Holding

The appellant is guilty of offences under Sections 342 and 354 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

Summary

The appellant, Raju Pandurang Mahale, lured the prosecutrix to the house of another accused by false pretence, locked the door from outside, supplied liquor and forced her to consume it, after which she was assaulted, forcibly disrobed and raped by another accused while nude photographs were taken. The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 342 (wrongful confinement) and 354 (outraging modesty) read with Section 34 IPC, a conviction upheld by the High Court. On appeal, the appellant contended that his role did not satisfy the ingredients of the offences. The Supreme Court held that the factual matrix clearly established his participation in the confinement and the outrage of the victim's modesty, and that Section 34 properly attached joint liability. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the convictions under Sections 342/34 and 354/34 were affirmed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant's conduct amounted to wrongful confinement punishable under Section 342 IPC.
Whether the appellant's conduct constituted assault or use of criminal force to outrage a woman's modesty under Section 354 IPC.
Whether Section 34 IPC can be invoked to hold the appellant jointly liable with the other accused.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 340, s. 342, s. 354

Subjects

wrongful confinementoutraging modestySection 34 IPCjoint liabilitysexual assaultrapeIndian Penal Code

Judgment

RAJU PANDURANG MAHALE
v. A
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 11,2004

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND A,RIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]
B

Indian Penal Code, 1860:

Sections 342134 and 354134-Wrongful confinement and assault or
criminal force on -woman with intent to outrage her modesty-Prosecutrix C
taken to house of one of the accused on false pretext by appellant in the night
ofoccurrence-Appellant and another accused assaulted prosecutrix and made
her to consume liquor-Prosecutrixforcibly disrobed and thereafter raped by
one of the accused in the presence of appellant-She was able to come out of
the confinement on the next day-Held, the factual scenario clearly establishes
coi11missi0n by the appellant of the offences punishable under Sections 342 D
. and 354-Further, Section 34 has rightly been pressed into service.

Section 34-Applicability of-Discussed.

Words and phrases:
E
Woman's modesty-Meaning oj:--Explained.

On the night of occurrence.at about 9.30 pm, appellant went to house
of prosecutrix and on pretext that A-4 had gone for night duty, persisted
her to stay at A-4's house with his wife as she was alone at home.
Prosecutrix was reluctant but relented as appellant had earlier taken her F. ·
daughter and lift. her at the house of A-4. On reaching A-4's house,
prosecutrix did not find A-4's wife. Instead A'-4 was present in his house
along with his friend A-2. A-2 went outside the house and closed the door
from outside forcing prosecutrix to remain in house with A-4 and
appellant. Appellant had brought liquor which was consumed by him.and G
A-4. Thereafter, both of them assaulted prosecutrix and forced her to
consume liquor. Soon she experienced giddiness and lost her balance. She
was, thereafter, raped by A-4. When she regained consciousness, she found
A-4 was lying on her person and A-3 was in the room whom she alleged
had .taken her nude photographs. In the morning, prosecutrix was ~sked
. 287 . H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A to go home after being threatened not to disclose the i.ncident to anybody.
She went to her sister's house, narrated the incident to her and thereafter
they lodged a report with the police. Investigation was undertaken and
chargesheet filed~ Appellant along with other 3 accused was convicted for
offences punishable under Section 376 (2) (g) IPC. Additionally appellant,
B A-2 and A-4 were found guilty for offences punishable under Sections 342
read With section 34 IPC. Appellant, A-3 and A-4 were also convicted for
offences punishable under Section 354 read with Section 34 IPC. In appeal,
High Court set aside the conviction and sentences of appellant and A-3
for offences punishable under Section 376 (2) (g). However, conviction and
sentence of the appellant along with other accused for offences punishable
C under Section 342/34 and Section 354/34 were maintained. Hence, the
present appeal.

On behalf of appellant, it was contended that the role attributed to
appellant did not in any manner establish existence of ingredients
necessary to constitute offence punishable under Sections 342 and 3S4 IPC.
...
D
·Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The factual scenario clearly establishes commission by the
appellant of the offence punishable under Section 342 IPC. Section 342
provides the punishment for wrongful confinement. It is established by
E the evidence on record that the victim was taken to A-4's place by the
appellant in the night of date of occurrence and she was able to come out
of the confinement on the next day. The evidence ~n record clearly
establishes that the appellant brought the victim to the house of A-4 on
false pretext and ma.de it compulsory for her to go by earlier taking away
her daughter to the house of A-4. She was confined with A-4 and the
F appellant, when rooms was locked from outside by A-2. It was appellant
who brought the liquor which the victim was made to drink. She was
forcibly disrobed by A-4 in the presence of the appellant. Thereafter A-4
raped her and A-2 took her nude photographs while .she was being sexually
ravished by A-4. (293-C-D-E, F]
G
Shyam Lal Sharma and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
(1972) SC 886, referred to.

2.1. The provision in Section 354 makes penal the assault or use·of
criminal force to a woman to outrage her modesty. The essential
H ingredients of offence under Section 354 IPC are : a) That the assault must
RAJU PANDURANG MAHA LE 1•. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 289
be on a woman; b) That the accused must have used criminal force on A
her; c) That the criminal force must have been used on the woman
intending thereby to outrage her modesty. What constitutes an outrage
to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman's modesty
is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter.
The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always B
decisive. Modesty in the Section is an attribute associated with female
human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to
her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her.Saree, coupled with a
request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the
modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged,
is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate intention C
having such outrage alone for its object. 1293-G-H; 294-A-C)

State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR (1967) SC 63, referred to.

Rex v. James Llyod, (1876) 7 C&P 817, referred to.
D
The Shorter Oxford Dictionaty (Third Edn.); Oxford English Dictionary
(1933 Edn.); Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language, referred to.

2.2. The ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been
outraged is whether the action of the offender is such as. could be perceived E
as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. When
the above test is applied in the present case, keeping in view the total fact
situation, the inevitable conclusion is that the acts of accused appellant
and the concrete role he consistently played from the beginning proved
combination of persons and minds as well and as such amounted to
"outraging of her modesty" for it was an affront to the normal sense of F
feminine decency. (295-C-Df

R.upan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr.,
(1995( 6 sec 194, referred to.

3. Section 34 has been rightly pressed into service in the instant case .G
to· fasten guilt on the accused-appellant, for the active assistance he
rendered and the role played by him, at all "times sharing the common
intention with other accused till they completed effectively the crime of
which the others were also found guilty. Section 34 has been enacted on
the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The liability H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A. of one person for an offence committed by another in the cours~ of
criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section .34 if such
criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons
who join in committing the crime. The true concept of the Section is that
if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law
B is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. The
· Section does not say "the common intention of all" nor does it say " and
intention common fo all". Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence
of the liability i.s to be fou~d in the existence of a common intention
animating the accused lea.d.ing to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance
of such 'intention. (~95-E-G; 296-A, C-DI
·C
As/10k Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) ·sc 109 and ·ch. Pu/la
Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC 1899, referred
to.

""· CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. }

D 616 of 2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.2.2002 of the Bombay High
Court in Crl. A. No. 3 of 1998.

Ajit Kumar Pande for the. Appellant.

E .Mukesh Giri and Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT P~SAYAT, J .. Appellant calls in question legality of the
conviction recorded in terms of Sections 342 and 354 read with Section 34
F ofthe Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the IPC') by the Trial Court, and
affirmed in appeal by the impugned judgment by learned Single Judge of the
Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench. Two appeals were disposed of by
a common judgment. Criminal Appeal no. 3 of 98 was filed by the present
---
appellant along with one Pankaj, whi.le the connected Criminal Appeal no.
G. 50/98 was filed by Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar.
Four accused persons faced trial. The appellants before the High Court
wer~ present appellant Raju Pandurang Mahale (A-1), Gautarri (A-2), Pankaj
(A-3) and ~ajesh S .. Kopekar (A"4): A-I t.o A-4 were convicted for offences
punishable under Sections 376 (2) (g) !PC and each of A-1, A-3 and A-4 was
H senten~ed to suffer RI for H> years and to pay tine of Rs.500 with default
RAJU l'ANDURANG MAHALE '"STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [l'ASAYAT, J.] 29}

stipulation; but Gautam (A-2) was awarded 2 years RI. Additionally, A-1, A
A-2 and A-4 were found guilty for offences punishable under Section 342
read with Section 34 IPC. Gautam (A-2) did not prefer any appeal questioning
his conviction. A-3 alone was convicted for offence punishable under Section
292 IPC. While A-4 was convicted for offence punishable under Section
323 IPC. A-1, A-3 and A-4 were convicted for offences punishable under
Section 354 read with Section 34 IPC. For offences relatable to Section 342 B
read with Section 34 ·IPC; six months RI and for the offence punishable
under Section 354 IPC one year custodial sentence was imposed.

The High Court by the impugned judgment set aside the conviction
and sentences of A-I and A-3 for the offences· punishable under Section C
376(2)(g). So far as the appeal filed by A-4 is concerned, he was convicted
for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC, though his conviction in
terms of Section 376 (2)(g) was set aside. The conviction of A- l and A-2
and A-4 for the offences punishable under Section 342 read with Section 34
IPC, and the conviction of A- l, A-3 and AA for the offences punishable
under Section 354 read with Section 34 !PC was also maintained with the D.
sentence imposed. Conviction of A-4 in terms of Section 323 IPC was
maintained. In essence so far as thCi! appellant is concerned, his conviction ·
for the offence punishable under Stiction 342 read with Section 34 IPC and
Section 354 read with Section 34 tPC was. maintained as noted above.

Prosecution version as unfolded during t,rial is as follows: E

The alleged occurrence took place on 12th and 13th January, 1996.
Husband ofthe prosecutrix (PW-5), at the relevant time, was undergoing
imprisonment for life after his conviction in a murder case. The prosecutrix,
along with a daughter of two years age, was residing with her sister (PW-
6). Accused no.4-Raju @ Rajesh s/o Sudakar Kopekar and accused no.!-
F
Raju s/o Pandurang Mahale were friends of the husband of prosecutrix. It
was for this reason that the prosecutrix was know~ to them. Both these
accused persons were on visiting terms·with the prosecutrix and her husband
used to go to their h~use. Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (accused no. 4) was
working in Railways and was required to go out of station sometimes. The G
prosecutrix, on request, by him, used to stay with his wife during his absence
in connection with his duties.

The incident occurred during the midnight of 12. l. 1996 and 13. I. I 996.
At about 9.30 p.m. of 12.1.1996, appellant Raju Pandurang Mahale came to
the house of the.prosecutrix and told her that Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar H
r

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004j 2 S.C.R.
-#

A (accused no. 4) had gone for night duty, and that his wife was alone at home.
She was also told that wife of Raju (A-4) had called her to stay with her; The
prosecutrix was reluctant to go to the house of Raju (A-4). She, however,
relented on persistence of appellant Raju (A-1 ). She agreed to go, also for the
reason that earlier, appellant Raju had taken her daughter and she had been
left at the house of Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4) by Appellant Raju.
B
On reaching the house of Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4), the
prosecutrix found her daughter sleeping on a cot in the house. She, however,
did not find the wife of Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4) at home. On the.
contrary, Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4), who was reported to have gone
on duty, was very much present there. On questioning by prosecutrix, as to
c why she had been called by sending misleading information, Raju @ Rajesh
I

S. Kopekar (A-4) stated that he had wanted her to come to his house for
company. Gautam Suresh Shejwal (A-2), a friend of Raju@ Rajesh S. Kopekar
(A-4) was also sitting in the house. He went outside the house and clos~d the
door from outside, forcing the prosecutrix to remain in the house with Raju
D @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4) along with appellant Raju s/o Pandurang Mahale
and her two years old daughter who was sleeping on the cot. Appellant Raju
s/o Pandurang Mahale brought liquor bottle and liquor was consumed by him
and Raju@ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4). Thereafter, both these accused persons
assaulted the prosecutrix and forced her to consume liquor. Soon she
experienced giddiness and lost her balance. She was raped, thereafter, by
E Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4), when the prosecutrix regained consciousness,
she found Raju @ Rajesh S. Kopekar (A-4) was lying on her person and
Pankaj Ganpat Avhad (A-3) was in the room. She alleged that Pankaj Ganpat
Avhad had taken her nude photographs. In the morning, the prosecutrix was
threatened not to disclose the incident to anybody and was asked to go home.
F The prosecutrix went to her sister's house and narrated incident to her sister
(PW-6). Thereafter, they went to the police station and lodged the report.
Investigation was undertaken and charge shee\ filed.
--
The Trial Court and the High Court accepted the evidence of the victim
prosecutrix to be cogent and taking note of the additional factors broughit on
G record made the conviction and awarded the sentence as aforenoted.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the offences under Section 342 and Section 354 IPC were not made out.
So far as he is concerned. It was submitted that the role attributed to the
appellant does not in any manner establish existence of ingredients necessary
H to constitute offence punishable under Sections 342 and 354 IPC. He pointed
RAJU PANDURANG MAHA LE 1•. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PASAY AT, J.] 293

out that the locking of the door from outside according to prosecution was A
done by A-2 in the house of A-4. The appellant had not poured liquor to the
mouth of the prosecutrix as victim herself said that she was forcibly made to
drink liquor by A-4. The High Court proceeded on the basis, as if, the
appellant and A-4 forced her to take liquor.

ln response, learned counsel for the State submitted that evidence has B
been analysed by both the Trial Court and the High Court in great detail. The
role attributed to the appellant by the victim is very clear and in any event
Section 34 was pressed into service to show that he shared the common
intention regarding commission of the alleged offences. That being so, the
conviction and the sentence as awarded do not need any interference. C
The evidence on record clearly establishes that the appellant brought
the victim to the house of A-4 on false pretext and made it compulsory for
her to go by earlier taking away her daughter to the house of A-4. She was
confined with A-4 and the appellant, when room was locked from outside by
A-2. It was the appellant who brought the liquor which the victim was made D
to drink. She was forcibly disrobed by A-4 in the presence of the appellant.
Thereafter A-4 raped her and A-2 took her nude photographs while she was
.,being sexually ravished by A-4. Section 342 provides the punishment for
wrongful confinement. It is established by the evidence on record. that the
victim was taken to A-4's place by the appeliant in the night of date of
occurrence and she was able to come out of the confinement on the next day. E
Wrongful confinement is defined in Section 340. As observed by this Court
Shyam Lal Sharma and Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1972) SC
886. Where a person is wrongfully restrained in such a manner as to prevent
that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribed limits, he is
wrong.fully confined within the meaning· of this Section. The essential F
ingredients of the offence "wrongful confinement" are that the accused should
have wrongfully confined the complainant and such restraint was to prevent
the complainant from proceeding beyond certain circumscribed limits beyond
which he/she has a right to proceed. The factual scenario clearly establishes
commission by the appellant as well of the offence punishable under Section
~IK G
Coming. to the question as to whether Section 354 of the Act has any
application, it is to be noted that the provision makes penal the assault or use
of criminal force to a woman to outrage her modesty. The essential ingredients
of offence under Section 354 IPC are:
H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· (2004) 2 S.C.R.

A (a) That the assault must be on a woman.
(b) That the accused must have used criminal force on her.
(c) That the criminal force must have been used on the woman
intending thereby to outrage her modesty.

B What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The
essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the
accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant,
but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute
associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches
to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a women, removing her
c saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an
outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely
to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence without any deliberate
· intention having· such ourtrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the ' ,
word "modesty' is not defined in IPC. The shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third
D Edn.) defines the word· 'modesty' in relation to woman as follows:
"Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lowe; Shame-fast:
Scrupulously. chast."

Modesty is defined as the quality of being modest; and in relation to
E woman, "womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupluous chastity of thought,
s·peech and conduct." It is the reserve or. sense of sha111e proceeding from
instinctive aversion to impu.re or coarse suggestions. As observed by Justice
Patterson in Rex v. James Llyod, (1876) 7 C & P 817. In order to find the
ac.cused guilty of an ass.ault with intent to commit a rape, court must be
satisfied that the accused, when. he laid hold of the prosecutrix, not only
F desired to gratify his passions upon. her person but that he intended to do so
at all events, and notwithstanding any resistance on her part. The point of
·distinction. between an offence of attempt to commit rape and to coinrriit
indecent assault is that there should be some. action on the part of the accused
which w.~uld show that he was just going to have sexual connection with ~er.
G Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
defines modesty as "freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a
regard: for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English
Dictionary (1933 Edn.), the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as
"womanly propriety of behaviour: scnipulous chastity of thought, speech and
H conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense of shame proceeding from
RAJU PANDURANG MAHA LE ,.. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PASA y AT, J.) 295
instinctive aversion to impure or coarse sugg~stions.'"

In State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR (1967) SC 63 a question arose
whether a female child of seven and a half months could be said to . be
possessed of 'modesty' which could be outraged. In answering the above
question the majority view was that when any act done to or in the presence

-- of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of Bl
mankind that must fall within the mischief of Section 354 IPC. Needless to
say, the "common notions of mankind" referred to have to be gauged by
contemporary societal standards. It was further observed in the said case that
the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex and from her very birth she
possess the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary (
meaning of 'modesty' and the interpretation given to that word by this Court
in Major Singh 's case (supra) the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty
has been outraged is whether the action of the offender is such as could be
perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a
woman. The abov.e position was noted in Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Anr.
v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr., [1995] 6 SCC 194. When the above test L
is applied in the present case, keeping in view the total fact situation, the
inevitable conclusion is that the acts of accused appellant and the Concrete
role be consistently played from the beginning proved combination of persons
and minds as well and as such amounted to "outraging of her modesty" for
it was an affront to the normal sense of feminine de"ency. It is further to be E
noted that Section 34 has been rightly pressed into service in the case to
fasten guilt on the accused-appellant, for the active assistance he rendered
and the role played by him, at all times sharing the common intention with
A-4 and A-2 as well, till they completed effectively the crime of which the
others were also found guilty.
F
Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the
doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The liability of one person ·for an offence
cominitted by another in the course o.f criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of C
a common intention of the persons who join in committing.the crime. Direct
proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention
can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts
· of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge
of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whe.ther f.
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or· meeting of ·mind of all the
accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the
aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true concept of Section
is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in
B law is just the same as if each of them has do.ne it individually by himself. '-~
As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC 109, the
existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a ~rime is the
essential element for application of this Section. I!..j,s,.Qotnecesssary that the
acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence ·jointly
must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character,
C but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order
to attract the provision.

The Section does not say "the common intention of all", nor does it ~ay
"and intention common to all". Under the provisions of section 34 the essence
of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating
D the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance .of such
intention. As a result of the· application of principles enunciated in Section
34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in
law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the i
deceased ,in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision
E is imended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between
I
acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common
intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As
was observed in Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
(1993) SC 1899. Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused
by the particular accused himself.
....
For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on
the part of the accused.

Looked at from any angle the conclusions of the Trial Court. and the
High Court in convicting the appellant do not suffer from any infirmity to
} warrant interference in exercise of the power~ under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, 1950. The sentences imposed by no stretch 'of.
imagination can be said to be on the higher side. On the contrary, backgrounds ·
facts of the case show that lenient sentences were imposed. The appeal fails
being without merit.
-I M.P. · Appeal d.isinissed.