Holding

A court may take cognizance of an offence if a whole or part of the cause of action arises within its territorial jurisdiction; the High Court erred in quashing the complaint.

Summary

Rajiv Modi filed a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC alleging offences under Sections 406, 420 and 120‑B IPC against Sanjay Jain and others, claiming that a C&F agency agreement was concluded in Patna. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, took cognizance and issued summons. The respondents obtained a quashing order from the Patna High Court under Section 482 CrPC, contending that the magistrate lacked territorial jurisdiction because no cause of action arose in Patna. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "cause of action" and held that if even a part of the cause of action is shown to have arisen within the court's territorial limits, the magistrate may rightly take cognizance. The Court found that the appointment agreement was negotiated and the letter of appointment delivered in Patna, establishing a part of the cause of action there, and therefore the High Court erred in quashing the complaint. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the trial court was directed to proceed with the complaint.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the private complaint on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Whether a court can take cognizance of an offence when a whole or part of the cause of action arises within its territorial jurisdiction.
Interpretation of the term "cause of action" for the purpose of determining territorial jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 177, s. 190, s. 200, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 406, s. 420

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCTerritorial jurisdictionCause of actionPrivate complaintCognizanceInherent powersCriminal ProcedureMagistrate jurisdictionAppeal

Judgment

[2009] 11 S.C.R. 34

A RAJIV MODI 't-
v.
SANJAY JAIN & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1214 of 2009)
JULY 14, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND H.L. ·DATTU, JJ.]
',.c
f-
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Complaint·
uls. 200 Cr.P.C. -Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the
c offence - Petition u/s. 482 - High Court quashing the
,,'· ' complaint on the ground that no cause of action arose within
territorial jurisdiction of the. Magistrate - On appeal, held: On
facts, part of cause of action arose within territorial jurisdiction
of the Magistrate - Cognizance of offence rightly taken - High
D Court not correct in quashing the complaint by going into
merits of the case in exercise of jurisdiction u/s. 482 Cr. P. C. >-

Words and Phrases - 'Cause of action' - Meaning of.

High Court, by impugned judgment in exercise of its
E power uls. 482 Cr.P .C. had quashed the private complaint
filed uls. 200 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the Judicial
Magistrate did not have the territorial jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offence alleged uls. 406, 420 and 120-
)*·
B IPC as no cause of action arose.
F
The questions for consideration before this court
were whether High Court in exercise of jurisdiction u/s.
482 Cr.P.C. was justified in quashing the complaint; and
whether a court can take cognizance of an offence after
G examining the complaint, wherein, prima facie whole or a
part of cause of action seems to have arisen. }
,
~
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. To constitute the territorial jurisdiction, the
t-
H 34
RAJIV MODI v. SANJAY JAIN & ORS. 35

whole or a part.of 'cause of action' must have arisen within A
the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the same must
be decided on the basis of the averments made in the
complaint without embarking upon an enquiry as to the
correctness or otherwise of the said facts. [Para 22] [44-
8-C] B

State of Bombay vs. Narottandas Jethabhai 1951 SCR
51; State ofMadras v. V.P. Agencies AIR 1960 SC 1309;
Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh (1977) 1 SCC 791; State of
Rajasthan v.. Swaika Properties (1985) 3 SCC 217; ONGC v.
Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4-scc ·711; Blo9!!1_ Dekor Ltd. v. C
Subhash Himatlal Desai (1994) 6 SCC 322; Rajasthan High
Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of lndia(2001) 2 SCC 294;
Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police (2004) 8 SCC 100
and Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim (2007) 11 SCC
335, referred to. D

Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), referred to.

2. The Court on the basis of the averments made in
the complaint, if it is prima facie of the opinion that the E
whole or a part of cause of action has arisen in its
jurisdiction, it can certainly take cognizance of the
complaint. There is no need to ascertain that the
allegations made are true in fact. [Para 29] (46.,E-F]

Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. 2002 (1) SCC 567; F
SatvinderKaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (1999) 8 SCC
728; V. C. Shukla v. State through CBI 1980 Supp SCC 92;
Liverpool and London S.P.& I Assn. Ltd. v. M. V. Sea
Success I (2004) 9 SCC 512 and Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh
0
Haran Nath Singh 1962 Supp (2) SCR 675, referred to. G

3. The appointment of the appellant's company as
C&F Agent of the respondent's company was agreed
upon in Patna and the Letter of Appointment was also
delivered at the address of the in-laws house of the
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORfS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
\,~,,«;·.

lo-
A appellant in Patna and therefore, it 'can be said that part
of cause of action prima facie appears to have arisen in
Patna. Therefore, Judicial Magistrate, Patna was justified
in taking cognizance of the complaint and issuing
process to the respondents. The High Court has erred
8 by going into merits ~fJ_he case_.and deciding doubtful
.
-- -or·comp1icateclquestions of law and fact while invoking
its powers u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. This is not the fit case where
~
the High Court could have exercised its inherent powers
u/s. 482 Cr. P. C. [Paras 31 a_nd 32] [46-G-H; 47-A-B]
c
-on.
-
--
State gf tf.P. v. Pirthi·ChanCJ(i 996) 2 SCC 37, relied
-

Case Law Reference:
1951 SCR 51 Referred to. Para 12
D
AIR 1960 SC 1309 Referred to. Para 13
(1977) 1 sec 191 Referred to. Para 14
(1985) 3 sec 211 R~ferred to. Para 15
E
(1994) 4 sec 111 Referred to. Para 16
"""'""
(1994) s sec 322 Referred to. Para 17 ~

-~- (2001) 2 sec 294 Referred to. Para 18 lit·

F (2004) 8 sec 1oo Referred to. Para 19
(2001) 11 sec 335 Referred to. Para 21
(2002) 1 sec 567 Referred to. Para 24
(1999) s sec 128
0

G Referred to. Para 25
1980 Supp sec 92 Referred to. Para 26
~
(2004) 9 sec 512 Referred to. Para 27
1962 Supp (2) SCR 675 Referred to. Para 28
H
RAJIV MODI v. SANJAY JAIN & ORS. 37

(1996) 2 sec 37 Relied on. Para 33 A

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1214 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 20.11.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature at Patna, in Criminal Misc. No. 17815 of B
2002.

Vanita Bhargava and Abhijeet Swaroop (for Khaitan &
Co.) for the Appellants.
c
Sunil Kumar, Gopal Singh, Pranab Prakash and Himanshu
Shekhar for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H.L., DATTU, J. 1. This is an appeal for special leave D
arises from the judgment and order of the Patna High Court in
Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 17815 of 2002 dated
20.11.2007. We grant special leave and dispose of this appeal
as hereunder.
E
2. By the judgment and the order impugned, the High
Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure has quashed the private complaint filed
under Section 200 Cr.P.C., on the ground that the Judicial
Magistrate, Patna did not have territorial jurisdiction to take F
cognizance of the offence alleged under Sections 406, 420 and
120-B of the Indian Penal Code.

3. The admitted facts are, that, on 1.4.1999 M/s. Dhriti
Agro Farms Private Limited (DAFPL), a company owned by
the appellant, had entered into an agreement with Rajasthan G
Breweries Limited (RBL), a company owned by respondent
Nos. 1 and 2. The agreement provides for appointment of
DAFPL as their C&F Agent for the State of Rajasthan. It also
provides the payment that requires to be made by the appeUant
for supply of raw materials to the suppliers of the respondents H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A on behalf of the respondents and the respondents would supply r--
the finished goods to the appellant for sale !n Rajasthan.

4. It is the case of the appellant that he had visited his in-
laws in Patna in the month of February, 1998 and there the
respondents had met him and had projected a lucrative picture
8
of their business and assured the appellant the high returns for
his investments. The appellant had agreed to become the C&F
Agent of the respondent's company for State of Rajasthan.
Subsequently, the respondents handed over the Letter of
Appointment of the appellant at the residence of his in-laws at
c Patna. It is the case of the appellant, that, pursuant to the
agreement it has made several payments for supply of raw
materials to different suppliers of the respondent but the
respondents have not made any payment of the same till date.
It is its further grievance that appellant though had made.
D repeated requests to the respondent to return the money paid,
the respondents have not acceded to the request so ma,de.

5. In view of the inaction of the police authorities, the
appellant was constrained to file a private complaint before the
E Chief Judicial Magistrate, inte,r alia alleging commission of the
offences by the respondents under Sections 406 and 420 read
with Section 120-8 of the Indian Penal Code.

6. After recording the statements of the appellant and his ,...
witnesses and being convinced that a prima facie case has
F been made out against the respondents, for the offences, under
Sections 420, 406 and 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code, the
learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the complaint and
has issued summons to the respondents.

G 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondents had
approached the High Court by filing a petition under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C., inter alia, requesting the court to quash the
proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Patna.

8. Before the High Court, the learned Counsel for the
H
RAJIV MODI v. SANJAY JAIN & ORS. 39
[H.L. DATTU, J.]
-</ respondents had submitted that, no part of cause of aGtion A
arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna and as such the
Judicial Magistrate, Patna could not have taken cognizance and
passed the impugned order. It was further argued that the
appellant had also filed a complaint before the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Economic Wing, Crime Branch, New B
Delhi and also before the Mehrauli Police Station, New Delhi,
but when both the authorities did not respond to his complaint,
'I(
he has filed the present complaint before the Judicial
Magistrate, Patna, only to harass the respondents. It was also
submitted that the complainant/appellant himself had c
approached the respondents for execution of the agreement
and therefore, a Letter of Appointment was sent to him at his
New Delhi address and, therefore, the learned Judicial
Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance of the complaint and
ordering issue of summons to the respondents.
D
--4.
9. The High Court by the impugned order has quashed the
proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate primarily
on the ground that no cause of action arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Patna, and while
elaborating on this issue, the Court has also observed that E
although there is an allegation that the respondents had
induced the appellant to part with huge amount of money, but
no such inducement was,made at Patna or the appellant parted
" with any part of his money at Patna or the respondents were
required to account for any property at Patna or any agreement F
was executed within the jurisdiction of Patna and even if it is
accepted that the Letter of Appointment was handed over by
the respondents to the appellant at Patna, it does not constitute
any part of cause of action. Aggrieved by the said order, the
appellant is before us in this appeal. G
10. The issue before us is, whether the High Court under
-"
Section 482, Cr.P.C was justified in quashing the complaint on
the ground that no cause of action has arisen in Patna in respect
of the alleged offences under the provisions of IPC.
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A 11. The Learned Counsel for the appellant would submit,
that, the cognizance stage and the trial stage are two different
aspects of criminal jurisprudence and under the Code, there
is no territorial restriction for any Magistrate to take cognizance
of an offence although at the stage of trial, the said issue may
B become relevant in view of the provisions of Chapter XIII of the
Code. The Counsel would also assert that section 177 of the
code relating to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts do not
trammel the powers of any court to take cognizance of the,
offence and thus, would apply to section 190 and 200 as w13ll.
c It is contended that a part of cause of action did arise in Patna
as in the complaint filed by the complainant/appellant, it was
specifically asse.rted that the appointment of the appellant's
company as C&F Agent of the respondent's company was
agreed upon in Patna. It was the respondents who approached
the appellant for the said agreement on his short stay at his in-
0
laws in Patna. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in
holding that the Judicial Magistrate did not have the jurisdiction
to take cognizance in the matter as no cause of action arose
in Patna and has erred in quashing the proceedings pending,
before the Judicial Magistrate by exercising its inherent power
E under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

12. In order to appreciate the jurisdictional aspect, it would
be relevant to discuss the meaning of the expression "cause
of action". This Court has laid down that the cause of action is
F a fundamental element to confer the jurisdiction upon any Court
and which has to be proved by the plaintiff to support .his right
to a judgment of the court. It is relevant to take note of what was
stated by this court in State of Bombay v. Narottamdas
Jethabhai, 1951 SCR 51. In this case, it is observed, that, the
G jurisdiction of the courts depended in civil cases on a "cause
of action" giving rise to a civil liability, and in criminal cases on
the commission of an offence, and on the provisions made in
the two Codes of Procedure as to the venue of the trial and
other relevant matters.
H
RAJIV MODI v. SANJAY JAIN & ORS. 41
[H.L. DATI~, J.]
"". 13. In the case of State of Madras v. V.P. Agencies, AIR A
1960 SC 1309, it was stated that:

"Now the cause of action, has no relation whatever to the
defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does
it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the
B
plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint
as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media
)(
upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a
conclusion in his favour."

14. In the case of Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, (1977) c
1 SCC 791, this Court held that:

"The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been
employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or
circumstances which constitute either the infringement or D
the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more
comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the
whole bundle of material facts which a plaintiff must prove
in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts
without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit."
E
15. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties,
(1985) 3 sec 217, it was observed that:

"The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed,
it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to F
support his right to a judgment of the court."

16. In the case of ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4
SCC 711, this Court held that:

"It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" G
means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove,
" ... if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by
the Court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack
of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action into H
'
..._
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as
,...
to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other
words the question whether a High Court has territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered
on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth
B or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently,
the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on
the facts pleaded in the petition." (Para 6)

17. In the case of Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal
Desai, (1994) 6 SCC 322, it was observed that:
c
"By "cause of action" it is meant every fact, which, if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove
in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court,
(Cooke v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107). In other words, cause
D of action is a bundile of facts which it is necessary for the
J...
plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit." (Para 28)

18. In Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union
oflndia, (2001) 2 SCC 294, this Court stated that:
E "The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially-
settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action
means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right
or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider ',

sense, it means the necessary conditions 'for the -r
F maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of
the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself.
Compendiously the expression means every fact which it
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.
G Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as
distinguished from every piece of evidence which is
necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of _,._ /

action". It has to be left to be determined in each individual
case as to where the cause of action arises." (Para 17) .
H
.A
RAJIV MODI v. SANJAY JAIN & ORS. 43
[H.L. DATTU, J.]
19. In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, A
"' (2004) 8 SCC 100, this Court said that:

"The expression "cause of action" is generally understood
to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to
maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of
8
operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting;
a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a
)' remedy in court from another person. In Black's Law
Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set
of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase
comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must
c
prove in order to obtain judgment. In Words and Phrases
(4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of
action" in common legal parlance is existence of those
facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on
his behalf." (Para 17) D

. 20. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been
stated as follows:

"Cause of action has been defined as meaning simply a
E
factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person
to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.
The phrase has been held from earliest time to include
every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the
t
plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would
have a right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also been
F
taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the
defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint,
or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not
.merely the technical cause of action."
G
~ 1. This Court in the case of Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank
_;, of Si kim, (2007) 11 sec 335, it was held that:

"~rom the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the
ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is
H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.
'l

clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred ,....
A
by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a
part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such
fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the
cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small
8 fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction
of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a "part
of cause of action", nothing less than that." (Para 37)

22. It is evident from the above decisions, that, to constitute
c the territorial jurisdiction" the whole or a part of "cause of action"
must have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and
the same must be decided on the, basis of the averments made
in th~ complaint without ~mbarking upon an enquiry as to the ...
\
9Qrre'ctness or otherwise of the said facts.
D
23. The next question is, whether a court can take }~-

cognizance of the offence after examining the complaint filed
by the complainant wherein, prima facie whole or a p~rt of
cause of action seems to have arisen. I

E
24. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC
567_, this -Qourt observed:

"It is seen from the above that in o.rder to confer jurisdiction
on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil 'f

F application as in this case, the High Court must be
satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the
cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so
as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has,
at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from
G the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by
the respondents in their application does not ipso facto
lead/to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause ...
of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless
tho.se facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or
H relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts
RAJIV MODI v. SANJAY JAIN & ORS. 45
[H.L. DATTU, J.]

which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved A
in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to
confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned.' (Para
17)

25. In the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT 8
of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728, it is stated that:

"If the FIR, prima fade, discloses the commission of an
offence, the court does not normally stop .the investigation,
for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of
the police to investigate into cognizable offences. It is also c
settled by a long couq;e of decisions of this Court that for
the purpose of exercising its power ul!lder Section 482
CrPC to quash an FIR, or a complaint, the High Court would
, have; to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations
made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the D
same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the
correctness or otherwise of the allegations." (Para 4)

26. This Court in the case of V. C. Shukla v. State through
CBI, 1980 Supp SCC 92, it was observed that :
E
"it is the duty of the court to apply its judicial mind to the
materials and come to a clear conclusion that a prima facie
case has been made out on the basis of which it would
be justified in framing charges." (Para 8)
F
27. Also in the case of Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn.
Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success 1,(2004) 9 SCC 512, it was observed
that:

'.'Whether a plaint discloses a cause of actiqn· or not is
essentially a question of fact. But whether it dbes or does
G
not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the
..t
said purpose the averments made in the plaint in tneir
entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whather
if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be cotrect
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A in their entirety, a decree would be passed." (Para 139)

"In ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action,
the court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry into
doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. By the
statute the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to
B
ascertaining whether on the allegations a_ cause of action
is shown." (Para 151)

28. In Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, 1962
Supp (2) SCR 675, this Court held that:
c
"If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause
of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry
whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the
petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him. By the
D statute, the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to
,,.._
ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action
is shown: the jurisdiction does not extend to trial of issues
which must fairly be left for decision at the hearing of the
suit." (Para 9)
-
E 29. In view of the above prindples, the Court on basis. of
the averments made in the complaint, if it is prima facie of the
opinion that the whole or a part of cause of action has arisen
in its jurisdiction, it can certainly take cognizance of the
complaint. There is no need to ascertain that the allegations
F made are true in fact.

30. The only question, which remains to be considered, is,
whether the Judicial Magistrate, Patna had the jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the complaint?
G 31. It is argued that the appointment of the appellant's
company as C&F Agent of the respondent's company was _..
agreed upon in Patna and the Letter of Appointment was also
delivered at the address of the in-laws house of the appellant
in Patna and therefore, it can be said that part of cause of action
H prima facie appears to have arisen in Patna. Therefore,
'
~
RAJIV MODI v. SANJAY JAIN & ORS. 47
[H.L. DATTU, J.] ~
Judicial Magistrate, Patna was justified in taking cognizance A
of the complaint and issuing process to the respondents.

34. In view of the above, in our considered opinion, the
High Oourt has erred by going into merits of the case and
deciding doubtful or complicated questions of law and fact while
8
invokirlg its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. This is not
the fit case where the High Court could have exercised its
inhereht powers under section 482 of th,e Code.

3~. The cardinal principle's which requires to be kept in
view While invoking powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has C
been stated in the case of State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand, (1996)
2 SCC 37, where in this Court has observed that:

When the court exercises its inherent power under Section
14

48?, the prime consideration should only be whether the D
exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice
or it would be an abuse of the process of the court." (Para
13)

"It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of
the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should EF
be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise
the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the
case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in
its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter
whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be F
remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the
machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After
the investigation is conducted (sic concluded) and the
charge-sheet is laid, the prosecution produces the
statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 G
of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage
it is not the function of the court to weigh the pros and cons
of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict
compliance of the provisions which are considered
mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.

A done after the trial is concluded. The court has to prima
facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and
the statements of witnesses on the record in support
thereof whether court could take cognizance of the offence
on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it
B reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made
out, no further act could be done except to quash the
charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases, i.e., _in rarest
of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the 'Proceedings to
}.--
wreak private vengeance, the court may erllbark upon the '
c consideration thereof and exercise the power." (Para 12)

34. In view of the above discussion, we allow this appeal
and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court.
The trial court is directed to proceed with the complaint.

D 35. We make it clear that the observations made by us in
the course of our judgment is only for the purpose of disposal
of criminal appeal and the same need not be taken as any
expression on the merits of the case.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.