RAJIV DAWARversusHIGH COURT OF DELHI
- Citation
- 2017 INSC 672
- Decided
- 26 July 2017
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- KURIAN JOSEPH
Holding
The conviction and sentence for criminal contempt are set aside due to lack of procedural fairness and the advocate's absolution by the disciplinary authority.
Summary
An accused in an NDPS case complained that his advocate had charged exorbitant fees and withdrawn from representation, seeking a refund. The Bar Council disciplinary authority examined the complaint, absolved the advocate, and ordered a partial refund of Rs.4 lakhs. The High Court, however, convicted the advocate of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, read with Sections 10 and 15, and suspended him under Article 215 of the Constitution, imposing a fine. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the contempt conviction was unsustainable because the advocate was not given a proper opportunity to be heard or to cross‑examine the complainant, violating procedural safeguards, and because the disciplinary authority had already cleared him of misconduct. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, allowing the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether a conviction for criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act is valid when the alleged contemnor is denied the opportunity to cross‑examine the complainant and to adduce evidence.
- Whether the findings of the Bar Council disciplinary authority, which absolved the advocate, preclude a subsequent contempt proceeding.
- Whether the advocate's alleged overcharging and withdrawal from a case constitute contempt of court.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 215
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 10, s. 15, s. 2(c)
Subjects
Judgment
[2017] 6 S.C.R. 411
RAJNDAWAR A
v.
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
(CriminalAppealNo. 51 of2007)
JULY 26, 2017 B
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
ss. 2(c), JO and I 5 rlw. Art. 215 of Constitution of India ~
Complaint before subordinate Court - By an accused undergoing C
trial in criminal case under NDPS Act - Against his advocate -
Alleging that the advocate had charged exorbitant fees and had
also withdrawn from the case - The complainant prayed for refund
ofpart of his fees - Reference to High Court - High Court held him
guilty of criminal contempt - On appeal held: In view of the facts D
that contemnor was completely absolved of the allegations by
disciplinary authority; that procedural safeguards were not followed;
and that the contemnor ·had complied with the direction to refund
the fee, conviction and sentence imposed on the contemnor, set aside
- Appeal allowed.
E
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 51 of 2007 ..
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2007 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Cr!. C. Ref. No. 2 of2005.
K. V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv., Ashok Mathur, Ms. Nidhi Agrawal, F
Sameer Dawar, Dhananjay Ray, Advs. for the Appellant.
C. K. Sucharita, Adv. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KURIAN, J. I. The appellant is before this Court aggrieved by G
the conviction and sentence under section 2( c) read with Section I 0 &
15 of Contempt of Courts Act and under Article 215 of the Constitution
of India. Under the Contempt of Courts Act a fine of Rs.2,000/- was
imposed and under Article 215 of the Constitution oflndia the appellant
was suspended from practice for a period of two months.
H
411
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.
A 2. The main contention of the learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant is that the whole conviction is based on the unilateral
version of the complainant before the Additional Sessions Judge, New
Delhi. Either before the Additional Sessions Judge at the time of reference
to the High Court or at the stage of the proceedings in the High Court,
the appellant was not given an opportunity to adduce evidence, or at
B
least cross examine the de facto complainant. We find that the learned
amicus before the High Court had also requested the High Court to
comply with the procedural formalities giving full opportunity to the
appellant to disabuse the allegations against him. In contempt proceedings,
the contemnor has to be given an opportunity to establish his innocence.
.c From the proceedings it is seen that the appellant was not granted such
an opportunity except the opportunity of filing an affidavit. On the facts
of this case, unless the allegations made by the de facto complainant
who was an accused in a criminal' case under the N.D.P.S. Act; had
actually been established or proved in accordance with law, there could
D not have been a conviction based solely on tlfe allegations. The situation
could have been different had at least at the time of reference by the
Additional Sessions Judge, the appellant had been given an opportunity
to participate in the enquiry and cross examine the complainant.
On facts, we do not find that any such exercise had been undertaken
even by the Additional Sessions Judge while making a reference to the
E High Court.
3. lt is a case where the de facto complainant made an allegation
that the appellant had charged exorbitant fees to the tune of Rs. 7.05
Lacs, without any active assistance to the accused and also withdrawn
from the case and, therefore, he prayed for a direction to the Additional
.F Sessions Judge for refund of at least Rs.6 Lacs. However, it was the
case of the appellant that for professional services rendered to the de
facto complainant appropriate fees had been charged and it was not as
if the amount received was for any other purpose as alleged by the
complainant.
G · 4. lt is seen that the Bar Council of Delhi ha:d also looked into this
complaint and in the order dated 30.09.2006, at paragraph 12, it has
been held as follows:-
"12. An advocate should not ordinarily withdraw from
, engagements, once accepted, without sufficient cause and unless
H reasonable and sufficient notices is given to the client. Upon his
RAJIV DAWAR v. HIGH COURT OF DELHI 413
[KURIAN JOSEPH, J.]
withdrawal from a case, he shall refund such part of the fee as A
has not been earned.
It is substantially a matter of withdrawal by Respondent from
the case and not one ofmisconduct involving any misrepresentation,
deliberate receipt of money by falsification or false assurances.
The complainant is also not seeking any disciplinary action. His B
prayer is confined to the refund ofRs.6 lacs and we feel that to
the extent ofRs.4 lacs, the prayer of the complainant is justified,
which would be covered under clause 12 of Bar Council oflndia
Rules.
The present matter according to us is, therefore, one of c
withdrawal from the case and for the deficiency of professional
services, the ends of justice would be met, it we order refund of
part of payments made to the Respondent. No prejudice will be
caused to the complainant. For the reasons stated above, issue
No. I and 2 are decided against the complainant insofar as the
misconduct is concerned. In view of the observations and findings, D
however, the refund ofRs.4.00 lakhs would be justified. There is
neither a claim for interest nor would be justified, as such no interest
will be payable."
5. The Disciplinary Authority having completely absolved the
appellant and in view of the procedural safeguards having not been E
followed in this case and also having regard to the fact that the appellant
has complied with the direction to refund the money, the conviction and
sentence imposed on the appellant is set aside.
6. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
F
7. Pending application(s), ifany, shall stand disposed of.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.
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