State level. Thereafter again the condition was imposed and --
r'

decided to prepare the merit list at the District Level instead of State Level.
The candidates who had applied on the basis of the order providing
preparation of merit list Statewise, since were not selected, filed writ
Petition. Single Judge of High Court allowed the Petition. Division Bench
of High Court also decided in favour of the State. Hence the present
B appeals.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD ·: 1. The special BTC training course contemplated by the
State of U.P. had not been recognized by the National Council for Teacher
c Education under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993.
It was, therefore not a recognized teachers' training course. The State
government, therefore, could not have declared it or treated it as ~

equivalent qualification for the purpose of Assistant Masters or Assistant
Mistresses. In view of the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules,
D 1981, and particularly keeping in view Section 16 of 1993, which gi\•es
overriding effect to the provisions of State Act, the special BTC training
course formulated by the State government was contrary to the provisions
of the Basic Education Act, 1972 and Rules and the 1993 (Central) Act.
(1180-C, F; 1181-A)

E Union of India and Ors. v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College,
JT (2002) 8 SC 269, relied on.

2. Restriction of the selection and preparation of merit list at the
district level was arbitrary and violative of Article 15(1) and 16(2) of the
Constitution. Though at one stage the State Government had decided to
F
prepare the merit list on the State level, it was suddenly changed to the
district level and the reasons advanced for the sudden change were found
to be wholly irrelevant and unjustified. 11179-A-C; 1179-BI

3. Articles 15(3) of the Constitution enables the State Government
G to make special provision for women and children notwithstanding the
prohibition contained in Article 15(1). Particularly viewed in the
background of the fact that a large number of young girls below the age J
of 10· years were taught in the primary. school, and recognizing that it
~
would be preferable that such young girls are taught by women, the

H
reservation of 50% of the posts in ~avour of female ca.ndidates was "'
RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA v. STATE OF U.P. [B.N. SRIKRISHNA. J.] 1173

justified. The classification made was justified and cannot be styled as A
arbitrary or liable to be hit by Article 14. (1178-E-GI

4. Article 350-A was not violated as there is no material to show that
the case of any linguistic minority was involved. f1170-G-H)

5. The candidates, who had applied and were not selected could not B
be said to be estopped from challenging the process of selection. Nor could
there be any plea of promissory estoppel invoked by the writ petitioners,
as nothing was established to show that they had altered their position to
their detriment by applying pursuant to the advertisement.

6. Even though the candidates, whose names appeared in the select C
list, were not made parties to the writ petition, the writ petitions could
not be summarily dismissed on the said ground.

Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, AIR (199l) SC 1612, followed.
D
Diwakar v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh. AIR (1982) SC 1555, relied
on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3048-3064,
3065-3066, 3067-3071, 3072 and 3073 of 2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2002 of the Allahabad High
E
Court in S.A. Nos. 206, 212, 365, 381, 384, 396, 417, 420, 440, 459, 461,
465, 479, 488, 624, 626 and 628 of 2002.

Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, Raju Ramachandran, Pradeep Misra, Ms. Malika
Trivedi, Kamal Singh Pundir, Kh. Nobin Singh, Shrish Kumar Misra, Dinesh F
Kumar Garg, Hari Om Yaduvanshi, Ms. Monika Gusain with them for the
Appellants.

R.G. Padia, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Abhishek Choudhary, Arail Kr. Shanna,
Dr. Kailash Chand, Yatish Mohan, A.S. Pundir, E.C. Vidya Sagar with him
for the Respondents. G
The Judgment of the Court wa~ delivered by

B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J. Leave granted.

This group of appeals impungs the judgment of the Division Bench of H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·(2005] 3 S.C.R.

A the Allahabad High Court in a group of appeal challenging the correctness
of the decision of the learned Single Judge, who allowed a batch of writ
petitions resulting in the queshing of certain Government Orders relating to
selection for training of candidates for appointment as Assistant Teachers in
the primary schools run by the U.P. Basic Education Board (hereinafter reffered
B to as the 'Board').

The material facts relevant for disposal of this group of appeals may be
summarized thus :

For several years, the State of U.P. had experienced a severe shortage
C of teachers as a result of which it was finding it difficult to fulfill its obligations
as mandated by Article 45 of the Constitution of India to provide free and
compulsory education for all children up to the age of 14 years. The State
Government runs a training college in each district, (about 70 in number)
where the candidates are given training in the teaching and on successful
completion of the training are awarded a 'Basic. Teacher's Certificate'
D (hereinafter referred to as BTC). The State· government experienced that the
number of candidates turned out from these training institutions was
insufficient to meet the large requirement of tained teachers required to teach
in primary schools run by the Board. While the intake in the training college
was only about JOO persons in a year, resulting in the number of trained BTC
E teachers in the range of 5000 to 6000 per annum, it was found that the total
requirement of Assistant Teachers for teaching students in the primary schools
run by the Board was in the range of about 50,000. In order to meet the
shortfall, the State government decided to impart two months''special training
to candidates, who had done their B.Ed/L/T. so that they could be employed
as Assitant Teachers in the primary schools run by the Board. This decision
F was implemented by a Government Order dated 3.8.2001. Applications were
called for from B.Ed/L.T. qualified candidates for selection to undergo the
special BTC training after which suitable candidates would be selected and
appointed as Assistant Teachers. The Government Order provided the 50%
of the candidates to be selected shall be from Science stream and 50% from
the Arts stream and furthC.- 50% would be female candidates and 50% would
G be male candidates. The Government Order also states that after the special
BTC training, there would be an examination held and the selected candidates
passing the examination would be interviewed and after selection would be
recruited as Assistant Teachers in the primary schools of the districts and
regions where there was deficiency of teachers. Thete was a restrictive
H. condition in the Government Order dated 3.8.2001 that candidates were eligible
RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA v. STATE OF U.P. [B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J.) 1175

to make applications only against the vacancies available in their home district A
and that, if a candidate applied for two or more districts, such applications
were liable to be rejected. There was a detailed manner of selection for
training on the basis of quality point marks obtained in the various
examinations passed by the candidates. The Government Orde..-stated that
those candidates who successfully completed the special BTC training shall

- be treated on par with the BTC general trained candidates and become eligible
for appointment to the vacant posts of Assistant Teacher for primary schools.

The Government Order dated 3.8.2001 was subsequently modified by
B

another Government Order dated 20.8.2001 under which the candidates having
C.P.Ed., D.P.Ed. and B.P ... Ed. Training as regular students from the C
universities, colleges and training college recognised and run by the State
government, were also eligible to apply for the BTC training programme.
There was some relaxation of age given by the Order which is not material.
The last date of receipt of application was extended from 15.9.2001 to
·. 29.9.2001.
D
By another Government Order dated 14.9.2001, the State government
took a policy decision to prepare a merit list, not on the district level, but at
the State level. The Government Order dated 14.9.2001 indicates the manner
in which the State level merit list was to be compiled.

On 31. l 0.200 I, by another Government Order, the Government Order E
dated 14.9.2001 was amended and once again the merit list of all the
applications received from the candidates was directed to be prepared in
accordance with the provisions given in the Government Order at the district

- level. A corrigendum published in the newspaper dated 22.9.2001 indicated
this policy decision.

Some of the candidates had applied on the basis of the corrigendum
F

which provided for preparation of merit list State wise found themselves left
our from consideration as a result of the change· in the criteria of preparation
of merit list from State wise to district wise pursuant to the Government
Order dated 31.1.2001. When the merit list was notified their names did not G

-- find place in the merit list of their respective horn district. Being aggrieved,
they moved the High Court by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and challenged the action of the Government as arbitrary
and in contravention of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution.

H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A The broad grounds of challenge before the learned Single Judge were
as follows :

(i) the preparation of merit list district wise was arbitrary and
violative of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Constituti.on of
India;
B
(ii) it was also contrary to the provisions of U.P. Basic Education
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and U.P. Basic
Education (Teachers) Service Rule, 1981 (hereinafter referred
to as the Rules); and

c (iii) the reservation to the extent of making selection of 50% males
and 50% females against the3 prescribed number of 50%
candidates from the Science group and 50% from the Arts group
is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. '

D The learned Single Judge overruled the objection that, having taken
their chance under the rules, the candidates who had failed were not entitled
to challenge the selection process. The learned Single Judge also found that
the impugned Government Orders were contrary to the provisions of the Act
as well as the Rules. Since a categorical statement was made by the Chief
E Standing Counsel on behalf of the State government that, not a single person
has been declared selected, and that not a single person has been appointed
pursuant to the impugned process of selection and only the result has been
declared, the learned Single Judge took the view that non impleadment of the
successful candidate was not an insurmountable difficulty which could come
in the way of entertaining the writ petitions. The learned Single Judge further
F held that the reservation of 50% to Arts and 50% to Science group and 50%
for ma!es and 50% for females was not warranted .by the constitutional
provisions, being over and above the constitutional reservations in favour of
backward classes. Finally, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion
that the change made in preparation of the merit list from Statewise basis to
G districtwise basis was contrary to and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.

The State of U.P. impugned the judgement of the learned Single Judge
by its Special Appeal No. 404 of2002 before the Division Bench of the High
Court. Some of the candidates in the selection also filed Special Appeal
H before the Division Bench. The Division Bench heard all the Special Appeals
RAJ ESH KUMAR GUPTA v. ST ATE OF U.P. [B.N. SRI KRISHNA, J.] 1177

together and disposed them of by the impugned judgment which upheld the A
judgment of the learned Single Judge with a slight modification. Being
aggrieved thereby, the <ippellants are before this Court.

The Division Bench raised the following points which arose for its
determination :
B
(i) Whether in the absence of the selected candidates having been
impleaded by the writ petitioners, the writ petitions are
maintainable.

(ii) Whether the writ petitioners having applied for Special BTC
training course and having failed to get their name in the merit c
list are estopped from challenging the advertisement and selection
made pursuant thereto.

_..,.,. (iii) Whether the plea of promissory estopped is available to the writ
petitioners.
D
(iv) Wherther the reservation of 50% females and 50% males and
50% for Arts group and 50% for science group in addition to
the reservation policy of the State Government already in force
is contrary to the provisions of Articles 14, 15 and of the
Constitution of India.
E
(v) Whether the State Government can prepare merit list at the
District level instead of State level and the same is violative of
Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

(vi) Whether the provisions of Article 350-A of the Constitution of
India are attracted in the present case. F

(vii) Whether the selection of candidates for special BTC training is
contrary to the provisions of the basic Eduction Act, 1972 and
U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Services Rules, 1981.

With regard to the first point, the impugned judgment of the Division G

- Bench holds that full effect of the result would be given only after verification
of the testimonials, certificates and documents mentioned in the application
and mere publication of the selection list on 31.11.2001 did not result in
accrual of any right in favour of the candidates, whose names had found
place in the select list. Relying on the judgment of this Court in Diwakar v. H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1982) SC 1555 and Shankarsan Das
v. Union of India, AIR (1991) SC 1612, and the statement made by the Chief
Standing counsel on behalf of the State made at the Bar, the Division Bench
held that even though the candidates, whose names appeared in the select list,
were not made parties to the writ petitions, the writ petitions could not be
B summarily dismissed on the said ground. We are inclined to agree with this
finding of the Division Bench, which is supported by the authority of the
Constitution Bench in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (supra) arid several
other judgments of this Court.

The Division Bench also found that at the time of making the application
C the scheme notified by the State Government was that the preparation of the
merit list would be at the State level and not at the district level. The criterion
for merit list was subsequently challanged only on 31.10.200 l i.e. after the
applications had been made by the candidates. Consequently, no candidate
had any occasion to protest, since the criterion was abruptly changed by the
State Government. Thus, the Division Bench overruled the objection to the
D maintainability of the writ petitions by taking the view that there was no
question of estoppel and the candidates, who had applied and were not selected
could not be said to be estopped from challenging the process of selection.
Nor could there be any plea of promissory estoppel invoked by the writ
petitioners, as nothing was established to show that they had altered their
E position to their detriment by applying pursuant to the advertisement. In our
view, the finding of the Division Bench on this point is justified.

The Division Bench took the view that Articles 15(3) of the Constitution
enables the States government to make special provision for woman and
children notwithstanding the prohibition contained in Article 15( l). Particularly
F viewed in the background of the fact that a large number of young girls
below the age of I 0 years were taught in the primary school and recognizing
that it would be preferable that such young girls are taught by women, the
reservation of 50% of the posts in favour of female candidates was held to
be justified. The classification made was justified and cannot be styled as
G arbitrary or liable to be hit by Article 14~

We agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that there was no
violation of Article 14, 15 and 16 'of the Constitution.

Whether the State Government can prepare merit list at the District
level instead of State level and the same is violative of Article 15 and
H
RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA v. ST ATE OF U.P. [B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J.] 1179

16 of the Constitution of India. A
j·
The Division Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion that the
merit list could not be prepared on districtwise basis and that restricting the
selection and preparation of merit list at the district level was not justified
and amounted to discrimination. It was also found that though at one stage
the State government had decided to prepare the merit list on the State level, B
it was suddenly changed to the district level and the reasons advanced for the
sudden change were found to be wholly irrelevant and unjustified. The action
of the State government in restoring the preparation of merit list from State
level to district level was held arbitrary and violative of Articles 15( l) and
16(2) of the Constitution of India. The High Court has referred and relied on
a number of judgement of this Court which have frowned upon recruitment
c
on the basis of criteria restricted to candidates from specified local areas.
""(

Although a feeble attempt was made by the counsel on behalf of the
-.' State respondents that different districts have different dialects and therefore,
it would be necessary to restrict the selection to candidates conversant and D
fluent in tho:>e regional dialects, we are not satisfies that adequate material
was presented to the High Court on the basis of which this distinction could
have been justified. In the first place, there was no material to indicate that
dialects vary from district to district. Consequently, there was no material to
· indicate that a candidate from one district was no likely to be familiar with
the dialect of another district for which he applied for training. There was E
also no materi:-1 placed on record to indicate that training was to be in local
dialect for the local school only. Finally, if the emphasis is really on the
regional dialect, nothing prevented the State govemmer..t from making the
knowledge of a specified regional dialect as preferential criterion for
recruitment. For these reasons, we agree with the view taken by the Division F
Bench on this issue and hold that restriction of the selection and preparation
of merit list at the district level was arbitrary and violative of Article 15( I)
and 16(2) of the Constitution.

Whether the provisions of Article 350-A of the Constitution of India
are attracted in the present case. G
There was no material for the High Court to show that the case of any
'....
linguistic minority was involved, hence the High Court rightly held that
• Article 350-A was not violated .

Whether the selection of candidates for special BTC training is H
..
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A contrary to the provisions of the basic Education Act, 1972 and UP.
Basic Education (Teachers) Services Rules, 1981.

Relying on the judgment of Union of Indian Ors. v. Shah Goverdhan
L. Kabra Teachers College, JT (2002) 8 SC 269, the High Court held that the
National Council for Teacher Education constituted under Section 3 of the
B National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 is an expert body whose
·function is to maintain the standards of education in relation to teacher's
education. It was for this body to prepare norms for recognised courses for
teachers' education on different levels. The special BTC training course
contemplated by the State of U.P. had not been recognised by the National
C Council for Teacher Education under the 1993 Act. It was, therefore, not a
recognised teachers' training course. The State government therefore, could
not have declared it or treated is as equivalent qualification for the purpose
of Assistant Masters or Assistant Mistresses. Merely because the State was
under pressure and in a hurry to recruit a large number of teachers, the
requirement of educational standards of the training imparted to the teachers
D could not be compromised. Strangely, despite recognition of E.Ed/L.T. and
other courses recognised by the National Council for Teacher Education
under the 1993 Act, the State government had not bothered to declare their
equivalence for the purpose of making appointment on posts of Assistant
Masters and Assistant Mistress for the schools run by the Board. The High
E Court, therefore, pointed out that the Government Order recognizing special
BTC course as equivalent qualification was contrary to the provisions of the
UP Basic Education Act and provisions of the National Council for Teacher
Education Act, 1993, particularly so in view of Section 16 of ihe National
Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 which gives overriding effect to the
provisions of the· State Act.
F
The U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981 provides
under Section 5 for direct recruitment to the posts of Assistant Masters and
Assistant Mistresses to Junior Basic Schools. The Rules prescribe the
qualifications requisite for such posts. Academic qualification required is a
bachelor's degree from a University established by law in India or a degree
G recognised by the Government together with 'training qualification' consisting
,t
of a Basic Teacher's Hindustani Teacher's Certificate, Junior Teacher's
Certificate, Certificate of teaching or any other training course recognised by
the government as equivalent thereto. In the face of these Rules, and
particularly keeping in view the provisions of the National Council for Teacher
H Education Act, 1993, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment of
RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA v. STATE OF U.P. (B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J.] 1181

the High Court that the special BTC training course formulated by the State A
' t
government was contrary to the provisions of the impugned Act and Rules
and the 1993 Central Act.

In the result, we find that the judgment under appeal is justified and
sustainable. We see no reasons to interfere with the impugned judgment.
Hence, all the appeals are dismissed. No costs. B
K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.