Holding

A landlord in Chandigarh may evict a tenant from a non‑residential building on the ground of bona‑fide personal requirement because the 1956 amendment is void and the original 1949 Act applies.

Summary

The appellant, Rakesh Vij, challenged an eviction order against his father’s tenancy in a shop‑cum‑flat in Chandigarh, arguing that the landlord could not evict a tenant from a non‑residential building under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as amended in 1974. The Court examined the effect of the 1956 Amendment, which had removed the landlord’s right to evict from non‑residential premises, but which had been struck down as violative of Article 14 in Harbilas Rai Bansal. It held that the 1956 amendment was a still‑born law and could not be read into the Act as extended to Chandigarh; therefore the original 1949 provisions, which allow eviction on bona‑fide personal use, apply. The landlord’s bona‑fide need for a larger dental clinic was upheld, and the eviction order was affirmed. The appeal was dismissed and the tenants were given six months to vacate.

Issues considered

Whether, under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as extended to Chandigarh, a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from a non‑residential building on the ground of his own use.
Whether the 1956 Amendment to the Act, which deleted the eviction right for non‑residential premises, is applicable after being declared unconstitutional.
How the Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974 should be interpreted with respect to incorporation or reference of the 1949 Act and its amendments.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 13, s. Article 14
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949s. 13, s. 2

Subjects

evictionrent controlnon‑residential buildingbona‑fide requirementstatutory interpretationArticle 14Article 13ChandigarhEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act

Judgment

RAKESHVIJ A
v.
RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI

SEPTEMBER 30, 2005

[R.C. LAHOTI, CJ., G.P. MATHUR AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.] B

Rent Control and Eviction:

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949:

Section 13-Eviction Petition-Bona tide requirement-Non-residential
c
building-Jn Union Territory Chandigarh-Landlord was co-owner of
premises described as Shop-cum-Flat-Landlord filed an eviction petition
under S. 13 of 1949 Act on the ground that the landlord ivanted to set up
a bigger dental clinic with modern gadgets for which space currently in his
o.:cupation was wholly inadequate-The 1949 Act was amended by the 1956 D
Amendment Act as a result of which the landlord could only seek eviction
of a tenant from a residential or a scheduled building, but was completely
deprived of his right to seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential
building-The 1949 Act was extended to Union Territory Chandigarh by the
1974 Extension Act-,Thereafter, the 1982 Amendment Act declared the suit E
premises i.e. the Shop-cum-Flat a non-residential building-Subsequently,
the Supreme Court struck down the 1956 Amendment Act in Harbilas' case-
The eviction petition was allowed by the Rent Control/er-High Court
dismissed the revision-Correctness of-Held: The provisions of the entire
1949 Act have been extended and made applicable to the Union Territory
of Chandigarh-Therefore, it is open to a landlord to seek eviction of a F
tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use-East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956-East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974-East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982.

The respondent was a Dental Surgeon and was the co-owner along with G
his wife of a premises described as Shop-cum-Flat located at the Union
Territory Chandigarh in which the appellant was a tenant. The respondent
filed an eviction petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 on the ground that the respondent wanted to set up a
777 H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A bigger dental clinic with modern gadgets for which the space required was
wholly inadequate in the rented premises currently in his occupation. The
1949 Act was amended by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 1956 as a result of which the landlord could only seek
eviction of a tenant from a residential ot a scheduled building or rented land,
but was completely deprived of his right to seek eviction of a tenant from a
B non-residential building even if he required it for his own use. The 1949 Act
was extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh by the East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974. By the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 the premises in
dispute became a non-residential building. The Amendment Act, 1956 was
C struck down by this Court in Harbi/as' case.

The eviction 'petition was allowed by the Rent Controller and the High
Court dismissed the revision filed by the appellant. Hence the appeal.

The following question arose before the Court:-
D
Whether a landlord in the Union Territory of Chandigarh can seek
eviction ofa tenant on the ground of his own use both from residential and
also non-residential building under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949?

E Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HEW: I. Section 3 of the EastPunjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension
to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 makes the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949, subject to the modification specified in the Schedule, applicable to the
Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect from 4.1I.I972. It is not a case
F where any specific Section or provision of the 1949 Act may have been made
applicable, but the provisions of the entire 1949 Act have been extended and
made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It is in fact a case of
extension of an Act to a territory to which it was previously not applicable.
[796-G-H; 797-A]

G 2. On the date when the eviction petition was filed or at any stage
subsequent thereto including the date when the matter was heard and is being -.'-

decided by this Court, it is not possible to read the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 in a manner in which it was amended by the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956 but has to be read as it
H originally stood which contained a provision giving right to a landlord to seek
RAKESH VIJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI 779
eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own A
use. This is so because in Harbilas' case the provisions of the Amendment
Act, 1956 were held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore,
in the Union Territory of Chandigarh it is open to a landlord to seek eviction
of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use.
[798-A, B; C; DJ B
Deep Chand v. State of V.P., AIR (1959) SC 648, Mahendra Lal Jaini v.
State of V.P., AIR (1963) SC 1019, State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR
(1992) SC 604, Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh, AIR (1954) SC 749, State
of MP. v. M V. Narasimhan, AIR (1975) SC 1835, V.P. Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad v. Jainul Islam, [1998) 2 SCC 467 and Mis. Punjab Tin Supply Co. C
v. Central Government AIR (1984) SC 87, relied on.

Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab, [1996) l SCC 1, Dr. Harkishan
Singh v. Union of India, AIR (1975) P & H (FB), Pakala Narayanaswami v.
Emperor, AIR (1939) PC 47 and Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma, AIR (1945)
PC 48, referred to. D
Maxwell: On The Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edn. 1969 p. 28,
referred to.

3. To completely deprive a landlord of his right to seek eviction of a
tenant from a non-residential building even on the ground of his own use for E
all times to come would be highly unjust and inequitable to him. [798-E)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2894 of 200 I.

From the Judgment and Order aated 20.12.2000 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in C.R. No. 5605 of 2000. F
WITH
W.P.(C). No. 234/2003, C.A. Nos. 7049/2001, 3551, 7920-7921/2002 and
S.L.P.(C) No. 20444 of2001.

Amarendra Sharan Mohan Parasaran, Additional Solicitor Generals, G
Sudhir Chandra, A.K. Chopra, Sanjay Karol, (NP), M.L. Varma, (NP), Sudhir
Chandra, Achintya Dvivedi, Manoj Swarup, Somiran Sharma, S.A. Haseeb,
S.M. Sarin, P.N. Puri, Gopi Chand, Rakesh Joshi, Rajinder Singh, Himanshu
Upadhyaya, Vikas Mahajan, Jaswant Rai Aggarwal, Bhaskar Y. Lulkami, R.K.
Talwar, Amit Talwar, Yash Pal Dhingra, Samir Ali Khan, Amit Anand Jiwary,
Navin Prakash, Gaurav Dhingra, Chiadanand D.L., Ms.Kamini Jaiswal, Ms. H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Shomila Bakshi, Ms. Inklee Barooah, Balbir Singh Gupta, Ms.S. Janani, (NP),
D.N. Goburdhan, K.L. Kohli, V.C. Mahajan, M.K. Dua, S.M. Sarin, Rajesh
Khorana, Vimal Chandra S.Dave, (NP), R.K. Kapoor, Vikash Jain, M.K. Verma
and Anis Ahmed Khan for the Appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
G.P. MATHUR, J. Civil Appeal No. 2894 of2001.

1. This appeal, by special leave, has been filed against the judgment and
order dated 20.12.2000 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
by which the revision preferred by the appellant against the order of eviction
C passed against him by the Rent Controller as affirmed by the Appellate
Authority was dismissed.

2. Before examining the legal issues raised by the learned counsel for
the parties it will be convenient to notice the facts of the case in brief. The
respondent Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi is a Dental Surgeon and he is co-
D owner along with his wife of a premises described as Shop-cum-Flat (for short
"SCF") in Sector 37-A, Chandigarh, in which father of the appellant late O.P.
Vij was a tenant. The respondent filed a petition for eviction of O.P. Vij on
the grounds, inter alia, that he was having his clinic in House No. 5, Sector
16-A, Chandigarh, but the owner of the said premises, namely, Shri Wasan
E Singh had filed an eviction petition against him on the ground that he was
a specified landlord within the meaning of Section 2(hh) of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, I 949 (for short '1949 Act') and the said petition
was pending adjudication before the Rent Controller. The respondent wanted
to set up a bigger dental clinic with modern gadgets, more number of dental
chairs, provision for x-ray examination, orthopentamorgrams and radio video
F graphs and other facilities for which the space required was wholly inadequate
in the rented premises currently in his occupation. The tenant O.P. Vij contested
the eviction petition on various grounds and the principal ground urged was
that eviction of a tenant cannot be sought on the ground of personal
requirement of the landlord under the relevant provisions of East Punjab
G Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, I974 or the amendment
made to the said Act in the year I 982. The Rent Controller, after a thorough
examination of evidence on record, allowed the eviction petition by the
judgment and order dated I 6.9.1999 and the said order was affirmed in appeal
by the Appellate Authority on I6. I 1.2000. During the pendency of the appeal
the original tenant O.P. Vij died and his legal heirs including the present
H appellant Rakesh Vij, who is his son, were substituted in his place. Rakesh
RAKESH VIJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 781
Vij then preferred a revision under Section 15(5) of the 1949 Act in the High A
Court, but the same was dismissed on 20.12.2000.

3. The principal submission made by Shri Ashwani Chopra, learned
senior counsel for the appellant, is that eviction of a tenant on the ground
of bona fide requirement of the landlord is not provided for in the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 and also after the B
amendment of the said Act in 1982 and, therefore, the eviction petition filed
by the respondent landlord wherein he had sought eviction of the appellant's
father, who was the sitting tenant, was not maintainable and the view taken
by the Rent Control Authorities and also by the High Court is erroneous in
law.
c
4. Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the respondent has,
on the other hand, submitted that on a correct interpretation of the provisions
of the enactment applicable to Chandigarh a landlord can seek eviction of a
tenant on the ground of his bona fide requirement and the contention to the
contrary raised by the learned counsel for the tenant is wholly erroneous in D
law.

5. In order to appreciate the controversy raised it is necessary to set
out the relevant provisions of the concerned enactments. The main enactment
wherein restrictions were imposed on the increase of rent of certain premises
situated within the limit of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom E
is the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which was published in
the East Punjab Gazette on 25.3.1949. Section 2 of this Act gives the definitions
and sub-sections (d), (t) and (g) thereof are being reproduced below: -

"2. Definitions - In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the
subject or context, - F
(d) "non-residential building" means a building being used solely for
the purpose of business or trade:

Provided that residence in a building only for the purpose of
guarding it shall not be deemed to convert a "non-residential building" G
< to a "residential building";

(t) "rented land" means any land let separately for the purpose of
being used principally for business or trade;

(g) "residential building" means any building which is not a non- H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A residential building."

Section 13 of this Act deals with eviction of tenants. Section 13(1) and
the relevant portion of Section 13(3)(a), which have a bearing on the
controversy in hand, are being reproduced below: -

B "13. Eviction of tenants, - (I) A tenant in possession of a building or
rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree
passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and
whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in
accordance with the provisions of this section.

c (2) ···········································
(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing
tenant to put the landlord in possession -
(i) in the case of a residential or a scheduled building if -
D (a) he requires it for his own occupation;

(b) he is not occupying another residential or a scheduled
building as the case may be in the urban area concerned;
and

E (c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause
after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area;
(ii) in the case of a non-residential building or rented land, if -
(a) he requires it for his own use;

F (b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the
purpose of his business any other such building or rented
land, as the case may be and

(c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without
sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the
G urban area concerned."

The aforesaid I949 Act was amended by the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Amendment) Act, I956 (for short "Amendment Act, I 956"), which
was published in Gazette on 24.9. I956 and the provisions thereof, which are
relevant for the decision of the present case, are being reproduced below:
H
RAKESH VIJ v. RAMINDERPAL SINGH SETHI[G.P. MATHUR, J.] 783

"2. Amendment ofsection I 3 of East Punjab Act Ill of I 949. - In clause A
(a) of sub section (3) of section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the principal Act -

(i) (a) In sub clause (i), the words "or a scheduled" shall be omitted.
(b) In sub-paragraph (b), the words "or a scheduled" and the
words "as the case may be" shall be omitted. B
(ii) (a) In sub-clause (ii) the words "a non-residential building
or" shall be omitted.

(b) In sub-paragraph (b), the words "building or" and the words
"as the case may be" shall be omitted. C
(c) In sub-paragraph (c), the words "a building or" shall be
omitted."

As a result of the amendment made by the Amendment Act, 1956 the
relevant provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 read D
as under: -

"13. Eviction of tenants - (I) A tenant in possession ofa building or
rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree
passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise a11i:!
whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in E
accordance with the provisions of this section, or in pursuance of an
order made under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949, as subsequently amended.

(2) ..........................;............... ..

(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing F
the tenant to put the landlord in possession -
(i) in the case of a residential building if ................................. :....... ..
(Omitted as not relevant)
(ii) In the case of rented land, if - G
(a) he requires it for his own use;

(b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the
purpose of his business any other such rented land, and

(c) he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
after the commencement of this Act,. in the urban area
A
concerned.
,,

It will be seen that as a result of the amendment effected by the
Amendment Act, 1956 the landlord could only seek eviction of a tenant from
B a residential or scheduled building or rented land, but was completely deprived
of his. right to seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building even
if he required it for his own use.

6. As a result of reorganization of the State of Punjab by Punjab
C Reorganization Act, 1966, Chandigarh was carved out as a Union Territory
with effect from 1.11.1966. The Central Government issued a Notification on
13.10.1972 by which East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was made
applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect from 4.11.1972.
The validity of this Notification was challenged and a Full Bench of Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Dr. Harkishan Singh v. Union of India and Ors.,
D AIR (1975) P&H 160, declared the Notification to be invalid. The result of this
decision was that East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 ceased to be
applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. Thereafter, the Parliament
enacted the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh)
Act, 1974 (for short "Chandigarh Extension Act"), which was published in
E Gazette on 20.12.1974. It is a short Act consisting of only 4 Sections and a
Schedule. Sections 1, 2 and 3 of this Act read as follows: -

"I. Short title. - This Act may be called the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974.

2. Definition. - Jn this Act "the Act" means the East Punjab Urban
F Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it is extended to, and was in force in,
certain areas in the pre-reorganization State of Punjab (being areas
which were administered by municipal committees, cantonment boards,
town committee or notified area committee or areas notified as urban
areas for the purposes of that Act) immediately before the 1st day of
G November, 1966.

3. Extension of East Punjab Act /II of 1949 to Chandigarh.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order
of any court, the Act shall, subject to the modifications specified in
the Schedule, be in force in, and be deemed to have been in force with
H
RAKE SH VJJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 785
effect from the 4th day of November, 1972 in the Union Territory of A
Chandigarh, as if the provisions of the Act as so modified had been
included in and formed part of this section and as if this section had
been in force at all material times."

Section 4 makes provisions for validation and savings of any judgment,
decree or order passed by any court under the 1949 Act and the Schedule B
makes some minor modifications whereunder it is provided that for "State
Government" occurring in the 1949 Act "Central Government" shall be
substituted and definition of "Urban Area" has been given, which means the
area comprised in the Union Territory of Chandigarh and makes further provision
empowering the Central Government to declare any area in the said territory C
having regard to the density of the population and the nature and extent of
the accommodation available to be urban for the purposes of this Act.

7. Thereafter, the Parliament enacted the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 (for short "1982 Act"), which
also consists of only 4 sections. Sections 2 and 3 of this Act are being D
reproduced below: -

"Amendment of Section 1. - In the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act III of 1949), as in force in the Union
Territory of Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act),
in section I, in sub-section(!), for the words "East Punjab", the word E
"Punjab" shall be substituted.

3. Amendment of Section 2. - In section 2 of the principal Act, for
clause (d), the following clause shall be substituted, namely: -

(d) "non-residential building" means
F
(i) a building being used solely for the purpose of business or
trade;
(ii) a building let under a single tenancy for use for the purpose
of business or trade and also for the purpose of residence.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, residence in a building G
only for the purpose of guarding it, shall not be deemed to convert
a "non-residential building" to a "residential building".

Section 4 makes provisions for pending cases, which is not relevant for
the purpose of the present case. The important amendment brought about by H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A this Act is that a "non-residential building" would also mean a building let
under a single tenancy for use for the purpose of business or trade and also
for the purpose of residence. It appears that there are many such buildings
in Chandigarh where the ground floor is used as a shop and the first floor
is used for residential purpose and they are known as Shop-cum-Flats (SCF).
The premises in dispute in the present case is a Shop-cum-Flat and, therefore,
B as a result of the aforesaid amendment brought about by the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 it became a non-
residential building.

8. To complete the chain of events it is necessary to take note of
C another development, which is of great significance. The constitutional vires
of the East funjab Urban Rent Restrictian (Amendment) Act, 1956 was
challenged and the same was held to be ultra vires and was struck down by
this Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab and Anr., (1996] I SCC
I. The judgment in this case was delivered on 5.12.1995. After a thorough
examination of the provisions of the aforesaid Act the Court recorded its
D conclusion as under in pan1graphs 13, 17 and I 8 of the reports: -

"13. The provisions of the Act, prior to the amendment, were uniformly
applicable to the residential and non-residential buildings. The
amendment, in the year I 956, created the impugned classification. The
objects and reasons of the Act indicate that it was enacted with a
E view to restrict the increase of rents and to safeguard against the
ma/a fide eviction of tenants. The Act, therefore, initially provided-
conforming to its objects and reasons-bona fide requirement of the
premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a
ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the
amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by
F
the Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the
landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory
protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the
landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life
even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use
G and occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are
suffering great hardships because of the amendment. A landlord may
genuinely like to let out a shop till the time he bona fide needs the
same. Visualise a case of a shopkeeper (owner) dying young. There
may not be a member in the family to continue the business and the
widow may not need the shop for quite some time. She may like to
H
RAKESH VIJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 787

let out the shop till the time her children grow-up and need the A
premises for their personal use. It would be wholly arbitrary-in a
situation like this-to deny her the right to evict the tenant. The
amendment has created a situation where a tenant can continue in
possession of a non-residential premises for life and even after the
tenant's death his heirs may continue the tenancy. We have no doubt
in our mind that the objects, reasons and the scheme of the Act could B
not have envisaged the type of situation created by the amendment
which is patently harsh and grossly unjust for the landlord of a non-
residential premises.

17. In Gian Devi's case [1985] 2 SCC 683 the question for consideration C
before the Constitution Bench was whether under the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, the statutory tenancy in respect of commercial
premises was heritable or not. The Bench answered the question in
the affirmative. The above quoted observations were made by the
Bench keeping in view that hardship being caused to the landlords
of commercial premises who cannot evict their tenants even on the D
ground of bona fide requirement for personal use. The observations
of the Constitution Bench that "bona fide need of the landlord will
stand very much on the same footing in regard to either class of
premises, residential or commercial'' fully support the view we have
taken that the classification created by the amendment has no
reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. E
We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the amendment, quoted in
earlier part of the judgment, are violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India and are liable to be struck-down.

18. We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High F
Court, declare the above said provisions of the amendment as
constitutionally invalid and as a consequence restore the original
provisions of the Act which were operating before coming into force
of the amendment. The net result is that a landlord - under the Act
- can seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the
ground that he requires it for his own use. The parties to bear their G
own costs."

In view of the above quoted conclusions of this Court the position of
law, which emerges, is that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant on the
ground of his own use both from residential and also non-residential building
under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 9. Now, we tum to the main controversy involved in the present case
where the landlord has sought eviction of his tenant from a Shop-cum-Flat
on the ground of his own use. As shown earlier as a result of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 a Shop-cum-Flat
let under a single tenancy would be a 'non-residential building". The question,
B which arises for consideration is, .whether in the Union Territory of Chandigarh /1
a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the
ground of his own use. Shri Ashwani Chopra, learned senior counsel for the
tenant has submitted that the Parliament enacted the Chandigarh Extension
Act, 1974 and this Act made the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. At the time when the
C Parliament enacted this Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974, which was published
in Gazette on 20.12.1974, factually the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 did not contain any provision whereunder a landlord could have sought
eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own
use on account of the amendment made to it by the Amendment Act, 1956
by which the words "a non residential building or" occurring in Section
D 13(3)(a)(ii) of the 1949 Act had been omitted. Consequently in the Union
Territory c;if Chandigarh a landlord has no right to seek eviction of a tenant.:
from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use as there exists
no provision to that effect in the law applicable thereto.

I 0. Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the landlord-
E respondent, has submitted that in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra),
this Court declared the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1956, as
constitutionally invalid being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and
consequently v~id in view of clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution.
Since the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1956 have been found to be
F void, the result, which would follow, would be as ifthe said Amendment Act,
1956, never came into existence and, therefore, by virtue of Sections 2 and
3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act what the Parliament made applicable to the
Union Territory of Chandigarh was the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949, as it existed prior to its amendment by the Amendment Act, 1956,
G which contained a provision whereunder a landlord could seek eviction of a
tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use.

11. We find sufficient force in the contention raised by the learned
counsel for the respondent-landlord. In Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra), this
Court held in very clear tenns that the classification created by the Amendment
H Act, 1956, by which the words "a non residential building or" occurring in
RAKESH VIJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 789

Section 13{3)(a)(ii) were deleted and certain other amendments had been A
made, had no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the
Act and consequently the provisions of the Amendment Act were violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution. The amendments made were thus struck
down. Clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution says that the State shall
not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part
III of the Constitution and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, B
to the extent of the contravention, be void. The real effect and import of this
constitutional prohibition contained in clause (2) of Article 13 of the
Constitution has been considered and examined in two Constitution Bench
decisions of this Court. In Deep Chand etc. v. The State of Utta1 Pradesh
and Ors., AIR {1959) SC 648, Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) held C
as under in paragraph 13 of the reports: -

"13 .............................. A Legislature, therefore, has no power to make
any law in derogation of the injunction contained in Article 13. Article
13(1) deals with laws in force in the territory of India before the
commencement of the Constitution and such laws in so far as they D
are inconsistent with the provisions of Part llI shall, to the extent of
such inconsistency, be void. The clause, therefore, recognizes the
validity of the pre-Constitution laws and only declares that the said
laws would be void thereafter to the extent of their inconsistency with
Part Ill; whereas clause (2) of that Article imposes a prohibition on E
the State making laws taking away or abridging the rights conferred
by Part llI and declares that laws made in contravention of this clause
shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. There is a clear
distinction between the two clauses. Under clause ( 1), a pre-
Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency
with the provisions of Part III; whereas, no post-Constitution law can F
be made contravening the provisions of Part lll, and therefore the law,
to that extent, though made, is a nullity from its inception. If this clear
distinction is borne in mind, much of the cloud raised is dispelled.
When clause (2) of Article 13 says in clear and unambiguous terms
that no State shall make any law which takes away or abridges the
rights conferred by Part Ill, it will not avail the State to contend either G
that the clause does not embody a curtailment of the power to legislate
or that it imposes only a check but not a prohibition. A constitutional
prohibition against a State making certain laws cannot be whittled
down by analogy or by drawing inspiration from decisions on the
provisions of other Constitutions; nor can we appreciate the argument H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A that the words "any law" in the second line of Article 13(2) posits the
survival of the law made in the teeth of such prohibition. It is said that
a law can come into existence only when it is made and therefore any
law made in contravention of that clause presupposes that the law
made is not a nullity. This argument may be subtle but is not sound.
The words "any law" in that clause can only mean an Act passed or
B made factually, notwithstanding the prohibition. The result of such
contravention is stated in that clause. A plain reading of the clause
indicates, without any reasonable doubt, that the prohibition goes to
the root of the matter and limits the State's power to make law; the
law made in spite of the prohibition is a still-born law. "
c (emphasis supplied)

The same question was considered by another Constitution Bench in
Mahendra Lal Jaini v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR (1963) SC
1019, where Wanchoo, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Court
D said as under in paragraph 22 of the Reports: -

"22 ............................... Further, Art. 13(2) provides that the law shall be
void to the extent of the contravention. Now contravention in the
context takes place only once when the law is made, for the
contravention is of the prohibition to make any Jaw which takes away
E or abridges the fundamental rights. There is no question of the
contravention of Art. 13(2) being a continuing matter. Therefore, where
there is a question of a post-Constitution law, there is a prohibition
against the State from taking away or abridging fundamental rights
and there is a further provision that if the prohibition is contravened
the law shall be void to the extent of the contravention. In view of
F this clear provision, it must be held that unlike a law covered by Art.
13(1) which was valid when made, the law made in contravention of
the prohibition contained in Art. I 3(2) is a still-born law either '
wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the contravention.
Such a law is dead from the beginning and there can be no question
G of its revival under the doctrine of eclipse ..............................."

(emphasis supplied)

These two Constitution Bench decisions clearly lay down that having
regard to the prohibition contained in clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution
H any law made in contravention of Part III of the Constitution would be a
RAKESH VIJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 791
stillborn law and such a law is dead from the very beginning. A law, which A
is stillborn and is dead right from its inception, cannot at all be taken notice
of or read for any purpose whatsoever.

12. Section 2 of the Chandigarh Extension Act defines the words "the
Act" as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it is extended
to, and was in force in certain areas in the pre-reorganization State of Punjab B
immediately before the first day of November, 1966. In view of Section 3 of
the Chandigarh Extension Act "the Act", which would mean the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as extended to and was in force will be
deemed to have been in force in the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect
from 4th day of November, 1972. The words "as it extended to and was in C
force in" are very significant. Though as a matter of fact certain amendments
had been made to East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 by the
Amendment Act, 1956, whereby Section 13(3)(a)(ii) had been amended and
the words "non-residential building" occurring therein had been deleted, but
the said amendment having been found to be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution and having been struck down cannot be taken notice of or read D
as the amendment itself was stillborn and dead from the very inception.
Therefore, what the Parliament extended and applied to the Union Territory
of Chandigarh by means of Chandigarh Extension Act was the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it existed prior to its amendment by the
Amendment Act, 1956. Something which was stillborn or dead from the very E
inception cannot be read in "the Act", as Section 3 does not say anything
except to make the 1949 Act applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh
with effect from the 4th day of November, 1972.

13. It may be noticed that the Chandigarh Extension Act simplicitor, or
if read in isolation, would carry no meaning and would be wholly ineffective. p
In order to make this Act effective and workable one has to necessarily read
"the Act'', viz., the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The important
words in Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act are "the Act shall be-in
force in and be deemed to have been in force with effect from 4th day of
November, 1972 in the Union Territory of Chandigarh" and as if this Section
.had been in force at all material times, though the Chandigarh Extension Act G
was published in the Gazette on 20.12.1974. This Section not only made the
1949 Act applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh but gave it
retrospective effect from 4th November, 1972 by virtue of the deeming prov\sion.
It is well known principle of interpretation of statute that full effect must be
given to a statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A In view of the mandate contained in clause (2) of Article 13 of the Constitution
Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act cannot be interpreted to mean that
the Parliament while. extending and applying the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 to the Union of Territory of Chandigarh also applied
those provisions which were stillborn or were dead from the very inception.
The mandate of Article 13(2) of the Constitution will equally apply to the
B Parliament when it is functioning as a Legislature for making an Act. The
Parliament cannot be deemed to have taken into consideration something
which was stillborn or dead.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant-tenant has next submitted that at
C the time when the Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974 was enacted, the judgment
in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) had not been rendered and the
Parliament had before it the text of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 as it stood after its amendment by the Amendment Act, 1956 by which
in Section l 3(3)(a)(ii) the words "non residential building or" had been deleted.
Naturally, therefore, the Parliament applied its mind to the said enactment
D (I 949 Act) which did not contain any provision regarding eviction of a tenant
from a non-residential building and extended the same to the Union Territory
of Chandigarh. Learned counsel has also submitted that in order to interpret
the provisions of the Act the Court must look to the intention of the Parliament
and having regard to the factual scenario then existing, namely, that at the
E time of passing of the Chandigarh Extension Act in the year 1974, the 1949
Act stood amended by the Amendment Act, 1956, it is not possible to hold
that the Parliament also intended to give a right to a landlord to seek eviction
of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his own use. Jn
our opinion, it is not possible to interpret Sections 2 and 3 of the Chandigarh
Extension Act in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the tenant
F as it is based upon the supposed intention of the Parliament. In Maxwell on
The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth edition - 1969) on page 28 it is said
that the primary rule is to give literal construction and if there is nothing to
modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be
construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences.
G In Chapter 2, page 28, the principle has been stated thus: -
"The rule of construction is "to intend the Legislature to have meant
what they have actually expressed". The object of all interpretation is
to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament
must be deduced from the language used," for "it is· well accepted that
the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament
H
RAKESH VIJ v. RAMINDERPAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 793

cannot make the law"." A
15. In State of Haryana and Ors v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., AIR (1992)
SC 604 in paragraph 42, this Court quoted with approval the following passage
from the judgment of Lord Atkin in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, AIR
(1939) PC 47: -
B
"When the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the duty of
Courts io busy themselves with supposed intentions ................. It,
therefore, appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or
disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests
of the prosecution or accused."
c
In Emperor v. Benoari fol Sanna and Ors., AIR (1945) PC 48, Lord
Chancellor Viscount Simon said, "Jn construing enacted words the Court is
not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or
otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used."
Therefore, any supposed intention of the Parliament cannot be taken into
consideration for interpretation of the Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974. D
16. Learned counsel for the appellant has laid emphasis on the Statement
of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, 1956, which says that the
provisions whereunder tenants of commercial premises can be evicted on the
ground of personal requirements of the landlord entail a great hardship on E
such tenants and the provision allowing eviction on the ground of personal
use has been misused by certain landlords and, therefore, it was considered
necessary that the tenants of non-residential property in Punjab should be
placed at par with tenants of such property in Delhi and other urban areas
covered by the Delhi-Ajmer Act. It has thus been submitted that the Parliament
while enacting the Chandigarh Extension Act, 1974 must have had this object F
in mind when it extended the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect from 4.11.1972. In our opinion
it will not be proper to interpret the provisions of Chandigarh Extension Act
by taking into consideration the Objects and Reasons of another Act and the
supposed intention or notions of the law makers. It will be apt to quote here G
what S.R. Das, J. (as His Lordship then was) said while speaking for a
Constitution Bench in Rananjaya Singh v. Bay·nath Singh and Ors., AIR
(1954) SC 749: -

"The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and
the supposed spirit can oertainly not be given effect to in opposition H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the rules made
thereunder. If all that can be said of these statutory provisions is that
construed according to the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning
of their language they work injustice by placing the poorer candidates
at a disadvantage the appeal must be to Parliament and not to this
Court."
B
This being the position of law, it will not be proper to take into
consideration the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act,
I956 for interpreting the provisions of Chandigarh Extension Act.

17. Learned counsel for the appellant has lastly submitted that the
C provisions of the 1949 Act have been incorporated into the Chandigarh
Extension Act and, therefore, the provisions of the said Act, as they textually
stood on 20.12.1974, became part and parcel of the later Act (Chandigarh
Extension Act) and consequently the amendment made to the said Act by the
Amendment Act, 1956 have to be taken into consideration and cannot be
D ignored while examining the applicability of 1949 Act to the Union Territory
of Chandigarh. The submission is that it is a case of incorporation, which
means that if a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the
clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that is to write those Sections into
the new Act as if they had been actually written in it with pen and ink or
printed in it. The result thereof is to constitute the latter Act along with the
E incorporated provisions of the earlier Act, an independent legislation, which
is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act.

18. Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the respondent-
landlord has, however, submitted that the principle embodied in legislation by
F incorporation or legislation by reference can have no application here as the
said principle has relevance only in the case of amendment or repeal of an
Act. According to the learned counsel as the effect of an amendment or repeal
of the Act does not arise for consideration here, it will not be proper to apply
the principle governing the cases of legislation by incorporation for the
purpose of finding out the real import of Chandigarh Extension Act.
G •
19. Adopting or applying an earlier or existing Act by competent
Legislature to a later Act is an accepted device of Legislation. If the adopting
Act refers to certain provisions of an earlier existing Act, it is known as
legislation by reference. Whereas if the provisions of another Act are bodily
lifted and incorporated in the Act, then it is known as legislation by
H
RAKESH VJJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 795
incorporation. The determination whether a legislation was by way of A
incorporation or reference . is more a matter of construction by the courts
keeping in view the language employed by the Act, the purpose of referring
or incorporating provisions of an existing Act and the effect of it on the day-
to-day working. Reason for it is the courts' prime duty to assume that any
law made by the Legislature is enacted to serve public purpose.
B
20. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan, AIR (1975) SC
1835, after review of several earlier decisions, the following principle was
enunciated: -

"Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act
then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent C
part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal
or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not
apply in the following cases :

(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental
to each other; D
(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia;
(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into
the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly
unworkable and ineffectual; and E
(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by
necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the
subsequent Act."

21. The same question was examined in considerable detail in U.P. Avas
Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam and Anr., [1998] 2 SCC 467, where a F
three Judge Bench of this Court considered the effect of Section 55 and
Schedule ofU.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, which makes a
reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and has laid down
'that any land or interest therein required by the Parishad for any of the
purposes of the Adhiniyam may be acquired under the provisions of Land G
Acquisition Act, which for this purpose has to be subject to the modifications
specified in the Schedule of the Adhiniyam. This Court, after referring to large
number of earlier decisions, laid down the following principle in paragraph 17
of the report : -

"17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to the earlier H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation
applicable to matters covered by the later legislation. Such a legislation
may either be (i) a referential legislation which merely contains a
reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or
(ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the
earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the
B later legislation by reference. If it is a referential legislation the
provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made in the
subsequent legislation would be applicable as it stands on the date
of application of such earlier legislation to matters referred to in the
subsequent legislation. In other words, any amendment made in the
c earlier legislation after the date of enactment of the subsequent
legislation would also be applicable. But if it is a legislation by
incorporation the rule of construction is that repeal of the earlier
statute which is incorporated does not affect operation of the
subsequent statute in which it has been incorporated. So also any
amendment in the statue which has been so incorporated that is made
D after the date of incorporation of such statute does not affect the
subsequent statute in which it is incorporated and the provisions of
the statue which have been incorporated would remain the same as
they were at the time of incorporation and the subsequent amendments
are not to be read in the subsequent legislation. In the words of Lord
E Esh er, M.R., the legal effect of such incorporation by reference "is to
write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually
written in it with the pen or printed in it, and, the moment you have
those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the
former Act at all." [See: Wood's Estate, Re, (1886) 31 Ch D 607 at p.
615]. As to whether a particular legislation falls in the category of
F referential legislation or legislation by incorporation depends upon
the language used in the statute in which reference is made to the
earlier legislation and other relevant circumstances."

In our opinion, the principle of law underlying legislation by
incorporation or legislation by reference has not much relevance in the present
G case. We do not have to examine the effect of any amendment or repeal of
any enactment. Section 3 of the Chandigarh Extension Act makes the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, subject to the modification specified
in the Schedule, applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect
form 4.11.1972. It is not a case where any specific section or provision of the
H 1949 Act may have been made applicable, but the provisions of the entire
RAKESH VJJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 797
1949 Act have been extended and made applicable to the Union Territory of A
Chandigarh. It is in fact a case of extension of an Act to a territory to which
it was previously not applicable.

22. This very question, namely, whether the 1949 Act was incorporated
in the Chandigarh Extension Act came up for consideration before this Court
in Mis. Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh v. Central Government and Ors B
AIR (1984) SC 87, and Venkataramiah, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as
under: -

"8. The Extension Act merely brought into force with effect from
November 4, 1972, the Act which was an Act in force in the former
State of Punjab with the modifications set out in its Schedule in the c
Union Territory of Chandigarh and validated all actions taken,
notifications issued and orders made or purported to have been taken,
issued or made under the Act. Having done that it withdrew from the
scene. Thereafter the Act as modified by the Extension Act alone has
to be looked into to consider its effect on the Union Territory of D
Chandigarh. As observed by this Court in Rajputana Mining Agencies
Ltd. v. Union of India, [1961] I SCR 453 at p. 457 "there is neither
precedent nor warrant for the assumption that when one Act applies
another Act to some territory, the latter Act must be taken to be
incorporated in the former Act. It may be otherwise, if there were
words to show that the earlier Act is to be deemed to be re-enacted E
by the new Act". The Act in the instant case was only extended but
not re-enacted. We should, therefore, proceed on the assumption that
the Act itself with the amendments was in force with effect from
November 4, 1972 in the Union Territory of Chandigarh."

(In this judgment East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 has F
been referred to as "the Act" and East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 has been referred to as the
"Extension Act" see paras 1 and 3.)

It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellant that the 1949 Act was incorporated in the Chandigarh G
Extension Act.

23. The ultimate question is what is "the Act". For ascertaining the
meaning of the words "the Act" we have to refer back to Section 2, viz., the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and the provisions of this 1949 H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Act have to be seen and examined as they stood on the date when the
eviction petition was filed or till the continuance of the litigation culminating
in the final judgment. On the date when the eviction petition was filed or at
any stage subsequent thereto including the date when the matter was heard
and is being decided by this Court, it is not possible to read the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in a manner in which it was amended by the
B Amendment Act, 1956 but has to be read as it originally stood which contained
a provision giving right to a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant from a non
residential building on the ground of his own use. This is so because in
Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1956 were
held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and were struck down.
C Therefore, read in any manner the inevitable consequence is that the words
"the Act" occurring in Section 2 of the Chandigarh Extension Act has to be
read as the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as it stood before
the Amendment Act, 1956. The result that follows is that in the Union
Territory of Chandigarh it is open to a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant
from a non residential building on the ground of his own use.
D
24. Apart from what has been said above, the Act has to be interpreted
in a just and equitable manner. To completely deprive a landlord of his right
to seek eviction of a tenant from a non residential building even on the
ground of his own use for all times to come would be highly unjust and
E inequit~ble to him.

25. In the present case the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority
have recorded concurrent finding of fact that the respondent landlord bona
fide needs the premises in question for his own use and this finding has been
affirmed in revision by the High Court. In this view of the matter we do not
F find any illegality in the impugned orders. The appeal is accordingly dismissed
with costs. The appellant-tenant is granted six months time to vacate the
premises subject to his filing the usual undertaking within one month.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of 2003

Raminder Pal Singh Sethi .... Petitioner
G
v.

Union of India and Anr. .... Respondents

In this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution following
H prayers have been made: -
RAKESH VJJ v. RAMINDER PAL SINGH SETHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 799

"(i) Issue a writ of certiorari striking down the provisions of Section A
13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Extension
to Chandigarh) Act, 1974 on the ground of the same being ultra
vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and

(ii) declare that under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949 as extended to Chandigarh vide East Punjab Urban Rent B
Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974, ejectment of
tenant on bona fide ground can be made both in case of residential
building as well as non-residential building;

(iii) pass such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper."
c
In Civil Appeal No. 2894 of 2001, we have held that under East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as extended to Chandigarh by East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974, a landlord can
seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his
own use. In this view of the matter, we do not consider it necessary to D
adjudicate the pleas raised in the writ petition as substantive relief has already
been granted to the writ petitioner. The writ petition and the I.As. moved
therein are disposed of.

Civil Appeal Nos. 704912001, 355112002, 7920-792112002 and Special
Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2044412001 E
In all these matters the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority
have recorded concurrent finding of fact that the landlord bona fide requires
the premises for his own use and this finding has been affirmed in revision
by the High Court. For the reasons given in Civil Appeal No. 2894 of2001,
there is no merit in the civil appeals and the special leave petition, which are F
hereby dismissed with costs. The tenants are given six months time to vacate
the premises subject to their filing usual undertaking within one month.
v.s.s. Appeals and SLP dismissed.
Writ Petition disposed of.